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SECURITY

As of March 31, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$58.8 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$57.3 billion) were channeled through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$57.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$48.9 billion had been obligated and \$46.6 billion disbursed as of March 31, 2014.⁸⁷

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges to transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Key issues and events this quarter include General Joseph F. Dunford's testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, continuing U.S. concerns over the lack of a signed U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement, the Center for Naval Analysis' release of its independent assessment of the ANSF, the disbanding of the Afghan Public Protection Force, and the release of focus group findings gauging the public perception of the Afghan Local Police.

General Dunford Warns Congress: ANSF Needs Continued U.S. Support

On March 12, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), warned lawmakers that the ANSF will need ongoing support if they are to succeed in their role of keeping Afghanistan secure. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate. The security environment

"If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate."

—General Joseph F. Dunford

Source: *The Washington Post*, "U.S. commander in Afghanistan warns that full withdrawal will allow al-Qaeda to regroup," 3/12/2014.

will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”⁸⁸

General Dunford told the House Armed Services Committee on March 13 that the ANSF has made progress in countering the Taliban threat, but identified areas where they will need ongoing assistance. He told lawmakers, “After watching the Afghan forces respond to a variety of challenges since they took the lead in June, I don’t believe the Taliban insurgency represents an existential threat to them or the government of Afghanistan.” He also said, “Although the Afghans require less support in conducting security operations, they still need assistance in maturing the systems, the processes and the institutions necessary to support a modern national army and police force. They also need continued support in addressing capability gaps in aviation, intelligence and special operations. To address these gaps a ‘train, advise and assist’ mission will be necessary after this year to further develop Afghan self-sustainability.”⁸⁹

Bilateral Security Agreement

The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan to determine the legal status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 remains unsigned. The final status of the BSA will have a profound impact on the U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan after 2014, the willingness of the United States and the international community to continue to finance reconstruction programs, and on Afghanistan’s ability to maintain progress in the security, governance, and economic sectors. Last quarter, the U.S. and Afghan governments reached agreement on a draft text of the BSA and a *Loya Jirga* (tribal assembly) approved the document. President Hamid Karzai refused to sign it. However, the two leading candidates in Afghanistan’s April 2014 presidential election have said they will sign the BSA if elected, according to the *The Wall Street Journal*.⁹⁰

The BSA would allow U.S. military trainers and counterterrorism forces to remain in Afghanistan after the end of this year.⁹¹ The size of the remaining contingent of U.S. forces has yet to be determined. According to media reports, ISAF commander General Joseph F. Dunford has recommended a post-2014 force of 12,000 troops: 8,000 U.S. and 4,000 international. While most of these troops would support, train, and advise the ANSF, approximately 2,000 would conduct counter-terrorism operations.⁹²

Independent Assessment of the ANSF

This quarter, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), a non-profit research organization, released its independent assessment of the ANSF. The Department of Defense (DOD) selected CNA in response to a 2013 National Defense Authorization Act requirement for “an independent assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the [ANSF] capable of providing security for their own country.”⁹³

The CNA study predicts that the insurgency in Afghanistan will be a greater threat in 2015–2018 than it is now due to the reduction in U.S. and NATO forces and continued presence of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.⁹⁴ The CNA report forecasts that the Taliban will keep pressure on the ANSF, expand its influence in areas vacated by Coalition forces, encircle key cities, and conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other cities. It also said that the Taliban will conserve resources in the short term as it recovers from years of Coalition operations before launching “a larger and more intense military effort.”⁹⁵

The CNA assessment concluded that if the ANSF are successful through 2018, a negotiated political settlement is more likely in 2019–2023.⁹⁶ To do this, the ANSF needs a strength of 373,400 personnel, with some changes to its existing force structure, through 2018.⁹⁷ According to CNA, the ANSF’s current force strength is 382,000.⁹⁸ This figure differs from SIGAR’s current total of 336,388 because it is based on authorized—rather than assigned—force levels and includes Afghan Local Police (ALP), which are not included in SIGAR’s total; ALP are counted separately in this report. In addition, CNA concluded that the ANSF and the ministries that support the ANA and the ANP will require international assistance and advisors “through at least 2018” with “similar authorities to the mission in Afghanistan today.”⁹⁹ This will also require the continued commitment of the international community. According to CNA, “withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including renewed civil war in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region.”¹⁰⁰

Afghan Public Protection Force to be Disbanded

According to DOD, President Karzai directed on February 17 that the state-owned enterprise managing the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) be dissolved and that APPF personnel and functions be incorporated into the Ministry of Interior (MOI).¹⁰¹ On March 8, 2014, Afghanistan’s Minister of Interior held a meeting to discuss the disbandment of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and alternatives for continuing to provide security for convoys and Coalition installations.¹⁰²

According to DOD, four security areas will be impacted by the APPF transition: national projects, private sector, convoy and road security, and international projects.¹⁰³

Security of national projects will transition from APPF to the ANP. For protection of private-sector sites, the Ministry of Finance is working out legal details of a process for private customers to pay for security services. Convoy and road security will shift from APPF to ANP with greater responsibility for provincial police and a new highway patrol unit. A rapid-response force and MOI transportation brigade will also help ensure adequate convoy security, according to DOD. For international projects, a joint commission of international and MOI representatives is working to

“Withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including renewed civil war in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region.”

—*Center for Naval Analysis*

Source: Center for Naval Analysis, “Summary of Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces,” 1/24/2014, pp. 40–41.

develop a way forward, given procedures and legal restrictions vary among countries and organizations.¹⁰⁴

According to DOD, details of the new APPF entity will be worked out during a transition period of undetermined duration. After the transition, MOI envisions that security for international installations will be provided by “special ANP police” who work for a “special annex” of ANP. This entity would have its own bank account at the Ministry of Finance and its own payment scheme. The MOI said that while these ANP personnel cannot be called “guards,” they may have only limited law enforcement powers and will function as guards. Because highway security is already an ANP function, the ANP cannot receive compensation for providing convoy security. The MOI said there would be no fee for convoy security, according to DOD.¹⁰⁵

Since the creation of the APPF in 2009 through FY 2012, the United States provided more than \$51 million to stand up the force.¹⁰⁶ The state-owned enterprise raises its own revenue by providing contract security services to U.S. and international agencies.

For more information on the APPF, see “Afghan Public Protection Force” on page 96 in this section.

Public Perception of the Afghan Local Police

This quarter, the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) released the findings of a focus group survey to gauge the public’s perception of the ALP. During the survey, 28 focus groups consisting of six to ten community members and village elders were asked a series of questions about the ALP. While focus groups in the northern and southern districts had the most negative perception of the ALP, all focus groups agreed that the ALP improves community security. The ALP received mixed marks for fighting local crime and were criticized for participating in community dispute resolution in several districts. According to SOJTF-A, several participants noted that since the ALP came under control of the ANP, they have turned to corruption and criminality to offset salaries that are not always paid on time.¹⁰⁷

The focus group survey identified both strengths and weaknesses in the ALP. Among the ALP’s strengths are ALP members’ local knowledge, their constant presence in villages, and opportunities they provide local youth through recruitment. Weaknesses included insufficient training and a lack of adequate equipment as well as “the predatory practices of some ALP members on neighboring communities that lack their own ALP units.” Respondents also noted factionalism and tribal discrimination in the ALP recruitment process.¹⁰⁸

For an update on the ALP program, including force strength, see “Afghan Local Police” on page 95.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

According to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the security situation in Afghanistan remains volatile. In his March 7 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said that 2013 had the second highest level of violence since the fall of the Taliban; 2011 had the highest. Armed clashes and improvised explosive device (IED) events accounted for 75% of all security incidents. The number of armed clashes was up 51% compared to the number in 2012. Afghan forces have proved capable of defending territory, but they have also suffered significant casualties.¹⁰⁹ Between November 16, 2013, and February 15, 2014, the number of security incidents increased by 24% over the number recorded during the same period in the prior year. As part of that increase, the UN recorded 35 suicide attacks compared to 17 the previous year.¹¹⁰

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, the number of U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan as of February 1, 2014, is 33,200.¹¹¹ Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,178 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,523 were wounded as of April 4, 2014.¹¹²



USFOR-A stores ammunition in munitions storage areas such as this one in Shindand. (SIGAR photo by Ron Riach)

COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACTING RULES STILL AN ISSUE

DOD contracting has been on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) high-risk list since 1992—almost a quarter of a century.¹¹³ A January 2012 contracting shura in Kabul produced broad agreement among U.S. military commands in Afghanistan that widespread noncompliance with existing rules and guidance was a continuing problem. A June 2012 DOD report to Congress mentioned the shura and 26 agreed-upon follow-up measures.¹¹⁴

In its April–September 2013 semiannual report to Congress, however, the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted that “The Department continues to struggle to consistently provide effective oversight of its existing contracting efforts.”¹¹⁵ In preparation for its October 2013, and later for its January and April 2014 reports to Congress, SIGAR asked DOD to identify steps taken to improve compliance with existing regulations. SIGAR also asked if noncompliance continued, if any accountability measures had been adopted to impose substantial individual consequences for noncompliance, and if anyone had in fact faced consequences. To date, DOD has provided no answer. More than two years after the shura consensus and after three requests for information, SIGAR finds this pattern of nonresponse troubling.

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 342,809, according to data provided by CSTC-A.¹¹⁶ This is 97% of the ANSF’s end strength goal of 352,000 personnel. DOD’s goal to reach 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014) has mostly been met.¹¹⁷ The ANA and ANP are within 2% of their target end strength and the Air Force (expected to reach its goal at the end of the year) is within 15%, as shown in Table 3.6. However, as noted below, ANA strength now includes civilian personnel.

TABLE 3.6

ANSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH, MARCH 2013			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 3/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by 12/2012	182,777 (98%)	-4,223 (2%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by 2/2013	153,269 (98%)	-3,731 (2%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by 12/2014	6,763 (85%)	-1,237 (15%)
ANSF Total	352,000	342,809 (97%)	-9,191 (3%)

Sources: DOD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2014; DCOM MAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2014.

ANA Civilians Still Count Toward ANSF Strength

SIGAR has long been concerned about the issue of civilians constituting a part of Afghanistan’s Army. In July 2012, CSTC-A told SIGAR that civilians were included in the assigned strength of the ANA.¹¹⁸ In October 2012, CSTC-A said that civilians had been accounted for and removed from the ANA’s “end strength number.”¹¹⁹ CSTC-A also said that civilians were not included in the end strength of the ANA in January and April 2013.¹²⁰ However, in July and October 2013, CSTC-A reported that the ANA’s “military strength” again included civilians.¹²¹ In January 2014, CSTC-A told

SIGAR that 9,336 civilians were being counted as part of the ANA and Afghan Air Force.¹²² This quarter, CSTC-A reported 9,486 civilians in the ANA and Air Force.¹²³

According to CSTC-A, the 187,000 authorized positions in the ANA include civilians and that “civilians have to be reflected against ANA end strength if the 352K goal [352,000] is to be the point of comparison.”¹²⁴

In February 2012, a DOD OIG report identified the issue of and risks associated with civilians being counted as part of the ANA. In that report, DOD OIG found that ANA finance officers had “coded” civilian personnel as military or armed forces personnel and included them for payment by CSTC-A, despite an agreement between NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that only military personnel would be reimbursed. At that time, CSTC-A finance personnel were unaware that civilians had been included for military pay.¹²⁵

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “uniformed ANSF positions in the MOD and MOI should be civilianized. If civilians with the appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or trained for these positions—or if active-duty ANSF personnel cannot be transitioned to the civil service—then ANSF force structure will need to be increased to accommodate them.”¹²⁶

ANSF Assessment

Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments also provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security. Since August 15, 2013, ISAF has used the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.¹²⁷

SIGAR has actively monitored ANSF assessment reporting and has issued two audit reports on the systems and processes used to rate ANSF capability—one in 2010 and another in February 2014. SIGAR’s February 2014 report found that the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) developed the RASR because the old Commander’s Unit Assessment tool (CUAT) was too difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful.¹²⁸ The RASR is the third different assessment tool used to rate the ANSF since 2005.¹²⁹

According to IJC, the RASR is a “holistic intelligence, operational, and sustainment assessment and reporting mechanism” of the ANSF.¹³⁰ The RASR uses rating definition levels (RDLs), based upon ANSF capabilities, to assess ANSF units at the brigade level.¹³¹ The RDLs use a simplified assessment matrix that is tailored to the specific unit type (e.g. infantry, intelligence, signals) and identifies the capabilities a unit must possess in order to be assessed “Fully Capable.” According to IJC, “this simplified system is easily observable, not as labor intensive or complex [as the previous

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of data for the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained.

system], and could form the basis of Afghan ‘self reporting’ as ISAF continues to draw down.”¹³²

SIGAR’s report found that as Coalition forces withdraw, the IJC will have less insight into the ANSF’s capabilities and rely more on the ANSF for assessment data. However, the report noted that “ISAF has not developed a plan that details how it will (1) ensure the continued collection, analysis, validation, and reporting of ANSF capability assessments as Coalition forces draw down and (2) address the challenges associated with having few advisor teams available to conduct assessments and relying on the ANSF’s processes for conducting its own internal assessments.”¹³³

The RASR rates ANA brigades in six areas:¹³⁴

- Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 brigades within corps and two brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 83% were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations. This is a decrease from the 88% assessed at those levels last quarter; however, this was due to one brigade not being assessed this quarter. Last quarter, that brigade was assessed as “capable.” In most assessment categories, the ANA’s capability either stayed the same or showed some improvement.¹³⁵ Most declines were due to one brigade not being assessed this quarter, as shown in Table 3.7.

According to the latest RASR report, the total number of “on hand” High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) gun trucks decreased by

TABLE 3.7

ANA RASR ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE															
	Fully Capable			Capable			Partially Capable			Developing			Not Assessed		
	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -
Combined Arms Operations	9	8	-1	12	12		3	3		0	0		0	1	1
Leadership	16	15	-1	7	6	-1	1	2	1	0	0		0	1	1
Command & Control	11	9	-2	13	14	1	0	0		0	0		0	1	1
Sustainment	7	6	-1	13	11	-2	4	6	2	0	0		0	1	1
Training	6	6		13	13		4	3	-1	1	1		0	1	1
Attrition	0	1	1	7	9	2	0	0		17	14	-3	0	0	

Note: Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing

Sources: IJC, December 2013 RASR, 12/30/2013; IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014.

400 vehicles. IJC noted that two brigades with significant reductions reported the decrease was the result of “an effort to turn in damaged and excess equipment.”¹³⁶ In most categories, the ANA meets or exceeds the amount of equipment it is authorized to have to fulfill its mission. However, not all of its equipment is “mission capable.” For example, in the case of HMMWV gun trucks, the ANA has 158% of the trucks it needs; however, since not all of those trucks are “mission capable,” its material readiness for those vehicles is 101%—still above the rate needed to fulfill its mission.¹³⁷ However, IJC noted that sustainment continues to be an impediment for progress for the ANA, mainly as a result of delivery and resupply issues.¹³⁸

Attrition also continues to be a major challenge for the ANA as 61% of brigades (not including the one brigade that was not assessed) are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more. However, this is a notable improvement from December 2013 when 71% were rated as “developing.” In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (91%), command and control (100%), sustainment (74%), and training (83%).¹³⁹

The RASR rates ANP components in six areas:¹⁴⁰

- Law Enforcement Operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 18 of 21 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones.¹⁴¹ Of the 18 that were assessed, 83% were “fully capable” or “capable” of carrying out law enforcement operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested), as shown in Table 3.8.

TABLE 3.8

	ANP RASR ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE																	
	Fully Capable			Capable			Partially Capable			Developing			Not Assessed					
	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -	Q1	Q2	+ -			
Law Enforcement Operations	8	5	-3	7	10	3	1	3	2	0	0		5	3	-2			
Leadership	10	10		4	6	2	1	2	1	0	0		5	3	-2			
Command & Control	4	5	1	11	9	-2	1	4	3	0	0		5	3	-2			
Sustainment	5	4	-1	10	12	2	1	2	1	0	0		5	3	-2			
Training	4	5	1	10	9	-1	1	3	2	1	1		5	3	-2			
Attrition	7	7		3	4	1	0	0		10	9	-1	1	1				

Note: Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing

Sources: IJC, December 2013 RASR, 12/30/2013; IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014.

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released this quarter, SIGAR found that ISAF Joint Command’s system for rating the capability of the ANSF—the Commander’s Unit Assessment tool (CUAT)—was too difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful. As noted in this section, the CUAT has now been replaced by the RASR. For more information, see Section 2, page 22.

IJC noted that ANP material readiness (equipment levels) rates showed improvement in some areas and a decline in others. In addition, access to MOI-sponsored training for ANP personnel is low due to “disorganized MOI training events.”¹⁴² Attrition also continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 50% of regional components are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these units is 3% or more. In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (89%), command and control (78%), sustainment (89%), and training (78%).¹⁴³

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

DOD reported that this quarter the MOD and the MOI continued to increase their capacity to perform critical functions. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:¹⁴⁴

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

Like last quarter, SIGAR was provided the CM ratings for only 37 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 46 in prior quarters. According to CENTCOM, there was no change in MOD capability since last quarter, as shown in Figure 3.26. This is the first time no quarterly changes in MOD capability were reported to SIGAR.¹⁴⁵

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; five progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM. Those whose ratings increased this quarter were:¹⁴⁶

- Deputy Minister for Security–Force Readiness (CM-1A)
- Chief of Staff Office of the Legal Affairs (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Administration–Training Management (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics (CM-2A)
- Deputy Minister for the Afghan Public Protection Force (CM-2B)


Three MOI staff sections are now rated CM-1A (capable of autonomous operations): the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness.¹⁴⁷

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In a special project report released last quarter, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed.

FIGURE 3.26

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY STATUS



Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013 and 3/31/2014.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

As of March 15, 2014, the ALP comprised 26,647 personnel, all but 887 of which were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The current goal is to have 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014.¹⁴⁸

As of March 31, 2014, nearly \$196 million of the ASFF had been obligated and expended to support the ALP. According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost \$121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength. To date, 23,246 AK-47 rifles and 4,045 PKM machine guns—both Russian designed—have been provided to the ALP.¹⁴⁹

According to NSOCC-A, between March 1, 2013, and February 28, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 84.9%. During that period, 572 ALP personnel quit their job, 226 were fired, 1,165 were undefined administrative losses, and 1,623 were other losses (also undefined). NSOCC-A reported that 1,144—or about 4.8% of the force—were killed in action (KIA).¹⁵⁰

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, CNA “interviewees in theater told us that the Chief of the ANA General Staff does not want [ANA Special Forces] to be formally associated with the ALP program, in part due to the ALP’s past record of human rights

abuses.”¹⁵¹ CNA noted that “it does not appear that the government of Afghanistan intends for the [ANA Special Forces] to continuing raising ALP after 2014.”¹⁵²

SIGAR AREA OF CONCERN

In discussions with the Professional Services Council—a national trade association representing businesses that provide services to the federal government—SIGAR has voiced its concern about the ability of the APPF to provide security services and how that ability will affect the implementation of reconstruction projects.

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit report released at the end of last quarter found that the transition to APPF-provided security has had a minimal effect on projects, but only because implementing partners hired risk management companies to fill APPF capacity gaps and perform critical functions. For more information, see SIGAR Audit 13-15.

AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, provides facility and convoy security services in Afghanistan. Following President Karzai’s 2010 decree disbanding private security companies (PSCs) and transferring protection responsibilities to the APPF, the Afghan government implemented a bridging strategy for a phased transition to the public security company.¹⁵³

As part of that strategy, security for military installations was scheduled to be transferred to the APPF in March 2013. In October 2012, however, IJC told SIGAR that meeting the deadline was “extremely unlikely.”¹⁵⁴ As of March 31, 2014, only five military forward operating bases (FOBs) were secured by APPF personnel; 43 FOBs were still secured by PSCs. This quarter, the APPF comprised 22,727 personnel, according to CSTC-A. This quarter, the APPF had 480 active contracts for their services.¹⁵⁵

The United States has provided more than \$51 million to support the APPF, of which \$34 million was provided in FY 2012; no FY 2013 funds were spent on the APPF. Of the \$34 million provided in FY 2012, most funds were for APPF vehicles (\$17 million). The rest was for APPF facility construction, weapons, radios, training, and other equipment and services.¹⁵⁶

According to CSTC-A, the most recent assessment of the APPF’s capability indicates that the APPF is capable of “planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services with advisory support.”¹⁵⁷

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$32.4 billion and disbursed \$30.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANA.¹⁵⁸

ANA Strength

As of March 31, 2014, the overall end strength of the ANA was 189,540 personnel (182,777 Army and 6,763 Air Force), according to CSTC-A.¹⁵⁹ However, as noted previously, these numbers include 9,236 ANA civilians and 250 Air Force civilians. The total is more than 97% of its combined end strength goal of 195,000 ANA personnel. While the numbers of assigned personnel in the ANA’s six combat corps, the 111th Capital Division, and the Special Operations Force declined, the number of personnel in training or awaiting assignment increased, as shown in Table 3.9. Personnel absent without leave (AWOL) fell by half, from 10,251 last quarter to 5,141.¹⁶⁰

TABLE 3.9

ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Quarterly Change	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Quarterly Change
	201st Corps	18,130	18,130	None	18,749	17,489
203rd Corps	20,798	20,798	None	21,098	20,029	-1,069
205th Corps	19,097	19,097	None	18,963	17,891	-1,072
207th Corps	14,879	14,879	None	14,320	13,806	-514
209th Corps	15,004	15,004	None	15,364	14,554	-810
215th Corps	17,555	17,555	None	18,132	16,310	-1,822
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	9,276	8,921	-355
Special Operations Force	11,013	12,149	+1,136	10,756	10,458	-298
Echelons Above Corps ^a	36,002	34,866	-1,136	25,992	29,727	+3,735
TTHS ^b	-	-	-	15,915 ^c	24,356 ^d	+8,441
Civilians	-	-	-	9,113	9,236	+123
ANA TOTAL	161,652	161,652	NONE	178,816^e	182,777	+3,961
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,370	7,097	-273	6,529	6,513	-16
AAF Civilians	-	-	-	223	250	+27
ANA + AAF TOTAL	169,022	168,749	-273	185,386	189,540	+4,154

Notes: Q4 2013 data is as of 12/30/2013; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014.

^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel

^c Includes 5,010 cadets

^d Includes 4,701 cadets

^e Q4 2013 assigned total includes 10,251 AWOL personnel

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 1/6/2014 and 3/31/2014.

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “Afghanistan has a significant need for special operations forces [SOF], but the ANSF cannot support more SOF.”¹⁶¹ CNA also said “ANA SOF currently depend on the U.S. and ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. Simply increasing the number of ANA SOF personnel without addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks.”¹⁶²

ANA Attrition

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between February 2013 and February 2014, 43,887 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls. The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. Between March 2012 and February 2014, the ANA had 2,166 personnel KIA and 11,804 wounded in action.¹⁶³

ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$12 billion and disbursed \$11.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.¹⁶⁴

ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of March 31, 2014, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided \$2.2 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2008. CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for the base salaries, bonuses, and incentives of the ANA at \$693.9 million.¹⁶⁵ This is an increase from the estimate provided last quarter of \$542 million per year.¹⁶⁶ CSTC-A noted that funding is provided assuming the ANA is staffed at 100% of its authorized strength.¹⁶⁷

ANA Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

Determining the amount and cost of equipment provided to the ANA remains a challenge. After a year of decreasing total costs for weapons procured for the ANA, this quarter CSTC-A reported an increase. Between April 2013 and December 2013, the total reported cost for weapons purchased for the ANA decreased from \$878 million to \$439 million. However in March 2014, CSTC-A reported total costs of \$461 million.¹⁶⁸ The trend in total ANA weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment costs is shown in Table 3.10.

TABLE 3.10

CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)				
	Weapons	Vehicles	Communications	Total
April 2013	\$878.0	\$5,556.5	\$580.5	\$7,015.0
July 2013	622.8	5,558.6	599.5	6,780.9
October 2013	447.2	3,955.0	609.3	5,011.5
January 2014	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	5,437.2
April 2014	461.2	4,385.7	670.3	5,517.3

Notes: SIGAR has sought clarification as to why these cumulative totals have declined in some quarters. See text.

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, and 3/31/2014.

In the past, CSTC-A has provided several explanations for the decreasing cost: a \$153 million correction in the total cost of some equipment and accounting for nearly \$102 million in donated equipment that was not U.S.-funded,¹⁶⁹ an extensive internal audit that revealed double-counted equipment,¹⁷⁰ and discovery of incorrect pricing during an internal audit.¹⁷¹ Moreover, CSTC-A noted that although the cost for donated weapons was not included, “the refurbishment and transportation cost of donated weapons was included because [reconstruction] funds were used.”¹⁷²

The ongoing corrections to the cost of equipment procured—a *cumulative* total that should rise rather than fall every quarter—raises questions about the accountability of U.S. funds used to equip the ANA. SIGAR is currently conducting an audit of ANSF weapons accountability.

Additionally, CSTC-A reported the cost of ANA equipment remaining to be procured has decreased from \$99 million last quarter to \$89 million this quarter.¹⁷³

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$11.4 billion and disbursed \$11.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.¹⁷⁴ Of these funds, \$5.4 billion was used to procure vehicles, weapons and related equipment, and communications equipment. Nearly 81% of that \$5.4 billion was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.11.

TABLE 3.11

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT BY CATEGORY		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$439,229,147	\$32,390,974
Vehicles	4,385,763,395	14,784,960
Communications Equipment	612,205,922	51,610,799
Total	\$5,437,198,464	\$98,786,733

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.

The United States has also procured \$1.3 billion in ammunition for the ANA and \$7 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANA. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.¹⁷⁵

ANA Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$6 billion and disbursed \$5 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.¹⁷⁶ At that time, the United States had completed 328 infrastructure projects (valued at \$4 billion), with another 71 projects ongoing (\$1.5 billion) and 12 planned (\$232 million), according to CSTC-A.¹⁷⁷

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade/201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$116 million), the 3rd Brigade/205th Corps in Kandahar (\$91 million), and the 1st Brigade/215th Corps in Helmand (\$87 million).¹⁷⁸ Last quarter, the largest ongoing project was phase one construction of the MOD headquarters in Kabul (\$108 million).¹⁷⁹ SIGAR has initiated an inspection of that project. In addition, 12 projects were completed this quarter at a cost of \$176 million and two contracts worth \$20 million were terminated.¹⁸⁰

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations and maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$953 million:¹⁸¹

- FY 2015: \$209 million
- FY 2016: \$186 million
- FY 2017: \$186 million
- FY 2018: \$186 million
- FY 2019: \$186 million



While in Afghanistan in March 2014, Special IG Sopko visited the Afghan Ministry of Defense's headquarters building, which is currently under construction. (SIGAR photo by Smythe Anderson)

SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR has initiated an inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended. For more information, see Section 2, page 39.

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions which could impact future cost estimates.¹⁸²

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations.¹⁸³ This quarter, NTM-A's response to SIGAR's request for information on ANA training raised some questions about the status of U.S.-funded training programs. According to NTM-A, the number of ANA students enrolled in training as of March 18 was 4,363.¹⁸⁴ This is the third quarter in which the number of enrollees has fallen. Last quarter, 17,706 ANA personnel were enrolled in some type of training, which was down from 43,942 enrolled in September 2013.¹⁸⁵ NTM-A did not provide an explanation for the quarterly changes in training enrollment. In a separate response to SIGAR, CSTC-A noted that there were 19,655 ANA personnel in training *or* awaiting assignment. An additional 4,701 personnel were ANA cadets.¹⁸⁶

ANA Literacy

Despite its goal to have 100,000 ANSF personnel (both ANA and ANP) functionally literate by December 2014, NTM-A does not know how many trained personnel are still in the ANSF. While NTM-A tracks the number of ANSF personnel that have received training, it does not how many have been lost to attrition.¹⁸⁷ NTM-A told SIGAR that ANSF are solely responsible for tracking their own personnel.¹⁸⁸ NTM-A estimated that “due to attrition less than 20% of the ANSF will be functionally literate by December 2014.”¹⁸⁹

As of this quarter, 85,535 ANSF personnel—including 47,731 ANA personnel—have completed level 3 literacy training. NTM-A expects to reach its goal of 100,000 functionally literate by December 2014. In response to a SIGAR question about the number of ANA personnel who have completed the level 3 training and are still in the ANA, NTM-A said that the answers were “unattainable due to insufficient ANA personnel tracking and skill/education tracking systems.”¹⁹⁰

Since 2009, NTM-A has viewed increasing literacy rates as critical to developing a capable, professional, and sustainable ANSF. An NTM-A commander estimated that the ANSF's overall literacy rate in 2010 was 14%.¹⁹¹ At the time, NTM-A set a goal of having the ANSF achieve 100% proficiency for level 1 literacy and 50% proficiency at level 3 literacy by the end of 2014.¹⁹²

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create,

communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials.”¹⁹³ However, in an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that U.S.-funded literacy contracts do “not require NTM-A/CSTC-A to independently verify students’ proficiency at the three literacy levels.”¹⁹⁴

NTM-A’s goals were based on the ANSF’s 2009 authorized strength of 148,000 personnel rather than on the current authorized strength of 352,000. SIGAR’s audit also found that NTM-A’s ability to measure the effectiveness of the literacy program is limited because none of the contracts requires independent verification of testing for proficiency or identifies recruits in a way that permits accurate tracking as they move on to army and police units.¹⁹⁵

As of February 28, 2014, NTM-A reported that ANA personnel who have completed a literacy program include:¹⁹⁶

- 162,268 level 1 graduates
- 48,988 level 2 graduates
- 47,731 level 3 graduates

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of \$200 million.¹⁹⁷ According to NTM-A, these contractors were providing literacy trainers to both the ANA and the ANP. They have assigned 736 literacy trainers to the ANA.¹⁹⁸

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 297 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 202 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 237 trainers.

The estimated cost of these contracts—including contracts for ANP literacy training—for 2014 is \$25 million.¹⁹⁹

Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force

This quarter, the ANA reported to CSTC-A that 723 women serve in the ANA—672 in the Army and 51 in the Air Force. Of those, 244 were officers, 260 were non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 46 were enlisted, and 173 were cadets. However, according to CSTC-A, Coalition advisors believe that these numbers are overstated and include civilians. CSTC-A noted that, next quarter, the MOD is expected to modify the way personnel are counted to only reflect active duty military personnel and not civilians.²⁰⁰

The current recruitment and retention goal, last published in September 2013, is for 10% of the ANA to be women. To achieve this goal, the ANA has waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups. The latest female officer candidate school class has 29 cadets: 18 Hazara, nine Tajik, and two Sadat. In addition, the ANA is using television advertisements to increase its recruitment of women. U.S. advisors at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that NTM-A/CSTC-A’s goal for achieving literacy in the ANSF was based on outdated ANSF personnel estimates and, therefore, may not be attainable. In addition, CSTC-A’s ability to measure the effectiveness of the literacy training program was limited. None of the three literacy training contracts require independent verification of testing for proficiency or identify and track recruits as they move on to their units. Furthermore, the contracts do not adequately define what constitutes a literacy class. One contractor billed the government for classes held for as little as two hours in a month.

continue to champion the idea that “women in Afghanistan are a talent pool the ANA cannot afford to ignore.” The ANA’s 12-week Basic Warrior Training course includes a class on behavior and expectations of male soldiers who work with ANA women.²⁰¹

Despite progress, the goal of 10% of the ANA to be women remains a distant milestone. Women make up less than 1% of the force. CSTC-A recognized that “training alone is not sufficient to change deep-seated cultural and religion-based attitudes toward women in the ANA. This training is a critical first step, but behavior will almost certainly not change significantly until male ANA personnel have the experience of working alongside well-trained, capable females.”²⁰²

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Public Law 113–66, provides \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.²⁰³

SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit SIGAR is examining U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force to determine the Afghan Air Force’s capability to absorb additional equipment.

SIGAR INQUIRY

In 2008, DOD initiated a program to provide 20 G-222 Italian-built, twin propeller military transport aircraft to the Afghan Air Force at a cost of more than \$486 million. In January 2013, the DOD Inspector General reported that the G-222 project management office and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not properly manage the effort to obtain the spare parts needed to keep the aircraft flight worthy. SIGAR is reviewing the G-222 contract to ensure that the U.S. government does not repeat the mistakes made throughout this nearly half billion dollar program.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

This quarter, the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) reported that the Afghan Air Force has 88 aircraft, excluding aircraft “no longer in service (crashed)” and nine Mi-17 helicopters that are on loan to Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing (SMW).²⁰⁴

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2012 alone, the United States provided more than \$5 billion to support and develop the 6,513-person Afghan Air Force—including over \$3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested an additional \$2.9 billion—including \$1.24 billion for equipment and aircraft—in FYs 2013 and 2014 for the Afghan Air Force, as shown in Table 3.12.

According to CENTCOM, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 97 aircraft:²⁰⁵

- 58 Mi-17 transport helicopters (includes nine on loan to the SMW)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- Six C-182 fixed wing training aircraft
- Five MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- Two C-130H medium transport aircraft

TABLE 3.12

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2014 (\$ THOUSANDS)					
Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013 (request)	FY 2014 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	\$461,877	\$778,604	\$1,805,343	\$169,779	\$1,068,329
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	188,262	192,354
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	473,946	777,748
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	0	0
Total	\$760,299	\$1,683,250	\$2,621,237	\$831,987	\$2,038,431

Sources: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37.



NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan personnel hold a ceremony to award newly certified Afghan Air force maintainers in Herat, Afghanistan. (SIGAR photo by Martin Wilson)

Since last quarter all the Mi-35 attack helicopters (totaling six, of which five were operational) were removed from the Afghan Air Force inventory.²⁰⁶ NATC-A did not provide a reason for the removal of those aircraft.

A SIGAR audit initiated in November 2013 is examining U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force.

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “Afghanistan has a significant need for air support, but the [Afghan Air Force] cannot support more air power than is currently planned.” CNA also noted that the Afghan Air Force is “struggling to find sufficient numbers of qualified recruits to grow to its planned size” and “even if additional recruits are found, only a small number could be fully trained by 2018.”²⁰⁷

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$16.2 billion and disbursed \$15.4 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANP.²⁰⁸

ANP Strength

This quarter, the overall strength of the ANP totaled 153,269 personnel, including 109,184 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,616 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,477 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 5,916 students in training, and 2,076 “standby” personnel awaiting assignment. Of the 109,184 personnel in the AUP, 22,562 were MOI headquarters staff or institutional support staff. In addition, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) were also rolled into the AUP which may, in part, account for the AUP’s 2,400 increase since last quarter.²⁰⁹ Overall, the ANP’s strength increased 3,803 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.13 on the following page.

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its

TABLE 3.13

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Quarterly Change	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Quarterly Change
AUP ^a	110,369	115,527	+5,158	106,784	109,184 ^b	+2,400
ABP	23,090	22,955	-135	20,902	21,616	+714
ANCOP	14,541	14,518	-23	13,597	14,477	+880
NISTA ^c	6,000	6,000	None	5,333	5,916	+583
Standby ^e	-	-	None	-	2,076	+2,076
ANP TOTAL	154,000	159,000	5,000	146,616	153,269	+6,653
CNPA	2,243	^d	^d	2,850	^d	^d
ANP+CNPA TOTAL	156,243	159,000	2,757	149,466	153,269	+3,803

Notes: Q4 2013 data is as of 11/2013; Q1 2014 data as of 2/2014; AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; CNPA = Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan.

^a Includes MOI headquarters and institutional support personnel

^b Includes 22,562 MOI headquarters and institutional support personnel.

^c NISTA = Not In Service for Training

^d CNPA personnel included in AUP total in Q1 2014.

^e Personnel that are pending assignment.

Sources: CENTCOM, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2014; CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014; DCOM MAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2014 and 4/11/2014.

personnel reports. For this reason, the actual operational capability of the ANP is not known.²¹⁰

ANP Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$5.9 billion and disbursed \$5.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.²¹¹ This includes the nearly \$1.27 billion that the United States has contributed to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to support the ANP.²¹²

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through March 31, 2014, the U.S. government had provided \$1.09 billion of ASFF, paid through the LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.²¹³

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$510.7 million per year to fund salaries (\$268.4 million) and incentives (\$242.3 million). This is a decrease from the estimated \$628.1 million reported last quarter—mainly because food will no longer be covered by CSTC-A.²¹⁴

ANP Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.²¹⁵ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment,

vehicles, and communications equipment.²¹⁶ More than 83% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.14.

TABLE 3.14

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,825,066
Vehicles	1,966,075,183	3,744,582
Communications Equipment	211,062,672	544,573
Total	\$2,364,389,332	\$9,114,221

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2014.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported no change in the total cost of the weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition procured for the ANP. As with the ANA, determining the cost of equipment provided to the ANP remains a challenge. CSTC-A reporting in this area has been inconsistent, raising questions about visibility and accountability for U.S. funding used to procure equipment for the ANP. For example, CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of U.S.-funded ANP weapons procured fell from \$369 million in July 2013 to \$137 million in October 2013.²¹⁷ At the time, CSTC-A said the decrease in total cost was due to actual, contracted equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing.²¹⁸ Then CSTC-A said in December 2013, the increase was "caused by inclusion of weapons procured through alternate funding vehicles."²¹⁹ Although the cumulative cost of equipment—a figure which should only go up or stay the same—has declined since July 2013, the total cost this quarter did not change from last quarter, as shown in Table 3.15.

CSTC-A's estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANP has been decreasing until this quarter. In July 2013, CSTC-A stated the total cost of vehicles was \$2.65 billion.²²⁰ In October 2013, CSTC-A stated the actual cost of vehicles procured was \$2.03 billion. According to CSTC-A, the "decrease in the number procured from last quarter (July 2013) is a result of an extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted."²²¹ In December 2013, the total cost of ANP vehicles procured again fell, this time to \$1.97 billion. According to CSTC-A, the reason for the decrease from the prior quarter was "due to actual obligated, contracted equipment pricing being higher."²²² It is not clear why a higher price would result in an overall *decrease* in the cost of vehicles procured to date. The total cost this quarter did not change from last quarter.

The United States has also procured \$312 million in ammunition for the ANP and \$1.5 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANP. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.²²³

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR sent a letter to CSTC-A and NTM-A expressing concern that the United States may be unwittingly helping to pay the salaries of non-existent members—or "ghost workers"—of the ANP. For more information, see Section 2, page 41.

TABLE 3.15

CUMULATIVE COST TO PROCURE U.S.-FUNDED ANP VEHICLES DECLINING	
Date	Cumulative Cost
July 2013	\$2,646.3
October 2013	2,029.4
January 2014	1,966.1
April 2014	1,966.1

Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, and 3/31/2014.

ANP Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated \$3.3 billion and disbursed \$2.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.²²⁴ At that time, the United States had completed 636 infrastructure projects (valued at \$3 billion), with another 97 projects ongoing (\$544 million) and 11 planned (\$55 million), according to CSTC-A.²²⁵

This quarter, 25 projects valued at \$116 million were completed and four valued at \$73 million were terminated. The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were administrative facilities (\$59.5 million) and building and utilities (\$34.3 million) at the MOI Headquarters and an ANCOP patrol station in Helmand (\$28.5 million).²²⁶

According to CSTC-A, the projected O&M, sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$485 million:²²⁷

- FY 2015: \$102 million
- FY 2016: \$98 million
- FY 2017: \$95 million
- FY 2018: \$95 million
- FY 2019: \$95 million

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions which could impact future cost estimates.²²⁸

ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANP and MOI training and operations.²²⁹ This quarter, according to NTM-A, the United States is no longer funding any ANP training courses. Since the beginning of 2014, a previously U.S.-funded ANP training course that was being held in Turkey is now NATO-funded. NTM-A continues to provide advisor support to the ANP.²³⁰ Last quarter, 9,513 ANP personnel were enrolled in some type of U.S.-funded training, according to NTM-A.²³¹

ANP Literacy

NTM-A's literacy program for the ANP uses the same three contractors, follows the same curriculum, and uses the same standards as the ANA's literacy program described earlier in this section.²³² Like the ANA, NTM-A tracks the number of ANP personnel that have received training, but NTM-A does not know how many trained personnel are still in the ANP.²³³ NTM-A told SIGAR that the ANSF is solely responsible for tracking its personnel.²³⁴

As of February 28, 2014, ANP personnel who have completed a literacy program include:²³⁵

- 92,740 level 1 graduates
- 57,395 level 2 graduates
- 37,804 level 3 graduates

SIGAR AUDIT

In an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that NTM-A/CSTC-A's goal for achieving literacy in the ANSF was based on outdated ANSF personnel estimates and, therefore, may not be attainable.

However, in an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that U.S.-funded literacy contracts do “not require NTM-A/CSTC-A to independently verify students’ proficiency at the three literacy levels.”²³⁶

According to NTM-A, the contractors were providing 454 literacy trainers to the ANP.²³⁷

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 263 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 61 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 130 trainers.

Women in the ANP

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but progress has been slow toward reaching the goal to have 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of 2014. This quarter, ANP personnel included 1,743 women—226 officers, 728 NCOs, and 789 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A.²³⁸ This is an increase of 539 women since August 22, 2011.²³⁹

CSTC-A said that “the ANP is currently focused more on finding secure areas (i.e., positions with appropriate facilities for females) for recruits than increasing recruiting to reach this target.”²⁴⁰ Despite an increase this quarter, women make up only 1% of the force.

However, according to CSTC-A, the Minister of Interior recently signed off on a plan that would emphasize achieving the goal of 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of solar year 1393 (March 20, 2015). CSTC-A supports the MOI’s efforts by providing advisors on the recruitment and training of women. This advising has focused on recruiting and enrolling women in “safe units in order to prevent much of the abuse and harassment that has been reported by international agencies.”²⁴¹ In addition, Coalition advisors have created an ANP training curriculum on human, gender, and child rights. As of this quarter, 25,059 ANP personnel have received that training. The course covers topics such as eliminating violence against women, international criteria for human rights, and self-defense for women in law enforcement.²⁴²

The FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 113–66, provides \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.²⁴³

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of March 31, 2014, the United States has funded construction of 176 ANSF medical facilities valued at \$155 million with an additional 11 projects ongoing valued at \$15 million. In addition, Coalition forces obligated \$11.7 million in contracts to provide the ANSF with medical training, according to CSTC-A. Since 2006, Coalition forces have procured and fielded \$48 million in ANSF medical equipment.²⁴⁴

SECURITY

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the ANSF health care system had 966 physicians out of 1,203 authorized. Of these, 611 were assigned to the ANA and 355 were assigned to the ANP. The ANSF also had 1,889 nurses, physicians' assistants, and other medical personnel out of 2,234 authorized. In addition, the ANSF had trained 4,828 medics since 2010, but it was not clear if all of those trained medics were still in service. According to NTM-A, 5,022 medic positions are authorized. NTM-A also noted that 1,288 trauma medics had been trained by DynCorp and were currently equipped and working in their field.²⁴⁵

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Since FY 2002, the U.S. Department of State has provided more than \$283 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).²⁴⁶ Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct IEDs.²⁴⁷

From January 1 through December 31, 2013, State-funded implementing partners cleared nearly 24 million square meters (more than nine square miles) of minefields, according to the most recent data from the PM/WRA.²⁴⁸ An estimated 518 million square meters (more than 200 square miles) of contaminated areas remain to be cleared, as shown in Table 3.16. The PM/WRA defines a "minefield" as an area contaminated by landmines, and a "contaminated area" as an area contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war.²⁴⁹

On April 9, *The Washington Post* reported that "dozens of children have been killed or wounded" after encountering unexploded ordnance—grenades, rockets, and mortar shells—the remnants of U.S. military

TABLE 3.16

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2013						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1–9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1–12/31/2014	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
TOTAL	12,496	143,035	307,564	9,540,592	23,523,200	518,000,000

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: DOS, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2014.

munitions.²⁵⁰ According to the article, the military has left about 800 square miles of land that once served as firing ranges. So far, the U.S. military has only cleared about 3% of the contaminated land. The rest of the land could take two to five years to clear at an expected cost of \$250 million. However, due to lack of planning, funding has not yet been approved.²⁵¹

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of March 31, 2014, the United States has provided more than \$7 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. This amount includes funding from multiple funds including ASFF, the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund, the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) fund, and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). [Note: This is an update that differs from the printed version of this report].²⁵²

The United States' drug control policy has shifted in recent years from eradication to interdiction and agricultural development assistance that aims to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods.²⁵³ The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is the lead government agency for developing counternarcotics policy, coordinating activities with other governmental and international agencies as well as implementing various drug interdiction and reduction programs. The MCN is also working to insert counternarcotics into the activities of the entire government by "mainstreaming" counternarcotics efforts into other existing nation strategies and programs.²⁵⁴

The Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which includes the Counter Narcotics Tribunal and the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), investigates, prosecutes and tries major narcotics and narcotics-related corruption cases. The CJTF is a vetted, self-contained unit comprised of investigators, prosecutors, and first instance and appellate court judges.²⁵⁵ The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) conducts interdiction operations with DOD and ISAF elements providing training and support.²⁵⁶ USAID funds agriculture and alternative livelihood programs, which are discussed in the Economic and Social Development section of this report on page 179.

According to an April 2014 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on drug use, "Afghanistan is the world's largest producer and cultivator of opium poppies," accounting for nearly "three quarters of the world's illicit opium."²⁵⁷ The latest UNODC Opium Survey estimates that 209,000 hectares are under opium-poppy cultivation, an all-time high and a 36% increase from 2012.²⁵⁸ This expansion occurred despite the goal outlined in Afghanistan's draft National Drug Control Strategy for 2012–2016 of reducing the cultivation of poppy by 50% from its 2011 baseline of 131,000 hectares.²⁵⁹ Eighty-nine percent of the opium fields are located in nine provinces in the country's southern and western regions, as shown in Figure 3.27 on the following page.²⁶⁰

SIGAR TESTIMONY


In his January 15 testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Special Inspector General John F. Sopko told lawmakers that the narcotics situation in Afghanistan "is dire with little prospect for improvement in 2014 or beyond." He also said "the expanding cultivation and trafficking of drugs is one of the most significant factors putting the entire U.S. and donor investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan at risk." Noting that the United States has not made counternarcotics efforts a priority, he outlined several steps that SIGAR is taking to augment counternarcotic efforts. For more information, see SIGAR's website www.sigar.mil.

SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is assessing U.S. government efforts to develop and strengthen the capacity and sustainability of the CNPA's provincial units.

FIGURE 3.27

OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE, IN HECTARES, 2013



Note: A hectare (ha) is about 2.5 acres.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 13.

Opium cultivation has significant social, political, and economic repercussions for the country and the region. The drug trade undermines the Afghan government because it funds the insurgency, fuels corruption, and distorts the economy. Moreover, the number of domestic addicts is growing. Earlier this year the executive director of UNODC pointed out that “more must be done to confront [the] drug trade, [and the] rise in domestic addiction.”²⁶¹ Domestic addiction poses a serious threat to public health, good governance, and sustainable development.

Drug Use in Afghanistan

The most recent Afghanistan National Urban Drug Use Survey, conducted by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in 2012 estimated the number of adult drug users (aged 15 years and older) above 1.3 million, or more than 7.5% of the population.²⁶² An earlier 2009 UNODC survey shows how the problem has been increasing. The 2009 survey estimated that one million Afghans were dependent on drugs.²⁶³ UNODC surveys have shown a climb in regular opium usage from 150,000

users in 2005 to approximately 230,000 in 2009 (a 53% increase). Meanwhile, regular heroin users had grown from 50,000 in 2005 to approximately 120,000 in 2009 or 140% increase. The 2009 UNODC survey also revealed a high number of parents—as high as 50% in the north and south of the country—providing opium to their children.²⁶⁴


INL funds a number of drug prevention and treatment initiatives as well as eradication, interdiction, and other law enforcement efforts.²⁶⁵ However, according to State, U.S. and Afghan efforts have contributed to the concentration of poppy cultivation in limited, remote, and largely insecure areas of the country.²⁶⁶

Governor Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Afghan government’s Governor Led Eradication (GLE) Program. The MCN, in partnership with UNODC, is responsible for verifying poppy cultivation and eradication.²⁶⁷ According to INL, the Afghan government’s eradication target for 2014 is 22,500 hectares. In 2013, governors eradicated 7,348 hectares, a decline from the 9,672 hectares eradicated in 2012, but still above the 2010 level of 2,316 hectares and the 2011 level of 3,810 hectares.²⁶⁸ Although poppy cultivation expanded in 2013, INL told SIGAR that the MCN has placed increased focus on eradication in provinces close to poppy-free status in order to further increase the number of poppy-free provinces.²⁶⁹ Since 2008, eradication efforts have affected on average less than 4% of the annual national poppy crop, as shown in Figure 3.28.

FIGURE 3.28

HECTARES OF POPPY CULTIVATED AND ERADICATED, 2008–2013 (THOUSANDS)



Note: A hectare is 10,000 square meters, or almost 2.5 acres.

Sources: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2012*, 6/2012, pp.27-28; UNDOC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings*, 11/2012, p.3; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, pp. 17-18, 32, 35.

GLE occurs at different times of the year depending on the climate of the province, according to INL. Results are tracked on a cumulative basis by the MCN, and are subjected to UNODC satellite verification on a rolling basis.²⁷⁰

In preparation for the 2014 eradication season, the MCN hosted a December conference for governors at which provincial leaders determined eradication targets. Another conference was held in January for the Afghan line ministries to coordinate efforts to support the GLE campaign. On January 26, 2014, a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between INL and the MCN to renew the GLE program for another year. The MOU also modified a few aspects of the program, including new advance payment regulations and the creation of a new joint INL-MCN bank account.²⁷¹

The 2014 eradication season began on March 3, 2014, in Helmand. Kandahar, Farah, and Nimroz are scheduled to begin eradication campaigns in mid-April.²⁷² The fact that this year's poppy-growing cycle and eradication efforts coincided with Afghan elections is likely to negatively impact eradication levels in 2014, as security forces were less available to support eradication activities.²⁷³

Good Performer's Initiative

INL also supports the MCN's efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI). Under the current terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for \$1 million in GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, according to INL. INL told SIGAR that the completion of GPI projects in a given province incentivizes continued counternarcotics performance in the year ahead, shows provincial leadership and citizens that there are tangible benefits to countering poppy cultivation, and reinforces the writ of the government in the province, district, and community.²⁷⁴ Since the start of the GPI program in 2007, more than 200 development projects either have been completed or are in process in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces, including: school construction, road and bridge projects, irrigation structures, farm machinery projects, and hospital and clinic construction.²⁷⁵

As of February 28, 2014, a total of 209 GPI projects with a value of \$106.7 million had been approved. Of those, 108 were completed, 95 were ongoing, and six were nearing completion.²⁷⁶ INL is collaborating with the MCN to redesign the GPI program to incentivize action on counternarcotics issues and focus on support for rural alternative livelihoods.²⁷⁷

Demand Reduction

With INL support, the Afghan government has established drug treatment centers to help address domestic drug dependency throughout the country. Nevertheless, as described in the Afghan government's latest Drug Demand Reduction Policy, 99% of Afghanistan's drug addicts are not receiving

treatment at the 50 drug treatment centers currently providing services.²⁷⁸ During this quarter, INL continued work with UNODC and the **Colombo Plan** to support treatment centers and rehabilitation services for men, women, and children in Afghanistan. INL supports 76 treatment programs of the 113 programs in the country.²⁷⁹ This quarter it provided support for the training of clinical staff, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand reduction, while continuing to implement a transition plan to transfer 13 treatment programs to Afghan authorities. The transition plan includes building staff capacity and promoting continued cooperation between the MCN and MOPH. INL's transition plan will continue through 2017, with additional programs transitioning to Afghan control each year.²⁸⁰ INL said it seeks to create uniformity among the treatment centers nationwide and help incorporate existing Afghan treatment professionals into the Afghan government civil service structure. Under the plan, treatment programs will transition to the Afghan government as INL support to individual programs slowly decreases over the coming years.²⁸¹

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

INL also funds the Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program which aims to promote poppy-free status for provinces. CNCE, implemented through Sayara Media Communications, targets farmers through national and local public awareness and media campaigns in opium poppy-growing areas. According to INL, CNCE is implemented in close coordination with the MCN, ensuring that messages are distributed through the media, provincial conferences, shuras, scholarly events, and youth outreach events. CNCE includes a capacity-building component to ensure the MCN develops the capability to take direct responsibility for CN media relations, public awareness, and behavioral change activities, with the goal of ensuring lasting success beyond conclusion of the program.²⁸²

Aga Khan Foundation Grant

INL administers a grant to the Aga Khan Foundation to help sustain the shift away from poppy cultivation in six key provinces: Bamyan, Takhar, Badakhshan, Daykundi, Samangan, and Baghlan. The grant allows the foundation to work with district- and cluster-level development councils, local NGOs, and provincial line departments to increase licit livelihood opportunities as a platform for sustaining transitions away from a dependence on poppy cultivation. The grant aims to strengthen community-level linkages between the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and the Afghan National Development Strategy.²⁸³

International Cooperation

The United States was among the 127 countries that attended the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting in Vienna, Austria, on

Colombo Plan: The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific was instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization for the furtherance of economic and social development of the region's nations. It was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1950 with seven founding member countries and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan's Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals, a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in the process of developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Sources: The Colombo Plan Secretariat website, History, www.colombo-plan.org; INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2013, p. 20.

March 13–21, 2014.²⁸⁴ The CND, a United Nations body responsible for drug control matters, has two functions. It oversees the application of international drug control treaties and acts as the governing body for the UNODC, including approving the UN International Drug Control Programme's budget.²⁸⁵ As part of those responsibilities, the CND monitors the world drug situation, develops strategies on international drug control, and recommends measures to combat the world drug problem, including through reducing demand for drugs, promoting alternative development initiatives, and adopting supply reduction measures. The CND provides a forum for the United States to work with multilateral partners to coordinate and discuss global drug issues, including illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.²⁸⁶

The 2014 CND meeting addressed a number of issues relevant to the growing narcotics problem in Afghanistan, including: supply and demand reduction, international cooperation, and UNODC activities. In addition, special side events included discussions on Afghan and Pakistani customs and the trafficking of Afghan opiates. The CND members have begun planning for the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs to take place in 2016.²⁸⁷

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building Program

This quarter, the MCN and INL signed the MCN Capacity Building Program/Advisor Support MOU. The program, which was renewed for 18 months, provides funding for 24 local and national advisors and helps build the MCN's capacity. INL tracks and evaluates the program's effectiveness using a performance measuring plan being implemented to track and evaluate the advisors' effectiveness.²⁸⁸ According to INL, this process not only helps stakeholders monitor the success of the Advisor Support program, but also improves the MCN human resources department's employee evaluation practices. In addition, this quarter INL assisted in the installation of information technology equipment for the MCN's headquarters.²⁸⁹

Effect of the Coalition Drawdown on Counternarcotics Operations

According to DOD, the drawdown of Coalition forces has hurt the CNPA and other Afghan counternarcotics agencies. The impact has been most pronounced in Helmand and Kandahar—the focus of the Coalition surge and subsequent withdrawal. Vetted counternarcotics units like the Intelligence and Investigation Unit, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), Technical Investigative Unit, and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) have also suffered from the drawdown, most significantly by losing access to ISAF-provided enablers.²⁹⁰

These factors have, in part, resulted in a decrease in operations and seizures. According to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database, these decreases included the following:²⁹¹

- Counternarcotic operations decreased 17% (624 in FY 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge to 518 in FY 2013)
- Heroin seizures decreased 77% (10,982 kg in FY 2011 to 2,489 kg in FY 2013)
- Opium seizures decreased 57% (98,327 kg in FY 2011 to 41,350 kg in FY 2013)

The decrease in overall counternarcotic missions was likely the result of reduced partnering of ISAF with Afghan forces conducting counternarcotic operations. According to DOD, the majority of Afghan seizures are a result of routine police operations near population centers or transportation corridors, such as at checkpoints or border crossings. Drug labs, storage sites, and major trafficking networks are concentrated in rural areas that are increasingly off limits to Afghan forces due to the ISAF drawdown and declining security in these areas. Despite the marked decreases in drug seizures, DOD told SIGAR that the Afghan counternarcotics units have shown increased ability over the past year to successfully conduct complex counter-network drug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance.²⁹²

INL maintains helicopters at Kandahar Airfield to support U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) missions in southern Afghanistan. The CNPA operates at both the national and provincial levels; CNPA detachments exist in both Kandahar and Helmand.²⁹³

Interdiction Operations

From January 1, 2014, to March 14, 2014, Afghan security and law enforcement forces conducted 66 drug interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 71 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon and search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the seizures of the following narcotics contraband:²⁹⁴

- 7,701 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 2,873 kg of opium
- 269 kg of heroin
- 4,654 kg of precursor chemicals

The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to Coalition mentors.²⁹⁵

According to DOD, most interdiction activities occurred in eastern Afghanistan and in Kabul Province. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of the country. This shift is

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, p. viii.

likely a result of the Coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul Province are generally less than the threat in the south and southwest. The U.S. forces conducted only one unilateral drug operation during this reporting period, detaining one individual and seizing 200 kg of marijuana. All other U.S. interdiction efforts were partnered with Afghan forces as ISAF continued its drawdown.²⁹⁶

Interagency groups, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. Both CJIATF-N and IOCC integrated data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt-narco-insurgent elements. All operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.²⁹⁷

INL and DOD share in developing Afghanistan's counternarcotics police vetted units. For example, DOD and INL both provide funding for the CNPA's NIU. DOD funding helped build three Regional Law Enforcement Centers (RLECs), while INL funding helped pay sustainment costs for the Kunduz RLEC, handed over to the Afghans in 2013, and the Herat RLEC, which is still funded by INL. DOD also funded training for the provincial CNPA and funds mentors who are based at the CNPA headquarters. At the operational level, DEA and specialized CNPA units such as the NIU typically use a mix of INL/Airwing and Afghan SMW aircraft during operations.²⁹⁸

Interdiction Results

Since 2008, a total of 2,649 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,712 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:²⁹⁹

- 736,810 kg of hashish
- 368,398 kg of opium
- 47,214 kg of morphine
- 27,359 kg of heroin
- 416,591 kg of precursor chemicals


However, as shown in Figure 3.29, seizures have affected on average only 1% of the total opium produced annually.

Aviation Support

During this reporting period, Department of State aircraft provided a total of 223.7 flight hours, conducted 123 sorties, moved 642 passengers, and transported 35,437 pounds of cargo.³⁰⁰ According to INL, State's "Embassy Air" will support INL poppy reconnaissance flights in late March. Counternarcotics support to the DEA consisted of 10.3 flight hours supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission profiles; 34.4 flight hours supporting interdiction efforts; and 146 flight hours supporting

FIGURE 3.29

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCED AND SEIZED (2008–2013) (THOUSANDS OF KILOGRAMS)



Sources: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2012*, 6/2012, p.28; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings*, 11/2012, p.3; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 3/28/2014.

Afghan NIU and DEA passenger movements. Additionally, DEA support included 17.9 flight hours during training. During the month of February, a task force consisting of DEA, DOD Special Operations Forces, and host-nation personnel supported a mission originating from Kandahar Airfield that resulted in the confiscation and destruction of 1,120 kg of marijuana and hashish in addition to the collection of two persons under confinement. Embassy Air also supported the SIGAR delegation from March 9 to March 12.³⁰¹