SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 14-41 Inspection Report

Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Requirements, but It Is Unclear if Facility Is Being Used as Intended



MARCH 2014

SIGAR 14-41-IP/ANA Camp Monitor



Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

March 12, 2014

General Lloyd J. Austin III Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Major General Dean J. Milner Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

Major General Kevin R. Wendel Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Afghan National Army's Camp Monitor, located in Jawzjan province, in northern Afghanistan. A draft of this report recommended that the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), direct the Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), to determine and report on the status of U.S. funds provided to the Afghan Ministry of Defense's Construction and Property Management Department for construction of the dining facility at Camp Monitor.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Commanding General, CSTC-A, did not concur with our recommendation, on the basis that direct assistance provided to the Afghans for the construction of Camp Monitor is intended to build ministerial capacity for infrastructure development and that once "donated," the Afghan government does not need to coordinate its use with the U.S. Department of Defense. USFOR-A agreed with CSTC-A's statements, but added that it will continue to engage with the Afghans until the construction of the dining facility is complete. USFOR-A also stated that it will provide status updates to SIGAR accordingly. Based on USFOR-A's commitment to work with SIGAR, our recommendation is satisfied and we have deleted it from our final report.

SIGAR conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction


ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

The Afghan National Security Forces consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police. As of April 2013, the Department of Defense had obligated \$9.2 billion from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for hundreds of ANA and Afghan National Police infrastructure projects. One of these ANA projects, Camp Monitor,¹ was built in Jawzjan province, in northern Afghanistan bordering Turkmenistan (see figure 1). In April 2013, a Swedish Forward Operating Base, together with the adjacent Camp Monitor, was turned over to the ANA for use by the 2nd Kandak,² 1st Brigade, 209th Corps.

For this inspection, we assessed whether (1) construction had been completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities were being used as intended and maintained.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and at Camp Monitor from March 2013 through February 2014, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by a professional engineer in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.



BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2010, the Kabul Regional Contracting Center awarded the first of five contracts to construct Camp Monitor for the ANA. The first contract, with a 120-day period of performance, was awarded to Fazlullah Construction and Engineering Company (FCEC)/UI Projects Joint Venture for \$830,000 to construct three openbay barracks. Subsequently, Kabul Regional Contracting Center awarded two additional contracts for three more barracks, latrines, an administration building and force protection walls. The Regional Contracting Command–North also awarded two contracts for guard towers, a firing range, additional force protection walls as well as a dining facility; power plant; water well; leach field; 5,000 gallon fuel point; and connection of water, sewer, and electrical systems. The combined value of the five contracts was \$3.9 million. Appendix II lists the five contracts for Camp Monitor and related information. Appendix III contains a site map of Camp Monitor.

¹ Also referred to as the 3rd Kandak Monitor, Camp Monitor, Camp Monitor Forward Operating Base Sheberghan, ANA Build at Camp Monitor, and Sheberghan Camp Monitor. For consistency within this report, we use the term "Camp Monitor."

² An Afghan kandak, a battalion-sized unit, ranges from 352 to 800 personnel.

CAMP MONITOR WAS GENERALLY CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS, EXCEPT FOR THE DINING FACILITY

We conducted our Camp Monitor site inspection on March 2, 2013, and found no major construction flaws. For example, the administration building appeared to be well constructed with no sign of foundation cracks or non-functioning windows and doors. All light fixtures and electrical outlets in the administration building were installed, as well as safety items such as smoke detectors and fire extinguishers (see photo 1). The building containing the water tanks was well constructed. All hot water heaters for the showers and sinks were installed, and the pipes were well insulated. Camp Monitor's two 275 kilowatt generators appeared to be properly installed. The generators were not operational at the time of our site visit, so there was no electricity available to test the lighting, heating, water, sewage and other mechanical systems. As a result, we could not fully assess the extent to which Camp Monitor met some technical specifications of the contracts.

At the time of our inspection, Camp Monitor's dining facility had not been completed. The dining facility construction was limited to the concrete footings that appeared to be of poor quality with uneven and cracked concrete surfaces (see photo 2). The contract's scope for the dining facility called for a K-Span³ structure with concrete flooring. However, the Regional Support Command-North representative informed us that the contractor abandoned the dining facility construction project, and the contract was terminated.⁴

Photo 1 - Interior of Administration Building



Source: SIGAR, March 2, 2013.

Photo 2 - Footer for Abandoned Dining Facility



Source: SIGAR, March 2, 2013.

³ A K-Span building is a thin-gauge metal that is fabricated on site from coil sheets of steel. The sheet steel is continuously fed into the K-Span roll-forming machine, which cuts the sheet steel into the desired length. The channel is then fed into the second stage of the forming machine that curves it to the desired radius.

⁴ The Regional Support Command-North representative told us that, according to the contractor, it ran out of funds and therefore abandoned the project.

IT IS UNCLEAR IF CAMP MONITOR IS BEING USED AS INTENDED

At the time of our March 2, 2013, site inspection, Camp Monitor was unoccupied. All facilities—the barracks, administration building, latrines, and firing ranges—were empty and unused. The Regional Support Command-North representative told us that the camp could not be used due to the lack of a dining facility. The Regional Support Command-North representative told us during our site visit that action was underway to find a new contractor to complete the dining facility. The representative noted, however, that the command's efforts to find a contractor were being hampered by the fact that Camp Monitor was in a location that would soon be inaccessible to U.S. government contracting officers and contracting officer representatives, due to the closure of coalition bases in the area.

In November 2013, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) organization responsible for managing construction of Afghan National Security Force facilities in Afghanistan—informed us that it had provided design and cost estimates to the Afghan Ministry of Defense's Construction and Property Management Department and provided \$1.2 million in direct assistance⁵ to the Afghan government to complete construction of Camp Monitor. Although CSTC-A documents indicate that NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) would track the expenditure of this direct assistance and the project's progress, CSTC-A/NTM-A officials were unable to tell us the status of the dining facility, when and if ANA personnel began occupying the camp, or the number of personnel currently occupying it. However, USFOR-A officials told us in January 2014 that the Construction and Property Management Department engineers had informed them that 60 percent of the dining facility was completed and that more than 700 ANA personnel had been occupying the camp for nearly 6 months. The Afghan engineers added that food was being prepared in a temporary kitchen and served to ANA personnel in tents.

Camp Monitor is located in an area that can no longer be reached by U.S. civilian employees because it sits outside the so-called "oversight bubble."⁶ The "oversight bubbles" are defined by the ability of the U.S. government to provide both adequate security and rapid emergency medical support to civilians traveling to the area. As a result, SIGAR inspectors can no longer access this area and cannot independently verify that the dining facility is being constructed in accordance with the contract requirements or whether the camp is being used as intended.

CONCLUSION

The facilities we inspected at Camp Monitor appeared to be well constructed, but we could not fully assess the camp's lighting, heating, water, sewer, and other mechanical systems because the generators were not operational at the time of our inspection in March 2013. The camp's greatest shortcoming was the lack of a dining facility, which prevented the ANA from occupying and using the facility. CSTC-A addressed the problem by providing \$1.2 million in direct assistance to the Afghan government to construct the dining facility, and Afghan personnel in January 2014 told U.S. officials that the dining facility was under construction and 60 percent complete, with 700 ANA personnel using the base. However, we are concerned that CSTC-A officials could not provide us with any oversight information regarding the status of the dining facility's construction or whether the ANA was currently occupying the camp. As a result, the U.S. government is relying solely on the Afghan government to report on the spending of U.S.-provided funding, the progress of construction, and how the camp is being used. In our view, oversight by CSTC-A or NTM-A is needed to ensure funds are being spent properly, construction of the dining facility is completed in accordance with requirements, and the camp is being used as intended.

⁵ Direct assistance is aid that a U.S. government agency implements through bilateral agreements with an Afghan government entity.

⁶ U.S. military officials have told us that they will provide civilian access only to areas within a 1-hour round trip, using air assets, of an advanced medical facility.

AGENCY COMMENTS

CSTC-A and USFOR-A provided written comments on a draft of this inspection report. Their comments were incorporated into the final report, as appropriate. Their comments are reproduced in appendices IV and V, respectively.

A draft of our report contained a recommendation to the Commander, USFOR-A, to direct the Commanding General, CSTC-A, to determine and report on the status of U.S. funds provided to the Afghan government for construction of the dining facility at Camp Monitor and that such reporting should continue until the facility is completed. CSTC-A Commanding General did not concur with the recommendation, on the basis that direct assistance provided to the Afghan government (identified as 'Code 25105' funds for construction projects) is intended to build ministerial capacity in infrastructure development. As such, it is up to the Afghans to choose and prioritize the projects that they want to undertake. CSTC-A further states that once funds are "donated," the Afghan government may use those funds without further coordination with the U.S. Department of Defense.

We do not question the Afghan government's selection of the dining facility at Camp Monitor as a project to be undertaken. We do, however, question CSTC-A's position that it is not required to track and report on the status of those funds as our recommendation stated. We believe that CSTC-A has the responsibility to provide stewardship over funds provided to the Afghan government for construction of the dining facility and all other projects funded with U.S. appropriated funds, whether they are provided directly or otherwise. Indeed, CSTC-A's comments show that its CJ8 Financial Management Oversight division has the capability to "disburse, monitor, assess, and audit direct assistance funding." Moreover, as noted in our report, documents provided by CSTC-A indicate that one of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan's responsibilities is to track the expenditure of this direct assistance and the project's progress.

USFOR-A agreed with CSTC-A's comments, but stated that it will continue to engage the Afghan government until construction is completed and it will provide status updates to SIGAR. USFOR-A's commitment to monitoring the outcome of this project and providing us with further information satisfies our recommendation. Therefore, we deleted this recommendation from our final report.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY


This report provides SIGAR's inspection results of the Afghan National Army's Camp Monitor located in Jawzjan province, in northern Afghanistan bordering Turkmenistan. We conducted our inspection on March 2, 2013, under code SIGAR I-006L. However, our inspection was limited because the facility's generators were not operational and, therefore, were not producing electricity. Due to the lack of electricity, we could not test Camp Monitor's lighting, heating, water, sewage and other mechanical systems.

To determine whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities were being used as intended and maintained, we

- reviewed relevant contract documents that were available to understand project requirements and contract administration;
- interviewed cognizant U.S. officials concerning the operation and maintenance of the facility; and
- conducted a physical inspection and photographed the project site to observe the current status, quality of construction, and determine the sustainability of the facilities.

SIGAR conducted its work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and at the Camp Monitor site from March 2013 through February 2014, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by a professional engineer in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. However, we considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk.

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our inspection objectives. SIGAR conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.



APPENDIX II - AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAMP MONITOR SITE PLAN

Figure 2 - Site Plan for ANA Camp Monitor Showing the Swedish-Built and U.S./CPMD-Built Sides

Source: NTM-A/CSTC-A Engineering with SIGAR labels added

Note: CPMD is the Afghan Ministry of Defense's Construction and Property Management Department.

Contract Number	Date Awarded	Contractor	Period of Performance	Construction Requirement	Contract Amount	Amount Paid
W91B4M-10-R- 6514	12/4/10	Fazlullah Construction and Engineering Company (FCEC)/UI Projects Joint Venture	120 days	Three open-bay barracks	\$830,000	\$830,000
W91B4M-11-D- 6501, Task Order 1001	3/27/11	ARAO-Fellgroup Joint Venture	120 days	Three open-bay barracks	\$1,113,924	\$1,113,924
W91B4M-11-D- 6501, Task Order 1002	7/23/11	ARAO-Fellgroup Joint Venture	100 days	Three latrines, one administration building	\$712,302	\$712,302
W919QA-11-C- 0088	9/16/11	24 Construction Company	45 days	Three guard towers, firing range, force protection for the contractor	\$487,828	\$487,828
W919QA-12-C- 0001	12/16/11	Northern Rock Construction Company	100 days	Dining facility, power plant, water well, connect water, sewer, and electrical, leach field, 5,000 gallon fuel point	\$787,293	\$538,861
Totals					\$3,931,347	\$3,682,91

Table 1 - Five Contracts Awarded for Camp Monitor

Source: SIGAR analysis.

APPENDIX IV - COMMENTS FROM COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

Reverse and the second	COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN MINISTERIAL ADVISORY GROUP KABUL, AFGHANISTAN APO AE 09356	
REPLY TO ATTENTION OF CSTC-A	26 FEB 2014	
MEMORANDUM THRU	United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356 United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621	
FOR: Special Inspector Ge 22202-3940	eneral for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA	
Construction Appears To H	3 Draft Response to SIGAR Inspection Report: "Camp Monitor: Most lave Met Contract Requirements, But It Is Unclear If The Facility Is Being R Inspection Report I-006L).	
REFERENCE: Inspection Reconstruction (SIGAR).	Report, dated March 2014, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan	
1. The purpose of this men	norandum is to provide draft responses on the SIGAR Inspection Report.	
2. CSTC-A appreciates SIC constructed.	GAR's conclusion that the facilities at Camp Monitor appear to be well	
construct the Camp Monito capabilities to prioritize req infrastructure development.	with the recommendation. CSTC-A views the Afghan decision to fund and or Dining Facility on their own as signs of good progress in developing Afghan purements and execute their budget. To build ministerial capacity in . CSTC-A provided U.S. \$17.7 million in the Afghan FY1392 commitment of this commitment was specified "for construction of the dining facility at he Afghans had the responsibility for choosing and prioritizing those projects ed under Code 25105. It is important to remember that once funds are donated slamic Republic of Afghanistan, the sovereign nation may use those funds	See SIGA comment
Camp Monitor." Instead, the that could be properly funder to the Government of the Is	n with the United States Department of Defense.	
Camp Monitor." Instead, the that could be properly fund- to the Government of the Is without further coordination	n with the United States Department of Defense. action is CPT Todd R. Williams at DSN	

CSTC-A MAG INSPECTION REPORT RESPONSE

"Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears To Have Met Contract Requirements, But It Is Unclear If The Facility Is Being Used As Intended" (SIGAR Inspection Report I-006L)

1. Recommendation 1:

Determine and report to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan on the status of U.S. funds provided to the Afghan Ministry of Defense's Construction and Property Management Department for construction of the dining facility at Camp Monitor; reporting should continue until the dining facility is completed.

See SIGAR comment 2

a. CSTC-A response: CSTC-A non-concurs with SIGAR's recommendation. To build ministerial capacity in infrastructure development, CSTC-A provided U.S. \$17.7 million in the Afghan FY1392 commitment under Code 25105. None of this commitment was specified "for construction of the dining facility at Camp Monitor." Instead, the Afghans had the responsibility for choosing and prioritizing those projects that could be properly funded under Code 25105.

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) prioritizes their infrastructure requirements and executes a budget to develop a sustainable ministerial process. Under the current system in Afghanistan, like the system in the United States, a budget is prepared that requires a prioritization of the country's needs. Like in the United States, the Afghans may face difficult decisions when prioritizing a list of needs that may exceed the available budget. Having to work through this difficult process is an important step for the Afghans to learn to be self-sufficient.

CSTC-A CJ8 has multiple steps to disburse, monitor, assess and audit direct assistance funding. The CJ8 Financial Management Oversight (FMO) division disburses funds by specific 5-digit object code/commodities (military pay, incentives, fuel, etc.). Once GIRoA receives the funding, FMO tracks the expenditures and completes daily oversight of the funding. The CJ8 Audit division conducts audits of the direct contribution financial processes and procedures. These audits enter the Throttle process if the findings and recommendations are not addresses by GIRoA. GIRoA's ability to choose and prioritize projects to be funded under Code 25105 pursuant to this oversight shows that it is developing important skills to be self-sufficient.

APPROVED BY: Daniel D. Cappabianca COL, CSTC-A CJ8 Director PREPARED BY: Steven A, Strain Lt Col, CSTC-A CJ8 Deputy Director, DSN

Regis C. Worley, Jr. LCDR, CSTC-A CJ-ENG Operations and Integration Branch Chief

Page 1 of 1

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16 Dec 13

UNCLASSIFIED CSTC-A INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Camp Monitor construction projects

PURPOSE: To document the status of construction plans at Camp Monitor

Enclosures:

- Tab A: CSTC-A-Provided Statement of Work
- Tab B: CSTC-A-Provided Project Form
- Tab C: USACE-Provided Building Plans
- Tab D: Letter to Major General Ameree

Introduction: FOB Monitor (Sheberghan) was a Swedish Coalition Force camp in Jowzjan Province, RC-N. In April of 2013, the base was turned over to the ANSF to be used by a 1/209 ANA Kandak. The base, however, lacked certain infrastructure necessary to serve as an enduring ANSF base. Specifically, the base did not have a permanent Kitchen DFAC with mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems or related furnishing, fixtures, and equipment. NTM-A/CSTC-A advised the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MoD) Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) to fund such infrastructure using CPMD's own funds. Further, it has been reported that a 1/209 Kandak is currently living at the base.

Discussion:

CSTC-A Projects at Camp Monitor: CSTC-A has identified four Coalition projects for the ANA proposed at Camp Monitor. Two of these projects were cancelled prior to being awarded. The two others, identified by contract numbers W91B4M-11-D-6501 TO 1 and W91B4M-11-D-6501 TO 2, were completed in 2011. The contract amounts with S&A were \$1,113,924 and \$712,302, respectively. These two projects were executed by RSC North. Therefore, more information for these projects can be obtained from RSC North or RCC-E (or their successors). These four projects are summarized below:

Project Name	Executing Agent	Amount	Contract #	Status
2/1/209 Kandak 3D Panel TO #1	RSC North	\$1,113,924 (awarded)	W91B4M-11-D-6501 1001	Complete (2011)
2/1/209 Kandak 3D Panel TO #2	RSC North	\$712,302 (awarded)	W91B4M-11-D-6501	Complete (2011)
2/1/209 Kandak, Shibirghan	AEN	\$3,600,000 (planned)	(None)	Not Awarded
Air Unit Sherbergen	AEN	\$7,000,000 (planned)	(None)	Not Awarded

Direct Contribution Project Funding and Preparation: When FOB Monitor was turned over to the ANA, it did not have a permanent Kitchen DFAC. CSTC-A provided CPMD with a Statement of Work (Tab A) and project form (Tab B) in both English and Dari, as well as all necessary building specifications (Tab C) to complete the DFAC. A letter (Tab D) was drafted to Major General Engineer Ameree, Chief of CPMD, stating that it was intended for CPMD to be responsible for all work items associated with this DFAC project and that CPMD should execute the project using CPMD's existing funds, Code 25105.

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	100 C 100 C	
ANA	Camp	Monitor

According to Leonard Manning, a CSTC-A advisor, when CSTC-A made the requirement, CPMD had more than enough Code 25105 construction funds DFAC project. CSTC-A received independent government estimates for the were coalition-funded it would cost no more than \$1.2 million. Since CPMD complete the project for \$1.2 million, CSTC-A transferred the requirement (1) its own estimates for less than \$1.2 million and has funds available for this project.	remaining to complete the Kitchen e project and determined that if it had enough funding available to Tab D). CPIMD reportedly received
Under the current system in Afghanistan, like the system in the United State requires a prioritization of the country's needs. Like in the United States, the decisions when prioritizing a list of needs that may exceed the available bud projects or facilities that receive less funding than would be desired if the bu- ministerial advisors have been helping the Afghans through this process by questions: What do they have?; What do they need?; and What can they aff difficult process is an important step for the Afghans to learn to be self suffic "wants" in front of required "needs." By transferring the Kitchen DFAC proje an opportunity to prioritize the needs of the transferred facilities at Camp Mo could be satisfied under Code 25105 in order to create a list of priorities that are important for a nascent country to develop, and CSTC-A desires to assist	e Afghans may face difficult liget. As a result, there are some idget were unlimited. The CSTC-A leading them through a series of ford? Having to work through this silent and to not put discretionary ct, GIROA can use this situation as mitor to the other MoD needs that t can receive funding. Such skills
Direct Contribution Project Status: As of December of 2013, CSTC-A has currently mobilized at FOB Monitor and that construction is well underway. occupying the base during the DFAC construction.	
Conclusion: The former Swedish camp FOB Monitor was transferred to the Kitchen DFAC. CSTC-A provided CPMD with building plans, a statement of in completing the Kitchen DFAC project. CPMD has sufficient FY13 funds to December 2013, it has been reported that a contractor was mobilized on site underway.	f work, and a project form to assist o complete the project. As of

APPROVED BY COL WILLIAM H. GRAHAM, DIRECTOR, CSTC-A CJENG	PREPARED BY LCDR REGIS C. WORLEY
UNCL	ASSIFIED

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NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN KABUL, AFGHANISTAN APO AE 09356

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: NTM-A ENG Serial Number: Serial Letter#1392-096

May 15, 2013

or email

Major General Engineer Ameree Chief of Construction and Property Management Department Ministry of Defense Kabul, Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Turn Over of the Sheberghan/Camp Monitor Dining Facility (DFAC) construction as a Direct Contribution Project

Respected Major General Ameree:

- NTM-A and CSTC-A have determined that it is in the best interests of the Afghan National Government, the Afghan National Army, and the Coalition Forces that the construction of the Camp Monitor Dining Facility (DFAC) be transferred to Ministry of Defense (MoD) Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) for design, contracting, award, construction, and closeout.
- CPMD shall develop a complete scope of work (SoW) as well as all designs for this facility. All
 designs developed by CPMD will be Site Adapt.
- It is expected that CPMD, through its selected construction contractor will build and be responsible for all work items associated with thisproject.
- Request CPMD execute this project from existing funds in Code 25105 as stated in the NTM-A/CSTC-A Comitment Letter

5. If you have any questions, please contact Leonard M. Manning at

Sincerely WILLIAM H. GRAHAM

COL (OF-5), EN, USA Engineering Director NTM-A/CSTC-A

SIGAR's Response to Comments from CSTC-A

 CSTC-A stated that direct assistance provided to the Afghan government (identified as 'Code 25105' funds for construction projects) is intended to build ministerial capacity in infrastructure development. As such, it is up to the Afghans to choose and prioritize the projects that could be properly funded under that code. CSTC-A also stated that once funds are "donated" to the Afghan government, it may use those funds without further coordination with the U.S. Department of Defense.

We do not question the Afghan government's selection of the dining facility at Camp Monitor as a project to be funded under Code 25105. We do, however, question CSTC-A's position that it is not required to track and report on the status of those funds as our recommendation states. We believe that CSTC-A has the responsibility to provide stewardship over funds provided to the Afghan government for construction of the dining facility and all other projects funded with U.S. appropriated funds, whether they be provided directly or otherwise. Indeed, CSTC-A's comments show that its CJ8 Financial Management Oversight division has the capability to "disburse, monitor, assess, and audit direct assistance funding."

2. Although we disagree with CSTC-A's assertions, we have deleted this recommendation from our final report because USFOR-A has committed to track the status of this project and provide updates to SIGAR.

APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN



HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN KABUL, AFGHANISTAN APO AE 09354

USFOR-A DCDR-S

March 2014

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

FOR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-3940

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Response to the SIGAR Draft Report on "Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Requirements, but It Is Unclear if the Facility Is Being Used as Intended," February 2014

1. References:

a. SIGAR Draft Report, February 2014

b. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) memo to SIGAR Draft Report, dated 26 February 2014

I have reviewed the SIGAR draft report (I-006L) and concur with CSTC-A's response to the subject draft report and provide the following additional comments.

3. USFOR-A has determined that construction of the dining facility is on-going, by an Afghansourced contractor and in accordance with the 1/209 Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Kandak's needs. Photographs received from local Afghan engineers on 25 February 2014 show substantial progress, estimated at 75-80% completion. This progress indicates the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's development in the areas of self-sufficiency and requirements prioritization. However, in our commitment to good stewardship, USFOR-A will continue to engage our Afghan partners through building completion, and will provide updates to SIGAR accordingly.

4. Point of Contact for this action is COL Thurinton Harvell at DSN error or via e-mail at

Encls: 1. CSTC-A Response, 26 Feb 2014 2. SIGAR Draft Report, Feb 2014 3. Photographs of DFAC Construction

DEFINITY N. COLT Major General, U.S. Army Deputy Commander, Support United States Forces-Afghanistan

SIGAR's Response to Comments from USFOR-A

1. Based on USFOR-A's commitment to monitoring the outcome of this project and providing us with further information, we have deleted the recommendation from our final report.

APPENDIX VI - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Scott Harmon, Senior Inspections Manager Brian Flynn, Senior Audit Manager Angelina Johnston, Senior Auditor William Shimp, Senior Auditor Ron Snyder, P.E., Engineer This inspection report was conducted under project code SIGAR-I-006L

SIGAR's Mission

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