Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put $19 Million Investment at Risk

July 30, 2012
What SIGAR Reviewed

Building the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is an objective of the coalition efforts in Afghanistan. As of June 30, 2012, the Congress appropriated about $89.48 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of this amount, about $52.15 billion (about 58 percent) has been allocated for security. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, provided over $19 million to construct four Afghan Border Police (ABP) bases in the Nangarhar Province on Afghanistan’s eastern border. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District-North (USACE-TAN) awarded the construction contract in June 2008. Specifically, SIGAR determined whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, (2) facilities were being used as intended, and (3) construction deficiencies were corrected before acceptance and transfer of the facilities to CSTC-A.

SIGAR conducted its work from January to July 2012, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Engineering assessments were conducted in accordance with the Code of Ethics for Engineers.

What SIGAR Found

Most facilities at the bases we inspected were either unoccupied or were not used for the intended purposes. SIGAR found construction deficiencies at the three bases it inspected. One base—Lal Por 2—had no viable water supply, and therefore, was not being used. The Nazyan base may soon be uninhabitable if the septic system continues to back up into the pipes causing overflow. Many construction deficiencies were not identified and corrected prior to our inspection because the contractor and USACE-TAN failed to follow their quality control and assurance processes. Moreover, USACE-TAN did not verify that construction at the bases had been completed, primarily due to security issues. As a result, USACE-TAN accepted and transferred the bases to CSTC-A before construction deficiencies were either completely identified or remediated. If the contractor does not correct the deficiencies, the U.S. government may incur additional costs for remediation.

What SIGAR Recommends

This report makes four recommendations to the Commanding General, USACE to ensure that construction deficiencies are addressed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; to take the necessary actions to remediate the identified deficiencies; and to ensure that the government and the contractor achieve the quality established by contract requirements for ongoing and future construction contracts. In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN concurred with the recommendations and noted the steps it has taken or plans to take to address them. In its response, USACE-TAN emphasized that critical security and access issues hamper its ability to perform quality management activities and verify construction completion. SIGAR recognizes that security has and will continue to have an impact on site visits. However, site visits and other oversight activities are necessary to provide assurance that the U.S. government only pays for work that was performed satisfactorily.

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July 30, 2012

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This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General’s for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) inspection of Afghan Border Police construction projects in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Of particular concern was the extent to which the $19 million investment in construction resulted in contributing to building the country’s capacity to provide for its own security. We found that the construction did not meet standards and made four recommendations to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to address these concerns and, specifically, to ensure that construction deficiencies are addressed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; actions are taken to remediate the identified deficiencies; and ensure the government and the contractor achieve the quality established by contract requirements for ongoing and future construction contracts.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABP Afghan Border Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DFAC Dining Facility
ER Engineer Regulation
HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
O&M Operations and Maintenance
POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
QA Quality Assurance
QAR Quality Assurance Report
QASP Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
QCR Quality Control Report
RRCC Road & Roof Construction Company
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
USACE-TAN U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District-North
Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put $19 Million Investment at Risk

An objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As of June 30, 2012, the Congress appropriated about $89.48 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of this amount, about $52.15 billion (about 58 percent) has been allocated for security. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), under the direction of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, uses this funding to equip, train, base, and sustain the ANSF, which includes the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. According to the Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, dated April 2012, the ANSF are ahead of schedule to achieve the end-strength of 352,000 by October 2012. As a result of these increases, additional facilities and infrastructure are needed to train, base, and house the Afghan forces. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, provided over $19 million to construct four Afghan Border Police (ABP) bases1 in the Nangarhar Province on Afghanistan’s eastern border.

For this inspection, we assessed the quality of construction and site improvements at three of the four Afghan Border Police bases (Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, and Nazyan) in the Nangarhar Province. Due to weather conditions, we were unable to conduct an inspection at Khogyani; however, we reviewed contractor quality control reports, the government’s quality assurance reports, contract specifications, and design plans pertaining to the construction of this base. We also assessed the extent to which the contractor followed quality control and government’s quality assurance processes at all four bases. Specifically, we determined whether:

- construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards,
- facilities were being used as intended, and
- construction deficiencies were corrected before acceptance and transfer of the facilities to CSTC-A.

We conducted this inspection at Kabul, Afghanistan; Jalalabad Area Office, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); Jalalabad Resident Office-Forward Operating Base Hughie, USACE; and the three ABP bases in Nangarhar Province from January to July 2012, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessments were conducted in accordance with the Code of Ethics for Engineers. This inspection is one in a series of four inspections of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District-North (USACE-TAN) construction projects we selected for review to evaluate the construction quality of infrastructure projects funded by reconstruction funds. These inspections evaluate the construction of facilities provided to the Afghan government by determining whether construction complies with established standards and requirements contained in the contract, project designs, established construction standards, and applicable laws.

1Among other contract requirements for Nangarhar, construction at each of the four bases consisted of utilities, roads, and buildings. For clarity in this report, we refer to the sites as “bases” and the infrastructure items and buildings on the bases as “facilities.”
BACKGROUND

The ABP contract included site improvements and the design and construction of bases to support the ABP units in Nangarhar Province on Afghanistan’s eastern border. The contract scope of work included four ABP bases: Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, Nazyan, and Khogyani. USACE-TAN constructed the bases under a firm-fixed-price contract (W917PM-08-C-0065), awarded on June 30, 2008, to Road & Roof Construction Company (RRCC) for $18,668,630, with an estimated completion date of July 7, 2009. The scope of work was defined as the management, design, material, labor, and equipment to design and construct and/or refurbish all utilities, roads, buildings, force protection measures, site security, de-mining activities, and other features referenced in the contract. The contract had 11 amendments that increased the total contract obligations by $527,949 to $19,196,579 and extended the completion date to June 20, 2011. Appendix II provides more detailed information on the contracted cost for each of the four bases under the contract.

Scope of Contractor Work

The contract’s scope of work required the contractor to design and make site improvements and construct facilities at four locations in accordance with the requirements stated in the contract. The project included the following activities and services:

- Site security (provide perimeter force protection security during construction)
- Surveys and site planning (perform a geotechnical investigation, leach field testing, water well capacity testing, a topographic survey of the site, and prepare site paving, grading, utility, and drainage plans, with existing grades, proposed grades, and building finished floor elevations, based on information contained in the Request for Proposal)
- De-mining (clear all mines and unexploded ordnance from the entire site)
- Demolition and grading (demolish all existing structures and buildings at the site prior to commencement of new work and remove and dispose of all debris, concrete, and foundations)

Specifically, for each base, the scope of work required the contractor to construct the following:

- Administration building with a communications room and arms room
- Barracks (private/semi-private and open-bay)
- Logistics building
- Dining facility (DFAC) to include outside wood stoves
- Toilet, ablution, shower, and laundry building (eastern style toilets)
- Vehicle maintenance
- Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) building
- Warehouse
- Vehicle parking
- Fuel storage and vehicle refuel point
- Ammunition supply point
- Guard shack - gate house
- Guard towers
• Perimeter force protection wall
• Well house
• Road network (including sidewalks and curbing)
• Site utilities
• Entry control points (including canopy at main entry control point)
• Trash point
• Two flagpoles

Additionally, for each facility, the scope of work required the contractor to design and construct the following:

• Water system
• Sanitary sewer
• Storm drain system
• Electrical distribution system

Project Design and Specifications

The contractor prepared individual design documents for each base. All four of the designs were similar in nature. According to the contract, all design and construction was to be in accordance with current U.S. and International Building Codes and standards. The contractor was required to develop a 35 percent site plan review after the contract was awarded. Incorporating the comments from CSTC-A and USACE-TAN, the contractor design drawings were to progress to 99 percent and then to 100 percent design, for construction to begin. After construction, a complete set of “as-built”\(^2\) drawings were to be provided by the contractor to reflect what was actually constructed.

CONSTRUCTION QUALITY WAS GENERALLY INADEQUATE AND CONTRACTOR AND GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT DID NOT ENSURE CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES WERE REMEDIATED

**Lal Por1Base.** During the inspection of the base on February 16, 2012, we found that the structural construction of facilities generally met contract and design specifications.\(^3\) However, construction quality of critical components was generally inadequate and required remediation. See appendix V for details on the discrepancies we identified during our inspection. The following are examples of some of the discrepancies we identified:

• The storm drain system was not constructed according to the design. Spacing of storm water inlets (gaps) in curbing was not completed in accordance with the as-built drawings (every 3,000 mm). The incorrect spacing in the curbing allows storm water to stay on roadways and not drain into storm water ditches. Water accumulation on the roads may cause flooding, erosion, and structural failures, such as what we observed at Nazyan, due to recent rain (see photos 1 and 14).

\(^2\)“As-built drawings” are a revised set of design drawings that show the final condition of what was actually constructed in the field.

\(^3\)Two barracks were locked and keys were not available for us to inspect them; consequently, we could not verify the use and quality of the interior construction.
• Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) was improperly constructed. Specifically, duct work in the Latrine building did not conform to the design documents. HVAC elbows (bends) were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees\(^4\) as required in the design documents. There was no evidence of turning vanes inside the elbows.\(^5\) Joints were also finished unsealed which can cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers. The improperly constructed HVAC system places additional stress on the HVAC equipment, which can significantly increase maintenance and repair costs.

• Electrical and mechanical door openers installed on the roll-up doors of the Logistics and Warehouse buildings were inoperable. Also, doors were stuck in the open position. This increased the risk of unauthorized access and facilitated weather intrusion into the buildings, such as rain, snow, and humidity.

• The water tower was missing insulation. As a result, water inside pipes can freeze and cause pipes to burst. Additionally, in warm and humid months, the exposed portion of the pipe can “sweat” causing possible damage to the insulation on the lower portion of the pipe (see photo 2).

• The generator fuel piping was leaking diesel fuel, wasting fuel and creating a possible fire and other environmental hazards (see photo 3).

• Drain piping was not installed in one of the DFAC sinks. As a result, wastewater draining from the sink will drain directly to the floor and not enter the wastewater system, causing water damage and possible flooding (see photo 4).

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\(^4\)Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degrees.
\(^5\)Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.
Lal Por 2 Base. During the inspection of the base on February 16, 2012, we found that the facilities’ construction was complete, but the structural construction and some critical components generally did not meet contract and design specifications.\textsuperscript{6} Because some of these deficiencies were of a time-critical nature, such as the lack of a viable water supply, septic system piping, and storm water erosion, we provided a briefing to USACE-TAN on April 19, 2012, to discuss our concerns and potential solutions. See appendix VI for details on the deficiencies we identified during our inspection. The following are examples of some of the deficiencies we identified:

- As part of preparing the site for construction, site testing for the presence of water had indicated that the water supply was very weak and would not meet the minimum requirements\textsuperscript{7} to sustain the base. The contractor had made three previous attempts to drill a well at the Well House, including installation of a temporary and a permanent pump. The permanent pump had become stuck at 157 meters in depth during installation. During our inspection, we observed another attempt underway by the contractor to drill a fourth well at a different location since the Well House had been demolished and needed to be reconstructed. Even after four attempts to drill a well, there continued to be no viable water supply. While water could be transported to the site via trucks, from an economical and logistical standpoint this could be a very expensive alternative and unsustainable over time. In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN noted that additional drilling the week of June 17, 2012, had been unsuccessful and that its program and project management and area engineers are performing analyses to identify the resources and options available to resolve the issue.

- The contractor constructed the septic tank without critical pipes, as required by the design drawings. If a viable water supply is found and a well is completed and used before the septic system issues are resolved, the septic system may not work as designed. The missing septic tank pipes do not provide any back-up if the installed pipe becomes plugged with debris, and will cause sewage to backup and flow out around the site. This deficiency could further negatively impact site habitation. During the briefing with USACE-TAN officials, we discussed our concerns and they stated they would ask the contractor to prepare a plan of action to repair the

\textsuperscript{6}We could not verify the use and quality of the interior construction of one of the barracks, since it was locked and keys were not available.

deficiencies. As of June 14, 2012, the issue remains unresolved. In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN provided additional information on the status of the septic deficiencies.

- The storm drain system was not constructed according to design. Spacing of storm water inlets (gaps) in curbing was not completed per as-built drawings (every 3000 mm). The incorrect spacing in the curbing allows storm water to stay on roadways and not drain into storm water ditches. Water accumulation on the roads may cause flooding, erosion, and structural failures (see similar issue at Nazyan at photo 14).

- The contractor did not construct an erosion protection area (riprap) on the southern exterior edge of the protection wall, as required in the design drawings. The missing riprap was causing severe erosion outside the protection wall, which will eventually undermine the wall and possibly cause the wall to fail near the discharge point. During the briefing with USACE-TAN on April 19, 2012, we expressed our concerns, and they stated they would ask the contractor to prepare a plan of action to repair the deficiencies in the erosion protection area, as required in the design drawings. As of June 14, 2012, the issue remains unresolved (see photo 5).

- Based on our observation, one of the guard tower columns was improperly constructed. The design indicated that a buried concrete block, called a “spread footing,” was to be installed 800 mm deep. Instead, we noted that the column was resting directly on the surface with no footing. If the column is constructed without a footing, there is a risk of structural failure to the guard tower (see photo 6).

- The HVAC was improperly constructed. Duct work in the latrine building did not conform to the design documents. HVAC elbows (bends) were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required in the design documents. There was no evidence of turning vanes inside the elbows. Joints were also finished unsealed which can cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers. The improperly constructed HVAC system places additional stress on the HVAC equipment, which can significantly increase maintenance and repair costs. Additionally, wall perforation for HVAC duct was left unfinished and duct ceiling supports were not all attached (see photos 7 and 8).

- Construction quality for several of the structures and fixtures we observed was poor or incomplete, as evidenced by improper material substitution for the rebar material used for ladders (see photo 9), ceramic wall tiles which had fallen off the wall (see photo 10), soil subsidence around buried piping (see photo 11), and missing door sills (see photo 12).

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8Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degrees.

9Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.
**Photo 5: Missing Erosion Protection**

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

**Photo 6: Guard Tower Column Unsupported**

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

**Photo 7: Wall Perforation Not Finished**

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

**Photo 8: HVAC Duct Supports Not Attached**

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012
Photo 9: Improper Material Substitution (Rebar Material Used for Ladder)

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

Photo 10: Tiles Fallen Off Wall

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

Photo 11: Soil Subsidence

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012

Photo 12: Missing Door Sill

Source: SIGAR Photo Lal Por 2 February 16, 2012
**Nazyan Base.** During our inspection of the base on February 17, 2012, we found that the facilities’ construction was complete and structural construction generally met contract and design specifications. However, construction quality of critical components, such as the septic system, was generally inadequate and required remediation. We also identified a major issue concerning the septic system, which we addressed on April 19, 2012, in a briefing to USACE-TAN officials. See appendix VII for details on the deficiencies we identified during our inspection. The following are examples of some of the deficiencies we identified:

- The generator fuel piping was leaking diesel fuel. As a result, fuel will be wasted, and the leak may create a fire and other environmental hazards (see photo 13).

- The storm drain system was not constructed as designed. Spacing of storm water inlets (gaps) in curbing was not completed in accordance with the as-built drawings (every 3000 mm). The incorrect spacing in the curbing allows storm water to stay on roadways and not drain into storm water ditches. Water accumulation on the roads may cause flooding, erosion, and structural failures (see photo 14).

- The septic system was not built according to the design specifications. We observed sewage rising into the manhole shafts. According to the as-built drawings, there should have been 300 mm between the liquid level and the tank ceiling. As a result of the deficiency, sewage will continue to back up into the pipes and eventually overflow. Once this happens, the base could eventually become unfit for human habitation. In response to our briefing with USACE-TAN officials on April 19, 2012, they held a meeting with RRCC on May 13, 2012, in an attempt to resolve the deficiencies and complete the project. RRCC indicated they had visited the site on May 9, 2012, to investigate the septic system flow obstruction (see photo 15). In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN stated that the septic system deficiencies had been remediated by the contractor; however, USACE-TAN had not conducted a site visit to verify the contractor’s work.

- The HVAC was improperly constructed. Ducting in the Latrine building did not conform to the design documents. HVAC elbows (bends) were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required in the design documents. There was no evidence of turning vanes inside the elbows. Joints were also finished unsealed, which can cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers. The improperly constructed HVAC system places additional stress on the HVAC equipment, which can significantly increase maintenance and repair costs (see photo 16).

- Electrical and mechanical door openers installed on the roll-up doors of the logistics and warehouse buildings were inoperable. Also, doors were stuck in the open position. This increased the risk of unauthorized access and facilitated weather intrusion into the buildings, such as rain, snow, and humidity.

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10Structural concrete work generally met contract and design specifications. Construction deficiencies identified generally related to finish and utility work.

11Septic systems are designed to keep the liquid level below the manholes and roughly level with the inlet and outlet pipes. Sewage levels that are higher than the inflow and outflow pipes and high enough to flow up into manholes, usually indicates that the system was either designed “undersized” or was improperly constructed.

12Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degrees.

13Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.
Quality Control and Quality Assurance Was Not Adequate and Did Not Ensure Construction Deficiencies Were Remediated

Obtaining quality construction is the responsibility of both the construction contractor and the government. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and USACE regulations require the contractor to develop and comply with a quality control plan and USACE-TAN to develop and comply with a quality assurance plan. However, neither the contractor nor USACE-TAN followed their quality assurance processes. In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN stated that critical security and access issues were the root cause for the specific quality management discrepancies cited in our report. We agree that security impacts the government’s ability to perform verification of construction completion and recognize security will continue to be a significant challenge to all oversight entities conducting work in Afghanistan. However, site visits, and other oversight activities, are necessary to provide assurance that the U.S. government does not pay, or that the contractor compensates the U.S. government, for work not performed or for work performed unsatisfactorily.
Contractor Did Not Follow Its Quality Control Process

The construction contractor—RRCC—did not exercise adequate quality control. RRCC developed a Contractor Quality Control Plan, dated 16 July 2008. The intent of this plan was to manage, control, and document the contractor’s activities to ensure compliance with contract plans and specifications, as well as quality construction. RRCC was also required to develop daily quality control reports (QCRs) to document quality control operations in support of the quality control plan. When properly prepared, the QCRs provide a record of quality control procedures, along with an assessment of the adequacy of the work performed in accordance with design specifications.

We reviewed daily QCRs for the period August 7, 2008 through September 19, 2011, which USACE-TAN provided, and found that the QCRs did not adequately document quality control procedures or determine whether the contractor’s work was performed in accordance with design specifications. The QCRs only provided a list of the work performed, but did not provide an assessment of the adequacy of the work. They essentially represented daily logs of construction activity and general information about the personnel on site, rather than providing a record of quality control procedures such as soil tests and repair of infrastructure items. The lack of an adequate quality control process was apparent, based on the significant deficiencies we identified with septic tank piping and the water supply, as well as other construction deficiencies, which were not identified or documented by RRCC.

USACE Did Not Follow Its Quality Assurance Process

USACE-TAN did not provide adequate monitoring and oversight over the contractor. USACE Engineer Regulation (ER) 1180-1-6 requires the contracting officer to clearly define the quality of materials and workmanship required for a project, and to ensure that construction contractors comply with the contract document and produce the required product. The regulation requires a quality assurance (QA) process to include preparation of a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP), review of contractor quality control plans, enforcement of contract clauses, maintenance of quality assurance and quality control inspection and work records, and acceptance of completed construction.

In accordance with USACE ER 1180-1-6 (paragraph 12 (a)), in order to comply with the QASP, USACE-TAN QA personnel were required to conduct QA tests at the job site to

- assure acceptability of work completed,
- monitor contractor procedures for tracking construction deficiencies,
- ensure acceptable corrective action, and
- ensure an adequate audit trail was maintained.

To document these procedures, QA personnel were required to prepare Quality Assurance Reports (QARs) for each visit day at the construction site. When QA personnel could not visit the site on a particular day, the next QAR should have clearly articulated the events occurring subsequent to the last visit. ER 1180-1-6 (paragraph 12(e)) further required the resident/project engineer to ensure that the QAR contained all pertinent items of information to support the accuracy and completeness of the QAR. The resident/project engineer should have reviewed and initialed the reports, and performed follow-up as deemed necessary, to ensure identified deficiencies were corrected, acceptable, and adequately documented in an audit trail. However, based on our review of numerous QARs and interviews with USACE-TAN and resident engineering officials, USACE’s implementation of the QASP was not adequate to ensure effective oversight.

14The Contractor Quality Control Plan was specific to the Afghan Border Police Company Headquarters for Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, Nazyan, and Khoygani bases.
USACE-TAN provided 587 QARs for all four bases, for the period August 2008 through August 2011. Based on our review of a sample of 60 QARs, we found that QARs did not provide sufficient information concerning the contractor’s performance; nor were they always prepared on a daily basis, as required by ER 1180-1-6. For example, QARs were either incomplete with regard to corresponding QCRs, not always signed by responsible quality assurance representatives, or not being properly tracked to show an audit trail of the status of actions taken or mitigation activities. Of the 60 QARs we reviewed:

- Twenty-one reports (35 percent) identified that QA tests had been conducted. These tests verify compliance or noncompliance with construction specification requirements; and of the 21, only 4 (19 percent) provided sufficient detail or specific information to support the acceptability of the completed work.
- Thirty-three reports (55 percent) were signed by the responsible QA representative.
- None of the 60 QARs had corresponding contractor QCRs attached or indicated that the corresponding QCR was being filed with the QAR.
- Only one QAR tracked deficiencies or provided an adequate audit trail to prevent the same or similar deficiencies from re-occurring.

**SOME FACILITIES WERE NOT USED FOR INTENDED PURPOSES AND OTHERS WERE NOT OCCUPIED**

Although each base was designed to house 93 personnel, during our inspections on February 16 and 17, 2012, we observed that most facilities at these bases were either unoccupied or were not used for the intended purpose. Also, the entire Lal Por 2 base was not used at all due to the lack of a viable water supply. As a result, Lal Por 2 is not included in the following table. Table 1 summarizes our observations of facility usage at Lal Por 1 and Nazyan.

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1587 QARs, from the bases, as follows: Lal Por 1 (155), Lal Por 2 (119), Nazyan (154), and Khogyani (159). Although we were unable to visit Khogyani, we did obtain and review QARs.

16As part of our review, we selected every tenth QAR, beginning with one (e.g., 1, 11, 21, 31, etc.) for a total of 60, to review and assess quality assurance for the four bases: Lal Por 1 (16 of 155); Lal Por 2 (12 of 119); Nazyan (16 of 154); and Khogyani (16 of 159).

17Nangarhar ABP contract (W917PM-08-C-0065).
Table 1. Facility Usage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Lal Por 1</th>
<th>Nazyan</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101-administrative</td>
<td>Partially occupied</td>
<td>Partially occupied</td>
<td>Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 &amp; 202-barracks</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Living quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203-latrine</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Toilets/showers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Dining facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-logistics</td>
<td>Storage/billeting</td>
<td>Used as garage</td>
<td>Storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601-warehouse</td>
<td>Firewood storage</td>
<td>Used as garage</td>
<td>Storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602-POL</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Used for billeting</td>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403/402-ammunition supply point</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Ammunition storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-well house</td>
<td>Used as a well, chicken house</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Covering for well head and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>990-propane</td>
<td>Used as kitchen</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Bottled propane storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel point</td>
<td>Diesel tank with gasoline, generators operational but not running</td>
<td>Generators operational, but not running</td>
<td>Fuel storage and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic tank/leach field</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational but with several problematic issues</td>
<td>Sewage disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water tank</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Potable water storage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR results of site visits from February 16 and 17, 2012.

The administration buildings were used as a combination office and housing for officers. Because the DFACs were not used, any cooking or eating occurred either in other on-site buildings or off-site. The logistics and warehouse buildings were used to store food or firewood, or were used as a garage. Use of the facilities on the bases was further impacted, because electrical power was only available for a few hours each day in order to conserve generator fuel. We noted other instances of inappropriate use of facilities. For example, at Lal Por 1, the well house was used as a chicken house, increasing the risk of sanitation and health issues (see photo 17). In addition, the propane storage building was used as a makeshift kitchen (see photo 18). At Nazyan, the POL and administration buildings were used as living areas (see photos 19 and 20).

**Photo 17: Lal Por 1, Well House Used as Chicken House**

**Photo 18: Lal Por 1, Propane Storage Building Used as Makeshift Kitchen**
BASES WERE TRANSFERRED AND ACCEPTED WITH SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES AND INADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION

USACE-TAN accepted bases from the contractor and transferred them, via the DD Form 1354, to CSTC-A before construction deficiencies had been either completely identified or remediated. For example, the significant issues we identified with the septic system and water supply during our inspection at the three bases had not been identified and included on the Master Deficiency List (or Master Punch List). In addition, USACE-TAN did not appropriately remediate the identified deficiencies before closing out the construction contract, by holding RRCC to the terms of the contract for final acceptance. While ER 415-345-38 allows for facility transfer to the customer with minor deficiencies, the resident area engineer should have ensured that identified deficiencies were completed within the 1-year warranty period, from the date of acceptance.18

RRCC informed the USACE-TAN contracting officer that work under the construction contract conformed to the contract requirements and was free of any defect in equipment, material, or design furnished, or workmanship performed by RRCC or any of its subcontractors. Based on our concerns, we met with USACE-TAN and CSTC-A officials and they agreed to follow up with the contractor for resolution of the deficiencies.

In response to a draft of this report, USACE-TAN stated that many of the deficiencies we identified were resolved by the contractor in June 2012, including uneven floor finishing, missing door sills, masonry repair around doors, water heaters missing valves, missing bathroom fixtures, missing insulation on water tower piping, and leaking fuel tanks. USACE-TAN attributed the lack of validation of repairs to security conditions. However, USACE-TAN stated it made a written request to the contractor to (1) address the deficiencies, by item; (2) clarify if the contractor corrected the reported deficiencies and provide an explanation if they have not done so; and (3) provide the estimated completion date for the remaining repairs and its ability to overcome access and security issues preventing project completion. USACE-

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18Based on our review of the DD1354s, CSTC-A accepted the four Nangarhar Border Police bases, including all facilities, on the following dates: 1) Lal Por 1 (July 15, 2011); 2) Lal Por 2 (July 26, 2011); 3) Nazyan (May 5, 2011); 4) Khogyani (July 26, 2011).
TAN further noted that it is unable to identify any willing or qualified Local National Quality Assurance personnel to conduct the inspections as of the week of June 24, 2012, and the Jalalabad Area Office officer-in-charge and engineer are currently planning a visit on August 12, 2012.

USACE-TAN stated that it has officially notified RRCC of the remaining deficiencies within the warranty period, is working with the contractor to determine the estimated completion date for resolving those deficiencies, and has withheld $684,000 in retainage and liquidated damages pending satisfactory closeout submittal and approval. Further, if the contractor is unable to resolve the remaining deficiencies, USACE-TAN stated it would pursue contractual methods to ensure that it does not pay, or that the contractor compensates the U.S. government, for work not performed.

We also identified deficiencies pertaining to technical documentation and training associated with the transfer of completed facilities. In accordance with USACE ER 415-345-38, *Transfer and Warranties*, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) manuals should be provided in draft at the time of transfer with final versions provided no later than 30 days after transfer of completed facilities. In addition, all technical documents and training of personnel required for safe and effective operation of the facilities should be provided before the facility is occupied. USACE-TAN informed us that RRCC did not provide operations and maintenance manuals or provide the required instruction and training on operations and maintenance to the end user, rather than “one-time” training on the operation of the generator at Lal Por 1. In addition, USACE ER 415-345-38 requires the contractor to provide facility keys as part of the transfer package. As documented in our inspection visits, facilities maintenance personnel at the bases did not have keys to all buildings and doors nor were they always aware of how to operate the equipment, such as the generators at Lal Por 2. In commenting on a draft of this report, USACE-TAN stated it would obtain the remaining technical documents required for safe and effective facility operations prior to contractor completion of work and any further payments.

**CONCLUSION**

Security issues and access to facilities during construction will continue to hamper U.S. government efforts to ensure that construction is properly executed and is constructed in accordance with contract terms. Many of the facilities inspected had several serious design and construction deficiencies, including health issues resulting from improper construction. Several critical construction issues, such as lack of water and repairing the septic system at Lal Por 2 and septic tank piping at Nazyan, remain unresolved. Moreover, outstanding deficiencies prior to the U.S. government’s acceptance of completed Afghan Border Police facilities resulted in remediation and, potentially, additional cost. According to USACE-TAN, the contractor has repaired many of the construction deficiencies we identified, but USACE-TAN has been unable to confirm that these repairs were completed, due to security issues. As a result, the $19 million obligated on the original contract is at risk.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

To ensure that construction is completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards at the four Afghan Border Police bases at Nangarhar Province, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, direct USACE-TAN to correct the construction deficiencies we identified as well as any open deficiencies on the Master Deficiency List for these bases. Specifically, we recommend that USACE-TAN:

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19CSTC-A stated that in most cases, training is only provided to the O&M contractor. No other trainees typically attend.

20CSTC-A stated that keys are usually provided to the NATO Infrastructure Training and Advisory Group personnel or senior Afghan commanders.
1. Review the current status of construction deficiencies identified as part of the transfer of the four bases, including the critical water supply and septic and sewage system deficiencies we identified during the briefing in April 2012, and determine a resolution that is in the best interest of the U.S. government and without unnecessary additional government cost. Specifically, determine the method of repair for the deficiencies still outstanding, including:
   a. Remediation by the contractor, as part of complying with the contract terms.
   b. Recovery under warranty, as stipulated in the contract remediation timeframes and warranty terms.
   c. Determining whether retainage and liquidated damages should be released to the contractor as part of the satisfactory closeout of the contract.

2. Based on the determination in recommendation 1, prepare a plan of action for the repairs and ensure the repairs are completed, inspected, and approved as expediently as possible.

3. For ongoing and future construction contracts, adhere to the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and USACE ER 1180-1-6 for effectively managing a Quality Management Program, by ensuring:
   a. Each USACE Resident/Area Office is aware of and has access to the applicable Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.
   b. The contractor has developed an effective Contractor Quality Control Program, which is adequately monitored and assessed through the Quality Assurance Program.
   c. Construction deficiencies are tracked and remedied in a timely manner, to ensure quality construction is delivered at completion of the project, as part of the transfer process.

4. Per the terms of the transfer process, ensure that Road & Roof Construction Company provides the requisite operations and maintenance manuals as well as the appropriate technical documents and supporting training required for safe and effective operation of the facilities.

COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to USACE-TAN for comment. USACE-TAN provided both general and technical comments and clarifications, particularly relating to security in conducting oversight, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate. We also provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Central Command for technical comment although they did not provide comments. USACE-TAN comments are reproduced in appendix VIII of this report.

Overall, USACE-TAN concurred with the recommendations and stated steps it has taken or plans to take to address them. The report was modified to incorporate USACE-TAN’s concern that security and access issues routinely affect all project and quality management activities for contractors and impact the ability of the government to perform verification of construction quality. We recognize that security is a challenge within Afghanistan that will continue to hamper U.S. government oversight responsibilities.

USACE-TAN stated that it will continue to implement recommendation 1, and noted that numerous deficiencies identified in the report have already been resolved by the contractor during June 2012. However, USACE-TAN has not verified the completion due to security issues and is working with the contractor to determine the estimated completion date. USACE-TAN stated that it officially notified the contractor to remediate the remaining deficiencies within the contract warranty period and that it has withheld $684,000 in retainage and liquidated damages pending satisfactory closeout submittal and approval. In addition, USACE-TAN stated that it will pursue contractual methods to ensure that USACE-TAN does not pay, or the contractor compensates USACE-TAN, for work under warranty the contractor cannot resolve. Further, USACE-TAN noted that it was confident the issues would be resolved without
unnecessary additional government expense. Recommendation 1 was modified from the draft report to
add that retainage and liquidated damages should be determined and released to the contractor as part of
the satisfactory closeout of the contract; and deleted reference to conducting repairs by means of the
USACE operations and maintenance contract.

USACE-TAN concurred with recommendation 2 and stated that it would identify the best course of
action and implement the plan as expeditiously as possible based on the results of the contractor’s
continuing work and in coordination with CSTC-A.

USACE-TAN concurred with recommendation 3 and cited actions to improve the established Quality
Management Program and would strive to improve its quality management process and documentation.
Specifically, it has prepared a plan to improve the project management and business process for
construction contracts. This includes actions to ensure that all contract awards include a QASP and that
contracting officials responsible for providing contract oversight and administration are properly trained.
USACE-TAN concurred with recommendation 4 and stated that it plans to obtain the remaining technical
documents required for safe and effective facility operations prior to contractor completion of work and
any further payment.

Overall, we found USACE-TAN’s comments to be responsive to the recommendations and we urge
USACE-TAN to pursue the planned actions addressed in its comments.
APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of project assessments of Afghan Border Police (ABP) bases in Nangarhar Province by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). This inspection report is one in a series of four inspections of construction projects contracted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

To determine whether the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, we:

- reviewed contract documents, design submittals, geotechnical reports to understand project requirements and contract administration;
- interviewed cognizant U.S. and Afghan government officials responsible for the construction project; and
- conducted physical inspections at Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, and Nazyan ABP bases to observe the current status of the quality of construction and photographed construction deficiencies.

To determine if the facilities were being used as intended, including operations and maintenance, we:

- reviewed quality management documentation to understand project requirements and the contractor’s quality control and government quality assurance processes, and
- interviewed cognizant U.S. and Afghan government officials responsible for the construction project.

We were unable to inspect one base, Khogyani, due to weather conditions. In addition, we were unable to verify early construction activities such as foundation work and underground utilities at any of the bases, since the early stage of the construction were buried, and construction photographs pertaining to the early months of construction were unavailable for our review. We determined the extent to which quality control and quality assurance was documented by reviewing Quality Control Reports (QCRs) and Quality Assurance Reports (QARs), contract specifications, and design documents.

We conducted work at Kabul, Afghanistan; Jalalabad Area Office, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); Jalalabad Resident Office-Forward Operating Base Hughie, USACE; and three Afghan Border Police (ABP) bases in Nangarhar Province from January to July 2012, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. These standards were established to guide all inspection work performed by the Offices of Inspector General. The engineering assessments were conducted in accordance with the Code of Ethics for Engineers. We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. We considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk.

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our inspection objectives. This inspection was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Afghanistan Engineer District\(^2\) awarded contract W917PM-08-C-0065, on June 30, 2008, to the Road & Roof Construction Company (RRCC) for $18,668,630. As of October 2, 2011, the contract had been amended 11 times increasing the cost to $19,196,579.

The following are some provisions of the contract:

The firm-fixed-price contract was for design and construction of site improvements and construction of facilities to support the Afghan Border Police (ABP) units in Afghanistan. In addition, the contract referenced the management, design, material, labor, and equipment to design and construct and/or refurbish all utilities, roads, buildings, force protection measures, site security, de-mining activities, and other features.

Among other things, the contract provided for liquidated damages of $1,900 for each calendar day of delay until the work was completed or accepted, if the contractor failed to complete the work within the time specified in the contract. The contract also provided for unusually severe weather delays, in January, February, and March, that were to be calculated chronologically from the first to the last day in each month. If the number of actual unusually severe weather days exceeded the number of days anticipated, the contracting officer would determine whether the contractor was entitled to a time extension.

The contract contained five contract line item numbers that specified the unit price for site construction for four ABP bases and the associated Defense Base Act insurance. Table I shows the contract line item numbers, titles, and amounts for each base and for insurance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Line Item Number</th>
<th>Contract Line Item Title</th>
<th>Initial Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>Khogyani Border Police Facility</td>
<td>$4,813,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0002</td>
<td>Lal Por 1 Border Police Facility</td>
<td>4,545,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003</td>
<td>Lal Por 2 Border Police Facility</td>
<td>4,483,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004</td>
<td>Nazyan Border Police Facility</td>
<td>4,767,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0005</td>
<td>Defense Base Act Insurance</td>
<td>58,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Contract Price</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$18,668,630</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Contract W917PM-08-C-0065

As of October 2, 2011, USACE-TAN amended the contract 11 times. The amendments increased the contract cost by $527,949 to $19,196,579 and increased the period of performance by 715 days. Additionally, the U.S. government gave up $543,243 in liquidated damages in exchange for the contractor not pursuing a Request for Equitable Adjustment. The amendments are summarized in table II.

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\(^2\)In 2009, the Afghanistan Engineer District was divided into two districts—the North (now referred to as USACE-TAN) was established in 2004 and the South was added in 2009.
### Table II: Summary of Amendments to Contract W917PM-08-C-0065

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification Number</th>
<th>Effective Date</th>
<th>Statement of Work Modification</th>
<th>Contract Time Change</th>
<th>Contract Price Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A00001</td>
<td>December 8, 2008</td>
<td>Time extension for Khogyhani for security shutdown.</td>
<td>+48 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00002</td>
<td>February 14, 2009</td>
<td>Resume work at Nazyan Site. Adjustment for right of entry.</td>
<td>+38 days</td>
<td>$19,968.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00003</td>
<td>April 23, 2009</td>
<td>Suspension of work at four sites. De-mine/survey due to relocation of Khogyani site.</td>
<td>+42 days</td>
<td>$252,522.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00004</td>
<td>June 18, 2009</td>
<td>Weather delay</td>
<td>+4 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00005</td>
<td>October 29, 2009</td>
<td>Holidays</td>
<td>+3 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00006</td>
<td>November 16, 2009</td>
<td>Security issues</td>
<td>+3 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00007</td>
<td>January 6, 2010</td>
<td>Security issues</td>
<td>+21 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00008</td>
<td>January 11, 2010</td>
<td>Delay in two submittals</td>
<td>+65 days</td>
<td>$255,458.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00009</td>
<td>January 11, 2010</td>
<td>Weather delay</td>
<td>+24 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00010</td>
<td>April 7, 2010</td>
<td>Weather delay</td>
<td>+1 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A00011(^{22})</td>
<td>October 2, 2011</td>
<td>Equitable Adjustment: delays due to weather, security issues, and long approval times by U.S. government for some submittals which affected contractor’s progress, vs. liquidated damages to be assessed by the U.S. government.</td>
<td>+467 days</td>
<td>No price change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $527,948.50


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\(^{22}\) Amendment A00011, effective October 2, 2011, extended contract completion by 467 calendar days. The contract completion date was revised to June 20, 2011; the contract price remained unchanged. The additional time granted was used to offset the contractor’s Request for Equitable Adjustment, whereby the contractor agreed to withdraw the Request for Equitable Adjustment and all associated costs. The amendment constituted compensation in full on behalf of the contractor and its subcontractors and suppliers, for all costs and markups directly or indirectly attributable for the change ordered; for all delays related thereto; for all extended overhead costs; and for performance of the change within the stated timeframe. Although amendment A00011 did not change the cost of the contract, a Price Negotiation Memorandum, dated September 20, 2011, stated that the government “agreed to extend the Contract Completion date 467 Calendar days to 20 June 2011, which will bring all liquidated damages to zero, and to release all retainage.” A Progress Payment History showed that, on August 20, 2011, retainage was $543,244 and deductions were $684,000. The same document indicated that the retainage was zeroed out on September 15, 2011; however, the balance for deductions remained.
Table III summarizes the construction quality issues we identified during our inspection of Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, and Nazyan in February 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defect</th>
<th>Lal Por 1</th>
<th>Lal Por 2</th>
<th>Nazyan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HVAC elbows are straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the specifications.a There was no evidence of turning vanesb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inside the elbows. Joints were also finished usealed.c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical and mechanical rollup door accutuators are inoperable.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary wall height varies above and below design</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper ladder material</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing storm water inlets</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaking fuel tanks</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof column bolts with insufficient threads through nuts</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breached secondary containment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong fuel dispenser</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left construction debris</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramic tiles fallen off wall</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing door sills</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrectly installed septic tank piping</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masonry needs repair around doors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing generator parts</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete sealant cracking</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard tower does not follow design</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneven floor finish</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil subsidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage backing into manhole shafts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel cradles for fuel tanks not flush with surface</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR results of site visits from February 16 and 17, 2012.

Notes:

aStraight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and significantly reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degrees.
bTurning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.
cUnsealed HVAC joints cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers.
APPENDIX IV: SUMMARY OF INCOMPLETE CONSTRUCTION

Table IV summarizes the incomplete construction issues we noted during our inspection of Lal Por 1, Lal Por 2, and Nazyan in February 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defect</th>
<th>Lal Por 1</th>
<th>Lal Por 2</th>
<th>Nazyan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing attached detention furniture</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC sink missing drain pipe</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel tanks unmarked and missing telemetry</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ungrounded fuel tanks</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing insulation on water tower piping</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing landscape seeding</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel point fence</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsupported HVAC ducting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water heaters/wall heaters not electrically connected, missing valves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing bathroom fixtures</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing erosion protection on storm drain outlet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR results of site visits from February 16 and 17, 2012.

Note: "The contractor was in the process of drilling a fourth well in an attempt to find a water supply at Lal Por 2."
Table V shows our observations at Lal Por 1 during our site visit on February 16, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Status a</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration building with communications room and arms room</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Missing attached detention furniture. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks (private/semi-private and open-bay)</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC to include outside wood stoves</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>HVAC elbows were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required in the specifications. HVAC elbows were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required in the specifications. HVAC elbows were straight 90 degrees, not sweep 90 degrees as required in the specifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricants Building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Electrical and mechanical rollup door actuators were inoperable. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage and vehicle refuel point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition supply point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard towers</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter force protection wall</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Boundary wall height varied above and below design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well house</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network (includes sidewalks and curbing)</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water system</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Missing insulation on water tower piping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary sewer system</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Improper ladder material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storm drain system</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Missing storm water inlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall site</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Missing landscape seeding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Statusa</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR observations during site visit to Lal Por 1 on February 16, 2012.

Notes:

a The contract’s scope of work outlined construction requirements for each facility. If we noted missing items during our site visit, we annotated the status of the facility as incomplete.

b Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and significantly reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degree.

c Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.

d Unsealed HVAC joints cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers.
Table VI shows our observations at Lal Por 2 during our site visit on February 16, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Status a</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed. Electrical and mechanical rollup door actuators were inoperable. Masonry repair needed around doors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC to include outside wood stoves</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed. Missing door sills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>HVAC elbows were straight 90 degree, not sweep 90 degree as required in the specifications. No evidence of turning vanes inside elbows. Joints finished unsealed. Concrete crack control joints not installed. Left construction debris. Unsupported HVAC ducting. Water Heaters missing valves. Missing bathroom fixtures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricants building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Electrical and mechanical rollup door actuators were inoperable. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage and vehicle refuel point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition supply point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard shack and gate house</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete sealant cracking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard towers</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Guard tower did not follow design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter force protection wall</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Boundary wall height varied above and below design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well house</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network (includes sidewalks and curbing)</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site utilities</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Soil subsidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Water system                         | Incomplete | Contractor drilling a well at a fourth site in attempt to find a water supply.  
Missing insulation on water tower piping. |
| Sanitary sewer system                | Incomplete | Improper ladder material.  
Left construction debris.  
Incorrectly installed septic tank piping.  
Missing septic tank piping.  
Septic tank smaller than shown in design drawings. |
| Storm drain system                   | Incomplete | Missing storm water inlets.  
Missing Erosion Protection on storm drain outlet. |
| Construct site electrical distribution system | Incomplete | Missing generator parts. |
| Construct overall site               | Incomplete | Missing landscape seeding. |

Source: SIGAR observations during site visit to Lal Por 2 on February 16, 2012.

Notes:

\(a\) The contract’s scope of work outlined construction requirements for each facility. If we noted missing items during our site visit, we annotated the status of the facility as incomplete.

\(b\) Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and significantly reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degree.

\(c\) Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.

\(d\) Unsealed HVAC joints cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers.
APPENDIX VII: DEFECTS IDENTIFIED AT NAZYAN

Table VII shows our observations at Nazyan during our site visit on February 17, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration building with communications room, and arms room</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks Buildings (Private / Semi-private and Open-Bay)</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Electrical and mechanical rollup door actuators were inoperable. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC to include outside wood stoves</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>HVAC elbows were straight 90°, not sweep 90° as required in the specifications. No evidence of turning vanes inside elbows. Joints were also unsealed. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricants building</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Electrical and mechanical rollup door actuators were inoperable. Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage and vehicle refuel point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition supply point</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard towers</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter force protection wall</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Boundary wall height varied above and below design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well house</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Concrete crack control joints not installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network (includes sidewalks and curbing)</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water system</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary sewer system</td>
<td>Complete with defects</td>
<td>Improper ladder material. Sewage filling manhole shafts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storm drain system</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Missing storm water inlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall site</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td>Missing landscape seeding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Status (^a)</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR observations during site visit to Nazyan on February 17, 2012.

Notes:
\(^a\) The contract’s scope of work outlined construction requirements for each facility. If we noted missing items during our site visit, we annotated the status of the facility as incomplete.
\(^b\) Straight 90 degree elbows cause turbulent air flow and significantly reduce the air velocity compared to sweep 90 degree.
\(^c\) Turning vanes are curved pieces of sheet metal placed in sharp bends to help avoid turbulent air flow.
\(^d\) Unsealed HVAC joints cause air leakage and reduce the flow out of the registers.
APPENDIX VIII: COMMENTS FROM U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Response to SIGAR Draft Report 
"Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases put $19 Million Investment at Risk"

1. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) welcomes the opportunity to review the draft 
report.

2. USACE appreciates the report’s recommendations and the need to implement; however, 
significant security and access issues throughout Afghanistan routinely affect all project and 
quality management activities for contractors and impact the ability of the government to 
perform verification of construction completion. This is especially the case with projects 
covered in this report which are located in extremely remote and predominately inaccessible 
sites. The SIGAR report does not mention the critical security and access issues which are the 
root cause for the specific quality management discrepancies.

3. Specific responses to the applicable recommendations and technical comments are provided 
in the enclosures.

4. My point of contact for these comments is Mr. John Daley (202) 761-5844.

[Signature]
JOHN S. HURLEY
COL, USA
Deputy Commander
ENCLOSURE 1

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Response to Draft SIGIR Report “Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases put $19 Million Investment at Risk”

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that construction is completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards at the four Afghan Border Police bases at Nangarhar Province, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, direct USACE-TAN to address the construction deficiencies we identified as well as any open deficiencies on the Master Deficiency List for these bases. Specifically, we recommend that USACE-TAN:

Recommendation 1: Review the current status of construction deficiencies identified as part of the transfer of the four bases, including the critical water supply and septic and sewage system deficiencies we identified during the briefing in April 2012; and determine the method of repair for the deficiencies still outstanding, including:

Response: USACE concurs with the recommendation and will continue actions in progress to determine the method of repair for the outstanding construction deficiencies, including water, septic, and sewage issues. It should be noted that numerous deficiencies shown in the SIGAR report have already been resolved by the contractor, including uneven floor finish, missing door sills, masonry needed repair around doors, left construction debris, water heaters missing valves, missing bathroom fixtures, missing insulation on water tower piping, and leaking fuel tanks. The contractor performed additional repairs during June but USACE has not verified their completion due to security issues. We are working with the contractor to determine the estimated completion date for remaining repairs. Further information on the status of the deficiencies and validating their completion is provided in the technical comments provided separately.

a. Remediation by the contractor, as part of complying with the contract terms.

Response: USACE officially notified the contractor of the remaining deficiencies within the contract warranty period. The contractor assumed responsibility for the deficiencies and has been consistently attempting to perform the work to resolve them. Security is a continuing concern. As previously noted, at La Por 2 last year, three serious insurgent incidents prevented the contractor from accessing the site for extended periods to finish the repairs. To further support contractor compliance, USACE has withheld $684,000, in retainage and liquidated damages pending satisfactory closeout submittal and approval. We are also coordinating with the NTM-A, the battle space owner, to determine the best course of action for repairs required.

b. Recovery under warranty, as stipulated in the contract remediation timeframes and warranty terms.

Response: The contractor provided a one-year warranty, and we identified the
discrepancies noted to the contractor during the warranty period. As previously stated, if the contractor cannot resolve the remaining discrepancies, we will pursue contractual methods to ensure USACE does not pay, or the contractor compensates USACE, for work that was not performed.

c. Repairs by means of the USACE operations and maintenance contract, while recognizing this will be an additional cost to the U.S. Government.

Response: USACE is working with the contractor and we are confident that the issues will be resolved in accordance with the best interests of the government and without unnecessary additional government expense.

Recommendation 2: Based on the determination in recommendation 1, prepare a plan of action for the repairs, as previously requested, and ensure the repairs are completed, inspected, and approved prior to the transition of base maintenance to GIRoA.

Response: USACE concurs with the recommendation. As stated in the preceding, based on the results of the contractor's continuing work, the results of the PDT, and the coordination with NTM-A, USACE will identify the best course of action and implement the plan as expeditiously as possible.

Recommendation 3: For ongoing and future construction contracts, adhere to the requirements of the FAR and USACE ER 1180-1-6 for effectively managing a Quality Assurance Program, by ensuring:

Response: USACE concurs with the recommendation. USACE/TAN consistently takes actions to improve the established Quality Management Program and ensure adherence to FAR and USACE requirements, as discussed in detail below.

a. Each USACE Resident/Area Office is aware of and has access to the applicable Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.

Response: USACE concurs with the recommendation. Each Resident/Area Office is aware of and has access to a variety of Quality Assurance resources on the TAN Construction Branch intranet site to assist in ensuring construction and project management quality. Again, the preponderance of security issues in these areas puts USACE civilians, contractors, and local nationals at significant risk and significantly impacts construction quality management.

- Available documentation includes the District-Level, Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, 15 Dec 08, a comprehensive guide for QC plans, supplemental project QA plans, testing, and reports, and the District SOP (C-8), Construction Branch, Project-Level Quality Assurance Plans, 30 Apr 10. SOP (C-8) includes a formatted simplified QAP, with QA start-up activities, a submittal register, and a work action list that delineates QA actions for specific validation items such as contractor QC and warranty management. The Area Office staff also uses these tools to train the local national QAR workforce on quality and safety issues.

- The USACE/TAN Construction Organization includes a Quality Assurance Branch (QAB) staff of approximately 15 trained personnel that's available to provide a variety of training, consultation, and inspection services to field offices, as necessary. The QAB maintains
extensive resources on the TAN intranet site, available to Resident/Area Offices to assist in effective quality assurance, such as District SOP (C-5), Construction Branch, Construction Contractor Performance Evaluations, 25 Apr 09, and other SOPs for the evaluation of contractor work.

b. **The contractor has developed an effective Contractor Quality Control Program, which is adequately monitored and assessed through the Quality Assurance Program.**

**Response:** USACE concurs with the recommendation. USACE/TAN continues to take actions to ensure each contract includes an effective quality control plan. Under USACE Transatlantic Division (TAD) direction, TAN has prepared a plan, based on OPORD 2012-41, Acquisition and Contracting Enterprise Initiative Program (ACE), to improve the project management business process for construction contracts. The plan includes actions to ensure all contracts awarded include a QASP; Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs), Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs), and contract administrators are properly trained; qualified representatives are appointed when necessary to replace redeployed representatives, and FAR requirements are met. These actions, in conjunction with the previously mentioned QAB personnel and tools, will continue to strengthen the USACE quality management process and assist managers/engineers in ensuring the quality assurance process for each contractor is effective.

c. **Construction deficiencies are tracked and remedied in a timely manner, to ensure quality construction is delivered at completion of the project, as part of the transfer process.**

**Response:** USACE concurs with the recommendation. The Resident Management System (RMS), used by government, and the Quality Control System (QCS), used by contractors, are quality management and contract administration programs designed by Resident Engineers. The systems provide an efficient method to plan, schedule, and control all aspects of construction. As previously stated, the contingency environment and related security and access problems significantly increase the difficulty of project completion and maintaining formal organized documentation of quality assurance actions performed. We continually strive to improve our quality management process and documentation.

**Recommendation 4:** Per the terms of the transfer process, ensure that RRCC provides the requisite operations and maintenance manuals as well as the appropriate technical documents and supporting training required for safe and effective operation of the facilities.

**Response:** USACE concurs with the recommendation and will obtain the remaining technical documents required for safe and effective facility operations prior to contractor completion of work and any further payment.

4
ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Technical Comments to Draft SIGIR Report “Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases in Nangarhar”

Page 2: “The contract had 11 amendments that increased the total contract obligations by $527,949 to $19,196,579 and extended the estimated completion date to June 20, 2011”.

USACE Comment: Change the italicized to ‘contract required’ to conform with project management and Resident Management System (RMS) definitions.

Page 21 Appendix III: “Table III: Summary of Construction Quality Issues”

USACE Comment: Specific deficiencies, as shown in the SIGAR report appendices, that were remedied included: The contractor provided a planned schedule to complete all repairs by 20 Jun 12, at which time USACE would perform a joint inspection with the contractor to validate that the repairs were complete. Unfortunately, although the contractor has performed additional repairs during the month of June, security conditions prevented validation of their completion. USACE has since made a written request to the contractor address deficiencies, by item, to clarify if the contractor corrected the reported deficiencies, if not why not; the estimated completion date for the remaining repairs, and its ability to overcome access and security issues which prevent effective project completion. USACE is still unable to identify any willing and/or qualified Jalalabad Resident Office Local National Quality Assurance (LNQA) personnel (as of the week of 24 Jun 12) to travel to Lal Por 2 to validate repairs because of continuing security concerns. The Jalalabad Area Office OIC and Engineer are planning an August 12, 2012 visit at this time.

- For the septic/sewage system deficiencies at both Nazyan and Lal Por 2, the contractor provided information that the septic systems were constructed in accordance with the contract requirements, photographs that indicated the SIGAR photos were taken while work was in progress, and comments that final photographs to illustrate proof of completed repairs to the internal piping for an operational septic tank were difficult to obtain. The TAN Engineering Branch has been reviewing the design drawings and contractor photos/documentation to determine if the current functionality of the septic systems meets contract requirements. Since TAN provided photographs and comments to show that the sewage level was normal after maintenance was performed, USACE believes it can satisfactorily resolve this issue in the near future.

- For the critical water supply at the Lal Por 2 site, as previously noted to SIGAR, USACE is currently working on a solution.

- TAN formed a project development team (PDT) specifically to determine the best course of action to make water available to the site, based on the contractor's notification to TAN
during the week of 17 Jun 12 that additional drillings had been unsuccessful. TAN Engineering and Construction, in coordination with Programs and Project Management, and area engineers are performing analyses to identify the resources/options available to resolve the issue.

- Also note, that at the time of project award, the CSTC-A customer directed the locations of projects based only on rudimentary site assessments. Those site assessments didn't thoroughly investigate the availability and quality of water. In June 2011, TAN implemented an Enhanced Site Assessment (ESA) process in which TAN hydro-geologists review all available resources and make a determination regarding water availability and quality. The ESA process includes review of the suitability of the site topography, e.g., projected significant cut/fill required, wadis that might cause erosion or flooding issues, access to the site from main roads, and other site constraints. The ESA is furnished to the CSTC-A Project Manager to make a determination whether to build at the site or select another location.
SIGAR’s comment to the USACE’s response dated July 9, 2012:

1. Regarding technical comments on the septic system deficiencies at both Nazyan and Lal Por 2, USACE-TAN did not provide conclusive evidence to resolve the issues we identified. In its comments, USACE-TAN stated it was unable to conduct a site visit and relied on the contractor’s assertions for verification. We could not determine from the documentation provided by the contractor to USACE-TAN whether it adequately addressed the noted deficiencies. We were also unable to determine whether the photographs submitted by the contractor were taken at the same location, or were taken of the same septic systems. For example, the photographs submitted of the septic system at Nazyan were inconsistent with the photographs we took of the same septic system, and were inconsistent with the design specifications we had reviewed. In an attempt to resolve our concerns, on June 7, 2012, we requested a meeting with engineers and project officials at the USACE Jalalabad Area Office and with contractor representatives. However, the Jalalabad Area Office informed us that it had already provided us the appropriate documentation and that a meeting was unnecessary. On June 17, 2012, USACE-TAN provided an update of the contractor’s warranty repair activities; however, the pictures and documentation concerning the septic system deficiencies remained the same and did not provide any new information for us to consider. Therefore, we continue to believe the issue remains unresolved.
This inspection report was conducted under project code SIGAR-I-003.
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The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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