EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The full report can be found on the SIGAR website at www.sigar.mil.

SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective:

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan is the second in a series of lessons learned reports to be issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The report examines how the U.S. government—primarily the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice—developed and executed security sector assistance (SSA) programs to build, train, advise, and equip the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), both unilaterally and as part of a coalition, from 2002 through 2016. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and provides recommendations for improved performance. In Afghanistan today, the U.S. effort to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF does not appear to be over. In light of the administration’s current focus on strategy in Afghanistan, this report provides timely and actionable recommendations for our current and future efforts there.

Our analysis revealed that the U.S. government was not properly prepared from the outset to help build an Afghan army and police force that was capable of protecting Afghanistan from internal and external threats and preventing the country from becoming a terrorist safe haven. We found the U.S. government lacked a comprehensive approach to SSA and a coordinating body to successfully implement the whole-of-government programs necessary to develop a capable and self-sustaining ANDSF. Ultimately, the United States designed a force that was not able to provide nationwide security, especially as that force faced a larger threat than anticipated after the drawdown of coalition military forces.

SIGAR began its lessons learned program in late 2014 at the urging of General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and others who had served in Afghanistan. This report and those that follow comply with SIGAR’s legislative mandate to provide independent and objective leadership and recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense about reconstruction-related problems and the need for corrective action.
Unlike other inspectors general, SIGAR was created by Congress as an independent agency, not housed inside any single department. While other inspectors general have jurisdiction over the programs and operations of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction over all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars, regardless of the agency involved. SIGAR is the only inspector general focused solely on the Afghanistan mission, and the only one devoted exclusively to reconstruction issues. Because SIGAR has the authority to look across the entire reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address whole-of-government lessons.

As *Reconstructing the ANSF* has done, future lessons learned reports will synthesize not only the body of work and expertise of SIGAR, but also that of other oversight agencies, government entities, current and former officials with on-the-ground experience, academic institutions, and independent scholars. The reports will document what the United States sought to accomplish, assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these efforts helped the United States reach its strategic goals in Afghanistan. They will also provide recommendations to address the challenges stakeholders face in ensuring efficient, effective, and sustainable reconstruction efforts, not just in Afghanistan, but in future contingency operations. Other lessons learned reports, currently in progress, will cover a range of topics, including, but not limited to, counternarcotics, stabilization, and private sector development.

SIGAR’s lessons learned program comprises subject matter experts with considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan, aided by a team of experienced research analysts. In producing its reports, the program also uses the significant skills and experience found in SIGAR’s Audits, Investigations, and Research and Analysis directorates, and the Office of Special Projects. I want to express my deepest appreciation to the research team members who produced this report, and thank them for their dedication and commitment to the project.

I also want to thank all of the individuals—especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford; Resolute Support mission commander, General John Nicholson; former Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) commander, Major General Richard Kaiser; deployed personnel at Resolute Support, the regional train, advise and assist commands, and the U.S. Embassy; senior agency officials at the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice; and academicians, subject matter experts, and others—who provided their time and effort to contribute to this report. It is truly a collaborative effort meant to not only identify problems, but also to learn from them and apply reasonable solutions to improve future reconstruction efforts.
I believe the lessons learned reports will be a key legacy of SIGAR. Through these reports, we hope to reach a diverse audience in the military services and the legislative and executive branches, at the strategic and programmatic levels, both in Washington and in the field. By leveraging our unique interagency mandate, we intend to do everything we can to make sure the lessons from the United States’ largest reconstruction effort are identified, acknowledged, and, most importantly, remembered and applied to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, as well as to future conflicts and reconstruction efforts elsewhere in the world.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Arlington, Virginia
September 2017
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The development of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) is a cornerstone of the overall U.S. policy in Afghanistan and a key requirement of the U.S. strategy to transition security responsibilities to the Afghan government. Since 2002, the ANDSF has been raised, trained, equipped, and deployed to secure Afghanistan from internal and external threats, as well as to prevent the reestablishment of terrorist safe havens. To achieve this, the United States devoted over $70 billion (60 percent) of its Afghanistan reconstruction funds to building the ANDSF through 2016, and continues to commit over $4 billion per year to that effort.

This lessons learned report draws important lessons from the U.S. experience building the ANDSF since 2002. These lessons are relevant to ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, where the United States will likely remain engaged in security sector assistance (SSA) efforts to support the ANDSF through at least 2020. In addition, the United States currently participates in efforts to build other developing-world security forces as a key tenet of its national security strategy, an effort which we anticipate will continue and benefit from the lessons learned in Afghanistan. Finally, the report provides timely and actionable recommendations intended to improve our actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

This report examines the U.S. efforts to design, train, advise, assist, and equip the ANDSF and describes how these efforts waxed and waned within the policy priorities of the United States and other key donors. It charts the evolution of the mission from the initial U.S. agreement to serve as the lead nation for the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), to later assuming a level of ownership for the success of the Afghan military and police forces, to ultimately making their development a critical precondition for reducing U.S. and coalition support over time. The report also describes how the U.S. government was ill-prepared to develop a national security force in a post-conflict nation; the changing resource requirements for ANDSF personnel, equipment, and funding; and the inherent tensions within and between the U.S. government and international coalition.

In addition, the report provides a detailed analysis of cross-cutting issues affecting ANDSF development. These issues include corruption, illiteracy, the role of women, the provision of weapons and equipment, high levels of ANDSF attrition, and the annual rotation of U.S. advisors and trainers.
Our report identifies 12 key findings regarding the U.S. experience developing the ANDSF:

1. The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA programs of the size and scope required in Afghanistan. The lack of commonly understood interagency terms, concepts, and models for SSA undermined communication and coordination, damaged trust, intensified frictions, and contributed to initial gross under-resourcing of the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF.

2. Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military operations and did not include the development of an Afghan army, police, or supporting ministerial-level institutions.

3. Early U.S. partnerships with independent militias—intended to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives—ultimately undermined the creation and role of the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP).

4. Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, force management, and special forces, were not included in early U.S., Afghan, and NATO force-design plans.

5. The United States failed to optimize coalition nations’ capabilities to support SSA missions in the context of international political realities. The wide use of national caveats, rationale for joining the coalition, resource constraints and military capabilities, and NATO’s force generation processes led to an increasingly complex implementation of SSA programs. This resulted in a lack of an agreed-upon framework for conducting SSA activities.

6. Providing advanced Western weapons and management systems to a largely illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate training and institutional infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. fiscal support, and extended sustainability timelines.

7. The lag in Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity hindered planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF.

8. Police development was treated as a secondary mission for the U.S. government, despite the critical role the ANP played in implementing rule of law and providing local-level security nationwide.

9. The constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training mission’s institutional memory and hindered the relationship building required in SSA missions.

10. ANDSF monitoring and evaluation tools relied heavily on tangible outputs, such as staffing, equipping, and training levels, as well as subjective evaluations of leadership. This focus masked intangible factors, such as corruption and will to fight, which deeply affected security outcomes and failed to adequately factor in classified U.S. intelligence assessments.

11. Because U.S. military plans for ANDSF readiness were created in an environment of politically constrained timelines—and because these plans consistently underestimated the resilience of the Afghan insurgency and
overestimated ANDSF capabilities—the ANDSF was ill-prepared to deal with deteriorating security after the drawdown of U.S. combat forces.

12. As security deteriorated, efforts to sustain and professionalize the ANDSF became secondary to meeting immediate combat needs.

In 2002, the United States and its coalition partners concluded that the development of an internationally trained and professional Afghan national security force could serve as a viable alternative to an expansion of international forces in Afghanistan. Despite being ill-prepared and lacking proper doctrine, policies, and resources, the United States took the lead for building the ANA. Coalition partners accepted responsibility for other efforts: police reform (Germany), counternarcotics (United Kingdom), judicial reform (Italy), and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Japan). General Karl Eikenberry, the first Security Sector Coordinator in Afghanistan, remarked that “overall, it might be termed exploratory learning because the many uncertainties of the Afghanistan mission added to the steepness of the learning curve.”

By May 2002, U.S. training of the new ANA began with the deployment of U.S. Special Forces to lead the effort. Recognizing that training a national army was beyond the core competency of the Special Forces, the United States deployed the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army to expand the training program from small infantry units to larger military formations and develop defense institutions, such as logistics networks. In order to ensure sufficient U.S. combat support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Army National Guard assumed responsibility for the ANA training mission.

In 2004, the United Nations described Afghanistan as “volatile, having seriously deteriorated in certain parts of the country.” The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that enemy attacks had reached “their highest levels since the collapse of the Taliban government.” The United States recognized that dividing security sector responsibilities among the coalition was not producing the desired results, requiring the Bush Administration to increase U.S. commitments. In 2005, the United States assumed the lead for developing both the ANA and the ANP, and in 2006, created the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) as the proponent responsible for training, advising, assisting, and equipping the Afghan security forces.

When assuming the lead for the ANP mission, the United States failed to sufficiently coordinate police training programs and mission requirements with Germany, which had previously had the lead, and the European Union. The United States preferred a plan to militarize the police as a localized defense force, while the Europeans wanted a traditional community policing model. This
led to conflicting training, advising, and assisting efforts and resulted in the current ANP identity crisis.

As U.S. and coalition military forces tried to get ahead of growing insecurity, the United States turned to rapidly expanding the ANDSF on a condensed training and development timeline. For the ANA, training capacity at the Kabul Military Training Center increased from two to five kandaks (U.S. Army battalion equivalents), and basic training was reduced from 14 weeks in 2005 to 10 weeks in 2007. In 2005, the U.S. military reported that of the 34,000 “trained” Afghan police officers, only 3,900 had been through the basic eight-week course, while the remainder had attended a two-week transition course. In contrast, police recruits in the United States—who are pulled from a highly literate pool of high school graduates—attend an average of 21 weeks of basic training, followed by weeks of field training.

The lack of appropriate equipment for the Afghan security forces threatened their combat readiness. According to a 2005 U.S. military report, some ANP units had less than 15 percent of the required weapons and communications systems on hand. In 2006, retired General Barry McCaffrey concluded that the ANA was “miserably under-resourced” and such circumstances were becoming a “major morale factor for the force.”

Despite known issues with equipping the force, the United States pushed for the expansion of ANDSF force strength. By the end of 2006, senior U.S. officials told the Afghan government that the United States would withhold funding if the Afghans did not agree to expand the ANP from 60,000 to 82,000 police. And in 2008, the U.S. and Afghan governments agreed to expand the ANA from 75,000 to 134,000 (to include a new Afghan Air Force), without considering the associated fiscal and resource requirements.

As part of the expansion of the Afghan military, the United States initiated training of specialized units, transitioning the ANA from a light-infantry army to a combined arms service with army, air force, and special forces elements. The train, advise, and assist programs for these specialized forces were the most successful of the training efforts, and were based on the comprehensive and persistent approach taken by U.S. Special Operations Command and some elements of the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Special Forces implemented a rigorous 16-week training program—modeled on the U.S. Army Ranger program—that included close and enduring post-training mentorship in the field. This resulted in Afghan Special Forces becoming the “best-of-the-best” in the Afghan military. And, while still a fledgling institution (largely because the program was not initiated until 2006), the Afghan Air Force shows great promise; it recently increased its ability to provide close air support and lift to ground forces.
The U.S. government initiated three specialized police programs after 2005: the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, the Afghan Public Protection Program, and the Afghan Local Police. With limited oversight from and accountability to the Afghan government and the United States, these police forces were reported to have engaged in human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and other corrupt activities, ultimately serving as a net detractor from security. While the United States stopped supporting two of the programs due to these issues, the Afghan Local Police continue to operate today.

In 2009, with the Taliban threat increasing and the ANDSF struggling to secure the country, President Barack Obama authorized a surge of U.S. combat forces and agreed to increase ANDSF end-strength to 352,000. President Obama also announced a withdrawal date for combat forces and the transfer of security to the ANDSF beginning in mid-2011. With guidance from the president, the U.S. military pursued a strategy of rapidly improving security, while also supporting the development of a struggling ANDSF. This dual-track strategy resulted in an environment ripe for capacity substitution, where U.S. trainers and advisors augmented critical gaps in Afghan capability, providing enablers such as close air support, airlift, medical evacuation, logistics, and leadership to ensure success on the battlefield. At the same time, the mandate to conduct partnered operations with the ANDSF taught the Afghans to model their fighting on that of the United States, resulting in Afghan ground forces’ increasing dependence on U.S.-provided advanced military capabilities.

Assessment tools used throughout the reconstruction effort evaluated tangible information, such as recruitment, training, and equipment, and failed to assess subjective factors, such as corruption, leadership, and battlefield performance. These assessment systems created disincentives for Afghan units to improve because the coalition prioritized supporting units with lower ratings. Furthermore, from 2005 to 2016, the United States used four different ANDSF assessment methodologies that resulted in inconsistent and often contradictory conclusions about the quality and readiness of the forces.

The ANDSF train, advise, and assist effort was chronically understaffed. In 2009, NATO established the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) as a partner organization to CSTC-A. In February 2010, when NTM-A/CSTC-A became fully operational, only 1,810 of the required 4,083 trainers were in place. Similar shortages remained as time went on. Even in those areas deemed critical priorities, NTM-A struggled to meet its personnel requirements. In November 2010, for example, about 36 percent of instructor positions seen as critical priorities were unfilled. At a time when the ANA was rapidly expanding toward a force strength goal of 171,600, these staffing shortfalls at training facilities and in the field negatively affected planned ANDSF development. General John
Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2006 to 2009, stated that “NATO nations have never completely filled the agreed requirements for forces needed in Afghanistan” since mission inception.\(^6\)

With a poor monitoring and evaluation system, and the United States and NATO substituting for the capacity and capability of the ANDSF, it was not a surprise that, as U.S. and NATO forces drew down and transitioned to training and advising at the regional and institutional level, the ANDSF struggled to succeed. General Joseph Dunford warned the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2014 that upon coalition troop withdrawal, the “Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate…. I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”\(^7\)

It was not until 2015 that the United States and NATO prioritized security sector governance and defense institution building over improving the fighting capabilities of the force. Prior to 2015, developing Afghan ministerial capability in the security sector was primarily focused on governing initiatives that would improve the combat effectiveness of the force, often postponing the governing functions that are critical to improving accountability, oversight, professional development, and command of subordinate units.

Starting in January 2015, U.S. and NATO forces have provided train, advise, and assist support to the ANDSF at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Four regional train, advise, and assist commands (TAAC) provide routine support to ANDSF units in close proximity and will “fly-to-advice” to more remote locations, as needed. This posture has significantly decreased U.S. “touch-points” with ANDSF units, causing the United States to rely on ANDSF information to understand the forces’ needs and struggles. Leaving some units uncovered, without regular U.S. advisors, proved disastrous in the summer of 2015, as the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand completely collapsed and had to be reconstituted.

Even with improved U.S. SSA efforts, corruption within the security forces and associated ministries continues to corrode the ANDSF’s force readiness and battlefield performance. By 2013, corruption was officially recognized as a critical threat to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Despite consistent reports of rampant corruption, U.S. security-related aid was provided with little oversight or accountability. According to Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, former commanding general of CSTC-A, the United States had “no conditions” on funds flowing through CSTC-A to the Afghan defense and interior ministries prior to 2014.\(^8\) SIGAR noted in a 2015 report to Congress that, even with conditions on U.S. aid, Afghan leaders “may construct compliance charades like enacting high-sounding but unenforced laws and conceal day-to-day practices.” Today,
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is widely accepted as one of the most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan. In May 2017, at the Third Annual European Union Anti-Corruption Conference, President Ashraf Ghani publicly admitted that “the Ministry of Interior is the heart of corruption in the security sector.”

As security in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, force protection requirements have increased, ultimately restricting U.S. advisors’ ability to operate. Civilian advisors, once able to drive themselves to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOI, are now forced to move with armed guards, in convoys, or even by helicopter. Expeditionary Advisory Packages—the U.S. military’s way of reaching remote units—typically travel in large armored convoys supported by U.S. air power. In these packages, advisor to security personnel ratios can be as high as 1 to 3. President Ghani is attempting to restructure the ANDSF to optimize offensive capabilities and to reverse the eroding stalemate, but with the U.S. military confined to large bases and the civilian advisory mission largely stuck behind U.S. Embassy Kabul’s walls, there are limits on what can be achieved.

LESSONS
This report identifies 11 lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation.

1. The U.S. government is not well organized to conduct SSA missions in post-conflict nations or in the developing world because our doctrine, policies, personnel, and programs are insufficient to meet mission requirements and expectations.
2. SSA cannot employ a one-size-fits-all approach; it must be tailored to a host nation’s context and needs. Security force structures and capabilities will not outlast U.S. assistance efforts if the host nation does not fully buy into such efforts and take ownership of SSA programs.
3. Senior government and nongovernment leaders in post-conflict or developing-world countries are likely to scrimmage for control of security forces; SSA missions should avoid empowering factions.
4. Western equipment and systems provided to developing-world militaries are likely to create chronic, high-cost dependencies.
5. Security force assessment methodologies are often unable to evaluate the impact of intangible factors such as leadership, corruption, malign influence, and dependency, which can lead to an underappreciation of how such factors can undermine readiness and battlefield performance.
6. Developing and training a national police force is best accomplished by law enforcement professionals in order to achieve a police capability focused on community policing and criminal justice.
7. To improve the effectiveness of SSA missions in coalition operations, the U.S. government must acknowledge and compensate for any coalition staffing shortfalls and national caveats that relate to trainers, advisors, and embedded training teams.

8. Developing foreign military and police capabilities is a whole-of-government mission.

9. In Afghanistan and other parts of the developing world, the creation of specialized security force units often siphons off the conventional force’s most capable leaders and most educated recruits.

10. SSA missions must assess the needs of the entire spectrum of the security sector, including rule of law and corrections programs, in addition to developing the nation’s police and armed forces. Synchronizing SSA efforts across all pillars of the security sector is critical.

11. SSA training and advising positions are not currently career enhancing for uniformed military personnel, regardless of the importance U.S. military leadership places on the mission. Therefore, experienced and capable military professionals with SSA experience often choose non-SSA assignments later in their careers, resulting in the continual deployment of new and inexperienced forces for SSA missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS
SIGAR recommends the following actions that can be undertaken by Congress or executive branch agencies to inform U.S. security sector assistance efforts at the onset of and throughout reconstruction efforts, and to institutionalize the lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. The first set of recommendations is applicable to any current or future contingency operation and the second set of recommendations is specific to Afghanistan.

Legislative Recommendations
1. The U.S. Congress should consider (1) establishing a commission to review the institutional authorities, roles, and resource mechanisms of each major U.S. government stakeholder in SSA missions, and (2) evaluating the capabilities of each department and military service to determine where SSA expertise should best be institutionalized.

2. The U.S. Congress should consider mandating a full review of all U.S. foreign police development programs, identify a lead agency for all future police development activities, and provide the identified agency with the necessary staff, authorities, and budget to accomplish its task.
Executive Agency Recommendations

1. Department of Defense (DOD) and State SSA planning must include holistic initial assessments of mission requirements that should cover the entire range of the host nation’s security sector.

2. DOD and State should coordinate all U.S. security sector plans and designs with host-nation officials prior to implementation to deconflict cultural differences, align sustainability requirements, and agree to the desired size and capabilities of the force. DOD and State should also engage with any coalition partners to ensure unity of effort and purpose.

3. DOD, in partnership with State, should reinforce with host-nation leaders that the United States will only support the development of a national security force that is inclusive of the social, political, and ethnic diversity of the nation.

4. To prevent the empowerment of one political faction or ethnic group, DOD, in coordination with State and the intelligence community, should monitor, evaluate, and assess all formal and informal security forces operating within a host nation. DOD should also identify and monitor both formal and informal chains of command and map social networks of the host nation’s security forces. DOD’s intelligence agencies should track and analyze political associations, biographical data, and patronage networks of senior security officials and political leadership.

5. DOD, State, and other key SSA stakeholders should enhance civilian and military career fields in security sector assistance, and create personnel systems capable of tracking employee SSA experience and skills to expedite the deployment of these experts.

6. DOD and State should mandate professional development and training for all civilian and military members involved in SSA activities, as well as review curricula from the current training programs to align training with mission requirements and fully prepare deploying SSA personnel.

7. To overcome staffing shortages within a coalition, DOD and State should bolster political and diplomatic efforts to ensure better compliance with agreed-upon resource contributions from partner nations and, if unsuccessful and unable to fill the gaps, reassess timeframes and anticipated outcomes to accommodate new realities.

DOD-Specific Recommendations

1. Prior to the initiation of an SSA mission—and periodically throughout the mission—DOD should report to the U.S. Congress on its assessments of U.S. and host-nation shared SSA objectives, alongside an evaluation of the host nation’s political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical context, to shape security sector requirements.
2. DOD should lead the creation of new interagency doctrine for security sector assistance that includes best practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Vietnam.

3. DOD should review the evolution of command structures and assessment methodologies used in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine best practices and a recommended framework to be applied to future SSA missions. DOD should design new monitoring and evaluation tools capable of analyzing both tangible and intangible factors affecting force readiness.

4. DOD should conduct a human capital, threat, and material needs assessment and design a force accordingly, with the appropriate systems and equipment.

5. When creating specialized units such as special forces, DOD should submit human capital assessments and sustainability analyses for both the specialized and conventional forces to the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Force capability assessments must determine the best course of action, including redesigning requirements for each unit.

6. DOD should diversify the leadership assigned to develop foreign military forces, to include civilian defense officials with expertise in the governing and accountability systems required in a military institution.

7. DOD and the military services should institutionalize security sector assistance and create specialized SSA units that are fully trained and ready to deploy rapidly for immediate SSA missions. DOD should create an institution responsible for coordinating and deconflicting SSA activities between the services and greater DOD, provide pre-deployment training, and serve as the lead proponent for security sector governance requirements, including defense institution building.

Afghanistan-Specific Recommendations

While the United States continues to support the development and professionalization of the ANSF, there are several actions that can be taken now to improve our SSA efforts.

Executive Agency Recommendations

1. Realign the U.S. advisor mission to meet the operational and organizational roles and responsibilities of the ANSF, MOD, and MOI.

2. Recreate proponent leads for the ANA and ANP.

3. Create a rear element to provide persistent and comprehensive support to CSTC-A and the TAACs.

4. Synchronize troop decisions with NATO force generation conference schedules and begin discussions for post-2020 NATO support to Afghanistan.

5. Mandate SSA pre-deployment training at service-level training centers.

6. Create incentives for military and civilian personnel with expertise in SSA.

7. Improve ANSF governing, oversight, and accountability systems.
8. Impose stringent conditionality mechanisms to eliminate the ANDSF’s culture of impunity.
9. Develop a civilian cadre of security sector governance personnel at MOD and MOI.
10. Institutionalize rotational schedules that allow for continuity in mission and personnel.
11. Increase civilian advisors to the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI.

**DOD-Specific Recommendations**

1. Implement best practices and develop mitigation strategies for the Afghan Air Force recapitalization.
2. Conduct a human capital assessment of the ANDSF conventional and special forces.
3. Review combat and logistics enabler support to the ANA.
4. Increase advisory capacity in ANA military academies and ANA and ANP training centers.
5. Expand the train, advise, and assist mission below the corps level.
6. Consider security requirements, such as guardian angels for trainers and advisors, when making decisions on contributing additional troops.
7. Ensure that the necessary technical oversight is available when maintenance or training tasks are delegated to support contracts.
8. Consider deploying law enforcement professionals to advise the ANP.

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RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

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DSN: 312-666-0378
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By fax: 703-601-4065
By email: sigar.hotline@mail.mil

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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil

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