IMAM SAHIB BORDER POLICE COMPANY HEADQUARTERS IN KUNDUZ PROVINCE: $7.3 MILLION FACILITY SITS LARGELY UNUSED
WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

In March 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Afghanistan Engineer District - North (USACE-TAN) awarded a $5.7 million firm fixed-price contract to Omran Construction, Consulting and Engineering Company to design and build facilities at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz province. Subsequent modifications to the contract increased its total value to $7.3 million. The facility was turned over to the Afghan Border Police on September 3, 2012. As part of its inspection program, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted a site inspection at the facility to determine (1) whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and (2) whether facilities were being used as intended and maintained.

In preparation for its site inspection, SIGAR reviewed contract documents, technical specifications, design documents, geotechnical reports, and quality control and quality assurance reports. SIGAR conducted its site inspection on November 19, 2012. SIGAR conducted its work in Kunduz province and in Kabul, Afghanistan from September 2012 to January 2013, in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

SIGAR’s inspection was limited to two buildings and a portion of a third of the total 12 buildings at the facility because most buildings were locked and on-site personnel did not have keys. No major construction quality issues were identified at the buildings SIGAR inspected. Built with a capacity for 175 persons, only about 12 Afghan personnel were on site during SIGAR’s inspection, and they were unaware of plans to move additional staff to the facility. Construction plans for Afghan forces were aligned to the personnel strength of 352,000, and there were no plans to adjust the building program to varying circumstances. Most buildings appeared unused and some equipment—specifically, wood-burning stoves near the site’s dining facility—had been dismantled.

The facility also lacks back-up electrical power. In addition, sustaining the facility will require personnel with appropriate skills to keep the electrical generator; fueling station; water treatment system; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in working order. However, there is neither an operation and maintenance contract nor a plan to train Afghan personnel to operate and maintain equipment. This raises questions about the Afghan government’s ability to sustain the facility.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

SIGAR recommends that USACE, in coordination with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), review plans for constructing Afghan police facilities to determine whether site construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are needed. If this facility is needed and plans are in place for its use, SIGAR recommends reviewing the feasibility of installing backup power or connecting to the local grid, awarding an operation and maintenance contract or providing training to Afghan personnel, and determining why wood-burning stoves at the site were dismantled.

USACE concurred with the first three recommendations but did not concur with the last recommendation to determine why the stoves were dismantled. NTM-A/CSTC-A’s comments were responsive to all four recommendations. In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A implemented the corrective action requested in the last recommendation and agreed to incorporate the lesson learned in future construction standards.
January 29, 2013

Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger
Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/
    Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick
Commanding General and Chief of Engineers
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

This report discusses the results of our inspection of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Imam Sahib Border Police Headquarters construction project in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan. This report includes four recommendations to the Commanding General, USACE, in coordination with the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). Our primary recommendation is to review plans for constructing Afghan Border Police facilities to determine whether site construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are needed, and provide an explanation of the review results. If it is determined that the facility discussed in this report is needed and plans are in place for its use, we recommend reviewing the feasibility of installing backup power or connecting to the local grid, awarding an operation and maintenance contract or providing training to Afghan personnel, and determining why wood-burning stoves at the site were dismantled and whether wood burning stoves are feasible for other ANP facilities. USACE concurred with the first three recommendations but did not agree with the last recommendation, stating that it had no control or authority over how facilities are used after they are turned over to the customer.

This inspection report is one of a series of nine inspections of construction projects contracted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan. SIGAR conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
    for Afghanistan Reconstruction
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE-TAN</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District-North</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which include the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP). To support these efforts, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) provided $7.3 million to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to construct a Border Police Company Headquarters at Imam Sahib in northern Kunduz Province on the border with Tajikistan.

For this inspection, we assessed the quality and maintenance of construction and site improvements for facilities located at the Afghan Border Police Company headquarters. Specifically, we determined whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and deficiencies were corrected before acceptance and transfer and (2) facilities would be used as intended and maintained.

We conducted this inspection at Kabul, Afghanistan; the USACE Kunduz Resident Office; and the Afghan Border Police Company Headquarters construction site at Imam Sahib in northern Kunduz Province from September 2012 to January 2013, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by Professional Engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics for Engineers. Appendix I contains more detail on our scope and methodology. Appendix II contains a site map of the headquarters.

BACKGROUND

USACE Afghanistan Engineer District-North (USACE-TAN) awarded a firm fixed-price contract W5J9JE-11-C-0001) on October 15, 2010, for $5.7 million to Omran Construction, Consulting and Engineering Company. As of November 5, 2012, there were seven modifications to the base contract that increased the award amount to $7.3 million and the period of performance by 152 days. The contract included site improvements and the design and construction of a headquarters compound. The scope of work included the management, design, material, labor, and equipment to design and construct and/or refurbish all utilities, roads, buildings, force protection measures, site security, de-mining activities, as well as a water system, sanitary sewer, storm drain system, and electrical distribution system. Construction was completed and the facility turned over to the Afghan Border Police on September 3, 2012.

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1 The ANP includes, among others, the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Afghan Border Police.
2 Funded through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
3 Both the District and City of Imam Sahib are transliterated and spelled in various documents as Imam Saheb, Emam Sahib, and Emam Saheb. For consistency within this report, unless used in a verbatim quotation, we use the Imam Sahib spelling.
4 Kunduz Province is located north of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and borders Tajikistan. The province covers an area of 7,827 km. Three quarters of the area is made up of flat land, while about 12 percent is mountainous or semi mountainous terrain.
5 In 2009, the Afghanistan Engineer District was divided into two districts—North and South. The North District is referred to as USACE-TAN.
6 Omran Incorporated, an Afghan consulting, construction, and engineering group, was established in 2004 under the name of Omran Company. The Kabul-based firm offers civil, structural, design, construction, supervision, and procurement services throughout Afghanistan.
The NTM-A basing strategy focuses on permanent garrison-type basing, with sites placed to allow the ANP to control the strategic crossroads, ensure freedom of movement for commercial traffic, respond to the most critical border crossing areas, and provide security for development of Afghanistan’s mineral resources. To accommodate and unify the requirements for site construction, standard garrisons have been designed for different unit echelons, including the ANP.8

See figures 1 and 2 for aerial views of the site that were taken by USACE-TAN in July 2012. Appendix III summarizes the scope of the contract.

**Figure 1 - Northern Portion of Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters**

![Northern Portion of Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters](image)


**Figure 2 - Southern Portion of Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters**

![Southern Portion of Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters](image)


INSPECTION ACCESS WAS LIMITED TO ONLY 3 OF THE SITE’S 12 BUILDINGS BECAUSE ON-SITE PERSONNEL DID NOT HAVE KEYS TO ALL BUILDINGS

During our November 19, 2012, site visit, we were able to obtain access to only two buildings, and a portion of a third, of the 12 buildings at the site. All of the other buildings and equipment were locked and Afghan personnel at the site informed us that they did not have keys to the locked buildings and equipment. Our observations of these buildings were therefore limited to their exteriors and what could be seen by looking through building windows.

We were able to obtain access to the site’s administration building (see figures 3 and 4) and combination latrine/ablution(bathing)/laundry building (see figures 5), as well as to a small building attached to the site’s dining facility that was designed to house two wood-burning stoves. This latter facility was connected to the dining facility by a covered walkway and wood storage area. The site, as a whole, was clean and appeared to be well-maintained. Structural construction of the facilities we were able to visit generally appeared to meet contract and design specifications. For example, we found no construction defects in the administration

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7 The permanent basing strategy developed by the Combined Joint Engineering Directorate of NTM-A is a compilation of information from a number of years of facility construction in support of Afghan National Security Forces. It is intended to help the security forces meet the long-term goals, missions, and tasks defined in the National Military Strategy of Afghanistan

8 See NTM-A Permanent Basing for the Afghan National Army and Facility Stewardship Program, April 2012.
building or the latrine. In addition, the fueling point for Afghan Border Police vehicles and the on-site electrical generator was observed to be running during our visit (see figure 6). Although we could not access the well house or water tank, the potable water system was functional as evidenced by the availability of water to the toilets and showers.

Figure 3 - Exterior of the Administration Building

![Figure 3](image1)

Source: Courtesy USACE-TAN, July 31, 2012.

Figure 4 - Interior of the Administration Building

![Figure 4](image2)

Source: Courtesy USACE-TAN, July 31, 2012.

Figure 5 - Sinks in the Combination Latrine, Shower, Ablution, and Laundry Building

![Figure 5](image3)


Figure 6 - Combined Fueling Point for Afghan Border Police Vehicles and Site Generator

![Figure 6](image4)

SITE FACILITIES WERE GENERALLY UNOCCUPIED, SOME INSTALLED EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN DISMANTLED, AND OTHER USE AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES WERE NOTED

Despite being designed for a capacity of 175 personnel, only about 12 Afghan staff were at the site at the time of our visit on November 19, 2012.9 On-site personnel were unaware of plans to move additional staff into the compound. As a result, most of the buildings on the site appeared to be unused. When we discussed this with NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, they informed us that the construction plans for the ANSF were aligned to the personnel strength of 352,000, and there were no plans to adjust the building program to varying circumstances.

Based on our observations and discussions with on-site personnel, plans to use some of the facilities were unclear. For example, two barracks buildings that were constructed to provide living quarters were unoccupied. Instead, the administration building, which was intended to be used solely as office space, was also being used as living quarters.

In addition, although we were unable to obtain access, our examination of the dining facility through the building’s windows indicated that it was empty and appeared to have never been used. We were unable to determine during our site visit whether any preparation of meals occurred on site in the dining facility or where meals were being eaten.

Table 1 shows the occupancy status and intended purposes of the buildings on the site. This problem of largely unoccupied buildings is similar to our finding in a July 2012 inspection that most buildings at four Afghan Border Police facilities in Nangarhar province were unoccupied or were not being used as intended.10

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9 During our site inspection, we were accompanied by six Afghan Police officials in uniform. As we conducted our inspection, we encountered approximately six more individuals, dressed in civilian clothes. We did not determine whether these were ANP soldiers in civilian clothes, or civilian personnel on-site.

### Table 1 - Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters Facilities: Occupancy/Operational Status and Intended Purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Occupied/Operational</th>
<th>Intended Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101-Administration building</td>
<td>Partially Occupied</td>
<td>Offices and living quarters (figures 3 and 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 &amp; 202-Barracks</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Living quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203-Latrine</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Toilets/showers (figures 5 and 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining facility</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Dining facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601-Warehouse</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602-Petroleum, oil, &amp; lubricants</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Petroleum, oil, &amp; lubricants storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403/402-Ammunition supply point</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Ammunition storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-Well house</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Covering for well head &amp; equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water tank</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Potable water storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>990-Propane</td>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>Bottled propane storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel point/generator</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Fuel storage and distribution (figure 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic tank/leach field</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Sewage disposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract W5J9JE-11-C-0001.

Furthermore, some equipment installed during construction had been dismantled at the time of our site visit. Specifically, two wood-burning stoves had been constructed in a small annex adjacent to a covered walkway that connected the annex with the site's dining facility (see figure 7). At the time of our November 2012 visit, however, the two stoves had been dismantled (see figure 8).

According to the Afghan Border Police commander present during our site visit, the stoves had been dismantled to make minor repairs. In contrast, three other Afghan personnel present on-site told us that the stoves had been removed from the annex so that the building could be used instead for storage. We were unable to resolve the discrepancy between these explanations during our visit. In particular, it is unclear from our observations whether the stoves had ever been used, raising questions as to how it was known that repairs were needed.

Furthermore, if repairs were indeed necessary, the stoves would have still been under warranty and so any minor repairs should have been referred by Afghan officials to USACE-TAN. Specifically, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation clause incorporated into the construction contract states that “the warranty shall continue for a period of one year from the final acceptance of the work [and] the Contractor shall remedy at the Contractor’s expense any failure to conform, or any defect...the Contracting Officer shall notify the Contractor...of any failure, defect, or damage.”

USACE-TAN project file documents indicated that meetings regarding warranties and facility transfer were conducted between USACE-TAN and Afghan National Police representatives. Transfer documentation also indicates that construction of the dining facility—including the wood-burning stoves—was completed in accordance with “maps, drawings, and specifications” and that no deficiencies existed. Moreover, USACE-TAN also obtained warranty documents from its contractor and provided them to the Afghan Border Police in both English and Dari. Therefore, it is unclear why Afghan officials would have chosen to make repairs themselves, rather than seek warranty service for the stoves. Importantly, by dismantling the wood-burning stoves, Afghan officials voided the warranty on the stoves and released USACE-TAN’s contractor from any obligation to repair or replace them. As a result, additional costs will need to be incurred if replacement of the stoves is necessary at a later date.

Figure 7 - September 6, 2012, Photograph of Two Installed Wood-Burning Stoves

Figure 8 - November 19, 2012, Photograph of Dismantled Stoves


Our inspection found other use and sustainability issues. For example, the site has no backup generator or connection to the municipal power grid. As a result, electrical power will be unavailable during periods that the on-site generator is undergoing maintenance or repair, when fuel is unavailable, and during periods of unexpected outages. In addition, there is neither an operation and maintenance contract for on-site facilities and equipment nor are there plans to provide training for local Afghan personnel to keep these systems in good working order. The site is fairly new, largely unoccupied, and, to date, has had little need for operation and maintenance support. Nevertheless, sustaining site support facilities—including the electrical generator; fueling station; water treatment system, and the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems—will require operation and maintenance skills, especially given the site’s remote location. We recently reported similar findings in our inspection of the Kunduz ANP headquarters facility.

11 Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.246-21.

12 See Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns Remain about the Facility’s Usability and Sustainability (SIGAR Inspection 13-4), January 24, 2013.
CONCLUSION

Our inability to obtain access to a number of key buildings at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters makes it difficult to assess whether the site’s overall construction met contract specifications and construction standards. Although we were able to inspect two buildings and a portion of a third and found that they generally met contract specifications, the other nine buildings were locked and no on-site personnel had keys to open them.

The problem with access to buildings during our inspection is symptomatic of the site’s overall lack of occupancy. Designed for 175 personnel, only 12 individuals were at the facility during our site visit, and on-site officials were uncertain whether additional personnel would be located there in the future. These findings are similar to a July 2012 inspection of Afghan Border Police facilities in Nangarhar province, where we noted that $19 million was spent to construct four Border Police sites, yet the facilities were unoccupied or not being used as intended. As a result, we question the need to construct a site of this size and design at this location.

Furthermore, $7.3 million worth of construction sits largely unused, and the wood-burning stoves installed near the site’s never used dining facility had been dismantled. By dismantling these stoves, Afghan officials voided the warranties on the equipment, potentially resulting in higher costs incurred to replace or repair the equipment at a later date. This is a worrisome example of waste in the reconstruction effort.

USACE-TAN and NTM-A/CSTC-A also have not adequately planned for the long-term sustainability of the site. There is no emergency supply of electricity using a backup generator or connection to the municipal electrical grid to ensure a continuous supply of electrical power to the site. In addition, the site has no operation and maintenance contract, and there are no plans to train Afghans to keep technically complex systems such as the electrical generator; fueling station for police vehicles; water treatment; and the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning in good working order. Protecting U.S.-investment in Afghan Border Police facilities, therefore, requires a reassessment of the design and sustainability of these facilities to ensure that they are adequately sized to meet Afghan needs and are appropriately maintained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure facilities are adequately planned, designed, sized, operated, and maintained to meet Afghan Border Police needs, we recommend that the Commanding General, USACE, in coordination with the Commanding General, NTM-A/CSTC-A, as appropriate, direct USACE-TAN to:

1. Review plans for constructing Afghan Border Police facilities to determine whether site construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are even needed; and provide an explanation of the review results.
   
   If it is determined that this facility is needed and plans are in place for its use, the following recommendations should be implemented:

2. Rather than relying solely on a single generator, determine the feasibility of installing a backup generator or connecting the site electrical system to the local power grid to prevent loss of electricity across the site when the primary generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages, including lack of fuel.

3. Award an operation and maintenance contract or otherwise provide training to Afghan personnel to ensure that the facility is appropriately maintained after the withdrawal of coalition forces.

4. Determine why the Afghan Border Police dismantled the wood-burning stoves at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters and assess the need to provide wood-burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for the future.
AGENCY COMMENTS

USACE provided comments on this report, which are reproduced in appendix IV. USACE concurred with the first three recommendations, stating that it is prepared to address these issues pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding. Specifically, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A funding and direction, USACE is prepared to reduce the scope of design and construction contracts, evaluate the feasibility of installing a back-up generator or connect to the local power grid, and issue a task order against the existing operation and maintenance contract.

USACE did not concur with SIGAR’s fourth recommendation, stating that, because the facilities were completed and turned over to the customer, it has no control or authority over how a customer uses a facility once completed and accepted. However, USACE is prepared to assist NTM-A/CSTC-A in assessing the need to provide wood burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for the future, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding. SIGAR understands USACE’s position; however, the inclusion of wood-burning stoves in facility construction is a facet of construction standards commonly known as “Afghan-right” or “Afghan austere” standards. The dismantling of the wood-burning stoves shortly after taking possession of the facility indicates that they may not be an effective element of these standards. Consequently, SIGAR continued to believe that USACE-TAN, in coordination with NTM-A/CSTC-A, should determine why the ANSF dismantled the wood-burning stoves at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters and assess the need to provide wood-burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned in the future. As noted below, NTM-A/CSTC-A took steps to determine the reason for the stove dismantling.

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s comments were responsive to our recommendations. Regarding Recommendation 1, NTM-A/CSTC-A responded that the ANP staffing requirement had changed from 175 personnel for a combined battalion and company headquarters at the time the facility was planned to only a 59 person company headquarters by the time the facility was completed. Further, NTM-A/CSTC-A learned in recent discussions with ANP leadership that due to dispersed daily operations, facilities would rarely be at full capacity. NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that Border Police operations and their impact on facility usage will be incorporated into future modifications for remaining ANP construction projects.

Concerning Recommendation 2, NTM-A/CSTC-A noted that a Power Summit was held in October 2012 to review current power requirements of the Coalition and ANSF as well as the current status and capacity of the Afghan national grid. The summit found that the Afghan power grid is inadequate for current demand and major investment is still required to connect major military bases to the national grid. The summit also highlighted the need to conduct feasibility and cost benefit analysis of connecting ANSF facilities to the national grid as a primary power source in the future. NTM-A will conduct this analysis to develop a feasible timeline for transition of ANSF facilities to the Afghan grid as their primary power source.

Regarding Recommendation 3, NTM-A/CSTC-A noted that training of Ministry of Defense and Interior facility engineers is a part of its general approach to building up Afghan ability to sustain their new facilities. The facilities and infrastructure that are deemed critical can be placed on an operation and maintenance contract exclusively for their maintainability to ensure the continued viability into 2014 and later. With respect to an operation and maintenance contract for the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters, the Afghan Ministry of Interior’s Facilities Department assumed responsibility when the facility was turned over to them in September 2012, which is consistent with the approach of urging Afghans into the lead for operating and maintaining the facilities constructed and transitioned to them.

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with Recommendation 4 and took corrective action. An NTM-A/CSTC-A investigation disclosed that the Afghan Border Police had dismantled the wood-burning stoves because the pots they were using were larger than the available cooking area on the stoves provided. The Afghans have built a new larger stove and are currently using it. NTM-A/CSTC-A will incorporate this lesson learned into future construction standards.

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments are reproduced in appendix V.
APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of an inspection of the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in northern Kunduz Province on the border with Tajikistan. This inspection report is one of a series of nine inspections of construction projects contracted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan.

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, deficiencies were corrected before acceptance and transfer, and facilities were being used as intended and maintained, we

- reviewed contract documents, design submittals, and geotechnical reports to understand project requirements and contract administration;
- interviewed cognizant U.S. and Afghan government officials responsible for operation and maintenance of the completed facility; and
- conducted a physical inspection and photographed the project site to observe the current status and the quality of construction.

Our physical inspection during the site visit was hindered by the inability to gain access to most of the site facilities. Because most buildings were locked, we were only able to enter and inspect two buildings and a portion of a third, out of the 12 buildings at the site. The on-site Afghan personnel informed us that they did not have keys to the locked buildings and equipment. Part of our inspection and assessment was therefore conducted by looking through windows, and conversing with the Afghan representatives.

We conducted work at Kabul, Afghanistan; the Kunduz Provincial Reconstruction Team; the USACE Kunduz Resident Office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters facility site from September 2012 to January 2013, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. These standards were established to guide inspection work performed by all the Offices of Inspector General. The engineering assessment was conducted by Professional Engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics for Engineers. We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. We considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk.

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our inspection objectives. This inspection was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.
APPENDIX II - IMAM SAHIB BORDER POLICE COMPANY HEADQUARTERS SITE PLAN

Figure I - Site Plan

Source: Courtesy of USACE-TAN
On October 15, 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a firm fixed-price contract (W5J9JE-11-C-0001) to Omran Construction, Consulting and Engineering Company for $5,721,667.25 to be completed within 400 days of the notice to proceed. As of November 5, 2012, seven modifications to the base contract had increased the award amount by $1,616,747.57 and the period of performance by 152 days.

Table I provides a summary of the facilities under the base contract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barracks building type 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks building type 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration building</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine/shower/ablution/laundry facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse building</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining facility</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricants building</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate house and guard shack</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard towers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure storage building</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage &amp; generator canopy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional: Construct barracks building type 2 to include utility tie-in and walkways</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract W5J9JE-11-C-0001.
APPENDIX IV - COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION
255 FORT COLLIER ROAD
WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA 22603

MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
ATTN: Benjamin J. Piccolo, Assistant Inspector General for Audit 2530 Crystal Drive,
Arlington, VA 22202-3940

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Response to SIGAR Draft Report 13-5,
Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility
Sits Largely Unused

1. Enclosed is USACE Transatlantic Division response to the SIGAR Draft Report, SIGAR
13-5, Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters In Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million
Facility Sits Largely Unused.

2. My point of contact for these comments is Mr. George Sullivan, Chief, Internal Review at
540-665-2117, George.a.Sullivan@usace.army.mil.

Encl

JOHN S HURLEY
Colonel, USA
Deputy Commander
USACE Comments to SIGAR 13-5 Draft Report, Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused

USACE comments are provided for the draft report and each recommendation as shown.

**USACE Comment**: USACE will coordinate with NTM-A/CSTC-A on the recommendations and take action as appropriate pending direction and funding from NTM-A/CSTC-A.

**Recommendations**

To ensure facilities are adequately planned, designed, sized, operated, and maintained to meet Afghan Border Police needs, we recommend that the Commanding General, USCE, in coordination with the Commanding General, NTM-A/CSTC-A, as appropriate, direct USACE-TAN to:

**Recommendation 1.** Review plans for constructing Afghan Border Police facilities to determine whether the construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are even needed; and provide an explanation of the review results.

USACE Response. Concur. USACE-TAN is prepared to reduce the scope of design and construction contracts, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding.

If it is determined that this facility is needed and plans are in place for its use, the following recommendations should be implemented.

**Recommendation 2.** Rather than relying solely on a single generator, determine the feasibility of installing a backup generator or connecting the site electrical system to the local power grid to prevent loss of electricity across the site when the primary generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages, including lack of fuel.

USACE Response. Concur. USACE-TAN is prepared to evaluate the feasibility of installing a backup generator or connecting the electrical system to the local power grid, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding.

**Recommendation 3.** Award an operation and maintenance contract or otherwise provide training to Afghan personnel to ensure that the facility is appropriately maintained after the withdrawal of coalition forces.

USACE Response. Concur. USACE-TAN is prepared to issue a task order against the existing operations and maintenance contract, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding.

**Recommendation 4.** Determine why the Afghan Border Police dismantled the wood-burning stoves at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters and assess the need to provide wood-burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for the future.
USACE Comments to SIGAR 13-5 Draft Report, Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused

USACE Response. Non-concur. The facilities were completed and turned over to the customer’s representative, NTM-A in accordance with the requirements provided. USACE has no control or authority over how the end-user, ANP, uses a facility once completed and accepted. If SIGAR has concerns about how facilities are being used, SIGAR should address those concerns to NTM-A/CSTC-A in the first instance and more specifically to the Minister of Defense (MOD). USACE is prepared to assist NTM-A/CSTC-A in assessing the need to provide wood burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for the future, pending NTM-A/CSTC-A direction and funding.
APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM THE NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202

Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused” (Report No.
SIGAR-Inspection-13-5)

REFERENCE: Draft Report, dated Jan 2013, Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide responses to SIGAR’S draft report.

2. Point of contact for this action is LCDR B. Patrick Michael at DSN 318-449-0944, or via e-mail at
Benjamin.P.Michael@afghan.swa.army.mil.

ANDREW W. BACKUS
COL, NTM-A ENG
Director

Enclosure:
NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to Draft Report
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide responses to SIGAR’s draft report.

2. Recommendation 1, Page 8, states:

   Review plans for constructing Afghan Border Police facilities to determine whether site construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are even needed; and provide an explanation of the review results. If it is determined that this facility is needed and plans are in place for its use, the following recommendations should be implemented:

   a. NTM-A/CSTC-A reviewed the draft report and has the following comments:

   b. NTM-A/CSTC-A acknowledges the SIGAR’s recommendation. Based on operational guidance from the DCOM requirement owners, construction projects can be de-scoped and/or cancelled as necessary. The initial site requirements were to construct an Afghanistan Border Police Battalion (BN) Headquarters (HQ) to replace an existing sub-standard facility. The standard ABP BN HQ manning documents call for a total of 59 personnel assigned (11 officers, 22 NCOs, and 26 enlisted policemen). During the planning of the project the requirement was changed from an Afghan Border Police Battalion HQ to a combined Afghan Border Police Battalion and Company HQs, the latter having a manning of approximately 175 persons. There are few historical records in the project’s files, none relating to a change in requirements.

   Our investigation into the current manning of the site revealed that an ABP BN HQ unit is now utilizing this as a headquarters. An ABP BN HQ has a taskil manning of 59 personnel. The facility was built for 175 personnel. The difference in designs between an ABP battalion and a company is the amount of barracks space. The build is complete and it would be cost prohibitive to downsize barracks at this facility.

   NTM-A builds the ANSF infrastructure to a 100% manned taskil. A change of the taskil will result in a de-scope or cancellation of future builds. NTM-A DCOM-P is the taskil requirement owner until December 2013 when the Ministry of Interior (MoI) will assume full responsibility of all taskil changes. We have recently had discussions with Afghan facility leadership regarding the design requirements of the ABP HQs, and have been told that a site designed for 59 will rarely be at full capacity due to dispersed daily operations. Border Police operations and their impact on facility usage will be incorporated into future modifications for the remaining ABP builds.

2. Recommendation 2, Page 8, states:

   Rather than relying solely on a single generator, determine the feasibility of installing a backup generator or connecting the site electrical system to the local power grid to prevent loss of electricity across the site when the primary generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages, including lack of fuel

   a. NTM-A/CSTC-A reviewed the draft report and has the following comments:

   b. NTM-A/CSTC-A acknowledges the SIGAR’s recommendation. The current NTM-A Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Infrastructure program utilizes a design standard of non-grid sourced, independent primary power generation (generators) for all ANSF facilities. The power
NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT

"Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused"


design selection made during the initial development of the program to not connect to grid power was based on several factors, the most significant of which was operational readiness and effectiveness of the facilities. Constructed facilities for the ANSF had to provide immediate reset, regeneration, and force projection capacity to the ANSF in order to allow the ANSF to conduct security operations in order to establish a safe and secure environment. Faced with the poor reliability and availability of the Afghan national grid during the early stages of the campaign, primary local power generation for ANSF facilities was the only option available to enable the ANSF to have consistent operational facilities. A Power Summit was held on 16 October 2012 by the Joint Engineer Directorate, USFOR-A, to review current theater power requirements of the Coalition and ANSF as well as the current status and capacity of the Afghan national grid. The Summit found that generally the Afghan grid capacity is still inadequate for current civilian demand and that major investment is required to connect major military bases to the national grid. The Summit highlighted the need to conduct feasibility and cost benefit analysis of connecting ANSF facilities to the national grid as their primary power source in anticipation of increased developed Afghan grid capacity in the future. NTM-A will conduct this analysis in order to develop a feasible timeline for transition of ANSF facilities to the Afghan grid as their prime power source.

3. Recommendation 3, Page 8, states:

Award an operation and maintenance contract or otherwise provide training to Afghan personnel to ensure that the facility is appropriately maintained after the withdraw of coalition forces.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A reviewed the draft report and has the following comments:

b. NTM-A/CSTAC-A acknowledges the SIGAR’s recommendation. The general approach to building facility stewardship is along four lines of effort: 1) hiring facility engineers, 2) training facility engineers, 3) provision of tools and equipment, and 4) delegating appropriate authorities and developing routine processes so maintenance is consistently executed to high standards. As the Ministries of Defense and Interior build up their own organic ability to sustain their new facilities, NTM-A utilizes a bridging strategy of utilizing a U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) National Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contract to provide facility maintenance and training for a period of up to 6 months. This allows time to build the capabilities of the assigned facility engineers (FE). In addition, facilities/infrastructure that is deemed of a critical nature can be placed on an O&M contract exclusively for their maintainability to ensure the continued viability into 2014 and later.

With respect to a Facility O&M contract at this specific facility, the Ministry of Interior Facilities Department assumed responsibility once the facility was turned over to them in September 2012. This is consistent with our approach to push Afghans into the lead for operating and maintaining the facilities we are constructing and transitioning to them.

4. Recommendation 4, Page 8, states:

Determine why the Afghan Border Police dismantled the wood-burning stoves at the Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters and assess the need to provide wood-burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for the future.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A reviewed the draft report and has the following comments:
b. NTM-A/CSTA-A acknowledges the SIGAR’s recommendation. NTM-A investigated this issue with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) 5th zone and found that the ABP had dismantled the stove to increase the size of the cooking area. The size of the pots they were using was larger than the available cooking area. The Afghans have already built a new larger stove and are currently using it. NTM-A will incorporate this lesson learned into future build standards.

APPROVED BY:  
Andrew W. Backus  
COL., NTM-A ENG  
Director

PREPARED BY:  
B. Patrick Michael  
Lcdr, NTM-A ENG  
Operations & Integration Chief,  
DSN 318-449-0944
APPENDIX VI - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Brian M. Flynn, Senior Audit Manager
Milton Naumann, Auditor-in-Charge
Warren Anthony, Senior Auditor
William “Lee” Dillingham, Senior Engineer
This inspection report was conducted under project code SIGAR-I-006C.
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