



August 29, 2025

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Secretary of State

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's audit of the Department of State's (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement's (Bureau) efforts to implement conventional weapons destruction (CWD) programming in Afghanistan following the Taliban's takeover of the country in August 2021. The objectives of the audit were to assess the extent to which the Bureau (1) modified its CWD programming following the Taliban's takeover, (2) conducted oversight of its CWD programming, and (3) met its CWD programming targets and State's CWD strategic objectives. At the time of our work, the Bureau had 18 CWD awards valued at \$51.6 million: 8 awards were ongoing when the Taliban's takeover occurred (valued at \$22 million), and 10 were initiated after the takeover (valued at \$29.6 million).¹ As of December 31, 2024, 13 of the 18 CWD awards were completed, while the remaining 5 were ongoing.² See enclosure I for further details on each of the 18 awards.

Although State is no longer providing foreign assistance to Afghanistan, State may wish to consider our findings if it resumes CWD operations there. We found that the Taliban allowed the Bureau and its implementing partners to continue CWD activities after the takeover of Afghanistan. As a result, the Bureau continued its ongoing CWD programs, initiated new CWD programs, gained access to sites contaminated with explosive remnants that were previously inaccessible due to Taliban insurgency operations, and modified ongoing CWD programming activities to fit Afghanistan's changed operating environment. However, we also found the Bureau did not adhere to every oversight requirement, such as ensuring its targets were measurable or consistent, not retaining required award documentation, and not ensuring award documentation contained required data. Lastly, we found only 2 of the Bureau's 18 awards met all their targets.

I am submitting this report under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 4. To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed State guidance related to oversight requirements, including its Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign Assistance Directive. We requested and analyzed information from State regarding its implementation of CWD awards in Afghanistan from August 15, 2021, through December 31, 2024. We also conducted interviews with officials from State, its implementing partners, and other organizations performing CWD work in Afghanistan. We conducted our work in Arlington, Virginia, from November 2023 through August 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a

¹ Our audit examined the Bureau's CWD programming in Afghanistan that was active during the period of August 15, 2021, through December 31, 2024, and included CWD-specific objectives such as land clearance. Our scope excluded Bureau awards that only had non-CWD-specific objectives, such as victim services for individuals disabled by explosive remnants of war. Including all programming, the Bureau had 12 awards (valued at \$41.7 million) at the time of the Taliban's takeover, and subsequently initiated another 16 awards (valued at \$40.6 million) for a total of 28 awards (valued at \$82.2 million) during the audit's scope.

² In January 2025, the President signed Executive Order 14169, which initiated a 90-day pause on all U.S. foreign assistance for an "assessment of programmatic efficiencies and consistency with United States foreign policy." In carrying out the executive order, the Bureau sent "notices of suspension" to its implementing partners in January 2025, pausing CWD programming in Afghanistan. In April 2025, the Bureau officially terminated all CWD programming in Afghanistan. See, Executive Order 14169 of January 20, 2025, *Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8619.

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment. State had no comments.

State Modified Its CWD Programming Due to Changes in Afghanistan's Operating Environment

State guidance requires that when there is a significant change in the operating environment for State-funded programming activities, bureaus must adjust programming activities and targets, as necessary, to ensure program success and conduct a new risk assessment. State guidance also notes that bureaus should update their country-wide strategic plans and increase program reporting requirements.³ We found that the Bureau complied with these requirements following the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. Specifically, the Bureau reevaluated its CWD ongoing awards and programming activities; modified award terms, programming activities, and targets, as necessary; terminated an ongoing CWD award; updated its strategic CWD plan for Afghanistan; and increased reporting requirements for its implementing partners. We also found that following the Taliban's takeover, the Bureau terminated capacity building programming activities because it could not work with Taliban-controlled governing institutions. Bureau officials told us that the changes to its CWD awards were intended to ensure that the Taliban did not interfere in programming activities, or receive U.S. funding or any other benefits from its programming.

State Conducted Oversight of Its CWD Efforts and Used a Third-Party Monitor for Site Visits, But Could Not Demonstrate It Performed Every Required Oversight Function

Federal law and State guidance require oversight of foreign assistance programming, which includes developing performance indicators, setting clear and measurable targets to monitor and track programming progress, monitoring implementing partner progress, retaining oversight documents, and using site visits or third-party monitors to verify implementing partner performance and progress.⁴ We found that although the Bureau utilized a third-party monitor to assess implementing partner performance and perform site visits, the Bureau did not perform all required oversight functions.

State Used a Third-Party Monitor to Perform Site Visits

We found that the Bureau used a third-party monitor to oversee its implementing partners' CWD programming activities in Afghanistan.⁵ The agreements required the third-party monitor to provide various forms of technical support, conduct site assessments, monitor and evaluate CWD programming activities, and provide the Bureau with progress reports. We found the Bureau complied with State guidance because it used a third-party monitor to perform oversight functions, including site visits, of its implementing partners' programming activities. After

³ Since SIGAR examined the Bureau's compliance with State's requirement to conduct a new risk assessment in a separate audit, we did not examine the Bureau's compliance with this requirement for this audit. See, SIGAR, *State Risk Assessments for Assistance Projects: Bureaus Prepared Required Assessments, But Inconsistencies May Increase Project Risk*, 25-27-AR, July 7, 2025. State, FAD, chapter 2 section K, chapter 3 section H, chapter 4 section D, E, and F, October 2021. State, 18 FAM 301.2-4(C), "Strategic Plan Revisions," October 20, 2022.

⁴ Performance indicators are used to observe an award's progress and to measure its actual results. Each performance indicator has a target, which is the expected result that actual programming progress is measured against. Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-191, § 3, 130 Stat. 666, 667; Records Management by Federal Agencies, 44 U.S.C. § 3101; State 5 FAM 400, "Records Management Policy," December 22, 2023; State, 18 FAM 300, "Strategic Direction and Management," October 20, 2022; State, FAD, chapter 2 section N(2), Ver. 6.1, October 2021; State, FAD, chapter 4 section D, Ver. 6.1, October 2021.

⁵ In September 2017, the Bureau entered into a \$11.3 million agreement with a third-party monitor. In September 2022, the Bureau entered into a second agreement, valued at \$5.0 million, with the same third-party monitor and same objectives as the first agreement.

reviewing the third-party monitor's reports, we found that the third-party monitor performed its work through 911 site visits and by observing the destruction of nearly 80,000 individual explosive remnants of war. Further, we determined the third-party monitor complied with both agreements' requirements. Specifically, the third-party monitor (1) provided grant management support, (2) provided planning and development support on 15 CWD awards, (3) provided CWD technical support, (4) conducted pre- and post-CWD site assessments, (5) conducted monitoring and evaluation of all CWD activities for 18 awards, and (6) provided all required reports to the Bureau.

State Did Not Ensure Every Performance Indicator Target Was Documented Consistently

When we analyzed the required documentation for the Bureau's 13 completed awards, we found that for 11 of those awards, the performance indicator targets listed between the required documents varied for the same award. For example, one award agreement included a performance indicator target to clear nearly 6.3 million square meters to be cleared, while the award's progress reports and final report listed the performance indicator target as 12.5 million square meters. In another example, an award agreement included a performance indicator target requiring the implementing partner to clear 29 hazardous sites in 8 villages; however, the award's progress reports listed the target as 25 hazardous sites in an unspecified number of villages and its final report listed the target as 25 hazardous sites in 9 villages.

Inconsistencies in performance indicator targets between award documents compromises the Bureau's ability to accurately track an award's progress, identify potential implementation challenges, and assess an award's or implementing partner's overall effectiveness. Without clarity and consistency, officials retroactively reviewing awards may not be able to determine what the correct performance indicator target was or whether an award met its performance indicator targets.

State Did Not Ensure Every Performance Indicator Target Was Measurable

When we analyzed the performance indicator targets for the Bureau's 18 awards and its third-party monitoring agreements, we determined that not every performance indicator target was measurable. Specifically, we found that that Bureau wrote 5 of the 139 (4 percent) CWD performance indicator targets, and 25 of the 41 (61 percent) third-party monitoring performance indicator targets in a manner that prevented it from measuring the performance indicator to determine whether it had been met. For example, the Bureau's third-party monitoring agreements did not state how many site assessments the third-party monitor was to perform or define what activities the third-party monitor should perform during the visits. As a result, the Bureau would be unable to gauge whether the third-party monitor's 911 site assessments, or the activities the third-party monitor performed during those visits, were sufficient to achieve both agreement's objectives or whether the Bureau's CWD programming activities were encountering challenges. In another example, a CWD award contained a performance indicator that required the implementing partner to perform education sessions for community members; however, the performance indicator did not specify a target that could be measured, such as the number of sessions held or number of individuals educated, thus preventing the Bureau from determining whether the implementing partner met the performance indicator's target.

Bureau awards containing performance indicators targets that cannot be measured is not a new issue. Our January 2022 report examining the Bureau's CWD activities in Afghanistan identified the same problem, finding that the Bureau did not ensure that every performance indicator had a clear and measurable target. That audit also found the Bureau lacked a method to evaluate implementing partner performance or whether its CWD awards met their intended objectives.⁶ Without performance indicators having measurable targets or defining how a target is met, the Bureau cannot assess programming progress, implementing partner performance, whether awards met their objectives, or whether the Bureau was successful in its strategic objectives.

⁶ SIGAR, *Demining Afghanistan: State Made Progress in Its Demining Efforts, But Did Not Conduct Timely Oversight and the Amount of Contaminated Land Increased*, SIGAR 22-11-AR, January 14, 2022.

State Could Not Provide the Required Data for Every Performance Indicator

When we analyzed the whether the 134 measurable performance indicators contained within Bureau's 18 awards met their targets, we found that the Bureau could not provide the required data for 31 of the 134 (23 percent) performance indicators to make such a determination. For example, an award included a performance indicator target that required 94 persons to be hired in Kabul and Laghman provinces and 162 persons in Baghlan province; however, the award's final report did not include data on the number of individuals hired. In another example, a performance indicator required the implementing partner to staff seven people on each demining team; however, the award's performance progress reports did not provide data on demining team staffing levels. This lack of data within award documents prevented us from determining whether the Bureau's CWD awards met every performance indicator target.

Despite State guidance requiring that award documentation include data on performance indicators, the Bureau did not ensure this inclusion. Without these data, the Bureau lacked information needed to address potential award performance issues or to adopt best practices that could have improved target outcomes.

State Could Not Provide Every Required Award Document

When we analyzed the documentation required by the Bureau's 18 awards, we determined the Bureau was unable to provide every required document. For its 13 completed awards, we found that the Bureau could not provide every required award document for 7 of those awards, and provided, on average, 84 percent of quarterly progress reports, 94 percent of quarterly financial reports, and 85 percent of its final closeout reports. For its 5 ongoing awards, we determined that the Bureau provided all required award documents for 4 of those awards, and for the fifth award, provided 89 percent of its quarterly progress and financial reports. For its two third-party monitoring agreements, the Bureau provided us all the required award documents. See enclosure II for a list of the 18 awards and the percentage of documents the Bureau provided for the respective award.

Despite federal regulations and State guidance requiring the Bureau to retain required award documents, the Bureau was unable to do so. Without these required documents, the Bureau is unable to prove that implementing partners provided the required reports, the Bureau reviewed those reports to ensure programming performance, and the Bureau retained required records of implementing partner activities. Federal law requires government agencies to maintain records of their activities, in part, to protect the legal and financial rights of the government and persons affected by the government's activities.⁷ Moreover, the Bureau's programing responses to the changes in Afghanistan's operating environment underscores the importance of State retaining complete, timely, and accurate records, as these records are critical to understanding how State made programming decisions.

While Only 2 of the 18 Awards Met All Their Performance Indicator Targets, State Made Progress in Meeting Its Strategic CWD Objectives

We determined that 2 of the Bureau's 18 CWD awards met all their performance indicator targets as of December 31, 2024. Of the 134 clear and measurable performance indicator targets contained within these 18 awards, 99 were for the 13 completed awards and the remaining 35 were for the 5 ongoing awards. The Bureau's awards can contain both CWD-specific and non-CWD specific performance indicator targets, depending on the award's objectives. Examples of CWD-specific performance indicator targets include the amount of land cleared of explosive remnants of war or the number of explosive remnants of war destroyed. Examples of non-CWD-specific performance indicator targets include the number of education sessions held or victim services provided. We also found that despite 16 of its 18 awards not meeting all their performance indicator targets, the Bureau's CWD efforts cleared land and reduced the hazard of explosive remnants of war in Afghanistan, demonstrating progress toward its strategic objective.

⁷ Records Management by Federal Agencies, 44 U.S.C. § 3101.

When we examined the 99 performance indicator targets for the Bureau's 13 completed awards, we found that only two awards met all their performance indicator targets; however, 4 awards met all their CWD-specific performance indicator targets despite missing some non-CWD-specific performance indicator targets. Specifically, the Bureau met 51 (52 percent) of its performance indicator targets and did not meet 24 (24 percent) of its performance indicator targets. We could not determine whether the bureau met the remaining 24 performance indicator targets because the award documents lacked the required data. However, when we analyzed whether the 13 awards met their CWD-specific performance indicator targets, we determined that 18 of their 25 (72 percent) CWD-specific performance indicator targets were met. Enclosure III lists each completed award and its respective number of clear and measurable performance indicator targets, number of performance indicator targets met and not met, number of undeterminable performance indicator targets, and percentage of CWD-specific performance indicator targets met.

When we examined the 35 performance indicators in the Bureau's 5 ongoing awards, we found that none had met or were on track to meet every performance indicator target. Specifically, the Bureau met or were on track to meet 13 (37 percent) of its performance indicator targets, 15 (43 percent) did not meet or were not on track to be met, and 7 (20 percent) were undeterminable due to a lack of required data. However, when we analyzed whether the 5 ongoing awards were on track to meet their CWD-specific performance indicator targets, we determined that 7 of its 13 (54 percent) CWD-specific performance indicator targets were met or on track to being met. Enclosure III lists each ongoing award and its respective performance indicators, period of performance, and status as of December 31, 2024.

While only 2 of the 18 awards met all their performance indicator targets, we found that the Bureau made progress towards its strategic objectives. The Bureau's mission is to deliver programs to reduce the harmful effects of CWD, including explosive remnants of war, with one of its strategic objectives being to improve the stability and prosperity of a country by clearing land that contains explosive remnants of war and returning it to productive use. When we analyzed the Bureau's CWD award objectives as applied to Afghanistan, we found those objectives were aimed at increasing safety for Afghans who live around land that contains explosive remnants of war and returning unusable land to productive use for water, agriculture, and other livelihood activities. As such, we determined the Bureau's CWD programming was in line with its strategic objectives. Furthermore, while only 2 awards met all their performance indicator targets, the Bureau did make progress towards achieving the Bureau's strategic objectives by clearing land of explosive remnants of war and reducing the hazard of these explosives to local and returnee populations.

Conclusion

Although the Bureau's awards made some progress in its CWD efforts in Afghanistan, its strategic CWD objectives in Afghanistan appear unattainable for the foreseeable future. The Bureau has demonstrated its ability to modify its CWD programming to take into account the challenges posed by Afghanistan's operating environment, including by using a third-party monitor to perform site visits. Despite these modifications, the Bureau did not ensure every performance indicator had measurable targets or ensure that every award document contained the clarity and data as required by State guidance. Having award documents contain the required data provides insight into which programming activities were successful and which were facing problems. Without these data, the Bureau could not properly evaluate whether its strategic CWD objectives or individual award performance indicator targets were being met, nor could it understand how to adjust its programming to improve the chances of success.

Recommendations

SIGAR is not making any recommendations because State no longer provides U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan. However, should the U.S. government resume assistance to Afghanistan, we encourage State to abide by all federal and agency guidance regarding performance indicators having clear and measurable targets, documentation retention, and other oversight requirements.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment. State had no comments.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Gene Aloise".

Gene Aloise
Acting Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Enclosures (3)

ENCLOSURE I: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF REMOVAL AND ABATEMENT’S CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION DEMINING AWARD AGREEMENTS

As of December 31, 2024, the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (the Bureau) had 18 awards in Afghanistan that included conventional weapons destruction (CWD) activities, such as land clearance. These 18 awards were valued at \$51.6 million: 8 that were ongoing at the time of the time of the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 (valued at \$22 million), and 10 that were initiated after the takeover (valued at \$29.6 million).⁸ Table 1 lists the Bureau’s CWD awards that were active during the scope of our audit with their respective award type, award amount, and period of performance.

Table 1 - State’s CWD Awards Active from September 1, 2021, through December 31, 2024

No.	Award Number	Award Type	Period of Performance	Award Amount
1	20-GR-0011	Grant	Mar. 2020–Mar. 2025	\$3,600,000
2	20-GR-0040	Grant	Jul. 2020–Apr. 2022	\$2,250,000
3	20-GR-0044	Grant	Jun. 2020–Sept. 2021	\$4,422,320
4	20-GR-0046	Grant	Jul. 2020–Nov. 2021	\$3,419,689
5	20-GR-0051	Grant	Sept. 2020–Oct. 2021	\$1,420,000
6	20-GR-0064	Grant	Aug. 2020–Nov. 2021	\$457,500
7	21-GR-3012	Grant	Apr. 2021–Sept. 2025	\$4,539,800
8	21-GR-3013	Grant	Mar. 2021–Nov. 2022	\$1,926,985
9	21-GR-3049	Grant	Nov. 2021–Mar. 2024	\$5,706,506
10	21-GR-3050	Grant	Oct. 2021–Dec. 2022	\$1,582,878
11	21-GR-3051	Grant	Oct. 2021–Sept. 2024	\$4,750,000
12	22-GR-0013	Grant	Jul. 2022–Apr. 2025	\$2,250,000
13	22-GR-0015	Grant	Jul. 2022–May 2024	\$3,477,103
14	22-GR-0018	Grant	Jul. 2022–Jul. 2024	\$3,455,000
15	22-GR-0019	Grant	Aug. 2022–Jan. 2025	\$3,282,000
16	22-GR-0020	Grant	Aug. 2022–Jan. 2023	\$520,142
17	22-GR-0021	Grant	Aug. 2022–Aug. 2023	\$600,000
18	22-GR-0037	Grant	Oct. 2022–Mar. 2025	\$3,953,780
Total				\$51,613,703

Source: SIGAR analysis of State’s CWD awards.

⁸ Our audit examined the Bureau’s CWD programming in Afghanistan that was active during the period of August 15, 2021, through December 31, 2024, and included CWD-specific objectives such as land clearance. We excluded the Bureau awards within our scope that only had non-CWD-specific objectives, such as victim services for individuals disabled by explosive remnants of war. Inclusive of all programming, the Bureau had 12 awards (valued at \$41.7 million) at the time of the Taliban’s takeover, and subsequently initiated another 16 awards (valued at \$40.5 million), for a total of 28 awards (valued at \$82.2 million) during the audit’s scope.

ENCLOSURE II: ANALYSIS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF REMOVAL AND ABATEMENT’S AWARD DOCUMENTATION

As part of our assessment of the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’s (the Bureau) award oversight, we requested the Bureau to provide us with its conventional weapons destruction (CWD) award required documents—performance progress, financial, site visit, and final closeout reports—for the period of August 15, 2021, through December 31, 2024. We determined that the Bureau could not provide the required award documentation for 7 of the 13 completed CWD awards. In addition, our analysis found that the Bureau retained the required award documentation for 4 of its 5 ongoing CWD awards and provided 89 percent of quarterly progress and financial reports for the fifth award. Lastly, we also found the Bureau retained the required award documents for its two third-party monitoring agreements. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis, including each completed award and the percentage of its respective completed progress, financial, and final reports the Bureau provided us.

Table 2 - Analysis of Oversight Documentation for State’s 13 Completed CWD Awards

No.	Award Number	Percent of Progress Reports Completed	Percent of Financial Reports Completed	Final Progress Report
1	20-GR-0040	75	100	Yes
2	20-GR-0044	100	100	Yes
3	20-GR-0046	50	100	Yes
4	20-GR-0051	50	50	Yes
5	20-GR-0064	50	100	Yes
6	21-GR-3013	100	100	Yes
7	21-GR-3049	91	91	Yes
8	21-GR-3050	100	100	Yes
9	21-GR-3051	100	100	Yes
10	22-GR-0015	100	100	No
11	22-GR-0018	100	100	Yes
12	22-GR-0020	100	100	Yes
13	22-GR-0021	80	80	No

Source: SIGAR analysis of State CWD awards and required oversight reports.

As part of our review of the required award documentation, we analyzed the documentation to ensure it contained the required data. We determined that 11 of the 13 completed awards contained inconsistent performance indicator targets across award documents. For example, an award agreement included a performance indicator target that called for implementing partners to clear nearly 6.3 million square meters to be cleared, while the award’s progress reports and final report listed the performance indicator’s target as 12.9 million square meters. Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis and lists each completed award and its respective performance indicator target inconsistencies.

Table 3 - Analysis of Performance Indicator Target Reporting Inconsistencies for State's 13 Completed CWD Awards

No.	Award Number	Percent of Award Target Descriptions Not Matching Final IP Report	Percent of Award Target Descriptions Not Matching Final Report	Percent of Results Not Included in Final IP Report	Percent of Results Not Included in Final Report
1	20-GR-0040	100	80	40	40
2	20-GR-0044	100	100	0	0
3	20-GR-0046	0	0	0	33
4	20-GR-0051	88	63	0	63
5	20-GR-0064	25	0	0	50
6	21-GR-3013	40	0	20	40
7	21-GR-3049	45	45	18	64
8	21-GR-3050	60	0	0	70
9	21-GR-3051	75	75	13	50
10	22-GR-0015	N/A*	50	N/A*	50
11	22-GR-0018	100	100	13	50
12	22-GR-0020	0	0	29	43
13	22-GR-0021	0	8	8	31

Source: SIGAR analysis of State CWD award progress and grant officer representative reports.

* The Bureau did not provide the final performance progress report.

ENCLOSURE III: ANALYSIS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF REMOVAL AND ABATEMENT’S ONGOING CWD AWARD PERFORMANCE INDICATOR TARGET DATA

As part of our audit of the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’s (the Bureau) conventional weapons destruction (CWD) programming, we assessed whether the Bureau’s awards were meeting their performance indicator targets. The details of our analysis of the Bureau’s thirteen completed awards are contained in Table 4. The details of our analysis of the five ongoing awards are contained in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 4 identifies each of the 13 completed award and its respective end date, number of performance indicator targets, number of performance indicator targets met and not met, number of undeterminable performance indicator targets, and the percentages of all performance indicator targets and CWD-specific performance indicator targets met.

Table 4 - Performance Indicator Target Data for State’s 13 Completed CWD Awards

No.	Award Number	End Date	Total Measurable Targets	Targets Met	Targets Not Met	Undeterminable Targets	Percent of Targets Met	Percent of CWD-Specific Targets Met
1	20-GR-0040	April 2022	5	0	3	2	0	0
2	20-GR-0044	Sept. 2021	2	2	0	0	100	100
3	20-GR-0046	Nov. 2021	9	7	2	0	78	100
4	20-GR-0051	Oct. 2021	8	4	4	0	50	33
5	20-GR-0064	Nov. 2021	4	2	2	0	50	100
6	21-GR-3013	Nov. 2022	5	2	3	0	40	50
7	21-GR-3049	March 2024	11	5	2	4	45	100
8	21-GR-3050	Dec. 2022	10	10	0	0	100	100
9	21-GR-3051	Sept. 2024	8	3	4	1	38	50
10	22-GR-0015	May 2024	12	*	*	12	*	*
11	22-GR-0018	July 2024	8	3	4	1	38	25
12	22-GR-0020	Jan. 2023	6	4	-	2	67	50
13	22-GR-0021	Aug. 2023	11	9	-	2	82	100
Total			99	51	24	24	52	67

Source: SIGAR analysis of State CWD award progress reports.

* The Bureau could not provide the final performance progress report for this award, which contains the final target measurements. Due to the lack of data for performance indicator targets, we were unable to determine whether the award met its performance indicator targets.

In Tables 5 and 6, we detail the results of our analysis for the Bureau’s five ongoing CWD awards, describing each respective award’s performance indicators and their targets, and the performance indicators target’s current status. In determining each performance indicator target’s current status, we noted: (1) if the performance

indicator target could not be measured due to how the Bureau wrote the target; (2) if the performance indicator target had met its outcome; (3) if the performance indicator's outcome was not met, if the target's percentage complete to date based on the most recent performance progress report; or (4) if the target's status is undeterminable because the target's outcome data was not included in performance progress report.

Table 5 lists the status of award 21-GR-3012's performance indicator target outcomes as of September 30, 2024, which is the date of its most recent performance progress report that the Bureau provided. Table 6 provides the status of remaining four ongoing CWD awards performance indicator outcomes as of December 31, 2024.

Table 5 - Performance Indicator Target Data for State's Ongoing CWD Award 21-GR-3012, as of September 30, 2024

No.	Performance Indicator Target Description	Completion Date	Status to Date
1	Survey 228 villages.	October 2022	Met
2	Destroy 1,026 U.S.-metric tons of sub-surface ammunition, explosives, and explosive source material.	September 2025	66%
3	228 explosive ordnance risk education sessions.	October 2022	Met
4	3,420 mixed gender beneficiaries.	October 2022	Met
5	Deploy 9 disposal teams for 12 months (or 108 team months.)	October 2024	Met
6	Disposal teams consist of 7 persons per team.	October 2024	Undeterminable
7	Deploy 9 disposal teams for 11 months.	September 2025	Undeterminable
8	Disposal teams consist of the 8 persons per team.	September 2025	Undeterminable
9	Disposal teams will be supported by the full time equivalent of 4 operations management staff including the weapons and ammunition management operations officer, weapons and ammunition management deputy officer, supervisors, and senior medic.	September 2025	Undeterminable

Source: SIGAR analysis of State CWD award 21-GR-3012 progress reports.

Table 6 - Performance Indicator Target Data for State's Remaining Four Ongoing CWD Awards, as of December 31, 2024

No.	Performance Indicator Target Description	Completion Date	Status to Date
Award 20-GR-011			
1	All landmines recovered in Swiss Foundation for Demining's area of responsibility are destroyed.	March 2024	No measurable target
2	All items of explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance recovered are destroyed.	March 2024	No measurable target
3	Deploying two demining teams.	March 2025	Met
4	Deploy demining teams in Kunduz and Badakhshan.	March 2025	50%
5	971,337 sq. meters in land clearance and release.	March 2025	64%
Award 22-GR-0013			
1	Destroy 206.1 U.S. tons of ammunition and explosives.	April 2025	Met
2	Conduct 2,624 risk sessions.	April 2025	34%
3	Risk session attendees of 40,960.	April 2025	72%
Award 22-GR-0019			
1	Clear 5,599,631 sq. meters of landmine and explosive remnants of war.	January 2025	98%
2	43 hazard areas released in 6 districts of Maydan Wardak province.	January 2025	96%
3	Hazard areas released in 7 districts of Maydan Wardak province.	January 2025	86%
4	107 former combatants employed for duration of project.	October 2023	Undeterminable
5	Former combatants from both sides of the previous conflict employed for duration of project.	January 2025	No measurable target
6	140 core staff of Afghan Technical Consultants engaged in mine action activities for duration of project.	October 2023	Undeterminable
7	Core staff of Afghan Technical Consultants are engaged in mine action activities for the duration of project.	January 2025	No measurable target
8	36 male and female community volunteers trained in explosive ordnance risk education.	January 2025	Undeterminable
9	26,735 local community members, mixed gender, participate in explosive ordnance risk education sessions.	January 2025	Met
Award 22-GR-0037			
1	80 hazardous areas released and removed.	March 2024	Not Met
2	2,772,571 sq. meters of hazardous ground cleared	March 2025	84%
3	Four districts in Helman province cleared.	March 2025	50%
4	60,791 direct beneficiaries from clearance.	March 2024	50%
5	47,940 indirect beneficiaries from clearance.	March 2024	85%
6	Conduct 1,163 explosive ordnance risk education sessions.	March 2025	58%
7	21,240 attendees to explosive ordnance risk education sessions.	March 2025	59%
8	2,500 men explosive ordnance risk education beneficiaries.	March 2025	13%
9	1,680 women explosive ordnance risk education beneficiaries.	March 2025	0%
10	5,000 girls explosive ordnance risk education beneficiaries.	March 2025	33%
11	6,000 boys explosive ordnance risk education beneficiaries.	March 2025	53%

Source: SIGAR analysis of State CWD award progress reports.