SECURITY CONTENTS

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As of June 30, 2015, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $65 billion to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the $60.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately $55.2 billion had been obligated and $53.5 billion disbursed as of June 30, 2015.97

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and the MOD and MOI; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

UN Reports Record-High Levels of Civilian Casualties as Security Incidents Increase
Conflict-related violence increased in Afghanistan as the ANDSF sought to contain insurgent activity whose intensification resulted in record-high levels of civilian casualties, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).98 For example, the UN reported a 45% increase in armed clashes the week after the start of the Taliban spring offensive on April 24, 2015, and a 23% increase in civilian casualties over the same period in 2014.99 According to the UN, more than 10,000 civilians were killed or injured during 2014, as compared to 8,615 in 2013, and a UNAMA representative predicted an increase in civilian casualties this year in Afghanistan.100

Insurgents continued to demonstrate their willingness to target civilians even during the holy month of Ramadan. On July 12, 2015, a vehicle-borne...
Security Incidents: reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.

Note: Not all reported incidents are verified.

On July 13, 2015, explosives set off at a mosque in Baghlan wounded more than 40 civilians gathered for dinner and for government-sponsored distribution of oil and rice. The UN representative in Afghanistan called for an immediate halt to attacks targeting civilians, and said “The perpetrators of this war crime must be held accountable.”

While fewer security incidents were reported than last quarter, as reflected in Figure 3.26, there were fewer days in the latest reporting period, so the incidents-per-day average was higher this period than in the same periods in 2014 or 2013. The UN reported the southern, southeastern, and eastern regions continued to endure most of the security incidents. But even the relatively safe northern and northeastern regions saw security incidents increase by 12% compared with the same period in 2014. A UNAMA representative reported that Kunduz Province experienced 250 civilian casualties, the highest of the northeast-region provinces.
The UN recorded 5,033 security incidents from February 15, 2015, through April 30, 2015. The count included 160 assassinations and 40 attempted assassinations, and an increase of 21.3% in abductions over the same period in 2014. Armed clashes (54%) and IED events (28%) accounted for 82% of all security incidents. Although the Taliban announced their main targets would be “foreign occupiers” as well as government offices and Afghan security forces, the UN reported that less than 1% of the incidents were directed against Coalition bases. During one incident, a June 9, 2015, rocket attack on Bagram Airfield, however, a Department of Defense (DOD) civilian was killed. The majority of the Taliban offenses were directed against the ANDSF and Afghan government officials and facilities.

A spokesman for an Afghan advocacy group for NGOs reported 26 humanitarian aid workers had been killed this year, and an additional 17 wounded and 40 abducted. One attack targeted a Czech aid group in Balkh, killing nine workers.

NATO Defense Ministers Meet
NATO defense ministers met in closed session in Brussels in late June to address the progress of the Resolute Support (RS) mission and determine how to best support the ANDSF through capacity building and institutional development. Attendees included Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, RS commander General John Campbell, and acting Afghan Minister of Defense Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the ministers reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan.

“At this period of increased need, it is particularly disturbing to note that humanitarian aid workers are increasingly becoming targets themselves.”

—Mark Bowden, UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan

The Taliban’s Spring Offensive

On April 24, the Taliban launched its first spring offensive since the NATO combat mission ended in December 2014. Afghan security forces are being spread increasingly thin as they respond to security threats throughout the country. The ANDSF has experienced higher casualty rates since the Taliban’s spring offensive began; May 2015 casualties were 33% higher than in the previous month.

The MOD reported in June that 40 to 50 districts throughout Afghanistan are facing security threats, noting that most insurgents are based in areas with a limited ANDSF presence. The MOD added that they had ongoing counterinsurgency operations in 14 of 34 provinces. Local media reported that in the first six months of 2015, insurgents carried out attacks in larger groups of fighters, resulting in the capture of several districts. In its spring offensive, the Taliban has been attacking Afghan police and soldiers at security posts in provinces including Paktiya, Badakhshan, Kandahar, and Helmand.

Insurgents demonstrated the continued ability to launch high-profile attacks in Kabul, but the ANDSF was able to respond to these incidents. On June 22, the Taliban attacked the Afghan parliament on the day members were to vote on the minister of defense nominee. Seven gunmen attempted to enter the parliament building following a vehicle-borne suicide attack against the entrance. Afghan security forces repelled and eventually killed the attackers. No parliamentarians were hurt, but the attackers killed a woman and a 10-year-old child and injured 31 other civilians. In May, the Taliban detonated a car bomb in the parking lot outside Afghanistan’s Ministry of Justice as civil servants were leaving to go home. The attack killed five people and injured at least 42.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Afghanistan

This quarter, DOD and RS officials acknowledged that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had spread into Afghanistan, although they added that the group was “nascent and relatively small.” The acknowledgement came after a NATO drone strike in Helmand killed a former Taliban member and released Guantanamo Bay detainee, Abdul Rauf, who had become an ISIL leader and recruiter in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) also announced the drone-strike killing of Mawlavi Shahidullah Shahid, an ISIL commander, on July 7, 2015, along with two of his deputies and five others. Shahid, a former Pakistani Taliban spokesman who was sacked after claiming allegiance to ISIL, was the second most senior ISIL commander in Afghanistan killed in a week and the third over the past few months. Four days later, the NDS announced the drone-strike killing of Hafez Saeed, who they described as the leader of ISIL in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saeed, also a former Pakistani Taliban who had switched allegiance to ISIL, was killed in Nangarhar.
In a March 2015 briefing, UNAMA officials were concerned over reports that ISIL had established a foothold in Afghanistan, because of its “potential to offer an alternative flagpole to which otherwise isolated insurgent splinter groups can rally.”

The Taliban addressed ISIL’s growing prominence in Afghanistan at the May 2015 Pugwash Conference in Qatar, an informal meeting designed to facilitate peace talks between the Taliban and Afghan government officials. Taliban officials called ISIL “alien to the tradition and the desires of the Afghan people.” Additionally, in June, the Taliban issued an open letter to ISIL leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, warning that ISIL interference would create undesired divisions within Afghanistan.

DOD officials characterize ISIL’s presence in Afghanistan primarily as disgruntled Taliban members rebranding themselves. This is emblematic of a larger problem in Afghanistan of fractured insurgencies and an influx of foreign fighters with disparate goals. These numerous groups and fighters not only affect stability and security, but may also strain any future peace processes with the Taliban, as there is increasingly no single entity with which to negotiate.

The UN reported that despite the initial attribution of several attacks to ISIL, including an April 18 suicide bombing in Jalalabad, “there remained a lack of clarity on any operational presence by ISIL.”

MOD Remains Without a Minister
At the end of the quarter, MOD remained without a confirmed minister. On July 4, 2015, the Afghan parliament rejected President Ghani’s third nominee for minister of defense, Masoom Stanekzai, who had been serving in an acting capacity since May. The second nominee for minister of defense withdrew his nomination on April 8, 2015, before the parliament scheduled the vote. Ghani had nominated General Mohammad Afzal Ludin, a military advisor in the National Security Council, on April 6. However, General Ludin said he did not wish his nomination to prove divisive for the country. Earlier, Afghan parliamentarians rejected Ghani’s nomination of then-acting Defense Minister General Sher Mohammad Karimi to lead the country’s military forces in January. The MOD has been without a confirmed minister since September 29, 2014, when Ghani was sworn in as president.

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN
According to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), some 9,000 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of May 31, 2015, a count holding steady since February 28, 2015. Another 7,000 personnel from other Coalition nations were also serving. Approximately 67% of the U.S. service members are from the Army, 28% from the Air Force, 3% from the Navy, and 1% from the
Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{144} Of the U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan, approximately 4.5\% are assigned to the Essential Function directorates that assist Afghan forces in functions such as intelligence and communications.\textsuperscript{144}

Since military operations began in 2001, a total of 2,217 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—82.7\% of whom were killed in action—and 20,055 were wounded as of July 7, 2015.\textsuperscript{145} Since the RS mission began, two U.S. military personnel and one DOD civilian have been killed in service and 25 wounded.\textsuperscript{146} This reporting does not include the casualty rates for U.S. contractors or other citizens.

Seven insider attacks against U.S. forces during 2014 resulted in four deaths and 15 personnel wounded.\textsuperscript{147} Three insider attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in 2015, killing one soldier and wounding 11 others. Additionally during 2015 three U.S. civilian contractors were killed and one was wounded as a result of an insider attack.\textsuperscript{148}

### ANDSF STRENGTH CONTINUES TO GROW THIS YEAR

This quarter, ANDSF’s assigned force strength was 331,944 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A. As reflected in Table 3.6, this is 92.2\% of the ANDSF target force strength of 360,004, counting civilian employees. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count civilians). The new assigned-strength number reflects an increase of 3,139 since February 2015 and 6,302 since November 2014.\textsuperscript{149} This quarter the ANA increased by 2,642, while the ANP increased by 497, as shown in Table 3.7.\textsuperscript{150}

Last quarter, SIGAR took an in-depth look at why having accurate, reliable force strength numbers for the ANDSF matters. To read this analysis, see Section 1 of SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, page 3.

This quarter, details of ANDSF force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will therefore report on them in a classified annex to this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Approved End-Strength Goal</th>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Current Assigned as of May 2015</th>
<th>% of Target Authorization</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>169,726</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>(25,274)</td>
<td>(13.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA and AAF Civilians</td>
<td>8,004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,036</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>(968)</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA + AAF Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>203,004</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>176,762</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(26,242)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(12.9%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>155,182</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
<td>(1,818)</td>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF Total with Civilians</strong></td>
<td><strong>360,004</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>331,944</strong></td>
<td><strong>92.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(28,060)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(7.8%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force.

ANDSF Attrition Declines

ANDSF attrition rates are declining, according to reporting provided to RS by the MOD and MOI, although neither the ANA nor the ANP has attained the ANDSF-established goal of a 1.4% average monthly attrition. The ANA had a monthly average attrition rate of 2.3% in May 2015, down from 2.55% in January.151 This was a more than one percentage-point decline from the average monthly attrition rates the ANA endured in 2013 of 3.52% and 2014 of 3.62%.152 The ANP’s monthly average attrition rate declined slightly to 1.56% in May, compared to 1.64% in January.153

To assist the MOD and MOI in mitigating attrition, RS identified five areas for the Afghans to evaluate.154 These focused on fairly assigning, promoting, and paying soldiers and patrolmen; providing improved quality of life conditions, such as leave and casualty care; and holding leaders accountable.155

ANDSF Assessed as Less Capable in April

This quarter the ANDSF was assessed as less capable than last quarter under the new Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR). The first MAAR, conducted in January 2015, assessed 21 ANDSF components from the ANA, Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and Afghan Border Police (ABP) in six functional categories and seven Operations Coordination Centers–Regional (OCC-Rs) in seven functional categories for a total of 175 component category ratings. SIGAR analysis of the January MAAR determined that 93% of those component categories were rated “capable,” “fully capable,” or “sustaining”—the highest three of five rating levels, in ascending order.156 However, the breakdown by rating level showed that only a handful had achieved the highest rating. Of the 175 component categories assessed:

- 7 were “sustaining” (4%)
- 50 were “fully capable” (29%)
- 106 were “capable” (61%)
- 11 were “partially capable” (6%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEB 2014–MAY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANDSF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Afghan Army and Air Force numbers include civilians; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

* Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.


Operations Coordination Centers (OCCs): regional and provincial OCCs are responsible for the coordination of both security operations and civil response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility. The focus of OCC activities will be coordination of security operations.

This quarter, USFOR-A reported the April 2015 MAAR was expanded to include the Afghan Air Force (AAF), which increased the total number of component categories to 181 (22 ANDSF components from the ANA, AUP, and ABP in six functional categories and seven OCC-Rs in seven functional categories). This quarter, SIGAR analysis of the April 2015 MAAR determined that 83% component categories were rated as “capable,” “fully capable,” or “sustaining.” Fewer component categories assessed in the April 2015 MAAR had achieved the highest rating levels than in the January 2015 MAAR, although more component categories were not rated in the April 2015 MAAR, which could partly account for the decrease.

USFOR-A reports the decrease in capability ratings are largely attributable to the stresses imposed on ANDSF units at the beginning of the 2015 fighting season, in particular with command and control and the coordination of joint-force operations. DOD also cited fighting-season stresses, noted that Afghans now have the lead in combat operations, and questioned whether, given the recent addition of the AAF to the MAAR, an overall capability decrease had actually occurred. However, Afghan forces are not new to leading security operations. According to an April 2013 DOD response to SIGAR, Afghan security forces began the process of assuming the lead in security operations in July 2011. DOD noted that, as of February 2013, “87% of the Afghan population now lives in areas under transition, where the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have the security lead.” (For more information, see SIGAR’s April 2013 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, pages 86–87.)

Of the 181 component categories assessed in the April 2015 MAAR:

- 2 were “sustaining” (1%)
- 35 were “fully capable” (19%)
- 114 were “capable” (63%)
- 14 were “partially capable” (8%)
- 2 were “in development” (1%)
- 14 were not assessed (8%)

NATO changed the method of assessing the ANDSF to align with the RS train, advise, and assist mission on January 1, 2015. The MAAR superseded the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) that was used since August 2013. The MAAR assesses aggregate ANDSF capability and effectiveness for eight essential functions related to the unit’s capacity to perform such functions as force generation, resource management, sustainment, intelligence, and strategic communications. The MAAR evaluates the capabilities of the corps and provincial headquarters and assesses how well they support their forces in defeating the insurgency and securing Afghanistan.
### Table 3.8

**MONTHLY ANDSF ASSESSMENT RATINGS, JANUARY AND APRIL 2015**

**Six ANA Corps, the 111th Capital Division, and AAF (specific ratings classified)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel &amp; Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Regions (specific ratings classified)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Command Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP Command &amp; Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP Personnel &amp; Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Command Assessment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Leadership</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Integration</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Command &amp; Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Personnel &amp; Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP Sustainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OCC-Rs (specific ratings classified)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-ANDSF Command &amp; Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enabler Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intel Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Color Key**

- Sustaining
- Fully Capable
- Partially Capable
- Developing
- Not Assessed

Note: Each dot is a rating of one unit or region. Specific units and regions not identified due to classification. AAF = Afghan Air Force; AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; OCC-R = Operations Coordination Centers-Regional; ICT = Information, Communications, and Technology. N/A = Not applicable: unit not included in January MAAR.

There are essentially four separate MAARs that assess ANA, AUP, ABP, and OCC-Rs capabilities, as shown in Table 3.8 on the previous page. One MAAR combines all six ANA corps, the 111th Capital Division, and the AAF into a single assessment. Another MAAR combines all seven OCC-Rs into a single assessment. The last two MAARs assess two ANP components: one combines the seven AUP zones and another combines the seven ABP zones. The assessment of the ANP’s elite Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), headquartered in Kabul, is discussed in the classified annex to this report.

There are six assessment categories for the ANA and ANP and seven categories for the OCC-Rs to address operational and sustainment effectiveness. Every ANDSF component is assessed on command and leadership; the ANA, AUP, and ABP are also assessed on command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. The ANA corps/division and the AAF are further assessed on combined arms, while the AUP and ABP are assessed on integration with other ANDSF units. The remaining five categories for the OCC-Rs are intra-ANDSF command and control, enabler coordination, intelligence sharing, logistics coordination, and information, communications, and technology.

The assessment ratings are similar to the previous assessment process, the RASR process ratings: sustaining, fully capable/effective, capable/effective, partially capable/effective, in development, or not rated. SIGAR analysis of the April ANA assessment, which now includes the AAF, determined the percentage of the units as either capable or fully capable in 83.3% of the categories, down from 97.6% in January. No unit obtained the highest rating of sustaining in any category in either the April or January 2015 MAAR. This quarter, the ANA was assessed as less capable in every category except for executing combined arms, in which they held steady.

SIGAR analysis of the ANP MAAR, which includes only the AUP and the ABP, determined the percentage of the categories in which the units were assessed as capable, fully capable, or sustaining as 86.9%, down from 91.7% in January. No capability assessment was reported for eight of the 84 ANP categories which could, in part, account for the decrease.

SIGAR analysis determined the percentage of the categories in which the OCC-R units were assessed as sustaining, fully capable, or capable decreased from 91.8% to 77.6%. However, no capability assessment was reported for six of the 49 OCC-R categories which could, in part, account for the decrease. The OCC-Rs serve as a coordinating authority between the ANDSF, provincial government officials, and other government officials. The OCC-Rs coordinate intelligence gathering, joint operations planning, disaster relief, and incident response at the ANA corps level with the provincial chief of police and provincial governor. ANDSF units use OCC-Rs for communication sharing between units as well as between regional and
provincial OCCs. The Afghan National Security Council is developing a proposal for President Ghani to reform the OCC that will include:

- creating a clear chain of command
- installing a merit-based senior leadership selection process
- updating the OCC standard operating procedure to update roles, functions, authorities, manning, and training

According to a statement released by Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah’s office, USFOR-A commander General John F. Campbell said Afghan security forces had developed better coordination to thwart attacks, but require strong leadership and effective command and control to spearhead their operations.

**RS LOWERS EXPECTATIONS FOR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

This quarter, the second in which RS used the new ministry-assessment process, RS revised its forecasts by lowering the expected capacity levels ministerial offices will achieve by the end 2016.

RS now forecasts that by the end of its mission in 2016, only 74% of MOD functions are expected to be sustaining or fully capable (the highest and second-highest ratings), a drop from the 90% forecast last quarter. Similarly lowered expectations were forecast for the MOI, where 68% of functions are predicted to be sustaining or fully capable, down from last quarter’s forecast of 86%. The medical corps is one function not expected to achieve sustaining capability for many years due to Afghanistan’s lack of fully trained medical professionals. RS attributes the reduction of expectations in their forecasts to two primary reasons:

- lack of leadership during the time without a confirmed minister
- RS’s better understanding of the operational environment

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advice or involvement. As of this quarter, no essential function of either the MOD or MOI had achieved a rating of “sustaining capability” and only one has achieved a rating of “fully capable,” as shown in Table 3.9 on the following page.

According to the current RS assessment, 18 of the 84 milestones (21%) have not reached the “initiated” stage, including all gender-advisor milestones. Despite fewer milestones being assessed, the MOD has increased the percentage of its “partially capable” development milestones from 28.6% last quarter to 37%. The MOI also increased its ratings, with 36.8% of its...
development milestones at “fully capable” or “partially capable” compared to 27.9% last quarter.  

RS also changed the milestones required to develop ministry capacity and core competencies under the assessment process. This quarter the ministry assessments were expanded to include three gender-affairs-related milestones being added to both the MOD and MOI assessments. Additionally, six (MOD) and eight (MOI) unidentified milestones were eliminated, reducing the total number of assessment milestones from 49 to 46 for MOD, and from 43 to 38 for MOI. Each RS essential-function...
directorate and the Gender Affairs office use the Essential Function Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in each ministry. The milestones are assessed based on the five-stage rating system displayed in Table 3.9. Milestone assessments are then combined to determine the overall assessment of that department. All department assessments, in turn, are combined to determine the assessment of the ministry as a whole.

There are 311 U.S. personnel advising or mentoring the MOD and MOI, and an additional 111 Coalition advisors. CSTC-A reports they will maintain three training-and-mentoring support contracts, totaling $183.4 million in 2015, until a single omnibus contract is fielded in the first quarter of FY 2016. The Coalition assesses that the ANDSF will require ministerial-development, logistics, professionalization, and acquisition-management support through 2017.

RS, building upon an existing program which used Afghan civilians to train police personnel, worked with the MOI to instead create civilian positions for functional areas, such as financial management, logistics, procurement, human resources, and information technology. Currently 138 civilians have been hired for the 363 positions the MOI has approved. These civilian positions are expected to provide continuity and the technical expertise to sustain the ministry into the future. CSTC-A is funding this subject-matter-expert program with on-budget funding provided to the MOI. To allow for tracking of the funds and to reduce corruption, a unique budget line was created in the Afghan Financial Management Information System and all the civilian employees are paid electronically.

**MOD and MOI Continuing Literacy Training**

This quarter, USFOR-A reported the MOD and MOI are continuing programs to train the trainers, whose graduates are the literacy-class instructors at all regional training areas. The 2014 literacy rate for new recruits, before attending Afghan basic warrior training, was reported as 36%. The ANDSF will require ministerial-development, logistics, professionalization, and acquisition-management support through 2017.

**AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE**

Afghan Local Police (ALP) members, known as “guardians,” are local citizens selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. Effective June 15, 2015, the ALP transitioned to align under the command and control of the AUP. However, the ALP will not be absorbed into the AUP tashkil (organizational strength) and even though the AUP is one of the ANP components, the ALP tashkil will remain independent of the ANP’s total authorized strength. As of May 24, 2015, however, the ALP has not reached its target of 30,000 guardians. According to the NATO Special Operations Component

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**Tashkil:** the list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI. The word means “organization” in Dari.

Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP comprised 28,356 personnel, 25,179 of whom were fully trained. This is a reduction of 20 since April 4, 2015, when the ALP comprised 28,376 personnel. During the first quarter of 2015, the ALP saw a dramatic increase in the number of its members killed or wounded in action, with 2.63% of its members killed or wounded compared to 1.41% reported for the same time period in 2014. In one recent incident, Taliban insurgents attacked the ALP in the Jalrez District of Wardak Province, on July 2, 2015, capturing nine police posts. The ALP and other reinforcements clashed with the insurgents until the security forces reclaimed all nine posts on July 4, 2015. Local officials reported 24 ALP were killed—some of them beheaded—as well as 40 insurgents in the clashes, while two police officers and 18 insurgents were injured.

NSOCC-A reduced the estimated cost to sustain the ALP target strength from $121 million to $117 million per year. The funding is authorized for items such as salary, food, maintenance, and training. The United States has obligated $274.2 million of ASFF funds to support the ALP from 2012 through June 1, 2015, and had expended $206.3 million of those funds by that date.

According to NSOCC-A, 93% of ALP members renew their contracts. Despite challenges in verifying the attrition rate due to the drawdown in U.S. forces, NSOCC-A reported a low monthly attrition rate of 1–2%.

According to an independent assessment conducted by NSOCC-A based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus-group surveys in ALP districts, the majority of Afghans surveyed perceived the ALP as an effective security element and stabilizing force. NSOCC-A also found that the extent to which a community perceives itself to be secure relates to the extent to which community leaders were involved in selecting ALP members. In its update on the status of recommendations from the December 2014 report, NSOCC-A highlighted the significance of staff visits. These visits allow the ALP to interact with community leaders and also provide opportunities for oversight. The ALP Special Operations Advisory Group prepares those carrying out the visits by emphasizing the importance of community leaders in selecting ALP members.

This quarter the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report that found the ALP has a mixed record of contributing to security in some areas but has either not improved security or has exacerbated the conflict in a number of districts among ethnicities, tribes, and families. Villagers’ expectations often determine how locals perceive acceptable ALP behavior. While ICG assessed that only one-third of the ALP is functioning correctly, NSOCC-A claims that the statement cannot be substantiated and contradicts the Eureka survey.

The group claims the cost of an ALP member is about one-fourth that of an ANDSF soldier or policeman. However, they contend while the ALP and pro-government militias cost less, they are dangerous and Kabul should...
not expand such groups. NSOCC-A argues, however, that the ALP should not be compared with pro-government militias.

The group made three recommendations, along with actions for the United Nations, the Afghan government, the United States government, and donor nations to:

- strengthen ALP oversight and identify units that worsen security
- integrate remaining ALP into the regular police forces
- disband abusive ALP along with the militias

The group also recommended foreign donors guarantee that the salaries of the ALP units not disbanded continue to be paid after 2018 through the same funding and accountability mechanisms that support the ANP. Among the recommendations the International Crisis Group had for the United States:

- publish clear, measurable criteria so funding conditions are transparent, and restrict funding if criteria are not met
- generously fund demilitarization of abusive ALP units
- refrain from supporting new progovernment militias
- support professional civilian law enforcement

SECURITY PROTECTION FORCES

Afghan Public Protection Force Transition Awaits Presidential Action

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, was established to provide contract-based facility and convoy-security services. In 2013, it was ordered to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP. However, USFOR-A reports the APPF is still operating and providing limited site and convoy-escort security. The APPF charter continues to await presidential signature before being presented to the Council of Ministers.

Facilities Protection Force

On September 13, 2014, ISAF commander General John F. Campbell and the Afghan National Security Advisor signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the security of Afghan and U.S./NATO security facilities. According to the MOU, the MOD will field a Facilities Protection Force (FPF) of 5,030 personnel to provide security for select forward operating bases being turned over to the MOD. The FPF will be employed by the MOD, but will not be part of the regular ANA. The MOU calls for USFOR-A to fund FPF salaries the first year at $13.7 million, with the option for the United States to fund the force for an additional year. However, USFOR-A reports that no additional FPF funding is likely as the Afghan government...
failed to complete an infrastructure transition and sustainment plan as required under the agreement. According to the MOU, the MOD will allow CSTC-A “to inspect and audit financial records” and ensure that “funds will be auditable by all U.S. Government agencies responsible for oversight of CSTC-A and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.”

The MOU also provides for Afghan force protection of the perimeter of U.S./NATO facilities and authorizes U.S./NATO forces “to utilize contracted armed security services inside NATO/U.S. agreed facilities.”

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $36.8 billion and disbursed $35.8 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.

**ANA Personnel Increases for the Second Quarter**

As of May 20, 2015, the overall assigned end strength of the ANA, including the AAF and civilians, was 176,762 personnel, according to RS. This is an increase of 2,642 ANA personnel since last quarter, when the February 2015 assigned end strength was reported at 174,120. The period also marked a second quarter of increasing numbers, ending the 2014 trend of decreases. USFOR-A reports that MOD provides ANA personnel data. Until Afghanistan completes installation of its human-resource information systems and inputs the data, however, RS will not be able to validate MOD’s strength numbers. Even then, SIGAR believes it is unlikely RS will have the personnel and resources to validate ANA personnel numbers other than by analyzing reports based on Afghan inputs into the new system.

This quarter, some details of ANA troop strength at corps level remained classified. SIGAR will report on these in a classified annex to this report.

**ANA Attrition**

This quarter, details of ANA attrition at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will therefore report on them in a classified annex to this report.

**ANA Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $14.7 billion and disbursed $14.3 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment. The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition replenishment and fuel purchases. Funding for food ceased on December 21, 2013, after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOD.

**SIGAR AUDIT**

An audit SIGAR released last quarter on the reliability and usefulness of the ANA personnel and payroll data found no assurance of that data being valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems possess inherent weaknesses and are not fully integrated. For more information, see SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, p. 23.
The U.S. Congress appropriates funds to the ASFF for the training, equipping, sustaining, and funding the ANDSF, as well as for facility repair and construction. DOD is authorized to use ASFF to provide funds directly (on budget) to the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{232} To ensure U.S. funds are used as intended, CSTC-A, the MOD, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) signed a Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter.\textsuperscript{233} The Afghan FY 1394 financial-commitment letter requires the MOD to document fuel consumption and deliveries. CSTC-A is to set the following month’s fuel allocation based on the sufficiency of the fuel documentation. Further reductions in fuel allocations are to occur if the documentation quality does not improve and if required audits and corrective actions are not performed within the agreed-to time frame.\textsuperscript{234} For information on the investigation of corruption in MOD fuel contracts, see pages 142–143 of this section.

**ANA Salaries and Incentives**

As of June 30, 2015, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided $2.8 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2009.\textsuperscript{235} CSTC-A reported the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average $690 million annually over the next five years.\textsuperscript{236}

Incentives are used to retain high-quality soldiers and airmen. ANA personnel are eligible for various incentives in addition to their base salaries. Examples include occupational incentives (such as aviation, medical, engineering/explosive-ordnance disposal), hazard-pay incentives, and longevity-pay incentives for every three additional years of continuous service.\textsuperscript{237}

CSTC-A noted that funding is provided on the basis of 100% of the ANA’s authorized, not assigned, strength. However, any unspent funds carry forward into the following fiscal year to support the requirements in the next year.\textsuperscript{238} To encourage the MOD to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically; pay for other positions will be 80% funded.\textsuperscript{239} Additionally, all ANA personnel records are required to be input into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System and all personnel must be assigned a tashkil position.\textsuperscript{240} However, CSTC-A does not plan to enforce the penalty on the ANA until the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016 or later.\textsuperscript{241}

**ANA Equipment and Transportation**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $12.6 billion and disbursed $12.4 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.\textsuperscript{242} Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 50% of
U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.10.241 This quarter, DOD reported an increase in most equipment categories. DOD said the increase was due in part to replenishment purchases required to replace current and projected battlefield damage and other losses, as well as the cost of supplying a new special-operations kandak (battalion).244 CSTC-A reported the replenishment purchases cost approximately $5 million.245 CSTC-A reported more than 426,000 weapons, 104,000 communication devices, and 60,000 vehicles had been procured for the ANA.246 Other equipment provided included clothing, such as uniforms, and individual equipment. Equipment purchased for the ANA that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF can be transferred to DOD for disposition, after the U.S. Congress is notified; as shown in Table 3.11.247

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) led a team of DOD subject-matter experts to develop a simple and Afghan-sustainable, demand-based supply process that would allow the ANA and ANP to determine material requirements and develop a budget based on those requirements.248 Since 2002, the Coalition ordered and provided (or “pushed”) supplies and parts to the Afghans to ensure adequate levels to meet the needs of active operations. According to the OSD-led team, the push of material resulted in two unintended consequences:

- no record of orders at Afghan national or regional warehouses
- no record of supply usage that could be used for future planning249

The OSD-led team made recommendations to transition the Afghans to a demand-based order process in which the ANDSF will submit the supply...
and part orders, create a professional logistics corps in both supply and maintenance, change the tashkil to include necessary logistics positions, and provide logistics-management education for senior- and middle-level ANDSF leaders as well as for logistic officers and item managers.250

The OSD-led team also sought to develop an Afghan-sustainable lifecycle management structure and process whereby they can forecast, budget, and manage the supplies and spare parts needed for the ANDSF.251 The ANDSF’s current computer system does not perform some critical logistics functions; which in part explains why the ANDSF has continued to rely on the U.S. and Coalition forces and contractors. The OSD-led team recommended several enhancements such as maintaining a catalog of all parts, automatically calculating re-order levels for both the regional depots (to the national supply warehouse) and the national supply warehouse (to the suppliers), tracking when material is estimated to arrive, and using hand-held scanners to record receipt of material.252 USFOR-A reported the computer software changes are in progress, with testing planned in July and system fielding in August 2015.253 However, the OSD-led team reports the existing computer system cannot adequately support other required functionality and recommends a more robust system for the ANDSF in the future.254

The OSD-led team estimated the FY 2015–2020 cost to provide the computer hardware and software enhancements, training, and Coalition advisors is $16.2 million over the six-year period.255

The financial-commitment letter providing funds to the MOD for Afghan FY 1394 requires the MOD to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and ensure that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicle funding.256

ANA Infrastructure
As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $6 billion and disbursed $5.6 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as military headquarters, schoolhouses, barracks, police checkpoint structures, and air fields, as well as roads.257

As of May 31, 2015, the United States had completed 366 infrastructure projects valued at $5 billion, with another 16 projects valued at $397.4 million ongoing, according to CSTC-A.258

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter continue to be the brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade of the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of $115.7 million), and phase three of the MOD headquarters and garrisons (which had costs increase from $58.6 million to $61.3 million); rounding out these projects, is the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University ($72.2 million).259 In addition, one project was awarded this quarter at a cost of $72.2 million, and nine projects were

SIGAR AUDIT
An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD’s support to the ANAs Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals, and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met.
completed at a cost of $228.1 million, including the garrison for the 2nd Brigade of the 215th Corps in Nimroz ($78.7 million). CSTC-A reports of the 17 projects ($105.3 million) in the planning stage, four projects ($30.1 million) are to construct female training, dining, and living facilities.

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations-and-maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction costs (less than $750,000 per project) for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is $228 million a year. The ANA has authorized 3,100 positions to maintain these facilities. The U.S. funding contribution of $188.6 million a year, for a five-year total of $943 million, provides funding for 22 ANA facilities. The United States does not provide funding to maintain excess facilities (facilities CSTC-A has determined the Afghan government should divest from the ANA).

The FY 1394 MOD financial-commitment letter requires the Afghan government to provide CSTC-A a transition and sustainment plan, including infrastructure security, for the facilities constructed with U.S. funding and transferred to the Afghan government. CSTC-A received a draft, but found the plan inadequate and withheld $29 million until acceptable plans are developed.

**ANA and MOD Training and Operations**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.5 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training. CSTC-A reported 28 ongoing U.S.-funded technical training programs. Additionally, USFOR-A reported two contracts for training, advising, and
assisting the ANA Training and Education Command at Marshal Fahim National Defense University that require RS to perform and report monthly contractor-performance observations. U.S.-funded training contracts include special operations, counter improvised-explosive-device and explosive-ordnance disposal, and intelligence training.

Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing
The United States has a considerable investment in the AAF. CSTC-A reported that between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the United States has obligated more than $2.2 billion to support and develop the AAF, including over $930 million for equipment and aircraft. This is an update to the numbers SIGAR reported last quarter, which were the initial budget justification amounts. In FY 2015, DOD has requested more than $925 million, including $21 million for equipment and aircraft for the AAF. However, the majority of the funding requested is for sustainment and training.

According to USFOR-A, this quarter, the AAF aircraft inventory includes:
- 12 Mi-35 helicopters
- 56 Mi-17 helicopters
- 18 MD-530 helicopters
- 26 C-208 airplanes
- 4 C-130 airplanes

Additionally, 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance, have been purchased but are not yet delivered.

USFOR-A assesses that the AAF’s fleet of Mi-35 attack helicopters is aging and plans to augment aerial-attack support primarily through fielding a fleet of armed MD-530 helicopters until the arrival of the A-29 Super Tucanos. At the end of last quarter, the first of the MD-530 rotary-wing helicopters, some armed and others unarmed, were delivered to the AAF. This quarter, training is ongoing to qualify pilots on the armed configuration of the MD-530. Additionally, DOD reported Afghan pilot training is ongoing in the United States on the A-29 Super Tucanos. The first class will graduate in December; which aligns with the first delivery of A-29 Super Tucanos in the fourth quarter of 2015.

USFOR-A reports that the RS Train, Advise, and Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) is investigating the feasibility of adding rockets to some Mi-17 aircraft. The Mi-17 version 5 aircraft is designed to fire the Soviet-developed S-8 rocket. TAAC-Air is currently procuring S-8 rockets through the foreign military sales process. However, this procurement is subject to interference due to potential Russian influence in Kazakhstan, the supplier of in-stock rockets. If those rockets cannot be obtained, S-8 rockets would be purchased from an allied European country.

SIGAR INSPECTION
SIGAR has an ongoing inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the MOD headquarters to determine if construction is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and if any occupied portions of the headquarters are being properly maintained and used as intended.

“We need to support more troops, moving them as soon as possible from one point to another, getting them into the fight faster. Getting commandos from the north to the south by helicopter would take days, but by C-130 it will take only a few hours.”

—Afghan Air Force C-130 pilot Capt. Muhammad Azimy

Beginning in 2014, TAAC-Air initiated Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator (ATAC) training for both ANA and AAF personnel. ATACs operate on the battlefield to support the ground force commander by integrating AAF aircraft through direct communication with aircraft and ground forces. The initial cadre of ATACs completed training in late fall 2014 and began training new ATACs in November 2014. To assist in the ATACs’ mission, TAAC-Air procured 540 Harris tactical radios. Last month, Afghan Harris subcontractors began teaching an operator-focused course for select ATACs to operate the radios.281

MOI, MOD, and NDS leaders signed the Special Mission Wing (SMW) air charter on May 14, 2014, outlining the creation of a new Joint Command and Control Coordination Center (JCCC) to facilitate priority SMW missions. Both MOD and MOI special-operations forces will have liaison officers to the JCCC. The AAF is to provide personnel, recruiting, and other administrative (nonoperational) support to SMW. The SMW commander meets weekly with special-operations unit leaders to discuss pending operations and synchronize requirements and priorities.282 Currently, all 456 personnel of the SMW are part of the MOD.283

According to CSTC-A, the SMW fleet is made up of Mi-17 helicopters and PC-12 turboprop planes for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, totaling 48 aircraft.284 According to NSOCC-A, the Afghans currently perform approximately 15% of the scheduled maintenance to the Mi-17 fleet. All PC-12 maintenance is performed by third-party contractors. In July 2015, 10 Afghan students were slated for PC-12 maintenance training after completing English-language training; it takes 60 months to fully train Mi-17 and PC-12 mechanics. The earliest the SMW will have full maintenance and repair capability is summer of 2020.285

For the next five years, funding for the SMW will come from a combination of ASFF and funding from the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Counter-Narcotics (OSD-CN). This breaks down into ASFF funding roughly 60% of the program and OSD-CN the remaining 40%. The SMW has flown 15 counternarcotics missions for FY 2015, or 1% of the total SMW missions.286

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $17.9 billion and disbursed $17.3 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.287

ANP Strength Reporting Continues to Raise Questions About Data Reliability
SIGAR has long questioned the validity of Afghan security personnel numbers for several reasons (see “Questionable ANSF Numbers Thicken Fog of
War in Afghanistan” in SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, pages 3–15). Recent reporting of ANP personnel strength data shows no indication that data is becoming more reliable.

This quarter, USFOR-A initially reported the overall strength of the ANP totaled 160,250 personnel. However, in response to a vetting draft of this report, USFOR-A revised the ANP’s strength to 155,182. According to USFOR-A, only personnel assigned to the AUP, ABP, and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—as well as personnel assigned to MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS)—are included in the ANP’s assigned strength. SIGAR analysis suggests that the revised total excluded ANP reserves, students, and “unknown” personnel categories. The ANP strength of 155,182 is an increase of 497 since last quarter and 1,818 below the authorized strength of 157,000, as reflected in Table 3.12.

This quarter saw yet another change in how ANP personnel numbers were calculated. Last quarter, the number of personnel assigned to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was reported for the first time. However, the number of personnel assigned to MOI HQ & IS was not reported. This quarter, personnel assigned to MOI HQ & IS and the CID were reported as a single category. In vetting comments USFOR-A stated the ANP assigned-strength number does not include students and standby personnel, but said in a later comment that “NISTA personnel” (which by definition includes students and trainees) were counted in the grand total.

| TABLE 3.12 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authorized</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Component</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI HQs &amp; IS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDp Reserve*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined personnel above authorized strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required to reconcile to ANP subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Total (as reported)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2015 data as of 2/2015; Q2 2015 data as of 5/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; CID = Criminal Investigation Department; NISTA = Not In Service for Training; GDp Reserve = General Directorate of Personnel; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

* Q2 CID personnel are included in MOI HQs & IS.
*a Personnel that are pending assignment.

overall strength. These seemingly contradictory comments add to the ongoing lack of clarity in ANDSF strength.

Although no civilians were included in the reported ANP strength number, in addition to the current 155,182 personnel, 71 positions were in transition from a military to civilian billet. CSTC-A is funding those positions during a two-year transition. At the end of that period, the military positions will be removed from the tashkil and the civilian positions added.

This quarter, USFOR-A included MOI headquarters personnel in the ANP's attrition rate, whereas last quarter the attrition rate covered only personnel from the AUP, ABP, and ANCOP. The overall ANP monthly attrition averaged below 2% for 10 of the last 12 months. During May 2015, 880 ANP personnel dropped from the rolls, a decrease from the 1,844 personnel dropped in February. Also, during the same period, the ANP endured 269 personnel killed in action, an increase from the 208 casualties in February.

As with the ANA strength reporting, USFOR-A reports that until the Afghan government completes installation of its human-resource information systems and inputs the data, RS will not be able to validate strength numbers. However, even if the new information system is installed, SIGAR believes it is unlikely RS will have the personnel and resources to validate ANP personnel numbers other than by analyzing reports based on Afghan inputs into the new system.

**ANP Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $7.2 billion and disbursed $7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment. This includes contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries. Since December 21, 2013, the United States has no longer funded food costs after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOI.

**ANP Salaries**

Through December 31, 2014, the U.S. government had provided $1.5 billion, contributed through LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) charges 4% of donor contributions—more than $20 million based on their estimated annual expenditures—to manage the LOTFA program. According to CSTC-A, the UNDP estimates annual international expenditures of $508.4 million for the ANP at an authorized strength of 157,000 personnel, based on an exchange rate of 56 afghanis to one U.S. dollar. The U.S. contribution to LOTFA for calendar year 2015 is $112 million to fund salaries, incentives, and the UNDP management fee. However, CSTC-A reports
the U.S. funding required for LOTFA over the next five years will range from a high of $615.8 million to a low of $502 million, for an average of $570.3 million annually.305

The CSTC-A financial commitment letter to the MOI for Afghan FY 1394 includes the LOTFA Steering Committee mandate for the MOI to provide 100% of ANP salaries through electronic funds transfer.306 To incentivize the MOI to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically.307 However, CSTC-A does not plan to enforce the penalty until the automated pay system is ready for ANP use until mid-2016 or later.308

On June 30, the MOI announced that the LOTFA would be extended for 18 months, after which the MOI will assume full management of police salary payments.309

ANP Equipment and Transportation
As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $4.1 billion and disbursed $3.8 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.310 Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, as shown in Table 3.13.311 The most funding in this category, more than 51%, was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.312

Examples of the types of equipment purchased for the ANP include sophisticated items such as high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); night-vision devices; global-positioning systems; explosive-ordnance disposal equipment; and biometrics equipment. Ordinary items include ambulances, spare parts, pistols, machine guns, radios, clothing, dental and medical equipment, and transportation services.313 CSTC-A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANP</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>$273,177,145</td>
<td>$205,652,818</td>
<td>$163,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>2,411,872,719</td>
<td>2,048,056,127</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>212,294,780</td>
<td>212,294,780</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>766,950,000</td>
<td>692,950,000</td>
<td>74,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>667,741,562</td>
<td>351,748,913</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Services</td>
<td>20,026,263</td>
<td>7,770,471</td>
<td>12,255,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
<td>123,454,216</td>
<td>86,447,721</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>243,097,382</td>
<td>91,438,300</td>
<td>14,412,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,718,614,067</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,696,359,130</strong></td>
<td><strong>$100,831,177</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. TBD = To be determined; amount dependent on how much damaged and destroyed equipment is turned in for replacement.

reported more than 575,000 weapons, 108,000 communication devices, and 54,000 vehicles had been procured for the ANP. DOD said the large increase was due in part to purchases needed to replace current and projected battlefield damage and other losses.

The financial-commitment letter providing ASFF funds to the MOI for their FY 1394 requires the MOI to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, to ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicle funding.

Equipment purchased for the ANP that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF can be transferred to the DOD for disposition, after the U.S. Congress is notified, as shown in Table 3.14.

The CSTC-A End-Use Monitoring (EUM) section inventories the specific U.S. equipment that is required to be monitored after it has been transferred to the Afghans, as well as conducts inspections of site storage facilities. CSTC-A reports their EUM personnel continue to travel to accessible locations in-country to carry out EUM inspections and have conducted 53 EUM missions this fiscal year. However, due to security concerns and inaccessible locations, they are evaluating other methods such as having the Afghans bring the equipment to safe areas or have locally employed contract staff conduct inventories and perform site-security inspections.

ANP Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated $3.1 billion and disbursed $2.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.

As of May 31, 2015, the United States had completed 723 infrastructure projects (valued at $3.5 billion), with another seven projects ongoing ($89.4 million), according to CSTC-A.

The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects are phase three of the MOI headquarters ($55.1 million), an ANCOP provincial headquarters building in Paktiya ($25 million), and the ANP command center and barracks at MOI headquarters ($24.1 million).

While there were no new contract awards this year, 17 projects were completed at a cost of $119.7 million. CSTC-A reports of the 15 projects ($62.3 million) in the planning stage, 14 projects ($61.3 million) are to construct female training, dining, and living facilities.

According to CSTC-A, the projected annual O&M, sustainment, restoration, and minor-construction cost (less than $750,000 per project) for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is $147 million per year, of which the U.S. will fund $131 million ($655 million over five years), with 2,184 skilled personnel required to maintain the facilities. The United States does not provide funding to maintain excess facilities (facilities CSTC-A has determined the Afghan government should divest from the ANP).
CSTC-A reported that while no additional facility sustainment and maintenance had been transferred to the ANP this reporting period, the United States continues to provide sustainment and maintenance services for eight facilities.\textsuperscript{325}

**ANP Training and Operations**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.6 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.\textsuperscript{326}

USFOR-A reported there are seven ongoing U.S.-funded technical training programs for the ANP.\textsuperscript{327} CSTC-A reported U.S.-funded training contracts include operational-specialty training, such as police intelligence, counter improvised-explosive-device and explosive-ordnance disposal, and radio operator and maintenance.\textsuperscript{328}

**STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ANDSF**

This quarter, even though the number of women reported as serving in the ANDSF increased, their percentage of the overall force slipped below 1%, to 0.99%, due to the greater gains in the overall ANDSF numbers.\textsuperscript{329} This quarter, RS reported 3,338 women among the ANDSF’s assigned force strength for the ANA and ANP, including students in training and recent training graduates. Of the total, 785 were officers, 1,261 were non-commissioned officers, and 1,142 were soldiers.\textsuperscript{330} While there was a slight increase in the overall number of women serving this quarter, the female officer ranks decreased by 125 personnel.\textsuperscript{331} RS reported the decrease can most likely be attributed to inaccurate MOD reporting, possibly combined with ANA female officer attrition.\textsuperscript{332}

Three women have trained to become pilots in the AAF, one of whom has since left the force.\textsuperscript{333} Captain Nilooftar Rahmani, who was the first female pilot since the fall of the Taliban and the first female fixed-wing pilot in Afghanistan, was recently recognized as one of the U.S. State Department’s International Women of Courage award winners in 2015.\textsuperscript{334}

This quarter, RS reported the ANA reduced their recruitment goal to 485 women per year, as that is the maximum number of women that can be accommodated in the applicable basic training courses.\textsuperscript{335} Unlike the last several quarters in which the number of ANP women has increased, this quarter the number decreased by four.\textsuperscript{336} The ANP remains far from reaching its goal of 5,000 women: women currently comprise only 1.5% of the police force.\textsuperscript{337}

In late May, a high-level advisory committee was established to oversee the RS Gender Office priorities and to provide guidance on the use of international funds donated in support of gender integration within the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{338} Rula Ghani, first lady of Afghanistan, will serve as the honorary chair, and RS commander General John Campbell will chair the advisory committee.\textsuperscript{339}

“I salute the courage and commitment of all the brave women who currently serve in uniform. They are setting a model example of selfless service for generations to come.”

—General John Campbell, RS commander

committee.\textsuperscript{339} Other members include Afghan ministry officials, ambassadors, UN and NATO officials, and Afghan and international-organization representatives.\textsuperscript{340} Results from the first meeting were not provided.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014 authorizes $25 million to be used for programs, facilities, recruiting, and the integration of women into the ANDSF. Of the $25 million, $4.8 million has been committed for salary incentives; bonuses; clothing; uniform tailoring, as women currently are issued male uniforms; security cameras; and building improvements, to include facilities at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University.\textsuperscript{341} Additionally, NATO has allocated $10 million from the ANA Trust Fund for ANA women’s programs.\textsuperscript{342}

**ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE IMPROVING**

Since 2006, the United States has funded the construction of 184 ANDSF medical facilities valued at $188.2 million and procured approximately $54.7 million in ANA medical equipment.\textsuperscript{343} The ANA has eight regional medical hospitals; the AAF has five clinics and five detachments. The ANP has just one hospital, in Kabul, but has an agreement with the ANA to treat police.\textsuperscript{344} At this time, no other medical-facility construction is planned.\textsuperscript{345}

This quarter, USFOR-A reported there are 896 physicians currently assigned in the ANDSF health-care system. The total number of positions authorized is 1,144, with 574 physicians assigned in an ANA position and 322 in an ANP position. The ANA and ANP have a shortage of 166 and 82 physicians respectively.\textsuperscript{346} Seven of the eight ANA regional hospitals, to include the Kabul National Military Hospital, are fully operational. The eighth hospital in Helmand was planned to have 50% staffing at the end of June 2015.\textsuperscript{347}

The ANDSF also has 2,442 nurses, physicians’ assistants, and other medical personnel, with an additional 765 positions remaining unfilled.\textsuperscript{348} The number of unfilled medical personnel positions has remained fairly constant since last quarter.\textsuperscript{349} Physician, nurse, and medic training pipelines are established with partner international and non-government organizations to provide trained medical personnel.\textsuperscript{350} The first ANA public-health administrator will graduate from Kabul University this year, addressing a deficiency within the ANA Medical Command, which expects eight additional public-health administrator graduates next year.\textsuperscript{351}

USFOR-A reported efforts to improve health-care and related logistics operations for both the ANA and ANP. Larger budgets for medical supplies are planned for next year based on the usage during this fighting season.\textsuperscript{352} The AAF medical service, at times augmented by ANA flight medics, has flown 30–40 medical-evacuation missions per week.\textsuperscript{353}
STATUS OF CLASSIFIED ANDSF DATA
This quarter, RS classified some information about ANDSF personnel strength, attrition, and assessments; the AAF; and the SMW. As authorized by its enabling statute, SIGAR provides Congress with a classified annex to this report containing that information.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
Afghanistan remains heavily contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), even though 80% of known contamination has been cleared since 1989. The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional weapons destruction program in Afghanistan to protect victims of conflict, provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, and enhance the security and safety of the Afghan people. Since FY 2002, State has provided $305.6 million in weapons destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. Not all PM/WRA FY 2014 funds have been expended as of this quarter. PM/WRA has two-year funding, and additional 2014 funding will be captured in subsequent SIGAR reports.

In its January 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR wrote that DOD transferred $901,511 to PM/WRA to support the effort of an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) to monitor the clearing of ordnance left behind at U.S. firing ranges. However, this may be only a fraction of the funding needed. An April 2014 Washington Post article noted that the U.S. military has reportedly left about 800 square miles of contaminated land that is expected to cost $250 million to clear. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General warned in his June 2015 report to the Security Council that funding might be insufficient to meet the country’s 2015 targets of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. His report estimated 4,025 minefields and 245 battlefields remained, affecting 1,603 communities across 255 districts. The UN, working with the NATO Resolute Support mission, will continue to address explosive hazard contamination, including firing ranges, from previous military operations.

State directly funds five Afghan NGOs, four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable the clearance of areas contaminated by ERW and support the clearance of conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. As of March 31, 2015, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 168.9 million square meters of land (approximately 65.2 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.9 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives (see Table 3.15 on the following page).
The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 202.5 square miles of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, 1.8 square miles were cleared. However, ongoing surveys identified 11.5 square miles of additional contaminated areas, bringing the total of known contaminated area to 206.8 square miles by the end of the quarter.\textsuperscript{362} PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.\textsuperscript{363}

In April 2015, USAID issued its first grant of $9.6 million under the $30.2 million Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III). ACAP III’s goal is to support victims of war, including victims of mines and ERW.\textsuperscript{364} The program provides immediate medical and other nonmonetary assistance, in addition to assistance tailored to meet victims’ needs. It also develops the capacity of government ministries and institutions that aid victims of war and enhance outreach to and advocacy efforts for victims.\textsuperscript{365} ACAP III will run until February 2018. Despite the absence of a formal performance-measurement plan, funds were disbursed in June 2015.\textsuperscript{366} Unlike ACAP II, which ended in February 2015, ACAP III will not stipulate that only victims injured by international forces will be eligible for assistance.

**COUNTERNARCOTICS**

As of June 30, 2015, the United States has provided $8.2 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated...
most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund ($2.9 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($1.6 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) ($1.5 billion), and a portion of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account ($2.1 billion). USAID’s alternative development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. (See Appendix B.)

In May 2015, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published its World Drug Report. Afghanistan once again led the world in opium production, cultivating a record 224,000 hectares (more than 550,000 acres) in 2014. Afghan opium production (6,400 tons) accounted for 85% of the global production (7,554 tons) which continued to rise in 2014. Afghan opium accounts for 90% of the heroin supplied to Canada, but little of the heroin supplied to the United States—though this may be changing, according to UNODC. The availability of Afghan heroin in the United States is increasing based on seizure data from 2011 and 2012. Information on current market share was not provided to UNODC but it was estimated that Afghan heroin accounted for 4% of the U.S. consumer market share.

On April 18, 2015, the Wolesi Jirga or lower house of parliament confirmed Salamat Azimi, former head of the Children’s Rights section at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, as the Minister of Counternarcotics (MCN). Azimi presented her 100-day plan, which includes making changes to the counternarcotics law and the national counternarcotics strategy, in addition to developing antidrug policies and building the capacity of ministry employees. The ministry’s goal is to reduce poppy cultivation by 90% over 10 years. On July 14, President Ghani appointed 19 advisors for various positions by presidential decree. Abdul Hai Niamati was appointed the advisor on counternarcotics.

Despite Billions Spent, Afghanistan Still World’s Leading Opium Producer

Despite U.S. spending of $8.2 billion on counternarcotics measures since 2002, Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium.

During February 2015 meetings with SIGAR in Afghanistan, Ambassador McKinley announced that a 2015 counternarcotics strategy would be prepared within six months. High-level meetings have taken place between INL and the new Afghan government on counternarcotics. The Afghan government is also developing a comprehensive national drug-action plan, which the U.S. government’s interagency counternarcotics strategy will be tailored to support. State has not finalized the revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy. INL informed SIGAR that the U.S. government currently

“Narcotics, our record is ‘F.’ We fail, because the problem is much larger than us.”

—President Ashraf Ghani

Source: Afghan Embassy in Cairo, “Transcript of President Ghani’s Interview with a Delegation of Western Journalists and Media Opinion Leaders,” 5/10/2015.
operates under the December 2012 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{380} UNODC warns that any plan should allow flexibility, as successful programs in one region of Afghanistan may not translate to success in another region.\textsuperscript{381}

**Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey 2015**

INL and the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) published the results of the latest national drug-use survey this quarter. The survey found that opioids are the most popular drugs in Afghanistan, with higher usage in rural areas than urban centers.\textsuperscript{382} The results showed cannabis was used in 11\% of households and 3\% of the population.\textsuperscript{383} However, the major findings were that 31\% of households, more than 10\% of people and approximately 9\% of children surveyed tested positive for one or more drugs.\textsuperscript{384} By comparison, globally 0.6\% of persons aged 15 to 64 years have a drug problem.\textsuperscript{385} In the United States, where heroin dependency is rising, the overall heroin dependency rate was 1.9 per 1,000 people in 2011–2013\textsuperscript{386}—considerably less than the results in Afghanistan. Across all categories surveyed, usage rates for rural populations were consistently higher than those of urban populations.\textsuperscript{387} At the December 2014 London Conference, the government of Afghanistan emphasized measures to counter narcotics trade and production in its reform program “Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership.”\textsuperscript{388} In the joint statement, the Afghan and U.S. governments released with the results of the national drug use survey, the Afghan government noted its commitment to addressing the domestic drug use problem.\textsuperscript{389}

**Drug Demand Reduction**

In January 2015, INL transitioned the first group of 13 treatment programs to the MOPH’s responsibility and transferred the clinical staff to the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{390} According to INL, the transition has gone smoothly without budget or management difficulties. INL holds meetings twice a year with the MOPH, the MCN, and the Colombo Plan to discuss and resolve any potential budgetary issues.\textsuperscript{391} A total of 140 clinical staff members were trained from October 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015. Quarterly results for staff members trained between April 1 and June 2015 are not yet available. State told SIGAR that it will transition another 15 centers to the government by January 2016.\textsuperscript{392} INL contributed over $7.6 million to the Colombo Plan for the drug demand-reduction program in October 2014. It has yet to contribute or commit FY 2014 and FY 2015 funds.\textsuperscript{393}

**Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement**

INL funds the nationwide Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop
production. Since 2013, INL has expended $8.6 million on the program. The program was extended for one year on April 4, 2015, with an additional cost of almost $1.6 million.

As part of the program, Sayara Media Communications, a contractor, analyzes the effectiveness of media campaigns. Its 42 reporters are placed in most categories of provinces, which are ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on cultivation levels, and gather information and gauge perceptions on the state of counternarcotics policies and messaging. In addition, Sayara assesses the effectiveness of campaigns with audience reports.

Sayara also monitors the amount and type of counternarcotics-related items in the media and evaluates any changes (positive or negative) from its baseline assessment findings. The effectiveness of this media campaign is unclear. INL told SIGAR that some areas exposed to counternarcotics media experienced a decrease in opium cultivation, while in other areas where security and governance remain a challenge, cultivation numbers increased or remained the same. An independent evaluation of the INL-funded messaging program has not taken place since early in the program’s implementation, but a 2008 evaluation of a similar campaign concluded that “public CN [counter-narcotics] awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be (i) coordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, and (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication).” For more information on CNCE, see SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

Ministry of Counter-Narcotics Capacity Building

The MCN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with INL in February 2014 renewing its capacity-building program for 18 months and providing funding for 24 local national advisors to help build capacity at the MCN. Last quarter, INL informed SIGAR it had completed a performance-measurement plan (PMP) in February 2015 to assess MCN capacity-building progress. However, INL informed SIGAR this quarter that it is still working on the initial PMP for this program and will finalize the document in August 2015. The program is scheduled for renewal in September 2015. INL is reviewing the revised MCN proposal to conduct a series of short- and long-term courses that will be taught by local universities with the aim of increasing work-related skills and overall capacity of MCN staff.

INL conducted an independent risk assessment of the MCN’s public financial-management system. The report identified significant deficiencies that increased the potential for material misstatement in financial reporting, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations. Areas of particular concern were internal control, program management and monitoring, and fixed-assets management.
**Security**

**Governor-Led Eradication Program**
INL funds the Governor-Led Eradication Program (GLE) program which operates at different times of the year depending on each province’s cultivation cycle. The MCN tracks cumulative results which are subsequently verified by UNODC. The June 2015 UNODC report shows total eradication results of 3,322 hectares—including 2,079 hectares in Helmand and 640 hectares in Kandahar. During this quarter, INL provided advance payments of $236,500 to the MCN for GLE start-up costs in nine poppy-producing provinces.

For more information on GLE, see SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

**Good Performer’s Initiative**
INL’s Good Performer’s Initiative (GPI) supports the MCN’s efforts to incentivize provincial counternarcotics performance. Under the terms of the original GPI, which ran through August 30, 2014, a province was eligible for financial support of GPI development projects for each year that it achieved UNODC-verified poppy-free status or reduced cultivation by more than 10% compared to the previous year’s levels. In August 2014, INL and the MCN announced GPI II, which expands the award categories for “good performers” to include public outreach and law enforcement, beginning in the 2014–2015 poppy cultivation season, and reduces the amount a province may receive from $1 million to $500,000.

INL informed SIGAR that GPI held its first GPI II project-review committee (PRC) meeting in March 2015 to approve projects proposed by the provinces. A second GPI II PRC was held in May 2015. According to INL, GPI expects to have the initial draft of project design plans for GPI II projects completed by July 2015. As of May 31, 2015, a total of 222 GPI projects with a value of more than $108 million have been approved. Some 170 projects have been completed, 48 were ongoing, and four were nearing completion. The GPI II PMP is currently under development.

INL ensures that projects proposed under the GPI program do not conflict with other U.S. government work through interagency consultation. INL and its implementing partners consult with USAID to avoid pitfalls such as duplicative work with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities, and to develop complementary activities where possible. State’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan hosts regular counternarcotics working groups to bring together interagency personnel from State, DOD, DEA, USAID, and other relevant agencies to maintain coordination on multiple programs.

INL commissioned a third party to monitor and evaluate its programs assisting farmers to reduce opium cultivation. The third party presented its finding to INL in a report published during the quarter. According to their analysis, no program in the near term would lead to lower opium
cultivation, but programs that promote income growth could lay the groundwork for lower levels of opium cultivation in the long term. Some of their recommendations for future programs designed to decrease opium cultivation are to:

- use traditional agricultural products, such as fruit, nuts, grapes, and other perennial orchard crops with well-established markets;
- create stronger links between farms and markets;
- use simple, inexpensive, and easily available technologies; and
- connect with enough farmers to promote and sustain marketing industries.417

The report also states that projects based on those recommendations would probably not require significant financial input, but are more likely to succeed based on their established track record and the conditions in country. Based on current conditions, the third party recommended abandoning the policy of widespread eradication in Helmand and Kandahar. The report echoes findings from other analysts who also advocate suspending eradication except in “areas where a legal economy already exists and generates sufficient livelihoods.”

**Alternative Development/Alternative Livelihood**

USAID’s alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports programs in several areas including supply reduction and alternative development. INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.

**Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods**

INL supports alternative-livelihood programs as part of its efforts to combat drug trafficking. The nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation and its partners implement activities under the $11.9 million Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant from INL. The implementers favor activities, rather than stand-alone projects, with the following five objectives:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crop systems
- increase economic return for licit crop systems
- improve farmers’ access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve subnational governance systems
SAGAL activities are implemented in 16 provinces including Helmand and Kandahar.\textsuperscript{426} INL informed SIGAR that $6.2 million has been expended to date.\textsuperscript{427}

According to INL, SAGAL activities will complement past and ongoing investments in licit livelihoods and rural development by the U.S. government, including support for GPI II. Where possible, SAGAL will support a more decentralized GPI II project-selection and nomination process to improve the recognition of rural community needs.\textsuperscript{428}

Table 3.16 provides summary financial information on SAGAL and other alternative livelihood programs.

### Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a two-year, $18.7 million project of USAID, implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD) under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar.\textsuperscript{429}

On January 26, 2015, USAID suspended IRD for serious misconduct.\textsuperscript{430} The USAID Office of Inspector General investigated IRD for allegedly improperly charging certain overhead costs to the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{431} In light of IRD’s suspension, USAID was exploring a bridge program with a public international organization. USAID had reported to SIGAR last quarter that the process of selecting an organization was ongoing and the project would end on July 30, 2015, should the process fail.\textsuperscript{432} USAID lifted IRD’s suspension, effective June 22, 2015. By this action, IRD is no longer excluded from eligibility for extensions or new awards. As a result, USAID

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**TABLE 3.16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 6/25/2015 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)</td>
<td>7/21/2014</td>
<td>1/20/2016</td>
<td>$11,884,816</td>
<td>$6,162,146*</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)</td>
<td>2/1/2010</td>
<td>12/30/2016</td>
<td>$45,296,184</td>
<td>$43,394,354</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)</td>
<td>3/2/2009</td>
<td>9/30/2015</td>
<td>$159,878,589</td>
<td>$152,961,457</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)</td>
<td>7/31/2013</td>
<td>8/30/2015</td>
<td>$18,695,804</td>
<td>$15,896,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-South</td>
<td>10/7/2013</td>
<td>10/6/2018</td>
<td>$125,075,172</td>
<td>$30,507,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-North</td>
<td>5/21/2014</td>
<td>5/20/2019</td>
<td>$78,429,714</td>
<td>$7,776,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP)-West</td>
<td>8/10/2014</td>
<td>8/9/2019</td>
<td>$69,973,376</td>
<td>$6,259,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Results through 6/25/2015. Some of the USAID programs listed receive both Alternative Development and Agriculture Development Funds.

approved a one-month, no-cost extension of KFZ until August 30, 2015; it intends to have IRD, rather than a public international organization, implement the one-year KFZ bridge program. Consequently, the risk of disruption of KFZ activities and personnel/contract terminations has diminished.\textsuperscript{433}

Last quarter, USAID expended $6 million on KFZ; this quarter, it has spent $3.7 million.\textsuperscript{434} From January to March 2015, KFZ completed four trainings for senior MCN staff to address capacity gaps in strategic planning and policy development regarding alternative livelihoods. The program completed 12 alternative livelihoods projects and 10 of 11 canal-construction and rehabilitation activities.\textsuperscript{435}

**Regional Agricultural Development Program**

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Three RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. These projects share objectives focused on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of high-value crops and livestock.\textsuperscript{436} Using a value-chain approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.\textsuperscript{437}

RADP-South, a five-year, $125 million effort, operates in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018.\textsuperscript{438}

RADP-South’s focus is on strengthening the capacity of producers, associations, traders, and businesses to respond to market demands and facilitate market linkages between value-chain actors\textsuperscript{439} such as retailers, input suppliers, mills, and agricultural depots. This quarter, RADP-South conducted training in wheat cultivation, pest management, nutrition, and high-value crops for several thousand farmers.\textsuperscript{440} RADP-South also supported veterinary field units with livestock vaccinations and treatment of diseases. It also conducted training for paraveterinarians (community-based animal health workers that provide initial diagnosis and basic treatment of animals) to deliver animal health-care services.\textsuperscript{441}

The $78 million RADP-North project began in May 2014. It operates in Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Badakhshan\textsuperscript{442} and has resulted in over 3,000 farmers being trained and 187 high-value-crop stakeholders identified in several of the provinces.\textsuperscript{443}

The $70 million RADP-West began operating in August 2014 in Herat, Farah, and Badghis. According to USAID, it is finalizing its value-chain analysis in order to identify constraints and potential areas for RADP-West intervention.\textsuperscript{444} Security and the delay of a signed MOU with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock have impacted RADP-West’s timetable and implementation.\textsuperscript{445}

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**Value chain:** the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.
USAID informed SIGAR in March that it is planning RADP-East, which will encompass Nangarhar and several other provinces, after the Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program closes later this year. RADP-East will focus on strengthening value chains (working with input suppliers, market intermediaries and other agribusinesses, particularly in the Jalalabad area), working less directly with farmers.\textsuperscript{446}

As of June 30, 2015, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of $7.8 million on RADP-North, $30.5 million on RADP-South and $6.3 million on RADP-West.\textsuperscript{447} For summary information on this alternative-livelihood program, see Table 3.16 on page 128 of this report.

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program
The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a $45 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. CHAMP worked to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by assisting them to shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.\textsuperscript{448}

CHAMP has worked in 17 provinces of Afghanistan, providing training in agricultural best practices, building storage facilities such as cool rooms and raisin-drying facilities, and helping grape farmers convert from traditional ground-level vineyards to higher-output trellis systems.\textsuperscript{449} CHAMP also helps stimulate farm exports by linking farmers to traders and traders to high-paying markets. CHAMP includes women in many of its activities in an effort to integrate them into the mainstream agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{450} The program has been extended an additional two years until December 2016 to reinforce gains made in the export sector and increase Afghan exports to regional supermarkets by up to 10,000 metric tons annually.\textsuperscript{451}

CHAMP is carrying out activities throughout six main value chains (apples, apricots, almonds, grapes, melons, and pomegranates).\textsuperscript{452} The program focuses on improving horticultural and marketing practices to produce high-quality fruit for high-value markets such as the United Arab Emirates and India.\textsuperscript{453}

Since 2010, CHAMP’s various achievements include training 105,700 farmers, including 2,790 women, to improve agricultural techniques; planting nearly three million saplings and root cuttings benefitting 19,500 farmers; and exporting 29,500 tons of produce valued at $33 million to international markets. CHAMP enabled the construction of over 230 storage facilities and created over 7,500 full-time jobs in agribusiness.\textsuperscript{454}

During the first quarter of 2015, CHAMP provided training to 792 farmers, including 98 women, at established farmer field schools in Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, and Wardak Provinces. At CHAMP
farmer field schools, participants learn new agricultural practices such as orchard or trellis management and receive modern agricultural tools. In March 2015, CHAMP arranged training on food safety, hazard analysis, and critical control points. During the February Dubai Gulfood Exhibition, CHAMP facilitated the participation of seven Afghan traders, generating deals worth nearly $3.8 million and a potential for additional orders valued at $672,000.455

As of June 30, 2015, USAID has disbursed $43.4 million for CHAMP projects.456 For summary financial information on this program, see Table 3.16 on page 128 of this report.

**Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East and West**

Launched in March 2009, the mission of USAID’s $160 million IDEA-NEW program is to expand the licit agricultural economy in the northern, eastern, and western regions of the country.457 Since 2014, IDEA-NEW has concentrated its efforts on the eastern region and on fruit and vegetable value chains.458 Because few female-owned or -operated businesses remain in the east, USAID’s IDEA-NEW implementer reached out to the Afghan government and other donors to collect information on women-owned businesses within the targeted value chains.459 A month-long power failure at the Salang pass and insecurity in certain locations delayed completion of some activities.460

An evaluation of IDEA-NEW noted that “none of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms adopted by the IDEA-NEW program . . . assess how different project activities might impact on opium poppy cultivation.”461 Using Nangarhar as the case study, the report noted that opium cultivation levels had increased over the course of the program.462 The report cautions that evaluating the impact of IDEA-NEW is complex given:

- insecurity in areas of the province
- factors other than development assistance that contribute to reduced opium cultivation
- numerous interventions in the region from other international organizations463

As of June 30, 2015, USAID has disbursed $153.0 million for IDEA-NEW activities.464 For financial information on IDEA-NEW and other alternative-livelihood programs, see Table 3.16 on page 128 of this report. Please see SIGAR’s April 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress for more information on IDEA-NEW.

**Interdiction Operations and Results**

DOD reported that from April 1 to June 22, 2015, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 50 drug-interdiction operations
resulting in 66 detained individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. This year, the U.S. military stopped providing Afghans with logistical and intelligence support for counternarcotics activities; however, DEA continues to provide mentoring and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. military still provides logistics support to the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW).465

Most interdiction activities occurred in the east and capital regional commands. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern regional commands, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. DOD said the continued reduction in seizures and operations is likely a result of the Coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in the east and capital regional commands is not as great as in the southern commands. Coalition forces (and U.S. military forces) are no longer conducting counternarcotics operations.466

In addition to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), Afghan organizations contributing to interdiction activities include the ABP, ANA, ANP, and the General Directorate Police Special Unit (GDPSU). Interagency elements, including the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and RS interdiction efforts.

The IOCC integrated data from military and law-enforcement sources, which have supported operations against narco-insurgent elements. DOD informed SIGAR that the IOCC will shut down by the end of June.467 DOD stated in its Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan that direct international assistance to the CNPA, particularly from State, is expected to decrease dramatically in 2016.468 The reduced financial support will impact the effectiveness of the CNPA, unless the Afghan government generates more revenue to meet its expenses. See page 165 in the Economic and Social Development section of this report for a discussion of the country’s budget.

DOD informed SIGAR that it has established a regional narcotics interagency fusion cell (RNIFC) to combat the drug trade given the U.S. military’s reduced capabilities within Afghanistan. The RNIFC, located in Bahrain, tracks and attacks the illicit movement of Afghan heroin on boats destined for the Middle East and East Africa. The RNIFC will connect with regional partner nations in order to coordinate and collaborate on future operations.469

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the reported seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 3,980 kg of opium
- 675 kg of heroin
- 1,208 kg of hashish/marijuana
- 80 kg of precursor chemicals 470

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

As shown in Table 3.17, interdiction results have been declining since 2012.

According to DOD, vetted Afghan units have successfully conducted complex counterdrug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance. However, the drawdown of Coalition forces has had an impact on Afghanistan’s ability to conduct counternarcotics interdiction operations, particularly in Kandahar and Helmand. Overall, counterdrug operations decreased 46.6%, from 624 in FY 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge to 333 in FY 2014, while actual heroin seizures have decreased 72%, from 10,982 kg in FY 2011 to 3,052 kg in FY 2014, and opium seizures have decreased 61% from 98,327 kg in FY 2011 to 38,307 kg in FY 2014, according to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database. In FY 2011, 75% of all counternarcotics operations occurred in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces with a decrease to 32% of all counternarcotics operations occurring in those same provinces in FY 2014.471

### Aviation Support

According to INL, State counternarcotics support to DEA consisted of 163.5 flight hours (108 flight hours for counternarcotics efforts and 55.5 flight hours in support of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and DEA passenger movements), 159 sorties, 879 personnel transported, and 64,645 pounds of cargo moved. INLs Kabul team was provided 35.4 flight hours.472 The INL air wing element at Kandahar Airfield officially closed on June 27, 2015.473 That element provided rotary wing assets in support of DEA missions in southern Afghanistan. According to INL, a specially trained Afghan counternarcotics police unit will continue to operate in the area, with an NIU platoon based at the Kandahar Regional Law Enforcement Center.474

### Table 3.17

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Operations</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>3,047</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3,265</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hashish seized (kg)</td>
<td>241,353</td>
<td>58,677</td>
<td>25,044</td>
<td>182,213</td>
<td>183,776</td>
<td>37,826</td>
<td>19,088</td>
<td>15,528</td>
<td>763,505</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heroin seized (kg)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>8,392</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td>3,441</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>30,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine seized (kg)</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>5,195</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>18,040</td>
<td>10,042</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>5,925</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>53,462</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opium seized (kg)</td>
<td>15,361</td>
<td>79,110</td>
<td>49,750</td>
<td>98,327</td>
<td>70,814</td>
<td>41,350</td>
<td>38,307</td>
<td>23,647</td>
<td>416,666</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precursor chemicals seized (kg)</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>93,031</td>
<td>20,397</td>
<td>122,150</td>
<td>130,846</td>
<td>36,250</td>
<td>53,184</td>
<td>234,981</td>
<td>695,548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Partial fiscal-year results through 6/22/2015 only. 1 kilogram (kg) = about 2.2 pounds. SIGAR’s analysis detected an anomaly in the cumulative FY 2015 data for seizures of precursor chemicals. DOD had yet to confirm the numbers as the report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 6/29/2015.