SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events	91
ANSF Strength	95
New Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Assessments	97
Afghan Local Police	98
Status of Afghan Public Protection Force Transition No Longer Available Due to Drawdown of U.S. Forces	100
Afghan National Army	100
Afghan National Police	103
ANSF Medical/Health Care	105
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	105
Counternarcotics	106

SECURITY

As of December 31, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $65 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds ($60.7 billion) were channeled through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the $60.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately $52.4 billion had been obligated and $50.7 billion disbursed as of December 31, 2014.[87]

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

"The road before us remains challenging, but we will triumph."

General John F. Campbell, Commander, Resolute Support

Source: ISAF, "Transition ceremony kicks off Resolute Support Mission," 12/28/2014.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

Key issues and events this quarter include the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its combat mission, the transition from Operation Enduring Freedom to Resolute Support Mission (RSM), record casualties within the ANSF, and the recent classification of previously publicly reported data on the status of the ANSF. In addition, the United Nations (UN) reported the worst year for civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

International Security Assistance Force Ends Operations

Thirteen years after its creation, ISAF concluded operations in a ceremony on December 28, 2014. ISAF initially focused on providing security in the capital of Kabul, and evolved into a coalition of some 50 nations combating the Taliban insurgency and rebuilding the Afghan security forces.[88] At its peak, ISAF had 130,000 U.S. and international troops, but it gradually shrank in recent years as Afghan police and soldiers began to assume responsibility for security.[89] ISAF was replaced on January 1, 2015, by RSM, a new NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF.

Ceremony marking the end of ISAF's mission in Kabul. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Frank Hartnett)

Resolute Support Mission Begins

NATO's new RSM advisory mission commenced on January 1, 2015.[90] RSM will advise the security ministries, ANSF at the corps level, and Afghan special-operations forces at the tactical level.[91] This train, advise, and assist mission will initially include approximately 12,000 troops. Four NATO members are serving as framework nations: Turkey will lead in the Kabul capital area, Germany in the north, Italy in the west, and the United States in the south and east.[92] RSM will train Afghan soldiers and police and will conduct counterterrorism operations. NATO partners will focus exclusively on training and advising Afghan security forces, while U.S. forces will additionally have a limited combat role, as part of the new force's counterterrorism component.[93] The United States involvement with these two missions is code-named Operation Freedom's Sentinel.[94]

ISAF had developed a security-forces assistance framework, which RSM will now implement, to improve the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior ministries and their associated institutions to perform eight essential functions (EF):[95]

- EF 1: Multi-year Budgeting and Execution of Programs
- EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight
- EF 3: Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions
- EF 4: Force Generation (recruit, train, and equip the force)
- EF 5: Sustainment (supply and maintenance)
- EF 6: Strategy and Policy Planning, Resourcing, and Execution
- EF 7: Intelligence
- EF 8: Strategic Communication

SIGAR will follow and report on RSM progress in training, assisting, and advising the Afghan government and its security forces.

UN Reports Civilian Casualties Highest in 2014

The year 2014 saw the highest number of civilian casualties yet recorded in the Afghanistan conflict, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In the first 11 months of 2014, civilian casualties totaled 9,617, of which 3,188 civilians were killed and 6,429 injured. UNAMA expected civilian casualties to exceed 10,000 for all of 2014.[96]

In his December 9, 2014, report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said antigovernment elements were emboldened to execute multiple assaults on district administrative centers, security-force checkpoints, and major roads.[97] As reflected in Table 3.5, the number of security incidents decreased this period. However, overall the 19,469 security incidents recorded since the beginning of 2014 is 10.3% greater than the 17,645 recorded during same period in 2013.[98]

Even though the threat levels are high in the east and south, as reflected in Figure 3.26, and a marked increase in incidents occurred in the east, the

Security Incidents: reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.

Source: SIGAR analysis of the United Nations report.

FIGURE 3.26

THREAT LEVELS FROM ANTIGOVERNMENT FORCES



Source: Die Bundesregierung (German federal government), *2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan*, 11/2014, p. 19.

TABLE 3.5

NUMBER OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

Date Range	Number of Security Incidents	Number of Days	Average Number of Security Incidents per Day
11/16/2013–2/15/2014	4,649	92	50.5
3/1/2014–5/31/2014	5,864	92	63.7
6/1/2014–8/15/2014	5,456	76	71.8
8/16/2014–11/15/2014	5,199	92	56.5
TOTAL	**21,168**	**352**	**60.1**

Source: UN Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security* reports, 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; and 3/7/2014, p. 5.

rest of Afghanistan also experienced a significant number of security incidents.[99] The UN recorded 5,199 security incidents from August 16 through November 15, 2014, that included 235 assassinations and 92 abductions, an increase of 9% for both over the same period in 2013.[100] Armed clashes (48.9%) and improvised explosive device (IED) events (27.1%) accounted for 76% of all security incidents.[101] Eight of the 46 suicide attacks occurred in Kabul City.[102]

The UN reported that overall the Afghan security forces were able to counter the insurgency with relative effectiveness and none of the attacks succeeded in permanently capturing the intended targets.[103] An intensive, Taliban effort to take control of the Sangin district in Helmand Province failed.[104]

In Faryab Province, insurgents used heavier weapons than they had previously, resulting in part to security forces' suffering more losses during 2014 than in past years (over 2,000 police officers and about 950 soldiers were killed in the country since March 21, 2014).[105]

NATO CLASSIFICATIONS

NATO Cosmic Top Secret: applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to NATO.

NATO Secret: applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause serious damage to NATO.

NATO Confidential: applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which would be damaging to the interests of NATO.

NATO Restricted: applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which would be disadvantageous to the interests of NATO.

NATO Unclassified: applied to information for official NATO purposes and access only granted to individuals or organizations for official NATO purposes.

Source: NATO North Atlantic Council, "The Management of Non-classified NATO Information," 7/11/2002.

After Six Years of Being Publicly Reported, ANSF Data Classified

Last quarter SIGAR expressed concern about ISAF's decision to classify a key measure of ANSF capabilities, the executive summary of the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR). This quarter the new NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) that has taken over from ISAF went much further, classifying additional data that SIGAR has been using in every quarterly report for the past six years to discuss the progress of the ANSF, the MOD, and the MOI.

Every quarter SIGAR sends out a request for data to U.S. implementing agencies in Afghanistan with a list of questions about their programs. This quarter SIGAR received its data call responses from USFOR-A in the usual unclassified format on December 29, 2014. Five days later, SIGAR received an email stating that RSM planned to retroactively classify many of the responses. On January 8, Special Inspector General Sopko requested that Resolute Support Commander General John F. Campbell have his staff review the classification of the responses to SIGAR's data call.

On January 14, SIGAR was informed that its data call responses concerning ANSF strength, equipment, infrastructure, anticorruption measures and many other matters had been classified under NATO guidelines at the Secret, Confidential, or Restricted levels. On January 16, SIGAR received an update that three of those responses had been changed back to unclassified, leaving the vast majority classified.

The classification of this volume of data for SIGAR's quarterly report is unprecedented. The decision leaves SIGAR for the first time in six years unable to publicly report on most of the U.S.-taxpayer-funded efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. On January 18, General Campbell wrote the Special Inspector General a memo explaining why information that had previously been unclassified was now being treated as classified. The memo is reprinted in full in Appendix F of this report.

The types of data classified are addressed in the Security and Governance chapters of this section. The actual questions SIGAR asked—the responses to which RSM classified—are listed in Appendix E of this report. As authorized by its enabling statute, SIGAR will publish a classified annex containing the classified data.

U.S. Forces in Afghanistan

According to USFOR-A headquarters, 9,500 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of December 20, 2014, a decrease of 23,300 since June 1, 2014. Another 6,000 personnel from other Coalition nations were also serving at that time.[106]

On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced U.S. forces in Afghanistan will reduce to approximately 9,800 by January 2015 and will be reduced further throughout 2015.[107] Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,216 U.S.

military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,950 were wounded as of December 30, 2014.[108]

There were six insider attacks against U.S. forces during 2014 resulting in four deaths, including that of a U.S. Army major general on August 5, 2014.[109] This quarter, an investigation into that attack determined that the killing was an isolated, opportunistic act by a determined shooter who acted without indicators or warnings.[110] They concluded that the incident could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented. However, they also found that the general's visit to the university that day included an unusually large number of visitors, there was no comprehensive security plan, and changes made to the schedule of events that day were not coordinated with security personnel.[111] Recommendations were made to help mitigate future risk.[112]

The ISAF color guard marches during the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and XVIII Airborne Corps closing ceremony, December 8, 2014, at Kabul International Airport. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Perry Aston)

ANSF STRENGTH

This quarter RSM classified the information SIGAR has used for the past six years to report on ANSF troop strength. The questions SIGAR asked about ANSF troop strength can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

In December, the outgoing IJC commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, addressed the challenge of sustaining Afghan troops with soaring casualties and desertions. He said nearly 20% of ANA positions were unfilled as of October and recruiting and retention were not making up for personnel losses.[113] CBS News reported that last year was the deadliest of the war, with more than 5,000 Afghan soldiers and police killed. General John Campbell, RS Commander, said the ANSF were going out on four times as many operations last year than previously, so it could be expected to entail more casualties.[114]

NATO Set to Change ANSF Assessment Reporting

Last quarter the IJC notified SIGAR that the executive summary of the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) assessing ANSF capabilities had been classified. The previous version of the RASR that SIGAR received provided reporting at the brigade level with synthesized analysis of observations and shortfalls, highlighting priority issues hampering long-term ANSF sustainability, and assessments of ANSF operational and equipment readiness. This quarter, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) provided SIGAR an unclassified excerpt from the RASR, which aggregated the assessments at the corps level in a single table.[115]

ISAF has been using the RASR since August 2013 to rate the ANSF.[116] According to IJC, the RASR provides a monthly operational-level update on readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the ANA and ANP.[117]

"Political meddling, not intelligence, drives Afghan military missions."

Lt. General Joseph Anderson

Source: *New York Times,* "Misgivings by US General as Afghanistan Mission Ends," 12/8/2014.

TABLE 3.6

ANSF RASR ASSESSMENTS, MONTHLY CHANGES

	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed				Total			
	M1	M2	+	–	M1	M2	+	–	M1	M2	+	–	M1	M2	+	–	M1	M2	+	–	M1	M2	+	–
Corps/Divisions	0	2	2		7	4	-3		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	1	1		7	7	0	
Operations Coordination Center - Regional	1	1	0		6	5	-1		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	1	1		7	7	0	
Regional Logistics Support Center	1	1	0		3	3	0		1	1	0		0	0	0		1	1	0		6	6	0	
Regional Military Training Center/Combat Battle School	1	1	0		2	2	0		2	1	-1		0	0	0		0	1	1		5	5	0	
Mobile Strike Force Brigade	0	0	0		1	1	0		1	0	-1		0	0	0		0	1	1		2	2	0	
National Engineering Brigade	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		1	1	0		0	0	0		1	1	0	
Afghan Uniformed Police Type-A HQ	1	1	0		4	4	0		1	1	0		0	0	0		1	1	0		7	7	0	
Afghan Border Police Zone HQ	0	1	1		5	5	0		1	0	-1		0	0	0		1	1	0		7	7	0	
Afghan National Civil Order Police HQ	0	0	0		1	1	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		1	1	0	
Total ANSF Units	**4**	**7**	**3**		**29**	**25**	**-4**		**6**	**3**	**-3**		**1**	**1**	**0**		**3**	**7**	**4**		**43**	**43**	**0**	

Note: M1 = September 2014; M2 = October 2014

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/28/2014.

The latest unclassified RASR rates a significant majority of ANSF components as capable or fully capable (74%), as shown in Table 3.6. However, with decreased U.S. and Coalition oversight, the reliability of the ANSF-provided assessment data cannot be validated.

In December, the last IJC commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, spoke to the press about his views of the ANSF. General Anderson said the record casualties of the Afghan forces were not sustainable, nor were their desertion rates.[118]

He added that the police and the army do not work together.[119] He said the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the army do not agree on who is in charge in areas in which they share security responsibility.[120] Furthermore, ANSF units are not repairing their own equipment, yet complain they don't have resources. General Anderson attributed this problem to "pure ineptitude."[121] However, he said at the tactical level, Afghan forces could beat the Taliban, if properly motivated.[122] "They have always proven the more you push them and force them to be more responsible they end up coming through," said the general.[123]

With the transition to RSM and the closing of IJC on December 8, 2014, NATO is changing its method of assessing the ANSF.[124] Effective January 1, 2015, the Monthly ANSF Assessment Report (MAAR) superseded the RASR.[125] The MAAR will assess the ANSF capability and effectiveness for the eight essential functions related to the unit's warfighting functions. The MAAR is to provide the ability to evaluate not only what capabilities the ANSF possess, but also how well they employ those capabilities to defeat the insurgency and secure Afghanistan.[126] The first

MAAR is scheduled for January 2015.[127] SIGAR will report on the MAAR in its April 2015 quarterly report.

MOD and MOI to Assume Responsibility for Literacy Training

This quarter, USFOR-A reported 117,296 ANSF personnel have completed level 3 or functional literacy training as of December 1, 2014, as shown in Figure 3.27. However, DOD has not been able to provide information on how many of these trained personnel actually remain in the ANSF.

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can "identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials."[128]

FIGURE 3.27

ANSF STAFF LITERACY TRAINING LEVELS, AS OF DECEMBER 1, 2014 (THOUSANDS)



Note: Levels are not additive.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/29/2014.

NEW MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS

This quarter, RSM Headquarters released a new plan to assess the Essential Functions (EFs) of ministries.[129] The new plan—called the Plan of Actions and Milestones (PoAM) ministry-assessment reporting process—replaced the Capability Milestone rating system in December 2014. This plan was developed by RSM advisors and their Afghan counterparts in the ministries of Defense and Interior. The PoAM identifies and breaks down the EFs of the ministries by the capabilities needed to perform each function. It also defines the "conditions" (such as processes, tasks, milestones, and outcomes) needed to achieve those capabilities.[130]

To assess a ministry, RSM uses the PoAM to assess the conditions, capabilities, and essential functions of a ministry's offices and departments.[131] Office assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of each department within a ministry. Department assessments, in turn, are combined to determine the assessment of the ministry as a whole.[132] RSM provided SIGAR with the overall assessment of the essential functions of the ministries, but did not provide a more detailed assessment of the capabilities and conditions within the ministry or its departments and offices.

Table 3.7 on the following page shows the chart USFOR-A uses to rate the operational capabilities of the ministries, along with the first MOD and MOI assessments.[133]

According to the first assessment, 54% of the MOD's development conditions are assessed as "initiated" and 15% as "partially capable." For the MOI, 48% of its development conditions have been initiated and 10% were partially capable.

There are 284 U.S. personnel advising or mentoring the MOD and MOI: 151 assigned to the MOD and 133 to the MOI.[134]

TABLE 3.7

FIRST MINISTRY ASSESSMENT USING NATO SYSTEM, AS OF DECEMBER 15, 2014

	RATING MEANING / ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (EF)	EF 1: Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution	EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight	EF 3: Civilian Governance of the ASI	EF 4: Force Generation	EF 5: Sustainment	EF 6: Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution	EF7: Intelligence	EF 8: Strategic Communications	Rating Total
MOD ASSESSMENT	Rating 5: Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
	Rating 4: Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
	Rating 3: Partially Capable/Effective	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	**7**
	Rating 2: Initiated (In Development)	1	1	2	2	8	3	5	4	**26**
	Rating 1: Scoped/Agreed	3	3	1	2	0	1	0	0	**10**
	Rating 0: Not Scoped/Agreed	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	**5**
	EF Total	**5**	**5**	**4**	**6**	**13**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**48**
MOI ASSESSMENT	Rating 5: Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
	Rating 4: Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
	Rating 3: Partially Capable/Effective	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	**4**
	Rating 2: Initiated (In Development)	0	0	0	3	9	4	4	0	**20**
	Rating 1: Scoped/Agreed	4	3	3	2	0	0	0	3	**15**
	Rating 0: Not Scoped/Agreed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	**3**
	EF Total	**5**	**4**	**4**	**5**	**13**	**4**	**4**	**3**	**42**

Note: Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness: Condition fully achieved. Advising only as requested by ANSF counterparts if opportunity and resources permit. Fully Capable/Effective: Developmental conditions nearly achieved. ANSF element fully capable but still requires attention; on track to be achieved by end of Resolute Support Mission; advising will continue. Partially Capable/Effective: Development conditions in progress. ANSF element is partially capable/effective. Conditions can be achieved by end of Resolute Support Mission; advising will continue. Initiated (In Development): Baseline design initiated by ANSF element; plan ready for implementation. Scoped and Agreed Upon: Development tasks/milestones (conditions) scoped and agreed; baseline capability and measures not complete. Not Scoped/Agreed: Development tasks/milestones (conditions) not scoped and/or agreed upon.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/28/2014.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is under MOI authority and functions under the supervision of the district Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). ALP members (known as Guardians) are selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.[135] As of December 1, 2014, the ALP comprised 27,837 personnel, all but 800 of whom were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The number trained decreased due to combat

losses, tashkil (organizational-strength) redistribution, and attrition.[136] The goal was to have 30,000 personnel in 154 districts by the end of December 2014, assigned to 1,320 checkpoints across 29 provinces.[137]

According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost $121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength.[138] The United States has provided the ALP with equipment such as rifles, machine guns, light trucks, motorcycles, and radios.[139]

According to NSOCC-A, between June 23, 2014, and October 22, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 92%. During that period, NSOCC-A reported 1% non-casualty attrition, while 7.4% of the force were killed or wounded in action.[140]

The Afghan government has not determined the final disposition of the ALP or its funding source.[141] DOD says U.S. policy on funding the ALP has not yet been determined.[142] According to an independent assessment conducted by NSOCC-A based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus-group surveys in ALP districts, most Afghans surveyed perceive the ALP as an effective security element and stabilizing force.[143] That position is consistent with survey results from March 2014 that public perceptions of ALP's value to community security are positive overall.[144]

The ALP were generally viewed as a more trustworthy and effective force than either the ANA or ANP. However, certain districts vehemently disapprove of ALP members and their management. Favorable views appear to be correlated to the extent of community involvement in the ALP selection process.[145] Areas where community leaders felt they had an operative role in implementing the ALP program and selecting ALP members tended to have a more favorable view of the security of their villages. Where the ALP was seen as a tool of a central authority, respondents reported lower levels of security.[146] However, whether or not the community supported or respected the current ALP Guardians, they believed that if properly administered, the ALP program would work in their community.[147] NSOCC-A provided updates on the status of the recommendations from the March 2014 assessment:[148]

- Support and supervision from the ANP: staff regulary inspect processes that support the ALP and an initiative to pay 100% of the ALP via electronic funds transfer (EFT). Currently 46% of the ALP is paid via EFT.[149]
- Transparent, locally owned recruitment processes: ALP was accepted more readily when village elders nominated local villagers as ALP Guardians as it was perceived that they will be more accountable to the people they already know.[150]
- Balanced tribal representation: established ALP procedures require recruitment be done proportionately when multiple tribes live in an area.[151]
- Regular information exchanges between community leaders and ALP commanders: the ALP leadership conducts summits for tribal elders and villagers to express concerns and to educate district and provincial-level security officials on the workings of the ALP.[152]

Tashkil: the list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI that detail authorized staff positions and equipment items. The word means "organization" in Dari.

Source: GAO, GAO-08-661, *Afghanistan Security*, 6/2008, p. 18.

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR has an ongoing audit on the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan's implementation of the Afghan Local Police program.

STATUS OF AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE TRANSITION NO LONGER AVAILABLE DUE TO DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, established to provide contract-based facility and convoy-security services in Afghanistan, was directed to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP.[153] SIGAR was unable to obtain an update on the transition status as the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) reported they no longer provide advisors or monitor the program.[154] SIGAR will attempt to obtain the status for the next quarterly report from other sources. For details on the last update on restructuring the security services into three parts, refer to page 88 in SIGAR's October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.[155]

This quarter, RSM classified other information SIGAR uses to report on the costs of APPF services. The questions SIGAR asked about these costs can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $34.8 billion and disbursed $33.7 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.[156]

ANA Strength

This quarter, RSM classified the information SIGAR uses to report on ANA troop strength. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA troop strength and attrition can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANSF Attrition

Last quarter, SIGAR reported on its concerns about ANA attrition. Between September 2013 and August 2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls.[157] This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANA attrition. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANA Sustainment

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $13.8 billion and disbursed $13.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.[158]

SIGAR AUDITS

An ongoing SIGAR audit is assessing the reliability and usefulness of ANA personnel and payroll data.

A SIGAR audit initiated this quarter will review DOD's support to the ANA's Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals, and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met. For more information, see Section 2, page 27.

ANA Salaries and Incentives

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANA salaries and incentives. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA salaries and incentives can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $11.5 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.[159]

This quarter, RSM classified or otherwise restricted the release of information SIGAR uses to report on ANA equipment and transportation. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA equipment and transportation can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANA Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $6.2 billion and disbursed $5.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.[160]

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANA infrastructure. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA infrastructure can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.[161]

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANA training programs, costs, and students. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA training programs, costs, and students can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

Long-Standing Goals for Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force Far From Met

Women still make up less than 1% of the ANA despite the past recruitment efforts and retention goals. The goal to increase the number of women in the ANA by 10% was moved into the ten-year plan. In March, the MOD is scheduled to publish the FY 1394 accession plan which will include the annual recruitment goal.[162] To achieve this goal, the ANA has waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan's various ethnic groups.

Additionally, the ANA is reviewing assignment locations to find locations with accommodation for females, such as separate restrooms. The ANA Recruiting Command also airs local television commercials directed at women beginning 20 days before training classes.[163] Forty-five slots are

SIGAR INSPECTIONS

SIGAR has initiated an inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended.

A SIGAR inspection published this quarter examined facilities constructed and renovated at Camp Commando, and found issues with the generators, power output, and fuel points. For more information, see Section 2, page 38.

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit published this quarter found that although DOD, State, and USAID reported spending at least $64.8 million on 652 projects, programs, and initiatives to support Afghan women in fiscal years 2011 through 2013, there was no comprehensive assessment available to show that gains in women's status were the direct results of U.S. efforts. For more information, see Section 2, page 21.

allocated for the four-year National Military Academy, 90 for the one-year Junior Officer Academy, and 150 for the officer candidate school/noncommissioned officer school.[164]

This quarter, RSM classified information on how the $25 million authorized under the FY 2014 NDAA (Pub. L. 113-66), is being used to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and improved treatment of women in the ANSF. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA women's programs can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR notified DOD and ISAF of concerns about the purchase of light air support aircraft. The Afghan Air Force may not be able to support the initial 20 aircraft and related equipment valued at $450 million. For more information, see Section 2, page 44.

Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the United States provided more than $6.5 billion to support and develop the Afghan Air Force, including over $3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested more than $925 million, including $21.4 million for equipment and aircraft, in FY 2015 for the Afghan Air Force. However, the majority of the funding is being requested for sustainment and training, as shown in Table 3.8.

This quarter the AAF declined to accept ownership of six C-182 fixed-wing training aircraft purchased with the ASFF. In lieu of training in C-182s, fixed-wing pilot training is being provided in the UAE, where Afghan students begin in C-172s and transition to more advanced training in C-208s.[165]

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on the AAF and SMW capabilities, pilots, and aircraft inventories. The questions SIGAR asked about AAF and SMW capabilities, pilots, and aircraft inventories can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

According to NSOCC-A, contract support for both maintenance and logistics is anticipated to be required through 2017.[166] A RSM advisory group is partnered with the Afghans to develop organic maintenance capabilities as well as contractor support.[167]

TABLE 3.8

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2015 ($ THOUSANDS)

Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	$461,877	$778,604	$1,805,343	$111,129	$2,300	$21,442
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	141,077	164,187	123,416
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	469,230	520,802	780,370
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	53,000	0	0
Total	**$760,299**	**$1,683,250**	**$2,621,237**	**$774,436**	**$687,289**	**$925,228**

Source: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 6/2014, pp. 10, 24, 26, and 29.

MOI, MOD, and National Directorate of Security leaders signed the SMW air charter on May 14, 2014, outlining the creation of a new Joint Command and Control Coordination Center (JCCC) to facilitate priority SMW missions. Both MOD and MOI special-operations forces will have liaison officers to the JCCC. The AAF is to provide personnel, recruiting, and other administrative (nonoperational) support to SMW. The SMW commander meets weekly with special-operations unit leaders to discuss pending operations and synchronize requirements and priorities.[168] The Afghan national security advisor is currently reviewing a proposal to transfer the SMW to the MOD while continuing to support both MOD and MOI special operation missions.[169]

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $17.1 billion and disbursed $16.6 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.[170]

ANP Strength

This quarter, RSM classified the information SIGAR uses to report on ANP troop strength and attrition. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP troop strength and attrition can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANP Sustainment

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $6.7 billion and disbursed $6.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.[171] This includes $1.5 billion in U.S. contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries.

ANP Salaries

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANP salaries and incentives. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP salaries and incentives can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) charges 4% of donor contributions—more than $20 million based on their estimated annual expenditures—to manage the LOTFA program. The Afghan government and some international donors prefer this funding instead be applied to police salaries.[172] On December 24, 2014, President Ghani announced a six-month deadline for the UNDP to transfer control of the trust fund to the MOI.[173] The European Union's ambassador to Afghanistan expressed support: "You have to take that cue when the host government says it wants to do something; it's not like the LOTFA

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit on ANP personnel and payroll data released this quarter found no assurance that data are valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems are not fully functional or integrated. For more information, see Section 2, page 23.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR sent an inquiry letter last quarter to UNDP expressing concern that the UNDP is not overseeing how LOTFA funds are spent, that they are not proactively addressing problems, and that they claim to lack authority to conduct oversight.

Border Patrol Boat Status

In FY 2011, CSTC-A requested eight rigid-hull, inflatable riverine border-patrol boats for the ANP. CSTC-A canceled the $1.93 million procurement near the end of the boats' manufacturing process. On July 25, 2014, DOD notified Congress that the boats purchased with ASFF funds were no longer required by the ANSF and would be treated as DOD stock. In November, the Navy transferred the boats to the Emergency Ship Salvage Material System in Virginia.

Source: OUSDP, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2014.

SIGAR INSPECTION

An inspection of the Afghan Special Police Training Center's Dry Fire Range (DFR) revealed water penetration caused walls to begin disintegrating within four months of DOD's acceptance of the project, the DFR's construction was plagued by poor government oversight, and the contractor was not held accountable for correcting the range's structural deficiencies before the contract warranty expired. The Afghan authorities demolished the DFR and are rebuilding. For more information, see Section 2, page 41.

has tons of good will with the donor community."[174] Because SIGAR has already found that MOI internal-control mechanisms are insufficient to the task, SIGAR believes shifting police payments from LOTFA to direct financial assistance to the Afghan government would invite serious risks. SIGAR is not opposed to direct assistance, but believes such a move must contain a strict regimen of internal controls to ensure that monies are spent for their intended purposes.

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.[175]

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANP equipment. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on ANP equipment in a classified annex.

ANP Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $2.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.[176]

This quarter, RSM classified information SIGAR uses to report on ANP infrastructure. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP infrastructure can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on ANP infrastructure in a classified annex.

ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.5 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.[177]

This quarter, RSM classified or otherwise restricted additional information SIGAR uses to report on ANP training programs, costs, and students. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP training programs, costs, and students can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

ANP Unlikely to Meet Quotas for Policewomen

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is slowly increasing, but the ANP is far from reaching its goal of 5,000 women by March 2015. Women still make up only 1.4% of the force. This quarter, ANP personnel included 2,178 women, according to CSTC-A, an increase of 974 women since August 22, 2011.[178] ISAF said the ANP is focused on finding secure workplaces with appropriate facilities for females and developing strategies to attract and retain qualified female recruits with at least a high-school degree.[179] The 10-year goal for the ANP is to have 15,700 police women serving.[180]

The NDAA for FY 2014 (Pub. L. 113-66), provides $25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and improved treatment of women in the ANSF.[181] This quarter, RSM did not classify or restrict information on ANP women, however, they did classify or otherwise restrict information on how the NDAA provision is being used to support ANA women. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA women's programs can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex. Some $1.1 million is allocated to provide secure transportation for policewomen. One reason families do not allow females to join the ANP is the fear that they will be targeted on public buses by insurgents. The ANP is seeking to provide safe rides to and from work or training centers in unmarked, curtain-drawn vehicles.[182]

ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

This quarter, RSM restricted the release of information SIGAR uses to report on the ANSF medical and health care programs, personnel, and their cost. The questions SIGAR asked about the ANSF medical and health care programs, personnel, and their cost can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR is reporting on this matter in a classified annex.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

More than any other country in the world, Afghanistan is plagued by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), putting thousands of lives at risk.[183] In its latest evaluation report, the UN Mine Action Service reported that an average of 39 people were killed or disabled by mines and other ERW every month in 2014.[184] Most of the mines are from the battles against the forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.[185]

Since FY 2002, the U.S. Department of State (State) has provided more than $294 million for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).[186] Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by ERW and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct IEDs.[187]

In September 2014, DOD transferred $901,511 to PM/WRA to support an international NGO's effort to monitor the clearing of ordnance left behind more recently at U.S. firing ranges.[188] However, this may be just a small percentage of the funding needed. As noted in an April 2014 *Washington Post*

TABLE 3.9

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1, 2013–SEPTEMBER 30, 2014

Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1–9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1–12/30/2013	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
1/1–3/31/2014	1,780	254,734	245,380	262,750	5,473,170	638,400,000*
4/1–6/30/2014	1,077	3,264	25,362	3,227,697	5,163,035	519,000,000
7/1–9/30/2014	1,329	26,873	21,502	2,860,695	5,705,984	511,600,000
TOTAL	**16,682**	**427,906**	**599,808**	**15,891,734**	**39,865,389**	**511,600,000**

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.
* Significant increase in contaminated area due to inclusion of contaminated firing ranges by Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) in estimates. MACCA reversed its decision during the quarter ending, 10/30/2014.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2014 and 12/31/2014.

article, the U.S. military has reportedly left about 800 square miles of contaminated land that is expected to cost $250 million to clear.[189]

As of September 30, 2014, State-funded implementing partners have cleared nearly 165 million square meters of land (nearly 64 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.8 million land mines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives (see Table 3.9). PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by land mines, whereas a contaminated area can include both land mines and other ERW.[190]

A recent UN-commissioned evaluation of the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), a UN program comprising 52 humanitarian and commercial organizations and employing 8,000 Afghans to clear mines and ERW, noted that the program has been successful while acknowledging that "the indirect and development impacts of the programme are neither properly assessed and quantified nor integrated in a real donor and advocacy strategy."[191] The report also noted that "the absence of clear yearly targets until 2014 make it difficult to assess the achievements of the programme against targets and in turn to communicate clearly on this with donors."[192] The report cautioned that a decrease in donor funding will make it difficult for MAPA to meet its obligation under the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty to deliver a mine-free country by 2023.[193]

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of December 30, 2014, the United States has provided $8 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated

most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund ($2.8 billion), the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($1.4 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) ($1.5 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.[194] USAID's Alternative Development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production.[195] In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. (See Appendix B.)

Afghanistan cultivates more than 90% of the world's poppies[196] and the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' (INL) programs support the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan (approved in December 2012) and the key priorities of Afghanistan's National Drug Control Strategy, approved in October 2013.[197] INL advises the U.S. President and U.S. departments and agencies on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. INL programs support two of State's strategic goals:

- reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States
- minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens[198]

A recent audit of INL's counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan conducted by the Department of State's Office of Inspector General (State OIG) found that the effectiveness of INL's initiatives could not be determined for lack of fully developed or implemented performance-measurement standards.[199] State OIG recommended, among other things, that INL implement performance-measurement plans for all its initiatives, analyze its spending patterns and past expenditure rates to adjust its budget requests, and develop sustainment plans for its initiatives.[200]

INL responded that it had developed the performance-measurement plans for its key Afghan counternarcotics programs during the fall of 2012 and updated them in October 2013 to better align them with the agency's performance-measurement guidance. INL also maintained that the budget calculations in State OIG's report contained inaccuracies.[201] State OIG considered its recommendations unresolved based on INL's response.[202]

Opium Cultivation Rises, Eradication Results Fall

The latest UN opium survey results, published November 2014, estimate that the total area under cultivation with poppy rose to 224,000 hectares, a 7% increase from the previous year.[203] Eradication decreased by 63% in 2014 from the previous year, to 2,692 hectares.[204] A hectare is about 2.5 acres. In a briefing to the UN Security Council, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) chief stressed that "the lessons of the past decade strongly

suggest that counternarcotics must be fully integrated in development and security strategies, and delivered as part of unified assistance."[205]

While cultivation remains concentrated in Afghanistan's southern and western regions, which accounted for 89% of the national production[206] (down from 95% in 2012),[207] a dramatic increase in Nangarhar—declared "poppy free" in 2007—to 18,227 hectares in 2014[208] shows how vulnerable other parts of the country are to resurgence.

INL also informed SIGAR that while opium cultivation has declined in some areas, it remained unchanged or has risen in areas where security and governance remain a challenge.[209]

Governor Led Eradication Program (GLE)

INL funds Afghanistan's Governor Led Eradication Program (GLE). UNODC verified in its November 2014 final report that GLE eradicated only 2,692 hectares nationwide in 2014 compared to 7,348 hectares in 2013.[210] The Afghan government has attributed the decrease in part to coinciding elections and the eradication season in some provinces, limiting the availability of security forces to assist in operations. The interministerial process to organize GLE efforts was also complicated by the elections, and the late-season approval of the plan limited its effectiveness.[211]

INL funds provided to support the GLE effort are based on eradication figures verified by UNODC.[212] Following the release of the UNODC report this quarter, INL/Kabul confirmed and transferred the final payment to MCN bringing the total for 2014 payments of $673,000. INL also donated 47 new tractors to MCN, designated for provincial poppy eradication. According to INL, the purchased tractors will enhance the aging fleet. The procurement and delivery of those tractors took place in October 2014, after the eradication season, and they will be used during the 2015 eradication campaign. The new units bring MCN's total eradication tractor count to 257.[213]

Good Performer's Initiative (GPI)

INL also supports the MCN's efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI). Under the terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for $1 million in GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, as verified by UNODC. In August 2014, INL and MCN announced GPI II, which expands the award categories for "good performers" to include public outreach and law enforcement, beginning in the 2014–2015 poppy cultivation season, and reduces the amount a province may receive for being poppy-free to $500,000.[214] Following concerns that the initial program was not appropriately targeted, development assistance under GPI II will be tailored to better meet the needs of rural communities by prioritizing alternative-livelihoods projects that support farmers as they transition from poppy cultivation.[215]

As of November 30, 2014, a total of 221 GPI projects with a value of over $108 million were approved with over $73 million in expenditures: 145 projects were completed, 64 are ongoing, and 12 are nearing completion.[216] Based on third-party audit recommendations, GPI has reverted to its practice of using a flat conversion rate of one U.S. dollar to 50 afghanis (AFN) rather than using the actual conversion rate on project-bid day as provided by Da Afghanistan Bank as was reported by INL last quarter. The total value of GPI projects in prior quarterly reports is therefore not directly comparable to the values in this report.[217]

INL coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan. For instance, INL ensures that projects proposed under the GPI program do not conflict with other U.S. government work through an interagency consultation process, drawing on past and present mission experience in each province.[218] Please refer to pages 115–117 of SIGAR's October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information on GPI.

Monitoring, Verification, and Regional Cooperation

INL participated in the Paris Pact Policy Consultative Group Meeting at the end of September 2014, and anticipates continued participation in 2015.

INL currently has two monitoring and evaluation programs: (1) a grant for "Reducing Reliance on Illicit Crops," which supports development of an analytical framework to assess the effect of programs designed to encourage Afghan farmers to reduce opium cultivation; and (2) a contract for the "Multi-Agent Modeling of INL Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Program," which supports development of a simulation model of the Afghan drug industry that enables INL to assess the impact of its counternarcotics programs in Helmand.

During this quarter, the grantee continued work on a report to estimate the likely effects of an array of counternarcotics programs, and the contractor entered the testing phase of the simulation-model prototype and continued work on a report explaining the simulation model use and methodology. Lastly, UNODC published the previously cited *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production* in November 2014.[219]

The Paris Pact: The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on central Asian drug routes. It aims to reduce opium-poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and establish a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

Source: Paris Pact, "What is it?" https://www.paris-pact.net, accessed 7/16/2014.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) coordinates the actions of other ministries and takes the lead in developing counternarcotics policy.[220] The MCN signed a memorandum of understanding with INL in February 2014 renewing its capacity-building program for 18 months and providing funding for 24 local national advisors to help build capacity at the MCN.[221] INL told SIGAR that the MCN capacity-building advisor, based at the U.S.

Embassy Kabul, coordinates project components including the INL-funded local national advisors, skills-focused workshops/training, and commodities.[222] The advisor shares requests for commodity support from MCN with INL, which then reviews the requests and approves those that add to MCN's capacity and development. For example, INL approved a cabling project to the MCN IT infrastructure that increased their internet communication capacity by 70%. On the other hand, INL rejected a recent MCN request for space heaters.[223]

When security conditions permit, the capacity-building advisor is embedded at the MCN four to five days each week to monitor program performance and implementation. An INL contractor is currently undertaking a public financial-management risk assessment of the MCN.[224] INL plans to incorporate the assessment's findings into the final MCN Capacity Building Program performance-measurement plan. During the next quarter, INL and MCN expect to finalize an agreement to undertake a series of courses to be taught by a local university with the aim of increasing work-related skills and overall capacity of MCN staff.[225]

During this quarter, MCN, with INL assistance, hosted two week-long development workshops in Kabul for MCN provincial directors and provincial staff. INL also delivered 34 trucks for MCN provincial offices, which needed reliable transportation.[226]

Drug Demand Reduction

INL says it worked this quarter with the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and MCN to continue administration of the Demand Reduction Program, as well as to prepare for the transition plan to move INL-supported treatment centers to MOPH responsibility. INL supports 76 drug-treatment programs and funds training of clinical staff, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand-reduction programs.[227] The transition plan will continue with the transfer of additional treatment programs as INL support decreases gradually over the coming years. In the first year of transition, INL will turn over 13 centers. It will also move trained clinical staff to the MOPH government employee roster.[228] Please refer to pages 119–120 of SIGAR's October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information.

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE)

INL also funds the nationwide Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which assists the Afghan government in combating the production, trafficking and use of narcotics through communication, outreach campaigns and capacity-building training.[229] According to INL, public-opinion polling shows that the majority of Afghan people polled have heard anti-poppy and anti-cultivation messages.[230]

The current CNCE grant will conclude in April 2015. INL told SIGAR it expects smaller, targeted programming to follow, to solidify the capacity-building training included in the original grant, as MCN takes over its public-information and outreach efforts. The scope and number of MCN campaigns will be determined in part by the Afghan government's budget allocation.[231] INL will continue with traditional U.S. Embassy and State-led public-outreach efforts, as occur elsewhere around the world.[232]

Alternative Development/Alternative Livelihood

USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production.[233] INL funding supports programs in several areas including supply reduction and alternative development.[234] INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.[235]

Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)

INL also funds alternative-livelihood programs.[236] For example, the non-governmental Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and its partners implement activities under the $12 million Strengthening Afghan Government and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant from INL.[237] As of September 30, 2014, activities focused on project start-up. AKF negotiated subgrants with two project partners. The project partners recruited 98 staff and established four new SAGAL project offices. Activities started in several provinces, including studies around the input supply system and cooperatives, mapping studies to collect data about value chains and existing market demand, and financial and operational training for business-member organizations and community-based savings groups.[238]

According to INL, SAGAL activities will complement past and ongoing investments in licit livelihoods and rural development by the U.S. government. In particular, SAGAL will provide a system of support for GPI II. Where district development planning structures exist, SAGAL will support a more decentralized GPI II project-selection process, improving the recognition of rural community needs in the provincial GPI II project-nomination process.[239]

Wherever GPI II projects and SAGAL are both operating, SAGAL project teams will maintain ongoing linkages and provide needed support such as access to improved techniques, technologies, and agricultural inputs; linkages to markets; and improved capacity of communities to increase the post-production value of licit crops. For example, if a district is implementing a GPI II greenhouse project, SAGAL could support GPI II in linking farmers' cooperatives with the market, District Agriculture

Community-based savings groups: provide sustainable access to credit and savings for the most vulnerable members of rural communities, particularly in areas lacking formal credit mechanisms through financial institutions. Participants are mobilized to form self-led savings groups that voluntarily contribute every month to a loan fund. Group members can access the loan fund to invest in public goods, businesses, or emergency needs. Each year, savings are paid out in full to all members and each individual may choose to reinvest. In the interim, groups can decide to grant small loans to individual members and recoup the credit with interest.

Source: INL, response to SIGAR Vetting, 7/11/2014.

TABLE 3.10

SELECT ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS

Agency	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost ($)	Cumulative Disbursement, as of 12/31/2014
State (INL)	Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)	7/21/2014	1/20/2016	$11,884,816	$2,155,821
USAID	Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/30/2016	45,296,184	40,316,854
USAID	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)	3/2/2009	2/28/2015	159,878,589	148,292,490
USAID	Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	7/31/2013	7/30/2015	18,695,804	7,315,000
USAID	Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-South	10/7/2013	10/6/2018	125,075,172	16,663,146
USAID	Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-North	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	2,208,501
USAID	Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-West	8/10/2014	8/9/2019	69,973,376	1,031,829

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2015; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/24/2014; INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2015.

Irrigation and Livestock/Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, and other relevant organizations. INL told SIGAR this support will make the implementation of GPI II more efficient and effective.[240] In addition, SAGAL builds upon the work of USAID projects wherever possible and expands alternative livelihood projects to new areas. SAGAL staff consults with USAID to avoid working with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities, and to develop complementary activities wherever possible.[241] As of December 31, 2014, disbursements total $2.2 million.[242] Please refer to Table 3.10 for information on several other alternative livelihood programs.

Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a two-year, $18.7 million project implemented by USAID under a joint strategy with INL and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar province.[243] USAID implements the alternative livelihood (AL) component, including support to MCN, and INL implements the eradication, public-information and demand-reduction components.[244]

As of December 2014, KFZ completed three alternative-livelihood projects; 15 other AL and 11 irrigation-canal construction/rehabilitation projects were ongoing.[245] An estimated $5.5 million of infrastructure projects in Zahri, Pajwai, and Maiwand have not begun because USAID is currently vetting the companies being considered for the work. Of the 14 infrastructure projects, one was cancelled and five were approved by USAID.[246]

KFZ also has 33 different AL projects in the pipeline, with five specifically designed for women.[247] These projects include vocational training in mechanical maintenance and masonry, the establishment of greenhouses and small poultry farms, and pre- and post- harvest marketing.[248] However, the USAID implementer raised security concerns, noting that spill-over in

fighting from neighboring Helmand risks destabilizing KFZ in western districts if left unchecked.[249]

According to USAID, 88 households benefitted from alternative-development or alternative-livelihood activities in U.S. government-assisted areas to date. The current objective is to assist over 7,100 households by July 2015.[250] It seems unlikely that KFZ will achieve its goal by the project's end date of July 2015.[251] As of December 31, 2014, USAID spent $7.3 million. Please see Table 3.10 and refer to pages 118–119 of SIGAR's October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information on the KFZ program.

Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)

The Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Within the overall RADP umbrella, there are currently three projects under implementation in the southern, western and northern regions of Afghanistan. These projects share a common set of objectives focused on strengthening the capacity of farmers in improving the productivity of wheat, high-value crops and livestock. Using a value-chain approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales of commodities, and overall development of agricultural value chains.[252]

RADP-South, a five-year, $125 million effort, operates in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces. It began in October 2013 and will end in October 2018.[253] Likewise, RADP-West, which operates in Herat, Farah, and Badghis Provinces, has a $70 million cost estimate and is scheduled to end in October 2019.

The $78 million RADP-North project operates in Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Badakshan.[254]

According to USAID, the RADP activities complement INL's efforts primarily through RADP-South, which operates in Helmand and Kandahar—the highest producers of opium poppy. RADP-North will work in Badakshan, which has historically been a poppy-growing area, and in other northern provinces like Balkh and Baghlan, which have relatively low levels of poppy cultivation at present. The three provinces covered by RADP-West all produced poppy in 2013. The projects will seek to increase the productivity of wheat, which directly competes with poppy for land as a winter crop.

More importantly, all the RADP projects will work to increase the productivity as well as expand the scale of annual horticulture production and livestock production, as alternative sources of income. According to USAID, increased income from licit sources will facilitate efforts to get farmers to reduce or eliminate poppy production. Without alternative income streams, abandoning poppy will have a severe negative economic impact on poppy-cultivating households.[255]

USAID told SIGAR that the RADP projects are just getting under way and have not reported any outcomes.[256] As of December 31, 2014, USAID spent $2.2 million on RADP-North, $16.7 million on RADP-South and $1.0 million on RADP-West.[257] Please see Table 3.10 on page 112 for summary information on this alternative livelihood program.

Please refer to pages 119 and 184 of SIGAR's October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information.

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East and West (IDEA-NEW)

Launched in March 2009, the mission of USAID's $160 million Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is to expand the licit agricultural economy in the northern, eastern, and western regions of the country.[258] During October 2014, USAID signed grant agreements with five suppliers of agricultural inputs such as seed and fertilizer, and with three food processors such as jams and tomato paste producers.[259] USAID program implementers provided pesticide handling and safety training to dealers from Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Nangarhar, and Kunar. The training aimed to improve knowledge of safe pesticide use, environmental risk-mitigation methods, and hazard-free pesticide handling and storage.[260]

Activities continued under other program areas such as grants to assist agriculture input dealers—for example, seed, fertilizer or agro-chemical suppliers—to improve their business image, extend their capabilities and profits[261] (four grants were issued in October 2014[262]) or take new initiatives such as introducing short message service (SMS) or mobile telephone marketing for input wholesalers.[263] During October 2014, the SMS grantees sent 34 individual, targeted messages to farmer groups, amounting to a total of 12,000 messages reaching thousands of individual farmers.[264] As of December 31, 2014, USAID has disbursed $148.2 million.[265] Please refer to Table 3.10 on page 112.

Though alternative-livelihood programs funded by USAID are designed to increase the size of the legal economy, it is not clear whether this will automatically lead to a reduction in the illicit economy. Experience has shown that unless programs adequately factor in the different causes of opium-poppy cultivation and how these differ by local context and socio-economic group, the risk remains that development inputs will lead to an increase in levels of opium-poppy cultivation and yields.[266]

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP)

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP) is a $45 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease

the country's poppy production. CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by assisting them to shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.[267]

CHAMP provides training in best agricultural practices, builds storage facilities such as cool rooms and raisin-drying facilities, and helps grape farmers convert from traditional ground-based vineyards to higher-output trellis systems. CHAMP also helps stimulate farm exports by linking farmers to traders and traders to high-paying markets. CHAMP includes women in many of its activities in an effort to integrate them into the mainstream agricultural sector.[268] The program began in February 2010 and was originally slated to end in January 2014. In June 2012, however, the program was extended until December 2014 to focus resources and activities on a value chain approach that emphasizes post-harvest handling and marketing activities.[269]

Under the new approach, CHAMP is carrying out activities throughout five main value chains (grapes, almonds, pomegranates, apricots, and apples). The program focuses on improving horticultural and marketing practices to produce high-quality fruit for high-value markets.[270] As of October 2014, CHAMP's achievements include training 100,000 farmers, including 2,600 women, to improve agricultural techniques, planting nearly three million saplings and root cuttings benefitting 19,500 farmers, and exporting 24,000 tons of produce valued at $26 million to Pakistan, India, United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Canada. CHAMP enabled the construction of storage facilities (cool rooms and drying facilities) and created over 7,000 full-time jobs in agribusiness.[271] USAID informed SIGAR that CHAMP will now continue through December 2016.[272]

According to the implementer, security remained an impediment to certain program activities. Antigovernment elements intimidated staff and beneficiaries in several provinces, affecting project implementation. The deteriorating security conditions that followed the presidential election results also led to the reduction of non-Afghan staff for a week. The program implementer reported that delays in the USAID vetting approval for procuring items such as baskets for post-harvest handling in Ghazni, Wardak, and Zabul Provinces; trellis posts for Parwan, Kapisa, and Kandahar; and protective equipment will likely impact the project's ability to meet the approved plan requirements.[273] As of December 31, 2014, USAID has disbursed $40.3 million.[274] Please see Table 3.10 on page 112.

Interdiction Operations

DOD reported that from October 1, 2014, to December 17, 2014, Afghan security and law-enforcement forces conducted 48 drug-interdiction operations resulting in 85 detentions.[275] These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention

operations. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units.[276]

Most interdiction activities occurred in the east and capital regional commands. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern regional commands, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. DOD said this shift is likely a result of the coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in the eastern regional commands, primarily Nangarhar Province, and the capital is not as great as the threat in the south and southwest. All U.S. interdiction activities were partnered with Afghan forces as ISAF continued its drawdown during the reporting period. Interagency elements, including the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. The IOCC provided data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt narco-insurgent elements.[277]

INL provides operations-and-maintenance support to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Headquarters and the specially vetted units in Kabul. INL does not provide operations-and-maintenance support to the provincial CNPA.[278] The U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to Coalition mentors.[279]

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 9,696 kg of opium
- 482 kg of heroin
- 495 kg of morphine
- 13,166 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 1,930 kg of precursor chemicals[280]

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, viii.

In FY 2014 and throughout the quarter, use of Afghan counternarcotics elements for election security support led to fewer CN missions, as did reduced partnering of ISAF with Afghan forces. These impacts were most pronounced in Kandahar, where the Coalition surge and subsequent withdrawal was focused.[281]

Interdiction Results

As shown in Table 3.11, interdiction results have been declining since 2012.

According to DOD, vetted Afghan units have successfully conducted complex counterdrug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance. However, the drawdown of Coalition forces has had an impact on Afghanistan's ability to conduct CN interdiction operations as critical enablers such as quick-reaction forces, close air support, and dedicated medical evacuation support are no longer available.[282]

TABLE 3.11

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FY 2008–FY 2015

	FY 08	FY 09	FY 10	FY 11	FY 12	FY 13	FY 14	FY 15*	Total
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	48	2,873
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	85	3,032
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	13,166	761,143
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	482	29,691
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	495	53,452
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	9,696	402,715
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	1,930	462,497

Note: *Data is for the first quarter of FY 2015.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2014.

DOD's focus will continue to be creating Afghan solutions that the Afghan government can sustain and build upon. DOD told SIGAR that it is important post-2014 to remain engaged in supporting CN efforts to contain and reduce the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and reduce the flow of illicit proceeds that finance insurgent and terrorist activities globally.

Meanwhile, the recently signed Bilateral Security Agreement appears to have limited the ability of contractors to carry firearms for self-protection. DOD is still waiting for formal guidance on how to implement this new stipulation.[283]

Aviation Support

The Department of Defense continues to mentor and develop the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) to provide aviation support to counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and special operations forces. The SMW moved into its new aviation facility at Kandahar Airfield and conducts operations from this location.

From October to December 2014, the SMW took delivery of the last of 30 new Mi-17 helicopters and currently has 13 of 18 authorized PC-12 reconnaissance airplanes. The SMW provides the only helicopter night-operations tactical capability for the ANSF.[284]

During the same period, Department of State aircraft provided a total of 1,496.8 flight hours, conducted 1,132 sorties, moved 3,729 passengers, and transported 244,797 pounds of cargo in Afghanistan. According to INL, State provided 18.5 flight hours supporting DEA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, 138.6 flight hours supporting DEA interdiction efforts, and 10.8 flight hours supporting Afghan National Interdiction Unit and DEA passenger movements.[285]