

SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events This Quarter	81
Security Environment	86
U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan	87
ANSF Strength	87
Afghan Local Police	88
Afghan Public Protection Force	89
ANSF Assessments	89
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Assessments	91
Afghan National Army	92
Afghan National Police	97
ANSF Medical/Health Care	101
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	101
Counternarcotics	102

SECURITY

As of August 31, 2013, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$54.3 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$52.8 billion) were appropriated through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Its purpose is to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$52.8 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$47.0 billion had been obligated and \$43.5 billion disbursed as of August 31, 2013.⁶³

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges to transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Key issues and events this quarter include continuing U.S. and Afghan concerns over ANSF casualties, a tentative new U.S.-Afghan bilateral security agreement, the appointment of a new Afghan Minister of Interior, the withdrawal of German forces from Kunduz, the ongoing process of transition to Afghan-led security, release of the latest U.S. Civil-Military Strategic framework, and the implementation of a new process to assess the readiness of the ANSF.

ANSF Casualties and Attrition

Senior U.S. and Afghan officials expressed continuing concern this quarter about the high number of ANSF casualties and their effect on the forces. In a September 2013 media interview, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Joseph Dunford, reportedly stated, “I’m not assuming that those casualties are sustainable.”⁶⁴ According to the news article, General Dunford said the ANSF are losing too many people and may need up to five years of support before they can fight on their own.⁶⁵

In addition, according to media reports, Afghanistan's new Interior Minister, Umar Daudzai, said in a September 2 speech, "In the last six months of this (Islamic calendar) year 1,792 Afghan policemen have lost their lives and over 2,700 were wounded."⁶⁶ During a press briefing last quarter, General Dunford said, "Afghan casualties are among my top concerns," and noted that the ANSF was "suffering in some cases 100 or 120 killed in action in a week."⁶⁷

The Department of Defense's (DOD) July 2013 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, said the ANSF is near its end-strength goal of 352,000 personnel and "is conducting almost all operations independently" resulting in lower ISAF casualties.⁶⁸ However, that report also showed a rise in the number of ANSF killed in action since 2010. In March 2013 (the latest date available in the DOD report), more than 300 ANSF were killed. DOD noted that ANSF casualties are based on ISAF operational reporting, which "is expected to under-represent the actual number of ANSF casualties."⁶⁹

This quarter, SIGAR requested an update on ANSF casualties; however, the response the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) provided was classified.⁷⁰ DOD has reported Afghan casualty trends in past reports but does not report specific Afghan casualty numbers.

In his September 2013 report on Afghanistan, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General noted that "the number of casualties [the ANSF] endure has risen considerably."⁷¹ According to the Secretary-General, more than 3,500 Afghan military personnel were reportedly wounded or killed in action, during the second quarter of this year. The MOI reported that 299 ANP personnel were killed between mid-May and mid-June—a 22% increase over the same period in 2012. The Secretary-General also said that insider attacks were still a problem. Between May 16 and August 15, there were two such attacks against Coalition forces in Kandahar and Paktika, for which the Taliban took responsibility, and five attacks involving Afghan forces in Herat, Helmand, and Kunar.⁷²

The Secretary-General also cited ongoing problems with large-scale unauthorized absences—mainly in the ANA—with attrition, from all causes, as high as 2.4% per month.⁷³ According to the latest numbers from CSTC-A, in August 2013, the ANA's attrition was 2.4% and the ANP's was 1.5%. From September 2011 through August 2013, the ANA's monthly attrition rate has averaged 2.5%, but has reached as high as 4.1% in January 2013; the ANP's has averaged 1.3% and has reached as high as 1.9% in October 2011 and again in July 2013.⁷⁴

ANA personnel absent without leave (AWOL) were also a problem. According to CSTC-A, 8,797 personnel—or 5.3% of the ANA—were AWOL during its most recent tally in August 2013.⁷⁵ Although SIGAR also requested the number of ANP personnel who were AWOL, CSTC-A did not provide that data.

Bilateral Security Agreement

On October 11, Secretary of State John Kerry met with President Karzai in Kabul to negotiate a bilateral security agreement (BSA) to determine the status and role of U.S. forces who stay in Afghanistan after their combat mission ends in 2014. According to State, the two sides shared ideas and concerns regarding an agreement. At an October 12 joint press conference, President Karzai said that he and Secretary Kerry agreed that the United States will not conduct counterterrorism operations by itself but with Afghan forces, will provide a written guarantee for the safety of the Afghan people from home invasion, and clearly commit to respect and honor the nation's sovereignty. However, President Karzai said the question of whether Afghanistan will accept the U.S. demand that the remaining U.S. troops be under the jurisdiction of U.S. military courts and not Afghan courts will be decided by a grand council of elders, or Loya Jirga, to be called at the end of November. If the Loya Jirga approves immunity for U.S. troops, then the agreement goes to Afghanistan's parliament for approval.⁷⁶ The United States and Afghanistan have been negotiating a BSA since November 15, 2012.⁷⁷

In an October media interview, President Obama said he prefers that the ANSF handle Afghanistan's security needs, but recognized that they are not yet ready to take on full responsibility. According to the media account, he would consider leaving behind some troops in a training and advisory capacity, but believes a BSA is required to ensure protection for U.S. troops who stay behind.⁷⁸


In previous statements, President Karzai has indicated his wish to see U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of international forces at the end of 2014. He has stressed that any deal should "preserve the national interests of Afghanistan."⁷⁹

New Minister of Interior

On September 1, 2013, President Karzai named Umar Daudzai as the new Minister of Interior; Daudzai was formally appointed on September 25, according to media reports.⁸⁰ Daudzai, Afghanistan's former ambassador to Pakistan, replaced Ghulam Majtaba Patang, who lost a vote of confidence in the Afghan parliament less than a year after his appointment for failing to improve security conditions.⁸¹

German Troops Leave Kunduz

German forces handed over command of their base in Kunduz to Afghan forces in an October 6 ceremony attended by Germany's defense and foreign ministers, according to a German media report. All 900 German troops in Kunduz are expected to withdraw by the end of October.⁸² Germany has been the lead nation for security in nine northern Afghan provinces. As of August 1, a total of 4,400 German troops were serving in Afghanistan.⁸³



Secretary of State Kerry holds press conference with President Karzai on the BSA at the Presidential Palace in Kabul on October 12, 2013. (State photo)

According to German media, many Kunduz residents are worried about the security environment following the withdrawal of German forces.⁸⁴

Transition Progress

Since last quarter, all five geographic “tranches” of Afghanistan were transitioning to ANSF-led security. By December 2014, the transition process will be complete and the ANSF will be fully responsible for security in Afghanistan, according to DOD.⁸⁵

During the transition process, ISAF will continue to engage in combat operations where necessary through 2014, and will remain committed to support the ANSF with key “enablers” like air, aviation, medical support, intelligence, counter-IED, signal, and logistics, according to DOD. However, the ANSF will be responsible for day-to-day execution of operations. The ANSF also will plan, prepare, and execute counterinsurgency operations with advice and enabler support provided by their Security Force Assistance Teams. The Afghan government, principally through its security ministries, will provide direction and policy for operations.⁸⁶

DOD says ISAF will retain military assets in or near transitioning areas to ensure that security is properly maintained, and continue to provide the ANSF with training, advising, and assistance support. As ANSF capabilities improve, the level of ISAF support will be adjusted, allowing ANSF to take on greater responsibility.⁸⁷

U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

In August, DOD and State released the latest revision of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The framework, which replaces an October 2012 version, provides strategic guidance for all American civilian and military personnel serving in Afghanistan and outlines U.S. priorities through what the framework calls the “transformation decade” of 2015–2024.⁸⁸ The United States has two goals in Afghanistan: disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates and strengthen Afghanistan so it can never again be a haven for terrorists.⁸⁹

Security is the foundation of the framework, necessary to enable progress in the governance, rule of law, and economic development sectors. According to the framework, the role of the United States is changing as ISAF transitions security responsibility to the Afghans. U.S. and Coalition forces will shift to supporting the ANSF, setting the conditions for the U.S. government to focus on governance and development in the transformation decade.⁹⁰

In developing the revised framework, U.S. planners made several assumptions, including the following security-sector assumptions:⁹¹

- The Afghan government’s strategic goals remain generally congruent with U.S. goals in Afghanistan through the transformation decade.

- The U.S. and Afghan governments will negotiate and conclude a bilateral security agreement and NATO will conclude a status of forces agreement with the Afghan government to define long-term security partnerships beyond 2014.
- There will be a NATO train, advise, and assist mission at the end of the ISAF mandate.
- Afghan government revenue generation will not cover operating expenditures, including increased security spending, and development costs until sometime after 2025.

That last point is significant because it indicates that Afghanistan will need to rely on international assistance if it is to fund its government and security forces for at least another 12 years.

Implementation of New ANSF Assessment Process

This quarter, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) stated that, as of August 15, a new reporting mechanism would be used to assess the ANSF. The new Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) is the third assessment tool used by ISAF to rate the ANSF since 2005.⁹²

The first was the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. SIGAR audited the CM rating system in 2010 and found that it had not provided reliable or consistent assessments of ANSF capabilities, had overstated ANSF operational capabilities, had inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF development, and had included outdated data. Moreover, ANSF units given a top rating using the rating system were not capable of sustaining independent operations. IJC concurred or partially concurred with all ten of SIGAR's recommendations at the conclusion of the audit report.⁹³

In April 2010, during the course of SIGAR's audit, IJC replaced the CM rating system with the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).⁹⁴ Since the implementation of the CUAT, SIGAR has tracked assessments of the ANSF in the security section of its quarterly reports. Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments also provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security.

Last year, SIGAR initiated an audit of the CUAT in order to rate its effectiveness as an assessment tool. That audit will be released next quarter. Due to implementation of the new RASR assessment process, SIGAR could not use and compare CUAT reports for assessing the progress of the ANSF in this report. For more information on the RASR assessment tool, see "ANSF Assessments" later in this section of the report, page 89.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is examining the methods and tools used to measure and evaluate the ANSF's operational effectiveness, including the extent to which these methods and tools are consistently applied, reliable, and validated.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

From May 16 to August 15, the UN recorded 5,922 security incidents—an 11% increase compared with the same period in 2012, but a 21% decrease from 2011. Armed clashes and improvised explosive devices constituted the majority of events (4,534 or 77% of the total). Insurgents also focused on attacking security checkpoints and bases that Coalition forces had handed over to Afghan forces. According to the UN Secretary-General, the ANSF was generally effective in protecting key urban and district administrative centers as well as strategic transport routes. As in previous quarters, the southern, southeastern, and eastern provinces accounted for the most security incidents (69% between May 16 and August 15).⁹⁵

The Secretary-General also said that insurgents conducted a number of “spectacular” attacks in urban areas during the same reporting period. From May 16 to August 15, there were 33 suicide incidents—seven in Kabul—compared to seven for all of 2012 and 16 in 2011. On August 3, in Jalalabad, Nangarhar, the Indian Consulate was the target of a complex suicide attack; all casualties were Afghan security personnel and civilians.⁹⁶

Attack on U.S. Consulate in Herat

On September 13, Taliban militants attacked the U.S. Consulate in Herat. Killed in the attack were three Afghans guards and an interpreter; nearly 20 people were wounded, none were American.⁹⁷ According to State, the attackers began by detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in front of the U.S. Consulate, damaging the outer gate. The attackers then fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the Consulate and detonated



U.S. Army soldiers react to potential threat at the U.S. Consulate in Herat on September 19, 2013. (DOD photo)

another VBIED. Consulate security personnel “neutralized several suicide bombers attempting to breach the compound.” Although the front gate was damaged, the Consulate’s interior compound was not breached.⁹⁸

Civilian Casualties

In a July 2013 report, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that civilian deaths and injuries were 23% higher in the first six months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. UNAMA documented 3,852 civilian casualties—1,319 deaths and 2,533 injuries—from January to June 2013, a 14% increase in deaths and 28% increase in injuries. According to UNAMA, this rise in civilian casualties reverses the decline in 2012, and marks a return to the high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. UNAMA attributed 74% of civilian casualties to “Anti-Government Elements,” 9% to “Pro-Government Forces”, and 12% to engagements between those combatants. The remaining 4% were unattributed, caused mainly by the explosion of abandoned or as-yet-unexploded ordnance.⁹⁹

U.S. AND COALITION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to CENTCOM, 64,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of September 30, 2013. Of those, approximately 1,600 were assigned to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/CSTC-A.¹⁰⁰ In addition, approximately 27,000 non-U.S. international troops were serving in Afghanistan as of October 1, 2013.¹⁰¹ Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,143 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,334 were wounded as of October 1, 2013.¹⁰²

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 336,587 (183,434 assigned to the ANA and Afghan Air Force, and 153,153 assigned to the ANP), according to data provided by CSTC-A.¹⁰³ The ANSF’s assigned strength includes personnel in training and cadets, as well as both personnel in the field (engaged in combat operations) and those who were “in barracks.” SIGAR requested the number of personnel who were sick or on leave, but CSTC-A did not identify those personnel separately in their response. The assigned strength is short of the goal to have an end strength of 352,000 ANSF personnel—195,000 in the ANA and Air Force and 157,000 in the ANP—by October 2012 that was given in DOD’s April 2012 report on *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*.¹⁰⁴ DOD revised this goal to 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014) when that end-strength was not met.¹⁰⁵ Neither the ANA nor the ANP met their end-strength goal by the revised deadline, as shown in Table 3.2 on the following page.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of data for the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained.

TABLE 3.2

ANSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH, AUGUST 20, 2013			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 5/2013	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	176,818	-10,182
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	153,153	-3,847
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,616	-1,384
ANSF Total	352,000	336,587	-15,413

Sources: DOD, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2013.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

This quarter, 24,286 personnel were assigned to the Afghan Local Police (ALP), according to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). As of September 30, 2013, the United States has obligated \$152.7 million and expended \$150 million of ASFF funds to support the ALP. The ALP is scheduled to reach 30,000 members in December 2014. At that strength, the ALP is estimated to cost \$117 million per year—including \$68 million in salaries—to sustain in fiscal years (FY) 2015 to 2018, according to USFOR-A.¹⁰⁶ DOD said a 30,000-strong ALP will cost \$180 million a year.¹⁰⁷

According to DOD, the ALP has demonstrated an ability to defend villages against insurgents and also coordinate with Afghan civil and military authorities. DOD reported the ALP battled enemy forces up to ten times more often than other Afghan security forces and successfully defended its positions over 80% of the time.¹⁰⁸ In his September 2013 report, the UN Secretary-General said the ALP has “borne an increasingly disproportionate brunt of attacks by anti-government elements.”¹⁰⁹ The Taliban have attempted on many occasions to infiltrate the ALP. However, DOD maintains the ALP has shown a unique resistance to this form of pressure due to the fact that its members are from the villages they protect and quickly recognize outside infiltrators. In addition, DOD said that during the first part of this current fighting season, the ALP has often been successful in coordinating with the Afghan government (at the district and provincial level) and with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) to defend their communities against Taliban aggression.¹¹⁰

The ALP program’s primary challenge is the MOI’s ability to properly support and manage the ALP as a pillar under the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), according to DOD. The NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and the MOI have implemented an initiative to meet immediate ALP support requirements and to build an enduring logistics and support capacity for the ALP in the MOI.¹¹¹

In an October 7 Afghan media report, members of the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house of the Afghan parliament, criticized the ALP over alleged unauthorized activities. The senators urged the ALP’s integration with the national police force.¹¹²

AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI that provides security services in Afghanistan. Following President Karzai's 2010 announcement to disband private security companies (PSCs) and transfer protection responsibilities to the APPF, the Afghan government implemented a bridging strategy for a phased transition to the public security company.¹¹³

As part of that strategy, security for development and humanitarian projects would transition from PSC responsibility to the APPF by March 20, 2012.¹¹⁴ Security for military installations was scheduled to be transferred to the APPF in March 2013. In October 2012, however, IJC told SIGAR that meeting the deadline was "extremely unlikely."¹¹⁵ As of September 30, 2013, only three military forward operating bases (FOBs) were secured by APPF personnel; 47 FOBs were still secured by PSCs.¹¹⁶

The APPF recruits officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the ANP. New recruits attend courses on facility, convoy, and personal security at the APPF Regional Training Center. And in some cases, trained guards also transition directly from private security companies into the APPF. According to the most recent assessment of the APPF, they are "partially capable of conducting full spectrum security services with coalition support," according to CSTC-A. The United States has provided more than \$51 million to support the APPF.¹¹⁷

As of September 30, 2013, the APPF comprised 19,612 personnel, according to CSTC-A. APPF numbers are not counted as ANSF.¹¹⁸

ANSF ASSESSMENTS

In prior quarterly reports, SIGAR has tracked the progress of the ANSF using the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) provided by DOD or IJC. However, the IJC's latest data is based on a new assessment mechanism, the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR). According to IJC, the RASR is a "holistic intelligence, operational, and sustainment assessment and reporting mechanism" of the ANSF.¹¹⁹ The RASR will use new rating definition levels (RDLs), based upon ANSF capabilities, to assess ANSF units at the brigade level.¹²⁰ The RDLs for the RASR are different than those used in the CUAT, as shown in Figure 3.23. According to IJC, the previously used RDLs "conflate the relationship/reliance of ANSF on Coalition forces, rather than describing actual ANSF unit capabilities." IJC also said the adjustment was needed as Coalition forces drawdown and ISAF loses the ability to advise and observe previously partnered ANSF units.¹²¹

The new RDLs use a simplified assessment matrix that is tailored to the specific unit type (e.g. infantry, intelligence, signals) and identify the capabilities a unit must possess in order to be assessed "fully capable."

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit report released at the end of last quarter found that the transition to APPF-provided security has had a minimal effect on projects, but only because implementing partners hired risk management companies to fill APPF capacity gaps and perform critical functions.

FIGURE 3.23

CHANGES IN RATING DEFINITION LEVELS

CUAT	RASR
Independent with Advisors	Fully Capable
Effective with Advisors	Capable
Effective with Partners	Partially Capable
Developing with Partners	Developing
Established	Established

Notes: CUAT rating definition levels are as of August 2011; RASR rating definition levels are as of August 2013.

Source: IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2013.

According to IJC, “this simplified system is easily observable, not as labor intensive or complex, and could form the basis of Afghan ‘self reporting’ as ISAF continues to draw down.”¹²²

Because the RASR assesses the ANSF mainly at the brigade level or higher, fewer units at the “kandak” or battalion level will be assessed. For example, in the CUAT report provided to SIGAR last quarter, 312 ANA and 515 ANP units—including both brigade-level and higher units and kandaks—were assessed using the CUAT.¹²³ The most recent RASR assessed 64 ANA and 21 ANP units.¹²⁴


And unlike CUAT reports, which were issued quarterly, the RASR is a monthly report.¹²⁵ IJC said that this could result in fluctuations as a unit may be rated “fully capable” one month, regress to “capable” and then return to “fully capable” within the same quarter.¹²⁶

According to the latest RASR report, 20 of 64 ANA units and 8 of 21 ANP units were rated “fully capable,” as shown in Figure 3.24.¹²⁷

According to the UN Secretary-General, there remains a notable shortage of logistical, air support, medical evacuation, and counter improvised explosive device (IED) capabilities within the ANSF.¹²⁸

FIGURE 3.24

RASR RATINGS OF THE ANSF, SEPTEMBER 2013



Note: The RASR Assessment provided by IJC showed 64 ANA units assessed by the RASR in September 2013. However, all ANA units in the RASR added up to 72 ANA units including those waiting to be fielded and 65 ANA units excluding those waiting to be fielded.

Source: IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2013.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

Assessments of the MOD and the MOI showed some progress and some regression this quarter. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:¹²⁹

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

At the MOD, all 46 staff sections and cross-functional areas were assessed this quarter. Of those, two progressed and four regressed. Last quarter, the Logistics Command became the first MOD office to achieve the highest rating of CM-1A (capable of autonomous operations).¹³⁰

The other offices that received a higher rating this quarter were:¹³¹

- ANA Training Command (CM-1B)
- Ministry of Defense Chief of Health Affairs (CM-2B)

The four MOD offices that regressed were the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intel Policy (fell to CM-4), Vice Chief of General Staff for the Air Force (CM-3), General Staff Logistics (CM-3), and the First Deputy Minister of Defense (CM-2A).¹³² The MOD Office for Gender Integration is still rated CM-4, meaning that it cannot accomplish its mission.¹³³

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; six progressed and none regressed since last quarter. No MOI sections were rated CM-4, as shown in Figure 3.25 on the following page. Those whose ratings increased this quarter were:¹³⁴


- Deputy Minister for Security - Afghan National Civil Order Police (CM-1A)
- Deputy Minister for Security - GDPSU (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Security - Plans and Operations (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Security - Force Readiness (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Support - Logistics (CM-2B)
- Deputy Minister for Support - Facilities and Installations (CM-2B)

As of this quarter, two MOI staff sections had achieved the highest rating of CM-1A (capable of autonomous operations): the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office and the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police.¹³⁵

SECURITY

FIGURE 3.25

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY CHANGE



Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2013; CSTC-A responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2013 and 10/1/2013.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$31 billion and disbursed \$29.1 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANA.¹³⁶

ANA Strength

As of August 21, 2013, the overall strength of the ANA was 183,434 personnel (176,818 Army and 6,616 Air Force), according to CSTC-A. This is a decrease of 1,853 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.3. The total includes 13,717 trainees, students, and those awaiting assignment, as well as 4,736 cadets. According to CSTC-A, the ANA includes 8,698 civilians (both ANA and Air Force personnel) in determining its end strength.¹³⁷ SIGAR's reporting of ANA's end strength does not include these civilians, but does count unassigned military personnel and cadets.

ANA Sustainment

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$10.8 billion and disbursed \$10.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.¹³⁸

As part of sustainment funding, the United States has provided the ANA with ammunition at a cost of approximately \$1.15 billion, according to CSTC-A.¹³⁹

TABLE 3.3

ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Quarterly Change	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	17,638	18,130	+492	18,116	18,636	+520
203rd Corps	20,002	20,798	+796	20,288	20,220	-68
205th Corps	18,287	19,097	+810	19,351	19,331	-20
207th Corps	14,097	14,879	+782	14,279	13,753	-526
209th Corps	14,236	15,004	+768	13,371	14,681	+1,310
215th Corps	16,733	17,555	+822	17,447	17,640	+193
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	8,619	9,492	+873
Special Operations Force	12,238	11,013	-1,225	10,970	10,925	-45
Echelons Above Corps ^a	38,773	36,275	-2,498	33,685	33,687	+2
TTHS ^b	-	-	-	22,700 ^c	18,453 ^d	-4,247
ANA Total	161,218	161,925	+707	178,826	176,818	-2,008
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	7,097	None	6,461	6,616	+155
ANA + AAF Total	168,315	169,022	+707	185,287	183,434	-1,853

Notes: Q2 data is as of 5/21/2013; Q3 data is as of 8/20/2013.

^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel

^c Includes 4,667 cadets

^d Includes 4,736 cadets

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 7/2/2013 and 10/1/2013.

ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of September 30, 2013, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided nearly \$1.9 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2008. According to CSTC-A, \$420 million was provided for these purposes between July and September 2013.¹⁴⁰ However, this raised a question about the cumulative total of \$1.9 billion, as CSTC-A last quarter reported a cumulative total of \$1.8 billion.¹⁴¹ CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for the base salaries, bonuses, and incentives of a 195,000-person ANA at \$931 million.¹⁴² This is a 36% increase over the \$686 million estimate reported last quarter.¹⁴³

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$11.2 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.¹⁴⁴ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, communications equipment, and aircraft and aviation-related equipment. Nearly 79% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.4 on the following page. The United States has also procured nearly \$774 million in other equipment such as clothing and personal gear.¹⁴⁵

SIGAR AUDITS

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that CSTC-A was placing orders for vehicle spare parts without accurate information on what parts were needed or were already in stock. CSTC-A relies on the ANA to maintain records of vehicle spare parts availability and future requirements. However, the ANA has not been consistently updating its inventory. For more information, see Section 2, page 30.

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that DOD was moving forward with a \$771.8 million purchase of aircraft for the SMW despite the SMW having less than one-quarter of the personnel needed, facing steep recruitment and training challenges, and lacking the ability to maintain its current aircraft fleet.

TABLE 3.4

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$447,161,951	\$26,819,942
Vehicles	\$3,955,027,637	\$0
Communications Equipment	\$609,320,331	\$0
Total	\$5,011,509,919	\$26,819,942

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2013.

Determining the amount and cost of equipment provided to the ANA remains a challenge. In April 2013, CSTC-A stated that the United States had procured \$878 million of weapons for the ANA.¹⁴⁶ In July 2013, CSTC-A stated that the total cost for weapons was actually \$623 million due to a \$153 million correction in the total cost of some equipment and accounting for nearly \$102 million in donated equipment that was not U.S.-funded.¹⁴⁷ This quarter, CSTC-A stated that the actual total cost of weapons procured for the ANA was \$447 million. According to CSTC-A, the “decrease in the number procured from last quarter is a result of an extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted.”¹⁴⁸

CSTC-A also reduced its estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANA this quarter. In July 2013, CSTC-A stated the total cost of vehicles was \$5.56 billion.¹⁴⁹ This quarter, CSTC-A stated the actual cost of vehicles procured was \$3.96 billion. According to CSTC-A, the “decrease in total cost from last quarter [was] due to actual, contracted equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing.”¹⁵⁰ The updated cost total is reflected in Table 3.4.

CSTC-A also noted that the cost of weapons remaining to be procured has increased from \$226,000 last quarter to nearly \$27 million this quarter due to increased requirements for weaponry.¹⁵¹

Afghan Air Force Aircraft Inventory

This quarter, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 105 aircraft, according to CSTC-A:¹⁵²

- 40 Mi-17s (transport helicopters)
- 11 Mi-35s (attack helicopters)
- 16 C-27As (cargo planes)
- 26 C-208s (light transport planes)
- 6 C-182s (four-person airplane trainers)
- 6 MD-530Fs (light helicopters)

However, this tally of aircraft may not accurately reflect operational capability. Last quarter, CSTC-A reported that only six Mi-35s were operational at that time.¹⁵³

SIGAR has concerns about the Afghan Air Force's reported inventory and has requested that CENTCOM confirm the status of the 16 C-27A aircraft. In March 2013, a DOD Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) official told Congress that the U.S. Air Force had stopped flying those aircraft based on DOD OIG's recommendation. At that time, a DOD initiative to replace those aircraft was underway.¹⁵⁴ In addition, SIGAR received two photos that seem to show 16 C-27A aircraft sitting unused. SIGAR is concerned that the aircraft CSTC-A reported as part of the Afghan Air Force's inventory may not be in service or may not be fit for service in the future.

CSTC-A also noted that the number of Mi-17s was reduced from 48 last quarter to 40 this quarter due to a "change in definition and 'double counting' of 10 loaned aircraft to [the Special Mission Wing]."¹⁵⁵

Still to be procured are 20 light support aircraft, nine Mi-17 helicopters, four C-130H cargo planes, and four C-27A cargo planes.¹⁵⁶ Last February, the U.S. Air Force awarded a U.S. company a \$427 million contract to deliver the 20 light support aircraft; the contract is capped at \$950 million through February 2019.¹⁵⁷

Separate from the Afghan Air Force's inventory of aircraft is the inventory of the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The SMW provides air support for Afghan Special Forces executing counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions.¹⁵⁸ This quarter, the SMW inventory consisted of 30 Mi-17 helicopters: 13 from DOD, 10 on loan from the Afghan Air Force, five from the United Kingdom, and two from Germany.¹⁵⁹

ANA Infrastructure

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$6.1 billion and disbursed \$4.7 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.¹⁶⁰ At that time, the United States had completed 242 infrastructure projects (valued at \$2.79 billion), with another 138 projects ongoing (\$2.82 billion) and 10 planned (\$106 million), according to CSTC-A. Of the ongoing projects, two new contracts (nearly \$21 million) were awarded this quarter.¹⁶¹

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were a brigade garrison for the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115.8 million), phase one of the MOD's headquarters in Kabul (\$108 million), and a brigade garrison for the 205th Corps in Kandahar (\$89.1 million).¹⁶²

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$2.9 billion and disbursed \$2.8 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.¹⁶³ This quarter, 43,942 ANA personnel were enrolled in some type of training, with 31,850 enrolled in literacy training, according to CSTC-A. In addition, 4,400 enlisted personnel were enrolled in basic warrior-training courses, 2,495 were training to become commissioned officers, and 1,302 were training to become NCOs. Other training programs include combat



Afghan Air Force personnel unload an Mi-17 out of a Russian cargo plane in Kabul on September 1, 2013. (DOD Photo)

SIGAR AUDITS

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR identified 52 construction projects that may not meet ISAF's December 2014 construction deadline and would therefore be at risk due to lack of oversight and increasing costs. In addition, SIGAR learned that CSTC-A does not track the ANSF's use of constructed facilities and cannot determine whether existing or planned facilities meet ANSF needs. For more information, see Section 2, page 25.

specialty courses such as infantry training; combat-support courses such as engineering, signals, and logistics; and courses to operate the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles known as “Humvees.”¹⁶⁴

According to CSTC-A, the United States funds a variety of contracts to train the MOD and the ANA. The largest of these are a \$256 million contract for advising, training, and supporting the MOD; a \$203 million contract to build the intelligence-collection capacity of both the ANA and ANP; and a \$76 million contract to train ANA specialized personnel to respond to IEDs and other explosive ordnance.¹⁶⁵

ANA Literacy

Since its start in 2009, NTM-A/CSTC-A’s literacy program has sought to achieve greater literacy rates within the ANA. The program is based on a 312-hour curriculum. According to CSTC-A, in order to progress from illiteracy to functional literacy, a student may take as many as seven tests. The student’s performance determines if he or she progresses to the next training level.¹⁶⁶

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At Level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials.”¹⁶⁷

As of September 30, 2013, ANA personnel who have completed a literacy program include:¹⁶⁸

- 139,360 Level 1 graduates
- 40,274 Level 2 graduates
- 37,087 Level 3 graduates

According to CSTC-A, NTM-A’s established goal to have 50,000 ANSF personnel achieve Level 3 or “functional literacy” before March 2014 was met in January 2013. However, in response to a SIGAR question that asked how many ANA personnel who had achieved Level 3 literacy were still in the ANA, CSTC-A responded: “Answers unattainable due to insufficient ANA personnel tracking and skill/education tracking systems.”¹⁶⁹

Literacy affects mission success: widespread illiteracy undermines effective training, use of technical manuals, understanding of orders, inventorying equipment, documenting operations, and other vital military functions. SIGAR is therefore concerned that no one appears to know what the overall literacy rate of the ANSF is. That requires determining the numbers of serving personnel—net of departures, casualties, or desertions—who were already literate when they joined the force and those who were not, but who have completed the Level 3 training.

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be

exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million.¹⁷⁰ According to CSTC-A, these contractors were providing 690 literacy trainers to the ANA.¹⁷¹

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 260 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 198 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 232 trainers.

CSTC-A said responsibility for literacy training for ANA personnel in the field was scheduled to transition to the ANA between October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014.¹⁷² Although CSTC-A noted that transitioning the literacy program from NTM-A to the MOD is not a primary focus. A train-the-trainers program is needed first; a contract for such a program is expected to be awarded in October with classes starting in November. Transitioning literacy training to the MOD is expected to happen after the April 5, 2014, elections.¹⁷³

Ongoing funding of the current literacy contracts through December 2014, at a cost of \$31 million, will come from the NATO Trust Fund and not ASFF, according to CSTC-A.¹⁷⁴

Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANA is increasing, but the goal for women to make up 10% of the ANA and Afghan Air Force remains distant. Despite an increase this quarter, women make up only 0.3% of the force.¹⁷⁵

This quarter, 502 women were serving in the ANA, according to CSTC-A. However, CSTC-A also provided SIGAR with a breakdown of the women serving—253 officers, 238 NCOs, 61 enlisted personnel, and 90 cadets—that would indicate a total of 642. CSTC-A noted that the “discrepancy between totals and ANA number may reflect civilians who are working in the supply chain (e.g., sewing).”¹⁷⁶ SIGAR will seek further clarification for the next quarterly report.

In the Afghan Air Force, 33 women were serving—20 officers and 13 NCOs.¹⁷⁷

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$15.6 billion and disbursed \$14.1 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANP.¹⁷⁸

ANP Strength

As of August 20, 2013, the overall strength of the ANP was 153,153 personnel, including 109,574 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,399 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,516 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 2,759 in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and 4,905 students in training, according to CSTC-A.¹⁷⁹ The total is an increase of 1,329 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.5 on the following page.

SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is evaluating the implementation and oversight of the three ANSF literacy training program contracts. SIGAR will also assess whether the contractors provide qualified instructors and services; the extent to which CSTC-A monitored the contractors’ performance and training outcomes; and the extent to which the contracts are meeting the goal of providing basic, sustainable levels of literacy for the ANSF.

TABLE 3.5

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Quarterly Change	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Quarterly Change
AUP	108,122	110,369	+2,247	108,128	109,574	+1,446
ABP	23,090	23,090	None	21,422	21,399	-23
ANCOP	14,541	14,541	None	14,515	14,516	+1
NISTA ^a	9,000	6,000	-3,000	3,779	4,905	+1,126
Other	154,753	154,000	-753	147,844	150,394	+2,550
ANP Total	2,247	2,247	None	3,059	2,759	-300
CNPA	157,000	156,247	-753	151,824 ^b	153,153	+1,329
ANP + CNPA Total	157,000	157,000	None	150,919	151,824^b	+905

Notes: Q2 data is as of 5/20/2013; Q3 data is as of 8/20/2013.

^a NISTA = personnel in training

^b CSTC-A provided total; actual sum of all ANP components and the personnel in the NISTA account was 150,903

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 7/2/2013 and 10/1/2013.

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that U.S. Central Command and CSTC-A had limited oversight of fuel purchases for the ANP, resulting in the use of higher-priced vendors and questionable costs to the U.S. government. For more information, see Section 2, page 27.

ANP Sustainment

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$5.3 billion, and disbursed \$4.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.¹⁸⁰

As part of sustainment funding, the United States has provided the ANP with ammunition at a cost of approximately \$306 million, according to CSTC-A.¹⁸¹

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through September 30, 2013, the U.S. government had provided \$907 million through the ASFF to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$628.1 million per year to fund salaries (\$265.7 million), incentives (\$224.2 million), and food (\$138.2 million).¹⁸²

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.¹⁸³ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment.¹⁸⁴ More than 85% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.6.

As with the ANA, determining the cost of equipment provided to the ANP remains a challenge. CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of U.S.-funded ANP weapons procured fell from \$369 million last quarter to \$137 million

TABLE 3.6

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$137,187,450	\$3,882,811
Vehicles	\$2,029,397,735	\$2,345,100
Communications Equipment	\$210,184,400	\$0
Total	\$2,376,769,585	\$6,227,911

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2013.

this quarter.¹⁸⁵ According to CSTC-A, the “decrease in total cost from last quarter [was] due to actual, contracted equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing.”¹⁸⁶

CSTC-A’s estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANP also decreased since last quarter. In July 2013, CSTC-A stated the total cost of vehicles was \$2.65 billion.¹⁸⁷ This quarter, CSTC-A stated the actual cost of vehicles procured was \$2.03 billion. According to CSTC-A, the “decrease in the number procured from last quarter is a result of an extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted.”¹⁸⁸ The updated cost total is reflected in Table 3.6.

ANP Infrastructure

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.4 billion and disbursed \$2.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.¹⁸⁹ At that time, the United States had completed 574 infrastructure projects (valued at \$2.02 billion), with another 165 projects ongoing (\$904 million) and 17 planned (\$75 million), according to CSTC-A. Of the ongoing projects, 19 new contracts (nearly \$5 million) were awarded this quarter.¹⁹⁰

This quarter, a regional police-training center in Herat (\$49.5 million) was completed. The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were administrative facilities (\$59.5 million) and building and utilities (\$34.3 million) at the MOI Headquarters and an ANCOP patrol station in Helmand (\$28.5 million).¹⁹¹

ANP Training and Operations

As of August 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.4 billion and disbursed \$3.1 billion of ASFF funds for ANP and MOI training and operations.¹⁹² This quarter, 8,273 ANP personnel were enrolled in some type of training, according to CSTC-A. Of those, 1,438 were training to become officers and 3,273 were training to become NCOs.¹⁹³

This quarter, the number of ANP in training increased as the ANP became more independent and took a more pro-active role in planning and executing their training, according to CSTC-A. The ANP has been reviewing overall training requirements and re-aligning courses and student numbers

SIGAR AUDIT

In an inspection report released this quarter, SIGAR found that mold, a lack of running water, and inoperable electrical systems at a district police headquarter in Kunduz Province showed that the facility is not being sustained. For more information, see Section 2, page 36.

to better meet their fielded force and professionalization needs and to deal with the problem of untrained ANP personnel assigned to the field without undergoing basic police training. CSTC-A noted that the ANP has developed a course planner and tracker, with minimal Coalition assistance, that meets ANP training needs for this year.¹⁹⁴

NTM-A/CSTC-A contracts with DynCorp International to provide training, mentoring, and support services at multiple training sites around the country. The ASFF-funded contract provides 373 mentors and trainers as well as approximately 1,225 support personnel at regional training centers and in mobile support teams. The contract value is \$1.21 billion.¹⁹⁵

ANP Literacy

NTM-A/CSTC-A's literacy program for the ANP follows the same curriculum and uses the same standards as the ANA's literacy program previously mentioned in this section. The program is based on moving students through three levels of literacy training.¹⁹⁶

As of September 30, 2013, ANP personnel who have completed a literacy program include:¹⁹⁷

- 81,170 Level 1 graduates
- 51,500 Level 2 graduates
- 33,263 Level 3 graduates

According to CSTC-A, NTM-A's goal to have 50,000 ANSF personnel achieve Level 3 or "functional literacy" before March 2014 was met in January 2013. However, in response to a SIGAR question that asked how many of ANP personnel that had achieved Level 3 literacy were still in the ANP, CSTC-A responded: "Answers unattainable due to insufficient ANP personnel tracking and skill/education tracking systems."¹⁹⁸ This fact, entailing an inability to determine the overall literacy rate of the ANP, raises the same concern discussed earlier for ANA literacy levels.

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million.¹⁹⁹ According to CSTC-A, these contractors were providing 649 literacy trainers to the ANP.²⁰⁰

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 231 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 135 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 283 trainers.

CSTC-A noted that transitioning the literacy program from NTM-A to the MOI is not a primary focus. A train-the-trainers program is needed first and a contract for such a program is expected to be awarded in October with

classes starting in November. Transitioning literacy training to the MOI is expected to happen after the 2014 elections.²⁰¹

Ongoing funding of the current literacy contracts through December 2014 was scheduled to shift from ASFF to the NATO Trust Fund on October 1, 2013, according to CSTC-A.²⁰²

Women in the ANP

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but progress has been slow toward reaching the goal to have 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of 2014. CSTC-A said that “the ANP is currently focused more on finding secure areas (i.e., positions with appropriate facilities for females) for recruits than increasing recruiting to reach this target.”²⁰³ Despite an increase this quarter, women make up only 1% of the force.

As of September 13, 2013, ANP personnel included 1,570 women—232 officers, 639 NCOs, and 699 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A.²⁰⁴ This is an increase of 366 women in two years (since August 22, 2011).²⁰⁵

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of September 30, 2013, the United States has funded construction of 174 ANSF medical facilities valued at \$134 million, and has funded \$10 million in contracts to provide the ANSF with medical training, according to CSTC-A. Since 2006, Coalition forces have procured and fielded \$36 million in ANSF medical equipment.²⁰⁶

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the ANSF health care system had 847 physicians out of 1,010 authorized. Of these, 566 were assigned to the ANA and 281 were assigned to the ANP. The ANSF had 7,360 other medical personnel (including nurses and medics) out of 10,162 needed.²⁰⁷

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Since 2002, the U.S. Department of State has provided nearly \$264 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).²⁰⁸ Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct improvised explosive devices.²⁰⁹

From July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013, State-funded implementing partners cleared nearly 33 million square meters (about 13 square miles) of minefields, according to the most recent data from the PM/WRA.²¹⁰ An estimated 537 million square meters (more than 200 square miles) of

TABLE 3.7

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JULY 1, 2012–JUNE 30, 2013						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)
7/1–9/30/2012	5,542	165,100	121,520	2,569,701	11,830,335	550,000,000
10/1–12/31/2012	2,146	62,449	22,373	3,672,661	7,265,741	570,000,000
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
Total	10,730	346,932	298,911	11,044,458	32,661,110	537,000,000

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2013.

contaminated areas remain to be cleared, as shown in Table 3.7. The PM/WRA defines a “minefield” as an area contaminated by landmines, and a “contaminated area” as an area contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war.²¹¹

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Although the U.S. has spent billions to reduce poppy cultivation and illicit drug trafficking, Afghanistan’s opium production continues to rise. The country is the world’s leading producer and cultivator of opium, accounting for 74% of global illicit opium production in 2012.²¹² The Afghan opium economy undermines U.S. reconstruction efforts by financing the insurgency and fueling corruption. According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) opium survey, an estimated 154,000 hectares of land were under poppy cultivation in 2012, an 18% increase from the previous year.²¹³

The impact of this cultivation is significant. Estimates of the magnitude of the opium economy’s size compared to Afghanistan’s licit GDP (nearly \$19 billion in 2012) range from just over 3% to as high as 11% depending on the type of data considered.²¹⁴ For example, the World Bank estimates that opium (by **farm-gate price**) is equivalent to 3.3% of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP), or as much as 7–8% if export earnings are included.²¹⁵ UNODC estimates farm-gate value is equivalent to 4% of GDP and net opium exports at 10% of GDP (11% for gross opium exports).²¹⁶

The U.S. counternarcotics (CN) strategy focuses primarily on combating the narco-insurgency nexus.²¹⁷ The main components of the strategy include U.S.-sponsored eradication, promotion of alternative livelihoods, public-awareness initiatives, and interdiction operations. As of September 30, 2013, the United States has appropriated \$6.9 billion for CN initiatives in Afghanistan since efforts began in 2002. Most of these funds were appropriated through two channels: the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$4.2 billion),

Farm-gate price: the price of the product available at the farm, excluding any separately billed transport or delivery charge.

Source: IMF, “Glossary,” 2004, p. 598.

and the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) fund (\$2.6 billion).²¹⁸

State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) bears the primary responsibility for funding Afghan-led eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public awareness programs. DOD and INL coordinate to support the CN efforts of Afghanistan.²¹⁹

Key Events

This quarter, specialized Afghan law enforcement units arrested the provincial police chief of Nimruz, Major General Mohammad Kabir Andarabi, on drug corruption and obstruction of justice charges. He was tried and convicted of obstruction of justice and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Andarabi is the highest-ranking government official arrested on drug charges to date. According to DOD, this and other high-profile arrests demonstrate the competency of vetted Afghan units to compile and use evidence against a target. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to Coalition mentors.²²⁰

Opium Cultivation


Afghanistan accounted for 64% of the global acreage devoted to poppy cultivation in 2012, according to UNODC. Poppy was cultivated in 17 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, as shown in Figure 3.26. Although eradication of poppy (by hectare) increased by 154%, poppy cultivation increased by over 50% in seven provinces, including four of Afghanistan's largest (by area) provinces in the west, as shown in Figure 3.27 on the following page. Overall, the number of hectares under cultivation increased by 18%.²²¹

The price per kilogram of opium fell in 2012 compared to the previous year. The average farm-gate price was \$180 per kilogram for fresh opium and \$241 per kilogram for dry opium in 2011. In 2012, those prices fell to \$163 and \$196 respectively. Moreover, farmers' gross income from opium per hectare fell by 57% and net income fell by 65%.²²²

Governor Led Eradication Program


INL supports the Afghan government's Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program.²²³ As of September 30, 2013, the United States has provided \$85 million for the GLE program.²²⁴ According to a September 25, 2013, report, the GLE program was responsible for eradicating 7,323 hectares in Afghanistan—a 24% decrease from 2012 when 9,672 hectares were verified as eradicated. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) attributes the decrease to the ANSF's diminished support for eradication efforts, Taliban attacks against the CNPA, cultivation in insecure and remote areas, and the hot climate this year, which meant farmers could harvest their opium crop earlier than most years. Eradication levels are verified by UNODC and the

FIGURE 3.26
OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE, 2012



Note: One hectare = about 2.5 acres.
Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012*, 5/2013, p. 14.

FIGURE 3.27
CHANGES IN OPIUM CULTIVATION LEVELS BY PROVINCE, 2011-2012



Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012*, 5/2013, p. 15.

MCN. The MCN reported that the GLE program is being used in 842 villages in 17 provinces, according to INL.²²⁵

Good Performer's Initiative

INL funds the MCN's Good Performer's Initiative (GPI), which incentivizes governors to achieve and sustain reductions in poppy cultivation.²²⁶ As of September 30, 2013, the United States has provided \$10 million for the GPI program.²²⁷ Provinces that achieve poppy-free status, reduce poppy cultivation by more than 10%, or demonstrate exemplary CN efforts receive development assistance to support local development priorities. Under the terms of the program, each year that a province achieves poppy-free status, it becomes eligible for \$1 million in GPI development projects. A province is deemed poppy-free when UNODC, in cooperation with MCN, verifies that it has fewer than 100 hectares under poppy cultivation during the year. During 2012, 17 Afghan provinces qualified for GPI poppy-free awards, the same number as in 2011. One province lost and one province gained poppy-free status from 2011 to 2012. GPI awards for 2013 have yet to be announced.²²⁸

Since the start of the GPI program in 2007, more than 200 development projects are either complete or in process in all 34 provinces. These projects include school construction, road and bridge projects, irrigation structures, farm machinery projects, and hospitals and clinic construction. INL noted that while the backlog in implementing GPI projects has been reduced substantially, the program has faced some delays as the capacity of the MCN continues to increase and the process is refined. There are also delays in implementation of construction projects due to security challenges.²²⁹

According to INL, the GPI program provides support once good performance in a province has been verified. In contrast, the GLE program provides a 10% advance based on mutually agreed upon goals, and the remaining funds are provided following verification of qualifying eradication results.²³⁰

Effect of the Coalition Drawdown on Counternarcotics Operations

DOD anticipates the ability of the CNPA and other Afghan government CN agencies to conduct CN operations in areas with decreased Coalition presence will diminish as U.S. and Coalition forces draw down. However, DOD said Afghan CN units including the Special Mission Wing, the National Interdiction Unit, and the Sensitive Investigative Unit are trained and capable units that have conducted CN operations independently or with limited U.S. and Coalition support.

DOD expects these Afghan CN units to continue to operate with a reduced Coalition presence. However DOD also recognizes that certain enabler functions currently provided by U.S. and Coalition forces—such as air support, security, and intelligence—cannot be replicated.²³¹

DOD also noted that two of the highest poppy-cultivation areas, Kandahar and Helmand, will be highly impacted by the withdrawal. These areas also have more insurgents and more entrenched narcotics networks. Poor security, a small Afghan CN security force, minimal assets, and lack of intelligence to identify opium production networks are likely to allow drug traffickers to move and operate largely unimpeded in these important provinces.²³²

According to DOD, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has advised it is closing a number of forward operating locations and significantly reducing its footprint in others, especially in southern Afghanistan.²³³ CSTC-A noted that these forward operating locations—including bases in Kunduz, Herat, and Kandahar—are being transitioned to CNPA control and will be used to launch counternarcotics operations as has been done in the past.²³⁴ However, without military support for security, intelligence, medical evacuation, and tactical air control for high-risk operations, DEA operations will center on Kabul with little ability to extend beyond the Afghan capital. This will also affect the Afghan CN forces' ability to conduct complex interdictions because DEA has directly augmented Afghan CN operational capabilities throughout the country. DOD noted that DEA's diminishing ability to operate in Afghanistan is directly related to the Coalition military drawdown and subsequent reduction of security.²³⁵

DOD also correlated the sharp decline in the interdiction of illicit drugs and drug-related chemicals from FY 2011 to FY 2013 with the military drawdown and loss of operational enablers. The largest declines were the interdictions of **precursor chemicals** (chemicals used to manufacture narcotics) by 73% and hashish by 79%. The only area to show a modest gain was the interdiction of morphine between FY 2012 and FY 2013; although nearly twice as much morphine was seized in FY 2011 than in either of the following two years. Moreover, the total number of CN operations has declined 26% between FY 2012 and FY 2013.²³⁶

With the end of 2014 combat operations, the ISAF military mission in Afghanistan will transition to the NATO-led training, advisory, and assistance Mission that has been named the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). RSM will not have the resources and capacity to support law enforcement CN missions at current levels. However, DOD stated it is committed to continuing support to U.S. law enforcement agencies for Afghan and regional CN efforts within budget constraints. According to DOD, it is working closely with U.S. interagency partners to identify law enforcement CN requirements in a post-transition environment.²³⁷

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan

This quarter, 2,759 personnel were assigned to the CNPA, according to CSTC-A. This 512 more personnel than the 2,247 personnel currently authorized for the CNPA.²³⁸

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, p. viii.

Afghan Interdiction Operations

From July 1 through September 30, 2013, the ANSF conducted 90 unilateral CN operations—routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and deliberate detention operations—according to DOD. The MOI's General Department of Police Special Units led the effort. The department participated in 17 operations that seized approximately 18,200 kg of various narcotics and precursor chemicals.²³⁹

U.S. Interdiction Operations

All U.S.-only interdiction activities occurred in south and southwest Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out. According to DOD, U.S. interdiction support remains focused on building Afghan capabilities and partnering with Afghan law enforcement. As Afghan forces have taken the lead in this area, there were only four unilateral U.S. operations.

The Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJITF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) continued working with ISAF and law enforcement mentors in building the capacity of Afghan forces. All operations were coordinated with U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.²⁴⁰

Interdiction Results

Since 2008, a total of 2,474 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,488 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:²⁴¹

- 728,886 kg of hashish
- 354,580 kg of opium
- 46,961 kg of morphine
- 25,923 kg of heroin
- 407,203 kg of precursor chemicals