

SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events This Quarter	87
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan	92
DOD Reports Steps To Improve Contract Management	92
ANSF Strength	93
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Assessments	99
Afghan Local Police	100
Afghan National Army	101
Afghan National Police	107
ANSF Medical/Health Care	110
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	111
Counternarcotics	112

SECURITY

As of June 30, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$61.8 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$57.3 billion) were channeled through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$57.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$50.0 billion had been obligated and \$48.2 billion disbursed as of June 30, 2014.¹⁰²

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges of transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Key issues and events this quarter include President Obama's announcement of a troop-withdrawal schedule, the release of the Department of Defense's (DOD) overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2015, continuing U.S. concerns over the lack of a signed U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), and the transition of convoy and facility security responsibilities from the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to the ANP. In addition, the United Nations (UN) reported an increase in violence in Afghanistan.

President Obama Announces Troop-Withdrawal Schedule

The United States will keep troops in Afghanistan after 2014 if the Afghan government signs a BSA shielding them from prosecution under the Afghan legal system. Both candidates for president in the Afghan run-off election have said they would sign the agreement. On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced the number of U.S. forces that would remain in Afghanistan under a BSA.

The United States has been steadily reducing its troop strength from a peak of 100,000 in 2011. President Obama announced that from the current strength of 32,800, the U.S. force will be reduced to approximately 9,800 by the beginning of 2015. That number will decline by half during 2015; remaining U.S. forces will be consolidated at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul. By the end of 2016, the force will be reduced to a normal embassy presence with a security-assistance component.¹⁰³

President Obama said post-2014 U.S. objectives are to disrupt threats posed by al-Qaeda, support Afghan security forces, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed. He also announced two other missions after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations. The president cautioned that Afghanistan will not be a perfect place nor is it America's responsibility to make it one.¹⁰⁴

President Karzai released a statement the following day welcoming President Obama's decision. However, members of the National Assembly and civil society expressed concern about the readiness of Afghan security forces and the withdrawal's impact on the broader international commitment to Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵

ANSF Secures Runoff Election

The ANSF succeeded in securing the runoff presidential election held on June 14, 2014, despite threats of violence.¹⁰⁶ ISAF reported the ANSF conducted non-stop security operations following the initial elections, leading all aspects of security, and securing approximately 6,200 polling centers across the country. General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commended the professionalism and commitment of the ANSF, "Once again, the Afghan security forces have provided the Afghan people with the opportunity to vote."

ANSF performance was consistent with a DOD assessment that the ANSF emerged from the 2013 fighting season as a competent and confident force, capable of providing security for Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷ During his nomination hearing, General John F. Campbell testified that "the ANSF have proven their combat capability through success in two fighting seasons, two national elections, and multiple high profile events."¹⁰⁸

FY 2015 ASFF Budget Request Increases Funding for ANSF Sustainment

This quarter, DOD released its FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request for the ASFF. The \$4.11 billion request is \$3.62 billion less than the FY 2014 request and \$617 million less than the final amount appropriated for FY 2014.¹⁰⁹ During FY 2015, Coalition advisors will focus on capability gaps and on improving systems for logistics, medical care, and countering improvised explosive devices.¹¹⁰ Over 84% of the request is for ANSF sustainment costs, such as salaries, fuel, and maintenance—more than

two and a half times the amount appropriated for this purpose in FY 2014. Although no FY 2014 funding was appropriated for ANP infrastructure, \$15 million was requested in the FY 2015 budget, \$10.2 million of which is for fire department facilities.¹¹¹ The amounts requested for other funding categories were far less than the FY 2014 appropriations, as shown in Table 3.6.

TABLE 3.6

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND			
	FY 2014 ASFF Current Distribution	FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request	Change
MOD/ANA			
Sustainment	\$890,078,000	\$2,514,660,000	182.5%
Infrastructure	278,650,000	20,000,000	-92.8%
Equipment and Transportation	1,688,382,000	21,442,000	-98.7%
Training and Operations	628,550,000	359,645,000	-42.8%
MOI/ANP			
Sustainment	\$605,020,000	\$953,189,000	57.5%
Infrastructure	10,000,000	15,155,000	51.6%
Equipment and Transportation	167,896,000	18,657,000	-88.9%
Training and Operations	441,419,000	174,732,000	-60.4%
Related Activities			
Sustainment	\$14,225,000	\$29,603,000	108.1%
Infrastructure	0	0	NA
Equipment and Transportation	0	0	NA
Training and Operations	2,500,000	2,250,000	-10.0%
Total	\$4,726,720,000	\$4,109,333,000	-13.1%

Notes: MOD = Ministry of Defense; MOI = Ministry of Interior.

Sources: DOD, "Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)," 6/2014; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/17/2014.

The FY 2015 OCO request for ANA equipment funding is to purchase light air-support and training aircraft, as well as maintenance, test, and ground-support equipment for the Afghan Air Force. The additional request for ANA infrastructure is to fund major projects that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has deemed necessary to meet its requirements. The majority of the ANP equipment and transportation request is to cover transportation costs of previously procured equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and radios. (\$18.2 million).¹¹²

Bilateral Security Agreement Remains Unsigned

The negotiated BSA between the United States and Afghanistan to define the legal status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 remains unsigned. The final status of the BSA will have a profound impact on the U.S.

military footprint in Afghanistan after 2014, the willingness of the United States and the international community to continue to finance reconstruction programs, and on Afghanistan's ability to maintain progress in the security, governance, and economic sectors. The U.S. and Afghan governments agreed on a draft text of the BSA and a *Loya Jirga* (tribal assembly) approved the document in November 2013.¹¹³ President Hamid Karzai refused to sign it. However, both candidates in Afghanistan's runoff presidential election have said they will sign the BSA if elected.¹¹⁴ NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned that failure to sign the BSA by the end of September would cause serious problems for the Western allies and put future security arrangements in jeopardy.¹¹⁵

Transition of Afghan Public Protection Force Responsibilities Leaves Project Security Uncertain

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), was established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services in Afghanistan following President Karzai's 2010 decree prohibiting operation of private security companies.¹¹⁶ However, on February 17, 2014, the Council of Ministers (COM), acting on President Karzai's orders, directed the APPF to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP.¹¹⁷ The United States has provided more than \$51 million to support the APPF, which provided security for many U.S.-funded programs and projects.¹¹⁸

In response to a SIGAR request for information about why the APPF was dissolved, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) explained that the Minister of Interior on June 10, 2014, told ISAF that the APPF "worked," but President Karzai "was not happy with its existence." It was not clear why President Karzai was dissatisfied with a program he created. According to NTM-A, four committees were tasked to develop a plan for transitioning APPF operations into the ANP. Although the committees reportedly completed their work, the Minister of Interior, under considerable pressure from President Karzai, was dissatisfied with the progress of the transition, and ordered the APPF's convoy security operations to transfer to the ANP on May 22, 2014.¹¹⁹

NTM-A said that qualified APPF personnel could join the ANP. However, due to the ANP's age policy, guards over age 35 would lose their jobs. Those choosing to transfer to the ANP would be sent to the ANP training academy and would sign a three-year contract. NTM-A noted that all security operations would continue under the control of the MOI's Deputy Minister for Security and the ANP.¹²⁰

The transition of convoy-security responsibilities from the APPF to the ANP is already creating some legal hurdles for the United States. The United States contributes to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which covers ANP salaries and expenses. Because

the APPF was a state-owned enterprise not funded by LOTFA, the United States paid for its services on a contract basis. However, with the ANP assuming convoy-security responsibilities from the APPF, CSTC-A believes the United States can no longer legally pay for those services because it would, in effect, be paying double. Accordingly, on May 23, 2014, USFOR-A stopped paying the security fees for APPF services. Unfortunately, provincial police chiefs, who would assume convoy-security duties within their jurisdiction, have indicated they do not have the personnel, fuel, and vehicles necessary to cover this new requirement. NTM-A stated that “discussions indicate MOI is working to establish a process closely resembling APPF in order to mitigate concerns.”¹²¹ This again raises the question of why the APPF is being dissolved.

Static security—guarding fixed facilities—has also been affected by the transition. As of June 30, 2014, the APPF provided security for five ISAF forward operating bases (FOBs); another 22 FOBs were secured by private security companies. NTM-A said salary payments to FOB guards have now been interrupted by the MOI’s “directed blockage of funds” to pay them.¹²² However, NTM-A noted that the MOI’s current plan for transitioning static-security responsibilities could also create the same legal hurdles for the United States as with convoys.¹²³ USAID and its implementing partners rely on APPF to provide site security for nearly \$2 billion in development-assistance projects. Their implementing partners currently have 26 contracts with the APPF state-owned enterprise valued at over \$13 million. CSTC-A reported that without security, USAID cannot continue some of its projects. CSTC-A also reported the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act prohibits USAID funds from being used to fund the services of police or soldiers. In order to comply with U.S. law, USAID needs written confirmation from the MOI that services will continue to be provided by security guards, as had been the case with the APPF state-owned enterprise. According to NTM-A, ISAF, USAID, and others are assessing the viability and feasibility of MOI proposed solutions.¹²⁴

According to NTM-A, the most recent tally showed that the APPF comprised 19,912 personnel, including approximately 3,800 convoy-security guards. However, this does not take into account the recent transitions. NTM-A reported that “verifying exact numbers is not possible at this time.”¹²⁵ It is unclear what the APPF or its successor organization will look like.

According to NTM-A, the MOI has admitted to making mistakes and is “working to find a way to effectively transition security services without impacting security services.”¹²⁶ A senior MOI official said they should have developed, reviewed, approved, and implemented a plan. Instead, they were told to make a change, which they did, without a clear plan in place. NTM-A noted that, “In addition to affecting ISAF interests, USAID, U.S. Embassy, and other elements within the International Community are impacted with respect to projects within their interests.”¹²⁷

APPF transition to the ANP leads to legal issues as U.S. development funding cannot be used for police services.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014.

In the first half of 2014, UNAMA observed a direct correlation between closures [of ISAF bases] and a rise in civilian casualties in some areas.

— UN Secretary-General

Source: UNAMA, *Afghanistan Midyear Report 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 7/2014, p. 7.

Coalition Forces Withdraw

Denmark's mission in Afghanistan came to an end with a ceremony at Camp Bastion on May 20, 2014. This year marked their 17th rotation and final deployment to Afghanistan. Throughout their mission, over 18,000 Danish soldiers deployed and 33 were killed in action.¹²⁸ Romania ended its combat operations on June 29, 2014, but will continue its support operations.¹²⁹

UN Reports Afghan Violence on the Rise

According to the UN Secretary-General, the conflict in Afghanistan is intensifying. In his June 18 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said that the first quarter of 2014 had the second-highest level of violence since the fall of the Taliban; 2011 had the highest. Between March 1 and May 31, 2014, the number of security incidents increased by 22% versus the same period a year earlier. The increase is attributed mainly to the election, with 476 security incidents recorded on polling day.¹³⁰ The majority of the 5,864 security incidents occurred in the south, south-east, and east.¹³¹ Armed clashes and improvised explosive device (IED) events accounted for 74% of all security incidents.¹³² In a worrying sign of spreading conflict, ground combat is causing more deaths and injuries than IEDs, with women and children increasingly caught in the crossfire.¹³³

“The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is changing in 2014 with an escalation of ground engagements in civilian-populated areas,” warned Ján Kubiš, the UN mission chief in Afghanistan. “The impact on civilians, including the most vulnerable Afghans, is proving to be devastating.”¹³⁴ The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) observed a direct correlation between ISAF base closures and the rise in civilian casualties.¹³⁵ Additionally, the UN recorded 229 assassinations and failed assassination attempts, an increase of 32% over the same period in 2013.¹³⁶

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to ISAF, 32,800 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of June 30, 2014. Approximately 17,102 Coalition forces were serving as of June 1, 2014.¹³⁷ On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced U.S. forces in Afghanistan will reduce to approximately 9,800 by January 2015 and will be reduced further throughout 2015.¹³⁸ Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,197 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,728 were wounded as of July 3, 2014.¹³⁹

DOD REPORTS STEPS TO IMPROVE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

DOD has advised SIGAR of several steps taken to address what a January 2012 contracting conference identified as the “failure to enforce existing standards, policies and procedures by all entities” involved in federal contracting in Afghanistan. The conclusion appeared in a memo on the contracting “shura” or conference in Kabul attended by more than 100 representatives of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), USFOR-A, ISAF Joint Command, contracting organizations, and others.¹⁴⁰ As described in prior SIGAR quarterly reports, SIGAR has repeatedly asked about follow-up steps

for the shura, whose summary memo also noted “poor accountability” for failure to enforce standards, policies and procedures.”¹⁴¹

In response to a fourth SIGAR request for information on the measures taken to address deficiencies in the contracting process, DOD has now reported that “initiatives to improve adherence to existing standards, policies, and procedures for Contingency Contracting Officers and Contingency Contracting Officer’s Representatives” (CORs) include new certification standards and curriculum content; efforts to improve acquisition workforce staffing; distribution of 40,000 copies of new COR handbooks and increased Internet information; joint exercises in contract support; a web-based COR tracking tool to manage the nomination, training, and tracking of CORs and their assigned contracts; a contract command officer liaison at CSTC-A to assist in building Afghan contracting capacity; and “numerous policy documents,” expanded guidance, and compliance monitoring for contracting entities.¹⁴²

SIGAR is reviewing the details of DOD’s response to questions on the important issues of contract management, oversight, compliance, and accountability, and will seek further information on the practical impacts of follow-up steps to the 2012 contracting shura. SIGAR is also reviewing the response to determine if DOD substantively addressed the full set of questions posed.

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 340,293, according to CSTC-A.¹⁴³ This is 97% of the ANSF’s end-strength goal of 352,000 ANSF personnel. DOD’s goal to reach 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014) has mostly been met.¹⁴⁴ The ANA and ANP are within 3% of their target end strength and the Air Force (expected to reach its goal at the end of the year) is within 16%, as shown in Table 3.7. However, as noted on the following page, ANA strength continues to include civilian personnel.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of data on the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained.

TABLE 3.7

ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, MAY 2014			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 5/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	181,439 (97%)	-5,561 (3%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	152,123 (97%)	-4,877 (3%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,731 (84%)	-1,269 (16%)
ANSF Total	352,000	340,293 (97%)	-11,707 (3%)

Sources: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014; SIGAR analysis.

TABLE 3.8

	CIVILIANS COUNTED TOWARD ANA STRENGTH									
	2012			2013				2014		
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	
Civilians Included in Force Strength?	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Number of Civilians Included	NA	NA	NA	NA	7,806	8,698	9,336	9,486	9,647	

Note: Reflects calendar year quarters; NA = Unknown.

Source: CSTC-A responses to SIGAR data calls, 7/1/2014, 3/31/2014, 1/6/2014, 10/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 4/1/2013, 1/2/2013, 10/1/2012, and 7/2/2012.

ANA Civilians Still Count Toward ANSF Strength

SIGAR has long been concerned about the issue of civilians being counted as part of ANA force strength. In July 2012, CSTC-A told SIGAR that civilians were included in the assigned strength of the ANA.¹⁴⁵ In October 2012, CSTC-A said that civilians had been accounted for and removed from the ANA’s “end strength number.”¹⁴⁶ However, after a few quarters, civilians were again included in the ANA’s force strength, as reflected in Table 3.8. This quarter, CSTC-A reported 9,647 civilians in the force strength of the ANA and Afghan Air Force.¹⁴⁷

According to CSTC-A, the 187,000 authorized positions in the ANA includes civilians and that “civilians have to be reflected against ANA end strength if the 352K goal [for the ANSF] is to be the point of comparison.”¹⁴⁸

In February 2012, a DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report identified the issue of and risks associated with civilians being counted as part of the ANA. In that report, the DOD OIG found that ANA finance officers had “coded” civilian personnel as military or armed forces personnel and included them for payment by CSTC-A, despite an agreement between NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MOD that only military personnel would be reimbursed. At that time, CSTC-A finance personnel were unaware that civilians had been included for military pay.¹⁴⁹

According to CSTC-A, U.S. funding is provided assuming 100% *tashkil*, or authorized staffing.¹⁵⁰ This raises the question: is the United States still paying civilian salaries?

According to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) independent assessment released last quarter, “uniformed ANSF positions in the MOD and MOI should be civilianized. If civilians with the appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or trained for these positions—or if active-duty ANSF personnel cannot be transitioned to the civil service—then ANSF force structure will need to be increased to accommodate them.”¹⁵¹

ANSF Assessment

Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with updates on

“Civilians have to be reflected against ANA end strength if the 352K goal [for the ANSF] is to be the point of comparison.”

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2014.

Tashkil: Lists of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI that detail authorized staff positions and equipment items. The word means “organization” in Dari.

Source: GAO, GAO-08-661, *Afghanistan Security*, 6/2008, p. 18.

the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security. ISAF uses the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.¹⁵²

According to ISAF Joint Command (IJC), the RASR provides a monthly operational-level update on readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the ANA and ANP.¹⁵³ The RASR uses rating definition levels (RDLs), based upon ANSF capabilities, to assess ANSF units at the brigade level.¹⁵⁴ The RDLs use an assessment matrix tailored to the specific unit type (e.g. infantry, intelligence, signals) and identifies the capabilities a unit must possess in order to be assessed “Fully Capable.” According to IJC, “this simplified system is easily observable, not as labor intensive or complex [as the previous system], and could form the basis of Afghan ‘self reporting’ as ISAF continues to draw down.”¹⁵⁵

A February 2014 report by SIGAR found that as Coalition forces withdraw, the IJC will have less insight into the ANSF’s capabilities and rely more on the ANSF for assessment data.¹⁵⁶ ISAF will continue to use the RASR in this situation as long as it provides substantial value to understanding the ANSF.¹⁵⁷ To address the decreased insight, ISAF developed a four-point plan: continue the RASR at ANA corps level and ANP brigade level; make partnered staff-assistance visits focused on units not covered by Coalition advisors; mature ANA and ANP readiness-reporting systems; and use a recently established Security Force Assistance working group to build long-term Afghan sustainability. ISAF’s Security Force Assistance resources are being realigned to focus on developing eight essential functions within the ANSF.¹⁵⁸

The RASR rates ANA brigades in six areas:¹⁵⁹

- Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 brigades within corps and two brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 92% were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined-arms operations. This is an increase from the 87%¹⁶⁰ assessed at those levels last quarter.¹⁶¹ This was due to one brigade improving from “partially capable” to “capable” and one brigade, not assessed last quarter but earlier deemed “capable,” being assessed as “capable.” In most assessment categories, the ANA’s capability showed some improvement, as shown in Table 3.9 on the following page.¹⁶²

According to the latest RASR report, the delivery of radios over the last two months dramatically improved the materiel readiness of 207th Corps

SECURITY

TABLE 3.9

REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANA ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE																				
	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Combined Arms Operations	8	8	0		12	14	2		3	2	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Leadership	15	16	1		6	6	0		2	2	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Command & Control	9	12	3		14	12	-2		0	0	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Sustainment	6	5	-1		11	14	3		6	5	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Training	6	6	0		13	14	1		3	3	0		1	1	0		1	0	-1	
Attrition	1	5	4		9	8	-1		0	0	0		14	11	-3		0	0	0	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.

Sources: IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014; IJC, June 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 6/1/2014.



The first sale of useable non-military vehicles, appliances, and furniture no longer needed by the United States took place in Bagram on June 25, 2014, the first of several planned across Afghanistan. (ISAF photo)

communication equipment. However, other units had a shortage of radios, and most corps have shortages of machine guns, fuel, and water trucks.¹⁶³ This quarter, the ANA's equipment readiness status reflected a reduction in the number of equipment types where it met or exceeded the amount of equipment authorized to fulfill its mission.¹⁶⁴ IJC noted that sustainment continues to be an impediment for progress for the ANA, mainly as a result of a supply system in which headquarters determines what is to be requisitioned, and slow resupply of spare parts.¹⁶⁵

Significant improvement was reported in attrition with 54% of brigades rated “fully capable” or “capable,” an increase over the 42% rated last quarter. Forty-six percent of brigades were still considered “developing,” meaning that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month. However, this is a notable improvement from the last two quarters, when 58% and 71% were rated as “developing.”¹⁶⁶ In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (92%), command and control (100%), sustainment (79%), and training (83%).¹⁶⁷

The RASR rates ANP components in six areas:¹⁶⁸

- Law Enforcement Operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 18 of 22 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones. IJC notes the four components were

TABLE 3.10

REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANP ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE																				
	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Law Enforcement Operations	5	2	-3		10	10	0		3	5	2		0	1	1		3	4	1	
Leadership	10	6	-4		6	8	2		2	2	0		0	0	0		3	6	3	
Command & Control	5	5	0		9	10	1		4	3	-1		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Sustainment	4	1	-3		12	12	0		2	5	3		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Training	5	2	-3		9	8	-1		3	6	3		1	2	1		3	4	1	
Attrition	7	10	3		4	5	1		0	0	0		9	7	-2		1	0	-1	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.

Sources: IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014; IJC, June 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 6/1/2014.

not assessed due to reduced Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams coverage.¹⁶⁹ Of the 18 that were assessed, 67% were “fully capable” or “capable” of carrying out law-enforcement operations, as shown in Table 3.10. The RASR defines law-enforcement operations as “making arrests and prosecuting those arrested.”¹⁷⁰ The common shortfalls are lack of investigative, evidence collection, and crime-scene processing skills.¹⁷¹

IJC noted that ANP rates of materiel readiness or equipment levels are generally similar to the previous reporting period.¹⁷² Attrition has improved, but continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 32% of regional components are considered “developing,” meaning attrition in these units is 3% or more per month. That is a reduction since last quarter, when 45% of regional components were considered “developing.” In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (88%), command and control (83%), sustainment (72%), and training (56%).¹⁷³

Notwithstanding the RASR assessments, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of ISAF and USFOR-A, has told the Congress that the ANSF will need continued support after 2014.¹⁷⁴

ANSF to Begin Providing Literacy Training

Although the NTM-A said it met its goal to have 100,000 ANSF personnel (both ANA and ANP) functionally literate by December 2014, NTM-A is unable to confirm how many of those trained personnel are still in the ANSF, based on the lack of personnel-tracking capabilities within the ANSF.¹⁷⁵ This raises the question: was the intent of the goal to train 100,000 personnel or to have 100,000 functionally literate personnel in the ANSF?¹⁷⁶ NTM-A estimated that “due to attrition less than 30% of the ANSF will be functionally literate [level 3 literacy] by the end of December 2014.”¹⁷⁷

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual

“If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate, the security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”

—General Joseph F. Dunford

Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, 3/12/2014, p. 13.

can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials.”¹⁷⁸

Since 2009, NTM-A has viewed increasing literacy rates as critical to developing a capable, professional, and sustainable ANSF. NTM-A said Coalition forces consider literacy a cornerstone of education.¹⁷⁹ A former NTM-A commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, estimated that the ANSF’s overall literacy rate in 2010 was 14%.¹⁸⁰ At the time, NTM-A set a goal of having the ANSF achieve 100% proficiency for level 1 literacy and 50% proficiency at level 3 literacy by the end of 2014. NTM-A’s goals were based on the ANSF’s 2009 authorized strength of 148,000 personnel rather than on the current authorized strength of 352,000.¹⁸¹

As of June 30, 2014, NTM-A reported that 104,042 ANSF personnel have completed the level 3 literacy course, as shown in Table 3.11.

TABLE 3.11

ANSF LITERACY TRAINING, AS OF JUNE 30, 2014				
Literacy Trained	ANA	ANP	Total ANSF	Goal End 2014
Level 1	176,668	97,097	273,765	Up to 300,000
Level 2	63,159	63,504	126,663	120,000-130,000
Level 3	61,623	42,419	104,042	100,000-110,000

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2014.

From 2010 through 2013, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. In 2014, the NATO Trust Fund will provide \$24.6 million for literacy contracts. The final task orders will expire on December 31, 2014. The MOD and MOI will then assume total program management and contracting responsibility for the literacy and language programs.¹⁸² NTM-A is assisting the MOD and MOI in planning and implementing the literacy training program transition.

Acting on recommendations made in the January 2014 SIGAR audit report on the ANSF literacy training program (SIGAR Audit 14-30-AR), NTM-A implemented a change that has increased program efficiency. Specifically, NTM-A now hosts monthly working-level meetings with the ANSF and the literacy contractors to address program-execution issues.¹⁸³ NTM-A also noted they halted the use of language in their contracts that gave contractors too much flexibility in course delivery. As a result, overall graduation rates for the first five months of 2014 compared to the last five months of 2013 have noticeably increased (level 1 increased 54%; level 2 increased 116%; level 3 increased 77%).¹⁸⁴

The SIGAR audit highlighted NTM-A’s inability to fully measure the effectiveness of the literacy program for lack of independent verification of testing or personnel tracking.¹⁸⁵ NTM-A proposed an improved program

plan, incorporating five years of lessons learned, for the MOD and MOI. NTM-A recommended that ANSF utilize the Ministry of Education (MOE) for personnel verification and tracking and capitalize on the MOE’s “train the trainer” capability currently being developed.¹⁸⁶

It is noteworthy that both the MOD and MOI agreed to full ownership of their respective literacy programs beginning January 1, 2015. The ANSF, with the advice and assistance of NTM-A, is postured to have finalized program plans with validated requirements that focus on two specific lines of effort by July 31, 2104:

- centralized institutional literacy training for new recruits at regional training centers
- continued development of a literacy-training capability via a train-the-trainer program


NTM-A will continue to assist, but MOD and MOI procurement advisors will take the lead for the final transition in January 2015.¹⁸⁷

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

DOD reported this quarter no improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions, as shown in Figure 3.26. To rate

FIGURE 3.26

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY STATUS



Note: Quarters are calendar-year.

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 7/3/2014.

the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:¹⁸⁸

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

This quarter, SIGAR was provided CM ratings for 35 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 37 last quarter and 46 in quarters prior. Six offices were rated CM-1B; the others are not expected to attain this rating until after 2014. The only office that had achieved the top rating of CM-1A as of last quarter, the Communications Support Unit, did not retain that rating this quarter.¹⁸⁹

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; 10 progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM. However, the projected date for three staff sections to achieve CM-1B was extended from one quarter to one year.¹⁹⁰ Three MOI staff sections are rated CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition, 16 MOI staff sections have attained a CM-1B rating; an increase of six since the last reporting period.¹⁹¹

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In a Special Project report released last year, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct-assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is under MOI authority and functions under the supervision of the district Afghan Uniform Police. ALP members are selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.¹⁹² As of June 1, 2014, the ALP comprised 26,698 personnel, all but 1,625 of whom were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The current goal is to have 30,000 personnel in 150 districts by the end of December 2014.¹⁹³

As of June 11, 2014, nearly \$214 million of the ASFF had been obligated and expended to support the ALP. According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost \$121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength. To date the United States has provided the ALP with 23,246 AK-47 rifles, 4,045 PKM machine guns, 2,057 light trucks, 4,950 motorcycles, and 2,686 radios.¹⁹⁴

According to NSOCC-A, between June 1, 2013, and May 31, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 84.5%. During that period, 691 ALP personnel quit their job, 118 were fired, and 2,038 left due to undefined administrative actions and other losses. NSOCC-A reported that 1,028 or about 4.1% of the force were killed in action.¹⁹⁵

According to an independent assessment released last quarter, public perceptions of ALP's value to community security were overall very positive: the ALP was perceived as a crucial Afghan-owned and Afghan-led institution, although with room for improvement.¹⁹⁶ Those who reported negative perceptions were usually responding to the actions of neighboring communities' ALP units. The assessment found that reports of unpaid ALP salaries rose dramatically. The unpaid ALP units were accused of predatory behavior, corruption and criminality.¹⁹⁷ The assessment, conducted by NSOCC-A and based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus-group surveys in ALP districts, reports that future ALP success can be achieved with:¹⁹⁸

- support and supervision from the ANP
- transparent, locally-owned recruitment processes
- balanced tribal representation
- regular information exchanges between community leaders and ALP commanders

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$33.1 billion and disbursed \$31.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANA.¹⁹⁹

ANA Strength

As of June 30, 2014, the overall end strength of the ANA was 188,170 personnel (181,439 Army and 6,731 Air Force), according to CSTC-A.²⁰⁰ However, as noted previously, these numbers include 9,394 ANA civilians and 253 Air Force civilians. The total is more than 96% of its combined end-strength goal of 195,000 ANA personnel. Most components increased, but the numbers of assigned personnel in the ANA's 111th Capital Division declined for a second quarter. The number of personnel in training also declined, as shown in Table 3.12 on the following page. Personnel absent without leave (AWOL) increased from 5,154 last quarter to 5,746 this quarter, but were still significantly less than the AWOL count from the last quarter of 2013 (10,292).²⁰¹

According to the DOD-commissioned independent assessment by the CNA released last quarter, "Afghanistan has a significant need for special operations forces [SOF], but the ANSF cannot support more SOF."²⁰² CNA also said "ANA SOF currently depends on the U.S. and ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. Simply increasing the number of ANA SOF personnel without

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR announced an audit this quarter on the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan's implementation of the Afghan Local Police program. For more information, see Section 2, page 29.

TABLE 3.12

ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,130	None	17,489	17,606	117
203rd Corps	20,798	20,798	None	20,029	22,114	2,085
205th Corps	19,097	19,097	None	17,891	18,534	643
207th Corps	14,879	14,879	None	13,806	14,204	398
209th Corps	15,004	15,004	None	14,554	14,674	120
215th Corps	17,555	17,555	None	16,310	16,999	689
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	8,921	8,356	-565
Special Operations Force	12,149	11,013	-1,136	10,458	10,649	191
Echelons Above Corps ^a	34,866	36,002	1,136	29,727	36,610	6,883
TTHS ^b	-	-	-	24,356 ^c	12,299 ^d	-12,057
Civilians	-	-	-	9,236	9,394	158
ANA Total	161,652	161,652	None	182,777	181,439	-1,338
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	7,370	273	6,513	6,478	-35
AAF Civilians	-	-	-	250	253	3
ANA + AAF Total	168,749	169,022	273	189,540	188,170	-1,370

Notes: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014; Q2 2014 data is as of 5/31/2014.

^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel.

^c Includes 4,701 cadets

^d Includes 5,157 cadets

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014 and 7/1/2014.

“I view it as serious and so do all the commanders. I’m not assuming that those casualties are sustainable.”

—General Joseph F. Dunford

Source: ISAF Commander General Joseph F. Dunford, on casualties in the ANSF, interview with *The Guardian* (UK), 9/2/2013.

addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks.”²⁰³

ANA Attrition

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between June 2013 and May 2014, 39,136 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls. The ANA has suffered serious losses from fighting. Between March 2012 and May 2014, 2,330 ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 12,696 were wounded in action (WIA).²⁰⁴ In a media interview in September 2013, General Joseph F. Dunford expressed his concern about ANSF casualties.²⁰⁵

ANA Sustainment

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$12.5 billion and disbursed \$12.3 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.²⁰⁶

ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of June 30, 2014, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided \$2.4 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives

since FY 2008. CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives at \$693.9 million. Since December 21, 2013, CSTC-A no longer provides funding for food. However, CSTC-A noted that when funding was provided, it was on the basis of 100% of the ANA's authorized strength.²⁰⁷

ANA Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

Determining the amount and cost of equipment provided to the ANA remains a challenge. After a year of decreasing total costs for weapons procured for the ANA—a *cumulative* total that should rise rather than fall every quarter—CSTC-A reported a slight increase last quarter. This quarter, CSTC-A reported no change. Between April 2013 and December 2013, the total reported cost for weapons purchased for the ANA decreased from \$878 million to \$439 million. However in April 2014, CSTC-A reported total costs of \$461 million. The trend in total ANA weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment costs is shown in Table 3.13.

TABLE 3.13

CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)				
	Weapons	Vehicles	Communications	Total
April 2013	\$878.0	\$5,556.5	\$580.5	\$7,015.0
July 2013	622.8	5,558.6	599.5	6,780.9
October 2013	447.2	3,955.0	609.3	5,011.5
December 2013	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	5,437.2
March 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	5,517.3
July 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	5,517.3

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, 3/31/2014, and 7/1/2014.

In the past, CSTC-A has provided several explanations for the decreasing cost: a \$153 million correction in the total cost of some equipment and accounting for nearly \$102 million in donated equipment that was not U.S.-funded, an extensive internal audit that revealed double-counted equipment, and discovery of incorrect pricing during an internal audit.²⁰⁸ Moreover, CSTC-A noted that although the cost for donated weapons was not included, “the refurbishment and transportation cost of donated weapons was included because [reconstruction] funds were used.”²⁰⁹

The ongoing corrections to the cost of equipment procured raise questions about accountability for U.S. funds used to equip the ANA.

Additionally, CSTC-A reported the cost of ANA equipment remaining to be procured stands at \$89 million, unchanged from last quarter.²¹⁰

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$11.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.²¹¹ Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, weapons, and related equipment, communications equipment, aircraft, and aviation-related equipment.

SIGAR AUDITS

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that DOD needs to take actions to account for and safeguard the small arms it supplies to the ANSF. When SIGAR compared the data in the two systems DOD uses to maintain information on the weapons, it found that the databases did not always match; some records were duplicated, and some records were incomplete. For more information, see Section 2, page 24.

A SIGAR audit this quarter on ANA Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) found that the security environment limited the contractor from providing training and maintenance services; U.S. government oversight personnel had limited ability to visit MSF brigade locations outside Kabul; an absence of spare parts hindered vehicle operability; a need for MSF vehicle operator training; and difficulties with ANA supply-chain ordering and distribution of spare parts. For more information, see Section 2, page 26.

More than 79% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.14.

TABLE 3.14

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$461,197,802	\$32,055,904
Vehicles	4,385,763,395	8,260,489
Communications	670,307,101	48,810,799
Total	\$5,517,268,298	\$89,127,192

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014.

The United States has also procured \$1.6 billion in ammunition for the ANA and \$7.1 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANA. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.²¹²

SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR has initiated an inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended.

ANA Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$6.1 billion and disbursed \$5.2 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.²¹³ At that time, the United States had completed 316 infrastructure projects (valued at \$4.1 billion), with another 56 projects ongoing (\$1.1 billion) and 9 planned (\$168.5 million), according to CSTC-A.²¹⁴

As with last quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter were brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade/201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115 million), the 3rd Brigade/205th Corps in Kandahar (\$91 million), and the 1st Brigade/215th Corps in Helmand (\$87 million).²¹⁵ In addition, two projects were awarded this quarter at a cost of \$19 million, 17 projects were completed at a cost of \$325 million, and one contract worth \$59 million was terminated.²¹⁶

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations-and-maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction cost for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is now \$168 million a year, or a total of \$840 million.²¹⁷

According to DOD, the MOD Construction Program Management Division's ability to plan, design, contract, and execute new construction is limited to \$20 million per year until greater capacity is demonstrated.²¹⁸

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.1 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.²¹⁹ Aside from literacy training discussed previously in this section, the other training

includes English-language training, explosive ordnance, and mobile strike force vehicle (MSFV) training. Earlier in this reporting period, 280 students completed MSFV training; 260 students currently are in training, and an additional 20 students are scheduled to begin class. During this reporting period, 173 students attended explosive-ordnance training.²²⁰ The MSFV and explosive-ordnance training contract is \$42.4 million for May through December 2014, bringing the total contract cost to date to \$287.3 million.²²¹

Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force

Women currently make up less than 1% of the ANA, despite the current recruitment and retention goal, last published in September 2013, for 10% of the force to be women. To achieve this goal, the ANA has waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan's various ethnic groups. Additionally, assignment locations are being reviewed to pinpoint locations with accommodation for females, such as separate restrooms. The ANA Recruiting Command also airs commercials on local television stations targeting women beginning 20 days before training classes.²²²

CSTC-A stated the Coalition believes that by having more women in the ANSF, men will learn to accept and respect women in the workplace. The involvement of families and communities is critical to recruiting women. CSTC-A has requested funding for media advertisements and programming to educate the Afghan public about the need for women to join the army and police.²²³

This quarter, the ANA reported to CSTC-A that 711 women serve in the ANA: 663 in the Army and 48 in the Air Force. Of those, 272 are officers, 268 are non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 69 are enlisted, and 102 are cadets. However, according to CSTC-A, Coalition advisors cannot validate these numbers and assume they include civilians. CSTC-A noted that by the end of Solar Year 1393 (March 20, 2015), MOD is expected to modify the way personnel are counted to reflect only active-duty military personnel and not civilians.²²⁴

The ANA's 12-week Basic Warrior Training course includes a class on behavior and expectations of male soldiers who work with ANA women. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission conducts two-day seminars for the ANSF that include training in eliminating violence against women.²²⁵

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Pub. L. 113-66, authorizes \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.²²⁶

Afghan Air Force

This quarter, the NATO Air Command-Afghanistan (NAC-A) reported the Afghan Air Force has 95 aircraft, excluding aircraft "no longer in service

SIGAR ALERT LETTER

SIGAR's preliminary review of an audit of AAF capability to absorb additional equipment indicates DOD's plan is to provide two more C-130 aircraft that may not be needed or sustainable. SIGAR reported its concern to DOD, CENTCOM, ISAF, and NTC-A. For more information, see Section 2, page 21.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.15

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2015 (\$ THOUSANDS)						
Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	\$461,877	\$778,604	\$1,805,343	\$111,129	\$2,300	\$21,442
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	141,077	164,187	123,416
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	469,230	520,802	780,370
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	53,000	0	0
Total	\$760,299	\$1,683,250	\$2,621,237	\$774,436	\$687,289	\$925,228

Sources: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 6/2014, pp. 10, 24, 26, and 29.



Helicopter flying over Zabul Province.
(Photo by Alan B Bell)

(crashed)” and eight Mi-17 helicopters that are on loan to Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing (SMW).²²⁷

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2012 alone, the United States provided more than \$5.8 billion to support and develop the 6,731-person Afghan Air Force, including over \$3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested an additional \$1 billion, including \$23.7 million for equipment and aircraft, in FYs 2014 and 2015 for the Afghan Air Force. However, the majority of the funding is being requested for sustainment and training, as shown in Table 3.15.

According to CENTCOM, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 102 aircraft:²²⁸

- 58 Mi-17 transport helicopters (includes eight on loan to the SMW)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- Six C-182 fixed wing training aircraft
- Five MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- Five Mi-35 attack helicopters
- Two C-130H medium transport aircraft

Beginning in the fourth quarter 2015, the first of 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance, will be delivered: four a year in 2015, 2016, and 2017; and eight in 2018.²²⁹ The SMW provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, and is the only ANSF unit to be night-vision goggle-qualified for air-assault and fixed-wing ISR capability.²³⁰ The SMW can support one air-assault operation per week and one partnered reconnaissance mission per day with no impact on developmental training. During the period from April 1–June 11, 2014, the SMW executed 39 non-training missions.²³¹

A 2013 SIGAR audit found that DOD was moving forward with a \$771 million purchase of aircraft for the SMW that the Afghans could not operate or maintain.²³²

In July, a Taliban attack on Kabul International Airport damaged two SMW helicopters and destroyed President Karzai’s helicopter. The aircraft were not occupied at the time. The same month a suicide bomber killed eight members of the Afghan Air Force when he attacked an Afghan military bus.²³³

According to the CNA independent assessment released last quarter, “Afghanistan has a significant need for air support, but the [Afghan Air Force] cannot support more air power than is currently planned.” CNA also noted that the Afghan Air Force is “struggling to find sufficient numbers of qualified recruits to grow to its planned size” and “even if additional recruits are found, only a small number could be fully trained by 2018.”²³⁴



The first C-130 manned by an all-Afghan aircrew flew from Kabul to Kandahar and back on June 16, 2014. (U.S. Air Force photo)

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$16.5 billion and disbursed \$15.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.²³⁵

ANP Strength

This quarter, the overall strength of the ANP totaled 152,123 personnel, including 113,385 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,667 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 12,731 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 4,313 students in training, and 27 “standby” personnel awaiting assignment.²³⁶ Of the 113,385 personnel in the AUP, 28,092 were MOI headquarters staff or institutional support staff, an increase of 5,530 staff over last quarter.²³⁷ Overall, the ANP’s authorized strength increased 3,323 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.16.

According to CSTC-A, the MOI, unlike the ANA, does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its

TABLE 3.16

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change
	AUP ^a	115,527	122,644	+7,117	109,184 ^b	113,385 ^c
ABP	22,955	23,573	+618	21,616	21,667	+51
ANCOP	14,518	13,106	-1,412	14,477	12,731	-1,746
NISTA	6,000	3,000	-3,000	5,916	4,313	-1,603
Standby ^d	-	-	None	2,076	27	-2,049
ANP Total	159,000	162,323	3,323	153,269	152,123	-1,146

Notes: Q1 2014 data as of 2/2014; Q2 2014 data as of 5/2014; AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; NISTA = Not In Service for Training.

^a Includes MOI headquarters and institutional support and CNPA personnel.

^b Includes 22,562 MOI headquarters and institutional support personnel.

^c Includes 28,092 MOI headquarters staff.

^d Personnel that are pending assignment.

Sources: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014; DCOM MAG, responses to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2014 and 4/11/2014.

personnel reports. For this reason, the actual operational capability of the ANP is not known.²³⁸

ANP Sustainment

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$6.1 billion and disbursed \$6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.²³⁹ This includes \$1.34 billion that the United States has contributed to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to support the ANP.²⁴⁰

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through June 30, 2014, the U.S. government had provided \$1.34 billion, paid through the LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.²⁴¹

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$521.2 million per year to fund salaries (\$275 million) and incentives (\$246.2 million). This is a decrease from earlier estimates as food costs are no longer covered by CSTC-A.²⁴²

ANP Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.²⁴³ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment.²⁴⁴ More than 83% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.17.

TABLE 3.17

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,093,066
Vehicles	1,966,075,183	3,744,582
Communications Equipment	211,062,672	544,573
Total	\$2,364,389,332	\$8,382,221

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported no change in the total cost of the weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition procured for the ANP. As with the ANA, determining the cost of equipment provided to the ANP remains a challenge. CSTC-A reporting in this area has been inconsistent, raising questions about visibility and accountability for U.S. funding used to procure equipment for the ANP. For example, CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of U.S.-funded ANP weapons procured decreased from \$369 million in October 2013 to \$137 million in December 2013.²⁴⁵ At the time, CSTC-A said the decrease in total cost was due to actual, contracted

SIGAR INQUIRY

SIGAR sent a follow-up letter this quarter to CSTC-A expressing concern that some ANP salary payments are at risk of diversion because not all salaries are paid via the “mobile money” electronic-transfer program. See Section 2, page 42.

equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing.²⁴⁶ Then CSTC-A said the following quarter's increase was "caused by inclusion of weapons procured through [alternative] funding vehicles."²⁴⁷ The cumulative cost of equipment—a figure which should only go up or stay the same—has declined since July 2013, although the total cost this quarter did not change from last quarter.

While CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANP has decreased since last year, the total cost this quarter did not change from the last two quarters.²⁴⁸

The United States has also procured \$366 million in ammunition for the ANP and \$1.5 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANP. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.²⁴⁹

ANP Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$3.3 billion and disbursed \$2.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.²⁵⁰ At that time, the United States had completed 669 infrastructure projects (valued at \$3.2 billion), with another 59 projects ongoing (\$345 million), and three planned (\$42 million), according to CSTC-A.²⁵¹

This quarter, three projects valued at \$3 million were awarded, 32 projects valued at \$167 million were completed, and eight valued at \$28 million were terminated.²⁵² The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were a building and utilities (\$34.3 million) at the MOI Headquarters, an ANP patrol station in Helmand (\$28.5 million), and an ANP provincial headquarters in Kandahar (\$25 million).²⁵³

According to CSTC-A, the projected annual operations and maintenance, sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 ranges from \$131–147 million (\$655–735 million over five years), an increase over the \$98–102 (\$485 million total) last reported.²⁵⁴

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions that could affect cost estimates.²⁵⁵

ANP Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$3.5 billion and disbursed \$3.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.²⁵⁶ Since January 1, 2014, the NATO Trust Fund has paid the cost for all ANSF literacy training. Additionally, Japan has assumed the cost of most of the police academy training in Turkey formerly funded by the United States. Aside from the literacy training discussed on page 97, English language training is the only remaining course funded by the ASFF this fiscal year. According to NTM-A,

SIGAR INQUIRY

In FY 2011, CSTC-A requested border-patrol boats for the ANP. CSTC-A canceled the \$3 million procurement when the boats were nearly finished. The boats remain in Virginia, accruing storage costs while awaiting disposition. For more information, see Section 2, pages 44–47.

the number of ANSF (both ANA and ANP) students enrolled in English language training this quarter is 2,539, of which 88% completed training. However, the percentage of students who graduated with an English comprehension-level score required for follow-on training was only 12%.²⁵⁷

Women in the ANP

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but the ANP is far from reaching its goal of 5,000 women by the end of 2014. Women still make up only 1% of the force. This quarter, ANP personnel included 1,971 women—280 officers, 826 NCOs, and 865 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A.²⁵⁸ This is an increase of 228 women since last quarter and 767 women since August 22, 2011.²⁵⁹

CSTC-A said the ANP is focused on finding secure workplaces with appropriate facilities for women and developing strategies to attract and retain qualified female recruits.²⁶⁰

However, according to CSTC-A, the Minister of Interior recently signed off on a plan that would emphasize achieving the goal of 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of solar year 1393 (March 20, 2015). CSTC-A supports the MOI's efforts by providing advisors on the recruitment and training of women. This advising has focused on recruiting and enrolling women in "safe units in order to prevent much of the abuse and harassment that has been reported by international agencies."²⁶¹

In addition, Coalition advisors have created an ANP training curriculum on human, gender, and child rights. As of this quarter, 25,059 ANP personnel have received that training, the same number as last quarter.²⁶² A CSTC-A gender advisor is working with the director of education on a course that will cover topics such as eliminating violence against women, international criteria for human rights, and self-defense for women in law enforcement.²⁶³

As noted previously, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Pub. L. 113-66, provides \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.²⁶⁴

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had funded construction of 176 completed ANSF medical facilities valued at \$155 million, with an additional 11 projects ongoing valued at \$15 million.²⁶⁵ This quarter, an additional hospital valued at \$21 million was completed. Another four facilities or expansions valued at over \$8.5 million are in progress.²⁶⁶

This quarter, IJC reported the ANSF health-care system had 959 physicians, a decrease of seven. Of these, 559 were assigned to the ANA and 400 were assigned to the ANP, which reflects an increase of 45 for the ANP. The ANA has a shortage of 182 physicians and the ANP a shortage of 112.²⁶⁷ The

ANSF also had 1,843 nurses, physicians' assistants, and other medical personnel, reporting a shortage of 497 positions.²⁶⁸

IJC reports both the ANA and ANP need support in forecasting medical supplies needed using historic and consumption data. The ANP plans to provide clinics with a standard list of items to be stocked, develop a regional logistic system for solar year 1394, and develop a standard operating procedure for outfitting ambulances with equipment.²⁶⁹

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Since FY 2002, the U.S. Department of State (State) has provided more than \$283 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).²⁷⁰ Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct IEDs.²⁷¹

During the reporting period, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan added former U.S. firing ranges to their database of contaminated areas in Afghanistan. Consequently, the reporting metrics for this report show an increase in remaining contaminated area of approximately 100 million square meters or nearly 39 square miles since 2013.²⁷² (See Table 3.18.)

As of March 31, 2014, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 154 million square meters of land and removed or destroyed approximately 7.8 million land mines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives.²⁷³ PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by land mines, whereas a contaminated area can include both land mines and other ERW.²⁷⁴

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR conducted a financial audit last year of several Department of State grants for demining activities to Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC). The audit covered money spent between April 2007 and August 2012 totaling over \$13.4 million. ATC reported clearing over 2 million square meters of land, which it achieved through the location and demolition of antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexploded ordnance and fragments. The audit found no concerns with the financial statements, findings from prior audits, or assessments for follow-up or corrective action. The report did identify six internal-control weaknesses and five compliance findings. It also uncovered \$200,000 in unsupported costs and nearly \$9,000 in interest earned from revenue advances not remitted to State.

TABLE 3.18

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1, 2013–MARCH 31, 2014						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1–9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1–12/31/2013	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
1/1–3/31/2014	1,780	254,734	245,380	262,750	5,473,170	638,400,000
Total	14,276	397,769	552,944	9,803,342	28,996,370	638,400,000

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2014.

Comprehensive third-quarter FY 2014 reports are not yet available. Quarterly reports are generally available one month after the end of each quarter; thus, the third quarter FY 2014 (covering April 1, 2014, through June 30, 2014) will be published in SIGAR's upcoming quarterly report (October 2014).²⁷⁵

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of June 30, 2014, the United States has provided approximately \$7.6 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$2.93 billion), the ASFF (\$1.31 billion), the Economic Support Fund (\$1.42 billion), and \$1.76 billion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. These appropriations fund DEA salaries and expenses in Afghanistan.²⁷⁶ (See Appendix B.)

U.S. drug-control policy has shifted in recent years from eradication to interdiction and agricultural-development assistance that aims to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods.²⁷⁷ Eradication activities predominantly occur under the Governor Led Eradication (GLE) and the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) programs. Interdiction activities fall under the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), which shares responsibilities with the MOI, the MOD, and the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH). The Counternarcotics Justice Center (CNJC), in partnership with the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), also assist in combating the illicit drug trade. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) conducts interdiction operations with DOD and ISAF elements providing training and support.²⁷⁸

The latest United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report notes that for the third consecutive year, Afghanistan, already the world's largest producer and cultivator of opium poppies, saw an increase in the area under cultivation (from 154,000 hectares in 2012 to 209,000 hectares in 2013)—a 36% increase.²⁷⁹ However, UNODC's estimate for 2013 was higher than the U.S. government's estimate of 198,000 hectares under poppy cultivation for that year.²⁸⁰ The report also notes that Afghan heroin is increasingly reaching new markets, such as Oceania and South West Asia, that had been traditionally supplied from South East Asia.²⁸¹ USAID funds agriculture and alternative-livelihood programs to counteract farmers' dependence on opium-poppy cultivation; these programs are discussed in the Economic and Social Development section of this report on page 170.

The drawdown of Coalition personnel has impacted interdiction results, particularly in southern regions of the country. The reduced troop presence

limited the number of joint operations between Coalition and Afghan forces or U.S. drug-enforcement personnel and Afghan forces.²⁸² Similarly, poppy eradication decreased this year since security forces were diverted from that effort to assist with election security.²⁸³ Opium-cultivation results are not yet available, but final results will likely exceed last year's all-time record. According to the United Nations, more land is being cultivated with poppy in 2014 than in 2013 in Helmand, Afghanistan's chief opium-producing province.²⁸⁴

Drug Use in Afghanistan

The UNODC's April 2014 study of drug use shows that consumption of heroin and other opiates has far-reaching consequences on Afghan society. Drug use leads to domestic violence, impedes children's progress in school, and is a problem in most Afghan communities.²⁸⁵

Between 2005 and 2009, consumption of heroin and other opiates doubled. The total number of heroin users was estimated at 120,000, a 140% increase since 2005. Approximately 8% of 15 to 64 year-olds are drug users, twice the global average.²⁸⁶ Among drug users interviewed:

- nearly 80% were male²⁸⁷
- 56% said they did not attend school, 19% attended primary school, and 2% attended university²⁸⁸
- 40% were 10–24 years old, 42% were 25–39 years old, and 15% were 40–54 years old²⁸⁹
- 64% indicated they had been unemployed for the previous year²⁹⁰

Governor Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Afghan government's GLE Program. The MCN, in partnership with UNODC, is responsible for verifying poppy cultivation and eradication.²⁹¹ GLE occurs at different times of the year depending on the climate of the province, according to INL. Cumulative results are tracked by the MCN, and subjected to UNODC verification on a rolling basis. A significant amount of the eradication in the southern provinces begins late in the second quarter and is completed early during the third quarter of the fiscal year.²⁹²

According to INL, the Afghan government's eradication target for 2014 is 22,500 hectares.²⁹³ Eradication began early March 2014 in Helmand and continued as of late June 2014. Verified eradication, conducted in 12 provinces, reached 2,796 hectares as of July 2, 2014, compared to 7,348 hectares eradicated for the entire year of 2013.²⁹⁴ The Afghan government attributed the decrease in GLE in part to the elections taking place during the eradication season in certain provinces. Security forces detailed to the elections were not available to assist with operations. Coordination between ministries to organize GLE efforts was also hampered by the elections and an approved plan was not issued until late in the season, limiting its effectiveness. INL noted that political will at the national and provincial level is necessary for the GLE program to be effective.²⁹⁵

INL told SIGAR that GLE is a tool that is most effective when combined with a long-term, multifaceted approach, integrated with broader efforts to support good governance and sustainable economic growth.²⁹⁶ Total GLE eradication results at year-end will likely be significantly lower than the previous year. According to the late May MCN eradication report, operations will no longer occur in provinces where opium has already been harvested (Farah, Herat, Kabul, and Nimroz) and were concluded in several provinces including Helmand and Kandahar—two of the largest poppy cultivating provinces.²⁹⁷

Good Performer's Initiative

INL also supports the MCN's efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the GPI. Under the current terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for \$1 million in GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, according to INL. INL told SIGAR that the GPI program incentivizes continued counternarcotics performance in the year ahead.²⁹⁸ It also shows provincial leadership and citizens that there are tangible benefits to countering poppy cultivation, and it reinforces the writ of the government in the province, district, and community.²⁹⁹

Since the start of the GPI program in 2007, 215 development projects have either been completed or are in process in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces; these projects include school construction, road and bridge projects, irrigation structures, farm machinery projects, and hospital and clinic construction. INL is currently collaborating with the MCN to redesign the GPI program to encourage greater action on counternarcotics and provide greater support for rural alternative livelihoods.³⁰⁰ Alternative-livelihood programs such as the Kandahar Food Zone are discussed in the Economic and Social Development section of this report on page 172.

As of May 31, 2014, a total of 215 GPI projects with a value of \$106.6 million had been approved. Of those, 115 were completed, 96 were ongoing, and four were nearing completion.³⁰¹ Based on third-party audit recommendations, GPI changed its practice of using a flat conversion rate of 1 U.S. dollar to 50 afghanis (AFN), to using the actual conversion rate on the day of the project bid, per Da Afghanistan Bank's official website. The total value of GPI projects in prior quarterly reports is therefore not directly comparable to the values in this report.³⁰²

Demand Reduction

During this quarter, INL signed a commitment letter at a stakeholders' meeting with the MCN, the MOPH, the **Colombo Plan**, and local Afghan NGOs operating treatment programs. The signed document ensures the transition of INL-supported treatment centers to MOPH authority.³⁰³ This quarter, INL provided support for clinical-staff training, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand-reduction programs, while continuing to

Colombo Plan: The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific was instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development of the region nations. It was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1950 with seven founding-member countries and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan's Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals, a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional-certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Sources: The Colombo Plan Secretariat website, History, <http://www.colombo-plan.org>; INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2013, p. 20.

implement a transition plan to transfer 13 treatment programs to Afghan authorities. INL supports 76 treatment programs.

The transition plan includes building staff capacity and promoting continued cooperation between the MCN and MOPH. INL said it seeks to create uniformity among the treatment centers nationwide and help incorporate existing Afghan treatment professionals into the Afghan government civil service. Under the plan, treatment programs will transition to the Afghan government as INL support to programs slowly decreases over the coming years.³⁰⁴

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

INL also funds the Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which assists the Afghan government in combating the production, trafficking, and use of narcotics in Afghanistan through periodic communication and outreach campaigns in targeted provinces. CNCE, implemented through Sayara Media Communications, targets farmers through national and local public awareness and media campaigns in opium poppy-growing areas. Sayara monitors the effectiveness of media campaigns through target audience analysis reports, including a baseline report to identify provincial drivers of drug trafficking and cultivation, and public sentiment about narcotics.³⁰⁵

Sayara also conducts geographic information system mapping in partnership with a contractor and has 42 observers placed in all provinces, which are ranked in tiers based on cultivation levels. The observers gather information on and gauge perceptions of the counternarcotics message campaigns. Sayara also conducts monthly media monitoring, assesses how counternarcotics media products fit into the current Afghan media landscape, and evaluates counternarcotics-related items in the media. Sayara and the CNCE program operate throughout the nation; in some areas where the program operates cultivation has decreased, according to INL.³⁰⁶ INL said the CNCE program will eventually transition to the MCN as a result of capacity-development efforts.³⁰⁷

Aga Khan Foundation Grant

From September 2010 through May 2014, INL provided assistance to local governance institutions to shift six provinces in central and northern Afghanistan away from growing poppies and toward licit livelihoods under a two-phase grant with the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) at a cost of \$6 million. According to INL, the project benefitted over 32,100 participants, including 8,776 women, through training workshops for agricultural management, organizational capacity, good governance, budgeting, and participatory planning. The project also enabled district and provincial officials to connect with members of **community-based savings groups** and other community groups. INL told SIGAR it is currently finalizing a new grant

Community-based savings groups:

provide sustainable access to credit and savings for the most vulnerable members of rural communities, particularly in areas lacking formal credit mechanisms through financial institutions. Participants are mobilized to self-select and form self-led savings groups that voluntarily contribute every month to a loan fund. Group members can access the loan fund to invest in public goods, businesses, or emergency needs. Each year, savings are paid out in full to all members and each individual may choose to reinvest. In the interim, groups can decide to grant small loans to individual members and recoup the credit with interest.

Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/11/2014.

with the AKF that will build upon its past subnational governance work in a third phase of activities, and expand to 16 provinces across Afghanistan, including poppy-cultivating provinces in the South.³⁰⁸

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC):

fosters economic and political cooperation among member nations. Its founding charter was signed in December 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined in 2007.

The Istanbul Process: Launched in 2011, the process enables discussion between Afghanistan and its neighbors in order to enhance political, economic and security cooperation. Over 20 nations and organizations along with the United States provide support on issues such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, poverty and extremism.

The Paris Pact: The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on central Asian drug routes. It aims at reducing opium poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and at the establishment of a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

Sources: SAARC website: "About SAARC, Charter" <http://www.saarc-sec.org/> accessed, 7/16/2014; State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Factsheet, "US Support for the Istanbul Process, 4/29/2013; Paris Pact, website "What is it?" <https://www.paris-pact.net>, accessed, 7/16/2014.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building Program

The MCN and INL signed the MCN Capacity Building Program/Advisor Support memorandum of understanding on February 18, 2014. The program, which was renewed for 18 months, provides funding for 24 local and national advisors and helps build the MCN's capacity. INL has implemented a performance measuring plan to track and evaluate the program's effectiveness.³⁰⁹ According to INL, this process not only helps stakeholders monitor the success of the advisor-support program, but also improves the MCN human resources department's employee-evaluation practices. In addition, this quarter INL coordinated and completed installation of information technology for the MCN's provincial offices. INL also enhanced MCN security by installing two new security towers and procuring communication equipment and metal detectors.³¹⁰ During this quarter, the MCN hosted a conference to launch a new integrated regional and international counternarcotics policy with the participation of ambassadors from several countries in the region, including Russia.³¹¹ The policy lays out a framework for working through existing mechanisms and processes such as the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**, the **Istanbul Process**, and the **Paris Pact**, to achieve regional and international cooperation. INL told SIGAR that the Afghan government used the conference to launch the new policy with its regional partners.³¹²

Effect of the Coalition Drawdown on Counternarcotics Operations


According to DOD, the drawdown of Coalition forces has hurt the CNPA and other Afghan counternarcotics agencies. The number of operations has been declining since 2012, as shown in Figure 3.27. According to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database:³¹³

- Counternarcotics operations decreased 17% (624 in FY 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge to 518 in FY 2013)
- Heroin seizures decreased 77% (10,982 kg in FY 2011 to 2,489 kg in FY 2013)
- Opium seizures decreased 57% (98,327 kg in FY 2011 to 41,350 kg in FY 2013)

The impact has been most pronounced in Helmand and Kandahar—the focus of the Coalition surge and subsequent withdrawal. Vetted counternarcotics units like the Intelligence and Investigation Unit, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), Technical Investigative Unit, and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) have also suffered from the drawdown, most

FIGURE 3.27

INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, 2008-2014



Note: Fiscal year.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2014.

significantly by losing access to ISAF-provided enablers.³¹⁴ These vetted units are critical to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan.³¹⁵ According to INL, U.S. drug-enforcement personnel may not be able to participate in operations in certain areas due to a reduction in ISAF capability including ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF).³¹⁶

The decrease in overall counternarcotics missions was likely the result of reduced partnering of ISAF with Afghan forces conducting counternarcotics operations. According to DOD, the majority of current Afghan seizures are a result of routine police operations near population centers or transportation corridors, such as at checkpoints or border crossings.

Drug labs, storage sites, and major trafficking networks are concentrated in rural areas that are increasingly off-limits to Afghan forces due to the ISAF drawdown and declining security in these areas. Despite the marked decreases in drug seizures, DOD told SIGAR that the Afghan counternarcotics units have shown increased ability over the past year to successfully conduct complex drug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance.³¹⁷

Interdiction Operations

DOD reported that from April 1, 2014, to June 30, 2014, Afghan security and law-enforcement forces conducted 57 drug-interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 88 individuals during the third quarter of this fiscal year. To date, 375 individuals have been detained this fiscal year (168 detainees during the first quarter and 119 detainees during the second quarter).³¹⁸ These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. Afghan

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, p. viii.

operations during this period also resulted in the seizures of the following narcotics contraband:³¹⁹

- 6,464 kg of opium
- 931 kg of heroin
- 11 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 34 kg of precursor chemicals

According to DOD, most interdiction activities occurred in southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of the country. Almost all U.S. interdiction activities partnered with Afghan forces as ISAF continued its drawdown during this reporting period. U.S. forces conducted six unilateral operations resulting in the detention of one individual and the seizure of 96 kg of opium and 0.5 kg of heroin. Interagency elements, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. Both CJIATF-N and IOCC integrated data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt narco-insurgent elements. All operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.³²⁰

Special Counternarcotics Police Units

During the quarter, INL provided mentors and advisors to develop the capability and independence of the specialized Afghan units and provided various types of support at NIU/SIU facilities. INL also developed plans to draw down U.S. government support to the Regional Law Enforcement Center in Herat. According to INL, SIU engaged in 14 law-enforcement operations the first quarter of 2014 and performed 25 counternarcotics-related arrests.³²¹

Interdiction Results


Since 2008, a total of 2,769 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,865 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:³²²

- 746,040 kg of hashish
- 378,231 kg of opium
- 48,105 kg of morphine
- 28,289 kg of heroin
- 445,205 kg of precursor chemicals

However, as shown in Figure 3.28, seizures have been declining since 2012.

FIGURE 3.28

DRUG SEIZURES, 2008–2014 (KILOGRAMS)



Note: Fiscal year.

Sources: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2014.

Aviation Support

During this reporting period, Department of State aircraft provided a total of 200.5 flight hours, conducted 135 sorties, moved 1,105 passengers, and transported 36,812 pounds of cargo.³²³ According to INL, counternarcotics support to DEA consisted of 18.7 flight hours supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, 31.5 flight hours supporting interdiction efforts, and 69 flight hours supporting Afghan NIU and DEA passenger movements.

INL also noted that DEA support included 16.5 hours of flight training. DEA flight hours are lower this quarter due to Embassy designation of no-fly days because of the Afghan elections.³²⁴ INL maintains an air wing at Kandahar Airfield with dedicated helicopters supporting DEA missions in southern Afghanistan.³²⁵