August 25, 2015

The Honorable Frank Kendall
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

The Honorable Christine E. Wormuth
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

General Lloyd J. Austin III
Commander, U.S. Central Command

General John F. Campbell
Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and
Commander, Resolute Support

Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick
Commanding General and Chief of Engineers,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

I am writing to share with you the results of an inspection that we conducted at a command and control facility at Camp Brown on Kandahar Airfield. SIGAR provided a classified version of this letter to your offices on August 6, 2015.

In 2012, a Kandahar Airfield Infrastructure Planning Board official proposed construction of a command and control facility at Camp Brown to support missions in southern and western Afghanistan. At the time, mission activities were split among numerous buildings on Camp Brown adapted for intended use. On June 11, 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded a firm-fixed-price contract—number W912ER-12-C-0031—for approximately $5 million to the Road and Roof Construction Company (RRCC), an Afghan firm, to construct the command and control facility at Camp Brown. The contract provided a performance period of 375 days from the notice to proceed, which occurred on July 17, 2012.

According to the contract, RRCC was required to construct a two-story, 1,200 square meter command and control facility containing administrative space, command group offices, conference rooms, training areas, a secure communications room, reinforced exterior walls, and building information systems. The offices were intended to provide space for multiple departments, including the command structure, logistics, maintenance, personnel, and operations. Support facilities included roads, curbs, walkways, electrical distribution and water systems, and parking. RRCC also was required to construct “all utilities,” storage tanks and handling systems, force protection and fire protection measures, a backup power generator system, site security, and other features to provide a fully functional command and control facility.¹

¹ Contract W912ER-12-C-0031, Scope of Work section 1.1.
We visited the command and control facility at Camp Brown in November 2014, and again in January and February 2015. We found that the building’s exterior walls were concrete and solidly built, and had no visible cracks. The interior was a shell with some cinder block walls and concrete pillars, but no flooring at the ground level. The 35-foot high building had a roof but no means of ascending to the second floor, and no plumbing or electrical systems had been installed. Photo 1 shows the exterior of the command and control building, and photo 2 shows a section of the interior.

From November 2012 through August 2013, USACE sent 14 letters to RRCC identifying issues with worksite safety, poor quality and lack of timely design submittals, and construction schedule slippage. For example, on April 8, 2013, USACE sent a letter notifying RRCC of its failure to procure long-lead items, such as special high-strength iron, power transformers, and diesel generators, in a timely fashion and stated that this would adversely affect the contract’s completion schedule. On October 7, 2013, the requirements owner initially expected to occupy the facility sent a letter to USACE stating that it intended to terminate the project for convenience of the government. The letter stated that the project was plagued by delays and poor workmanship. The letter also stated that slightly more than a year after contract award, the project was only 42 percent complete, and the completion date had slipped from July 2013 to May 2014. The letter additionally stated that the facility was no longer needed for operations and to continue building it was not in the best interest of the U.S. government.

In April 2014, USACE sent a letter to RRCC stating that USACE was terminating the construction contract for convenience of the government because the facility was no longer needed. At the time of contract termination, RRCC had completed less than half of the command and control facility and USACE had paid the company about $2.2 million. According to a USACE official, no final termination settlement agreement has been reached with RRCC. The official stated that the final amount paid would not be determined until after the Defense Contract Audit Agency completes its audit of RRCC’s costs and expenses. Since construction was terminated, the command and control facility has stood empty and has never been used.

Responsible officials stated they are not aware of any Department of Defense (DOD) plans to complete the facility or to demolish it. During our February 2015 site visit, the Train, Advise, Assist Command–South Deputy Commander stated the operations for which the facility had originally intended were modified. The Deputy Commander further stated that Camp Brown’s other buildings
provided personnel with sufficient assets and that completing the command and control facility would not be an effective use of DOD funds.

Based on information available to us at this time, the decision to terminate the contract for the command and control facility at Camp Brown appears reasonable. Requirements and conditions had changed, resulting in the determination that the facility was no longer needed and project termination would save U.S. taxpayers’ money. However, depending on what the future of DOD’s or the Afghan government’s activities at Kandahar Airfield might be, the department may want to consider whether the facility may be of use and, if so, complete the remaining construction. Factors to consider would include cost and time needed for project completion, mission requirements, and the expected life and maintenance costs of currently used facilities.

I am submitting this letter pursuant to my authority under Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Should you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ms. Gabriele Tonsil, Assistant Inspector General for Audits & Inspections, at [redacted] or at [redacted]. Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction