

## SECURITY CONTENTS

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## SECURITY

As of March 31, 2013, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$54 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$52.7 billion) were appropriated through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the lead U.S. agency responsible for ANSF development. The purpose of the funding is to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$52.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$44.1 billion had been obligated and \$40.0 billion disbursed as of March 31, 2013.<sup>67</sup>

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on security sector events over the quarter and efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges to transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

### U.S. FUNDING

On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed the “Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013” into law. This law provides \$5.12 billion for the ASFF for fiscal year (FY) 2013. This was \$625 million less than the amount sought in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) FY 2013 budget request. The cuts included \$100 million for ANA infrastructure and a general reduction of \$525 million “due to lack of execution.”<sup>68</sup> This does not include any amounts that may be affected by budget sequestration.

Prior-year ASFF funding has also been reduced. DOD **reprogrammed** \$1 billion of the FY 2011 ASFF. In addition, DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion of FY 2012 ASFF and, as part of the FY 2013 appropriations, Congress provided for **rescission** of another \$1 billion. These changes reduced the amount of FY 2012 ASFF from \$11.2 billion to \$9.2 billion.<sup>69</sup>

### The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

As noted in the Status of Funds section of this report (page 67), the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) is a multinational trust fund,

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**Reprogramming action:** permits the use of funds for purposes other than those originally intended by Congress. Depending on the circumstances, approval for reprogramming may be internal to DOD or may involve Congress.

**Rescission:** cancels budget authority previously provided by Congress. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 specifies that the President may propose to Congress that funds be rescinded. If both Houses have not approved a rescission proposal (by passing legislation) within 45 days of continuous session, any funds being withheld must be made available for obligation.

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Sources: Defense Acquisition University, “Lesson 10: Financial Management: Program/Budget Execution,” accessed 4/12/2013; U.S. Senate, Glossary, accessed 4/12/2013.

administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to pay ANP salaries and other ANP-related recurring costs, to build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and for community policing initiatives. Since 2002, donor countries had paid more than \$2.7 billion into this fund, of which the United States, the largest contributor, provided more than \$950 million. Most U.S. funding provided through the LOTFA is from the ASFF (see ANP Salaries in this section, page 101).

This quarter, LOTFA continued to meet the salary and remuneration requirements of Afghanistan's police officers and prison personnel, according to the UN Secretary-General. The UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations completed an inquiry into the LOTFA and distributed a summary to donors. Action on its findings is expected.<sup>70</sup> SIGAR had not seen the inquiry at the time this report went to press.

## **NATO ANA Trust Fund**

In addition to U.S.-provided funding in the security sector, most of which is routed through the ASFF, NATO also provides funding through its ANA Trust Fund. Through this fund, 22 countries (including the non-NATO country Japan) have donated nearly \$715 million since 2007, though often with restrictions on use. ANA Trust Fund donations are not direct contributions to the Afghan government. These funds are administered by the United States on behalf of NATO and non-NATO donors and are provided through the ASFF to pay for ANA sustainment (such as salaries and incentives), logistical support, and non-recurring costs (such as equipment). The DOD Office of Inspector General is currently auditing the NATO ANA Trust Fund; the audit is expected to be completed in summer 2013.<sup>71</sup>


## **U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO THE ANSF**

From March 21, 2009, through December 31, 2012, the United States has provided \$3.38 billion from the ASFF in direct, on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan; \$1.95 billion in direct assistance is planned for 2013, but has not yet been disbursed. Most disbursed and planned funding (\$3.75 billion) is to support the Afghan government's operational budget to pay for salaries, as shown in Figure 3.23. The rest (\$1.59 billion) covers sustainment-related expenses such as repairs and maintenance of facilities and equipment, and water and electrical service.<sup>72</sup>

More on-budget assistance is being provided as Afghans continue to improve their financial management capability and capacity. While this increases the risk to U.S. funding by limiting visibility of these funds and their use, it also increases the Afghan government's capacity to execute larger amounts and prepares it to identify and pay for future ANSF requirements.

FIGURE 3.23

## ASFF DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT (\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded; SY = Afghan Solar Year; FY = Afghan Fiscal Year; increases in the "other" category reflect an ongoing shift from off-budget to on-budget assistance.

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/16/2013.

## KEY EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Most of the quarter's key events in security relate to the transition of security responsibility from Coalition Forces to the ANSF. These events included: a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) change of command, the MOI's new 10-year vision for the ANP; the first meeting of the new U.S. Secretary of Defense and President Karzai; and discussions of the size of the ANSF, the U.S. military footprint in the coming years, and the presence of U.S. Special Forces in certain provinces. Other key events related to the security environment include the rise in ANSF casualties, the ongoing threat of insider attacks, and the second-to-last tranche of provinces and districts beginning the transition from Coalition-led to ANSF-led security.

### General Dunford Assumes Command of ISAF

At a February 10 ceremony, departing ISAF and U.S. Forces commander General John R. Allen passed the reins to incoming commander General Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

U.S. and NATO leaders praised General Allen for his work during his 19 months of command in Afghanistan. In his remarks, General Dunford said, "Today is not about change, it's about continuity."<sup>73</sup>



General Joseph F. Dunford observes ANSF training on March 18, 2013. General Dunford assumed command of ISAF and USFOR-A in February 2013. (NTM-A photo)

## **New Police Initiative**

On February 5, 2013, the Minister of the Interior presented a draft 10-year vision for the Ministry and the ANP to the International Police Coordination Board, according to the UN Secretary-General. The strategy was created to transform the police from a security force into a law-enforcement and community-policing force. This followed the United Nations' launch of a democratic policing project funded by the Dutch government. The three-year project, which emphasizes outreach to women and children, is designed to empower Afghans to be more active in the issues of police accountability and community engagement.<sup>74</sup>

Also in February, senior MOI officials traveled to Turkey to observe community-policing initiatives during a 10-day study tour. LOTFA funds supported the tour.<sup>75</sup>

## **Secretary of Defense Meets with President Karzai**

On March 10, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel met with President Karzai in Kabul. The meeting followed controversial remarks by President Karzai suggesting that the United States was conspiring with the Taliban to keep violence levels high in order to ensure a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. The Secretary discussed those comments with the Afghan president and denied the accusation. The Secretary also said that any negotiation with the Taliban “must come from the Afghan government.”<sup>76</sup>

## **U.S., Coalition, and ANSF Force Strength through 2018**

As transition from Coalition-led to Afghan-led security continues throughout Afghanistan, policy makers and military leaders must consider the right balance of Afghan and Coalition forces over the next few years. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the leaders of ISAF-contributing countries outlined a plan to reduce the ANSF to a more fiscally sustainable 228,500-strong force in 2017. However, this quarter, U.S. officials suggested the current ANSF end-strength goal of 352,000 could be maintained through 2018.

On February 22, 2013, following a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said the plan to reduce the Afghan force would not go forward and that it made sense to maintain a 352,000-strong ANSF through 2018. He also noted that the United States will maintain a force of 60,000 troops in Afghanistan through the spring and summer fighting seasons, then cut the U.S. presence to 34,000 by February 2014. U.S. forces are expected to stay at that level through the 2014 Afghan election cycle, then begin a final drawdown.<sup>77</sup>

On March 5, 2013, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General James Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee he recommended a post-2014 force of 20,000 Coalition troops—13,600 of them U.S.—in Afghanistan. In their February meeting, NATO defense ministers discussed leaving a force of 9,500 U.S. and 6,000 Coalition troops.<sup>78</sup> A final

decision on a post-2014 Coalition force strength had not been reached as this report went to press.

On March 8, 2013, the Dutch Prime Minister announced that the Netherlands would end its Afghan police-training mission in July 2013.<sup>79</sup>

## U.S. Special Forces in Wardak

U.S. Special Forces are leaving Wardak following Afghan allegations that they harassed and killed citizens there. President Karzai said an Afghan-American citizen originally from Kandahar was part of a Special Forces team in Wardak and “was violating the rights of the Afghan people massively.”<sup>80</sup> In one example, he also noted that local residents complained after a student was found dead and alleged that U.S. forces had taken him from his home two days earlier.<sup>81</sup> ISAF officials have said that no evidence was found linking U.S. troops to abuse or murder in the region, but formed a joint ISAF/Afghan commission to further review allegations.<sup>82</sup> On February 24, 2013, President Karzai announced ISAF would stop all Special Forces operations in Wardak following the reports of “repeated local complaints of harassment and annoyance by the American Special Forces.”<sup>83</sup> Karzai told the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to make sure all U.S. Special Forces were out of the province within two weeks.<sup>84</sup>

On March 25, 2013, a senior U.S. official said ISAF and the Afghan government had reached a “favorable resolution.” The official said, “It wasn’t a complete departure of U.S. security forces from Wardak province; it was a transition from U.S. security forces to Afghan security forces in a small section of Wardak in the end.”<sup>85</sup> President Karzai welcomed the announcement of the withdrawal and said Afghan forces “will move in to provide security for the region.”<sup>86</sup>


## Insider Attacks

The number of insider attacks (Afghans in uniform attacking their Coalition partners) has been on the rise, from two attacks in 2008 to 46 attacks in 2012.<sup>87</sup> The 2012 attacks resulted in 62 Coalition deaths, 35 of them U.S. personnel.<sup>88</sup> This accounts for more than 11% of all U.S. casualties and 15% of all U.S. casualties resulting from hostile actions in 2012, as shown in Figure 3.24. In addition, insider attacks by ANSF personnel (or individuals posing as ANSF personnel) against other ANSF personnel rose from three in 2008 to 29 in 2012 (through the end of September).<sup>89</sup>

This quarter, insider attacks continued. On March 8, two U.S. soldiers and two Afghan soldiers were killed and 10 U.S. soldiers were wounded in Wardak when an Afghan in uniform opened fire on them. According to media accounts of the incident, Coalition forces quickly returned fire and killed the attacker.<sup>90</sup> This was the third insider attack in 2013. In separate incidents this year, a British soldier was killed on January 7 and a U.S. contractor was killed on March 8.<sup>91</sup>

FIGURE 3.24

U.S. MILITARY DEATHS IN AFGHANISTAN:  
JANUARY 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2012



Note: “Non-Hostile” includes deaths from accident, injury, illness, homicide, or suicide.

Sources: DOD, Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed 4/17/2013; DOD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 12/2012, pp. 34–35; DOD, “Apparent Insider Attack Kills 2 Americans, 2 Afghans,” 3/11/2013.

In addition to insider attacks aimed primarily at U.S. and Coalition forces, insider attacks by Afghan police and soldiers against their colleagues continued this quarter. Notably, 17 U.S.-trained Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel in Ghazni were killed February 27 after one of their own drugged and shot them, stole their weapons, and fled, according to a media report.<sup>92</sup> The Taliban claimed responsibility for that attack.<sup>93</sup> In an incident on March 21, an ALP member killed five other Afghan police personnel in Badghis.<sup>94</sup>

## TRANSITION PROGRESS

As of February 2013, four of five tranches (geographic areas) were transitioning to ANSF-led security with Tranche 4 just beginning the process this quarter, according to DOD. As of the end of February 2013, the ANSF had begun to assume the lead for security in 312 of the country's 405 districts where approximately 87% of Afghans were living. In all, 23 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces were completely in transition and areas in all 34 provinces were in some stage of transition.<sup>95</sup>

To ensure that security is maintained in transitioning areas, ISAF will continue to provide training, advising, and other support to the ANSF, according to DOD. As ANSF capabilities improve, ISAF support will be adjusted, allowing ANSF to move into the operational lead. DOD noted that counterinsurgency operations are increasingly Afghan planned, prepared, and executed with advice and enabler support provided by Coalition Security Force Assistance Teams. This support includes fire, air, aviation, medical evacuation, and counter-IED support to augment ANSF capabilities that are still under development. During this transition period, Coalition forces will realign their posture to set the conditions for the ANSF to assume full security responsibility in late 2014, prior to the withdrawal of the bulk of remaining Coalition troops.<sup>96</sup>


According to DOD, Tranche 5 will be announced this spring and will mark the point at which the ANSF will assume the operational lead for 100% of the population with ISAF in a support role through their train-advise-assist mission. Tranche 5 will be in the final tranche in the transition process and is expected to be implemented during the summer of 2013.<sup>97</sup> It includes a total of 91 districts in 11 provinces, mainly along the remaining eastern border areas, as shown in Figure 3.25.

## U.S. FORCES

According to the U.S. Central Command, 70,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of March 31, 2013. Of those, approximately 48,200 were assigned to ISAF and 1,800 to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/CSTC-A. Of the remaining U.S. personnel, 7,500 were assigned to the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and 12,500 were designated "other military

FIGURE 3.25

## AREAS IN TRANSITION TO AFGHAN-LED SECURITY



Notes: Tranches include cities, districts, and provinces (or parts thereof). Tranche 1 began in July 2011, Tranche 2 in November 2011, Tranche 3 in July 2012, and Tranche 4 in February 2013. Source: NATO, "Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal," accessed 4/18/2013.

personnel."<sup>98</sup> As of April 15, 2013, a total of 2,072 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 18,404 were wounded as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>99</sup>

### ANSF STRENGTH AND PERSONNEL DATA

In February, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said supporting a 352,000-strong ANSF through 2018 is "an investment that would be worth making, because it would allow us greater flexibility as we take down our troops."<sup>100</sup> This is a change from the 228,500-strong ANSF that leaders of nations contributing to ISAF envisaged at the Chicago NATO Summit in May 2012.<sup>101</sup> This quarter, the ANSF force strength was 332,753 (181,834 assigned to the ANA and Afghan Air Force and 150,919 assigned to the ANP).<sup>102</sup> This is 4,763 fewer than the 337,516 ANSF force strength in March 2012, and 19,247 fewer than the end strength goal, as shown in Table 3.2 on the following page.

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.2

ANSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 18, 2013			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 2/2013	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	175,441	-11,559
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	150,919	-6,081
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,393	-1,607
<b>ANSF Total</b>	<b>352,000</b>	<b>332,753</b>	<b>-19,247</b>

Sources: DOD, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 1/2/2013, 1/4/2013, 1/6/2013, and 4/1/2013.

## SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, SIGAR began an audit to assess the reliability and usefulness of data for the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained. This audit will also look at the methodology for gathering data on ANSF, including the extent to which DOD reviews and validates the information collected. For more information, see Section 2, page 32.

The goal to "train and field" 352,000 ANSF personnel by October 2012 was not met, although DOD reported that the ANSF reached its "recruiting" goal of 352,000.<sup>103</sup> In its December 2012 report to Congress, DOD noted that the number of reported ANSF personnel fell in 2012 after civilian personnel were removed from ANA force-strength reports. DOD also said the date for achieving an end strength of 352,000 ANSF personnel is by December 2014: 187,000 in the ANA by December 2012, 157,000 in the ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 in the Afghan Air Force by December 2014. However, according to DOD, the dates for all of these personnel to be trained, equipped, and fielded are December 2013 for the ANA and ANP, and December 2017 for the Afghan Air Force.<sup>104</sup>

Accurate and reliable accounting for ANSF personnel is necessary to help ensure that U.S. funds that support the ANSF are used for legitimate and eligible costs. However, SIGAR and others have reported that determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges. U.S. and Coalition forces rely on the Afghan forces to report their own personnel strength numbers, which are often derived from hand-prepared personnel records in decentralized, unlinked, and inconsistent systems. CSTC-A reported last quarter that there was no viable method of validating personnel numbers.



An ANA Special Forces soldier talks with a potential ALP candidate in Helmand on April 4, 2013. The ALP provides security in rural areas with limited ANSF presence. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)


## AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP)—like Village Stability Operations described in the Governance section of this report—is part of the counterinsurgency strategy of ISAF and the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A).<sup>105</sup> This quarter, the number of ALP—"guardians"—was 21,656. Of those, nearly 97% are fully trained and assigned.<sup>106</sup> This quarter, the ALP were operational at 104 sites.<sup>107</sup>

The Taliban's senior leadership considers the ALP the top threat to the insurgency's ability to control the population and threaten the Afghan government, according to DOD. Insurgents attack ALP units up to 10 times more often than other ANSF components. However, DOD noted, the ALP

FIGURE 3.26

## AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE TIMELINE: HISTORY, GROWTH, AND MAJOR EVENTS



Sources: SOJTF-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2013; Human Rights Watch, "Just Don't Call It a Militia," 9/2011, pp. 5–8.

successfully defended their positions against these attacks more than 80% of the time.<sup>108</sup>

ALP members are recruited locally, recommended by village elders, and assigned to protect their home villages. Because they are a local force, the ALP has demonstrated “a unique resilience” against infiltration by the Taliban “as anyone outside the area would be immediately recognized as a foreigner.”<sup>109</sup> In addition, the ALP has the most stringent vetting procedures of all ANSF, according to the SOJTF-A.<sup>110</sup> DOD stated that all ALP members were recently re-vetted. Only 5% were removed from ALP ranks, mostly for drug use.<sup>111</sup>

The ALP has been evolving since its establishment in August 2010, as shown in Figure 3.26, but challenges remain. According to DOD, the ALP’s main challenge is “the MOI’s ability to support and manage the program.”<sup>112</sup> DOD also noted that the MOI “has identified these difficulties and is working with [the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A)] to build an enduring logistics and support capacity in MOI to meet ALP requirements.”<sup>113</sup> In addition, NSOCC-A worked with the MOI to develop a revised ALP procedures document which extends the ALP program to 2025, increases the maximum age limit for potential ALP guardians from 45 to 50, and designates the ALP as a component of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), according to SOJTF-A. The last step is expected to institutionalize the ALP, raise its status within the ANSF, and enable ALP leadership to use AUP infrastructure and pay and logistics systems. The revised procedures document also increases the maximum length of ALP Guardian contracts from one to three years. The document is currently being reviewed at the MOI, and is expected to be released in April.<sup>114</sup>

As of March 31, 2013, the United States has obligated \$139.9 million of the ASFF to support the ALP. Of that amount, \$47.7 million are direct

contributions to the Afghan Ministry of Finance and \$91.6 million are “in-kind” funds that are used by U.S. forces to support the ALP.<sup>115</sup> According to SOJTF-A, after ALP guardians are trained they become employees of the MOI, sign yearly service contracts, work part-time, and are paid approximately 60% of basic police salary (about \$120 per month).<sup>116</sup>

In his latest report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General said “while [the ALP] initiative contributed to increased stability in some areas and progress in promoting accountability, concerns remain over insufficient implementation of policies regarding vetting, command and control and local-level oversight.” The Secretary-General also noted that United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 55 incidents attributed to the ALP that resulted in 62 civilian casualties (24 deaths and 38 injuries) in 2012.<sup>117</sup>

## AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI that provides security services in Afghanistan. Following President Karzai’s 2010 decree to disband all national and international private security companies (PSCs), the Afghan government implemented a bridging strategy for a phased transition process to a public security company. As part of the transition, the APPF was expected to assume responsibility for security of development and humanitarian projects in March 2012 and for security of military installations in March 2013.

This quarter, SIGAR initiated a follow-on audit to the agency’s March 2012 testimony and its June 2012 report that assessed the potential effects of USAID’s transfer of security functions for its projects from PSCs to the APPF. This audit will identify the following:

- the cost of security services for selected USAID projects and any effect the transition to the APPF had on overall security costs for reconstruction projects
- USAID mechanisms to review security costs and oversee security services
- the impact of the APPF transition on reconstruction projects

The audit will also determine whether USAID’s implementing partners for selected projects were appropriately using companies licensed by the Afghan government.

As of March 6, 2013, the number of personnel assigned to the APPF was 16,326—a 15% increase since last quarter—according to CSTC-A. Of these, 1,158 were officers, 1,217 were noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 13,951 were guards.<sup>118</sup> The target goal for the APPF is approximately 23,000 personnel.<sup>119</sup>

### SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, SIGAR initiated a follow-on audit to the agency’s March 2012 testimony and its June 2012 report that assessed the potential effects of USAID’s transfer of security functions for its projects from PSCs to the APPF. For more information, see Section 2, page 30.

## ANSF ASSESSMENTS

Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. efforts—and, by extension, of U.S. funding—to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments also provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with regular updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security. SIGAR continues to closely monitor and report these assessments.

In assessing the capability of ANA and ANP units, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) uses the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), which has five rating levels:<sup>120</sup>

- **Independent with Advisors:** The unit is able to plan and execute its missions, maintain command and control of subordinates, call on and coordinate quick-reaction forces and medical evacuations, exploit intelligence, and operate within a wider intelligence system.
- **Effective with Advisors:** The unit conducts effective planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to a code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan government. Coalition forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to unit personnel and may provide **enablers** as needed. Coalition forces augment support only on occasion.
- **Effective with Partners:** The unit requires routine mentoring for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with other units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and most of the unit adhere to a code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan government. ANSF “enablers” provide support to the unit; however, Coalition forces may provide enablers to augment that support.
- **Developing with Partners:** The unit requires partnering and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with other units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders and most of the staff usually adhere to a code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan government. Some enablers are present and effective, providing some of the support. Coalition forces provide enablers and most of the support.
- **Established:** The unit is beginning to organize but is barely capable of planning, synchronizing, directing, or reporting operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit. The unit is barely able to coordinate and communicate with other units. Leadership and staff may not adhere to a code of conduct or may not be loyal to the Afghan government. Most of the unit’s enablers are not present or are barely effective. Those enablers provide little or no support to the unit. Coalition forces provide most of the support.

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**Enablers:** specialized units that support combat units such as engineering, civil affairs, military intelligence, helicopter, military police, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.


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Source: DOD, “Mullen Tours Forward Outposts in Afghanistan,” 4/22/2009, accessed 1/4/2012.

# SECURITY

FIGURE 3.27

CUAT RATINGS OF ANSF UNITS, BY QUARTER, 2013



Source: DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/17/2013.

## SIGAR AUDIT

In a new audit, SIGAR is examining the methods and tools used to measure and evaluate the ANSF's operational effectiveness, including the extent to which these methods and tools are consistently applied, reliable, and validated. For more information, see Section 2, page 32.

During this reporting cycle, the total number of ANA units rose from 292 to 302. According to IJC, this increase is the result of new units being fielded, mostly in the 215th Corps.<sup>121</sup>

For the ANP, the total number of units fell from 536 to 528. According to IJC, "Special Police Units" are not reported, so they do not appear in this reporting cycle.<sup>122</sup>

Because not every unit is reported in every CUAT cycle, the IJC uses the most recent assessment (within the last 18 months) to "enable cycle to cycle comparisons." When compared this way, 9 more ANA units and 11 more ANP units were rated "independent with advisors," as shown in Figure 3.27. According to the most recent assessments, more than 78% of all ANA units were rated at the two highest levels: nearly 21% were "independent with advisors" and nearly 58% were "effective with advisors." Less than 5% of units had not been assessed within the last 18 months. For the ANP, more than 63% of units were rated at the two highest levels: nearly 27% were "independent with advisors" and nearly 37% were "effective with advisors." More than 10% of ANP units had not been assessed within the last 18 months.<sup>123</sup>

## MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

Assessments of the MOD and the MOI continued to show progress this quarter. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:<sup>124</sup>

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight only
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

At the MOD, all 46 staff sections and cross-functional areas were assessed this quarter, including the newly assessed Ground Forces Command, which debuted at CM-2B. Eight offices progressed, including:<sup>125</sup>

- Logistics Command (CM-1B)
- General Staff Communications (CM-2A)
- General Staff Force Structure, Training and Doctrine (CM-2A)
- Medical Command (CM-2A)
- Army Support Command (CM-2A)
- Director of General Staff (CM-2A)
- MOD Chief of Health Affairs (CM-2B)
- Director of Strategic Communications (CM-2B)


Two MOD offices received lower ratings: the Acquisition Agency (fell to CM-2B) and the General Staff Logistics office (CM-3). Three MOD offices were rated CM-4, meaning that they cannot accomplish their missions, as shown in Figure 3.28 on the following page. Those offices were the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intel Policy, the Afghan Air Force Command, and Gender Integration.<sup>126</sup>

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; four progressed since last quarter. The MOI office for the Afghan Local Police increased two rating categories since last quarter, from CM-3 to CM-2A. The other offices of the Legal Advisor and the Afghan National Civil Order Police progressed to CM-1B (the second highest rating category). The Office of the Surgeon (Medical) also increased to CM-2A.<sup>127</sup>

# SECURITY

FIGURE 3.28

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY CHANGE



Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/2/2013 and 4/1/2013.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$28.9 billion and disbursed \$26.2 billion of the ASFF to build, train, and sustain the ANA.<sup>128</sup>

### ANA Strength

As of February 18, 2013, the overall assigned strength of the ANA was 181,834 personnel (175,441 Army and 6,393 Air Force), according to CSTC-A.<sup>129</sup> This is an increase of 1,317 since last quarter—as shown in Table 3.3—but lower than the 191,592 reported in May 2012.<sup>130</sup>

### ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$9.7 billion and disbursed \$9.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA sustainment.<sup>131</sup>

As part of sustainment funding, the United States has provided the ANA with ammunition at a cost of approximately \$1.03 billion, according to CSTC-A.<sup>132</sup>

### ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had provided nearly \$1.6 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives (since

TABLE 3.3

<b>ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE</b>						
<b>ANA Component</b>	<b>Authorized</b>			<b>Assigned</b>		
	<b>Q4 2012</b>	<b>Q1 2013</b>	<b>Quarterly Change</b>	<b>Q4 2012</b>	<b>Q1 2013</b>	<b>Quarterly Change</b>
201st Corps	18,421	17,821	-600	17,966	17,427	-539
203rd Corps	20,614	20,022	-592	20,625	19,095	-1,530
205th Corps	19,075	18,476	-599	19,856	18,982	-874
207th Corps	14,706	14,313	-393	13,261	12,803	-458
209th Corps	14,852	14,458	-394	14,170	13,065	-1,105
215th Corps	17,542	16,933	-609	17,135	17,307	+172
111th Capital Division	9,608	9,273	-335	9,152	8,654	-498
Special Operations Force	12,525	12,261	-264	10,338	10,366	+28
Echelons Above Corps <sup>a</sup>	44,712	37,592	-7,120	36,858	37,837	+979
TTHS <sup>b</sup>	-	-	None	15,284	16,103	+819
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>172,055</b>	<b>161,149</b>	<b>-10,906</b>	<b>174,645</b>	<b>175,441</b>	<b>+796</b>
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,639	7,639	None	5,872	6,393	+521
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>179,694</b>	<b>168,788</b>	<b>-10,906</b>	<b>180,517</b>	<b>181,834</b>	<b>+1,317</b>

Notes: Q4 data is as of 11/21/2012. Q1 data is as of 2/18/2013.

<sup>a</sup> Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

<sup>b</sup> Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel; also includes 3,802 cadets.

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 1/2/2013, 1/4/2013, 1/6/2013, 4/1/2013, and 4/16/2013.

FY 2008). The estimated annual amount of funding required for the base salaries, bonuses, and incentives of a 195,000-person ANA is \$686.1 million.<sup>133</sup>

CSTC-A said that all ANA personnel (including those in the Afghan Air Force) receive some sort of incentive pay as of November 20, 2012. CSTC-A also noted that payroll numbers are lower than end-strength numbers due to time delays in reporting between the payroll system and the personnel accounting system. For example, personnel absent without leave will stop receiving pay, but will be counted as part of the ANA's end strength until they are dropped from personnel rolls.<sup>134</sup>

## ANA Equipment and Transportation

The U.S. effort to equip the ANA is coming to an end as all vehicles and communications equipment have been procured and only \$858,920 worth of weapons are yet to be procured to meet ANA requirements as shown in Table 3.4.<sup>135</sup>


TABLE 3.4

<b>COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT</b>		
<b>Type of Equipment</b>	<b>Procured</b>	<b>Remaining to be Procured</b>
Weapons	\$878,027,233	\$858,920
Vehicles	\$5,556,502,248	\$0
Communications Equipment	\$580,538,328	\$0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$7,015,067,809</b>	<b>\$858,920</b>

Source: CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

FIGURE 3.29

**COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT PROCURED, AS OF MARCH 31, 2013**  
(PERCENT)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

## SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR will assess the process CSTC-A uses to determine requirements and to acquire, manage, store, and distribute repair parts for the ANSF, and evaluate internal controls to determine if they are sufficient to account for these parts and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. For more information, see Section 2, page 34.

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$10.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.<sup>136</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, communications equipment, and aircraft and aviation-related equipment. Nearly 80% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Figure 3.29.<sup>137</sup>

This quarter, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 113 aircraft, including Russian-built Mi-series helicopters, according to CSTC-A:<sup>138</sup>

- 48 Mi-17s (transport helicopters)
- 11 Mi-35s (attack helicopters)
- 16 C-27As (cargo planes)
- 26 C-208s (light transport planes)
- 6 C-182s (four-person trainers)
- 6 MD-530Fs (light helicopters)

Still to be procured are 12 Mi-17 transport helicopters and 20 light support aircraft.<sup>139</sup> The U.S. Air Force awarded an American company and its Brazilian subcontractor a \$427 million contract to build 20 A-29 Super Tucanos—a single-engine, air-to-ground combat, light support aircraft—for the Afghan Air Force. Once delivered, these aircraft will be used “to conduct advanced flight training, surveillance, close air support and air interdiction missions.”<sup>140</sup> In addition, on March 28, a contract for 20 C-27A cargo planes ended and was not renewed; 16 of the 20 are already in the Afghan Air Force. The remaining four will be replaced by four C-130H cargo planes.<sup>141</sup>

## GAO Report on DOD Procurement of Mi-17 Helicopters

DOD has been procuring Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters for the ANSF since 2005. The Mi-17 is a multi-use transport helicopter developed by the former Soviet Union to operate in the thin air of Afghanistan’s high elevations. The ANSF had approximately 50 Mi-17s as of 2012, with a goal of a fleet of about 80 helicopters.<sup>142</sup>

New Mi-17s are sold by Russia’s state-owned arms export firm, Rosoboronexport, the sole authorized exporter of military end-use products from Russia. As a result of multiple violations of U.S. law, Rosoboronexport was subject to U.S. sanctions in 2006. The sanctions were lifted in 2010.<sup>143</sup>

Prior to 2010, DOD competitively procured a small number of Mi-17s through U.S. companies, whose subcontractors purchased them new from the original equipment manufacturer in Russia. In 2010, the Navy initiated a competitive procurement for 21 Mi-17s in a civilian variant, but canceled the solicitation and transferred responsibility for it to the Army at DOD’s direction. In 2011, the Army contracted Rosoboronexport to purchase 21 Mi-17 military helicopters with the option to buy 12 additional aircraft. Members of Congress have criticized this contract for its structure and cost and because of Rosoboronexport’s alleged arms sales to Syria.<sup>144</sup>

In Senate Report 112-173 accompanying the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review DOD’s procurement of Mi-17 helicopters from Rosoboronexport. GAO found that DOD had directed the Navy to cancel its solicitation for 21 civilian Mi-17s because Russian authorities told U.S. officials that the helicopters, intended for military use, could only be sold through Rosoboronexport. GAO also found that DOD did not assess alternative means for procuring Mi-17s after verifying that Russia would only sell them through Rosoboronexport. However, GAO noted, an Army analysis determined that the price paid to Rosoboronexport (\$17.5 million) for the Mi-17s was reasonable and the contract offered greater access to technical information and increased assurance of safety compared to previous Mi-17 contracts.<sup>145</sup>

According to a media account, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter notified members of Congress on April 3 that it was in the national interest to continue buying Mi-17s from Russia to equip Afghan forces.<sup>146</sup>

## ANA Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$6.1 billion and disbursed \$3.9 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.<sup>147</sup> As of March 31, 2013, the United States had completed 213 infrastructure projects (valued at \$2.63 billion), with another 138 projects ongoing (\$3.11 billion) and 20 planned (\$321 million), according to CSTC-A. Of the ongoing projects, 37 new contracts (valued at more than \$645 million) were awarded this quarter.<sup>148</sup>

As with ANA equipment, the U.S. effort to provide ANA infrastructure is coming to an end. In total, nearly 95% of funding for ANA infrastructure has gone to projects now completed or ongoing. The 20 planned projects valued at \$321 million represent the final 5% of U.S. funding for ANA infrastructure as shown in Figure 3.30.<sup>149</sup>

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were a brigade garrison for the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115.8 million), phase one of the MOD’s headquarters in Kabul (\$89.5 million), and a brigade garrison for the 205th Corps in Kandahar (\$89.1 million).<sup>150</sup>


DOD’s FY 2013 ASFF budget request of \$190 million for ANA infrastructure was 85% less than the amount authorized in FY 2012. However, the final amount appropriated (\$90 million) for FY 2013 was \$100 million less than the request and a 93% decrease from the amount authorized in FY 2012. FY 2013 ASFF funding is not for construction projects, but for upgrades and modernizations of garrisons and force-protection systems, and to prepare Coalition facilities for handover to the ANSF as U.S. forces are drawn down.<sup>151</sup>

## ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$2.7 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.<sup>152</sup> This quarter,

FIGURE 3.30

**COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2013**  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

## SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR will examine CSTC-A’s justification and support for the ANSF infrastructure project requirements. The audit will also assess: (1) the extent to which U.S. and Coalition basing plans for the ANSF reflect ANSF force-strength projections; (2) whether CSTC-A fully considered alternatives to new construction; (3) whether CSTC-A developed and used appropriate criteria to ensure that current and proposed construction projects for the ANSF are necessary, achievable, and sustainable by the Afghan government. For more information, see Section 2, page 34.

62,298 ANA personnel were enrolled in some type of training, with 46,264 enrolled in literacy training, according to CSTC-A. In addition, 8,211 enlisted personnel were enrolled in basic warrior-training courses, 2,090 were training to become commissioned officers, and 1,652 were training to become NCOs. Other training programs include combat specialty courses such as infantry training; combat support courses such as engineering, signals, and logistics; and courses to operate the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles known as “Humvees.”<sup>153</sup>

According to CSTC-A, the United States funds a variety of contracts to train the ANA. CSTC-A estimates that these training activities cost approximately \$106 million this quarter (down from \$140 million reported last quarter) and include costs for personnel, food, fuel, ammunition, facilities, and medical support. CSTC-A estimated that the total cost of this training is \$560 million per year.<sup>154</sup>

## **MOD Training Institutions Assessments**

The Capability Milestone (CM) rating system used to assess the operational capabilities of the MOD are also used to assess MOD training institutions. The training assessments use the same four primary and two secondary ratings.<sup>155</sup>

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight only
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

This quarter, 31 of 35 MOD training institutions were assessed. More than 61% had achieved a rating of CM-1B or higher. Three training institutions received a higher rating since last quarter: the Regional Military Training Center in Mazar-e-Sharif (CM-1A), the Kabul Military Training Center’s Female Training Brigade (CM-1B), and Kabul Military High School (CM-1A).<sup>156</sup>

## **ANA Literacy**

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s literacy program, which began in October 2009, seeks to achieve greater literacy rates within the ANA. The program is based on a 312-hour curriculum. According to CSTC-A, in order to progress from illiteracy to functional literacy, a student may take as many as seven tests. The student’s performance determines if he or she progresses to the next training level. Since the start of the program, the ANA success rates for passing these tests were: 95% for Level 1 literacy, 97% for Level 2, and 97% for Level 3.<sup>157</sup>

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At Level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials.” As of March 1, 2013, the number of ANA graduates at Level 3 was 27,111. The goal is to achieve 100% Level 1 literacy and 50% Level 3 (or functional) literacy by the time the NTM-A/CSTC-A program ends.<sup>158</sup>

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million. According to CSTC-A, these contractors were providing 724 literacy trainers to the ANA:<sup>159</sup>

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 254 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 178 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 292 trainers.

The number of trainers fell sharply from the 1,391 reported last quarter.<sup>160</sup> CSTC-A said this was due to a shift from a focus on growing the program to ensuring that students in the program reach Level 3. To do this, the number of classes are being downsized “in an effort to maintain appropriate oversight and to ensure that those students already in the program are making progress” toward that goal.<sup>161</sup> CSTC-A said responsibility for literacy training for ANA personnel in the field will transition to the ANA between July 1, 2013, and July 1, 2014. Literacy training at ANA training centers is expected to transition by April 2014. In the meantime, a new contract is being coordinated to provide training for Afghan literacy trainers ahead of the transition.<sup>162</sup>

## Women in the ANA

As of February 20, 2013, ANA personnel included 366 women—254 officers, 105 NCOs, and seven enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A. In addition, the Afghan Air Force included 46 women: 18 officers, 21 NCOs, and seven enlisted personnel. The current target is for women to make up 10% of the 195,000-strong combined ANA and Afghan Air Force.<sup>163</sup> However, during this reporting period, women made up only 0.2% of the combined ANA and Afghan Air Force strength, or one-fiftieth of the target level.

This quarter, an NCO course designed specifically to train women did not meet its 70-person quota, and of the 15 women recruited, only six met the educational standards for the course. However, the nine women who did not meet the educational standards graduated from a concurrent Basic Warrior Training Course. As for officers, 13 women were selected to attend the National Military Academy of Afghanistan’s class of 2017. They will join

## SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is evaluating the implementation and oversight of the three ANSF literacy training program contracts. SIGAR will also assess whether the contractors provide qualified instructors and services; the extent to which CSTC-A monitored the contractors’ performance and training outcomes; and the extent to which the contracts are meeting the goal of providing basic, sustainable levels of literacy for the ANSF. For more information, see Section 2, page 35.

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16 women already at the academy who are expected to graduate in 2016. In addition, the ANA Officer's Academy—a one-year course with three entry dates per year—is expected to enroll 300–400 cadets for each class. Of those, 10% are expected to be women, according to CSTC-A.<sup>164</sup>

Several issues have impacted the ANA's ability to recruit women. Among these are challenges to outreach and cultural barriers to women serving in the military, according to CSTC-A. Although training slots and gender-appropriate positions are available, Coalition advisors are not sure if families are still reluctant to support the recruitment of women or if the ANA leadership is not ready to recruit more women.<sup>165</sup>

The United States has assigned advisors to the MOD and the Afghan National Defense University to assist with gender integration issues. In addition, NTM-A advisors and their Afghan counterparts are working on a recruiting plan to target high school students for officer training. The plan would also include an open house “to show male family members [training] facilities to help dispel any misconceptions.”<sup>166</sup>

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$14.9 billion and disbursed \$13.5 billion of the ASFF to build, train, and sustain the ANP.<sup>167</sup>

### ANP Strength

As of February 18, 2013, CSTC-A reported the overall assigned strength of the ANP was 150,919 personnel: 103,851 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 22,029 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,592 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 3,059 in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and 7,388 students in training. This is a slight decrease of 161

TABLE 3.5

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q4 2012	Q1 2013	Quarterly Change	Q4 2012	Q1 2013	Quarterly Change
AUP	110,279	108,122	-2,157	106,235	103,851	-2,384
ABP	23,090	23,090	None	21,928	22,029	+101
ANCOP	14,541	14,541	None	14,383	14,592	+209
NISTA <sup>a</sup>	-	9,000	None	5,953	7,388	+1,435
<b>ANP Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>154,753</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>148,499</b>	<b>147,860</b>	<b>-639</b>
CNPA	-	2,247	-	2,581	3,059	+478
<b>ANP + CNPA Total</b>	<b>157,000<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>157,000<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>None</b>	<b>151,080</b>	<b>150,919</b>	<b>-161</b>

Notes: Q4 2012 data is as of 11/20/2012. Q1 2013 data is as of 2/18/2013

<sup>a</sup> Personnel in training

<sup>b</sup> Total ANP authorized figures are higher than the sum of the AUP, ABP and ANCOP. It was unclear if other components were included in the ANP total.

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/1/2012, 1/2/2012, and 1/4/2013.

personnel since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.5. ANP personnel (those not in training) include 25,171 officers, 44,709 NCOs, and 74,151 patrolmen.<sup>168</sup>

## ANP Sustainment

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$4.8 billion and disbursed \$4.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.<sup>169</sup>

As part of sustainment funding, the United States has provided the ANP with ammunition at a cost of approximately \$288 million, according to CSTC-A.<sup>170</sup>

## ANP Salaries

From 2008 through March 31, 2013, the U.S. government had provided \$818 million through the ASFF to pay ANP salaries and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported. However, that number does not include non-ASFF funds. Since 2002, the United States has provided more than \$950 million through the LOTFA to support the ANP. The United States also provided \$51.5 million outside of LOTFA for Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries and incentives.<sup>171</sup>

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$628.1 million per year to fund salaries (\$265.7 million), incentives (\$224.2 million), and food (\$138.2 million).<sup>172</sup>

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

The U.S. effort to equip the ANP is coming to an end; only \$8.8 million worth of weapons and vehicles (0.2% of the total funding for ANP equipment) are yet to be procured, as shown in Table 3.6.<sup>173</sup>

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.5 billion of the ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.<sup>174</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment.<sup>175</sup> More than 82% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Figure 3.31.

TABLE 3.6

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$366,108,080	\$2,853,472
Vehicles	\$2,643,049,123	\$5,960,454
Communications Equipment	\$201,958,600	\$0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$3,211,115,803</b>	<b>\$8,813,926</b>


Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

## SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR will assess the ANP's logistics capacity for petroleum, oil, and lubricants. The audit focuses on two main issues: accuracy of fuel requirements, and accountability for fuel purchases. For more information, see Section 2, page 34.

FIGURE 3.31

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT PROCURED, AS OF MARCH 31, 2013 (PERCENT)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

## SIGAR INSPECTION

This quarter, SIGAR completed an inspection of the construction of the ANP Main Road Security Company compound in Kunduz. SIGAR found that the project is behind schedule and may not be sustainable. For more information, see Section 2, page 36.

FIGURE 3.32

### COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2013 (\$ BILLIONS)

Total Cost: \$3.0 (763 Projects)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2013.

## ANP Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.5 billion and disbursed \$2.3 billion of the ASFF for ANP infrastructure.<sup>176</sup> As of March 31, 2013, the United States had completed 495 infrastructure projects (valued at \$1.57 billion), with another 246 projects ongoing (\$1.30 billion) and 22 planned (\$157 million), according to CSTC-A, and shown in Figure 3.32.<sup>177</sup>

As with the ANA, the U.S. effort to provide ANP infrastructure is coming to an end. In total, nearly 95% of funding for ANP infrastructure has gone to projects now completed or ongoing. Only 22 planned projects (those valued at \$157 million) remain. This is the final 5% of U.S. funding for ANP infrastructure projects.<sup>178</sup>

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were regional police-training centers in Kandahar (at a cost of \$62.3 million) and Herat (\$62.2 million), and administrative facilities at the MOI Headquarters (\$59.5 million).<sup>179</sup>

All \$50 million of the DOD's FY 2013 ASFF budget request for ANP infrastructure was appropriated.<sup>180</sup>

## ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.1 billion and disbursed \$3.0 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.<sup>181</sup> This quarter, 8,034 ANP personnel were enrolled in some type of training, according to CSTC-A. Of those, 910 were training to become officers and 4,692 were training to become NCOs. Other training programs include APPF and medic training courses.<sup>182</sup>

NTM-A/CSTC-A contracts with DynCorp International to provide training, mentoring, and support services at multiple training sites around the country. The ASFF-funded contract (two-year base and one option year) is under the DOD's Foreign Military Sales case system and provides 340 mentors and trainers as well as approximately 3,000 support personnel at regional training centers and in mobile support teams. The contract value is \$1.18 billion.<sup>183</sup>

## ANP Literacy

NTM-A/CSTC-A's literacy program, which began in October 2009, seeks to achieve greater literacy rates within the ANP. The ANP's literacy program, like the ANA's, is based on a 312-hour curriculum. According to CSTC-A, in order to progress from illiteracy to functional literacy, a student may take as many as seven tests. The student's performance determines if he or she progresses to the next training level. Since the start of the program, the ANP success rates for the passing these tests were: 90% for Level 1 literacy, 90% for Level 2, and 86% for Level 3.<sup>184</sup>

Level 1 literacy provides an individual with the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At

Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At Level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials.” Since the start of the ANP literacy program, the number of ANP graduates at Level 3 was 27,251 as of March 1, 2013.<sup>185</sup>

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million. According to CSTC-A, these contractors were providing 742 literacy trainers to the ANP.<sup>186</sup>

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 290 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 152 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 300 trainers.

The number of trainers fell sharply from the 1,776 reported last quarter.<sup>187</sup> CSTC-A noted that, as with the ANA’s program, this reflected a shift from a focus on growing the program to ensuring that students in the program reach Level 3. To do this, the number of classes is being downsized “in an effort to maintain appropriate oversight and to ensure that those students already in the program are making progress” toward that goal.<sup>188</sup> CSTC-A said responsibility for literacy training for ANP personnel in the field will transition to the ANP between July 1, 2013, and July 1, 2014. Literacy training at ANP training centers is expected to transition by April 2014. In the meantime, a new contract is being coordinated to provide training for Afghan literacy trainers ahead of the transition.<sup>189</sup>

## Women in the ANP

As of February 20, 2013, ANP personnel included 1,489 women—226 officers, 605 NCOs, and 658 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A. This is an increase of 32 since last quarter. The ANP currently has 2,995 authorized positions for women in the ANP.<sup>190</sup> The goal is for the ANP to recruit 5,000 women by March 2014.<sup>191</sup> During this reporting period, women made up less than 1% of the ANP.

The MOI is planning a conference for May 2013 to gain support from religious leaders and the community for recruiting women into the ANP—an effort the United States supports—according to CSTC-A. In addition, a U.S. advisor from NTM-A/CSTC-A is mentoring the MOI’s Human Rights, Gender, and Child Rights Directorate. CSTC-A noted that the U.S. Embassy Kabul has integrated these efforts into its gender strategy, which is based on four focus areas:<sup>192</sup>

- access to justice and security
- leadership and civic engagement

- economic development
- education and health

This strategy is aligned with the Afghan government's priorities outlined in the National Action Plan for Women and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. These efforts also support other strategies such as the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and U.S. Civilian Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan.<sup>193</sup>

## **ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE**

As of the end of this quarter, the ANSF health care system had 915 physicians—an increase of 169 since last quarter—out of 1,056 needed, according to CSTC-A. Of these, 706 were assigned to the ANA and 209 were assigned to the ANP. The ANSF had 6,821 other medical personnel (including nurses and medics)—a decrease of 731 since last quarter—out of 9,840 needed.<sup>194</sup>

## **REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

From 2002 through 2013, the U.S. Department of State has provided nearly \$260 million in funding for weapons destruction and de-mining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, the Department of State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, the United Nations Mine Action Service, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable the clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war, support the removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct improvised explosive devices, and provide mentoring to the Afghan government's Department of Mine Clearance.<sup>195</sup>

From January 1 through December 31, 2012, Department of State-funded implementing partners cleared nearly 41 million square meters of minefields, according to the most recent data from the PM/WRA.<sup>196</sup> An estimated 570 million square meters of contaminated areas remain to be cleared, as shown in Table 3.7. The PM/WRA defines a "minefield" as an area contaminated by landmines, and a "contaminated area" as an area contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war.<sup>197</sup>

## **COUNTERNARCOTICS**

Despite efforts by the international community and the Afghan government to reduce poppy cultivation and illicit drug trafficking, Afghanistan still

TABLE 3.7

<b>CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2012</b>						
<b>Date Range</b>	<b>AT/AP Destroyed</b>	<b>UXO Destroyed</b>	<b>SAA Destroyed</b>	<b>Fragments Cleared</b>	<b>Minefields Cleared (m2)</b>	<b>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m2)</b>
1/1–3/31/2012	2,113	62,043	467,071	3,364,885	14,604,361	585,000,000
4/1–6/30/2012	1,559	28,222	20,580	3,601,378	7,251,257	563,000,000
7/1–9/30/2012	5,542	165,100	121,520	2,569,701	11,830,335	550,000,000
10/1–12/31/2012	2,146	62,449	22,373	3,672,661	7,265,741	570,000,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,370</b>	<b>317,814</b>	<b>631,544</b>	<b>13,208,625</b>	<b>40,951,694</b>	<b>(remaining) 570,000,000</b>

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/3/2013.

produces about 90% of the world’s opium. The illicit trade also funds the insurgency. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy strives to cut off the flow of money to the insurgency through interdiction operations.

As of March 31, 2013, the United States had appropriated \$6.4 billion for counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since efforts began in 2002. Most of these funds were appropriated through two sources: State’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$3.6 billion), and the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) fund (\$2.7 billion).<sup>198</sup>

DOD and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) coordinate to support the counternarcotics efforts of the MOI and the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), INL stated. For example, in some provinces, DOD funded the construction of forward operating bases used by the CNPA’s National Interdiction Unit; INL funded the maintenance of those bases.<sup>199</sup>

## UNODC Opium Risk Assessment 2013

This quarter, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its 2013 Opium Risk Assessment of Afghanistan. UNODC expects poppy cultivation to increase in most regions and the main poppy-growing provinces. Overall, 12 provinces are expected to increase their poppy cultivation and one is expected to decrease. Another 14 are expected to maintain their status as poppy free and seven poppy-cultivating provinces are not expected to see a change in their status in 2013. Notably, increases in Helmand and Kandahar are expected due to the current high price of opium and because of a low opium yield in 2012. UNODC warned that some provinces may lose their poppy-free status if timely eradication is not implemented. UNODC also noted a “worrying situation” in the southern, eastern, western, and central regions where poppy cultivation is expected to expand in areas where it had previously existed and also in “new areas or in areas where poppy cultivation was stopped.”<sup>200</sup>

UNODC noted that “a strong association between insecurity, lack of agricultural assistance and opium cultivation continues to exist.” Villages with poor security, those that had not received agricultural assistance in the past year, and those that had not been reached by anti-poppy awareness campaigns, were significantly more likely to grow poppy. Unlike previous years, farmers frequently reported fear of eradication as a reason for not cultivating poppy.<sup>201</sup>

## Poppy Eradication

INL provides financial support to the Afghan government’s Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program. INL said 9,672 hectares of poppy were eradicated in 2012 through the GLE program.<sup>202</sup>

INL also works with the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces. For example, INL funds the MCN’s Good Performer’s Initiative (GPI) which gives incentives for governors to reduce poppy cultivation in their provinces. According to INL, a province becomes eligible for \$1 million in GPI development projects if it is deemed poppy-free or has fewer than 100 hectares under cultivation during the year. In 2012, the number of provinces that qualified for GPI awards was 17, the same number as in 2011. INL noted that since the start of the GPI in 2007, more than 100 development projects—including the construction of schools, roads, bridges, and agricultural and medical facilities—are either complete or in progress in 33 provinces.<sup>203</sup>

INL also funds the Counternarcotics Public Information program to promote continued poppy-free status in provinces through nationwide pre-planting season public awareness and media campaigns in poppy-growing areas. In addition, INL funds a grant to the Aga Khan Foundation, which focuses on helping six key provinces maintain success in eliminating poppy cultivation by working with communities and local NGOs to increase opportunities for residents to find non-narcotics-related jobs.<sup>204</sup>

## Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan

This quarter, the number of personnel assigned to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was 3,059, according to CSTC-A.<sup>205</sup>

NTM-A and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) provide mentors and advisors to the CNPA. According to CSTC-A, NTM-A provides 16 advisors and the DEA provided 33 counternarcotics trainers (of which 20 are in country at a time). According to CSTC-A, a U.S. company provides 37 staff to assist the CNPA.<sup>206</sup> In addition, INL funds the training of the CNPA’s National Interdiction Unit and DOD funds the Special Mission Wing (which is also supported by INL helicopters). DOD also funds programs to improve the CNPA’s Tactical Operations Center/Intelligence Fusion Center which targets drug trafficking networks.<sup>207</sup>

### SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR will determine the extent to which U.S. assistance provides responsive air-mobility support for drug interdiction operations, assess U.S. government agencies’ oversight of their assistance to the Afghan Special Missions Wing, and evaluate the extent to which U.S. assistance has resulted in developing a sustainable capability to provide air-mobility support for counternarcotics efforts. For more information, see Section 2, page 33.

INL supports the interdiction activities of the CNPA's National Interdiction Unit and Special Investigative Unit by providing investigative and strategic mentoring, logistics, housing, food, and fuel, as well transportation to and from interdiction operation sites.<sup>208</sup>

## Interdiction Operations

From January 1 through March 28, 2013, the ANSF partnered with the United States and ISAF to conduct 50 interdiction operations—partnered patrols, cordon and search operations, and deliberate detention operations—according to DOD. These operations resulted in 57 detentions and led to the seizure of several thousand kilograms of narcotics and narcotics-related chemicals. Since 2008, a total of 1,650 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,245 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:<sup>209</sup>

- 730,076 kg of hashish
- 346,059 kg of opium
- 43,432 kg of morphine
- 25,308 kg of heroin
- 412,082 kg of narcotics-related chemicals

The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support in addition to on-ground quick-reaction assistance, according to DOD. DEA mentored specialized units throughout the country to establish investigative and law enforcement capability. In addition, the U.S. intelligence community provided targeting and analytical support to the Coalition mentors.<sup>210</sup>

As in past quarters, most interdiction activities continued to occur in the south and southwest, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. According to DOD, Afghan forces in these areas increasingly led patrols and military operations. DOD noted that Afghan specialized units, aided by their Coalition mentors, synchronized their investigations with conventional military operations to target traffickers with ties to the insurgency.<sup>211</sup>

Conventional and specialized Afghan units continued to execute operations with support from interagency elements, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC). CJIATF-N and IOCC integrate information from various military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt narco-insurgent elements. According to DOD, all operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders.<sup>212</sup>