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SECURITY

As of September 30, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$61.5 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds (\$57.3 billion) were channeled through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the \$57.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$51.8 billion had been obligated and \$48.9 billion disbursed as of September 30, 2014.¹³⁴

This section gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges of transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of this year.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Key issues and events this quarter include the signing of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), the change of command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the international community's renewed commitment to Afghanistan's future at the NATO summit in Wales, the transition of ISAF to its new support mission, the transition of convoy and facility security responsibilities from the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and ongoing concerns about ANSF attrition levels. In addition, the United Nations (UN) reported a continuing trend of increased violence in Afghanistan.

Bilateral Security Agreement Finally Signed

After prolonged uncertainty and negotiation, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral security agreement that, among other things, defines the legal status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. The BSA—or formally the Security Cooperation and Defense Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—was

signed on September 30, 2014, one day after the inauguration of new Afghan president Ashraf Ghani. President Ghani and newly appointed Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah were on hand to witness U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham and Afghan National Security Advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar sign the agreement.¹³⁵

Although the BSA does not establish how many U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan, it is a necessary condition for them to remain after 2014.¹³⁶ President Obama announced in May that U.S. forces will be reduced to approximately 9,800 by the beginning of 2015.¹³⁷ The BSA enumerates protections that will be afforded to Department of Defense (DOD) military and civilian personnel. As under the 2003 status of forces agreement, under the BSA contractors are not immune from prosecution under the Afghan legal system, but U.S. soldiers are.¹³⁸ Among the many issues covered in the BSA, the agreement also:¹³⁹

- reaffirms the United States' obligation to develop, equip, and seek funding to support the ANSF
- establishes agreement to develop measures for analyzing Afghanistan's use of defense and security resources
- requires semiannual assessments of actual performance of Afghanistan's use of defense and security resources
- develops a process for making timely cooperative assessments of internal and external threats to Afghanistan
- directs that specific recommendations are made on enhancing information and intelligence sharing
- makes available facilities and areas, without fee, to U.S. forces and authorizes those forces to control entry into those facilities and areas
- authorizes U.S. forces to move freely by land, water, or air without being subject to fees
- provides for the United States to enter into contracts in Afghanistan and directs both countries to "work together to improve transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of contracting processes in Afghanistan with a view to preventing misuse and bad contracting practices."

The new BSA arrives as most foreign troops are leaving and as the Taliban is increasingly attacking areas around the country in an effort to regain control. According to DOD, the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 will encourage the international community to continue to provide financial assistance to reconstruction programs, allowing Afghanistan to maintain progress in the security, governance, and economic sectors.¹⁴⁰

Following the signing of the BSA, a Status of Forces Agreement was signed by the Afghan national-security advisor and NATO's senior civilian representative to Afghanistan, Maurits R. Jochems.¹⁴¹ These agreements provide the legal framework for the United States, NATO, and its partner nations to continue their commitment to train, advise, and assist the ANSF.

NATO is expected to contribute 2,700 to 2,900 troops, bringing the total post-2014 international troop presence to 12,500 to 12,700 personnel. Those numbers will decline over the next year.¹⁴²

ISAF Change of Command

On August 26, 2014, U.S. Army General John F. Campbell assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph F. Dunford. Senior Afghan, NATO, and U.S. officials, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Martin E. Dempsey, attended the ceremony.¹⁴³ General Campbell, who is on his third tour in Afghanistan, will serve as the last ISAF commander before the NATO transition to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).¹⁴⁴ The U.S. Senate confirmed General Dunford as the 36th commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps on July 23, 2014.¹⁴⁵



U.S. Army General John Campbell takes command of ISAF, August 26, 2014. (U.S. Air Force photo)

Wales Summit Declaration

On September 4, 2014, NATO allies and ISAF partners reaffirmed their intent to conduct a noncombat train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan beyond 2014 at a summit in Wales, United Kingdom.¹⁴⁶ In a declaration, participating heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to the RSM, as well as their support for the financial sustainment of the ANSF, and for a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership.¹⁴⁷ As the ISAF mission comes to a close at the end of this year, the ANSF will assume full responsibility for national security.¹⁴⁸ The international community reaffirmed its 2012 Chicago Summit commitment to provide over \$1 billion annually for ANSF sustainment through 2017.¹⁴⁹ Participants also restated their aim that the Afghan government should assume full financial responsibility for their security forces no later than 2024.¹⁵⁰

Resolute Support Mission

NATO's new RSM advisory mission will commence at the beginning of 2015. The RSM will advise the security ministries, ANA at the corps level, police at the zone level, and Afghan special-operations forces at the tactical level. This noncombat mission will initially include approximately 12,000 troops. Four NATO members have agreed to serve as "framework nations": Turkey will lead in the Kabul capital area, Germany in the north, Italy in the west, and the United States in the south and east.¹⁵¹

ISAF has developed a security-forces assistance framework that emphasizes improving the capacity of the defense and interior ministries and their associated institutions to perform eight essential functions:¹⁵²

- Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
- Internal Controls to Assure Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight
- Rule of Law and Governance
- Force Generation

“Tomorrow is going to begin just like today with the men and women of ISAF focused on training, advising and assisting the Afghan Security Forces as they secure the Afghan people. Tomorrow will begin just like today, coalition and Afghan forces taking the fight to the common enemy.”

—General Joseph F. Dunford

Source: ISAF change of command ceremony, “Gen. Campbell assumes ISAF command from Gen. Dunford,” 8/26/2014.

- Force Sustainment
- Command and Control
- Intelligence
- Strategic Communications

As the RSM begins its work next year, SIGAR will follow its progress in supporting the Afghan government and its security forces.

Transition of Afghan Public Protection Force Site Security Responsibilities Remain Unresolved

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), was established to provide contract-based facility and convoy-security services in Afghanistan following President Karzai's 2010 decree prohibiting operation of private security companies.¹⁵³ However, on February 17, 2014, the Council of Ministers, acting on then-President Karzai's orders, directed the APPF to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP.¹⁵⁴ The United States has provided more than \$51 million to support the APPF, which provided security for many U.S.-funded programs and projects.¹⁵⁵

In response to a SIGAR request for information about why the APPF was dissolved, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) explained that the Minister of Interior on June 10, 2014, told ISAF that the APPF "worked," but President Karzai "was not happy with its existence."¹⁵⁶ It was not clear why President Karzai was dissatisfied with a program he created. According to NTM-A, four committees were tasked to develop a plan for transitioning APPF operations into the ANP. Although the committees reportedly completed their work, the Minister of Interior, under considerable pressure from President Karzai, was dissatisfied with the progress of the transition and ordered the APPF's convoy-security operations to transfer to the ANP on May 22, 2014.¹⁵⁷

U.S. concerns about legal restrictions on using some U.S. reconstruction funding to pay for police services resulted, to some degree, in the MOI revising their plan.¹⁵⁸ One of those concerns was that the United States could end up paying double for ANP security services: once under terms established by the UN Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and again in direct convoy-security fees.¹⁵⁹ Following conversations between the MOI, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and USAID, the MOI restructured its security services into three parts:

- Convoy security will be provided by the Convoy Transportation Guard Brigade (CTGB). CTGB, under the MOI, will provide fee-for-service convoy-escort services, using uniformed civilian contract employees. According to NTM-A, CTGB was 70% manned at the end of July. According to ISAF's legal advisor, however, the final method by which convoy transportation guards are organized and paid is still in flux.¹⁶⁰
- The APPF will continue to provide security at fixed-site facilities.¹⁶¹

- The APPF-supported national business-operations center will continue to provide scheduling and invoicing for security services, collect funds, and reimburse the CTGB and APPF for guard salaries and operating expenses until an alternative is established. NTM-A reported that the Afghan National Security Council rejected MOI's proposal to select a risk-management company to perform these functions.¹⁶²

As of August 2014, the APPF provided security for two ISAF forward operating bases (FOBs): the New Kabul Compound (at a cost of \$2.26 million) and Camp Morehead (\$704,600). Private security companies secured an additional 36 FOBs, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).¹⁶³

According to NTM-A, the official number of APPF personnel is in flux due to *tashkil* changes, elimination of civilian billets assumed by the MOI, and ANP assumption of functions. The most recent APPF unofficial personnel count is 16,981 authorized and 16,015 assigned.¹⁶⁴

NTM-A said "Discussions indicate MOI is working to establish a process closely resembling APPF in order to mitigate concerns."¹⁶⁵ This again raises the question of why the APPF is being dissolved.

Tashkil: List of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI that detail authorized staff positions and equipment items. The word means "organization" in Dari.

Source: GAO, GAO-08-661, *Afghanistan Security*, 6/2008, p. 18.

ANSF Attrition Remains a Concern

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANSF. Between September 2013 and August 2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, the ANA continues to suffer serious combat losses. Between March 2012 and August 2014, more than 2,850 ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 14,600 were wounded in action (WIA).¹⁶⁷

For the ANP, attrition fell from 2.35% for the month of July to 1.68% in the month of August, the latest period for which SIGAR was provided data. Unlike the ANA, the ANP does not report on personnel present for duty, absent without leave, or killed or wounded in action. The ANP remains short of its goal to maintain less than 1.4% monthly attrition.¹⁶⁸

UN Reports Afghan Violence Continuing to Rise

According to the UN Secretary-General, the conflict in Afghanistan continues to intensify. In his September 9 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said insurgent groups, international terrorists, and associated networks took advantage of the protracted electoral crisis and political uncertainty to mount major assaults around the country.¹⁶⁹ As reflected in Table 3.6 on the following page, the number of security incidents continued to increase, with this period reflecting the second-highest level of violence, after 2011, since the fall of the Taliban.¹⁷⁰

The majority of the security incidents once again occurred in the south, south-east, and east.¹⁷¹ The UN recorded 211 assassinations and 30 failed assassination attempts, an increase of 7.1% for both over the same period

TABLE 3.6

NUMBER OF SECURITY INCIDENTS			
Time Period	Number of Incidents	Number of Days	Average Number of Incidents per Day
November 16, 2013–February 15, 2014	4,649	92	50.5
March 1–May 31, 2014	5,864	92	63.7
June 1–August 15, 2014	5,456	76	71.8
Total	15,969	260	61.4

Source: UN Security Council, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 9/9/2014, p. 6, 6/18/2014, p. 5, and 3/7/2014, p. 5.

in 2013.¹⁷² Armed clashes (47.3%) and improvised explosive device (IED) events (29.1%) accounted for 76.4% of all security incidents.¹⁷³ The UN reported that some insurgents attempted not only to capture but also to hold territory through the use of “swarm attacks” consisting of several hundred attackers attempting to overwhelm district administrative centers and security checkpoints.¹⁷⁴

Afghan and American commanders say the ANSF is holding well near main cities, but are being tested as more remote districts come under heavy attacks.¹⁷⁶ Afghan interior minister Mohammad Omar Daudzai

“In every job I had we got things done that I think made our Army better, and it was done by other people. All I did was try to pull people in the right direction and they went out and did great things.”

—Major General Harold J. Green

Source: WJLA, “Army Maj. Gen. Harold Greene, slain in Afghanistan, buried with honors at Arlington National Cemetery,” 8/14/2014.

In Tribute to Major General Harold Joseph ‘Harry’ Greene

Army Major General Harold J. Greene, Deputy Commanding General of CSTC-A, was honored by a memorial ceremony on August 13. MG Greene was killed by an Afghan soldier while visiting the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul on August 5. The two-star general was the highest-ranking U.S. military officer to be killed in a hostile action since the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 9/11, and the highest-ranking officer killed in an active combat zone since the Vietnam War. U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham, Deputy Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, General Joseph F. Dunford, Afghan Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Afghan General Shir Karimi, Afghan General Mohammad Ayub Salangi, and ISAF and SIGAR personnel



(U.S. Army photo)

attended the ceremony. On August 24, the Major General Harold J. Greene Building at ISAF headquarters in Kabul was dedicated as a residential facility for the multinational coalition service members and civilians. The general was interred with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.¹⁷⁵

testified to the Afghan parliament that the past six months had been the deadliest of the 13-year-long conflict, with 1,368 ANP personnel killed and 2,370 wounded since the beginning of the current Afghan year. Police casualties have generally run at twice the level of Afghan Army casualties through much of the war.¹⁷⁷

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to ISAF, 25,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of September 29, 2014, a decrease of 7,800 since June 1, 2014.¹⁷⁸ Approximately 12,154 Coalition forces were serving as of September 3, 2014.¹⁷⁹ On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced U.S. forces in Afghanistan will reduce to approximately 9,800 by January 2015 and will be reduced further throughout 2015.¹⁸⁰ Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,208 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,890 were wounded as of October 1, 2014.¹⁸¹

Coalition Forces Withdraw

Slovakia's mission in Afghanistan came to an end with a ceremony at Kandahar Airfield on September 22, 2014. The Slovaks advised one of the ANA mobile strike force kandaks and provided base defense.

Source: ISAF News, "Slovak land force ends mission in Afghanistan," 9/24/2014.

DESPITE WEAKNESSES IN CONTRACTING IDENTIFIED TWO YEARS AGO, DOD'S ACCOUNTABILITY REMAINS A CONCERN

In January 2012, more than 100 representatives of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), USFOR-A, ISAF Joint Command, contracting organizations, and others, held a contracting *shura* or conference in Kabul.¹⁸² The conference identified weaknesses in contracting including the "failure to enforce existing standards, policies and procedures by all entities" involved in federal contracting in Afghanistan.¹⁸³ DOD reported to Congress in June 2012 that the shura "identified and agreed to pursue 26 actions to improve contract oversight and management," and stated that "Actions are well under way."¹⁸⁴ SIGAR has repeatedly asked about the follow-up steps for the shura, whose summary memo also noted "poor accountability" for enforcing standards, policies and procedures.¹⁸⁵

As noted in the July 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, DOD has provided SIGAR with descriptions of steps taken to address the findings of the 2012 contracting conference. But it is unable to provide instances of people or entities being held accountable for failing to meet contracting standards.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, an October 2014 SIGAR interview with a Pentagon official indicated that DOD was not aware of any tracking mechanisms or metrics in place to determine whether the 26 follow-up actions, if implemented, had achieved desired results.¹⁸⁷ The official offered to seek additional information, and noted that DOD has faced several challenges to contracting in Afghanistan, among them short deployment times, rapid turnover, and the ongoing drawdown of personnel in country.

SIGAR recognizes the difficulties of contract management and oversight in combat zones and welcomes DOD's initiative in launching follow-up actions, but finds its apparent shortfalls in tracking, results assessment, and accountability unfortunate and troubling. As DOD's own current action plan notes, "Operational contract support (OCS) is a core defense capability and a critical component of total force readiness"; addressing shortfalls and transforming capability requires "an 'owner' for every task" and "continuous monitoring."¹⁸⁸ This is a sound judgment on an issue that is not confined to military doctrine. For example, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology presentation on "Project Management 101" lists "Track, Control, Report and Review" as a basic step in project management.¹⁸⁹ In view of the costs and mission criticality of the continuing heavy reliance on contractors in Afghanistan and in DOD total-force planning, more energetic and thorough effort in tracking OCS-improvement results and monitoring accountability for noncompliance appears to be needed.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of data on the number of ANSF personnel authorized, assigned, and trained.

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter, ANSF's assigned force strength was 338,856, according to ISAF.¹⁹⁰ This is 96% of the ANSF's end-strength goal of 352,000 personnel. DOD's goal to reach 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014) has mostly been met.¹⁹¹ The ANA is within 4.5%, the ANP is within 2.3%, and the Afghan Air Force (expected to reach its goal at the end of the year) is within 13.5% of their target end strength, as shown in Table 3.7.

TABLE 3.7

ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, AUGUST 20, 2014			
ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 8/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	178,617 (96%)	-8,383 (-4.5%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	153,317 (98%)	-3,683 (-2.3%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,922 (87%)	-1,078 (-13.5%)
ANSF Total	352,000	338,856 (96%)	-13,144 (-3.7%)

Note: Numbers updated since publication of the print edition.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2014; SIGAR analysis 10/2/2014.

ANA Strength Includes Civilians

SIGAR has long been concerned about civilians being counted as part of ANA force strength. Over the years, CSTC-A has sometimes counted civilians in the ANA's force strength and sometimes not counted them, as reflected in Table 3.8.

TABLE 3.8

CIVILIANS COUNTED TOWARD ANA STRENGTH										
	Q2 2012	Q3 2012	Q4 2012	Q1 2013	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Q3 2014
Civilians Included in Force Strength?	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Civilians Included?	NA	NA	NA	NA	7,806	8,698	9,336	9,486	9,647	8,976

Note: Reflects calendar-year quarters; NA = unknown. Numbers updated since publication of the print edition.

Source: CSTC-A responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/2/2014, 7/1/2014, 3/31/2014, 1/6/2014, 10/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 4/1/2013, 1/2/2013, 10/1/2012, and 7/2/2012.

In February 2012, a DOD Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) report identified counting civilians as part of the ANA as a risk. In that report, the DOD OIG found that ANA finance officers had “coded” civilian personnel as military or armed forces personnel and included them for payment by CSTC-A, despite an agreement between NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that only military personnel would be reimbursed. At that time, CSTC-A finance personnel were unaware that civilians had been included for military pay.¹⁹²

According to the Center for Naval Analyses’ (CNA) independent assessment released earlier this year, “uniformed ANSF positions in the MOD and MOI should be civilianized. If civilians with the appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or trained for these positions—or if active-duty ANSF personnel cannot be transitioned to the civil service—then ANSF force structure will need to be increased to accommodate them.”¹⁹³

This quarter, CSTC-A reported separate authorizations for ANA military and civilian positions:¹⁹⁴

- Military: 195,000
- Civilian: 8,004
- **Total: 203,004**

This quarter, CSTC-A reported 8,976 civilians assigned to the ANA and Afghan Air Force—12% above the authorized level for civilian positions.¹⁹⁵

Civilian position: a civilian that is included in the ANA authorized end strength count.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2014.

ANSF Assessment's Classification Raises Concerns for Transparency and Oversight

The ANSF capability assessments prepared by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) have recently been classified, leaving SIGAR without a critical tool to publicly report on development of the ANSF.¹⁹⁶

This is a significant change. SIGAR has routinely reported on assessments of the ANA and ANP as indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders—including the American taxpayers who pay the costs of recruiting, training, feeding, housing, equipping, and supplying Afghan soldiers—with updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security.

ISAF uses the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.¹⁹⁷ According to the IJC, the RASR provides a monthly operational-level update on readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the ANA and ANP.¹⁹⁸ From its inception until this quarter, the RASR executive summary, which provides a high-level overview of ANSF corps-level units across several operational effectiveness pillars, was unclassified. The remainder of the RASR, which assessed individual units in a more qualified and detailed way, was classified. From the RASR's foreword: "The [then-unclassified] EXSUM presents a synthesized analysis of observations and identified shortfalls, highlighting main findings and most pressing issues that hamper ANSF long-term sustainability."¹⁹⁹

SIGAR's reporting has been taken from the executive summary at an aggregated corps level, not at an operational or tactical level that might be of use to Afghan insurgents' attack planning. It is not clear what security purpose is served by denying the American public even high-level information. SIGAR will continue to press for explanations of the classification change and seek some modification of this serious obstacle to its oversight role in the security area of reconstruction. Until such time as parts of the ANSF assessment are again unclassified, SIGAR will report on developmental progress and/or shortfalls from other sources.

Afghan Training Advances

During September, two graduation ceremonies occurred to mark mobile strike force (MSF) training achievements. ANA soldiers completed three months of intense training before being commissioned into the 7th MSF. They were the last graduating class in this program; new training programs are being developed to better prepare Afghan forces to assume sole responsibility for combat missions at the end of this year. The new training will provide enhanced capabilities by integrating all specialty branches—armor, artillery, and infantry—for training, equipping, and deploying as combined-arms units.²⁰⁰

Also in September, 51 Afghan soldiers constituted the first graduating class of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle and MRAP Recovery Vehicle (MRV) operators. The course covered MRAP operation, preventive maintenance, and driving. Training also included operating MRVs, the large support vehicles capable of righting overturned MRAPs or transporting damaged vehicles back to a base for repair.²⁰¹

By next summer, the ANA plans to have over 500 soldiers trained to operate the Afghan fleet of 200 MRAPs and 20 MRVs. The course will include training select Afghans how to teach the MRAP/MRV courses to future classes of Afghan soldiers.²⁰²

ANSF to Begin Providing Literacy Training but Planning Lags

Both the MOD and MOI agreed in April to full ownership of their respective literacy programs beginning January 1, 2015.²⁰³ The ANSF, with the advice and assistance of NTM-A, was to have finalized program and contracting plans by July 31, 2014, six months before the NTM-A contracts end.²⁰⁴ However no progress report has been received. The MOD and MOI are to develop:²⁰⁵

- centralized institutional literacy training for new recruits at regional training centers
- an organic literacy-training capability via a train-the-trainer program

NTM-A will continue to assist with literacy training contracting support. However, MOD and MOI procurement advisors are to take the lead for the final transition in January 2015.²⁰⁶

The NTM-A literacy program was to provide basic literacy training (Dari/Pashto reading and writing) to the ANSF and to develop the organic capability to teach basic literacy training.²⁰⁷ The NTM-A has met its goal to have 100,000 ANSF personnel (both ANA and ANP) functionally literate by December 2014. Further, NTM-A is unable to confirm how many of those trained personnel are still in the ANSF due to lack of personnel-tracking capabilities within the ANSF.²⁰⁸ NTM-A estimated that “due to attrition less than 30% of the ANSF will be functionally literate [level 3 literacy] by the end of December 2014.”²⁰⁹

NTM-A reported the number of ANSF personnel who have completed each literacy program level as of August 1, 2014, which is shown in Table 3.9.

TABLE 3.9

ANSF LITERACY TRAINING, AS OF AUGUST 1, 2014				
Literacy Trained	ANA	ANP	Total ANSF	Goal End 2014
Level 1	185,030	100,908	285,938	Up to 300,000
Level 2	68,556	64,749	133,305	120,000-130,000
Level 3	64,426	43,909	108,335	100,000-110,000

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2014.

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials.”²¹⁰

From 2010 through 2013, the United States has funded literacy training contracts for the ANSF. Beginning in 2014, the NATO Trust Fund provided \$24.6 million funding for the literacy contracts. The final task orders for those contracts will expire on December 31, 2014, at which time, the literacy program will transition to the Afghan government. It will be the Afghan government’s responsibility to establish their own contracts and request funds from NATO to pay for those contracts.²¹¹ According to USFOR-A, the NATO ANA Trust Fund has identified ANA literacy training funds for 2015.²¹²

A SIGAR audit of ANSF literacy training in January highlighted NTM-A’s inability to fully measure the effectiveness of the literacy program for lack of independent verification of testing or personnel tracking.²¹³ NTM-A proposed an improved program plan, incorporating five years of lessons learned, for the MOD and MOI. NTM-A recommended that ANSF utilize the Ministry of Education (MOE) for personnel verification and tracking and capitalize on the MOE’s organic “train the trainer” capability currently being developed.²¹⁴

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS ON HOLD UNTIL JANUARY


The assessment process for Afghan ministries is on hold until January. The DOD reported this quarter that the ministerial-development planning process for the MOD and MOI is undergoing a complete rewrite.²¹⁵ The objective is to have the new process in place to perform ministerial assessments for the period October–December 2014.²¹⁶

The final assessments under the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, as reported last quarter, reflected no rating improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions, as shown in Figure 3.26. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A used this system to assess staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:²¹⁷

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance

FIGURE 3.26

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS OF MOD AND MOI, QUARTERLY STATUS



Note: MOD as of 6/30/2014. MOI as of 6/14/2014. Reflects downgrading of MOI Deputy Minister Counter Narcotics from CM-1B to CM-2A. Quarters are calendar-year.
 Source: CSTC-A responses to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, 7/3/2014, and 9/22/2014.

- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

The last quarterly CM ratings were for 35 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 37 in prior quarters.²¹⁸ Six MOD offices attained the second-highest rating of CM-1B.²¹⁹ Thirty-one staff sections at MOI were assessed. Three attained the highest rating of CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition, 15 MOI staff sections had attained a CM-1B rating.²²⁰

The United States has provided \$1.2 million for the MOD and \$1.5 million for the MOI for ministry development.²²¹ ISAF has 191 personnel assigned to or supporting it for advising the MOD, and another 231 for advising the MOI.²²²

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In a special project report released last year, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct-assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed.

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR has an ongoing audit on the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan's implementation of the Afghan Local Police program.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is under MOI authority and functions under the supervision of the district Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). ALP members are selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.²²³ As of September 14, 2014, the ALP comprised 28,814 personnel, all but 4,298 of whom were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The current goal is to have 30,000 personnel in 150 districts by the end of December 2014, assigned to 3,120 checkpoints across 29 provinces.²²⁴

As of September 29, 2014, \$409.2 million of the ASFF had been obligated and expended to support the ALP.²²⁵ According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost \$121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength.²²⁶ To date the United States has provided the ALP with equipment such as rifles, machine guns, light trucks, motorcycles, and radios.²²⁷

According to NSOCC-A, between October 1, 2013, and September 30, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 93%. During that period, NSOCC-A reported a 1.6% attrition rate (losses not including casualties) while 6.4% of the force were killed or wounded in action.²²⁸

The Afghan government has not determined the final disposition of the ALP or its funding source. However, NSOCC-A noted that post-transition funding depends on when transition takes place.²²⁹ According to DOD, U.S. government policy on funding the ALP has not yet been determined.²³⁰ According to an independent assessment released last quarter, public perceptions of ALP's value to community security are positive overall, although there is room for improvement.²³¹ A second assessment, conducted by NSOCC-A based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus-group surveys in ALP districts, is under way.²³² This second assessment will in part evaluate if actions recommended in the first assessment were implemented and had the desired effect. Those recommendations were:²³³

- support and supervision from the ANP
- transparent, locally-owned recruitment processes
- balanced tribal representation
- regular information exchanges between community leaders and ALP commanders

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$34.4 billion and disbursed \$32.4 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.²³⁴



Afghan National Defense University, under construction, Kabul, September 2014. (USACE photo)

ANA Strength

As of August 20, 2014, the overall end strength of the ANA was 185,539 personnel (178,617 Army and 6,922 Air Force), according to ISAF.²³⁵ However, as noted previously, this quarter ISAF reported separate authorizations for ANA military and civilian positions.²³⁶

- Military: 195,000
- Civilian: 8,004
- **Total: 203,004**

The above end strength includes a total of 8,976 civilians (8,749 ANA and 227 Air Force civilians).²³⁷ Overall, the total assigned is 95% of the combined end-strength goal. However, the ANA civilian count exceeds its authorization target by 11%; refer to Table 3.10 for details. All components except for the special-operations forces (SOF) had a modest authorization increase. Most components, however, experienced a decrease in the number of assigned personnel, as shown in Table 3.10. Personnel absent without official leave (AWOL) increased from 5,746 last quarter to 8,610 this quarter, but were still significantly less than the 10,292 reported AWOL in the last quarter of 2013.²³⁸

TABLE 3.10

ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,205	75	17,606	17,401	(205)
203rd Corps	20,798	22,520	1,722	22,114	21,057	(1,057)
205th Corps	19,097	19,116	19	18,534	18,128	(406)
207th Corps	14,879	15,089	210	14,204	13,761	(443)
209th Corps	15,004	15,214	210	14,674	14,566	(108)
215th Corps	17,555	18,329	774	16,999	17,106	107
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,410	236	8,356	8,866	510
Special Operations Force	11,013	10,746	(267)	10,649	9,827	(822)
Echelons Above Corps ^a	36,002	37,713	1,711	36,610	38,248	1,638
TTHS ^b	-	13,359	13,359	12,299	10,908	(1,391)
Civilians	-	7,726	7,726	9,394	8,749	(645)
ANA Total	161,652	187,427	25,775	181,439	178,617	(2,822)
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,370	7,552	182	6,478	6,695	217
AAF Civilians	-	278	278	253	227	(26)
ANA + AAF Total	169,022	195,257	26,235	188,170	185,539	(2,631)

Note: Quarters are calendaryear; Q2 2014 data as of 5/31/2014; Q3 2014 data as of 8/2014.

^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel; Q2 Assigned Includes 4,701 cadets; Q3 Assigned includes 5,157 cadets

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 7/1/2014 and 10/2/2014.

The decrease in SOF strength does not bode well, but simply increasing SOF numbers would not necessarily improve the ANSF's ability to conduct special operations. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) said in a DOD-commissioned, independent assessment released earlier this year, "Afghanistan has a significant need for SOF, but the ANSF cannot support more SOF."²³⁹ CNA also said "ANA SOF currently depends on the U.S. and ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. Simply increasing the number of ANA SOF personnel without addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks."²⁴⁰

ANA Attrition Challenges

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between September 2013 and August 2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls.²⁴¹ The ANA continues to suffer serious losses from fighting. Between March 2012 and August 2014, more than 2,850 ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 14,600 were wounded in action (WIA).²⁴²

ANA Sustainment

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$13.4 billion and disbursed \$12.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.²⁴³

ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives

As of September 30, 2014, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided \$2.5 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2008. CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives at \$693.9 million. That estimate did not change from last quarter, but the allocation increased pay-related expenditures by \$85.5 million and decreased incentives by the same value. However, CSTC-A noted that funding is provided on the basis of 100% of the ANA's authorized strength. Since December 21, 2013, CSTC-A no longer provides funding for food.²⁴⁴

ANA Equipment, Transportation, and Ammunition

After a challenging period which saw multiple corrections to the recorded cost of equipment procured for the ANA, CSTC-A reported an increase in the total cost from \$5.5 billion to \$5.8 billion.²⁴⁵ The trend in total ANA weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment costs is shown in Table 3.11.

Additionally, CSTC-A reported the cost of ANA equipment remaining to be procured is \$82.9 million, a slight decrease from last quarter.²⁴⁶

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$11.5 billion and disbursed \$11.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.²⁴⁷ Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, weapons and

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit last quarter on the ANA Mobile Strike Force (MSF) found that: the security environment limited the contractor from providing training and maintenance services; U.S. government oversight personnel had limited ability to visit MSF locations outside Kabul; an absence of spare parts hindered vehicle operability; MSF vehicle operators needed training; and difficulties had occurred with ANA supply-chain ordering and distribution of spare parts.

TABLE 3.11

CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)				
	Weapons	Vehicles	Communications	Total
April 2013	\$878.0	\$5,556.5	\$580.5	\$7,015.0
July 2013	622.8	5,558.6	599.5	6,780.9
October 2013	447.2	3,955.0	609.3	5,011.5
December 2013	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	5,437.2
March 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	5,517.3
July 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	5,517.3
September 2014	522.3	4,638.9	688.2	5,849.4

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, 3/31/2013, 7/1/2014, and 9/29/2014.

related equipment, communications equipment, aircraft, and aviation-related equipment. More than 79% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.12.

TABLE 3.12

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$522,336,282	\$13,803,951
Vehicles	4,638,861,237	38,124,578
Communications	688,157,101	31,010,799
Total	\$5,849,354,620	\$82,939,328

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/29/2014.

The United States has also procured \$1.6 billion in ammunition, \$4.6 billion in aircraft for the ANA, and \$9.6 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANA. However, SIGAR has some concern about how that \$9.6 billion cost of other equipment and supplies was determined. According to CSTC-A, it was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, aircraft, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs—in other words, computed as a residual, rather than based on an inventory list or actual record keeping.²⁴⁸

ANA Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$6.2 billion and disbursed \$5.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.²⁴⁹ At that time, the United States had completed 329 infrastructure projects (valued at \$4.3 billion), with another 46 projects ongoing (\$950 million) and nine planned (\$97.8 million), according to CSTC-A.²⁵⁰

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter were brigade garrisons for the 3rd Brigade/205th Corps in Kandahar (\$91 million) and the 2nd Brigade/215th Corps in Nimroz (at a cost of \$78.7 million), and

SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR has initiated an inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended.



Ministry of Defense Headquarters Building under construction in Kabul, September 2014. (CSTC-A photo)

phase three of the MOD headquarters and garrisons (\$58.6 million).²⁵¹ In addition, five projects were awarded this quarter at a cost of \$61.7 million, 16 projects were completed at a cost of \$226.6 million, six contracts were descope to a value of \$182.1 million, including the brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade/201st Corps in Kunar (originally costing \$115 million), and one contract worth \$31.3 million was terminated.²⁵² CSTC-A reported that 18 facilities were transferred to the ANSF since the end of July; an additional 13 facilities will be transferred by the end of January 2015.²⁵³

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations-and-maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction cost for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$168 million a year, for a total of \$840 million.²⁵⁴

According to DOD, the MOD Construction and Property Management Department's capacity to plan, design, contract, and execute new construction is limited to \$20 million per year until greater capacity is demonstrated.²⁵⁵

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.2 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.²⁵⁶ Aside from literacy training discussed previously in this section, the other training includes English-language, officer, and operational-specialty training such as artillery, infantry, logistics, and medical.²⁵⁷ SIGAR received incomplete responses to its questions on operations and training for this quarter.

Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force

Women currently make up less than 1% of the ANA, despite the current recruitment and retention goal published in September 2013 for 10% of the force to be female. To achieve this goal, the ANA has waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan's various ethnic groups. Additionally, assignment locations are being reviewed to pinpoint locations with accommodation for females, such as separate restrooms. The ANA Recruiting Command also airs local television commercials directed at women beginning 20 days before training classes.²⁵⁸

ISAF said the Coalition believes that as more women serve in the ANSF, men will learn to accept and respect women in the workplace. The involvement of families and communities is critical to recruiting women. ISAF has requested funding for media advertisements and programming to educate the Afghan public about the need for women to join the army and police.²⁵⁹

This quarter, the ANA reported to ISAF that 833 women serve in the ANA: 785 in the Army and 48 in the Air Force. Of those, 291 were officers, 324 were non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 140 were enlisted, 29 were in training, and 49 were cadets. In addition, the ANA reported to CSTC-A that there are 413 civilian women supporting the ANA.²⁶⁰ The ANA's

12-week Basic Warrior Training course includes a class on behavior and expectations of male soldiers who work with ANA women. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission conducts two-day seminars for the ANSF that include training in eliminating violence against women.²⁶¹

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Public Law 113-66, authorizes \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.²⁶²

SIGAR received incomplete responses to its questions on women in the ANA and the Air Force this quarter.

Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the United States provided more than \$6.5 billion to support and develop the 6,922-person Afghan Air Force, including over \$3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested more than \$925 million, including \$21.4 million for equipment and aircraft, in FY 2015 for the Afghan Air Force. However, the majority of the funding requested is for sustainment and training, as shown in Table 3.13.

SIGAR has questioned the Afghan Air Force’s ability to fully utilize the aircraft that the United States has provided at a considerable cost to the American taxpayer. For example, after DOD provided the Afghan Air Force with two C-130H medium transport aircraft, SIGAR questioned DOD plans to deliver two additional C-130Hs after an audit raised concerns about the Afghan Air Force’s ability to absorb the new aircraft. As a result, DOD this quarter concurred with SIGAR’s recommendation to defer the decision on delivering a fourth aircraft until a review of Afghan Air Force requirements is completed, for a potential savings of \$40.5 million. A third aircraft will be delivered to mitigate the risk to Afghan air capabilities should one of the aircraft become unavailable.²⁶³

TABLE 3.13

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2015 (\$ THOUSANDS)						
Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	\$461,877	\$778,604	\$1,805,343	\$111,129	\$2,300	\$21,442
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	141,077	164,187	123,416
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	469,230	520,802	780,370
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	53,000	0	0
Total	\$760,299	\$1,683,250	\$2,621,237	\$774,436	\$687,289	\$925,228

Source: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 6/2014, pp. 10, 24, 26, and 29.



An A-29 Super Tucano arrives at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, September 26, 2014. (U.S. Air Force photo)

According to CENTCOM and the NATO Air Command–Afghanistan, as of October 11, 2014, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 101 aircraft:²⁶⁴

- 56 Mi-17 transport helicopters (down from 58 after two combat losses; includes three on loan to the Special Mission Wing)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- Six C-182 fixed-wing training aircraft
- Five MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- Five Mi-35 attack helicopters
- Three C-130H medium transport aircraft

Twelve additional MD-530F helicopters equipped with air-to-ground attack capability are on contract, as is conversion of five existing MD-530F helicopters to air-to-ground attack capability, thereby providing the AAF with 17 attack helicopters.²⁶⁵

Beginning in the fourth quarter 2015, the first of 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance, will be deployed to Afghanistan following the training in the United States, beginning in February 2015, of pilots and the initial maintenance cadre.²⁶⁶ Four Super Tucanos will be delivered each year in 2015, 2016, and 2017; and eight in 2018.²⁶⁷ The planes are intended to replace aging Mi-35 aircraft.

The Afghan Air Force has 131 fully trained pilots. All pilots are officers who have attended the Air Academy or a similar officer training program and completed undergraduate pilot training.²⁶⁸ The AAF capability to

perform casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) missions has steadily increased over the last three years:²⁶⁹

- 2012: 391 missions
- 2013: 1,540 missions (128/month; 394% increase)
- 2014: 1,295 missions YTD (162/month); assuming this trend continues through
- December, a total of 1,944 missions this year is expected (150% increase)

Despite this improving CASEVAC capability, the AAF still faces challenges such as increasing operational demand without commensurate gain in capability, lack of trained CASEVAC medics, and misuse of limited CASEVAC resources.²⁷⁰

The Special Mission Wing (SMW), while not part of the AAF, provides aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, and—aside from two Afghan Air Force crews—is the only ANSF unit to be night-vision goggle-qualified for air-assault and fixed-wing ISR capability.²⁷¹ The SMW has 266 members, of which 76 are pilots.²⁷² Of SMW missions flown during FY 2014, 26% have been counterterrorism related, and 74% counternarcotics related.²⁷³

MOI, MOD, and National Directorate of Security leaders signed the SMW air charter on May 14, 2014, outlining the creation of a new Joint Command and Control Coordination Center (JCCC) to facilitate priority SMW support. Both MOD and MOI special operations forces will have liaison officers to the JCCC. The AAF is to provide personnel, recruiting, and other administrative (non-operational) support to SMW. The SMW commander meets weekly with special operations unit leaders to discuss pending operations and synchronize requirements and priorities.²⁷⁴

With the AAF's FY 2015 budget in excess of \$900 million, aggressive cost cutting was needed to bring the budget in line with the estimated donor-ation funding of \$450 million by FY 2017 as agreed to at the Chicago Summit in 2012.²⁷⁵ A joint Secretary of the Air Force-International Affairs and Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) team was assembled to assist NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) in creating a construct and mechanism to reduce to overall cost and improve AAF self-sufficiency.²⁷⁶ After three weeks of research in a combat environment, the team proposed changes in four main areas:²⁷⁷

- Increase capacity for maintenance training.
- Decrease the number of Western contract logistics support (CLS) contractor personnel.
- Consolidate each individual CLS supply system into one AAF aviation supply depot.
- Reduce aviation maintenance redundancies.

Using these concepts, the team proposed 65 major changes in the contracts supporting the AAF's Mi-17, Mi-35, PC-12, C-130, C-208, C-182,

SIGAR ALERT LETTERS

During an ongoing review, SIGAR learned that the Defense Logistics Agency had scrapped 16 G222 aircraft that had been delivered to Afghanistan but saw little usage and were ultimately grounded due to safety concerns and their inability to fully meet operational requirements. Scrap metal from those 16 aircraft—now shredded but originally valued at nearly \$390 million in acquisition and sustainment costs—were sold for approximately 6 cents a pound or \$32,000 for all 16 aircraft. SIGAR has not been notified of any decision regarding the ultimate disposition of the remaining four G222 aircraft in Germany. SIGAR reported its concern to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force. DOD officials have said they kept lawmakers informed of this matter for nearly two years. Congress provided the authority to convert equipment no longer needed by the ANSF to DOD equipment in the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. After determining that the aircraft were unusable and obsolete, DOD notified Congress it was converting the G222s to DOD stock and was preparing them to be scrapped. For more information, see Section 2, page 47.

SIGAR's preliminary review of an audit of AAF capability to absorb additional equipment indicates DOD plans to provide two more C-130 aircraft that may not be needed or sustainable by the Afghans. SIGAR reported its concern to DOD, CENTCOM, ISAF, and NTC-A.

MD-530, and A-29 programs. They estimated that if all of the 65 requested changes were adopted, programmed FY 2014–FY 2019 cost savings would be \$895 million. These efforts, combined with a potential reduction in medium airlift acquisition, and the accelerated consolidation of CLS support to the Kabul International Airport, met COMISAF’s directed \$450 million budget cap in FY 2017.²⁷⁸ According to DOD, these results will be factored into planning that is currently under way to determine sustainment requirements for DOD-fielded aircraft. The costs may be adjusted following this more in-depth review of these requirements.²⁷⁹

Encouraged by the team results, CSTC-A adopted the methodology to resolve issues with its ANA wheeled-vehicles program.²⁸⁰ SIGAR will report on those results next quarter.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$17 billion and disbursed \$16.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.²⁸¹

ANP Strength

This quarter, the overall strength of the ANP totaled 153,317 personnel, including 113,515 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,643 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,881 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 2,492 students in training, and 786 “standby” personnel awaiting assignment.²⁸² Of the 113,515 personnel in the AUP, 25,512 were MOI headquarters staff or institutional support staff.²⁸³ Overall, the ANP’s strength increased 1,194 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.14.

TABLE 3.14

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change
AUP ^a	122,644	120,003	(2,641)	113,385 ^b	113,515 ^c	130
ABP	23,573	22,955	(618)	21,667	21,643	(24)
ANCOP	13,106	15,223	2,117	12,731	14,881	2,150
NISTA	3,000	3,000	-	4,313	2,492	(1,821)
Standby ^d	-	-	-	27	786	759
ANP Total	162,323	161,181	(1,142)	152,123	153,317	1,194

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2014 data as of 5/2014; Q3 2014 data as of 8/2014. AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; NISTA = Not In Service for Training.

^a Includes MOI headquarters and institutional support and CNPA personnel.

^b Includes 28,092 MOI headquarters staff.

^c Includes 25,512 MOI headquarters staff.

^d Personnel that are pending assignment.

Source: CSTCA, responses to SIGAR data calls, 7/1/2014 and 10/6/2014.

According to CSTC-A, the MOI, unlike the ANA, does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, the actual effective strength of the ANP is not known.²⁸⁴

SIGAR received incomplete responses to its data-call questions on ANP strength this quarter.

ANP Sustainment

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$6.7 billion and disbursed \$6.3 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.²⁸⁵ This includes \$1.3 billion in U.S. contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to support the ANP.²⁸⁶

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through September 30, 2014, the U.S. government had provided \$1.32 billion, paid through the LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.²⁸⁷ An additional \$158.5 million has been provided since 2010 for the Afghan Local Police and subject-matter experts' salaries and incentives, which are not funded from LOTFA.²⁸⁸

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$483 million per year to fund salaries (\$263 million) and incentives (\$220 million). This is a decrease of \$38.2 million from last quarter's estimate, based on a foreign-exchange rate of 56 afghanis to one U.S. dollar. Beginning in fiscal year 1394 (December 21, 2014), food costs are no longer covered by CSTC-A.²⁸⁹

ANP Equipment, Transportation, and Ammunition

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.²⁹⁰ Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment.²⁹¹ More than 83% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.15.

TABLE 3.15

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,093,066
Vehicles	2,046,681,026	2,385,261
Communications	211,062,672	544,573
Total	\$2,444,995,175	\$7,022,900

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/29/2014.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS

This quarter, SIGAR issued an inquiry letter to the State Department to raise concerns about Afghan government budgetary shortfalls. In that letter, SIGAR also noted its concern about reports that Afghan police units had cut power to Kandahar due to a lack of funding over the next several years. For more information, see Section 2, page 44.

SIGAR sent an inquiry letter this quarter to UNDP and CSTC-A expressing concern that the UNDP is not overseeing how LOTFA funds are spent, that they are not proactively addressing problems, and that they claim to lack authority to conduct oversight. For more information, see Section 2, pages 43-44.

Border Patrol Boat Status

In FY 2011, CSTC-A requested eight rigid-hull, inflatable, riverine border-patrol boats for the ANP. CSTC-A canceled the \$3 million procurement near the end of the boats' manufacturing process. On July 25, 2014, DOD notified Congress that the boats purchased with ASFF funds were no longer required by the ANSF and would be treated as DOD stock. The boats remain in storage awaiting a Department of the Navy determination whether to use, sell, or dispose of the them.

Source: OUSDP, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2014.

For two earlier quarters, CSTC-A reported no change in the total cost of the weapons and communications equipment procured for the ANP. This quarter, however, CSTC-A reported increases in the total cost of vehicles and ammunition procured for the ANP of \$80.6 million and \$167.6 million, respectively.²⁹²

The United States has also procured \$534.3 million in ammunition for the ANP and \$1.3 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANP. However, SIGAR has some concern about how that \$1.3 billion cost of other equipment and supplies was determined. According to CSTC-A, it was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs, rather than being based on inventory lists or actual record keeping.²⁹³ In response to a vetting draft of this report, USFOR-A asserted that the \$1.3 billion cost of other equipment is not calculated in this way, but instead was used to calculate the numbers that were provided to SIGAR. USFOR-A also said that "Headquarters ISAF has always made it a point to advise the MOI on ammunition forecasting and inventory procedures" and that "this is very much a priority in force train, advise, and assist efforts."²⁹⁴ SIGAR will seek clarification for its next report and request that future reporting reflect actual accounting for equipment and supplies provided to the ANP.

Examples of some equipment purchased for the ANP include sophisticated items such as high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); MRAP vehicles; night-vision devices; global-positioning systems; explosive-ordnance disposal equipment; and biometrics; as well as ordinary items such as ambulances, spare parts, pistols, machine guns, radios, clothing, dental and medical equipment, and transportation services.²⁹⁵

ANP Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$3.2 billion and disbursed \$2.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.²⁹⁶ At that time, the United States had completed 685 infrastructure projects (valued at \$3.2 billion), with another 45 projects ongoing (\$327.6 million), and one planned (\$7 million), according to CSTC-A.²⁹⁷

This quarter, three projects valued at \$25.9 million were awarded, 16 projects valued at \$48.3 million were completed, and one valued at \$614 million was terminated.²⁹⁸ The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were a building and utilities (\$34.3 million) at MOI headquarters, an AUP provincial headquarters in Kandahar (\$25 million), and the ANP command center and barracks at MOI headquarters (\$24.1 million).²⁹⁹ CSTC-A reported that seven facilities were transferred to the ANSF since the end of July.³⁰⁰

According to CSTC-A, the projected annual operations and maintenance, sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction cost for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$147 million (\$735 million over five years), with 2,184 skilled personnel required to maintain the facilities.³⁰¹



Ministry of Interior headquarters under construction in Kabul, September 2014. (USACE photo)

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions that could affect cost estimates.³⁰²

ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$3.5 billion and disbursed \$3.4 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI operations and training.³⁰³ Since January 1, 2014, the NATO Trust Fund has paid the cost for all ANSF literacy training. Additionally, Japan has assumed the cost of most of the police-academy training in Turkey formerly funded by the United States. Aside from the literacy training discussed previously in this section, other training includes English-language and operational-specialty training, such as police intelligence, logistics, medical, and special-operations force.³⁰⁴

ANP Still Struggling to Meet Quotas for Women Police Personnel

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but the ANP is far from reaching its goal of 5,000 women by the end of 2014. Women still make up only 1% of the force. This quarter, ANP personnel included 2,074 women, according to CSTC-A.³⁰⁵ This is an increase of 103 women since last quarter and an increase of 870 since August 22, 2011.³⁰⁶ However, the annual attrition rate for women in the ANP is high at 16%.³⁰⁷ ISAF said the ANP is focused on finding secure workplaces with appropriate facilities for females and developing strategies to attract and retain qualified female recruits.³⁰⁸

As noted previously, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Public Law 113-66, provides \$25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.³⁰⁹

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had funded construction of 181 completed ANSF medical facilities valued at \$184.5 million.³¹⁰ The figure includes this quarter's completion of four hospitals and facilities valued at \$8.5 million. The sole construction project in progress is the national medical hospital barracks renovation including the construction of a barracks for women.³¹¹

This quarter, ISAF reported the ANSF health-care system had 808 physicians; of these, 464 were assigned to the ANA and 344 were assigned to the ANP. This represents two quarters with a decreasing number of physicians: seven left last quarter and 151 this quarter. The ANA has a shortage of 140 physicians and the ANP a shortage of 168.³¹² The ANSF also has 2,826 nurses, physicians' assistants, and other medical personnel; although 950

positions remain unfilled in part due to increased authorizations to staff new hospital.³¹³

ISAF reports efforts to solidify the healthcare logistics operations for both the ANA and ANP. Advisors are developing a system to report on combat life-saving training in the field with the capability for corps commanders to identify where point-of-injury care is needed.³¹⁴ Additionally advisors are in the final stages of an Afghan-led program that will allow for online access to free continuing education for physicians. Another initiative under way is a course in repairing equipment and facilities. Advisors are also assisting the ANP, in concert with the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and Ministry of Higher Education, to recruit healthcare-professional graduates.³¹⁵

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Since FY 2002, the U.S. Department of State (State) has provided more than \$283 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).³¹⁶ Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs).³¹⁷


The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), which keeps a database of contaminated areas, estimates that 100 individuals suffer casualties monthly from detonations of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is a significant decrease from 2002, when about 750 people suffered casualties from UXO monthly.³¹⁸ The head of MACCA states that 4,400 areas in Parwan, Khowst, Logar, Nangahar, Herat, Jowzjan, Faryab, and other provinces still need to be cleared. Those areas would be cleared by 2023 according to the landmine-clearance plan.³¹⁹ Figure 3.27 shows the contaminated and non-contaminated areas as of July 2014.

As of June 30, 2014, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 159 million square meters of land and removed or destroyed approximately 7.8 million land mines and other ERW such as UXO, abandoned ordnance, stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives (see Table 3.16). There is a substantial decrease in the contaminated area as MACCA has revised its estimate and no longer includes contaminated firing ranges.³²⁰ PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by land mines, whereas a contaminated area can include both land mines and other ERW.³²¹

Comprehensive fourth-quarter FY 2014 reports are not yet available. Quarterly reports are generally available one month after the end of each

FIGURE 3.27

MINE CONTAMINATION STATUS, AS OF JULY 1, 2014



Source: Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), *Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, Newsletter*, August 2014.

TABLE 3.16

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1, 2013–JUNE 30, 2014						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1–9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1–12/30/2013	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
1/1–3/31/2014	1,780	254,734	245,380	262,750	5,473,170	638,400,000
4/1–6/30/2014	1,077	3,264	25,362	3,227,697	5,163,035	519,000,000
TOTAL	15,353	401,033	578,306	13,031,039	34,159,405	519,000,000

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2014.

quarter; thus, the fourth-quarter FY 2014 (covering July 1, 2014, through September 30, 2014) will be published in SIGAR's next quarterly report in January 2015.³²²

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit this quarter examined the financial support provided to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) provincial units by State, DOD, and DEA. SIGAR learned that it was not possible to fully determine the amount of direct assistance given to those units and that no formal assessments of their operational capabilities existed, making it difficult to quantify the effectiveness of the U.S. aid. Although provincial units have received some support, overall U.S. financial resources devoted to the CNPA have only tangentially benefitted them. For more information, see Section 2, page 25.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of September 30, 2014, the United States has provided \$7.8 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$2.7 billion), the ASFF (\$1.4 billion), the Economic Support Fund (\$1.4 billion), and \$2.1 billion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.³²³ In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. (See Appendix B.)

Since 2009, the focus of U.S. drug-control policy has shifted from eradication to interdiction and a greater emphasis on agricultural-development assistance that aims to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods.³²⁴ The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) laid out the following objectives for its programs in Afghanistan in its fiscal year 2013 Program and Budget Guide: (1) disrupt and dismantle the narcotics/insurgent/corruption-nexus targets, (2) increase support for the Afghan government's demand-reduction and treatment programs, (3) support subnational supply-reduction programs, (4) improve counternarcotics strategic communications, (5) combat corruption and expand access to justice, (6) develop a corrections system in line with international standards, and (7) develop the justice sector's institutional capacity.³²⁵

INL's programs support the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan and the key priorities of Afghanistan's National Drug Control Strategy, approved in October 2013.³²⁶ The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) coordinates the actions of other ministries and takes the lead in developing counternarcotics policy.³²⁷

Drug-reduction activities occur under the Governor Led Eradication (GLE), the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI), and Counternarcotics Public Information programs.³²⁸ Interdiction activities are carried out by the CNPA with DOD and ISAF elements providing training and support. The Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) whose mission ended in September 2014, and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) also support interdiction efforts.³²⁹

Counternarcotics Efforts Hindered by Troop Drawdown and Election Security Challenge

The drawdown of Coalition personnel has impacted interdiction results, particularly in southern regions of the country. The reduced troop presence limited the number of joint operations between Coalition or U.S. drug-enforcement personnel and Afghan forces.³³⁰ Similarly, poppy eradication decreased this year in part because Afghan security forces were diverted from that effort to assist with election security.³³¹ Opium-cultivation

results are not yet available, but according to UN data, final results will likely exceed last year's all-time record. According to the United Nations, more land is being cultivated with poppy in 2014 than in 2013 in Helmand, Afghanistan's chief opium-producing province.³³² Moreover, eradication decreased by 63% in 2014 from the previous year, which the MCN attributed partly to the need for presidential-election security.³³³ According to some analysts, nearly every district where security has been handed over from ISAF to Afghan security forces has seen an increase in attacks.³³⁴ Those conditions impede both reconstruction and eradication efforts.

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noted in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year that Afghan security forces had fought successfully against insurgents, but could not control contested areas long-term.³³⁵ He further noted that while the Taliban-led insurgency failed to gain control of Kandahar and Helmand in 2013, it increased attacks targeted at the ANSF with nationwide destructive effects comparable to those of the previous two years.³³⁶ Nangahar's southern districts, for instance, experienced deteriorating security conditions during the months preceding December 2013, when winter crops were planted.³³⁷

Rural areas of Nangahar were not under the government's control, as illustrated by the rise in poppy cultivation across the province in early 2014.³³⁸ Specifically, in Upper Achin, the provincial police chief met with the elders in December 2013 to ask them to refrain from poppy cultivation—a request the farmers largely ignored.³³⁹ The government's weakness in rural areas of Nangahar led to increased cultivation of poppy there.³⁴⁰

The World Bank, in its latest report on the Afghan economic outlook, anticipates the political and security uncertainty to continue through the first half of 2015.³⁴¹ Given these parameters, areas under poppy cultivation will probably expand next year.

Governor Led Eradication Program

INL funds Afghanistan's Governor Led Eradication Program (GLE). The GLE eradicates poppies with tractors or manually, using sticks, blades, or hand uprooting.³⁴² The MCN, in partnership with UNODC, is responsible for verifying poppy cultivation and eradication.³⁴³ During the quarter, the INL office in Kabul hosted a GLE Lessons Learned conference for Afghan provincial governors that focused on methods to improve eradication efforts. Additionally, INL is expecting delivery and distribution of 47 new tractors designated for provincial poppy eradication.³⁴⁴


UNODC and the MCN published their final poppy-eradication verification report for this year. Compared to 2013, results decreased by 63%: 2,692 hectares were eradicated in 17 provinces versus 7,348 hectares eradicated in 18 provinces in 2013. The MCN attributes the decrease to the convergence of the eradication campaigns and presidential elections. Security presented a challenge as well in all provinces where eradication took place.³⁴⁵ The report

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, a SIGAR special project reported that despite over \$7 billion in U.S. spending on counternarcotics efforts, poppy-cultivation levels in Afghanistan are at an all-time high. SIGAR and the U.S. Army Geospatial Center developed maps for the project that provide a more refined view of the concentration of poppy cultivation. Using geospatial overlays of arable land in Afghanistan combined with district-level opium-poppy cultivation rates, these maps show the intensity of opium cultivation and where those cultivation levels are rising or receding. For more information, see Section 2, page 48.

FIGURE 3.28

HECTARES OF POPPY CULTIVATED AND ERADICATED, 2008–2013 (THOUSANDS)



Note: A hectare is 10,000 square meters, or almost 2.5 acres. *2014 cultivation data has yet to be released by UNODC. Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Poppy Eradication Verification Final Report*, 8/2014, p. 4; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, pp. 18, 33–35, 99; UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 6/2014, p. 21.

The growth stages of poppy are:

1. emergence stage or growth of seedlings
2. cabbage stage, when poppy plants are easily recognizable and form rosette-type leaves and stalks
3. stem-elongation stage
4. flowering stage
5. capsule stage
6. lancing stage, when harvesters make cuts on the poppy capsule so opium latex will ooze out and dry. Harvesters scrape off the dry latex. Several lancing cycles occur in the traditional method.


Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Poppy Eradication Verification, Final Report*, 8/2014, pp. 3, 16; UNODC, *Bulletin on Narcotics: Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and the Oil Poppy in the Soviet Union*, 1/1969; UNODC, *World Drug Report Methodology*, 6/2014, p. 9.

notes the poor quality of eradication this year, particularly in Badakhshan, where fields were eradicated by beating the plants with sticks due to the terrain. Manual eradication, which is the traditional practice, in some cases only resulted to partial eradication, as shown by a review of aerial imagery.³⁴⁶ Moreover, if eradication occurred at the “cabbage” stage, when plants are still young, there is a greater likelihood of regrowth of the poppy plant.³⁴⁷ Figure 3.28 compares eradication levels for 2013 and 2014 by province and illustrates the significant increase in manual eradication this year. Figure 3.29 provides the final eradication results by province.

Last quarter, INL told SIGAR the Afghan government’s eradication target for 2014 was 22,500 hectares.³⁴⁸ Based on the poppy-eradication verification final report, the Afghan government resoundingly missed that objective: only 2,692 hectares were eradicated this year, or 12% of the target level. The presidential election and ballot audit likely played a role by diverting official energies. INL also informed SIGAR that an interministerial GLE plan was not approved until late in the season, thereby limiting its effectiveness. INL noted that political will at the national and provincial level is necessary for the GLE program to be effective.³⁴⁹

FIGURE 3.29

GOVERNOR LED ERADICATION RESULTS BY PROVINCE, 2013 AND 2014 (HECTARES)



Note: Provinces declared poppy-free are not listed.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Poppy Eradication Verification Final Report*, 08/2014, p. 16; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 33.

Good Performer's Initiative

INL also supports the MCN's efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI).³⁵⁰ Under the current terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for \$1 million in GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, as verified by UNODC.³⁵¹ INL told SIGAR that the GPI program incentivizes continued counternarcotics performance in the year ahead. It also shows provincial leadership and citizens that there are tangible benefits to countering poppy cultivation, and it reinforces the writ of the government in the province, district, and community.³⁵²

The MCN in partnership with UNODC verifies poppy cultivation and eradication. According to UNODC's *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013* published last winter, 15 of the country's 34 provinces were declared poppy free—two less than in 2012. According to INL, poppy cultivation increased overall in 2013 partly due to economic insecurity and high opium prices. INL told SIGAR that fluctuations in cultivation can and will occur as Afghan authorities take on increasing responsibilities. The goal is to encourage and facilitate sustainable overall poppy-cultivation reductions over the long term.³⁵³

GPI II was announced on August 30, 2014, and expands the award categories for “good performers” to include public outreach and law enforcement beginning with the 2014–2015 poppy-cultivation season. GPI II development assistance will also be tailored to better meet the needs of rural communities by prioritizing alternative-livelihoods projects that support farmers as they transition away from poppy cultivation. GPI II also reduces the amount a province may receive for being poppy-free to \$500,000.³⁵⁴

As of August 31, 2014, there were 221 approved GPI projects with a total value of \$108 million: 132 projects were completed, 83 projects are ongoing, and six projects are nearing completion. The 89 ongoing projects all relate to infrastructure or construction, and include alternative-livelihoods infrastructure projects such as irrigation structures and protection walls, which prevent erosion.³⁵⁵ Based on third-party audit recommendations, GPI changed its practice of using a flat conversion rate of one U.S. dollar to 50 afghanis (AFN), rather than using the actual conversion rate on the day of the project bid, per Da Afghanistan Bank's official website. The total value of GPI projects in prior quarterly reports is therefore not directly comparable to the values in this report.³⁵⁶

Under INL's direction and through the “Strengthening Sub-National Governance” grant with the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), the AKF facilitated workshops between community, district, and provincial level representatives and stakeholders of the GPI program between September and December 2013. The purpose of these workshops was to disseminate information about GPI and to solicit feedback on the program, including recommendations for improvement.³⁵⁷ The AKF November 2013 report submitted to INL found that GPI projects failed to address the needs of rural farmers for competitive, licit livelihood alternatives to poppy cultivation.³⁵⁸ Conducting the bidding and procurement process from Kabul led to project delays and increased costs, and provided no economic benefit to local communities.³⁵⁹ Moreover, the preponderance of infrastructure projects did not demonstrate to the local communities the benefits of reducing poppy cultivation.³⁶⁰

Certain poppy-free regions were ignored, possibly leading to the perception that farmers needed to cultivate poppy in order to qualify for GPI funding and thereby negating the program's aspirations. The district

governors of areas free of poppy cultivation recommended a review of the policy and procedures to include non-poppy-growing areas.³⁶¹ INL informed SIGAR that GPI implementing instructions do not preclude non-poppy-growing areas from eligibility for GPI projects though workshop participants, and that the AKF recommended GPI projects directly benefit rural poppy-growing communities.³⁶²

Based on the workshop feedback, AKF submitted three recommendations to INL in its report: (1) increase the number of district and community level institutions, women, and other stakeholders in poppy-growing communities consulted throughout the project identification and implementation process to ensure more contextually appropriate projects are prioritized; (2) decentralize project selection, procurement, and contractual bidding, making the process more localized to reduce award processing times and costs, and increasing indirect economic and employment benefits to rural poppy-growing communities; and (3) shift from infrastructure projects based around provincial capitals, to projects that directly benefit rural poppy-growing communities by offering competitive and sustainable sources of income to poppy cultivation.

According to INL, the MCN and INL incorporated two of the three recommendations into GPI II, to be launched with the 2014–2015 poppy cultivation season. The 2014 GPI Awards, which will be made following the publication of the UNODC *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014*—currently scheduled for October 2014—will be the final awards for achievements under the old GPI program. The first awards under GPI II will be made in the fall of 2015.

INL told SIGAR that GPI II awards will continue to be issued at the provincial level. Provincial governors, who have the best knowledge of local conditions throughout their province, will continue to select which communities receive GPI projects. Project selection will be the result of consultations with the input of local community structures, such as agricultural cooperatives and community-development councils; district stakeholders, including district governors and district development assemblies; and the provincial government. Where feasible and relevant, local structures will be responsible for the ongoing maintenance of GPI II projects.³⁶³

INL informed SIGAR that after much consideration, INL and the MCN decided not to implement the AKF's third recommendation to decentralize the GPI procurement and contractual bidding processes. INL said the changes would weaken INL's oversight of the program, and had the potential to increase project costs and decrease project quality by restricting bidding to local companies. Under the current GPI procurement process, projects are bid nationally, which does not preclude local contractors that meet the bidding requirements, such as previous experience and financial liquidity, from bidding. Bid openings are conducted in the provincial capitals, in the presence of bidders, the MCN, and provincial officials. Once the bids have been recorded, the bid documents are transported to Kabul.

As part of its oversight of the GPI program and under the requirements of the GPI On-Budget Memorandum of Understanding, INL participates in the bid evaluation and decision processes. Due to security restrictions, however, INL is unable to participate in procurement activities in the provinces. Conducting bid evaluation activities in Kabul provides the U.S. government with greater management control and oversight of the GPI program. INL and the MCN will consider future modifications to the procurement and bidding processes as lessons are learned under GPI II.³⁶⁴

Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program is a two-year project funded by USAID and designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of the province through grants.³⁶⁵ As of early September 2014, no infrastructure or alternative-livelihood projects have been implemented, but over \$5 million have been disbursed.³⁶⁶ The August 2014 monthly report lists USAID vetting approval as one of the challenges to project implementation. Security instability is frequently an impediment to the KFZ projects, causing delays or interruptions.

The USAID pillar of this \$18.7 million USAID program has two components: (1) building MCN capacity and (2) providing alternative livelihoods (AL) and community infrastructure.³⁶⁷ Seven districts were chosen by USAID, the MCN, and the provincial governor to participate in the program. KFZ's anticipated goals and results are to:³⁶⁸

- rehabilitate more than 150 km of irrigation canals in three target districts
- have more than 85,000 people benefit from infrastructure and alternative livelihood activities
- improve approximately 20,000 hectares with irrigation to provide farmers with alternative licit income
- reduce poppy cultivation in areas where KFZ improved the irrigation system³⁶⁹

According to USAID, the KFZ is using community-based planning to support alternatives to poppy cultivation. This approach involves communities in identifying root causes of poppy cultivation and addressing them through projects approved by community representatives or elders, Community Development Councils (CDCs), District Development Assemblies, district governors, the KFZ-Coordination Committee (KFZ-CC), and the provincial governor.³⁷⁰

USAID informed SIGAR that the two-year timeframe for the KFZ program is problematic since 2014 and 2015 are Afghan election years (the presidential election in 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2015). USAID noted that the Afghan government and provincial offices could be less willing to eradicate poppy during this period. Moreover, the agency says the causes of poppy cultivation are long-term problems that cannot be

addressed within a two-year period.³⁷¹ According to USAID, the MCN wishes to apply the KFZ model to the 17 remaining provinces with poppy cultivation, including Uruzgan, Farah, Badakshan, and Nangarhar. The MCN is seeking support from other donors as USAID has no plans to fund the proposed food-zone expansion.³⁷²

According to USAID, the KFZ program coordinates closely and intimately with the Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP) interventions so as to maximize impact and avoid duplication.³⁷³ The USAID-funded Regional Agricultural Development Program-South (RADP-S) is a five-year program which aims at improving the productivity of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock in southern Afghanistan, including Helmand Province.³⁷⁴ USAID told SIGAR that KFZ and RADP-S in Zharai and Panjwayi districts are working together closely to avoid targeting the same areas for greenhouse projects. Additionally, RADP-S will continue working with those beneficiaries once the KFZ program comes to a close. USAID also informed SIGAR that KFZ and RADP-S coordinate interventions for the Afghanistan National Agriculture Sciences and Technology University (ANSTU), where KFZ intends to construct a demonstration greenhouse and RADP-S intends to build a demonstration farm for high-value orchard and vineyard crops.³⁷⁵

Drug Demand Reduction Activities

INL supports 76 treatment programs. This quarter, INL provided support for clinical-staff training, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand-reduction programs, while continuing to implement a transition plan to transfer 13 of its 76 treatment programs to Afghan responsibility.³⁷⁶

The transition plan includes building staff capacity and promoting continued cooperation between the MCN and MOPH. INL said it seeks to create uniformity among the treatment centers nationwide and to help incorporate existing Afghan treatment professionals into the Afghan government civil service. Under the plan, treatment programs will transition to the Afghan government as INL support to programs slowly decreases over the coming years.³⁷⁷

According to the final September 2014 report of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the MCN set a target to increase drug-prevention and treatment capacity for heroin and opium users by 30% between 2012 and 2016.³⁷⁸ Considering the country's insufficient number of treatment facilities, that goal may be overly ambitious. By contrast, the 2013 U.S. goal for lowering illicit drug consumption among 12-to-17-year-olds in the United States is only 15% by 2015.³⁷⁹

State also funded the Afghanistan National Urban Drug Use Study (ANUDUS) to glean reliable information on illicit drug use in order to develop approaches for demand reduction and prevention.³⁸⁰ Nearly 2,200 households were randomly selected, representing over 19,000 household

Opiate Consumption

According to UNODC, local consumption accounts for at most 5% of the Afghanistan's opium production.³⁸⁵ Afghan opium is exported to Western and Central Europe through Iran and Turkey, through the so-called Balkan route.³⁸⁶ China and India also receive direct shipments by air or land.³⁸⁷ Heroin from Afghanistan is heavily used in Eastern Europe, where levels of opiate use are higher than the global average.³⁸⁸ Afghan opium is exported through the country's northern neighbors for the Russian Federation market.³⁸⁹ The Canadian government also estimates that 90% of its heroin originates in Afghanistan.³⁹⁰

Nevertheless, little heroin in the United States originates in Afghanistan. Although a recently released U.S. government report noted a significant rise of U.S. heroin overdose deaths,³⁹¹ DEA reports that the availability of heroin from Afghanistan has not increased and is not increasing in the United States based on all its indicator programs and investigative reporting. New England, in particular, has seen a surge of heroin used, but DEA told SIGAR there is no indication that heroin from Afghanistan is crossing the border from Canada into New England.³⁹² DEA's indicator programs and investigative reporting identify that most of the heroin available in New England originates from South America.³⁹³

Source: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2014*, 6/2014, pp. x, 2, 26, 27, 95; UNODC, *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2013*, 10/2013, pp. 69, 71; CDC, *Increases in Heroin Overdose Deaths—28 States, 2010 to 2012*, 10/3/2014.

members. Over 5,200 people were tested.³⁸¹ The ANUDUS survey found that drug use was more than twice as high among Afghan men as the world average for adults. In all provinces, 10.7% of Afghan men tested positive for drug use, compared to 4.3% of women and 2.2% of children.³⁸² UNODC estimates that 5.2% of adults worldwide have used illicit drugs, with 0.7% being the best global estimate for the opioid user and 0.35% for users of opiates.³⁸³ Opioids were the most prevalent drug in the biological samples, although prescription drugs (prescription pain pills, sedatives, and tranquilizer) were the most commonly reported in the past 30 days in the questionnaires.

Monitoring, Verification and Regional Cooperation

The Paris Pact Policy Consultative Group Meeting (PCGM) occurred at the end of September in Vienna; INL participated. **The Paris Pact** functions as a balanced and neutral forum to promote collaborative action in the region, emphasizing long-term donor assistance to Afghanistan and drawing attention to cross-border smuggling and illicit drug abuse in the region.³⁸⁴

INL currently has two ongoing monitoring and evaluation programs to assess its counternarcotics work:

1. a cooperative agreement to develop an analytical framework to assess the effect of programs designed to encourage Afghan farmers to reduce opium cultivation

The Paris Pact: the partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on central Asian drug routes. It aims at reducing opium poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and at the establishment of a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

Source: Paris Pact, website "What is it?" <https://www.paris-pact.net>, accessed 7/16/2014.

2. a contract to develop a simulation model of the Afghan drug industry that will enable INL to assess the impact of its CN programs in Helmand

INL awarded the MCN Public Financial Management Risk Assessment contract on September 19, 2014, for \$172,120. During the quarter, UNODC performed eradication verification in support of the Afghanistan Opium Survey, tentatively scheduled for release in October.³⁹⁴

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

INL also funds the Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which assists the Afghan government in combating the production, trafficking, and use of narcotics in Afghanistan through periodic communication and outreach campaigns in targeted provinces. CNCE, implemented through Sayara Media Communications, targets farmers through national and local public-awareness and media campaigns in opium-poppy-growing areas.³⁹⁵ To date, INL has disbursed \$5.3 million of the \$8.2 million obligated under CNCE.

Sayara monitors the effectiveness of media campaigns through target-audience analysis reports, including a baseline report to identify provincial drivers of drug trafficking and cultivation, and public sentiment about narcotics. Sayara also conducts geographic information system mapping in partnership with a contractor and has 42 observers in all provinces. The provinces are ranked in tiers based on cultivation levels. The observers gather information on and gauge perceptions of the counternarcotics message campaigns. Sayara also conducts monthly media monitoring, assesses how counternarcotics media products fit into the current Afghan media landscape, and evaluates counternarcotics-related items in the media.

According to INL, the CNCE program began in 2013, so no correlation would exist between 2013 cultivation data and program activities. Cultivation estimates are not yet available for the current calendar year.³⁹⁶ The CNCE program will conclude in May 2015 and after that, the MCN, currently undergoing capacity-building training, will take over responsibility for CN media and public information campaigns.³⁹⁷

Aga Khan Foundation Grant

INL funded \$6 million of the project called Strengthening Sub-National Governance in Afghanistan, implemented by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), which ended May 28, 2014.³⁹⁸ The AKF is a non-profit, international development agency that focuses on health, education, civil society and other development projects.³⁹⁹ INL provided assistance to local governance institutions to shift six provinces in central and northern Afghanistan away from growing poppies and toward licit livelihoods.⁴⁰⁰

In July 2014, INL awarded a new \$12 million grant to AKF for the Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) project. The grant will enable AKF to work in 16 provinces across Afghanistan to improve alternative livelihoods for vulnerable populations. SAGAL has five main objectives to help address the key drivers of poppy cultivation:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crop systems
- increase economic return for licit crop systems
- improve farmers' access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve sub-national governance systems⁴⁰¹

According to INL, the SAGAL project builds upon the work of USAID projects wherever possible and expands U.S. government-funded alternative-livelihood projects to new areas. INL and its implementing partners consult with USAID to avoid pitfalls such as duplicative work with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities, and to develop complementary activities wherever possible.⁴⁰²

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building Program

The MCN and INL signed the MCN Capacity Building Program/Advisor Support memorandum of understanding on February 18, 2014. The program, which was renewed for 18 months, provides funding for 24 local and national advisors and helps build the MCN's capacity. INL is developing benchmarks for methods and processes that will track and evaluate the program's effectiveness. According to INL, this process not only helps stakeholders monitor the success of the advisor-support program, but also improves the MCN human resources department's employee-evaluation practices.⁴⁰³

This quarter, MCN with INL's assistance, conducted a skills assessment of nearly 200 MCN staff. The results of that assessment will be used to design a series of courses, to be taught by a local university, with the goal of increasing staff members' work-related skills and overall capacity. INL informed SIGAR it is expecting delivery and distribution of six four-wheel-drive vehicles for the MCN Kabul headquarters and 34 trucks for MCN provincial offices, which need reliable transportation. Also this quarter, three female students from the Asian University for Women began fellowships at MCN.⁴⁰⁴

Interdiction Operations

DOD reported that from July 1, 2014, to September 19, 2014, Afghan security and law-enforcement forces conducted 40 drug-interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 64 individuals. Overall, 441 individuals have been detained this fiscal year (168 detainees during the first quarter, 119

detainees during the second quarter, and 90 during the third quarter). These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units.⁴⁰⁵

INL provides operations-and-maintenance support to the CNPA Headquarters and the specially vetted units in Kabul. INL does not provide operations-and-maintenance support to the provincial CNPA.⁴⁰⁶ The U.S. Intelligence Community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to coalition mentors. Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 11,888 kg of opium
- 467 kg of heroin
- 4,850 kg of morphine
- 1,437 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 18,062 kg of **precursor chemicals**⁴⁰⁷

According to DOD, most interdiction activities occurred in southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of the country. Almost all U.S. interdiction activities partnered with Afghan forces as ISAF continued its drawdown during this reporting period. Interagency elements, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. Both CJIATF-N and IOCC integrated data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt narco-insurgent elements. All operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.⁴⁰⁸ The CJIATF-N mission ended in September 2014.⁴⁰⁹

Interdiction Results

Since 2008, a total of 2,818 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,939 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:

- 747,977 kg of hashish
- 391,080 kg of opium
- 52,957 kg of morphine
- 29,207 kg of heroin
- 460,067 kg of precursor chemicals⁴¹⁰


According to DOD, the drawdown of Coalition forces has had a negative impact on the CNPA and other Afghan counternarcotics agencies. The impact is most pronounced in Helmand and Kandahar, where the coalition troop surge and subsequent withdrawal was focused. Overall, counterdrug

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, *Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals*, 2009, viii.

FIGURE 3.30

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCED AND SEIZED, 2008–2014 (KILOGRAMS)



Note: 2014 production data has yet to be released by UNODC.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, pp. 12, 40, 42, 44; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2014.

operations decreased 17%, from 624 in fiscal year 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge, to 518 in fiscal year 2013. Heroin seizures decreased 77%, from 10,982 kg in fiscal year 2011 to 2,489 kg in fiscal year 2013. Opium seizures decreased 57%, from 98,327 kg in fiscal year 2011 to 41,350 kg in fiscal year 2013, according to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB). DOD told SIGAR that the decrease of overall counterdrug missions was likely the result of reduced partnering of ISAF with Afghan forces conducting counterdrug operations.⁴¹¹ As shown in Figure 3.30, seizures have been declining since 2012.

Information entered into the CCDB comes from multiple sources including the ANSF. DOD told SIGAR it was unable to verify ANSF-reported unilateral interdictions conducted by Afghan military or law-enforcement units where Coalition mentors are not present. In those instances, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which maintains the database, seeks to corroborate the reported seizure from other sources to increase confidence in the information.⁴¹²

DOD said they assess the majority of Afghan seizures to be the result of routine police operations near population centers or transportation corridors, such as at checkpoints or border crossings. Drug labs, storage sites, and major trafficking networks are concentrated in rural areas and

according to DOD, are increasingly denied to Afghan forces due to the ISAF drawdown and declining security in these areas. The notable exceptions are U.S.-and UK-supported vetted Afghan counterdrug units like the Intelligence and Investigative Unit (IIU), Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), and National Interdiction Unit (NIU), which have shown increased ability to conduct counter-network drug investigations and operations. These units also have been negatively impacted by the Coalition drawdown, most significantly by losing access to ISAF-provided enablers. However, DOD said that over the past year, the units have successfully conducted complex counterdrug investigations and operations without coalition assistance.⁴¹³

Aviation Support

During this reporting period, Department of State aircraft provided a total of 60.9 flight hours, conducted 51 sorties, moved 260 passengers, and transported 13,272 pounds of cargo in Afghanistan. DEA flight hours are unusually low this quarter because the program was restricted from conducting CN missions during the election recount.⁴¹⁴ According to INL, State provided no flight hours supporting DEA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, no flight hours supporting DEA interdiction efforts, and 10.3 flight hours supporting Afghan NIU and DEA passenger movements and training flight hours. INL maintains an air wing at Kandahar Airfield with dedicated helicopters supporting DEA missions in southern Afghanistan.⁴¹⁵

The Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) is a database that tracks drug interdictions and seizures in Afghanistan and is maintained by DIA.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2013.