Reintegration of Ex-Combatants:Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

Implementing an effective reintegration program is difficult in any context. If pursued without a peace agreement, reintegration efforts face even greater obstacles.

Afghanistan’s two reintegration programs targeting insurgents were undertaken in an environment of ongoing conflict. Though nascent peace talks between U.S. and Taliban representatives took place during the period of APRP implementation, these talks proved abortive. There was no viable peace process that could establish political commitment by the warring parties to demobilize and reintegrate fighters. Activities described as reintegration efforts were more akin to efforts to encourage defections. Taliban foot soldiers and commanders who participated faced high costs: potential retribution against them or their families by fellow insurgents or by Afghan security forces (who themselves or whose families have been victims of Taliban violence), loss of employment, and loss of prestige. By the end of APRP, an estimated 225 program participants had been killed, likely deterring other insurgents from joining the program. There is no evidence that reintegration programs attracted a significant number of insurgents.

A political settlement can improve the chances of success for a reintegration program. A peace agreement brings an ebbing of violence, reducing the need for guaranteeing ex-combatants’ security. Without an agreement, those implementing reintegration efforts must provide security guarantees for ex-combatants, vet them to mitigate the risk of insider threats, and deliver timely assistance despite ongoing insecurity and lack of access to many areas.

In Afghanistan, using reintegration programs as a counterinsurgency tool produced few benefits. The U.S. government, particularly the military, viewed PTS and APRP largely as a tool to fracture and weaken the Taliban. Although APRP “peeled away” an undetermined number of genuine Taliban fighters, that number was not significant, and it had no effect at the operational level. Taliban fighters have largely remained integrated into the movement and loyal to the leadership, despite some internal friction—a cohesiveness vividly displayed in the success with which the Taliban observed the 2018 ceasefire.

Attempts to use reintegration as a counterinsurgency tool also failed to bring Taliban leadership to the negotiating table. The Taliban perceived reintegration programs as seeking their surrender to an Afghan government they viewed as illegitimate and abusive. Taliban leaders claimed to see PTS and APRP as indicators that the United States was not serious about peace negotiations. There is no firm evidence that reintegration programs helped to pressure the Taliban leadership toward pursuing peace negotiations.

The U.S. government provided only limited political and financial support to early demobilization and reintegration efforts, including the DDR and DIAG programs. The U.S. government was focused on its role of building the ANA, and demonstrated relatively little interest in the DDR program (funded mainly by Japan, which contributed $91 million). The United States withheld its $9 million in pledged funding for the DDR program for nearly two years, and contributed only $200,000 for DIAG.

Moreover, on the ground, the U.S. military opposed the demobilization of militia forces, especially those in the south, where U.S.-led coalition forces relied on these militias for intelligence, combat operations, and to secure military bases. Limited political support from the U.S. and Afghan governments and disagreements over which militias to demobilize and reintegrate created distrust and discouraged militia commanders from participating in the DDR process. In the absence of political will and an enforcement mechanism on the ground, reintegration programs could not stop local commanders from manipulating the programs in their favor or evading them altogether.

In Afghanistan, former combatants generally faced at least one of three threats: (1) being targeted or arrested by the ANDSF or ISAF; (2) retribution attacks from former insurgent networks; and (3) revenge from former victims. Coordination and information-sharing among ISAF, ANDSF, and USFOR-A were difficult, making it a challenge to remove participants from targeting lists and prevent the targeting of former insurgents. There were also reports of insurgents reintegrating quietly, outside of formal programs, due to fears of being targeted if they affiliated with the formal reintegration program. The consequences of failing to provide former combatants with adequate protection from these risks undermined reintegration efforts and discouraged insurgents from seeking to reintegrate.

Reintegration programs in Afghanistan did not include monitoring and evaluation systems that could effectively assess whether former insurgents gained acceptance from the communities to which they returned, or what happened to them over time. The lack of baseline data and program evaluation prevented programs from tailoring assistance to the specific needs of ex-combatants or adjusting strategies mid-course, and made it impossible to gauge long-term impact.

Claims regarding numbers of insurgents reintegrated through PTS and APRP are difficult to substantiate, as there was no effective system to vet and monitor individual participants. The lack of any comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system also limited PTS and APRP’s ability to determine whether program participants returned to the insurgency after joining the program. In addition, the lack of adequate vetting systems meant that some people who were never insurgents in the first place were counted as participants in the reintegration programs.

Both Afghan and wider international experience illustrates the importance of ensuring that communities play a role in planning and executing a reintegration program, and that such programs deliver benefits to both former combatants and the communities that receive them. Failing to do this can create perceptions of favoritism, fueling community resentment and derailing the reintegration process.

The design of post-2001 Afghan reintegration programs demonstrated an awareness of this important principle. From the DDR program to APRP, programs evolved to place greater emphasis on attempting to ensure that benefits reached not only ex-combatants, but also the communities receiving them. In practice, however, it was difficult to develop community improvement projects linked to APRP, due to widespread perceptions that it existed only as a counterinsurgency tool. Policymakers and program implementers should remain sensitive to these challenges.

None of the four main Afghan reintegration programs entailed a long-term effort to assist ex-combatants. Benefits were mainly confined to short-term transitional assistance packages and vocational training programs that did not match the former combatants’ needs or local economic realities. Stipends provided by PTS and APRP did not substantially improve former combatants’ ability to transition away from fighting and into a civilian livelihood. Once the transitional assistance stopped, and without an established labor market to absorb them, many program participants were left no better prepared for civilian life than when they joined the program.

Vocational training provided by the DDR program bore little relation to the local labor market’s actual needs or capacity. For example, some ex-combatants were provided with livestock which required expensive feed that many participants could not afford. Many of the farm animals died or were sold.

Past reintegration programs in Afghanistan were not able to deliver benefits in a timely or effective manner. This was due to insecurity, corruption, weak Afghan government capacity, and delayed and inconsistent funding from international donors. This led to a loss of credibility for the Afghan government and international community, and likely deterred other combatants from participating.

Policymakers and implementers should acknowledge the many barriers to implementation in a conflict-affected country. They must maintain realistic timelines and expectations, and convey those clearly to beneficiaries. Setting overly ambitious expectations risks fueling frustration and resentment among ex-combatants and the communities that receive them, and undermining trust in the program. For this reason, before a program is announced, it should be fully conceived, funded, and ready for implementation. A slow, clumsy program can do as much harm as none at all, as it erodes confidence in the effort.

Grievance resolution was widely viewed as a foundational component of APRP—a means to learn about the factors driving support for the insurgency, and to help resolve those grievances. APRP listed a broad range of measures to address grievances. Yet program documents provided few details on how grievance resolution was meant to be implemented, and few steps were taken to see these initiatives through. The failure likely created an overemphasis on economic incentives, and left unresolved many of the underlying factors that provoked individuals to participate in or support the insurgency.

Though local security agreements temporarily reduced violence, they remained fragile amid an ongoing conflict and without a national-level political settlement. Four local security agreements in Helmand, Baghlan, and Kapisa Provinces were extensively negotiated, involving district and provincial government officials, local security forces, tribal leaders, local insurgent leaders, and in some cases, international military forces (see chapter 3 of the report).

Each one broke down within months of their signing, for similar reasons. These included lack of political support from Kabul and international partners, including the United States; harassment and violence by insurgents who were not party to the agreements; lack of security for those involved in negotiations; ongoing violence and a wider atmosphere of distrust on all sides; and provincial and district officials’ inability to deliver on development promises for the community. As these local agreements broke down relatively early, there was little opportunity to implement a reintegration effort.

Past reintegration programs targeting the Taliban were fundamentally undercut by the absence of a peace agreement, and the risks and complexity involved in implementing a program amid an ongoing—and, at times, intensifying—insurgency. As explained in Lesson 1, there was no viable peace process that could establish political commitment by the warring parties to demobilize and reintegrate fighters. Further, neither the Afghan government nor coalition forces had the capacity to provide security guarantees to fighters who wanted to reintegrate. As a result, participants in any reintegration program faced grave risks in the form of retribution against them and their families. Widespread insecurity exacerbated the lack of jobs, and made it difficult to vet participants, deliver benefits on time, or monitor and evaluate programs.

Any new reintegration program, including the provision of monetary or in-kind assistance to ex-combatants, would face the same risks and limitations, if not more. Nothing about current conditions in Afghanistan improves the odds of success: There is no peace agreement, insecurity has worsened, corruption remains endemic, the political environment is uncertain, economic growth has slowed, and Afghan government capacity remains weak. A new program would also face the added challenge of a significantly reduced international presence in the country. Finally, recent Taliban battlefield gains may further dampen individuals’ willingness to leave the fight.

Moreover, there is a risk that a new reintegration program could undermine the United States’ current top policy goal: a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Taliban leaders accurately perceived APRP as part of a counterinsurgency strategy to weaken them, and claimed to view the program as evidence that the United States was not serious about peace negotiations. Given this legacy, restarting a reintegration program today could damage the trust needed to sustain current peace talks.

Cases have been reported in which Taliban individuals or small groups approach U.S. or Resolute Support authorities, saying they wish to stop fighting. Given the limited U.S. presence in the country and the nature of the Train, Advise, and Assist mission, it may be difficult for U.S. forces to confirm that individuals and groups coming forward are in fact insurgents and are genuine in their desire to leave the insurgency. It would also likely be difficult to track them to confirm they do not become recidivists. Given past security failures, physically protecting former insurgents would require additional efforts by U.S., NATO, or Afghan forces. The risk remains that any former Taliban fighters participating in a program could be targeted by their former comrades.

Any decision to accommodate these individuals would need to acknowledge these severe limitations—and to be transparent about the United States’ inability to offer security guarantees. DOD and State should also acknowledge that efforts to accommodate fighters would be highly unlikely to have any strategic effect on the security or political situation, though efforts may achieve some tactical effects.

A U.S. policy toward these individuals might provide for accommodating them on a case-by-case basis. This might involve removing the individual from U.S. targeting lists, or downgrading him to a restricted targeting list.

Further, State and DOD should be as transparent as possible with Taliban interlocutors about how they respond to former insurgents who wish to stop fighting. So as not to undermine the larger U.S. policy objective of reaching a deal with the Taliban, State and DOD should make clear that there is no proactive U.S. effort to entice insurgents to defect.

As early as possible, intra-Afghan peace negotiations should address the issue of reintegration. Details are often highly political and contentious, and may rely on information—like the number and prole of combatants—that is not readily available. Yet avoiding the difficult task of building a framework for reintegration can undermine implementation of the peace process later on, as parties to the conflict seek to maintain a credible threat of violence to retain leverage.

State can encourage Afghan negotiators to address these issues early on. But State’s engagement with Afghan and international partners should be closely coordinated with DOD and USAID. A DDR working group could be formed to facilitate this U.S. interagency coordination. USAID could work with State to ensure that reintegration efforts are adequately linked to wider development strategies.

No single U.S. agency or office has the lead role on matters related to reintegration. Nor is any particular office or agency responsible for developing and retaining institutional knowledge of reintegration processes, or of DDR issues generally. Partly for this reason, U.S. agencies’ engagement on reintegration issues in Afghanistan has been inconsistent and ad hoc. In practice, DOD assumed many responsibilities during the period of APRP because the program was viewed as a counterinsurgency tool. The informal division of labor in which State had the lead for reconciliation, while DOD had the lead for reintegration, contributed to a failure to adequately link and integrate these two parallel efforts.

Given that reintegration is fundamentally a political, psychosocial, economic, and developmental process, and DDR frameworks are often the product of negotiations involving international and multilateral organizations and donor countries, State and USAID should establish in-house DDR expertise. DOD should do the same, as DDR efforts are increasingly being conducted amid ongoing military operations, and because DDR is connected to security sector reform. In State, USAID, and DOD, an office with ownership of DDR issues would help develop in-house expertise and improve communication with the international field of DDR practitioners and experts. These offices should work with their respective regional bureaus, policy and program offices, and missions and commands overseas, to determine how U.S. agencies can support reintegration objectives in conflict-affected countries.

Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries, where 55 percent of people live on less than one U.S. dollar per day. On average, just $8 per capita per year is spent on health care. Four decades of war have brutally traumatized the population, with millions losing family members, homes, livelihoods, and access to health care and education. While reintegration programs may provide assistance more specific to ex-combatants’ needs, there are limits to any program’s ability to improve overall economic conditions.

As discussed in SIGAR’s 2019 High-Risk List an equitable and sustainable peace agreement could end much of the violence that presents the greatest threat to reconstruction and development efforts. In the wake of a peace agreement, there may be a significant opportunity to strengthen the gains made since 2001 in education, health care, and women’s rights—and to expand development efforts to areas that have seen little investment since 2001.

The United States, other donors, and Afghan partners are already planning what economic initiatives should be prioritized after a peace agreement. The draft plan envisions directing benefits to people and areas on the basis of need. Broad development assistance programs—not targeting ex-combatants and not part of any formal reintegration program—can have a profound effect on an ex-combatant’s ability to reintegrate into society. A rising tide lifts all ships: stimulating private sector growth and creating jobs in the legal economy means more jobs for ex-combatants, too.

Attempts to reintegrate ex-combatants without the above conditions in place are unlikely to succeed, and may undermine other security and peace-building objectives. A peace agreement must establish high-level political commitment and trust on both sides to demobilize and reintegrate their fighters. Without that, fighters face greater risk of retribution for participating in a reintegration program. Further, a reduction in violence must occur in order for a program to realistically deliver benefits to former combatants and communities accepting them, and carry out adequate vetting, monitoring, and evaluation. Finally, a strong monitoring and evaluation system is crucial to assess program outcomes and make ongoing adjustments.

The above conditions present a high bar for U.S. appropriations for a reintegration program. But a program done poorly and in adverse conditions may prove worse than none at all.

Current U.S. sanctions prohibit U.S. agencies from providing any assistance to areas under Taliban control. In a post-settlement scenario, many areas may remain under de facto Taliban control for some time—or an interim security arrangement may establish new but ambiguous lines of security responsibility among the Afghan state, state-aligned militias, and Taliban-affiliated forces. Yet the imperative will be to ensure development assistance can reach those areas, in part to demonstrate the tangible benefits of a peace agreement. State, USAID, and DOD should have full authority to provide development and security sector assistance to these areas.

Since any reintegration program would occur alongside many other development projects, it is important to consider how these parallel efforts may be integrated. For example, if USAID is implementing a program in Helmand Province, the program design should take into account what effect it will have on former combatants, their families, and the communities accepting them. USAID and implementing partners should take steps to ensure that their projects do not inadvertently complicate ongoing or planned reintegration efforts.

In addition, State and USAID should review all relevant ongoing and planned assistance—whether it includes specific reintegration objectives or not—to determine how it might be used to support the reintegration of former combatants into society. State and USAID should also ensure that implementing partners for development projects fully support reintegration goals.

In sum, broad development programs should be designed, executed, and evaluated in a manner that accounts for ex-combatants as a vulnerable population.

The international community’s resistance to transitional justice in the wake of the U.S.-led intervention and Bonn Agreement was shortsighted. The lack of accountability mechanisms for past crimes and human rights violations denied Afghans an opportunity for broader societal reconciliation. Since a fundamental part of reintegration is the community’s forgiveness and acceptance of ex-combatants, a reintegration program should be integrated with transitional justice processes.

Afghanistan’s DDR and DIAG programs focused on particular armed groups and neglected others. Many armed individuals and groups refused to participate, believing their rivals were not being demobilized and reintegrated. Some armed groups were allowed to bypass reintegration programs because they were politically connected to Afghan government officials or worked with U.S.-led coalition forces to provide services such as security, logistics, and intelligence. This lack of inclusive participation undermined reintegration goals.

In a post-settlement context, major powerbrokers within and outside the Afghan government may agree to demobilize and reintegrate their private militias. A reintegration program should be designed to accommodate these groups. Failing to do so would give the Taliban a rationale for not participating, as they would likely seek to protect themselves against former rivals.

Given the fluidity of the conflict and the difficulty of determining true allegiances, it is possible that an Afghan-led reintegration program may accept a certain number of former members of terrorist groups. U.S. agencies should be thinking now about what their legal response would be to this scenario.

Reintegration programs are often justified on the basis that they reduce the risk of war recurrence, encourage economic and livelihood development, mitigate post-war escalation in violence and crime, bolster political participation and civic engagement, and address the impact of wartime trauma on communities and individuals.

Given the range of factors a reintegration program seeks to influence, any reintegration program must include a strong monitoring and evaluation system that accounts for appropriate metrics of success. This system should include measurable indicators to determine how a program is actually supporting an ex-combatant’s transition into the post-conflict political and economic order, as well as any potential adverse effects. Any data collected should strictly protect the identities of individual ex-combatants. In the wrong hands, information about ex-combatants’ location and personal history could enable retribution attacks against them, their families, and communities.

A monitoring and evaluation system must also address vetting challenges. Several officials and experts interviewed for this report observed that the moment a program for former Taliban fighters exists, there will not be 60,000 Taliban anymore, but 200,000—including many thousands willing to call themselves former Taliban in order to access program benefits.

The international community has only a limited understanding of what works in reintegration efforts, under what conditions, and why. There have been few systematic attempts to gather data on individual former combatants and follow them over time so as to identify the determinants of successful reintegration into society. Many best practices in reintegration are based largely on anecdotal evidence and common-sense observations, but contain untested assumptions. Those who fund, design, and implement reintegration programs face an urgent need for empirical data and analyses.

If a reintegration program is undertaken in Afghanistan following a peace settlement, it would offer a vital opportunity to help fill this gap in knowledge and improve subsequent reintegration efforts not just in Afghanistan but around the world.

Community buy-in and participation are important to a successful reintegration effort; communities should be part of the decision-making process on a reintegration effort. They are also the source of locally appropriate solutions. Any reintegration program must avoid the pitfall of unfairly benefiting the ex-combatant population. In northeast Nigeria, for example, former Boko Haram fighters have been provided with grants and equipment to start small businesses when they return to communities. This has provoked tensions among other community members who have not received equivalent support. Some community members viewed reintegration efforts as forcing communities to accept former Boko Haram fighters.

Past DDR processes have frequently included “reinsertion” packages that are one to two years long. These are intended to address the immediate needs of former combatants and their families. In practice, these often became the sum total of so-called reintegration efforts. Reinsertion packages should be the first step toward reintegration, not a poor alternative. Long-term support should connect former combatants with ongoing development projects implemented by various local, national, and international organizations.

Afghan government and Taliban negotiating teams are unlikely to be familiar with international DDR best practices. If both sides are educated about how DDR is conducted around the world, they may have greater trust that those standards will be applied to them and will protect crucial interests of both sides.

International DDR experts, ideally from organizations and countries seen as neutral in the Afghan conflict, may advise both Afghan government and Taliban representatives. These advisors could also include individuals from both sides of past conflicts in other countries—for instance, Colombia and Northern Ireland. These experts would serve as educators and advisers on DDR processes as implemented in other post-conflict environments, and help guide negotiators in agreeing to a framework for the socioeconomic, military, and political components of reintegration in Afghanistan.