

SIGAR

**Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction**

SIGAR 19-07 Inspection Report

Zarang Border Crossing Point: Facilities Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Construction Deficiencies Pose Safety Concerns



SIGAR 19-07-IP/Zarang Border Crossing Point

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SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

On August 22, 2011, the U.S. Air Force's 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, in support of the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, awarded a \$26.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee task order to United Research Services Group Inc. (URS). The task order required URS to design and construct Afghan Border Police border patrol company headquarters at Burjas, Kang, and Taba E Talib, and a border crossing point at Zarang, all in Nimroz Province. In addition, on September 1, 2011, the 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron awarded a \$1.6 million task order to Henningson Durham and Richardson Environmental Operations and Construction Inc. to provide quality assurance services for the projects. In October 2012, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment was reorganized as the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC).

This inspection focused on the \$11.1 million Zarang Border Crossing Point. After 14 modifications, the value of the border crossing point was reduced to \$10.9 million. On February 28, 2013, AFCEC transferred the Zarang Border Crossing Point facilities to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and CSTC-A transferred the facilities to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI). The task order's 1-year warranty expired on February 27, 2014.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether the Zarang Border Crossing Point (1) was constructed in accordance with the task order's requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) is being used and maintained.

December 2018

Zarang Border Crossing Point: Facilities Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Construction Deficiencies Pose Safety Concerns

SIGAR 19-07 INSPECTION REPORT

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

SIGAR found that URS completed all of the required construction and the facilities were generally constructed according to task order requirements, but identified eight instances in which URS failed to adhere to task order requirements and technical specifications. Most notably, the task order required URS to install 32 certified fire-rated doors in six buildings. SIGAR inspected those doors and found that they did not have the required manufacturer's labels identifying the manufacturer and specifying that the doors were fire-rated and certified. In addition, URS did not (1) place native crushed stone around the Zarang Border Crossing Point's buildings and facilities; (2) install wood-burning stoves in the women's barracks; (3) apply the finishing coats of paint to the entry control point gates; (4) install bollards on each side of the drop arm barrier gate located next to one of the guard shacks; (5) install a ceiling fan in the administration building; (6) install full-length, or, in one case any, rainwater downspouts; or (7) install ventilation screens in the eaves of three buildings. These deficiencies pose safety risks and raise concerns that U.S. taxpayer funds may have been wasted on noncompliant products and construction.

Due to AFCEC's incomplete record keeping, SIGAR could not fully assess the extent to which URS complied with the task order and AFCEC oversaw the project. AFCEC could not locate 26 of the 67 documents (39 percent) that SIGAR requested, such as material approval submittals, purchase invoices, and inspection reports. As a result, there may be additional deficiencies that SIGAR did not discover. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires agencies to retain contract documents for 6 years after final payment, which for the Zarang Border Crossing Point project would be June 23, 2021. AFCEC stated that it did not have enough computer server space to store all of the documents for this project and that security issues in the Zarang area had an impact on its ability to conduct oversight.

Most of the Zarang Border Crossing Point's facilities are being used or partially used, but they are not being adequately maintained. For example, SIGAR found that one senior barrack and one women's barrack were not being used, and only half of two other barracks were being used. In addition, three other buildings have not been used since they were constructed. The combined cost of the five unused buildings was \$1.1 million. Further, multiple facilities, including the administration building and two senior barracks, are not being maintained. For example, SIGAR found that after CSTC-A transferred the Zarang Border Crossing Point to the MOI and the warranty on the task order expired, the sewer line became blocked and remains blocked. SIGAR also found counterfeit and missing fire extinguishers, nonfunctioning lights and smoke alarms, broken door hardware, leaking electric water heaters, and missing and broken electrical panel doors. These deficiencies jeopardize the \$10.9 million investment that the United States has made in the Zarang Border Crossing Point. Although maintenance at the facilities has been lacking, in their May 2018 financial commitment letter CSTC-A and the MOI agreed that the MOI would establish repair and maintenance policies and procedures for handling routine and emergency work requests for its facilities, and guidelines for hiring facility engineers, developing training, and awarding repair and maintenance contracts.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

CSTC-A and AFCEC provided written comments on a draft of this report. The draft included one recommendation for the CSTC-A Commander to inform the MOI of the 32 unlabeled doors in the six buildings that the task order required to be fire-rated and explain the potential safety hazards that would exist in event of a fire if the doors were not fire-rated. In its comments, CSTC-A described the actions it took to address the recommendation, including informing the MOI's acting director of facilities management of the potential life, health, and safety issues resulting from unlabeled fire doors. CSTC-A stated that it also recommended that the acting director (1) appoint primary and alternate fire wardens at each MOI facility to identify and resolve fire safety issues, and (2) conduct monthly fire and safety inspections of MOI facilities using a checklist CSTC-A provided and resolve any fire and safety issues identified to ensure that facilities and personnel are not placed at undue risk. Based on CSTC-A's response and SIGAR's review of documentation supporting those actions taken, SIGAR closed the recommendation as implemented and removed it from the final report.



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

December 4, 2018

The Honorable James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense

General Joseph L. Votel
Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Austin Scott Miller
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and
Commander, Resolute Support

Lieutenant General James E. Rainey
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

General Ellen M. Pawlikowski
Commander, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command

Mr. Edwin H. Oshiba
Director, Air Force Civil Engineer Center

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Zarang Border Crossing Point. In August 2011, the U.S. Air Force's 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, in support of the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, now the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), awarded a \$26.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee task order to United Research Services Group Inc. (URS) to design and construct four compounds for the Afghan Border Police, one of which was the Zarang Border Crossing Point. The border crossing point was expected to cost \$11.1 million. URS began construction on March 30, 2012. After 14 modifications, the border crossing point's value was reduced to \$10.9 million. AFCEC transferred the Zarang Border Crossing Point to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) on February 28, 2013, and CSTC-A transferred it to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) that same day.

We found that URS built the facilities required by the task order but identified eight instances in which URS did not adhere to the task order's requirements and technical specifications. For example, we could not determine whether 32 doors URS installed in six buildings were certified fire-rated doors, as the task order required, because they did not have the manufacturer's labels. These and other deficiencies pose safety risks and raise concerns that U.S. funds may have been wasted on noncompliant products and construction. However, due to AFCEC's incomplete record keeping and security issues that prevented AFCEC's inspectors from monitoring construction work for several months, we could not fully assess URS's compliance with the task order or AFCEC's oversight of the project. We also found that although most of the Zarang Border Crossing Point's facilities are being used or partially used, they are not being adequately maintained.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from CSTC-A and AFCEC, which are reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. The draft report included one recommendation for the CSTC-A Commander to inform the MOI of the 32 unlabeled doors in the six buildings that the task order required to be fire-rated and explain the potential safety hazards that would exist in event of a fire if the doors are not fire-rated. In its comments, CSTC-A described the actions it took to address the recommendation. Based on CSTC-A's response and our review of documentation supporting those actions taken, we closed the recommendation as implemented and removed it from the final report.



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABP	Afghan Border Police
AFCEC	Air Force Civil Engineer Center
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
HDR	Henningson Durham Richardson Environmental Operations and Construction Inc.
MOI	Ministry of Interior
URS	United Research Services Group Inc.

The Afghan Ministry of Interior's (MOI) Afghan Border Police (ABP) are responsible for maintaining Afghanistan's borders and controlling entry and exit at border checkpoints.¹ The MOI has recognized that it needs ongoing assistance from the international community in building and maintaining facilities for the border police.

On August 22, 2011, the U.S. Air Force's 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, in support of the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, now the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC),² awarded a \$26.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee task order³ to United Research Services Group Inc. (URS), an American company.⁴ Under the task order, URS was to design and construct three ABP border patrol company headquarters at Burjas, Kang, and Taba E Talib, and a border crossing point at Zarang, all in Nimroz Province. In addition, on September 1, 2011, the 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron awarded a \$1.6 million time and materials task order to Henningson Durham Richardson Environmental Operations and Construction Inc. (HDR), an American company, to provide quality assurance supervision and oversight services for the three projects.⁵

This inspection focused on the Zarang Border Crossing Point, which was one line item in the task order. The task order required URS to design, build, and renovate the border crossing point to accommodate 87 to 162 personnel. The project included an administration building; six barracks; a dining facility; a petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage building; toilet, ablution, shower, and laundry facilities; a vehicle inspection area; and a dog kennel. The project also included various infrastructure items, such as guard shacks and towers, perimeter walls, a well house, a power plant and electrical distribution system, a sanitary sewer collection system, and an access road to the compound. The initial value of the project was \$11.1 million

On March 30, 2012, URS started constructing the Zarang Border Crossing Point with an expected completion date of December 25, 2012. After 14 modifications, the project's completion date was extended to February 15, 2013, and the value of the project was reduced by \$151,296 to \$10.9 million. On February 28, 2013, AFCEC transferred the Zarang Border Crossing Point to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A transferred it to the MOI that same day. The task order's 1-year warranty expired on February 27, 2014.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether the Zarang Border Crossing Point (1) was constructed in accordance with the task order's requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) is being used and maintained.

We conducted our work in Kabul and Zarang, Afghanistan, and Arlington, Virginia, from February 2017 through December 2018, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. Appendix I contains a discussion of our scope and methodology.

¹ In December 2017, the Afghan government moved most of the ABP that provides security for the border outside of the border crossings to the Ministry of Defense and renamed it the Afghan Border Force. About 4,000 ABP personnel who conduct customs operations at border crossing points and airports remained with the MOI.

² In October 2012, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment was reorganized as AFCEC.

³ The task order was no. 30 under contract no. FA8903-06-D-8520.

⁴ AECOM Technical Services Inc. acquired URS on October 17, 2014.

⁵ The time and materials task order is no. 0139 and was awarded under contract no. FA8903-08-D-8771.

THE ZARANG BORDER CROSSING POINT HAS EIGHT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES, BUT INCOMPLETE RECORDS PREVENTED A FULL ASSESSMENT OF URS'S COMPLIANCE AND AFCEC'S OVERSIGHT

URS's Noncompliance Resulted in Eight Construction Deficiencies that Pose Safety Concerns and Suggest that U.S. Funds Were Wasted

During our four site visits in August 2017, we found that URS completed all of the required construction at the Zarang Border Crossing Point and that the facilities were generally constructed according to task order requirements and technical specifications. However, we found eight instances where URS did not comply with the task order's requirements and technical specifications (see table 1).

Table 1 - Construction Deficiencies SIGAR Found at the Zarang Border Crossing Point

Deficiency	Description
1. URS installed noncompliant doors instead of certified fire-rated doors.	The Zarang Border Crossing Point design drawings required URS to install 32 certified fire-rated doors, which are designed to limit the spread of smoke and flames in the event of a fire, in six buildings. These doors were to consist of 30 single-leaf doors and 2 roll-up doors. ¹ Our review of the material submittal register for the project showed that AFCEC approved URS's request to install certified fire-rated doors. We inspected the doors URS installed in the six buildings and found that they did not have the required manufacturer's labels identifying the manufacturer and specifying that the doors were fire-rated and certified. As a result, we could not determine whether they were certified fire-rated doors as required. National Fire Protection Association standards require fire doors to have this information and for it to be visible. ² The possible absence of certified fire-rated doors raises the concern that occupants of the six buildings would be at an increased risk of injury or death in the event of a fire.
2. URS did not place native crushed stone around the Zarang Border Crossing Point's buildings.	The task order required URS to place native crushed stone around all of the Zarang Border Crossing Point's buildings to reduce erosion and control dust. However, during our 2017 site visits, we did not find native crushed stone around any of the buildings. Instead, we found that some buildings, such as the administration building and the open-bay barracks, had river aggregate applied around them, while other buildings, such as the border liaison office and administration building and several guard shacks, did not have any material applied around them. ³ We reviewed the modifications to the task order but did not find that AFCEC approved URS to substitute river aggregate for native crushed stone. Further, our review of the May 27, 2012, deficiency log showed that HDR's quality assurance inspector discovered unapproved aggregate materials around a women's barrack. The inspector reported that URS's project manager and the AFCEC contracting officer's representative agreed to a corrective action plan to address the unapproved aggregate materials. However, our site visits indicate that URS did not correct the deficiency.
3. URS did not install stoves in the women's barracks.	The task order required URS to install a wood-burning cooking stove, with ventilation, in each of the two women's barracks. The Zarang Border Crossing Point as-built drawings showed that a propane stove was supposed to have been installed in each barrack, and URS's submittal register showed that AFCEC approved the purchase of gas stoves. However, we did not find stoves of any type in either of the women's barracks, and it did not appear that the stoves had ever been installed. Our review of the transfer and acceptance document shows that AFCEC did not identify the lack of cooking stoves in the women's barracks as a deficiency. Further, AFCEC did not provide the final inspection reports or URS's material purchase documents. Without those documents, we could not determine whether URS did not purchase the stoves, or purchased the stoves but did not install them.

4. URS did not apply finishing coats of paint to the entry control point gates.	The task order required URS to apply two coats of metal primer and two coats of finishing paint to the entry control point gates. The task order stated that the AFCEC contracting officer's representative would select the final paint color from the samples URS provided. We found that URS did not apply the two coats of finishing paint to the entry control point gates. Specifically, we observed that the layer of paint present was a red, anticorrosion primer coat and the final layer of finishing paint that would normally have a polished appearance was missing. AFCEC's deficiency logs did not identify the absence of the finishing coats of paint.
5. URS did not install bollards on each side of the drop arm barrier gate located next to one of the guard shacks.	The Zarang Border Crossing Point as-built drawings showed two bollards, one on each side of the drop arm gate located next to the guard shacks. A bollard is a post that is anchored to concrete to protect against vehicle ramming attacks. We found that URS did not install bollards at one of the guard shacks. Further, AFCEC did not provide the final inspection or the warranty inspection reports, and the deficiency logs did not show that the bollards were missing. Without those documents, we could not determine whether URS did not purchase the bollards, or purchased the bollards but did not install them. The absence of these bollards could degrade the compound's physical security.
6. URS did not install a ceiling fan in the administration building.	The Zarang Border Crossing Point design drawings showed that URS was required to install 10 electrical ceiling fans in the administration building. However, we found that URS installed only nine. AFCEC did not provide URS's material approval submittals or the purchase invoices for the fans. As a result, we could not determine whether AFCEC approved URS to purchase the 10th fan and URS did not purchase it, or URS purchased the fan but did not install it.
7. URS did not install full-length, or in one case any, rainwater downspouts.	The Zarang Border Crossing Point design drawings for the guard towers showed rainwater downspouts extending to the ground. However, we found that the downspouts at six of the guard towers ended as much as six feet above the ground and that URS did not install the required downspout at the fuel storage canopy. This could result in rainwater settling against the buildings rather than running away from them, thereby causing soil erosion and possibly compromising the buildings' foundation.
8. URS did not install ventilation screens in the eaves of three buildings.	The Zarang Border Crossing Point design drawings required URS to install ventilation screens between the bottom edge of the roof and the outside building wall, known as the eaves, on all newly constructed buildings. The absence of the ventilation openings prevents air from circulating in the roof space and building ceiling. Circulation is required to prevent heat and moisture from building up in the air. However, we found that URS did not install ventilation screens on three buildings: the administration building, warehouse, and the petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage building. URS's materials submittal register did not show a request to purchase ventilation screens for these buildings, and the deficiency logs did not indicate that ventilation screens were missing from the three buildings. Further, since AFCEC did not provide the final inspection or warranty inspection reports, we were not able to determine whether this deficiency had been identified.

Source: SIGAR site visits and analysis of task order documents.

¹ The task order required URS to install 45- and 90-minute certified, fire-rated doors in the gatehouse, the administration building, the open-bay barrack, the dining facility, the border liaison office and administration building, and the pedestrian and entry control building.

² See National Fire Protection Association Standard 80, *Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives Handbook 2010*.

³ River aggregate is smaller than native crushed stone and is known for its attractive appearance. River aggregate is commonly used in aboveground applications such as walkways and as a base for patios. Native crushed stone is normally used as a base for roads, concrete blocks, and drainage.

Incomplete Project Records Prevented SIGAR from Fully Assessing URS's Compliance with the Task Order and AFCEC's Oversight

Air Force Instruction 33-364 requires contractors to maintain records in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other requirements.⁶ FAR 4.805 states that agencies are required to retain contract documentation for 6 years after final payment. Our review of the Zarang Border Crossing Point project payment records shows that AFCEC made the final payment to URS on June 24, 2015. Therefore, AFCEC was required to retain documents for the project until June 23, 2021. Because the project involved a cost-plus-fixed-fee task order, the contractor must provide material approval submittals, purchase invoices, and inspection reports to be reimbursed for the construction items required by the task order, such as certified fire-rated doors and wood-burning stoves.

Between March 26, 2017, and April 19, 2018, we requested 67 task order administration and oversight documents. As of October 2018, AFCEC had provided 41 of those documents. AFCEC officials did not give us the remaining 26 documents, which related primarily to task order oversight and included material submittals, material inspection and receiving reports, purchase invoices, URS's approved quality control plan, final inspection reports, and warranty plans and inspections. Further, HDR, AFCEC's quality assurance contractor, stated that it did not have on-site inspectors monitoring the construction work for several months due to security concerns in the area. Therefore, HDR reported that it could not "achieve effective oversight," "did not have onsite inspectors monitoring the work for several months due to inadequate security," and, as a result, did not provide AFCEC with all of the required quality assurance progress reports.⁷ AFCEC stated that the Zarang Border Crossing Point is in a remote location along the Iranian border in Nimroz Province, which posed a security challenge during construction and resulted in HDR not being able to conduct adequate on-site oversight. For example, on April 28, 2012, less than a month after URS started construction, a suicide bomber attacked a U.S. convoy en route to the compound.

AFCEC also told us it did not have adequate computer server space available during project construction to store all material submittals and other large quality assurance files on its shared drives. However, AFCEC did not follow its own quality assurance procedures, which required all project documentation to be maintained on the contractor's project portal. The requirement existed to enable all project stakeholders—the quality assurance contractor, the contracting officer's representative, and the contracting officer—to have timely access to all project information. In addition, during project closeout, the quality assurance procedures required the construction and quality assurance contractors to give AFCEC discs or external hard drives containing all project documentation. However, due to file size limitations, turnover of the contracting officer's representative and project manager for the task order, office location moves, and operating system upgrades, AFCEC did not provide us complete quality assurance data and task order oversight records for this project.

MOST OF THE ZARANG BORDER CROSSING POINT'S BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES ARE BEING USED, BUT THEY ARE NOT BEING ADEQUATELY MAINTAINED

Although Most Buildings and Facilities Are Being Used, Some Are Vacant

During our August 2017 site visits, we found that the ABP was using most of the Zarang Border Crossing Point's buildings and infrastructure, such as the administration building, the dining facility, and the vehicle

⁶ Air Force Instruction 33-364, "Records Disposition—Procedures and Responsibilities," December 22, 2006 (updated November 6, 2014).

⁷ HDR, *Final Contractor's Progress, Status, and Management Report (CPSMR) for Title II Services for Nimroz Border Patrol Facilities, Nimroz Province, Afghanistan*, October 9, 2013.

inspection area. However, some were vacant or being partially used. For example, of the six barracks, we found that one of the senior barracks and a women's barrack were not being used, and only half of two other barracks were being used. According to officials with the facilities and engineering department, there are not enough ABP personnel to occupy all of the barracks, which were designed to accommodate 87 to 162 ABP personnel.⁸

We also found that three buildings have not been used since they were constructed: the secure storage building; the petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage building; and one of the guard shacks. The fuel dispensers located at the fuel storage canopy/vehicle refueling point had not been used either. In addition, we found that the Zarang Border Crossing Point's electrical power was being provided from the Iranian local power grid through the Afghan government. However, there is no fuel to operate the five generators that would support the facility during power shortages or blackouts because, according to the Zarang Border Crossing Point director, the MOI provided fuel only to operate vehicles. The director told us that without fuel for the generators, personnel in the passport office would not be able to perform security biometrics operations during power shortages or blackouts.

We determined that the combined cost of the unused senior barrack; women's barrack; secure storage building; petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage building; and guard shack was \$1.1 million.⁹ This funding could be wasted if the ABP does not use these buildings in the future.

The Zarang Border Crossing Point's Buildings and Facilities Are Not Being Adequately Maintained

During our August 2017 site visits, we found that the Zarang Border Crossing Point is not being adequately maintained. Most significantly, we found that after CSTC-A transferred the buildings and facilities to the Afghan government and the warranty on the task order expired, the sewer line became blocked and was still blocked as of May 2018. This has affected the ABP's use of multiple facilities, including the toilets and showers in the shower building, the janitor's room, the bathrooms in the border liaison office and administration building, and the bathrooms in two senior barracks. Officials at the border crossing point told us the sewer blockage has existed since 2015. The MOI hired an operation and maintenance contractor to fix the problem, but the contractor did not have any success eliminating the blockage despite making several attempts to do so.

We also found other maintenance issues that present safety or health hazards. Specifically:

- **Counterfeit and missing fire extinguishers.** The task order required URS to install 69 wall-mounted, multipurpose fire extinguishers throughout the compound. The May 9, 2013, materials submittal register shows that AFCEC approved URS's submittal to purchase fire extinguishers. However, during our site visits, we determined that 45 of the 69 fire extinguishers were counterfeit because they all had one of two serial numbers—AH-18855 or E-513641—while authentic fire extinguishers have a unique serial number. The 24 remaining fire extinguishers were missing or the buildings where they were required to be located were locked and we could not examine them. For example, we determined that three fire extinguishers were missing and there were no wall-mounted hooks in the areas where the extinguishers were required. We also found fire extinguishers that were at lower than the required pressure. The counterfeit, missing, and low pressure fire extinguishers present a safety hazard, which could result in injury or death should a fire occur.
- **Nonfunctioning lights and smoke alarms.** We found that 113 of 491 (23 percent) of the ceiling lights, 56 of 143 (39 percent) of the emergency lights, and 41 of 65 (63 percent) of the smoke alarms were

⁸ Although we inquired, the Zarang Border Crossing Point director would not give us the total number of ABP personnel at the compound.

⁹ We could not determine the cost of the unused fuel dispensers because the cost was included in the total cost of the fuel storage canopy on the transfer and acceptance document.

not functional. The nonfunctioning emergency lights and smoke alarms could cause delays evacuating buildings in emergencies or prevent occupants from exiting safely.

- **Broken door hardware.** We found door handles and locks in two guard shacks and two guard towers were missing. In addition, the door handles on two guard towers were broken and had been replaced with sliding bar locks. The missing door handles and locks could degrade the physical security of the guard shacks and towers.
- **Leaking electric water heaters.** Two electrical water heaters—one in the storage room and the other in the dining facility—were leaking, and the wet floor conditions have created a safety hazard. ABP personnel use the dining facility on a daily basis and could slip on wet floors and be injured. In addition, the standing water could result in the growth of mold, a possible health risk.
- **Missing and broken electrical panel doors.** The electrical panel doors at the fuel storage canopy were missing, causing the electrical controls inside to be exposed. In addition, the electrical panel door at one of the guard towers was broken. The missing and broken electrical panel doors could negatively affect the operational capability of the associated systems.

Since 2014, the MOI has been responsible for the Zarang Border Crossing Point's operation and maintenance. CSTC-A funds the MOI's operations, including facility repair and maintenance, through annual commitment letters. However, the command said it does not have control over which facilities the ministry chooses to maintain with those funds. Nonetheless, in its 2017-2018 commitment letter with the MOI, issued in July 2018, CSTC-A and the MOI provided details on the repair and maintenance of MOI facilities being funded. For example, they agreed that the MOI will establish repair and maintenance policies and procedures for handling routine and emergency work requests for its facilities, and guidelines for hiring facility engineers, developing training, and awarding repair and maintenance contracts.

CONCLUSION

AFCEC has provided the ABP with a border control point in Zarang that is generally well-built. However, we identified eight instances in which URS failed to adhere to the task order requirements and technical specifications. These deficiencies pose safety concerns and suggest that U.S taxpayer funds may have been wasted on noncompliant products and construction. However, due to AFCEC's incomplete record keeping, we could not fully assess the extent to which URS deviated from the task order. As a result, additional deficiencies might exist. Further, although we could not fully assess the extent of AFCEC's oversight of the project, the contractor responsible for oversight acknowledged that it could not achieve effective oversight of the project. We acknowledge AFCEC's statement that security issues in the Zarang area affected oversight activities. Less compelling is AFCEC's position that it could not locate the documents we requested due to inadequate computer server space to store contract documents, personnel turnover, and office moves. In the end, AFCEC did not comply with the FAR or its own instruction, which require agencies to retain contract documentation for 6 years after final payment. Such information is critical for agencies to ensure that contractors adhere to their requirements.

Although the ABP is currently using the Zarang Border Crossing Point, several facilities are not being used to full capacity and some are unusable due to a sewer blockage problem that has existed for the past 3 years. The blocked sewer and other maintenance issues, such as counterfeit and missing fire extinguishers and nonfunctioning lights and smoke detectors, put the health and safety of the compound's personnel at risk. Although the MOI agreed in its 2017-2018 commitment letter with CSTC-A to maintain its facilities, it is unclear whether the ministry will spend the funds it receives to address the deficiencies we identified at the Zarang Border Crossing Point. If the MOI does not address these maintenance deficiencies, particularly those related to fire safety, the long-term usefulness of this \$10.9 million compound will be in jeopardy.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review and comments. CSTC-A and AFCEC provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. AFCEC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Our draft report included one recommendation for the CSTC-A Commander to inform the MOI of the 32 unlabeled doors in the six buildings that the task order required to be fire-rated and explain the potential safety hazards that would exist in event of a fire if the doors are not fire-rated.

In its comments, CSTC-A described the actions it took to address the recommendation. CSTC-A stated that it informed the MOI's acting director of facilities management of the potential life, health, and safety issues, due to safety hazards resulting from unlabeled fire doors. CSTC-A further stated that it recommended that the acting director (1) appoint primary and alternate fire wardens at each MOI facility to identify and resolve fire safety issues, and (2) conduct monthly fire and safety inspections of MOI facilities using a checklist CSTC-A provided and resolve any fire and safety issues identified to ensure that facilities and personnel are not placed at undue risk. Based on our review of CSTC-A's comments and the supporting documentation provided, we determined that CSTC-A had addressed the recommendation. As a result, we closed the recommendation as implemented and removed it from this final report.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Zarang Border Crossing Point in Nimroz Province. The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether the border crossing point (1) was constructed in accordance with the task order's requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) is being used and maintained. Specifically, we:

- reviewed the task order and modifications, pre-approved design submittals, site visit reports, building codes, and other relevant project documentation;
- reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulation 4.8, "Government Contract Files";
- conducted engineering assessments of the project drawings and construction methods used;
- interviewed U.S. and Afghan government officials concerning the project's construction; and
- conducted four site visits in August 2017.

We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. However, we considered compliance with laws and indicators of fraud, other illegal acts, and abuse, and their potential impact.

In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, Afghan engineers inspected the Zarang Border Crossing Point facilities from August 22 through 24, and on August 30, 2017. We developed a standardized engineering evaluation checklist covering items required by the task order and design/specification documents. Our checklist required our partners to analyze the task order documents, scope of work, technical specifications, and design drawings.

We compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring and quality control process, we:

- met with the Afghan engineers to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement;
- attended periodic meetings with our partners, and conducted our normal entrance and exit conferences with agency officials;
- discussed significant inspection issues with them;
- monitored our partners' progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates as needed; and
- conducted oversight of them in accordance with SIGAR's policies and procedures to ensure that their work resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information.

We conducted our work in Kabul and Zarang, Afghanistan, and Arlington, Virginia, from February 2017 through December 2018. This work was conducted in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

APPENDIX II - COMMENTS FROM THE COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN



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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09320

DCOS SA/CSTC-A

3 November 2018

MEMORANDUM THRU

United States Forces – Afghanistan DCDR-S, APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

FOR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington,
VA 22202-3940

SUBJECT: Special Inspector General Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) SIGAR-I-044 Draft
Report "Zarang Border Crossing Point"

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a response to the SIGAR-I-044 Draft Report
"Zarang Border Crossing Point".

2. SIGAR Draft Recommendation –

a. *To reduce the safety risks to ABP personnel at the Zarang Border Crossing Point, we
recommend that the CSTC-A Commander:*

*Inform the MOI of the 32 unlabeled doors in the six buildings that the task order required to be
fire-rated and explain the potential safety hazards that would exist in event of a fire if the doors
are not fire-rated.*

3. CSTC-A Management Response –

a. CSTC-A has informed the MOI Acting Director, Facilities Management, of potential life,
health and safety issues, due to safety hazards resulting from unlabeled fire doors.

b. CSTC-A has recommended that MOI Acting Director, Facilities Management –

(1) Appoint primary and alternative fire wardens at each MOI facility to identify and
resolve fire safety issues.

(2) Conduct monthly fire and safety inspections of MOI facilities, using the CSTC-A
provided checklist and resolve noted fire/safety issues to ensure facilities and personnel are not
placed at undue risk.

4. CSTC-A appreciates SIGAR's inspection program for ANDSF facilities and will continue to
TAA MOI Acting Director, Facilities Management on fire/safety and building utilization.

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DCOS SA/CSTC-A
SUBJECT: Special Inspector General Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) I-044 Draft Report
"Zarang Border Crossing Point"

5. Point of contact is Jeff Zielinski, jeffrey.m.zielinski2.civ@mail.mil, DSN 318-449-9939.

Encl
CSTC-A Memo 21 Jun 18

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ERIC P. SHIRLEY
COL (OF-5), U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, COS SA/CSTC-A

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APPENDIX III - COMMENTS FROM THE AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER
JOINT BASE SAN ANTONIO LACKLAND TEXAS

05 Nov 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR SIGAR

FROM: AFCEC/CFS
2261 Hughes Ave, Ste 133
JBSA-Lackland TX 78236-9833

SUBJECT: Response to Draft SIGAR Report for Zarang Border Crossing Point Inspection Report

1. I appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on SIGAR's Zarang Border Crossing Point Inspection Report. AFCEC has completed a thorough review of the latest SIGAR report recommending one potential action and provides the attached technical response to SIGAR. AFCEC engineers have reviewed as-built drawings and other project documentation to ensure that the findings of this report and AFCEC's response to it demonstrate the highest degree of veracity and lend full context to the issues identified.
2. AFCEC has been supporting this audit since receiving notice in January 2017. AFCEC has responded to SIGAR's technical questions and 16 requests for information. Additionally, AFCEC has previously supported SIGAR's financial audit of the same project, completed in October 2016 and published under the serial number 17-07.
3. Although AFCEC acknowledges that certain quality assurance documents known to exist could not be located, AFCEC believes that the available documentation that was provided to SIGAR for this inspection demonstrates AFCEC's commitment to persistent and appropriate oversight, even in the face of significant security challenges such as those posed by this project location.
4. If there are any questions or concerns, please contact the AFCEC POC: Capt Jose D. Figueroa, jose.figueroa.11@us.af.mil, DSN (312) 969-8563, COMM: (210) 395-8563.

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JOHN R. BERG, Maj, USAF
Chief, Strategic Execution Branch
Air Force Civil Engineer Center

Enclosure:

1. Attachment 1 - AFCEC Technical Review of Draft SIGAR Report I-044

APPENDIX IV - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Steven Haughton, Senior Inspection Manager

Warren Anthony, Inspector-in-Charge

Javed Khairandish, Civil Engineer

Wilhelmina Pierce, General Engineer

Hasibullah Zeer, Program Analyst

This inspection was conducted
under project code SIGAR-I-044.

SIGAR's Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR's hotline:

- Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud
- Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil
- Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300
- Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
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Public Affairs Officer

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