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SECURITY

As of January 17, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$59 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$57.5 billion) were appropriated through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Its purpose is to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$57.5 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$47.9 billion had been obligated and \$45.4 billion disbursed as of December 31, 2013.⁸⁹

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges to transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Key issues and events this quarter include continuing U.S. concerns over the lack of a signed U.S.-Afghan bilateral security agreement, record-breaking poppy cultivation and opium production (see “Counternarcotics” in this section, page 104), and questions about the actual strength of the ANA.

Bilateral Security Agreement

The future of the U.S. and international investment in Afghanistan may rest on political events that will develop in 2014. The outcome of current efforts of the United States and Afghanistan to reach a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) on future U.S. and Coalition troop levels after the U.S. troops draw down at the end of 2014 will have a profound impact on the willingness of the United States to continue to finance reconstruction programs and on Afghanistan’s ability to maintain progress in the security, governance, and economic sectors. This quarter, the U.S. and Afghan governments reached agreement on a draft text of the BSA and a *Loya Jirga* (tribal assembly) approved the document. Nevertheless, President

Hamid Karzai has refused to sign it. According to *The Washington Post*, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham has warned the Obama Administration that President Karzai is not likely to sign a BSA before the Afghan presidential election scheduled for April.⁹⁰

The BSA would allow U.S. military trainers and counterterrorism forces to remain in Afghanistan after the end of this year.⁹¹ The size of the remaining contingent of U.S. forces has yet to be determined. According to media reports, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. has recommended a post-2014 force of 12,000 troops: 8,000 U.S. and 4,000 international. While most of these troops would support, train, and advise the ANSF, approximately 2,000 would conduct counterterrorism operations.⁹²

U.S. officials have warned that without an agreement, the United States may opt to remove all its troops after 2014, as it did in Iraq in 2011. They have also said that failure to reach an agreement could jeopardize future U.S. and international aid to Afghanistan. If the U.S. exercises the so-called zero option—leaving no troops in Afghanistan after 2014—Coalition partner nations would likely pull their remaining troops, leaving a struggling ANSF to face the insurgency alone. Moreover, billions in future aid could hang in the balance as international donors consider a growing risk to their investments.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of data for the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained. As part of this effort, SIGAR is looking at ANSF personnel “unavailable” and “present for duty” to better determine the ANSF’s operational capability.

Questions about ANA Strength and Availability

This quarter, the ANA consisted of 178,816 personnel (not counting Afghan Air Force personnel), according to data provided to CSTC-A by the ANA. Of those 126,658 personnel were assigned to the ANA’s combat forces—the ANA’s six corps, the 111th Capital Division, and Special Operations Forces. Another, 25,992 were assigned to the MOD’s general staff and intermediate commands (a decrease of 7,695 since last quarter). CSTC-A did not provide an explanation for the 30% decrease in ANA general staff and intermediate command staff, but did note that 1,139 of them were absent without leave (AWOL).⁹³

Of the 126,658 combat personnel, 9,043 were absent without leave (AWOL) and 15,915 were in training, were cadets, or were awaiting transfer to an ANA unit. The rest were “present for duty” or “unavailable.” This quarter, 62,753 personnel were “present for duty.” According to CSTC-A, the term “present for duty” corresponds to “combat strength” and refers to soldiers who are “physically parading with assigned unit, healthy, ready for orders, and [are] accounted in combat strength.”⁹⁴

Another 63,905 of them (more than 50%) were “unavailable.” The “unavailable” category includes personnel who cannot currently perform military duties because they are missing, arrested, in hospital, on training assignments, on scheduled leave, and for other reasons—but also personnel who are on duty and under ANA control, but are deployed in the field.⁹⁵ For example, according to data provided to SIGAR by CSTC-A in the course of an ongoing audit, 39,249 ANA personnel were in “combat.”⁹⁶ It was unclear

why “combat strength” does not include soldiers categorized as in “combat” who are instead categorized as “unavailable.” For a more complete listing of “unavailable” categories, see “ANA Strength” in this section, page 91.

In addition, a SIGAR audit now under way is examining the quality of personnel-numbers reporting for the ANSF, which is an important issue both for assessing the capability of the force and for verifying U.S.-funded sustainment costs that are partly a function of reported personnel numbers.

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 55,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of November 30, 2013. Of those, approximately 400 were assigned to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), 300 to CSTC-A, and 32,000 to ISAF.⁹⁷ Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,164 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,558 were wounded as of January 3, 2014.⁹⁸

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 334,852, according to data provided by CSTC-A.⁹⁹ This is short of the goal to have an end strength of 352,000 ANSF personnel by October 2012. That goal had been in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) April 2012 *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*.¹⁰⁰ When that end strength was not met, DOD revised the goal to 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014).¹⁰¹ Neither the ANA nor the ANP met their end-strength goal by the revised deadline, as shown in Table 3.6.

TABLE 3.6

ANSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH, AUGUST 20, 2013			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 12/2013	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End- Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by 12/2012	178,816	-8,184
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by 2/2013	149,466	-7,534
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by 12/2014	6,570	-1,430
ANSF Total	352,000	334,852	-17,148

Sources: DOD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013; CENTCOM, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2014.

ANSF ASSESSMENT

Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments also provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with updates on

the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security. Since August 15, 2013, ISAF has used the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.¹⁰²

SIGAR has actively monitored ANSF assessments and issued an audit report on the systems and processes used to rate ANSF capability in 2010. SIGAR is now auditing the ISAF Joint Command's (IJC) Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).¹⁰³ When the RASR replaced the CUAT, it became the third different assessment tool used to rate the ANSF since 2005.¹⁰⁴

According to IJC, the RASR is a "holistic intelligence, operational, and sustainment assessment and reporting mechanism" of the ANSF.¹⁰⁵ The RASR uses rating definition levels (RDLs), based upon ANSF capabilities, to assess ANSF units at the brigade level.¹⁰⁶ The RDLs use a simplified assessment matrix that is tailored to the specific unit type (e.g. infantry, intelligence, signals) and identifies the capabilities a unit must possess in order to be assessed "Fully Capable." According to IJC, "this simplified system is easily observable, not as labor intensive or complex [as the previous system], and could form the basis of Afghan 'self reporting' as ISAF continues to draw down."¹⁰⁷


SIGAR's ongoing audit is also looking at how the withdrawal of Coalition forces will affect ISAF's ability to accurately assess the ANSF. In addition, the audit will review ISAF plans to (1) ensure the continued collection, analysis, validation, and reporting of ANSF capability assessments and (2) address the challenges associated with having fewer advisor teams available to conduct assessments.¹⁰⁸

The RASR rates ANA brigades in six areas:¹⁰⁹

- Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 corp brigades and 2 brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 88% were "fully capable" or "capable" of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations, as shown in Figure 3.22. According to the latest RASR report, "[equipment] readiness within the ANA Ground Forces Command (GFC) continues to improve." However, attrition continues to be the major challenge for the ANA as 71% of brigades are still considered "developing" which means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month. In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated "fully capable" or "capable," including leadership (96%), command and control (100%), sustainment (88%), and training (83%).¹¹⁰

FIGURE 3.22



Note: Bde = Brigade

Source: IJC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

The RASR rates ANP components in six areas:¹¹¹

- Law Enforcement Operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition


For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 16 of 21 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones. Of the 16 that were assessed, 94% were “fully capable” or “capable” of making arrests and prosecuting those arrested, as shown in Figure 3.23 on the following page. According to the latest RASR report, “readiness within the ANP continues to be a point of concern” and “the ANP also struggles with maintaining a manageable level of equipment readiness.” In addition, attrition continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 50% of regional components are still considered “developing” which means that monthly attrition in these units is 2% or more. In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (94%), command and control (94%), sustainment (94%), and training (88%).¹¹²

SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is examining the ISAF Joint Command’s system for rating the capability of the ANSF.

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FIGURE 3.23



Notes: AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police

Source: IJC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

DOD reported that the MOD and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued to increase their capacity to perform critical functions this quarter. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:¹¹³

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight only
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

This quarter, SIGAR was provided the CM ratings for only 37 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 46 in past quarters. Of the 37 MOD assessments received this quarter, eight showed progress and one received a lower rating, according to CENTCOM. Notably, the office of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence increased two levels from CM-4 (the lowest rating) to CM-2B. No MOD sections are rated CM-4, as shown in Figure 3.24. The other offices that received a higher rating this quarter were:¹¹⁴

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- General Staff – Communication Support Unit (CM-1A)
- General Staff – Communications (CM-1B)
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Personnel (CM-1B)
- Vice Chief of Staff – Air Force (CM-2B)
- Sergeant Major of the Army (CM-2B)
- General Staff – Logistics (CM-2B)
- Office of Gender Integration (CM-3)


The office that regressed was the Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy, which fell to CM-2B.¹¹⁵

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; seven progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM. No MOI sections were rated CM-4, as shown in Figure 3.24. Those whose ratings increased this quarter were:¹¹⁶

- Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy – Strategic Planning (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Security – Afghan Uniform Police (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Security – Anti-Crime Police (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Security – Counter-IED (CM-2A)
- Deputy Minister for Administration – Training Management (CM-2A)
- Chief of Staff Office of Gender Affairs (CM-2B)
- Deputy Minister for Security – Fire Services (CM-2B)

FIGURE 3.24

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY CHANGE



Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/1/2013 and 12/30/2013.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In a special project report released this quarter, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed. For more information, see Section 2, page 44.

Two MOI staff sections are rated CM-1A (capable of autonomous operations): the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office and the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police.¹¹⁷

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel, according to CENTCOM. The current goal is 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.¹¹⁸

As of December 31, 2013, more than \$190 million of the ASFF had been obligated and more than \$184 million expended to support the ALP. According to CENTCOM, the ALP will cost \$117 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength. To date, 23,496 AK-47 rifles (at a cost of \$6.77 million) and 4,149 PKM machine guns (\$9.42 million) have been provided to the ALP. In addition, 9.4 million rounds of rifle ammunition and 4.5 million rounds of machine gun ammunition (with a combined cost of \$5.07 million) have been provided. CENTCOM noted that the ALP plans to issue an additional 7,000 AK-47 rifles (at a cost of \$2.02 million) and has budgeted \$13.3 million for ammunition in 2014. For ALP mobility, 2,127 Ford Ranger pickup trucks have been provided. These Ford Rangers cost \$21,980 each at point of sale, but \$45,000 each including delivery costs (for a total cost of \$95.7 million).¹¹⁹

AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI that provides facility and convoy security services in Afghanistan. Following President Karzai's 2010 decree disbanding private security companies (PSCs) and transferring protection responsibilities to the APPF, the Afghan government implemented a bridging strategy for a phased transition to the public security company.¹²⁰

As part of that strategy, security for military installations was scheduled to be transferred to the APPF in March 2013. As of December 30, 2013, only three military forward operating bases (FOBs) were secured by APPF personnel; 43 FOBs were still secured by PSCs. As of November 30, 2013, the APPF comprised 20,005 personnel, according to CSTC-A. This quarter, the APPF had 480 active contracts for their services.¹²¹

The APPF recruits officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the ANP. New recruits attend courses on facility, convoy, and personal security at the APPF Regional Training Center. In some cases, trained guards also transition directly from private security companies into the APPF. According to CSTC-A, the most recent assessment of the APPF indicates they are "partially capable of conducting full spectrum security services with Coalition

support.” The United States has provided more than \$51 million to support the APPF.¹²² It was not clear if the money provided was payment for security services rendered or to standup and/or support the APPF.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$31.7 billion and disbursed \$30.1 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANA.¹²³

ANA Strength

As of December 30, 2013, the overall end strength of the ANA was 185,386 personnel (178,816 Army and 6,529 Air Force), according to CSTC-A. The ANA’s end strength showed a modest increase (1%) since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.7. The total includes 10,251 ANA personnel and 41 Air Force personnel who were AWOL, 10,905 trainees, students, and those awaiting assignment, as well as 5,010 cadets, according to CSTC-A. The ANA includes 9,336 civilians (both ANA and Air Force personnel) in its end strength.¹²⁴ SIGAR’s reporting of ANA’s end strength does not include these civilians, but does count unassigned military personnel and cadets.

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit report released at the end of last quarter found that the transition to APPF-provided security has had a minimal effect on projects, but only because implementing partners hired risk management companies to fill APPF capacity gaps and perform critical functions. For more information, see SIGAR Audit 13-15.

TABLE 3.7

ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,130	None	18,636	18,749	+113
203rd Corps	20,798	20,798	None	20,220	21,098	+878
205th Corps	19,097	19,097	None	19,331	18,963	-368
207th Corps	14,879	14,879	None	13,753	14,320	+567
209th Corps	15,004	15,004	None	14,681	15,364	+683
215th Corps	17,555	17,555	None	17,640	18,132	+492
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	9,492	9,276	-216
Special Operations Force	11,013	11,013	None	10,925	10,756	-169
Echelons Above Corps ^a	36,275	36,002	-273	33,687	25,992	-7,695
TTHS ^b	-	-	-	18,453 ^c	15,915 ^d	-2,538
AWOL ^e	-	-	-	8,797 ^f	10,251	+1,454
ANA TOTAL	161,925	161,652	-273	176,818	178,816	+1,998
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	7,370	+273	6,616	6,529	-87
AAF AWOL	-	-	-	-	41	
ANA + AAF TOTAL	169,022	169,022	NONE	183,434	185,386	+1,952

Notes: Q3 data is as of 8/20/2013; Q4 data is as of 12/30/2013.

^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel

^c Includes 4,667 cadets

^d Includes 4,736 cadets

^e Absent without leave

^f AWOL personnel were rolled into the assigned strength last quarter

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/1/2013 and 1/6/2014; Teleconference with CSTC-A officials, 1/4/2014.

Personnel “Unavailable” and “Present for Duty”

The number of personnel in the Afghan security forces—coupled with performance assessments and other reporting mechanisms—is one of the main metrics used to determine the effectiveness of U.S. programs to build the ANSF. SIGAR has been tracking the number of ANSF personnel since its inception.

Determining ANSF strength continues to prove challenging. In July 2012, following a request from SIGAR, CSTC-A defined two major terms—“unavailable” and “present for duty”—used to show the status of ANA personnel. In its July 2013 response to a request for data, CSTC-A stated that “The ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’ This explains the low present for duty numbers for those Corps actively engaged in ops.”¹²⁵

This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% for the 215th Corps to 20.5% for the 209th Corps. About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.¹²⁶

Although limited details were available to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:¹²⁷

- Present for Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)
- Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave, but not personnel AWOL): 54,862 (43%)
- Absent without Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)

However, as part of an ongoing audit, SIGAR was provided data on the ANA’s strength as of October 21, 2013, that can help put these numbers in perspective. At that time, 72,641 personnel were “unavailable,” including the following (partial list):¹²⁸

- In Combat: 39,249
- On leave: 19,570
- AWOL: 8,489
- On temporary assigned duty, inside the Afghan border: 3,541
- Outside TAD, temporary assigned duty, outside the Afghan Border: 2,116
- Course, soldier is currently parading on an authorized course outside the unit: 2,503
- In Hospital, soldier is in a military hospital: 699
- WIA, wounded in action: 645
- Detained, soldier is arrested and in a military jail: 264
- Unit Patient, soldier is in a unit field medical facility: 35
- Detainee in Unit, soldier is in custody of military police: 21
- Unauthorized absence with no weapons: 7
- Unauthorized absence with weapon: 1
- Captured by the enemy: 1

ANA Attrition

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between January and November 2013, 38,916 ANA personnel left the service. The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. Between December 2011 and November 2013, the ANA had 2,055 personnel killed in action (KIA) and 10,484 wounded in action (WIA).¹²⁹

ANA Sustainment

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$11.4 billion and disbursed \$11.1 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.¹³⁰

ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of December 30, 2013, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided nearly \$2 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2008. CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for the base salaries, bonuses, and incentives of the ANA at \$542 million.¹³¹ This is a decrease from the estimate provided last quarter of \$931 million per year.¹³² CSTC-A explained that last quarter's estimate was based on the money Afghanistan's Defense Ministry actually spent in these areas. The latest figures are based on all disbursements made by DOD's Defense Finance and Accounting Services to Da Afghanistan Bank—Afghanistan's central bank—in FY 1392 (December 2012–December 2013). CSTC-A noted that funding is provided assuming the ANA is staffed at 100% of its authorized strength.¹³³ As shown earlier, that assumption generally does not correspond to reported data.

ANA Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

Determining the amount and cost of equipment provided to the ANA remains a challenge. Since April 2013, CSTC-A's reported total cost for weapons procured for the ANA has been falling due to corrections in determining the price of weapons. Between April 2013 and December 2013, the total reported cost for weapons purchased for the ANA has fallen from \$878 million to \$439 million.¹³⁴

CSTC-A has provided several explanations for the ongoing decrease in cost for weapons procured. In response to a recurring question from SIGAR, requesting the total "cost of weapons and weapons-related equipment procured and fielded to date," CSTC-A stated in April 2013 that the United States had procured \$878 million of weapons for the ANA.¹³⁵ In July 2013, CSTC-A reported that the total cost for weapons was actually \$623 million due to a \$153 million correction in the total cost of some equipment and accounting for nearly \$102 million in donated equipment that was not U.S.-funded.¹³⁶ In October 2013, CSTC-A stated that the actual total cost of weapons procured for the ANA was \$447 million. According to CSTC-A, the "decrease in the number procured from last quarter is a result of an

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that CSTC-A was placing orders for vehicle spare parts without accurate information on what parts were needed or were already in stock. CSTC-A relies on the ANA to maintain records of vehicle spare parts availability and future requirements. However, the ANA has not been consistently updating its inventory.

extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted.”¹³⁷ This quarter, the total cost fell again to \$439 million. CSTC-A said the “decrease in total cost [was] due to discovery of incorrect pricing during [an] internal audit.” Moreover, CSTC-A noted that although the cost for donated weapons was not included, “the refurbishment and transportation cost of donated weapons was included because [reconstruction] funds were used.”¹³⁸

The ongoing corrections to the cost of equipment procured—a *cumulative* total that should rise rather than fall every quarter—raises questions about the accountability for U.S. funds used to equip the ANA. SIGAR is currently conducting an audit of ANSF weapons accountability.

CSTC-A also noted that the cost of ANA equipment remaining to be procured has increased from \$27 million last quarter to \$99 million this quarter due to increased requirements.¹³⁹

As of December 30, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$11.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.¹⁴⁰ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, communications equipment, aircraft, and aviation-related equipment. More than 80% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.8.

TABLE 3.8

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$439,229,147	\$32,390,974
Vehicles	\$4,385,763,395	\$14,784,960
Communications Equipment	\$612,205,922	\$51,610,799
Total	\$5,437,198,464	\$98,786,733

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.

The United States has also procured \$1.3 billion in ammunition for the ANA and nearly \$7 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANA. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.¹⁴¹ Last quarter, CSTC-A said the United States has spent nearly \$774 million on other equipment such as clothing and personal gear.¹⁴²

ANA Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$6 billion and disbursed \$4.8 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.¹⁴³ At that time, the United States had completed 255 infrastructure projects (valued at \$2.9 billion), with another 123 projects ongoing (\$2.5 billion) and three planned (\$22 million), according to CSTC-A.¹⁴⁴

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were a brigade garrison for the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115.8 million), phase one of the MOD's headquarters in Kabul (\$108 million), and a brigade garrison for the 205th Corps in Kandahar (\$89.1 million).¹⁴⁵ In addition, 15 projects were completed this quarter at a cost of \$236 million, 9 contracts worth \$258 million were terminated, and 10 contracts worth \$360 million were transferred.¹⁴⁶

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations and maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$966 million:¹⁴⁷

- FY 2015: \$209 million
- FY 2016: \$199 million
- FY 2017: \$186 million
- FY 2018: \$186 million
- FY 2019: \$186 million

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions which could impact future cost estimates.¹⁴⁸

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$2.9 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.¹⁴⁹ This quarter, 17,706 ANA personnel were enrolled in some type of training—down from 43,942 enrollees last quarter. Of that amount, 844 were enrolled in literacy training—down from 31,850—according to NTM-A.¹⁵⁰ NTM-A did not provide an explanation for the massive drop in enrollment from training courses.

Of those ANA personnel in training, 3,795 enlisted personnel were enrolled in basic warrior-training courses, 5,010 were training to become commissioned officers, and 2,680 were training to become NCOs. Other training programs include combat training in the United States, transportation and driving courses, and weapons systems training.¹⁵¹

According to NTM-A, the United States funds a variety of contracts to train the MOD and the ANA. The largest of these are a \$285 million contract for advising, training, and supporting the MOD; a \$203 million contract to build the intelligence-collection capacity of both the ANA and ANP; and a \$31 million contract to train ANA criminal investigators.

According to NTM-A, \$188 million was obligated for training in 2013.¹⁵² NTM-A is also funding three contracts with a combined value of \$200 million to improve literacy in the ANA and the ANP.¹⁵³

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR identified 52 construction projects that may not meet ISAF's December 2014 construction-completion deadline and would therefore be at risk due to lack of oversight and increasing costs. In addition, SIGAR learned that CSTC-A does not track the ANSF's use of constructed facilities and cannot determine whether existing or planned facilities meet ANSF needs or are being used for intended purposes.



A team of Afghan National Army soldiers prepares to breach a door during training in Nangarhar Province. (DOD photo)

ANA Literacy

Since 2009, NTM-A has viewed increasing literacy rates as critical to developing a capable, professional, and sustainable ANSF. An NTM-A commander estimated that the ANSF's overall literacy rate in 2010 was 14%.¹⁵⁴ At the time, NTM-A set a goal of having the ANSF achieve 100% proficiency for level 1 literacy and 50% proficiency at level 3 literacy.¹⁵⁵

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials.”¹⁵⁶

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that NTM-A's goals were based on the ANSF's 2009 authorized strength of 148,000 personnel rather than on the current authorized strength of 352,000. The audit also found that NTM-A's ability to measure the effectiveness of the literacy program is limited because none of the contracts requires independent verification of testing for proficiency or identifies recruits in a way that permits accurate tracking as they move on to army and police units.¹⁵⁷

As of December 30, 2013, NTM-A reported that ANA personnel who have completed a literacy program include:¹⁵⁸

- 148,738 level 1 graduates
- 43,651 level 2 graduates
- 41,182 level 3 graduates

Although NTM-A earlier reported that the literacy programs had achieved their goal of having 50,000 ANSF personnel achieve level 3 or “functional literacy,” NTM-A could not tell SIGAR how many of the ANA level 3 graduates were still in the ANA. NTM-A said the ANA was not able to track this.¹⁵⁹ This quarter, NTM-A issued two new literacy goals: train and graduate 30,000 ANSF personnel to level 3 in 2014, and train/graduate 2,500 ANSF trainers (1,500 for the ANA and 1,000 for the ANP) so that the ANSF can conduct their own literacy training. While NTM-A again noted this quarter that the literacy rate of the ANSF remains “unattainable,” it reported that over 9,200 ANA personnel graduated from level 3 training with in the last six months.¹⁶⁰

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million.¹⁶¹ According to NTM-A, these contractors were providing literacy trainers to both the ANA and the ANP. They have assigned 699 literacy trainers to the ANA:¹⁶²

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 271 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 208 trainers.

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that NTM-A/CSTC-A's goal for achieving literacy in the ANSF was based on outdated ANSF personnel estimates and, therefore, may not be attainable. In addition, CSTC-A's ability to measure the effectiveness of the literacy training program was limited. None of the three literacy training contracts require independent verification of testing for proficiency or identify and track recruits as they move on to their units. Furthermore, the contracts do not adequately define what constitutes a literacy class. One contractor billed the government for classes held for as little as two hours in a month. For more information, see Section 2, page 26.

- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 220 trainers.

The estimated cost of these contracts—including contracts for ANP literacy training—for 2014 is \$25 million. NATO has set aside an additional \$31 million to fund the last year of these contracts.¹⁶³

Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force

This quarter, CSTC-A reported two figures for the number of women in the ANA and the Afghan Air Force. The first figure is provided to CSTC-A by the ANA. According to the ANA's figure, 684 women serve in the ANA and the Afghan Air Force. Of those, 633 serve in the ANA—219 officers, 209 NCOs, 50 enlisted personnel, and 155 cadets—and 51 serve in the Afghan Air Force—21 officers, 13 NCOs, 8 enlisted personnel, and 9 cadets.¹⁶⁴

Advisors in the field, however, could confirm only 491 women in the ANA—273 officers, 147 NCOs, 28 enlisted personnel, and 43 cadets. According to CSTC-A, the discrepancy “may reflect civilian females who are working in the supply chain (e.g. sewing factories).” CSTC-A noted that over the next 6–8 weeks, a civilian personnel list will be created which “should create greater visibility between civilian employees and military members.” It was unclear if male civilian employees were still being counted as part of the overall ANA's strength.¹⁶⁵

The current recruitment and retention goal is for 10% of the ANA—including the Afghan Air Force—to be women.¹⁶⁶ However, despite some progress, this goal remains elusive. Women make up less than 1% of the force.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

This quarter, CENTCOM reported that the Afghan Air Force has 103 aircraft, excluding aircraft “no longer in service (crashed)” and 10 Mi-17 helicopters are on loan to Afghanistan's Special Mission Wing.¹⁶⁷

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2012 alone, the United States provided more than \$5 billion to support and develop the 6,529-person Afghan Air Force—including over \$3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested an additional \$2.9 billion—including \$1.24 billion for equipment and aircraft—in FYs 2013 and 2014 for the Afghan Air Force, as shown in Table 3.9 on the following page.

According to CENTCOM, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 103 aircraft:¹⁶⁸

- 58 Mi-17 transport helicopters (18 more than last quarter)
- 6 Mi-35 attack helicopters (of which 5 are flight capable)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- 6 C-182 fixed wing training aircraft



Afghan Air Force graduates of undergraduate pilot training wait to receive their pilot wings at a ceremony at Shindand Air Base. (DOD photo)

SIGAR AUDITS

This quarter, SIGAR announced it is initiating an audit of U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force to examine the U.S. investment in, planning for, and training of the Afghan Air Force.

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that DOD was moving forward with a \$771.8 million purchase of aircraft for the SMW despite the SMW having less than one-quarter of the personnel needed, facing steep recruitment and training challenges, and lacking the ability to maintain its current aircraft fleet.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.9

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2014 (\$ THOUSANDS)					
Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013 (request)	FY 2014 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	461,877	778,604	1,805,343	169,779	1,068,329
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	188,262	192,354
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	473,946	777,748
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	0	0
Total	\$760,299	\$1,683,250	\$2,621,237	\$831,987	\$2,038,431

Sources: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37.

- 5 MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- 2 C-130H medium transport aircraft

Changes to the inventory since last quarter include: the addition of 18 Mi-17 helicopters and two C-130H aircraft, and the removal of one MD-530F helicopter (destroyed when it landed on an improvised explosive device during a training exercise), five Mi-35 helicopters (no longer operational), and 16 G-222 cargo planes (also referred to as the C-27A).¹⁶⁹ SIGAR had expressed concern about the Afghan Air Force’s reported inventory of the 16 G-222 aircraft after a DOD Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) official told Congress that those aircraft were no longer in service.¹⁷⁰ SIGAR had also received photos showing the 16 G-222 aircraft sitting unused and was concerned that the aircraft were not in service or fit for service in the future. Another four G-222s sit at a base in Germany. According to CENTCOM, the aircraft titles were never transferred to the Afghan government; the program for these aircraft was cancelled because the contractor did not meet its obligations.¹⁷¹

In November 2013, SIGAR initiated an audit of U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force. That audit is currently ongoing.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR initiated a special project to review the \$486.1 million in acquisition and sustainment costs of the terminated G-222 (C-27A) aircraft program.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$15.8 billion and disbursed \$14.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANP.¹⁷²

ANP Strength

In November 2013, the overall strength of the ANP was 149,466 personnel, including 106,784 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 20,902 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 13,597 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 2,850 in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and 5,333 students in training. The overall ANP strength has decreased by 3,191 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.10. According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does

not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.¹⁷³

TABLE 3.10

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change
	AUP	110,369	110,369	None	109,574	106,784
ABP	23,090	23,090	None	21,399	20,902	-497
ANCOP	14,541	14,541	None	14,516	13,597	-919
NISTA ^a	6,000	6,000	None	4,905	5,333	+428
ANP Total	154,000	154,000	None	150,394	146,616	-3,282
CNPA	2,247	2,243	-4	2,759	2,850	+91
ANP + CNPA Total	156,247	156,243	-4	153,153	149,466	-3,191

Notes: Q3 data is as of 8/20/2013; Q4 data is as of 11/2013; AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police.
^a NISTA = personnel in training

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/1/2013 and 12/30/2013; CENTCOM, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2014 .

ANP Sustainment

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$5.5 billion and disbursed \$5.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.¹⁷⁴ According to CSTC-A, the United States has contributed more than \$1.1 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to support the ANP.¹⁷⁵

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through December 30, 2013, the U.S. government had provided \$939 million through the ASFF to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.¹⁷⁶

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$628.1 million per year to fund salaries (\$265.7 million), incentives (\$224.2 million), and food (\$138.2 million). CSTC-A noted that these funding amounts are supported by LOTFA, the Afghan government and CSTC-A.¹⁷⁷

ANP Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.¹⁷⁸ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment.¹⁷⁹ Most funding was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.11 on the following page.

ANP Pay Missed

A recent discovery of an Afghan ministerial mix-up may reinforce questions about ministry competence and security-force motivation. *The New York Times* has reported that the Afghan Interior Ministry was late getting salary paperwork for the country's police to the Finance Ministry. Tens of thousands of police got no pay for December 2013—or, in six provinces, for November—even though the donor-provided funds were in the Afghan treasury. The Interior Ministry says several officials have been sacked, the pay will be issued, and “This will not happen again.”

Source: *The New York Times*, “Afghan Police, Often Derided, Face Another Drawback: Missing Pay,” 1/12/2014.

TABLE 3.11

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,691,866
Vehicles	\$1,966,075,183	\$3,744,582
Communications Equipment	\$211,062,672	\$845,223
Total	\$2,364,389,332	\$9,281,671

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.

As with the ANA, determining the cost of equipment provided to the ANP remains a challenge. CSTC-A reporting in this area has been inconsistent, raising questions about visibility and accountability for U.S. funding used to procure equipment for the ANP. For example, CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of U.S.-funded ANP weapons procured fell from \$369 million two quarters ago to \$137 million last quarter.¹⁸⁰ At that time, CSTC-A said the "decrease in total cost from last quarter [was] due to actual, contracted equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing."¹⁸¹ This quarter, CSTC-A said the total cost for ANP weapons procured was \$187 million, an increase "caused by inclusion of weapons procured through alternate funding vehicles."¹⁸²

CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANP has also been decreasing. In July 2013, CSTC-A stated the total cost of vehicles was \$2.65 billion.¹⁸³ Last quarter, CSTC-A stated the actual cost of vehicles procured was \$2.03 billion. According to CSTC-A, the "decrease in the number procured from last quarter is a result of an extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted."¹⁸⁴ This quarter, the total cost of ANP vehicles procured again fell, this time to \$1.97 billion. According to CSTC-A, the reason for the decrease from last quarter was "due to actual obligated, contracted equipment pricing being higher."¹⁸⁵ It was not clear why a higher price would result in an overall *decrease* in the cost of vehicles procured to date.

The United States has also procured \$312 million in ammunition for the ANP and nearly \$1.4 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANP. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.¹⁸⁶

ANP Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.3 billion and disbursed \$2.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.¹⁸⁷ At that time, the United States had completed 599 infrastructure projects (valued at \$2.1 billion), with another 136 projects ongoing (\$776 million) and three planned (\$21 million), according to CSTC-A.¹⁸⁸

This quarter, 20 projects valued at \$77 million were completed and 19 valued at \$84 million were terminated. The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were administrative facilities (\$59.5 million), building and utilities (\$34.3 million) at the MOI Headquarters, and an ANCOP patrol station in Helmand (\$28.5 million).¹⁸⁹

ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2013, the United States had obligated \$3.4 billion and disbursed \$3.3 billion of ASFF funds for ANP and MOI training and operations.¹⁹⁰ This quarter, 9,513 ANP personnel were enrolled in some type of training, according to NTM-A. Of those, 1,422 were training to become officers and 3,404 were training to become NCOs.¹⁹¹

NTM-A/CSTC-A contracts with DynCorp International to provide training, mentoring, and support services at multiple training sites around the country. The ASFF-funded contract provides 356 mentors and trainers as well as approximately 1,045 support personnel at regional training centers and in mobile support teams. The contract value is \$1.21 billion.¹⁹²

ANP Literacy

NTM-A's literacy program for the ANP uses the same three contractors, follows the same curriculum, and uses the same standards as the ANA's literacy program described earlier in this section.¹⁹³

As of December 30, 2013, ANP personnel who have completed a literacy program include:¹⁹⁴

- 84,905 level 1 graduates
- 54,997 level 2 graduates
- 35,652 level 3 graduates

According to NTM-A, the contractors were providing 531 literacy trainers to the ANP.¹⁹⁵

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 297 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 112 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 122 trainers.

Women in the ANP

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but progress has been slow toward reaching the goal to have 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of 2014. CSTC-A said that “the ANP is currently focused more on finding secure areas (i.e., positions with appropriate facilities for females) for recruits than increasing recruiting to reach this target.”¹⁹⁶ Despite an increase this quarter, women make up only 1% of the force.

As of December 2013, ANP personnel included 1,592 women—232 officers, 636 NCOs, and 724 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A.¹⁹⁷ This is an increase of 388 women in two years (since August 22, 2011).¹⁹⁸

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that NTM-A/CSTC-A's goal for achieving literacy in the ANSF was based on outdated ANSF personnel estimates and, therefore, may not be attainable. For more information, see Section 2, page 26.



Afghan National Army soldiers bandage a fellow soldier with a simulated injury during casualty-care training in Laghman Province. (DOD photo)

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of December 31, 2013, the United States has funded construction of 175 ANSF medical facilities valued at \$134 million with an additional 12 projects ongoing valued at \$36 million. In addition, Coalition forces obligated \$10 million in contracts to provide the ANSF with medical training, according to CSTC-A. Since 2006, Coalition forces have procured and fielded \$41 million in ANSF medical equipment.¹⁹⁹

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the ANSF health care system had 1,087 physicians out of 1,263 authorized. Of these, 603 were assigned to the ANA and 484 were assigned to the ANP. The ANSF had 7,793 other medical personnel (including nurses and medics) out of 8,337 authorized.²⁰⁰

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Since 2002, the U.S. Department of State has provided more than \$283 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).²⁰¹ Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct improvised explosive devices.²⁰²

From October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013, State-funded implementing partners cleared more than 25 million square meters (nearly 10 square miles) of minefields, according to the most recent data from the PM/WRA.²⁰³ An estimated 537 million square meters (more than 200 square miles) of contaminated areas remain to be cleared, as shown in Table 3.12. The PM/WRA defines a "minefield" as an area contaminated by landmines, and a "contaminated area" as an area contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war.²⁰⁴

TABLE 3.12

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, OCTOBER 1, 2012–SEPTEMBER 30, 2013						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)
10/1-12/31/2012	2,146	62,449	22,373	3,672,661	7,265,741	570,000,000
1/1-3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1-6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1-9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
TOTAL	6,431	203,024	275,697	10,148,683	25,059,918	521,000,000

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.

OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

CSTC-A reported that NTM-A/CSTC-A currently has 71 Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs)—including U.S. and Coalition military and civilian personnel—overseeing the performance of 155 ASFF-funded service contracts worth \$2.4 billion. According to CSTC-A, this number “is adequate to deal with the number, complexity, mission criticality, and geographic dispersion of its contracts.”²⁰⁵ CSTC-A said that this is a decline from six months ago when it had 99 CORs performing oversight on 206 contracts. NTM-A/CSTC-A also has five contracts managed by the Defense Contract Management Agency with an additional 50 CORs trained and assigned to perform contract oversight.²⁰⁶

NTM-A/CSTC-A monitors the number of CORs and ensures COR coverage of contracts using several methods and tools. These include using a contract management database, tracking contracts, and holding monthly general-officer-level meetings to discuss progress, COR coverage, and other issues.²⁰⁷

To train its CORs, NTM-A/CSTC-A follows the guidance of the U.S. Army Contracting Command and the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. CORs are required to complete the three Defense Acquisition University on-line classes. In addition, CORs must be nominated by their chain of command, receive in-person training from a contracting officer, and complete a financial disclosure. According to CSTC-A, lengths of deployments for CORs varies by service, but on average a COR would serve the following lengths of time:²⁰⁸

- U.S. Air Force: 6 months
- U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Coalition: 9 months
- DOD Civilians: 12 months

CSTC-A reported that lack of security will continue to be a challenge in executing, managing, and overseeing reconstruction contracts. CSTC-A noted that it is working to transition responsibility for logistical contracts to the ANSF. CSTC-A said that it has provided “a significant amount of training to the ANSF to improve their procurement processes and contract oversight.”²⁰⁹ The IJC is also training ANSF organizations, such as the Material Movement Center, to oversee the fuel ordering and reporting process. CSTC-A has helped to stand up the Afghanistan Defense Acquisition and Resource Management Institute, which started its first classes in June 2013. In addition, over the last year, NTM-A/CSTC-A has placed six Contract Advise & Assist Teams composed of a military leader with contracting experience and three to four contracted mentors in six different regions throughout Afghanistan. These teams mentor and advise the ANA and ANP at the Corps and provincial levels.²¹⁰

SIGAR TESTIMONY

Special Inspector General John Sopko testified this quarter before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control on the state of the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. For more information, see Section 2, page 20.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Although the United States has spent billions to reduce poppy cultivation and illicit drug trafficking, Afghanistan's opium cultivation and production continues to rise. In its Afghanistan Opium Survey, released in November, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said, "Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached a sobering record high in 2013." According to UNODC's survey, a record-setting 209,000 hectares were under opium cultivation in 2013—a 36% increase over 2012. The previous record was 193,000 hectares set in 2007. Moreover, 5,500 tons of opium was produced in 2013, a 49% increase over 2012. And two previously poppy-free provinces—Faryab and Balkh—lost their status this year, bringing the number of Afghanistan's 34 provinces under cultivation to 15.²¹¹

Afghanistan is the world's leading producer and cultivator of opium, and may account for as much as 90% of the world production in 2013. The impact of opium cultivation is significant. It undermines Afghanistan's licit economy, fuels corruption, finances the insurgency, and fosters drug addiction. The latest data indicate that the export value of opium and its derivatives, such as heroin and morphine, increased by more than 30% to almost \$3 billion in 2013.²¹² Any contraction of the Afghan economy resulting from the U.S. troop drawdown and reduction in international assistance could result in the opium trade accounting for an even greater slice of the Afghan economy.

In 2013, an alarming 48% of the poppy fields were located in Helmand Province, a key focus of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort. From 2012 to 2013, poppy cultivation in Helmand expanded by 34% from 75,176 hectares to 100,693 hectares.²¹³ Seventy-five percent of the Taliban's revenue from drugs reportedly comes from just 12 districts. Eight of those districts are in Helmand Province.²¹⁴

The U.S. counternarcotics (CN) strategy focuses primarily on combating the narco-insurgency nexus.²¹⁵ The main components of the strategy include U.S.-sponsored eradication, promotion of alternative livelihoods, public-awareness initiatives, and interdiction operations. As of January 17, 2014, the United States has appropriated \$7.3 billion for CN initiatives in Afghanistan since efforts began in 2002. Most of these funds were appropriated through two channels: the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$4.2 billion), and the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$2.9 billion).²¹⁶

State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) bears the primary responsibility for funding Afghan-led eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public awareness programs. DOD and INL coordinate to support the CN efforts of Afghanistan.²¹⁷ The Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), in partnership with UNODC, is responsible for verifying poppy cultivation and eradication.²¹⁸

Governor Led Eradication Program

INL supports the Afghan government's Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program. Eradication levels are verified by the UNODC and the MCN. According to a September 2013 final report, the GLE program was responsible for eradicating 7,323 verified hectares in 842 villages in 18 provinces. Compared to 2012, when 9,672 hectares were eradicated, there was a 24% decrease in eradication in 2013. According to INL, MCN attributes the decrease to diminished ANSF support for eradication efforts, Taliban attacks against the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the presence of cultivation in insecure and remote areas of the country, and hot weather, which shortened eradication time because farmers could harvest their crop earlier than in most years.²¹⁹

GLE occurs at different times of the year depending on the climate of the province, according to INL. Results are tracked on a cumulative basis by the MCN, and are subjected to UNODC verification on a rolling basis. A significant amount of eradication occurs in southern provinces. For example, 2,162 hectares of poppy were eradicated in Helmand and 1,083 hectares in Kandahar, as opposed to 262 hectares in Farah, 447 hectares in Nangarhar, and 352 hectares in Uruzgan. Only Badakhshan in the East had more poppy eradicated: 2,798 hectares.²²⁰

Good Performer's Initiative

The MCN's Good Performer's Initiative (GPI), funded by INL, provides development assistance as an incentive to provincial governors who significantly reduce or eliminate poppy cultivation within their province, according to INL. Provinces that achieve poppy-free status, reduce poppy cultivation by more than 10%, or demonstrate exemplary counternarcotics efforts receive development assistance to support local development priorities. A province is deemed poppy-free when UNODC, in cooperation with MCN, verifies that it has fewer than 100 hectares under poppy cultivation during the year. In 2013, 15 Afghan provinces qualified for GPI poppy-free awards, two less than in 2012.²²¹

GPI projects have included drug rehabilitation and rural development, such as improvements to roads and irrigation structures that provide farmers with access to water and markets. GPI projects provide short-term employment opportunities for local communities. Since the program was initiated, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan has grown from six to 15, according to INL.²²²

Since the start of the GPI program in 2007, more than 200 development projects are either complete or in process in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces, including: school construction, road and bridge projects, irrigation structures, farm machinery projects, and hospitals and clinic construction. INL noted that while the backlog in implementing GPI projects has been reduced, the MCN-managed program has faced implementation delays as



A Navy Petty Officer provides security for Marines and members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit as they conduct a counternarcotics raid in Helmand Province. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

the capacity of the MCN continues to increase and the process is refined. There are also delays in implementation of construction projects due to security challenges in more dangerous areas of the country.²²³

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

The Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program promotes poppy-free status for provinces through public awareness and media campaigns targeting farmers in poppy-growing areas. According to INL, CNCE is implemented in close coordination with the MCN, ensuring that messages are distributed through the media, provincial conferences, shuras, scholarly events, and youth outreach events. CNCE includes a capacity building component for the MCN, to ensure it can take increasing responsibility for CN media relations, public awareness, and behavioral change activities, ensuring lasting success beyond conclusion of the program.²²⁴

Aga Khan Foundation Grant

INL administers a grant to the Aga Khan Foundation to help sustain the shift away from poppy cultivation in six key provinces: Bamyan, Takhar, Badakhshan, Daykundi, Samangan, and Baghlan. The grant allows the foundation to work with development councils, local NGOs, and provincial line departments to increase licit livelihood opportunities in those provinces and aims to strengthen community-level linkages between the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and the Afghan National Development Strategy.²²⁵

Monitoring, Verification, and Regional Cooperation

This quarter, UNODC coordinated two working groups dedicated to drug demand reduction and combating the availability of precursor chemicals, according to INL. The working groups are part of the Paris Pact initiative, a multilateral partnership to combat the Afghan opiate trade. The U.S. government, 57 other countries and 21 international organizations support the initiative. The Paris Pact emphasizes long-term donor assistance to Afghanistan and focuses on cross-border smuggling and illicit drug abuse in the region.²²⁶

In October and November 2013, INL funded a two-week joint CN training for Afghan and Pakistani officers through the UNODC-implemented NATO-Russia Council. The training brought together 12 Afghan CN police officers and 12 Pakistani customs officials for specialized investigative training at the Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Organized Crime in Ankara, Turkey. Turkish and American CN police led the trainings.²²⁷

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building Program

The MCN Capacity Building program focuses on training, procuring equipment, and upgrading facilities at the MCN. This quarter, INL advisors working with the MCN held two week-long training sessions in

Kabul for approximately 160 MCN provincial staff from more than 30 provinces. MCN advisors also participated in the annual personnel performance review process for INL-funded positions at MCN. This quarter, INL awarded a contract to provide the MCN with an updated vehicle fleet, including six utility vehicles for use at headquarters and one diesel truck for each of the ministry's 34 provincial offices. Also during the quarter, INL provided MCN provincial offices with information technology equipment, according to INL.²²⁸

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

This quarter, 2,850 personnel were assigned to the CNPA, according to CSTC-A.²²⁹ By law, the CNPA is the only counternarcotics operational police entity in Afghanistan, according to CENTCOM. The CNPA is headquartered in Kabul and has provincial units in all 34 provinces that operate under the control of the provincial police chief, but take operational direction from CNPA headquarters.²³⁰

The DEA has played a key role in training and mentoring elements of the CNPA, developing critical intelligence on counternarcotics, and spearheading interdiction operations. It is mentoring two specialized units within the CNPA—the NIU and the SIU. Established to conduct interdiction operations and target major trafficking organizations, these units have had some successes. According to the DEA, the CNPA led 2,490 operations during the first nine months of this year. These operations, generally conducted with DEA and military support, resulted in 2,258 arrests, 55 drug labs destroyed, and over 121 metric tons of drugs seized.²³¹ However, as DOD noted in its latest report, overall counternarcotics interdiction efforts have not significantly reduced insurgent income from the narcotics trade. Moreover, DOD reported, “the current drawdown of U.S. and coalition military forces has affected the ability of U.S. and international law enforcement personnel to conduct operations throughout Afghanistan.”²³²

Because the CNPA is a vital component of the entire counternarcotics effort, SIGAR recently announced an audit of the U.S. effort to build the CNPA and particularly its provincial units. This audit will evaluate the extent to which development and capacity-building of the CNPA's provincial units are based on a comprehensive interagency plan; facilities constructed for CNPA provincial units are being used as intended; and U.S. government assistance has contributed to building sustainable and capable provincial unit forces.

According to CENTCOM, NTM-A/CSTC-A provides funding to the MOI to cover CNPA costs such as salaries, equipment, weapons, and ammunition.²³³

Effect of the Coalition Drawdown on Counternarcotics Operations

DOD anticipates the ability of the CNPA and other Afghan government CN agencies to conduct CN operations in areas with decreased Coalition

SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter SIGAR announced an audit of the U.S. efforts to build the CNPA's provincial units. For more information, see Section 2, page 30.

presence will diminish as U.S. and Coalition forces draw down. However, DOD said Afghan CN units including the Special Mission Wing, the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) are trained and capable units that have conducted CN operations independently or with limited U.S. and Coalition support.²³⁴

INL provides operation and maintenance support for CNPA and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) facilities. According to INL, the freedom of movement for units funded through the GLE program will be negatively affected by the drawdown, according to INL. Moreover, given the link between insecurity and poppy cultivation, the drawdown could result in higher cultivation.²³⁵

Interdiction Operations

From October 1 through December 15, 2013, the ANSF conducted 69 unilateral CN operations—routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and deliberate detention operations—according to DOD. The MOI's General Department of Police Special Units led the effort. The department participated in 17 operations that seized approximately 11,420 kg of various narcotics and precursor chemicals. During this time period, Afghan combined operations seized 9,992 kg of opium, 182 kg of morphine, 872 kg of heroin, 220 kg of hashish/marijuana, and 4,404 kg of precursor chemicals, as well as detaining 96 individuals.²³⁶

According to DOD, nearly all U.S. interdiction activities were partnered with Afghan forces. Most of these activities occurred in south and southwest Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out. U.S. forces conducted three unilateral drug operations during this reporting period, detaining two individuals and seizing eight kilograms of heroin and one kilogram of opium. Interagency elements, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. Both CJIATF-N and IOCC integrated data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt-narco-insurgent elements. All operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.²³⁷

INL supports the interdiction efforts of specific vetted units of the CNPA—the NIU and the SIU. INL-supported interdiction activities include investigative and strategic mentoring, logistics, housing, food and fuel, and transportation to and from seizure sites. INL's implementing partner, DEA, mentors NIU/SIU officers on investigative skills development and conducts joint raids with both NIU and ISAF.²³⁸

Interdiction Results

Since 2008, a total of 2,564 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,604 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:²³⁹

- 729,109 kg of hashish (1 kilogram = approximately 2.2 pounds)
- 364,705 kg of opium
- 47,214 kg of morphine
- 27,037 kg of heroin
- 411,787 kg of **precursor chemicals**

Aviation Support

From October 1 to December 16, 2013, the Department of State's "Embassy Air" in Afghanistan provided 322 flight hours, conducted 164 sorties, moved 509 passengers, and transported 58,737 pounds of cargo in support of DEA and INL efforts. According to INL, counternarcotics support to the DEA consisted of 34 flight hours supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, 199 flight hours supporting interdiction efforts, and 55 hours supporting NIU and DEA passenger movements (of which 15 hours were dedicated to transporting NIU weapons and cargo). Notably, this quarter, Embassy Air supported an interdiction operation resulting in the seizure of four active narcotics processing laboratories, 478 kg of opium, 700 kg of morphine base, 13 kg of heroin, 5,800 liters of morphine solution, 650 kg of homemade explosives, and one incendiary explosive device.²⁴⁰

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, p. viii.