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## SECURITY

As of March 31, 2015, the U.S. Congress had appropriated \$65.2 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).

United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) informed SIGAR this quarter that the Department of Defense's (DOD) preferred term for the ANSF is now the **Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)**. DOD said its definition of the ANDSF includes the members of the security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) of Afghanistan, which includes several organizations apart from the ANA and ANP.<sup>96</sup>

Although the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (known commonly as the Bilateral Security Agreement) includes “the National Directorate of Security, and other entities as mutually agreed,”<sup>97</sup> DOD does not include the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in its definition of the ANDSF, as that directorate does not fall under MOD and MOI control. Further, DOD's ASFF does not fund the NDS.<sup>98</sup> To avoid confusion, SIGAR plans to adopt the new DOD term and definition in its next quarterly report, after all SIGAR directorates have had time to change the terminology in their products.

Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the \$60.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately \$53.1 billion had been obligated and \$51.6 billion disbursed as of March 31, 2015.<sup>99</sup>

This section discusses assessments of the ANA and ANP and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

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**Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF):** defined by DOD to include the members of the security forces under the MOD and MOI. The MOD includes the ANA and the new Facilities Protection Force (FPF). The ANA includes the Afghan Air Force (AAF), ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The MOI includes the ANP, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). However, neither the ALP nor the APPF are included in DOD's authorization of a 352,000 force strength for the ANDSF.

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Source: OSD-P, email correspondence with SIGAR, 4/13/2015.

## KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

### Afghan President and CEO Visit the United States

During the week of March 22, 2015, President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah visited the United States. The leaders conferred with President Obama, addressed the U.S. Congress, met with the Secretaries of Defense and State, visited Camp David, and spoke at various institutions.

The security-related highlights of the visit included:

- On March 24, during a press conference at the White House with Ghani, President Obama announced his decision to maintain the current strength of 9,800 deployed U.S. troops into 2016, postponing the original plan to halve the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2015.<sup>100</sup>
- During a March 23 press conference at Camp David, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter announced the department intends to seek funding through 2017 to sustain the ANSF at an authorized force strength of 352,000.<sup>101</sup>
- Ghani addressed a joint meeting of Congress on March 24 in which he expressed a profound debt to U.S. servicemen and women who served in Afghanistan and to those who lost their lives to keep Afghanistan free. He also thanked Americans who came to his country to help build schools, care for the sick, and provide clean water.<sup>102</sup>
- During his address, Ghani also reaffirmed the strategic partnership agreement and the Bilateral Security Agreement, defined the framework for Afghanistan's relationship with the United States, and committed Afghanistan to becoming self-reliant by the end of this decade.<sup>103</sup>
- During a forum at the U.S. Institute for Peace addressing how peace with the Taliban is possible, Ghani emphasized the importance of Pakistan. He said both governments now acknowledge their undeclared state of hostilities and his position that the fundamental problem is not about peace with the Taliban, but instead about peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>104</sup>

For more information on the Afghan leaders' visit, see page 127 of this report.

### ANSF Leading Security Operations

When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) concluded operations at the end of 2014 and the new NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began its training, advising, and assisting role on January 1, 2015, the ANSF assumed responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. In mid-February 2015, the ANSF began Operation Zulfikar, reportedly the largest operation the ANSF has ever conducted independently, to clear Helmand of insurgents ahead of the spring fighting season.<sup>105</sup> This joint cross-ministry operation was planned and led by the ANA's 215th Corps, with support from

the 205th and 207th Corps, and includes units from the Afghan Air Force (AAF), ANA Special Operations Command, and the ANP.<sup>106</sup>

On April 8, 2015, an ANA commander announced the 50-day Zulfiqar military operation had ended, resulting in the deaths of 418 insurgents, 93 security personnel, and seven civilians.<sup>107</sup> The same day, local officials reported Afghan police leaving checkpoints in Sangin, possibly indicating police could not remain at their posts without ANA support.<sup>108</sup> The reports of the ANA and the police departing after clearing the district conflicted with an earlier statement by Helmand's deputy governor that the government planned to build army and police posts throughout the district to keep the Taliban from returning.<sup>109</sup> A month later, local officials reported the Taliban controlled most of the district with government forces controlling only the bazaar and the asphalt road.<sup>110</sup>

With the uptick in fighting, increased civilian casualties were reported in Sangin, a Taliban stronghold in northern Helmand. Since the operation began, the local hospital had admitted 30% more patients than during the same period last year.<sup>111</sup> The hospital reported more civilians are getting caught in crossfire. A hospital official said, "These are not normal numbers for the place and it's never been peaceful."<sup>112</sup> A Helmand-based civil activist group reported 1,500 families had left the district to escape the violence.<sup>113</sup>

On April 14, 2015, the interior minister told the Afghan parliament that 11 provinces face high-level security threats and nine others face medium-level security threats.<sup>114</sup>

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in his statement for the record submitted to the U.S. Congress, reportedly sees the Taliban steadily reasserting influence over significant portions of the Pashtun countryside in 2015, as the Taliban view the exit of Coalition forces as a sign of their inevitable victory.<sup>115</sup> Clapper expects the Afghan military to maintain control of the largest cities, but does not expect the ANSF to remain a cohesive or viable security force without continued donor contributions.<sup>116</sup>

## UN Reports Security Incidents Decreasing but Afghanistan Still Volatile

The security situation in Afghanistan remained volatile, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The number of **security incidents** was less than in March 2013, as reflected in Table 3.6 on the following page. However, there were still 9.2% more incidents recorded this period than the 4,649 recorded during same period in 2013–2014 and 33.2% more from the same period in 2012–2013.<sup>117</sup> The UN reported the highest number of security incidents in the months of December 2014 and January 2015 compared with the same period in each year since 2001, a fact it attributed to the relatively mild winter.<sup>118</sup>

The UN recorded 5,075 security incidents from November 16, 2014, through February 15, 2015, that included 191 assassinations and 40

**Security Incidents:** reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.

Source: SIGAR analysis of the United Nations report, 12/9/2014.

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TABLE 3.6

NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS			
Date Range	Number of Security Incidents	Number of Days	Average Number of Security Incidents per Day
11/16/2013-2/15/2014	4,649	92	50.5
3/1/2014-5/31/2014	5,864	92	63.7
6/1/2014-8/15/2014	5,456	76	71.8
8/16/2014-11/15/2014	5,199	92	56.5
11/16/2014-2/15/2015	5,075	92	55.2
<b>Totals and average incidents/day</b>	<b>26,243</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>59.1</b>

Source: UN Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; and 3/7/2014, p. 5.

attempted assassinations, increases of 26.4% and 29% over the same period in 2013–2014. Armed clashes (46.8%) and IED events (30.9%) accounted for nearly 78% of all security incidents. Some 40 suicide attacks occurred, including one at an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander’s funeral in Laghman that resulted in 15 fatalities, among them senior ALP personnel.<sup>119</sup>

Following the spike in insurgent activity in Kabul during October and November, operations by Afghan security forces, supported by Coalition forces, contributed to reducing the number of high-profile insurgent operations in the capital. Suicide attacks were down from 10 to five, while improvised-explosive-device (IED) attacks were down from 18 to five during December and January.<sup>120</sup>

In his February 27, 2015, report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General predicted the coming summer season will see an intensification of the armed conflict.<sup>121</sup> He also affirmed that peace remains the fundamental precondition to durable and sustained political and economic progress in Afghanistan.<sup>122</sup>

On April 12, 2015, concerned with the record-high civilian casualties and the impact on civilians during the seasonal resumption of conflict-related violence, the UNAMA head called on all parties to prevent harm to civilians. UNAMA reports civilian casualties from ground engagements increased 8% compared to the same period in 2014 and pled for the parties to stop using mortars and rockets in populated areas.<sup>123</sup>

The UN reported that despite media speculation about the presence of antigovernment elements linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there is no indication of widespread or systematic support for or accommodation of ISIL in Afghanistan.<sup>124</sup> However, on April 18, 2015, President Ghani blamed a suicide bombing in Jalalabad that reportedly killed 35 people and wounded 125 on ISIL. The Taliban denied involvement.<sup>125</sup>

“The United Nations calls on the Taliban to cease all attacks against persons who are not taking a direct part in hostilities.”

—Georgette Gagnon, Director,  
UNAMA Human Rights

Source: UNAMA, Press Release: Latest UNAMA figures show continuing record high civilian casualties, 4/12/2015.

## Status of Classified ANSF Data

This quarter, RSM classified some information about ANSF personnel strength and attrition, the AAF, and the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW). From now on, as authorized by its enabling statute, SIGAR will publish a classified annex to this report for Congress containing the classified data.

## U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to USFOR-A, some 9,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of February 28, 2015, a decrease of 500 since December 20, 2014. Another 7,000 personnel from other Coalition nations were also serving at that time.<sup>126</sup>

On March 24, during a press conference at the White House with President Ghani, President Obama announced his decision to maintain a strength of 9,800 deployed U.S. troops into 2016, deferring the original plan to halve the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan during 2015. The decision allows U.S. troops to remain at bases that are critical for gathering intelligence and launching counterterrorism operations, as well as to continue air and logistical support to the ANSF.<sup>127</sup> Since military operations began in 2001, a total of 2,215 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 20,026 were wounded as of March 30, 2015.<sup>128</sup>

Seven insider attacks against U.S. forces during 2014 resulted in four deaths and 15 personnel wounded.<sup>129</sup> This is one more attack than USFOR-A reported last quarter; the earlier number was updated after a review revealed U.S. forces were the probable target of one additional attack.<sup>130</sup> One insider attack against U.S. forces has occurred in 2015, killing one soldier and wounding two others. This attack ended the longest period between combat-zone deaths of U.S. military members since September 2001.<sup>131</sup> Another attack during 2015 killed three U.S. contractors and wounded one.<sup>132</sup>

## ANSF STRENGTH SHOWS SLIGHT INCREASE

This quarter, ANSF's assigned force strength was 328,805 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A. As reflected in Table 3.7 on the following page, this is 91.3% of the ANSF target force strength of 360,004. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count civilian employees). The new assigned-strength number reflects an increase of 3,163 since November 2014.<sup>133</sup> The increase came in the ANA, which grew by 4,917, while the ANP decreased by 1,754, as shown in Table 3.8 on the following page.<sup>134</sup>

This quarter, details of ANSF force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will therefore report on them in a classified annex to this report.

### SIGAR ESSAY

This quarter, SIGAR took an in-depth look at why having accurate, reliable force strength numbers for the ANSF matters. To read this analysis, see Section 1, page 3.

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.7

<b>ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2015</b>						
<b>ANSF Component</b>	<b>Approved End-Strength Goal</b>	<b>Target Date</b>	<b>Current Assigned as of February 2015</b>	<b>% of Target Authorization</b>	<b>Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals</b>	<b>Difference (%)</b>
ANA including Afghan Air Force	195,000	December 2014	167,024	85.7%	(27,976)	(14.3%)
ANA including AAF Civilians	8,004		7,096	88.7%	(908)	(11.3%)
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>203,004</b>		<b>174,120</b>	<b>85.8%</b>	<b>(28,884)</b>	<b>(14.2%)</b>
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	154,685	98.5%	(2,315)	(1.5%)
<b>ANSF Total with Civilians</b>	<b>360,004</b>		<b>328,805</b>	<b>91.3%</b>	<b>(31,199)</b>	<b>(8.7%)</b>

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/24/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015.

TABLE 3.8

<b>ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, Q1 2014–Q1 2015</b>					
	<b>2/2014</b>	<b>5/2014</b>	<b>8/2014</b>	<b>11/2014</b>	<b>2/2015</b>
ANA including AAF	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203	174,120
ANP*	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439	154,685
<b>Total ANSF</b>	<b>338,108</b>	<b>329,612</b>	<b>324,918</b>	<b>325,642</b>	<b>328,805</b>

Note: Afghan Army and Air Force numbers include 7,096 civilians. Available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included. \*Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, 10/6/2014, 12/28/2014, and 3/24/2015; RSM, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 2/3/2015; RSM, email communication from General John F. Campbell, Commander, RSM, to SIGAR, 2/25/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015.

## SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR sent a letter to the Commanders of RSM and CSTC-A requesting information on the analysis underlying the current and optimal ANSF size and structure and the U.S. government's ability to anticipate future support costs. For more information, see Section 2, page 42.

## DOD To Seek Funding for Larger ANSF

During the March 23, 2015, press conference at Camp David, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter announced the Defense Department intends to seek funding through 2017 to sustain the ANSF at an authorized force strength of 352,000. Previously, the United States had agreed at the 2012 Chicago Conference to reduce the ANSF to 228,500 as a cost-saving measure.<sup>135</sup> Carter stated both Coalition and Afghan military commanders recommended the 352,000 force size to ensure lasting security gains.<sup>136</sup>

DOD reports the total annual cost for the ministries of Defense and Interior and the ANSF, at the current authorized force strength of 352,000, is \$5.5 billion a year. To help meet that need for fiscal year (FY) 2015, the U.S. Congress appropriated \$4.1 billion for ASFF. While DOD has requested just over \$3.7 billion for FY 2016, future sustainment costs will depend on the size, structure, and operational tempo of the force.<sup>137</sup>

## MOD Remains Without a Minister

As SIGAR went to press, the MOD remained without a confirmed minister. President Ghani's second choice for minister of defense withdrew his nomination on April 8, 2015. Ghani had nominated General Mohammad

Afzal Ludin, a military advisor in the National Security Council, on April 6.<sup>138</sup> However, General Ludin said he did not wish his nomination to prove divisive for the country.<sup>139</sup> In January, Afghan parliamentarians rejected Ghani's nomination of then-acting Defense Minister General Sher Mohammad Karimi to lead the country's military forces. The MOD has been without a confirmed minister since September 29, 2014, when Ghani was sworn in as president.<sup>140</sup>

### **ANSF Attrition Declines**

ANSF attrition rates are declining, according to reporting provided to RSM by the MOD and MOI, although neither the ANA nor the ANP has attained the ANSF-established goal of a 1.40% average monthly attrition. The ANA has a monthly average attrition rate of 2.55% compared to the ANP's 1.64%.<sup>141</sup> This is a significant 1% decline from the average monthly attrition rates for the ANA in 2013 (3.52%) and 2014 (3.62%).<sup>142</sup> ANP monthly attrition rates for four of the past five months have been below normal averages.<sup>143</sup>

To assist the MOD and MOI in mitigating attrition, RSM identified five areas for the Afghans to evaluate.<sup>144</sup> These focused on fairly assigning, promoting, and paying soldiers and patrolmen; providing improved quality of life conditions, such as leave and casualty care; and holding leaders accountable.<sup>145</sup>

The UN supported the Afghan security forces in revising verification procedures for recruitment into the ANSF.<sup>146</sup> The revised procedures require the recruit to be an Afghan citizen, at least 18 years of age (sometimes difficult to verify in a country with limited birth records), who can pass the medical and character tests, and meet literacy requirements.<sup>147</sup>

This quarter, more detailed information on ANSF attrition remained classified. SIGAR will report on this in a classified annex to this report.

### **Resolute Support Changes Assessment Reporting**

Effective January 1, 2015, NATO changed the method of assessing the ANSF to align with the new train, advise, and assist mission. The Monthly ANSF Assessment Report (MAAR) has superseded the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) that was used since August 2013.<sup>148</sup> The RASR summary that SIGAR received provided reporting at the brigade level with synthesized analysis of observations and shortfalls, highlighting priority issues hampering long-term ANSF sustainability, and assessments of the ANSF operational and equipment readiness status.<sup>149</sup> The MAAR will assess aggregate ANSF capability and effectiveness for eight essential functions related to the unit's capacity to perform such functions as force generation, resource management, sustainment, intelligence, and strategic communications. The MAAR provides the ability to evaluate the capabilities of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, their institutions, and their corps/provincial headquarters, and to determine how well they perform those functions to support their forces in defeating the insurgency and securing Afghanistan.<sup>150</sup>



## Operations Coordination Centers

**(OCCs):** regional and provincial OCCs are responsible for the coordination of both security operations and civil response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility. The focus of OCC activities will be coordination of security operations.

Source: ISAF/SFA, RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.1, p. G-6, 7/1/2014.

The first MAAR assessed select ANA and ANP capabilities during January 2015, as shown in Table 3.9.<sup>151</sup> One MAAR combines all seven ANA corps and the 111th Capital Division into a single assessment. Another MAAR combines all seven Operations Coordination Centers-Regional (OCC-Rs) into a single assessment. Two ANP components are assessed in separate MAARs: one combines the seven Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) zones; another combines the seven Afghan Border Police (ABP) zones.<sup>152</sup> The ANP's Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are no longer assessed.

There are six assessment categories for the ANA and ANP and seven categories for the OCC-Rs to address operational and sustainment effectiveness. Every ANSF component is assessed on command and leadership; the ANA, AUP, and ABP are also assessed on command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. The ANA corps/division is further assessed on combined arms, while the AUP and ABP are assessed on integration with other ANSF units. The remaining five categories for the OCC-Rs are intra-ANSF command and control, enabler coordination, intelligence sharing, logistics coordination, and information, communications, and technology.<sup>153</sup>

The assessment ratings are similar to the RASR ratings: sustaining, fully capable/effective, capable/effective, partially capable/effective, in development, or not rated due to lack of advisory presence.<sup>154</sup>

The first MAAR assessed 93% of ANSF components, rated in several categories, as capable, fully capable, or sustaining.<sup>155</sup> USFOR-A reports that while progress is being made, the ANSF still struggles in the areas of sustainment and installation management.<sup>156</sup> However, with decreased U.S. and Coalition oversight, the reliability of the ANSF-provided assessment data cannot be validated.

USFOR-A said the ANA demonstrated improvements in combined-arms integration through information sharing with the OCC-Rs.<sup>157</sup> USFOR-A Commander General John F. Campbell told a congressional panel this quarter he has counseled the Afghans to not plan operations wholly dependent upon U.S. close-air support. "The Taliban doesn't have close-air support," he said. "The Taliban doesn't have up-armored Humvees. The Taliban doesn't have D-30 howitzers. The Taliban doesn't have, you know, weapons that you have."<sup>158</sup> USFOR-A also reported the ANA still had challenges accurately forecasting supply demands and tracking consumption.<sup>159</sup>

USFOR-A reports effective ANP higher-level leadership and positive outcomes in operations integrated with the ANA, but says police are challenged by lack of evidence-collection equipment and an inability to get evidence to the labs. The ANP's reported inability to use secure communications during police operations is also a cause of concern.<sup>160</sup> The OCC-Rs serve as a coordinating authority between the ANSF, provincial government officials, and other government officials.<sup>161</sup> ANSF units use OCC-Rs

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TABLE 3.9

<b>MONTHLY ANSF ASSESSMENT REPORT, JANUARY 2015</b>							
<b>COMMANDS IN SEVEN GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS ASSESSED IN EACH CATEGORY</b>							
<b>ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division</b>							
Command Assessment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Leadership	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Combined Arms	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Command & Control	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Personnel & Training	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sustainment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<b>ANP</b>							
AUP Command Assessment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Leadership	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Integration	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Command & Control	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Personnel & Training	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
AUP Sustainment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Command Assessment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Leadership	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Integration	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Command & Control	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Personnel & Training	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ABP Sustainment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<b>OCC-Rs</b>							
Command Assessment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Leadership	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
IntraANSF Command & Control	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Enabler Coordination	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Intel Sharing	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Logistics Coordination	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ICT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<b>Color Key</b>							
● Sustaining	● Fully Capable	● Capable					
● Partially Capable	● Developing	● Not Assessed					

Note: Specific region not identified due to classification. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; OCC-R = Operational Coordination Centers-Regional; ICT = Information, Communications, and Technology

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/11/2015.

for communication sharing between units as well as between regional and provincial OCCs. However, USFOR-A reports that facilities and equipment maintenance continues to be a challenge for OCC-R leaders.<sup>162</sup>

## **ANSF Detainees**

UNAMA reported one-third of the 790 detainees they interviewed experienced torture or ill treatment on arrest or in an Afghan security-forces detention facility. While the number of incidents decreased by 14% compared with January 2013 reporting, the UN stressed increased efforts were needed for Afghanistan to comply with international law. The UN found a pervasive lack of accountability for perpetrators of torture and observed continuing impunity for those involved. In response to the UN report, the national-unity government announced a national action plan to eliminate torture that includes regulatory reforms, deterrence measures, and comprehensive training programs.<sup>163</sup>

## **MOD and MOI Continuing Literacy Training**

This quarter, USFOR-A reported the MOD and MOI are benefitting from train-the-trainer programs at all regional training areas.<sup>164</sup> Two third-party, nonprofit organizations are also conducting literacy training to the police in the field.<sup>165</sup> USFOR-A reports the MOD has 15,000 soldiers in 324 classes being conducted in all provinces. While reportedly less capable than contracted trainers, the MOD and MOI are establishing an internally resourced literacy program. When an Afghan-contracted literacy class is held, the Afghan trainers in training serve as assistant instructors to build their capability.<sup>166</sup>

## **MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS**

RSM focuses on training, advising, and assisting the MOD and MOI at the ministerial, institutional, and operational levels. RSM developed a security-force assistance framework, with seven focus areas, to guide Afghan and Coalition efforts to develop capacity and core competencies of the ministries for enduring sustainability.<sup>167</sup> The eight essential functions (EF) directorates lead RSM's efforts to identify the processes and build the assessment framework, known as the Plan of Actions and Milestones (POAM).<sup>168</sup> The respective EF processes, milestones, and associated actions for ministry offices and departments are captured in separate POAMs.<sup>169</sup> Each process can have more than one milestone and each milestone can have one or many associated actions.

This quarter, EF1, the RSM directorate for planning, programming, budgeting, and executing programs, added one additional milestone to both the

## Minister of Interior Noor ul-Haq Ulumi

<b>Confirmed</b>	January 28, 2015
<b>Ethnicity</b>	Pashtun
<b>Tribe</b>	Barakzai
<b>Political Party</b>	National United Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e Muttahed-e Melli)
<b>Nominated by</b>	CEO Abdullah Abdullah
<b>Experience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wolesi Jirga member from Kandahar; defense committee chair</li> <li>• Governor of Kandahar (under Soviet-backed government)</li> <li>• Commanding General of the 2nd Corps Kandahar (under Soviet-backed government)</li> </ul>



(EUPOL photo)

Source: Afghan Biographies, *Ulumi, Noorulhaq Noor ul Haq Olomi Ulumi*, 1/29/2015; Reuters, “Factbox: A look at the major nominees for Afghanistan’s new cabinet,” 1/12/2015; *Wall Street Journal*, “Afghanistan announces members of cabinet,” 1/15/2015; *The Guardian*, “Afghan President names cabinet three months after taking office,” 1/15/2015.

MOD and MOI assessments. This brings to 49 the number of milestones on which the MOD is assessed. The MOI is assessed on 43.<sup>170</sup>

An example of an associated action, process, and milestone would be to develop an operationally informed list of requirements as part of the MOD medium-term budget-framework development process. The milestone is for the ministry to be capable of accurately identifying requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.<sup>171</sup>

Each EF directorate uses the POAM to assess the essential-function capabilities of every ministry’s offices.<sup>172</sup> The offices are assessed based on the five-stage rating system displayed in Table 3.10 on the following page.<sup>173</sup> Every office assessment is then combined to determine the overall assessment of that department. All department assessments, in turn, are combined to determine the assessment of the ministry as a whole.<sup>174</sup>

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.<sup>175</sup> As of this quarter, no essential function of either the MOD or MOI had achieved a rating of “sustaining capability” (the highest rating) or “fully capable” (the second highest rating) as shown in Table 3.10. Under the previous assessment tool, the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, which assessed ministerial and general staff offices (rather than essential functions), several offices had achieved the highest ratings of “autonomous” or “capable with oversight.” For more information on the CM rating system, see page 97 of SIGAR’s October 2014 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>176</sup>

According to the current assessment, all MOD and MOI development conditions are at least at the “initiated” stage. The MOD has increased the

### SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR wrote to the commanders of USFOR-A and CSTC-A to request information about how the Resolute Support Mission will measure the progress of its efforts to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the ANSF and the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI). According to the Resolute Support Security Force Assistance handbook, efforts to develop the ANSF and ASI will focus on eight essential functions (EF). For more information, see Section 2, page 45.

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.10

MINISTRY ASSESSMENT USING NATO SYSTEM, AS OF FEBRUARY 2015											
RATING MEANING		ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (EF)	EF1: Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution	EF2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight	EF3: Civilian Governance of the ASI	EF4: Force Generation	EF5: Sustainment	EF6: Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution	EF7: Intelligence	EF8: Strategic Communications	Rating Total
MOD ASSESSMENT	Rating 5: Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rating 4: Fully Capable/Effective		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rating 3: Partially Capable/Effective		1	0	2	0	6	2	0	3	14
	Rating 2: Initiated (In Development)		3	2	1	5	7	2	5	3	28
	Rating 1: Scoped/Agreed		2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
	Rating 0: Not Scoped/Agreed		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<b>EF Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>49</b>
MOI ASSESSMENT	Rating 5: Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rating 4: Fully Capable/Effective		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rating 3: Partially Capable/Effective		1	0	0	1	6	4	0	0	12
	Rating 2: Initiated (In Development)		3	0	2	3	7	0	4	0	19
	Rating 1: Scoped/Agreed		2	4	2	1	0	0	0	3	12
	Rating 0: Not Scoped/Agreed		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<b>EF Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>43</b>

Note: EF1 & EF7 assessments as of 3/1/2015; EF2 & EF5 - 2/26/2015; EF3 & EF6 - 2/12/2015; EF4 - 2/17/2015; EF8 - 2/20/2015. Sustaining Capability/Effectiveness: Condition fully achieved. Advising only as requested by ANSF counterparts if opportunity and resources permit. Fully Capable/Effective: Developmental conditions nearly achieved. ANSF element fully capable but still requires attention; on track to be achieved by end of Resolute Support Mission; advising will continue. Partially Capable/Effective: Development conditions in progress. ANSF element is partially capable/effective. Conditions can be achieved by end of Resolute Support Mission; advising will continue. Initiated (In Development): Baseline design initiated by ANSF element; plan ready for implementation. Scoped and Agreed Upon: Development tasks/milestones (conditions) scoped and agreed; baseline capability and measures not complete. Not Scoped/Agreed: Development tasks/milestones (conditions) not scoped and/or agreed upon.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/11/2015.

percentage of its “partially capable” development conditions from 15% to 28.5%. For the MOI, 27.9% of its development conditions are “partially capable”; an increase from last quarter’s rating of 10%.<sup>177</sup> By the end of FY 2016, RSM forecasts both the MOD and MOI will have achieved sustaining capability in approximately 50% of their milestones. Additionally, they forecast the MOD will achieve a combined fully capable/sustaining capability of 90% and the MOI to attain 86%.<sup>178</sup> The medical corps is one area not expected to achieve sustaining capability for many years due to Afghanistan’s lack of fully trained medical professionals.<sup>179</sup>

There are 311 U.S. personnel advising or mentoring the MOD and MOI; and an additional 111 Coalition advisors.<sup>180</sup>

CSTC-A reports they will maintain three existing training and mentoring support contracts, totaling \$183.4 million in 2015, until a single omnibus contract is fielded in the first quarter of FY 2016.<sup>181</sup> The Coalition assesses that the ANSF will require ministerial development, logistics, professionalization, and acquisition-management support through 2017.<sup>182</sup>

## AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is under MOI authority and functions under the supervision of the district Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). ALP members, known as “guardians,” are selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.<sup>183</sup> As of April 4, 2015, the ALP comprised 28,376 personnel, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A).<sup>184</sup> That is a slight reduction of 74 since February 28, when the ALP comprised 28,450 personnel, all but 4,000 of whom were fully trained.<sup>185</sup> The number trained decreased due to combat losses, *tashkil* (organizational-strength) redistribution, and attrition.<sup>186</sup> The goal was to have 30,000 personnel in 154 districts by the end of December 2014, assigned to 1,320 checkpoints across 29 provinces.<sup>187</sup>

According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost \$121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength.<sup>188</sup> The United States has provided \$469.7 million to support the ALP as of April 1, 2015.<sup>189</sup> The United States has provided the ALP with equipment such as rifles, machine guns, light trucks, motorcycles, and radios.<sup>190</sup>

According to NSOCC-A, the ALP has a retention rate of 93%. During the past year, NSOCC-A reported a low attrition rate of 1–2% per month. During the last quarter of 2014, the ALP had 1.82% of its force killed or wounded in action, a decrease from the 2.05% reported for same time period in 2013.<sup>191</sup>

The Afghan government has not determined the final disposition of the ALP or its funding source.<sup>192</sup> DOD says U.S. policy on funding the ALP has not yet been determined.<sup>193</sup> According to an independent assessment conducted by NSOCC-A based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus-group surveys in ALP districts, the majority of Afghans surveyed perceived the ALP as an effective security element and stabilizing force.<sup>194</sup> That finding is consistent with survey results from March 2014 that public perceptions of ALP’s value to community security were positive overall.<sup>195</sup> For details on the last survey results, refer to page 98 in SIGAR’s January 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>196</sup>

**Tashkil:** the list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI. The word means “organization” in Dari.

Source: GAO, *Afghanistan Security*, GAO-08-661, 6/2008, p. 18.

## SIGAR AUDIT

In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is reviewing DOD’s support to the ALP program, the extent to which the ALP is achieving its security goals, oversight and controls of ALP salary payments, and future planning for the ALP.

## AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE TRANSITION AWAITING PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, established to provide contract-based facility and convoy-security services in Afghanistan, was ordered in 2013 to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP.<sup>197</sup> However, USFOR-A reports the APPF is currently operating and providing limited convoy-escort security. The APPF charter is awaiting presidential signature before being presented to the Council of Ministers.<sup>198</sup> For details on the last update on restructuring the security services into three parts, refer to page 88 in SIGAR's *October 2014 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>199</sup>

### Facilities Protection Force

On September 13, 2014, ISAF commander General John F. Campbell and the Afghan National Security Advisor signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the security of Afghan and U.S./NATO security facilities. According to the MOU, the MOD “will field an organization known as the Facilities Protection Force” (FPF) of 5,030 personnel to provide security for select forward operating bases being turned over to the MOD.<sup>200</sup> The FPF will be employed by the MOD but will not be part of the regular ANA. USFOR-A will provide funding for FPF salaries for one year at a cost of \$13.7 million, with the option to fund the force for an additional year.<sup>201</sup>

According to the MOU, the MOD will allow CSTC-A “to inspect and audit financial records” and that the “funds will be auditable by all U.S. Government agencies responsible for oversight of CSTC-A and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.”<sup>202</sup>

The MOU also provides for Afghan force protection of the perimeters of U.S./NATO agreed-upon facilities and authorizes U.S./NATO forces “to utilize contracted armed security services inside NATO/U.S. agreed facilities.”<sup>203</sup>

### SIGAR AUDIT

An audit SIGAR released this quarter on the reliability and usefulness of the ANA personnel and payroll data found no assurance of that data being valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems possess inherent weaknesses and are not fully integrated. For more information, see Section 2, page 23.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$35.5 billion and disbursed \$34.4 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>204</sup>

### Number of ANA Personnel Rebounds Slightly

As of February 20, 2015, the overall assigned end strength of the ANA—which includes the AAF and civilians—was 174,120 personnel, according to RSM.<sup>205</sup> This is an increase of 4,917 ANA personnel since last quarter, when the ANA's November 2014 assigned end strength was reported at 169,203, and a reversal of a decreasing trend since February 2014.<sup>206</sup> USFOR-A reports that MOD provides ANA personnel data. Until Afghanistan

completes installation of its human-resource information systems and inputs the data, however, RSM will not be able to validate MOD's strength numbers.<sup>207</sup> Even then, SIGAR believes it is unlikely RSM will have the personnel and resources to validate ANA personnel numbers other than by analyzing reports based on Afghan inputs into the new system.

This quarter, some details of ANA troop strength remained classified. SIGAR will provide Congress a classified annex to this report.

### ANA Attrition

In past quarterly reports, SIGAR reported on its concerns about ANA attrition. Between September 2013 and August 2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls,<sup>208</sup> an average of 3,000 per month. This quarter 2,225 ANA personnel were dropped from the rolls.<sup>209</sup> However, USFOR-A reported an ANA training surge will result in approximately 5,000 new soldiers being added to the rolls when they complete training during April 2015.<sup>210</sup>

This quarter, some details of ANA attrition remained classified. SIGAR will report on this in a classified annex to this report.

### ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$14.3 billion and disbursed \$14.0 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.<sup>211</sup> The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition replenishment and fuel purchases. Funding for food ceased on December 21, 2013, after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOD.<sup>212</sup>

The U.S. Congress appropriates funds to the ASFF for the training, equipping, sustaining, and funding of the ANSF, as well as to provide funding for facility repair and construction. DOD is authorized to use ASFF to provide funds directly (on budget) to the Afghan government.<sup>213</sup> To ensure U.S. funds are used as intended, CSTC-A, the MOD, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) signed a Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter.<sup>214</sup> The Afghan FY 1394 financial-commitment letter requires the MOD to document fuel consumption and deliveries. CSTC-A is to set the following month's fuel allocation based on the sufficiency of the fuel documentation. Further reductions in fuel allocations are to occur if the documentation quality does not improve and if required audits and corrective actions are not performed within the agreed-to time frame.<sup>215</sup> For information on the ongoing fuel investigation, see pages 135–136 of this report.

### ANA Salaries and Incentives

As of March 31, 2015, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided \$2.6 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2009.<sup>216</sup> CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of

#### SIGAR AUDIT

An audit SIGAR initiated this quarter will focus on DOD's procurement, maintenance, and oversight of occupational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) purchases for the ANSF. For more information, See Section 2, page 28.



funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives this year is \$710.4 million. CSTC-A said the funding will range from a high of \$741.7 million and a low of \$613.6 million—an average of \$690 million annually—over the next five years.<sup>217</sup>

Incentives are used to retain high-quality soldiers and airmen. ANA personnel are eligible for various incentives, in addition to their base salaries. Examples include occupational incentives (such as aviation, medical, engineering/explosive-ordnance disposal), hazard-pay incentives, and longevity-pay incentives for every three additional years of continuous service.<sup>218</sup>

CSTC-A noted that funding is provided on the basis of 100% of the ANA's authorized, not assigned, strength.<sup>219</sup> To encourage the MOD to use electronic payment systems, beginning in July 2015, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically; pay for other positions will be 80% funded.<sup>220</sup> Additionally, by June 1, 2015, all ANA personnel records are required to be input into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System and all personnel must be assigned a tashkil position.<sup>221</sup>

## ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$11.7 billion and disbursed \$11.6 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.<sup>222</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 50% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.11.<sup>223</sup>

Because CSTC-A used a new reporting format last quarter, SIGAR did not report quarter-to-quarter comparisons. This quarter, CSTC-A reported

TABLE 3.11

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANA	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$613,581,608	\$522,336,282	\$1,700,000
Vehicles	5,405,890,683	4,767,803,280	TBD
Communications	709,157,101	688,157,101	TBD
Aircraft	1,091,376,104	649,861,508	441,514,596
Ammunition	1,699,431,299	1,563,013,160	TBD
Transportation Services	40,000,000	13,459,569	26,540,431
Counter-IED	330,656,219	296,489,871	2,700,000
Other	883,546,190	773,658,682	1,005,377
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$10,773,639,204</b>	<b>\$9,274,779,453</b>	<b>\$473,460,404</b>

Note: Counter-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. TBD = To be determined; amount depends on how much damaged and destroyed equipment is turned in for replacement.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/24/2015.

### SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD's support to the ANA's Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals, and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met.

### SIGAR INSPECTION

In an inspection report released this quarter, SIGAR looked at the termination of a stalled ANA slaughterhouse construction project after \$1.25 million had already been expended. For more information, see Section 2, page 39.

TABLE 3.12

<b>CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)</b>				
	<b>Weapons</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Communications</b>	<b>Total</b>
September 2013	\$447.2	\$3,955.0	\$609.3	<b>\$5,011.5</b>
December 2013	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	<b>5,437.2</b>
March 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>
June 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>
September 2014	522.3	4,638.9	688.2	<b>5,849.4</b>
December 2014	537.8	4,767.8	688.2	<b>5,993.8</b>
March 2015	613.6	5,405.9	709.2	<b>6,728.7</b>

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, 9/29/2014, 2/6/2015, and 3/24/2015.

an increase in most equipment categories and corrected prior cumulative reporting figures.<sup>224</sup> Table 3.12 reflects an \$879.3 million increase in the three commonly reported types of equipment since September 2014.<sup>225</sup> CSTC-A reported more than 426,000 weapons, 104,000 communication devices, and 56,000 vehicles had been procured for the ANA.<sup>226</sup> The bulk of the “other” equipment category is clothing, such as uniforms, and individual equipment.

CSTC-A notified Congress that some ASFF-purchased equipment for the ANA will be transferred to DOD in accordance with the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provision. Table 3.13 provides more details on these transfers.

USFOR-A led a vehicle team of DOD subject-matter experts that identified logistical and sustainment gaps necessary for the Afghans to overcome prior to assuming full supply-management ownership. This quarter the team identified additional gaps and solutions, including:<sup>227</sup>

- developing the contract requirements to provide maintenance management training at all the regional maintenance sites
- the ANA approved life-cycle management tashkil positions to address personnel shortfalls; RSM EF5 is developing a life-cycle management training program
- recruiting Afghan college graduates, training them in supply functions and computer systems, and assigning them to critical supply sites

The financial-commitment letter providing funds to the MOD for Afghan FY 1394 requires the MOD to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and ensure that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicle funding.<sup>228</sup>

## ANA Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$6.2 billion and disbursed \$5.6 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.<sup>229</sup>

TABLE 3.13

<b>TRANSFERRED ASFF-FUNDED EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)</b>		
	<b>Scrap</b>	<b>To DOD Stock</b>
Vehicles	\$7.9	\$5.4
Troop Enclosure	9.0	
HMMWVs	2.9	
Aircraft	136.0	3.1
Office Equipment		1.7
Crane/Forklifts	1.1	
Water Tankers	0.2	
Body Armor		0.3
Weapons		1.1
GPS/NVG		0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$157.1</b>	<b>\$11.7</b>

Note: Dollar amounts rounded. Already-owned C-208s became a suitable training aircraft substitute, resulting in the transfer to DOD stock of six C-182 aircraft. A troop enclosure is an add-on installed to the roof of a HMMWV or other vehicle that allows a soldier to stand up through a roof hatch with some degree of protection. HMMWV = High-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle; GPS/NVG = Global Positioning System and Night Vision Goggles items.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 1/14/2015 and 3/24/2015; RSM, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 2/3/2015; OSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 3/27/2015.

At that time, the United States had completed 357 infrastructure projects (valued at \$4.8 billion), with another 24 projects ongoing (\$512 million) and two planned (\$81 million), according to CSTC-A.<sup>230</sup>

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter, as last quarter, were brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade of the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115.7 million) and the 2nd Brigade of the 215th Corps in Nimroz (\$78.7 million), and phase three of the MOD headquarters and garrisons (\$58.6 million). All are expected to be completed by the end of summer.<sup>231</sup> In addition, one project was awarded this quarter at a cost of \$7 million, and 14 projects were completed at a cost of \$156.3 million, including the garrison for the 2nd Brigade of the 209th Corps in Kunduz (\$25.8 million).<sup>232</sup> CSTC-A reported that one facility was transferred to the ANSF since the beginning of December. The transfer of the remaining 19 facilities is contingent on the ANSF training readiness and their ability to effectively perform contracting functions.<sup>233</sup>

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations-and-maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction costs for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$168 million a year, for a total of \$840 million. The ANA has authorized 3,100 positions to maintain these facilities.<sup>234</sup>

The FY 1394 MOD financial-commitment letter requires the Afghan government to provide CSTC-A a transition and sustainment plan for the transferred facilities, including infrastructure security, by the end of 2015.<sup>235</sup>

## ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.<sup>236</sup>

CSTC-A reported 18 ongoing U.S.-funded technical training programs.<sup>237</sup> Additionally, USFOR-A reported two contracts for training, advising, and assisting the ANA Training and Education Command at Marshal Fahim National Defense University that require RSM to perform and report monthly contractor-performance observations.<sup>238</sup> U.S.-funded training contracts include special operations, counter improvised-explosive-device and explosive-ordnance disposal, and intelligence training.<sup>239</sup>

## Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

The United States has a considerable investment in the AAF. Between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the United States provided more than \$6.8 billion to support and develop the 7,800-person AAF, including over \$3.3 billion for equipment and aircraft.<sup>240</sup> In addition, DOD requested more than \$548 million, including \$22 million for equipment and aircraft, in FY 2016 for the AAF. However, the majority of the funding is being requested for sustainment and training.<sup>241</sup>

### SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR has an ongoing inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended.

### SIGAR AUDIT

In a financial audit completed this quarter, SIGAR found a lack of supporting documentation on a counterinsurgency intelligence training contract resulting in \$134.6 million in questionable costs and other findings. For more information, see Section 2, page 33.



**A-29 Super Tucano aircraft** on the flight line at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, USA. (SIGAR photo by Nick Heun)

According to CSTC-A, this quarter, the AAF has a requirement for 136 aircraft, to include:<sup>242</sup>

- Mi-17 transport helicopters
- C-208 light transport planes
- MD-530 helicopters
- Mi-35 attack helicopters
- C-130H medium transport aircraft
- A-29 Super Tucanos light attack aircraft

Last month, the first of the MD-530 helicopters was delivered to the AAF.<sup>243</sup> In the fourth quarter of 2015, the first of 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance, will be deployed to Afghanistan.<sup>244</sup> The planes are intended to replace aging Mi-35 attack helicopters.<sup>245</sup>

RSM Train, Advise, and Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) reports working with the AAF to accelerate the growth of flight engineers and loadmasters through in-country training. There are adequate numbers of pilots in the training pipeline, according to TAAC-Air, with more pilots expected to join the force in 2016 and 2017.<sup>246</sup>

According to TAAC-Air, the AAF is expected to reach full operational capability in airlift missions by early 2016, and to reach full operational capability in attack missions by early 2017.<sup>247</sup> The C-130 affords new capabilities, although the AAF will need time to fully exploit the airframe's potential.<sup>248</sup> The AAF is not expected to achieve full sustainability of

maintenance capability until the end of 2023. The AAF will depend on contracted logistics support for the majority of its fleet maintenance until AAF capability exists for each type of aircraft.<sup>249</sup>

The AAF capability to perform casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) missions has steadily increased over the last three years. With the withdrawal of Coalition forces, the AAF CASEVAC missions increased 45% this year over last year.<sup>250</sup> Approximately 140 AAF and ANA air medics were trained by the Coalition on CASEVAC procedures improving their capacity and capability.<sup>251</sup> The U.S. Air Force's 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan (AETF-A) assesses the AAF can provide adequate CASEVAC support if they maximize use of the C-208 aircraft at unimproved airfields and the ANSF executes missions with proper synchronization, prioritization, and disciplined command and control.<sup>252</sup>

MOI, MOD, and National Directorate of Security leaders signed the SMW air charter on May 14, 2014, outlining the creation of a new Joint Command and Control Coordination Center (JCCC) to facilitate priority SMW missions. Both MOD and MOI special-operations forces will have liaison officers to the JCCC. The AAF is to provide personnel, recruiting, and other administrative (nonoperational) support to SMW. The SMW commander meets weekly with special-operations unit leaders to discuss pending operations and synchronize requirements and priorities.<sup>253</sup> During FY 2015, two missions have supported six counternarcotics sorties and 68 missions have supported 115 counterterrorism sorties.<sup>254</sup> The Afghan national security advisor is currently reviewing a proposal to transfer the SMW to the MOD.<sup>255</sup>

U.S. reconstruction funding of \$1.75 billion has been obligated for the SMW, with \$920 million for aircraft and equipment.<sup>256</sup> SMW will require Coalition funding for almost all its costs through 2020.<sup>257</sup> The SMW consists of 450 members, 224 from the MOI and 226 from the MOD, according to NSOCC-A. Among the SMW members are 15 qualified flight crews, just short of the 2015 goal.<sup>258</sup> The SWM fleet consists of Mi-17 helicopters and PC-12 passenger/cargo planes.<sup>259</sup>

According to NSOCC-A, contract support for both maintenance and logistics is anticipated to be required through 2020.<sup>260</sup> The Afghans are currently performing approximately 10% of the scheduled maintenance on the Mi-17 fleet; it takes 60 months to fully train a Mi-17 or PC-12 mechanic.<sup>261</sup>

This quarter, more detailed information on the AAF and the SMW remained classified. SIGAR will report on this in a classified annex to this report.

## SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

On February 12, 2015, SIGAR conducted a fact-finding visit on the A-29 Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft training program at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. This visit was a follow-up to a SIGAR Special Project inquiry letter issued last quarter.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$17.2 billion and disbursed \$16.8 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.<sup>262</sup>

## ANP Strength Reporting Changes

This quarter, USFOR-A reported the overall strength of the ANP totaled 154,685 personnel, a decrease of 1,754 since last quarter; as reflected in Table 3.14.<sup>263</sup>

However, another change in how ANP personnel numbers are calculated continues to raise questions about their validity. Last quarter, the reported number of the assigned Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) personnel could not be reconciled unless traffic personnel and fire-and-rescue personnel were double-counted. This quarter, there was no reporting on the number of personnel assigned to the MOI headquarters. However, the number of AUP personnel increased by 11,854. In the past, the MOI headquarters personnel were sometimes included in the AUP personnel count.<sup>264</sup> This quarter, the number of ANP personnel reported did not equal the total overall strength number provided. In its vetting comments, USFOR-A adjusted the overall strength number so that ANP personnel added up to the total first provided.<sup>265</sup> SIGAR has reported on unbalanced and unsupported totals of ANSF personnel figures in past quarterly reports and audits.

USFOR-A reported the ANP had an aggregate attrition rate of 19.72% between February 21, 2014, and February 20, 2015, with most of the attrition occurring among patrolmen.<sup>266</sup> Overall ANP monthly attrition averaged below 2% for 11 months of the year.<sup>267</sup> Some 1,844 ANP personnel dropped

TABLE 3.14

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q4 2014	Q1 2015	Quarterly Change	Q4 2014	Q1 2015	Quarterly Change
	AUP	92,732	104,695	11,963	88,180	100,034
ABP	22,955	22,990	35	21,766	21,953	187
ANCOP	15,223	15,223	-	14,773	15,010	237
CID	-	11,592	11,592	-	10,847	10,847
NISTA	3,000	2,500	(500)	3,422	3,539	117
GDoP Reserve <sup>a</sup>	-	-	-	891	850	(41)
Undefined personnel above authorized strength	-	-	-	-	2,452	2,452
MOI HQs & IS	24,161	-	(24,161)	22,240	-	(22,240)
Required to reconcile to ANP Total <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	5,167	-	(5,167)
<b>ANP Total (as reported)</b>	<b>158,071</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>(1,071)</b>	<b>156,439</b>	<b>154,685</b>	<b>(1,754)</b>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q4 2014 data as of 11/2014; Q1 2015 data as of 2/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; CID = Criminal Investigation Department; NISTA = Not In Service for Training; GDoP = General Directorate of Personnel; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

<sup>a</sup>Personnel that are pending assignment.

<sup>b</sup>Reported Q4 2014 total assigned ANP number appears to double-count some AUP; actual number may be 151,272.

Source: RSM, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 2/3/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/24/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015.

from the rolls during February 2015. Also, during the same period, the ANP saw 208 personnel killed in action.<sup>268</sup>

As with the ANA strength reporting, USFOR-A reports that until the Afghan government completes installation of their human-resource information systems and inputs the data, RSM will not be able to validate strength numbers.<sup>269</sup> However, even if the new information system is installed, SIGAR believes it is unlikely RSM will have the personnel and resources to validate ANP personnel numbers other than by analyzing reports based on Afghan inputs into the new system.

## ANP Sustainment

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$6.8 billion and disbursed \$6.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.<sup>270</sup> This includes \$1.5 billion in U.S. contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries. Beginning in FY 1393 (starting December 22, 2013), the United States no longer funded food costs after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOI.<sup>271</sup>

## ANP Salaries

From 2008 through December 31, 2014, the U.S. government had provided \$1.24 billion, contributed through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.<sup>272</sup>

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) charges 4% of donor contributions—more than \$20 million based on their estimated annual expenditures—to manage the LOTFA program. The Afghan government and some international donors prefer this funding instead be applied to police salaries.<sup>273</sup>

According to CSTC-A, at an authorized strength of 157,000 personnel, the UNDP estimates annual international expenditures of \$508.4 million for the ANP, based on an exchange rate of 56 afghanis to one U.S. dollar. The U.S. contribution to LOTFA for calendar year 2015 is \$114.4 million to fund salaries and incentives.<sup>274</sup> *The Times* of London reported in April that the British government decided to suspend its planned contribution of £70 million to LOTFA because of corruption concerns.<sup>275</sup>

The CSTC-A financial commitment letter to the MOI for Afghan FY 1394 includes the LOTFA Steering Committee mandate for the MOI to provide 100% of ANP salaries through electronic funds transfer by March 31, 2015.<sup>276</sup> To incentivize the MOI to use electronic payment systems, beginning in July 2015, CSTC-A plans to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically.<sup>277</sup>

### SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit on ANP personnel and payroll data released last quarter found that data has no assurance of being valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems are not fully functional or integrated. For more information, see SIGAR's January 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.<sup>278</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, as shown in Table 3.15. The most funding in this category, more than 49.5%, was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

TABLE 3.15

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANP	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$224,603,779	\$205,607,238	\$208,805
Vehicles	2,205,856,127	2,048,056,127	TBD
Communications	212,294,780	212,294,780	TBD
Aircraft	766,950,000	692,950,000	74,000,000
Ammunition	667,741,562	324,984,471	TBD
Transportation Services	20,026,263	7,770,471	12,255,792
Counter-IED	119,980,508	86,305,626	0
Other	243,088,347	91,438,300	14,412,160
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$4,460,541,366</b>	<b>\$3,669,407,013</b>	<b>\$100,876,757</b>

Note: Counter-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. TBD = To be determined. Amount depends on how much damaged or destroyed equipment is turned in for replacement.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/24/3015.

Examples of the types of equipment purchased for the ANP include sophisticated items such as high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); night-vision devices; global-positioning systems; explosive-ordnance disposal equipment; and biometrics; as well as ordinary items such as ambulances, spare parts, pistols, machine guns, radios, clothing, dental and medical equipment, and transportation services.<sup>279</sup>

The financial commitment letter providing ASFF funds to the MOI for their FY 1394 requires the MOI to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, to ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicle funding.<sup>280</sup>

CSTC-A notified Congress of the following ASFF-purchased equipment for the ANP that will be transferred to DOD in accordance with the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provision. Table 3.16 provides more details on these transfers.

## ANP Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$3.2 billion and disbursed \$2.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.<sup>281</sup>

TABLE 3.16

TRANSFERRED ASFF-FUNDED EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)		
	Scrap	To DOD Stock
8 RHIB Patrol Boats		\$1.9
Other		1.4
Vehicles	\$1.3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1.3</b>	<b>\$3.3</b>

Note: RHIB = rigid-hulled inflatable boats. Dollar amounts rounded.

Source OSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2014; CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 3/24/2015.



At that time, the United States had completed 719 infrastructure projects (valued at \$3.5 billion), with another 11 projects ongoing (\$101.7 million), according to CSTC-A.<sup>282</sup>

This quarter, one project valued at \$4 million was awarded and 12 projects valued at \$106.7 million were completed, including ammo bunkers and a fuel depot (\$17.5 million and \$13.9 million respectively).<sup>283</sup> Another project, a building and utilities (\$35 million) at MOI headquarters, was reported both completed and as ongoing after being recompeted.<sup>284</sup> The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were an ANCOP provincial headquarters building in Paktiya (\$25 million), and the ANP command center and barracks at MOI headquarters (\$24.1 million).<sup>285</sup> CSTC-A reported that sustainment and maintenance services are being funded for 214 ANP facilities.<sup>286</sup>

According to CSTC-A, the projected annual O&M, sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction cost (less than \$750,000 per project) for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is \$147 million per year, of which the U.S. will fund \$131 million (\$655 million over five years), with 2,184 skilled personnel required to maintain the facilities.<sup>287</sup>

CSTC-A reported that while no additional facility sustainment and maintenance had been transferred to the ANSF this reporting period, the transfer of the remaining two facilities is contingent on the training readiness and the ANSF's ability to execute O&M contracts.<sup>288</sup>

## ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.<sup>289</sup>

CSTC-A reported seven ongoing U.S.-funded technical training programs.<sup>290</sup> U.S.-funded training contracts include operational-specialty training, such as police intelligence, counter improvised-explosive-device and explosive-ordnance disposal, and radio operator and maintenance.<sup>291</sup>

## STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ANSF

This quarter, women finally account for 1% of the ANSF, in a small, but hard-earned, milestone of long-standing efforts to recruit and retain women.<sup>292</sup>

This quarter, RSM reported 3,325 women in the ANSF's assigned force strength for ANA and ANP, including students in training and recent training graduates. Of the total, 910 were officers, 1,249 were non-commissioned officers, and 1,166 were soldiers.<sup>293</sup>

Ongoing recruitment has slightly increased the number of females joining the ANSF across Afghanistan.<sup>294</sup> The goal to increase the number of women in the ANA by 10% was moved into a 10-year plan. In March, the MOD was scheduled to publish the FY 1394 accession plan which was to include the annual recruitment goal.<sup>295</sup> To achieve this goal, the ANA has

waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan's various ethnic groups.

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but the ANP was far from reaching its goal of 5,000 women by March 2015. Women still make up only 1.4% of the force. There were 190 ANP female officer-academy graduates in February who graduated with the rank of second lieutenant.<sup>296</sup> Graduation ceremonies were held in their honor in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Beginning in May, the basic police course, also being held in Turkey, has a goal to graduate 400 policewomen.<sup>297</sup>

While resistance to women in Afghan forces has long existed within the MOD and MOI, the President and the First Lady of Afghanistan and MOD and MOI leaders have expressed support for an expanded female presence in the ANSF.<sup>298</sup> The ANA and ANP are continuing their efforts to increase their numbers of women and to better integrate their forces.<sup>299</sup>

The ANP is focused on finding secure workplaces with appropriate facilities for females and developing strategies to attract and retain qualified female recruits with at least a high-school degree.<sup>300</sup> The 10-year goal for the ANP is to have 15,700 policewomen serving.<sup>301</sup>

Both the ANA and ANP are continuing to provide training opportunities and female-appropriate facilities. The ANA has 45 slots allocated for women for the four-year National Military Academy, 90 for the one-year Junior Officer Academy, and 150 for the officer candidate school/noncommissioned officer school.<sup>302</sup> The 12-week Basic Warrior Training course that every soldier takes includes a class on behavior and expectations of male soldiers who work with ANA women. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission conducts two-day seminars for the ANSF that include training in eliminating violence against women.<sup>303</sup> The ANP conducted 51 workshops last year and is committed, during the next two years, to holding seminars on investigation and prosecution procedures toward violence-against-women offenders.<sup>304</sup>

The NDAA for FY 2014 authorizes \$25 million to be used for programs, facilities, recruiting, and the integration of women into the ANSF. Of the \$25 million, \$1.05 million has been committed for incentives and domestic travel.<sup>305</sup> CSTC-A has met with gender advisors from both ministries to validate and prioritize requirements. They anticipate initial requirements will be to renovate facilities and institute a recruitment campaign.<sup>306</sup> Additionally, NATO has allocated \$10 million from the ANA Trust Fund for ANA women's programs.<sup>307</sup>

## ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

Since 2006, the United States has funded the construction of 184 ANSF medical facilities valued at \$188.2 million.<sup>308</sup> The ANA has eight regional medical hospitals, the AAF has five clinics and five detachments, and the



**Police Sergeant Training Academy** graduates at Mazar-e-Sharif (RS News photo by Philipp Hoffmann)

ANP has one hospital in Kabul but has an agreement with the ANA to treat police.<sup>309</sup> At this time, no other medical-facility construction is planned.<sup>310</sup>

This quarter, USFOR-A reported there are 905 physicians currently assigned in the ANSF health-care system. The total number of positions authorized is 1,144, with 574 physicians assigned in an ANA position and 331 in an ANP position. The ANA and ANP have a shortage of 166 and 73 physicians respectively.<sup>311</sup> The shortage is critical in the rural districts near conflict areas, where trauma care is needed most.<sup>312</sup>

The ANSF also has 2,440 nurses, physicians' assistants, and other medical personnel, with an additional 773 positions remaining unfilled.<sup>313</sup> While the number of unfilled medical personnel positions declined by 236 positions since last quarter, the overall number of authorizations also fell, by 785 positions.<sup>314</sup> To compensate for shortages, the ANA medical commander shifts personnel during contingency operations to the nearest regional hospital.<sup>315</sup> Physician, nurse, and medic training pipelines are established with partner international and non-government organizations to sustain the need for medical personnel.<sup>316</sup>

USFOR-A reported efforts to solidify healthcare and related logistics operations for both the ANA and ANP. The ANA medical command developed its first five-year strategic plan. The ANP developed a medical supply requirement list to improve procurement, usage, and demand forecasting.<sup>317</sup> RSM TAAC-Air Surgeon General (SG) advisors have trained 80 AAF medical personnel on three different air frames and 336 ANA medical personnel on the Mi-17 helicopter and/or the C-208 airplane.<sup>318</sup> TAAC-Air advisory efforts are aimed at building AAF medical evacuation capability to have trained medics in aircraft able to render care en route. A similar goal is to have trained medics in ambulances administering life-saving medical care.<sup>319</sup> The ANA medical commander and the ANP SG stress the need for personnel to wear protective equipment and are working to increase the number of personnel trained in combat life-saving skills.<sup>320</sup>

## REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), even though 80% of known contamination has been cleared since 1989. In January 2015, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) reported that an average of 38 casualties occurred every month, down from a peak of 16 casualties per day in 2001.<sup>321</sup> Unexploded ordnance remains in 1,609 communities, 253 districts, and 33 provinces directly affecting 774,000 people.<sup>322</sup> The country faces the recent challenge of contamination around International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) firing ranges and bases. From 2010 to the end of March 2014, MACCA recorded 82 casualties resulting from ERW accidents in or around ISAF/

NATO firing ranges and bases. There were 23 people killed and 59 injured; 83% of casualties were children. Casualties have risen around firing ranges and bases as the withdrawal of international military forces has made those places more accessible.<sup>323</sup>

Last quarter, SIGAR reported that DOD transferred \$901,511 to the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) to support an international nongovernmental organization's (NGO) effort to monitor the clearing of ordnance left behind more recently at U.S. firing ranges.<sup>324</sup> However, this may be only a small percentage of the funding needed. An April 2014 *Washington Post* article noted that the U.S. military has reportedly left about 800 square miles of contaminated land that is expected to cost \$250 million to clear.<sup>325</sup>

PM/WRA manages the Conventional Weapons Destruction program in Afghanistan to protect victims of conflict, provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, and enhance the security and safety of the Afghan people. Since FY 2002, the Department of State has provided more than \$299.3 million in weapons destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan.<sup>326</sup> Not all PM/WRA FY 2014 funds have been expended as of this quarter; PM/WRA has two-year funding, and additional 2014 funding will be captured in subsequent SIGAR reports.<sup>327</sup>

State directly funds five Afghan NGOs, five international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable the clearance of areas contaminated by ERW and support the removal and destruction of abandoned or otherwise at-risk conventional weapons used by insurgent elements to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices that target coalition forces, Afghan civilians, and international aid organizations.<sup>328</sup> As of December 31, 2014, U.S. Department of State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 166.5 million square meters of land (nearly 64.3 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.9 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives (see Table 3.17 on the following page).<sup>329</sup>

The total area of contaminated land recorded continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing surveys identify and add new contaminated land to the Information Management System for Mine Action database. At the beginning of this quarter, there was a total area of 511.6 square kilometers (197.5 square miles) of contaminated minefield and battlefield. During the quarter, 16.8 square kilometers (6.5 square miles) were cleared. However this quarter, ongoing survey identified an additional contaminated area of 29.8 square kilometers (11.5 square miles), bringing the total of known contaminated area to 524.6 square kilometers (202.5 square miles) by the end of the quarter.<sup>330</sup> PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by land mines, whereas a contaminated area can include both land mines and other ERW.<sup>331</sup>

TABLE 3.17

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1, 2013–DECEMBER 31, 2014						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m <sup>2</sup> )*
1/1–3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1–6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1–9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1–12/31/2013	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
1/1–3/31/2014	1,780	254,734	245,380	262,750	5,473,170	638,400,000
4/1–6/30/2014	1,077	3,264	25,362	3,227,697	5,163,035	519,000,000
7/1–9/30/2014	1,329	26,873	21,502	2,860,695	5,705,984	511,600,000
10/1–12/31/2014	465	20,274	58,369	538,499	1,604,410	524,600,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17,147</b>	<b>448,180</b>	<b>658,177</b>	<b>16,430,233</b>	<b>41,469,799</b>	<b>524,600,000</b>

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre. \*Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2015, 12/30/2014, and 10/7/2014.

## SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROJECT

This quarter the Lessons Learned Program announced a project that will review the efficacy of counternarcotics efforts within Afghan reconstruction. For more information, see Section 2, page 46.

## COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of March 31, 2015, the United States has provided \$8.4 billion for counternarcotics (CN) efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$3.0 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$1.6 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$1.5 billion) to encourage farmers to plant crops other than poppy, and a portion of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$2.1 billion).<sup>332</sup> USAID’s Alternative Development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production.<sup>333</sup> In addition to reconstruction funding, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan (see Appendix B).

Afghanistan is the global leader in illicit opium cultivation and production.<sup>334</sup> The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the U.S. government provide data on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The two estimates have long varied, such as in 2004, when there was a difference of 80,000 hectares between the U.S. and UNODC surveys.<sup>335</sup> Since 2005, the surveys are more congruent thanks to the improved use of high-resolution imagery by UNODC and closer association between the technical experts responsible for the annual estimates in UNODC and the U.S. government. While national opium-cultivation data have become more aligned, discrepancies remain at the provincial level. For 2014, the U.S. government estimates illegal opium cultivation at 211,000 hectares and production of raw opium at 6,300 metric tons (MT); the November 2014

*Afghanistan Opium Survey* by UNODC estimates opium cultivation at 224,000 hectares.<sup>336</sup> One hectare is roughly 2.5 acres of land; one metric ton is about 2,200 pounds.

The 2014 U.S. government figures represent a 6.6% increase in poppy cultivation from the 2013 U.S. estimate of 198,000 hectares, and a 14.5% increase in opium production from the 2013 estimate of 5,500 MT of raw opium.<sup>337</sup>

The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) performs counternarcotics activities, such as disrupting overseas production and trafficking of illegal drugs, and developing police and a robust criminal justice system.<sup>338</sup> INL advises the U.S. president and U.S. departments and agencies on developing policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. INL programs in Afghanistan support two of State's strategic goals:

- reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States
- minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens<sup>339</sup>

INL supports the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan, approved in December 2012, and the key priorities of Afghanistan's National Drug Control Strategy, approved in October 2013.<sup>340</sup> The Department of State is preparing a new counternarcotics strategy that will be finalized later this year.<sup>341</sup>

Through its CN fund, DOD has funded capacity building in the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), improvements to border security, information sharing, and regional and international cooperation to reduce the national-security impacts of the illicit narcotics trade and networks. DOD's *Post-2014 CN Strategy for Afghanistan and the Region*, released in October 2013, lays out DOD's goals to continue supporting Afghan counternarcotics (CN) efforts, transition CN program responsibilities to Afghans, and build regional cooperation to combat the Afghan drug flow.<sup>342</sup>

## Domestic Drug Use: A Looming Health Crisis

Drug abuse is spreading in Afghanistan, with long-term social, political and economic ramifications.<sup>343</sup> The 2012 National Drug Use Survey sponsored by INL estimated the number of Afghan drug users at 1.3–1.6 million in a population of nearly 31 million, one of the highest per capita rates in the world.<sup>344</sup> The Government of Afghanistan's National Development Strategy states: "The number of domestic drug users in Afghanistan has also increased significantly and illicit drugs and the corruption surrounding it is threatening to destroy the next generation of Afghan youth."<sup>345</sup> In its latest *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, INL notes that more recent drug studies underscore the pervasiveness of drug use, including among Afghan children.<sup>346</sup> INL also conducted a rural survey in 2014; its

**Colombo Plan:** Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan's Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals, a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Source: The Colombo Plan Secretariat website, History, [www.colombo-plan.org](http://www.colombo-plan.org), accessed 4/7/2014; State, INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2013, p. 20.

preliminary findings suggest that drug use may exceed 10% of the population, or more than twice the global rate reported by UNODC.<sup>347</sup>

Afghanistan has 113 U.S.-funded treatment centers with a current annual capacity for treating about 30,000 individuals.<sup>348</sup> Clearly, the demand for treatment services exceeds the capacity of the national government. INL told SIGAR it supports 97 treatment programs through the **Colombo Plan**. INL's goal is to train 75% of the more than 500 treatment workers in the country between 2015 and 2016, with at least 50% of the trainees passing the initial credentialing exam for International Certified Addiction Professional-Level I.<sup>349</sup> In October 2014, INL contributed \$7,609,541 to the Colombo Plan for the FY 2013 drug-demand reduction program. INL has yet to contribute or commit FY 2014 and FY 2015 funds to the Colombo Plan.<sup>350</sup>

Training was scarce prior to 2008, when INL established its first treatment center. Between 2008 and 2015, INL expanded its support to 97 programs. In the past two years, INL intensified training when it translated and modified its Universal Treatment Curriculum and emphasized training as part of its drug-demand reduction transition strategy.<sup>351</sup> Between 2003 and 2012, 506 individuals were trained in drug treatment; another 580 individuals were trained in 2013–2014 alone.<sup>352</sup> However, the recent influx of trained addiction professionals probably is not sufficient to address the growing addiction problem, particularly given the current capacity of treating only 30,000 persons every year. Though the United States funds outpatient treatment centers nationwide, most have waiting lists for new patients.<sup>353</sup>

January 2015 marked the official start of the transition of the first group of 13 treatment programs supported by INL to the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) control, as well as transfer of the clinical staff onto the Afghan government staff list (tashkil).<sup>354</sup> INL worked closely with the MOPH to ensure the full transition of the clinical staff to the Afghan government tashkil. According to INL, all the necessary steps were completed for the January 2015 transition start date, but the Afghan government faced some payment delays for the new employees. INL closely monitored the situation and informed SIGAR that the government has resolved the internal issues and employees are receiving pay, including any delayed paychecks.<sup>355</sup> Throughout the quarter, INL continued to support clinical-staff training, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand reduction.<sup>356</sup>

INL's Drug Demand Reduction Program provides treatment directly to men, women, and children to overcome addiction. The Preventative Drug Education program provides antidrug education to youth in schools, targeting the next generation and aiming to prevent drug use.<sup>357</sup>

The negative economic impact of so many opiate users will be felt increasingly as the Afghan economy develops; the burden of providing shelter and treatment to the large population with substance-use disorders is already falling heavily on provincial governments.<sup>358</sup>

## Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE)

INL also funds the nationwide CNCE program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production.<sup>359</sup> Since 2013, INL has obligated \$8.2 million and expended \$6.6 million to date.<sup>360</sup> As a part of the program, Sayara Media Communications monitors the effectiveness of media campaigns by analyzing audience reports, including a baseline report to identify provincial drivers of drug trafficking and cultivation, and public sentiment. Sayara additionally has 42 reporters placed in most categories of tiered provinces. Provinces are ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on cultivation levels, with category one as the highest. The reporters gather information and gauge perceptions on the state of counternarcotics policies and messaging.

Sayara also conducts media monitoring, with a baseline assessment of how CN media products fit into the current Afghan media landscape, with monthly monitoring and evaluation of the amount and type of CN-related items in the media and any changes (positive or negative) to the initial baseline assessment. Addressing the effectiveness of the media campaign, INL told SIGAR that some areas exposed to CN media experienced a decrease in opium cultivation, while cultivation numbers have increased or remained the same in other areas where security and governance remain a broader challenge.<sup>361</sup> However, one should not conclude that opium cultivation levels are directly linked to the presence or absence of CN messaging. Rising cultivation levels of the past few years attest to the inability of media campaigns to discourage opium poppy planting.

According to UNODC, reductions in cultivation occurred between 2013 and 2014 in the central, eastern, western, and southwestern regions in provinces as diverse as Nimroz, Herat, Daykundi, Kabul, Laghman, Kapisa, and Kunar.<sup>362</sup> INL told SIGAR that this past quarter, in the high poppy-cultivating provinces, the program found a statistically significant increase in the percentage of respondents who think poppy can lead to addiction of a farmer and/or his family, a key message of INL's outreach.<sup>363</sup>

During the same time period, radio and television counternarcotics messages increased to a monthly average of 15.4 aired pieces from 5.4 last quarter and to 147.7 from 5.8 last quarter on television across provinces.<sup>364</sup> The Afghan Premier Soccer League, which carries a U.S. government-sponsored antidrug message, is now the most-watched program on Afghan television.<sup>365</sup> According to INL, public-opinion polling shows that the majority of Afghan people polled have heard antipoppy and anticultivation messages.<sup>366</sup> The CNCE program will conclude April 2015, with a possible extension to continue remaining civil society subgrants, and to support INL's most significant antipoppy campaign of the year, the preplanting campaign.<sup>367</sup> An independent evaluation of the INL-funded messaging has not yet taken place, but a 2008 evaluation of a similar campaign concluded that "public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to



## Minister of Counter Narcotics Salamat Azimi

<b>Confirmed</b>	April 18, 2015
<b>Ethnicity</b>	Tajik
<b>Nominated by</b>	President Ashraf Ghani
<b>Experience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Professor and deputy director at Balkh University</li> <li>• Head of the law department, Ministry of Justice</li> <li>• Head of the children's rights section at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in Mazar-e-Sharif</li> <li>• Director of the Ariana Legal Foundation in Mazar-e-Sharif</li> </ul>



(Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics photo)

Source: *Afghan Analysts Network*, "Finally Towards a Complete Afghan Cabinet? The next 16 minister nominees and their bios (amended)," 3/24/2015; *Pajhwok Afghan News*, "WJ approves all 16 ministers-designate," 4/18/2015.

increase the chances of success, need to be (i) coordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, and (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication)."<sup>368</sup>

## Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) coordinates the actions of other ministries and takes the lead in developing counternarcotics policy.<sup>369</sup>

The MCN signed an MOU with INL in February 2014 renewing its capacity-building program for 18 months and providing funding for 24 local national advisors to help build capacity at the MCN.<sup>370</sup> INL completed the performance-measurement plan designed to assess MCN capacity building progress, in February 2015.<sup>371</sup>

The plan will evaluate MCN's capacity development by measuring program self-management, the effectiveness of U.S. and local national advisors, and process efficiency. Some of the indicators, to be collected quarterly, are the number of independently led MCN projects; the number of MCN staff capable of planning workshops, training, and other events without assistance; and the number of MCN staff capable of drafting government documents and donor funding proposals.<sup>372</sup> During the reporting period, the MCN completed and submitted their proposal for a series of short- and long-term courses that will be taught by Dunya University in order to increase work-related skills and overall capacity of MCN staff.<sup>373</sup>

## Governor Led Eradication Program (GLE)

INL funds the GLE program, which operates at different times of the year depending on provinces' crop season. MCN tracks cumulative results, which are subsequently verified by UNODC.<sup>374</sup> Verified eradication results

decreased in 2014 for a third consecutive year to 2,692 hectares, 63% less than the 7,348 hectares eradicated in 2013.<sup>375</sup> According to INL, Afghan government officials ascribe the latest decrease to the reallocation of security forces from eradication efforts to election security.<sup>376</sup>

In late January 2015, INL cosponsored a two-day conference with the British High Commission, attended by the MCN, MOI, National Directorate of Security, Ministry of Defense, provincial governors, and international organizations. The conference developed national, provincial, and district plans for the 2015 eradication program scheduled for February 27 to July 31, 2015.<sup>377</sup> According to INL, early indications are that 2015 eradication efforts will achieve more than in 2014.<sup>378</sup> As of March 2015, 1,753 hectares have been destroyed compared to 793 hectares by the same time last year; 2,721 hectares in 2013 and 2,637 hectares in 2012.<sup>379</sup> Eradication efforts under this year's plan are designed to disrupt the drug trade by placing a greater focus on conducting eradication efforts in the highest-cultivating districts. According to INL, this approach should lead to higher eradication levels and inject greater risk into farmers' planting decisions for 2016.<sup>380</sup>

Last quarter, INL informed SIGAR it had donated 47 new tractors to the MCN for provincial poppy eradication.<sup>381</sup> Based on information INL provided this quarter, the total cost for these tractors exceeds \$600,000.<sup>382</sup> In 2013, the MCN received 55 new tractors,<sup>383</sup> yet eradication results decreased 24% from the 2012 level of 9,672 hectares to 7,348 hectares in 2013.<sup>384</sup> According to INL, the new tractors augment the existing fleet of 210 tractors, purchased from various sources.<sup>385</sup> The MCN and INL's Kabul office coordinated the placement of the new tractors based on a review of cultivation levels, terrain, and previous equipment stock.<sup>386</sup> However, several provinces are slated to receive new tractors though their cultivation results were nominal, while certain provinces with higher cultivation results were omitted. For example, as shown in Table 3.18 on the following page, Kunar and Sar-e Pul will receive two tractors when their respective cultivation results for 2014 were 754 hectares and 195 hectares. Sar-e Pul had even been declared poppy-free in 2013.<sup>387</sup> On the other hand, Badghis, Uruzgan, and Laghman received no tractors even though the provinces cultivated thousands of hectares.<sup>388</sup>

Eradication is under way in certain provinces.<sup>389</sup> Eradication campaigns, as illustrated in Figure 3.26 on page 117, have remained ineffective in reducing overall opium cultivation, which has been expanding in recent years. Eradication or its threat has proven effective on a localized basis but only where the right conditions are in place.

According to INL, early results indicate better cooperation between the MCN, the MOI, and provincial government offices. If provincial governors similarly strengthen their leadership, then Afghanistan will certainly increase eradication over last year's results with large increases possible in several provinces.<sup>390</sup> However, the eradication season in the south and east,

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.18


<b>GLE NEW TRACTOR DONATION BY PROVINCE AND CULTIVATION RESULTS</b>					
<b>Province</b>	<b>2014 Tractor Donation</b>	<b>2015 Tractor Donation (February)</b>	<b>Functioning Tractors per 2015 MCN Eradication Plan</b>	<b>2013 Opium Cultivation (hectares)</b>	<b>2014 Opium Cultivation (hectares)</b>
Badakhshan	2		9	2,374	4,204
Badghis	-		0	3,596	5,721
Baghlan	-		0	141	168
Balkh	-		4	410	poppy free
Bamyan	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Daykundi	-		0	1,536	587
Farah	5		19	24,492	27,513
Faryab	1		3	158	211
Ghazni	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Ghor	3		3	264	493
Helmand	-	14	39	100,693	103,240
Herat	6		6	952	738
Jowzjan	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Kabul	-		0	298	233
Kandahar	-		20	28,335	33,713
Kapisa	-		0	583	472
Khowst	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Kunar	-	2	2	1,127	754
Kunduz	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Laghman	-		0	1,236	901
Loghar	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Nangarhar	3		5	15,719	18,227
Nimroz	7		7	16,252	14,584
Nuristan	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Paktika	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Paktiya	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Panjshir	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Parwan	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Samangan	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Sar-e Pul	2		2	poppy free	195
Takhar	-		1	poppy free	poppy free
Uruzgan	-		5	9,880	9,277
Wardak	-		0	poppy free	poppy free
Zabul	2		5	1,335	2,894
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>209,381</b>	<b>224,125</b>

Note: A "-" indicates data not provided. Opium cultivation totals differ slightly from UNODC published numbers which have been rounded.

Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/27/2015; INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/16/2015; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 60.

FIGURE 3.26

## OPIMUM CULTIVATION AND ERADICATION RESULTS, 2008–2014 (HECTARES IN THOUSANDS)



Note: A hectare is 10,000 square meters, or almost 2.5 acres.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, pp. 26, 60, 67; UNODC, *World Drug Report 2014*, 7/2014, p. 87; UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 32.

where the majority of cultivation occurs, is almost at an end with the harvest beginning in Helmand on April 7, 2015.<sup>391</sup>

### Good Performer’s Initiative (GPI)

INL supports the MCN’s efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the GPI. Under the terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for financial support of GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, as verified by UNODC. In August 2014, INL and MCN announced GPI II, which expands the award categories for “good performers” to include public outreach and law enforcement, beginning in the 2014–2015 poppy cultivation season, and reduces the amount a province may receive for being poppy-free to \$500,000. (Previous award amounts were \$1 million.)<sup>392</sup>

Following concerns that the initial program was inappropriately targeted, development assistance under GPI II will be tailored to better meet the needs of rural communities by prioritizing alternative-livelihoods projects that support farmers as they transition from poppy cultivation to licit crops.<sup>393</sup> The GPI II MOU is currently under negotiation and feasibility studies will be conducted under GPI II on a project-level basis. The program will be implemented nationwide once the new implementing documents have been finalized.<sup>394</sup>

The GPI program has experienced problems and challenges, according to the MCN's own assessment. In 2014, the GPI procurement process was suspended for several months, partly as a result of the program's redesign. Some GPI projects implemented in 2014 had already completed the requisite procurement stages in 2013, yet were not awarded until 2014. GPI projects were delayed by a slow procurement process, mainly due to the "unprofessional" work of MCN staff in procurement and evaluation committees. As a result, MCN readvertised all GPI projects in the procurement pipeline during 2014.<sup>395</sup> Other challenges such as delayed payments and insecure environments impeded project implementation.

As of February 28, 2015, a total of 222 GPI projects with a value of \$108.6 million were approved with over \$80.5 million in expenditures: 166 projects were completed, 55 are ongoing, and one is nearing completion.<sup>396</sup> INL deconflicts projects proposed under the GPI program with other U.S. government work through an interagency consultation drawing on mission experience in each province. INL and its implementing partners consult with USAID to avoid pitfalls such as working with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities, and to develop complementary activities wherever possible. State's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan hosts regular counternarcotics working groups to bring together interagency personnel from State, DOD, DEA, USAID, and other relevant agencies to maintain coordination on multiple programs.<sup>397</sup>

## **ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD**

USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production.<sup>398</sup> INL funding supports programs in several areas including supply reduction and alternative development.<sup>399</sup> INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.<sup>400</sup>

### **Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)**

INL provides support to alternative-livelihood programs as part of its efforts to combat drug trafficking.<sup>401</sup> In Afghanistan, the nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation and its partners implement activities under the \$12 million SAGAL grant from INL.<sup>402</sup> The implementers favor activities, rather than stand-alone projects, with the following five objectives:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crop systems
- increase economic return for licit crop systems
- improve farmers' access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve subnational governance systems

TABLE 3.19

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS					
Agency	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2015 (\$)
State	Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)	7/21/2014	1/20/2016	\$11,884,816	\$3,926,198
USAID	Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/30/2016	45,296,184	42,438,854
USAID	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)	3/2/2009	9/30/2015	159,878,589	150,702,887
USAID	Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	7/31/2013	7/30/2015	18,695,804	12,544,000
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-South	10/7/2013	10/6/2018	125,075,172	22,279,151
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-North	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	4,177,911
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-West	8/10/2014	8/9/2019	69,973,376	3,532,601

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/9/2015; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/27/2015; INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2015.

SAGAL activities are implemented in 16 provinces across Afghanistan: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, Bamyan, Kunduz, Parwan, Faryab, Kabul, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Laghman, Uruzgan, and Kunar.<sup>403</sup> INL informed SIGAR that \$3.9 million has been expended to date.<sup>404</sup>

According to INL, SAGAL activities will complement past and ongoing investments in licit livelihoods and rural development by the U.S. government. In particular, SAGAL will provide a system of support for GPI II. Where district development planning structures exist, SAGAL will support a more decentralized GPI II project-selection process, improving the recognition of rural community needs in the provincial GPI II project-nomination process.<sup>405</sup>

Table 3.19 provides summary financial information on SAGAL and other alternative livelihood programs.

## Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

The KFZ is a two-year, \$18.7 million project implemented by USAID under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar province.<sup>406</sup>

Early in the quarter, USAID suspended KFZ's implementer, International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD), for serious misconduct.<sup>407</sup> The USAID Office of Inspector General is currently investigating IRD for allegedly improperly charging certain overhead costs to the U.S. government.<sup>408</sup> As a result, IRD's contracts will not be extended beyond current project end dates, nor will new ones be awarded. USAID is currently exploring

a one-year extension of the KFZ program that would be implemented by a public international organization (PIO), rather than IRD. This one-year extension would serve as a bridge while USAID designs and completes the procurement for a follow-on alternative development activity in the province. The proposed PIO agreement would have to be in place prior to July 31, 2015, to allow for a smooth transition from the existing KFZ program to the one-year extension and mitigate the disruption caused by the IRD suspension.<sup>409</sup>

USAID recognizes that its suspension of IRD could potentially disrupt activities and slowdown the momentum of KFZ's efforts. Retaining personnel will become a challenge in view of the looming personnel contract terminations in July 2015.<sup>410</sup> There are over 100 individuals (expatriates and local staff) employed full-time on KFZ activities.<sup>411</sup> To mitigate these problems, USAID recognizes the need to get the new contract implementation arrangements in place quickly.<sup>412</sup>

From February 25 to March 1, 2015, all canal construction and rehabilitation activities were suspended in Zharai District as a precautionary measure in response to the start of Afghan security forces' poppy-eradication activities in the district.<sup>413</sup> Eradication efforts occasionally meet with armed resistance in insecure areas.<sup>414</sup> Since that time, canal construction and rehabilitation activities in Zharai District have recommenced. As of April 9, four out of five projects in the district were complete, while the remaining one is 81% complete.<sup>415</sup> Other alternative-development activities, such as pre- and post-harvest marketing trainings, solar drying mechanisms for fruits and vegetables projects, vocational training, greenhouses or women's vegetable production and processing projects, continued unabated throughout various districts.<sup>416</sup>

As of March 31, 2015, USAID has cumulatively disbursed \$12.5 million on KFZ.<sup>417</sup>

## Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)

The RADP is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Three RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. These projects share objectives focused on strengthening the capacity of farmers in improving the productivity of wheat, high-value crops (i.e., perennial and annual horticultural crops) and livestock.<sup>418</sup> Using a **value-chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales of commodities, and overall development of agricultural value chains.<sup>419</sup>

RADP-South, a five-year, \$125 million effort, operates in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan Provinces. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2019.<sup>420</sup>

RADP-South's focus is on strengthening the capacity of producers, associations, traders and businesses to respond to market demands and

**Value chain:** the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

facilitate market linkages between value chain actors<sup>421</sup> such as retailers, input suppliers, mills and agricultural depots. During the quarter, RADP-South conducted training-of-trainers courses for master trainers to transfer their knowledge to lead farmers and other beneficiary farmers.<sup>422</sup> The program also worked with a local company, Kandahar Fresh Fruit Association, to build its capacity in post-harvest and cold-storage techniques. As a result, the company successfully shipped pomegranates to Western Europe for the first time.<sup>423</sup> RADP-South also provided training for paraveterinarians to deliver animal health care services.<sup>424</sup> The decline of the security situation during the quarter may hamper program activities.<sup>425</sup>

The \$78 million RADP-North project began in May 2014. It operates in Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Badakhshan Provinces.<sup>426</sup> RADP-North activities centered on program startup for several months in 2014.<sup>427</sup> Additionally, analysis and implementing activities began on wheat, high-value crop (melon, dried fruit, nut, and grape/raisin) value chains in Jowzjan, Samangan, and Baghlan.<sup>428</sup> RADP-North sponsored several businesses to take part in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock's September 2014 Agricultural Fair resulting in economic success: the agribusinesses represented sold over 80% of their goods and began negotiations for future lucrative contracts thanks to contacts made at the fair.<sup>429</sup>

RADP-West, which operates in Herat, Farah, and Badghis Provinces with a \$70 million cost estimate, began operations in August 2014, finalizing its chain analysis in order to identify constraints and potential areas for RADP-West intervention.<sup>430</sup>

USAID informed SIGAR it is planning RADP-East which will encompass Nangarhar and several other provinces, after IDEA-NEW comes to a close later this year. It will focus on strengthening value chains (working with input suppliers, market intermediaries and other agribusinesses, particularly in the Jalalabad area) and less on working directly with farmers.<sup>431</sup>

As of March 31, 2015, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$4.2 million on RADP-North, \$22.3 million on RADP-South and \$3.5 million on RADP-West.<sup>432</sup> For summary information on this alternative livelihood program, see Table 3.19 on page 119 of this report.

## Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP)

CHAMP is a \$45 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease the country's poppy production. CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by assisting them to shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.<sup>433</sup>



CHAMP provides training in agricultural best practices, builds storage facilities such as cool rooms and raisin-drying facilities, and helps grape farmers convert from traditional ground-based vineyards to higher-output trellis systems. CHAMP also helps stimulate farm exports by linking farmers to traders and traders to high-paying markets. CHAMP includes women in many of its activities in an effort to integrate them into the mainstream agricultural sector.<sup>434</sup> The program has been extended an additional two years until December 2016 to focus resources and activities on a value chain approach that emphasizes post-harvest handling and marketing activities.<sup>435</sup>

Under the new approach, CHAMP is carrying out activities throughout six main value chains (grapes, almonds, pomegranates, apricots, apples, and melons).<sup>436</sup> The program focuses on improving horticultural and marketing practices to produce high-quality fruit for high-value markets such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Russia, and Canada.<sup>437</sup> Initially, Afghan traders were supplying their products to wholesale markets that involved the commission of agents to sell their products in their respective countries. CHAMP now enables Afghan traders to bypass commission agents by linking them directly to supermarket retailers in those countries.<sup>438</sup>

During the years 2010 to 2014, CHAMP's various achievements include training 105,000 farmers, including 2,700 women, to improve agricultural techniques; planting nearly three million saplings and root cuttings benefiting 19,500 farmers; and exporting 29,500 tons of produce valued at \$33 million to international markets. CHAMP enabled the construction of over 230 storage facilities (cool rooms and raisin-drying facilities) and created over 7,500 full-time jobs in agribusiness.<sup>439</sup> During the quarter, CHAMP provided training to 264 farmers, including 32 women, at established farmer field schools in Kandahar, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, and Wardak Provinces. At CHAMP farmer field schools, participants learn new agricultural practices such as orchard or trellis management and receive modern agricultural tools. In January 2015, CHAMP also made preparations for the February Gulfood Exhibition in Dubai, where Afghan products were displayed to buyers around the world.<sup>440</sup> During the February 8–12 exhibition, CHAMP, along with another USAID program, facilitated the participation of seven Afghan traders.<sup>441</sup>

According to USAID, planting orchards and upgrading vineyards have resulted in nearly doubling the income of beneficiary farmers. Thus, the CHAMP project has provided tangible alternatives to poppy cultivation, and played a vital role in reducing poppy cultivation.<sup>442</sup> Additionally, USAID said converting the land to orchards/vineyards (once they are mature and assuming appropriate crop management), will prevent beneficiary farmers from returning to poppy cultivation, although an evaluation of IDEA-NEW in Nangarhar suggest that this is not always the case and in some areas, orchards may in fact be removed and poppy replanted.<sup>443</sup> Nevertheless,



**An opium poppy** in bloom. (Photo by David Mansfield)

USAID concluded that the risk is negligible that CHAMP's activities will backfire and increase poppy cultivation.<sup>444</sup> As of March 31, 2015, USAID has disbursed \$42.4 million.<sup>445</sup> For summary financial information on this program, see Table 3.19 on page 119 of this report.

### **Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)**

Launched in March 2009, the mission of USAID's \$160 million IDEA-NEW program is to expand the licit agricultural economy in the northern, eastern, and western regions of the country.<sup>446</sup> During the quarter, project activities included accounting and marketing on-the-job coaching sessions for input suppliers and food processors in central and eastern provinces. Workshops were held in Kabul and Jalalabad with representatives from food processing companies and government representatives.<sup>447</sup> IDEA-NEW hosts monthly coordination meetings with SAGAL and other USAID development projects to enhance coordination and avoid duplication of activities. As of March 31, 2015, USAID has disbursed \$150.7 million.<sup>448</sup> For financial information on IDEA-NEW and other alternative livelihood programs, see Table 3.19 on page 119 of this report.

### **Interdiction Operations and Results**

DOD reported that from January 1, 2015, to March 17, 2015, Afghan security and law-enforcement forces conducted 89 drug-interdiction operations resulting in 126 individual detentions.<sup>449</sup> These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. The U.S. military ended general logistics

and intelligence support, while DEA continued providing mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to Coalition mentors.<sup>450</sup>

Most interdiction activities occurred in the east and capital regional commands. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern regional commands, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. DOD said the continued reduction is likely a result of the Coalition drawdown, which has left Afghan security forces with less freedom of movement in southern and southwest Afghanistan.<sup>451</sup> Under the Resolute Support Mission, Coalition military forces no longer conduct operations, except for counterterrorism.<sup>452</sup> Interagency elements, including the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and Coalition interdiction efforts. The IOCC provided data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against narco-insurgent elements.<sup>453</sup>

INL provides operations-and-maintenance support to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Headquarters and the specially vetted units, such as the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and Technical Investigations Unit (TIU) in Kabul, but not to the provincial CNPA.<sup>454</sup> DOD has provided training, equipment, and infrastructure to the vetted units within the CNPA.<sup>455</sup> Specially trained Afghan CNPA continued to operate in Kandahar with an NIU platoon based out of the Kandahar Regional Law Enforcement Center. The NIU unilaterally conducted at least two cases involving the arrest of three traffickers and the seizure of small amounts of narcotics. One of the cases involved the arrest of a trafficker who was related to a government official. This generated political sensitivities, which were handled by NIU officers on the scene without any U.S. assistance. In Helmand, MOI police elements conducted eradication operations concurrently with MOD military operations elsewhere in the province.<sup>456</sup>

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the reported seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 8,077 kg of opium
- 415 kg of heroin
- 961 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 1,027 kg of precursor chemicals<sup>457</sup>

Other seizures took place but were not vetted during the reporting period.<sup>458</sup>

Since 2014, the Afghan government has taken measures to block all imports of acetic anhydride, the main precursor chemical used to manufacture heroin. The United States and regional and other international partners are also seeking to limit Afghanistan's imports of the substance.<sup>459</sup>

As shown in Table 3.20, interdiction results have been declining since 2012.

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**Precursor chemical:** substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

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Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, viii.

TABLE 3.20

<b>INTERDICTION RESULTS, FY2008–FY2015</b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015*</b>	<b>Total</b>
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	144	2,969
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	226	3,173
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	14,267	762,244
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	930	30,139
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	495	53,452
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	17,954	410,973
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	4,257	464,824

Note: 1 kilogram (kg) = about 2.2 pounds. \*First- and second-quarter results.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2015.

According to DOD, vetted Afghan units have successfully conducted complex counterdrug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance. However, the drawdown of Coalition forces has had an impact on Afghanistan’s ability to conduct CN interdiction operations, particularly in Kandahar and Helmand.<sup>460</sup> Overall, counterdrug operations decreased 46.6%, from 624 in FY 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge to 333 in FY 2014, while actual heroin seizures have decreased 72%, from 10,982 kg in FY 2011 to 3,052 kg in FY 2014, and opium seizures have decreased 61% from 98,327 kg in FY 2011 to 38,307 kg in FY 2014, according to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database. In FY 2011, 75% of all CN operations occurred in Helmand and Kandahar provinces with a decrease to 32% of all CN operations occurring in those same provinces in FY 2014.<sup>461</sup>

The Bilateral Security Agreement has not altered the Coalition forces’ train, advise and support mission for counternarcotics. The CNPA continue to conduct operations across Afghanistan with mentoring and support from Coalition members.<sup>462</sup>

## Aviation Support

According to INL, State counternarcotics support to the DEA consisted of 116.6 flight hours with 60.4 flight hours supporting interdiction efforts, 37.3 flight hours supporting Afghan NIU and DEA passenger movements and 18.9 flight hours of mission training.<sup>463</sup>