

SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events This Quarter	85
Quarterly Highlight: After Kunduz: Assessing the ANDSF	87
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan	92
ANDSF Strength Declines Slightly	93
RS Lowers Expectations for Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior for Second Consecutive Quarter	96
Afghan Local Police	98
Security Protection Forces	100
Afghan National Army	101
Afghan National Police	108
Status of Women in the ANDSF	113
ANDSF Medical/Health Care	113
Status of Classified ANDSF Data	114
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	114
Counternarcotics	116
Alternative Development/ Alternative Livelihood	121

SECURITY

As of September 30, 2015, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$65 billion to provide assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This accounts for 59.3% of all U.S. reconstruction funding in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the \$60.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF, \$56.9 billion had been obligated and \$55.8 billion disbursed, as of September 30, 2015.⁴⁵

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and of the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

President Obama Halts U.S. Troop Withdrawal

On October 15, 2015, President Obama announced that the United States will cease withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan through most of 2016 and keep thousands in the country through the end of his term in January 2017. President Obama said U.S. forces will continue to perform two critical missions—training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda.⁴⁶ He said the United States will:⁴⁷

- through most of 2016, maintain the current level of 9,800 U.S. troops in Afghanistan
- in 2017, reduce to 5,500 troops stationed in Kabul and at a small number of bases including Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar
- work with NATO and the Coalition to align the U.S. troop presence in accomplishing the two missions
- continue to support Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the national-unity government as they pursue critical reforms

The Obama Administration's original plan had been to cut the number of U.S. troops in half next year and then reduce the U.S. force to about 1,000 troops based only at U.S. Embassy Kabul by the start of 2017. However, President Obama said the security situation in key areas of Afghanistan remains very fragile, with risk of deterioration in some areas.⁴⁸ His decision followed consultations with his national security team, Congress, and international partners, and also took into consideration requests for continued U.S. support from President Ghani.⁴⁹ The cost of the larger force is projected at approximately \$15 billion a year, about \$5 billion more than the 1,000-person, Kabul-based force would have cost.⁵⁰

The Capture of Kunduz

In a major setback for the Afghan government, the Taliban this quarter temporarily seized a provincial capital for the first time since Coalition forces began operations in Afghanistan in 2001. In the early hours of Monday, September 28, 2015, Taliban fighters appeared in the center of Kunduz, a city of more than 300,000 in northern Afghanistan and, by some measures, Afghanistan's fifth-largest city.⁵¹ During the attack, insurgents captured the governor's compound and police headquarters. They also released inmates from the local jail and occupied a local hospital. Residents reported the looting of the local United Nations (UN) office, the Afghan intelligence agency's office, two radio stations, and car dealerships, as well as an attack on a bank.⁵² Electricity and phone service were reportedly down throughout most of the city, and there were reports of executions.⁵³

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 6, 2015, General John F. Campbell, commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the Resolute Support (RS) mission, said Afghan army units were largely deployed outside of Kunduz at the time of the attack, so the Taliban, who attacked from within the city, were initially engaging police units. As regular and special-forces troops were, at the time of his testimony, still clearing the city of small, isolated pockets of insurgents, the full implications of the fall of Kunduz remained unclear.⁵⁴ However, in his testimony, General Campbell said "poor leadership" played a role in the Afghan police's inability to hold Kunduz: "I go back to leadership and leadership makes a difference. In areas that they have had problems, I think leadership has been the key."⁵⁵

According to media reports, the ANDSF's effort to retake the city was slowed by ambushes and roadside bombs.⁵⁶ U.S. forces provided close-air support to ANDSF troops clearing the city. However, one of those airstrikes hit a Doctors Without Borders trauma center, killing at least 22 people, including medical staff and patients.⁵⁷ The president of Doctors Without Borders called for what would be a first-ever fact-finding mission to be launched under the applicable Geneva Convention protocol.⁵⁸ In addition, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

“The Afghan security forces’ inconsistent performance in Kunduz underscores several of their shortcomings.”

—General John F. Campbell,
RS and USFOR-A commander

Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces-Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan*, 10/6/2015.

AFTER KUNDUZ: ASSESSING THE ANDSF

One of the most important questions facing Afghanistan has long been whether the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) can maintain security following the U.S. and Coalition military drawdown.

On September 28, 2015, Taliban fighters took control of Kunduz, a northern city of more than 300,000 people, forcing the ANDSF to retreat.⁵⁹ The ANDSF retook the city within two weeks, but important questions remain.

Will this happen again? And could it happen in Kabul? General John F. Campbell told a Senate committee on October 6 that the Taliban “will not overthrow the Afghan government.”⁶⁰ Despite events in Kunduz, his statement appears accurate. The ANDSF have so far protected national-level government institutions. But SIGAR is concerned that if insurgents repeatedly draw Afghan army troops outside cities, then stage dramatic, if temporary, successes against police units, the cumulative impact on ANDSF morale and popular support of the Afghan government could be as adverse as defeats in main-force battles.

U.S. national-security strategy in Afghanistan aims to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government and to strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces. To achieve these and other goals, the United States has provided more than \$65 billion to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF. SIGAR carefully tracks this funding and how it is used. However, much of what SIGAR tracks is quantitative and does not address intangible factors such as leadership and the will to fight. The ANDSF has more tools at their disposal than their enemies, but that fact by itself does not guarantee success. As Campbell has told the ANDSF, “The Taliban don’t have D-30 howitzers, it doesn’t have [reconnaissance aircraft], it doesn’t have Mi-35s, Mi-17s, MD-530 helicopters. It doesn’t have up-armored Humvees.”⁶¹ Yet the Taliban can still fight.

SIGAR and other organizations have long voiced concern about the ANDSF’s capability to counter the threats facing them in the foreseeable future. For example:

- In June 2010, SIGAR found that army and police units deemed capable of operating independently later showed significant levels of backsliding in their capability levels. This was due, in part, to the fact that once a unit achieved a top rating, Coalition forces

withdrew assistance such as force protection, supplies, or expertise.⁶²

- In July 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised concerns that changing the title of the highest rating level an ANDSF unit could attain—from “independent” to “independent with advisors”—was, in part, responsible for an increase in the number of units rated at the highest level.⁶³
- In January 2014, the nonprofit Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) predicted that the insurgency will be a greater threat in 2015 due to the reduction in NATO forces. CNA accurately forecasted that the Taliban would keep pressure on the ANDSF, encircle key cities, and conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other cities.⁶⁴
- In February 2014, SIGAR repeated that the assessment tool used to rate the ANDSF was inconsistently applied and not useful. A new assessment tool was created that provided brigade-level assessments, but after October 2014, that level of detail was classified by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).⁶⁵
- In December 2014, SIGAR included ANDSF capabilities in its High-Risk List calling attention to areas susceptible to waste, fraud, and abuse.⁶⁶
- Earlier this year SIGAR published two audits reporting that there is no assurance that ANDSF personnel and payroll data are accurate.⁶⁷
- This quarter SIGAR released an audit showing that the Afghan Local Police lacked adequate logistics support, oversight, and planning.⁶⁸
- This quarter the U.S. military told SIGAR that its current assessment tool was “not intended to be used as an assessment or evaluation the entire ANDSF.” This raises questions about the U.S. ability to determine ANDSF effectiveness at an operational level.

General Joseph Dunford warned in March 2014, “If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate. The security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”⁶⁹ The situation in Kunduz warrants close monitoring and may call for a reassessment of the tools used to measure Afghan force capabilities and the security outlook.

announced they are reviewing the Kunduz incident and will report to the Afghan government and the NATO-led RS mission on their findings and recommendations to protect civilians.⁷⁰ On October 7, 2015, President Obama apologized to the president of Doctors Without Borders for the air attack on their facility and said the United States would examine its military procedures.⁷¹ The Afghan government pledged cooperation with a full and transparent investigation.⁷² General Campbell has pledged a thorough, objective, and transparent U.S. investigation of the incident. He also directed a review of the U.S. forces' operational authorities and rules of engagement and force-wide training for U.S. personnel in targeting authorities and rules of engagement.⁷³

The Taliban attack on Kunduz did not come as a complete surprise. The head of the provincial council reported local officials warning for months of insurgents advancing in the area.⁷⁴ Twice this year insurgents had encroached into Kunduz.⁷⁵ The UN reported on July 2, 2015, that the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz was temporarily closed after Afghan security forces raided the hospital and allegedly threatened medical staff while searching for insurgents reportedly being treated there.⁷⁶ According to one account, insurgents had been amassing arms and ammunition in the city for weeks before the assault.⁷⁷ On August 13, 2015, General Wilson Shoffner, RS deputy chief of staff for communications, said the ANA corps operating in the north was stretched so thin that another brigade was added and another deputy brigade commander assigned.⁷⁸

On October 9, 2015, an Afghan government spokesman reported the majority of Kunduz City was again under government control, though pockets of resistance remained and skirmishes erupted as security forces performed a house-by-house search.⁷⁹ On October 13, 2015, the Taliban announced their complete withdrawal from the city, 15 days after they entered it.⁸⁰

General Campbell Testifies to Congress

During the week of October 5, 2015, General Campbell testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee on the situation in Afghanistan.⁸¹ General Campbell recommended that President Barack Obama revise his original plan of reducing the U.S. troop presence to a Kabul-based embassy presence by the end of 2016.⁸² Campbell said much had changed since that plan was formulated in mid-2014, such as the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an increased al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan due to Pakistani military operations, and the emergence of a new Afghan national-unity government that is willing to work with the United States. He said the U.S. military would have a very limited ability to carry out its train-advise-and-assist and counterterrorism missions with only an embassy presence of about 1,000 in Kabul.⁸³

Despite the recent fall of Kunduz, Campbell said he believes the Taliban will not overthrow the Afghan government, and any action toward peaceful reconciliation will take a “good couple months.”⁸⁴ He classified the ISIL presence as an operational emergency, with reports of ISIL in at least 25 provinces, but predominantly in Nangarhar.⁸⁵ Within the context of a “very, very tough” fighting season, he said the ANDSF has remained intact and resilient, a creditable performance for a young force severely tested. General Campbell admitted the ANDSF has faltered at times, but said they continue to evolve, improve, and fight hard in spite of increased casualties.⁸⁶

General Campbell said the enemies of Afghanistan, including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, ISIL, and other extremist groups, will present formidable challenges for the remainder of 2015 and beyond.⁸⁷ He concluded that the United States needs to exercise strategic patience and sustain its commitment to Afghanistan.⁸⁸

Taliban Leadership Changes

In late July, Afghan officials announced that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar had died in 2013 in a Pakistan hospital.⁸⁹ The Taliban later admitted they withheld announcing his death in order to maintain solidarity in the fight against the United States and Afghanistan.⁹⁰ The news resulted in a divisive struggle among various factions before a new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, was recognized. Planned peace talks were cancelled.⁹¹

A former DOD official told *Pajhwok Afghan News* that he believed a few people at the Pakistani intelligence agency knew of Mullah Omar’s death but withheld the information in order to better control the Taliban.⁹² Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney added that in 2010, Pakistan had no interest in peace talks and had imprisoned approximately 40–50 Taliban members who were open to them.⁹³

ANDSF Members Sexually Abusing Boys

This quarter the *New York Times* reported that U.S. forces had been instructed to ignore the rape of young boys by ANDSF members. In response to the report, President Ghani called for action to remove those ANDSF members violating children from the security forces and to charge them in the courts. He said the sexual abuse of boys will not be tolerated, although he acknowledged that “the larger cultural dynamic needs time” since the Afghan custom of *bacha bazi* is centuries old.⁹⁴ In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 6, 2015, General Campbell said the incidents cited in the *New York Times* article dated from 2010–2012. He said there is no U.S. policy to ignore such acts of sexual abuse, and that a policy in place since at least 2011 requires U.S. service members to report all suspected human-rights violations to their chain of command, who will then report them to the Afghan authorities.⁹⁵ On

Bacha Bazi: literally translates to “playing with boys,” and encompasses the ancient Afghan custom of powerful men sexually abusing young boys. The Taliban made the practice punishable by death, but *bacha bazi* has been resurrected since the fall of the Taliban. Under the practice, young boys, also known as ‘chai (tea) boys’ are sold to wealthy and powerful men for entertainment and illicit sex. As women are not allowed to dance in public, boys are made to dance and perform feminine gestures and acts. Boys have been raped, kidnapped, trafficked, and even sold by their parents for family prestige and money. Reports that *bacha bazi* is evolving into a nonviolent and consensual practice do not recognize that adolescent boys have not reached the age of consent.

Leahy Amendment: Commonly known by the name of its Senate sponsor, section 826 of the National Defense Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, provides that CSTC-A cannot use U.S. funds for any training, equipment, or other assistance for members of an ANDSF unit if the U.S. Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a “gross violation of human rights.”

Source: Pub. L. No. 112-239, National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2013, p. 1833; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/25/2015.

September 22, 2015, General Campbell issued a statement for U.S. and non-U.S. personnel assigned to the RS mission to immediately report suspicions of sexual abuse to the chain of command.⁹⁶

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) condemned the reported sexual abuse, saying it violated a provision of U.S. law, the **Leahy Amendment**.⁹⁷ However, CSTC-A reported this quarter that both the MOI and MOD are making sufficient progress to date with regard to the Leahy Amendment. CSTC-A said it routinely performs Leahy vetting for all individuals slated to attend U.S.-funded training, but did not state if any individuals had been rejected due to Leahy violations. CSTC-A stated it would enforce any decisions made by the Secretary of Defense to deny equipment or funds to ANDSF units found in violation of the Leahy Amendment.⁹⁸

A spokesman for RS told the *Times* that allegations of child sexual abuse by Afghan military or police personnel would be a matter for Afghan domestic law enforcement. While sexual assault is addressed in Afghan law, there is no specific provision with regard to bacha bazi (sexual abuse of boys is not the totality of bacha bazi). The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has recommended the government criminalize the practice and modify the penal code based on provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human-rights conventions.⁹⁹

UN Reports Conflict Intensity Shows no Signs of Abating

The intensity of conflict in Afghanistan shows no signs of abating and the security environment has become more fragile and dynamic, according to UNAMA.¹⁰⁰

The UN recorded 6,096 **security incidents** from May 1, 2015, through July 31, 2015, a 4.6% decrease compared to the same period in 2014 during the second round of the presidential election.¹⁰¹ The count included 291 assassinations and attempted assassinations, an increase of 11.4% compared to the same period in 2014.¹⁰² The UN reported armed clashes (53%) continued to account for the majority of the incidents, together with improvised-explosive device (IED) events (26%) accounting for 79% of all security incidents.¹⁰³

While more security incidents were reported than last quarter, as reflected in Figure 3.26, there were more days in the latest reporting period, resulting in the incidents-per-day average being slightly lower this period compared to last quarter.¹⁰⁴ The UN said the majority of the incidents were reported in the southern and eastern regions, with Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Helmand, and Kunar enduring 44.5% of all security incidents.¹⁰⁵


The UN reported that the period was marked by antigovernment elements’ efforts to capture and hold district centers in a number of provinces. Of the 364 districts in Afghanistan, seven district centers were captured, a significantly larger number than in previous years, with five recaptured by the ANDSF during the reporting period.¹⁰⁶

Security Incidents: reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of the United Nations report of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 12/9/2014, p. 6.

FIGURE 3.26

AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY



Source: UN, reports of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 9/1/2015, 6/10/2015, p. 4; 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; 3/7/2014, p. 5; 12/6/2013, p. 6; 9/6/2013, p. 6; 6/13/2013, p. 5; and 3/5/2013, p. 5.

Civilians continue to endure most of the attacks; from May 1 through July 31, UNAMA documented 2,985 civilian casualties (934 killed and 2,051 injured).¹⁰⁷ The UN reported August 7, 2015, to have been the deadliest day since UNAMA began tracking civilian casualties in 2009, with 355 civilian casualties (42 deaths and 313 injured).¹⁰⁸ UNAMA attributed a 78% increase in civilian casualties to antigovernment elements from suicide and **complex attacks** in the first half of 2015.¹⁰⁹

MOD Continues Without a Confirmed Minister for Over One Year

The MOD has been without a confirmed minister since September 29, 2014, when Ghani was sworn in as president.¹¹⁰ On July 4, 2015, the Afghan parliament rejected President Ghani's third nominee for minister of defense, Masoom Stanekzai, who has been serving in an acting capacity since May.¹¹¹ The second nominee for minister of defense withdrew his nomination on April 8, 2015, before the parliament scheduled the vote. Ghani had nominated General Mohammad Afzal Ludin, a military advisor in the National Security Council, on April 6.¹¹² However, General Ludin said he did not wish his nomination to prove divisive for the country.¹¹³ Earlier,

Complex Attack: A deliberate and coordinated attack which includes a suicide device, at least one other type of device, and more than one attacker. All three elements must be present for an attack to be considered complex.

Note: DOD's definition of "complex attack" does not require a suicide device.

Source: UNAMA, "Afghanistan Midyear 2015 Report, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," 8/2015.

Acting Minister of Defense Masoom Stanekzai

Confirmed Confirmation rejected; serving as acting minister since May 21, 2015.

Ethnicity Pashtun

Tribe Stanekzai

Nominated by President Ashraf Ghani

Experience

- Jennings Randolph Afghanistan Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace
- Head of the High Peace Council
- Chief executive of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

Background As a former official of the High Peace Council and the Chief executive of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, Minister Stanekzai has been an integral part in peace negotiations with the Taliban. In 2011, Stanekzai was seriously injured in a suicide attack which also killed then High Peace Council Chairman Berhanuddin Rabbani.



Acting Minister of Defense Masoom Stanekzai (Körber Foundation photo by Marc Darchinger)

Source: Afghan Biographies, *Stanikzai, Masoom*, 6/19/2015; *Pajhwok Afghan News*, "Stanikzai wants offensive strategy changed," 9/21/2015; *Tolo News*, "Parliament Rejects Stanekzai as Defense Minister," 7/4/2015; *Tolo News*, "Ghani Names Stanekzai as Defense Minister Nominee," 5/21/2015; USIP, "Adviser to Afghan President Karzai, an Ex-USIP Fellow, Confers with Institute Staff," 1/11/2013; *RS News*, "Minister Stanekzai: Afghanistan's Future is Bright," 5/12/2011.

Afghan parliamentarians rejected Ghani's nomination of then ANA chief of staff General Sher Mohammad Karimi to lead the country's military forces in January.¹¹⁴

DOD to Review USFOR-A Inputs to SIGAR

This quarter DOD informed SIGAR that DOD will receive, review, and incorporate responses to comments made on SIGAR's quarterly report drafts by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), including USFOR-A and CSTC-A, before submitting them to SIGAR. In the past SIGAR has received CENTCOM's comments on its drafts as the command judged appropriate. SIGAR is concerned that receiving consolidated submissions will reduce the informational value from the original CENTCOM submissions, and will monitor the impacts of the change.¹¹⁵

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to USFOR-A, approximately 8,550 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of August 22, 2015, with approximately 7,000 personnel from other Coalition nations also serving.¹¹⁶ Of the U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan, approximately 3,550 are assigned to the RS mission.¹¹⁷

Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in action and 50 U.S. military personnel wounded in action. In addition, 17 DOD civilians or contractors have been killed in service and seven wounded.¹¹⁸ This includes the loss of six U.S. service members and five civilian contractors in the C-130 crash in Jalalabad on October 1, 2015.¹¹⁹

Five insider attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in 2015, killing three soldiers and wounding 15 others. Also during 2015, three U.S. civilian contractors were killed and one has been wounded as a result of an insider attack.¹²⁰

A Georgian soldier killed on September 22, 2015, brings to 12 the number of foreign forces (including U.S.) killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the RS mission. The Republic of Georgia is the second-largest force contributor to the NATO-led RS mission after the United States.¹²¹

On October 1, 2015, Major General Gordon Davis took over leadership of CSTC-A from Major General Todd Semonite in a change of command ceremony in Kabul.¹²²

ANDSF STRENGTH DECLINES SLIGHTLY

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 324,716 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A. As reflected in Table 3.6, this is 90.2% of the ANDSF target force strength of 360,004, counting MOD civilian employees. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count MOD civilians). The new assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 7,228 since May 2015 and 4,089 since February 2015.¹²³ This quarter the ANA decreased by 342, while the ANP decreased by 6,886, as shown in Table 3.7 on the following page.¹²⁴ However, 5,788 of the ANP decrease is due to corrections to the records made following a CSTC-A audit; for more information, see page 108 of this section. SIGAR has long questioned the validity and reliability of Afghan security-personnel numbers for several reasons (see “Questionable ANSF Numbers Thicken Fog of War in Afghanistan” in SIGAR’s April 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, pages 3–15). Recent reporting of negligible ANA personnel strength decreases during the fighting season and the issues uncovered with ANP personnel strength data show no indication that data is becoming more reliable.

“No one can argue with the naysayer that feels progress should be faster, but we need to reinforce those with a long-term vision, to champion those who know that successes comes with challenges and to embrace those with strategic patience to support steady progress.”

—Major General Todd Semonite,
outgoing CSTC-A commander

Source: RS News, “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan welcomes new commander,” 10/1/2015.

TABLE 3.6

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, JULY 2015						
ANDSF Component	Approved End-Strength Goal	Target Date	Current Assigned as of July 2015	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals	Difference (%)
ANA including AAF ^a	195,000	December 2014	160,461	82.3%	(34,539)	(17.7%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	-	7,048	88.1%	(956)	(11.9%)
ANA + AAF Total	203,004		176,420	86.9%	(26,584)	(13.1%)
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	148,296	94.5%	(8,704)	(5.5%)
ANDSF Total with Civilians	360,004		324,716	90.2%	(35,288)	(9.8%)

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANA = Afghan National Army; ANDSF = Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces.

^a The ANA and AAF detail numbers do not equal the reported ANA-including-AAF total number. Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent part or all of the unreconciled variance of 8,911 personnel.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/11/2015.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.7

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2014–JULY 2015							
	2/2014	5/2014	8/2014	11/2014	2/2015	5/2015	7/2015
ANA including AAF	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203	174,120	176,762	176,420**
ANP	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439*	154,685	155,182	148,296
Total ANDSF	338,108	329,612	324,918	325,642	328,805	331,944	324,716

Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA and AAF numbers include civilians; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

*Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

**The supporting ANA and AAF numbers do not equal the reported ANA including AAF July 2015 total; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled number.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 10/6/2014; RS, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 3/14/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vettings, 4/10/2015 and 7/12/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2014, 3/24/2015, 6/29/2015, and 9/11/2015.

This quarter, details of ANDSF force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will therefore report on them in a classified annex to this report.

ANDSF Attrition Holding Steady

ANDSF attrition rates are holding steady, according to reporting provided to RS by the MOD and MOI. The ANA had a monthly attrition rate of 2.4% in July 2015, up from 2.3% in May; and more than a one percentage-point decrease from the average monthly attrition rates the ANA endured in 2013 of 3.52% and 2014 of 3.62%.¹²⁵ The ANP's monthly average attrition rate was reported to be holding steady at 1.9% from May through July.¹²⁶ This quarter USFOR-A reported that RS is no longer tracking a monthly attrition goal. For more information, see page 101 of this section.

USFOR-A Clarifies MAAR Assessment Process

During the last two quarters SIGAR reported on the assessments of the ANA, Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Operations Coordination Centers-Regional (OCC-Rs) using a new assessment tool, the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR). As with past systems used to assess the ANDSF, SIGAR found the MAAR did not provide a clear picture of ANDSF capability. This quarter USFOR-A informed SIGAR that use of the MAAR as a comprehensive assessment for the ANDSF components is incorrect, as the MAAR differs fundamentally from the prior Regional ANDSF Status Report. USFOR-A gave three reasons:¹²⁷

- The MAAR assesses only the six ANA corps headquarters, six provincial ABP and AUP headquarter elements, and the ANCOP headquarters, and not ANA or ANP corps, battalions, or lower-level operational units.
- MAAR assessment categories are not weighted equally. Some category ratings contribute more to the overall unit capability than other categories, so unweighted averaging of ratings is not appropriate.

- The MAAR assessment process varies over time and among regions, resulting in variations in assessment completeness, reliability, and accuracy, and preventing strictly apples-to-apples comparisons.

USFOR-A reported that training, advising, and assisting is conducted by a small number of advisors at the corps/police-headquarters level who provide input into the MAAR. The MAAR is one of many tools used by RS to direct the efforts of the Coalition trainers and advisors.¹²⁸

USFOR-A's response to SIGAR raises a serious concern that the United States does not have a reliable system to actually rate the capability of the ANDSF and, by extension, the effectiveness of the United States' \$65 billion investment to build, train, equip, and sustain them.

Under the circumstances, SIGAR cannot evaluate the progress of ANA corps or police units and their operational capabilities this quarter. In the future, USFOR-A has offered to provide SIGAR an unclassified narrative that provides "a comprehensive assessment."¹²⁹ It was not clear, why USFOR-A had not previously provided this type of assessment despite SIGAR's quarterly requests for ANDSF capability assessments. SIGAR, in absence of any other usable or analyzable assessment, will provide the assessment narratives as reported by USFOR-A.

USFOR-A also said the MAAR provided to SIGAR last quarter reflected rating decreases at the headquarters level attributable to the significant stresses of the fighting season. The ANDSF suffered decreases in a number of areas early in the fighting season, but have begun to recover in some areas as they gain experience. Other areas will likely not recover until after the fighting season when the ANDSF have time to reconstitute their forces.¹³⁰

During his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 6, 2015, General Campbell described the fighting in Kunduz and underscored several ANDSF shortcomings: poor intelligence sharing, lack of cross-pillar coordination, and suboptimal use of the forces.¹³¹ Without the combat power and numbers to protect every part of Afghanistan, he said the ANDSF has difficulty countering the Taliban's ability to temporarily mass, seize an objective, and then blend back into the population when confronted with an ANDSF counterattack.¹³² The general said the ANDSF needs to improve responsiveness, flexibility, and preparedness of the forces at the tactical and operational levels. He added that ANDSF leaders need to discern better when to take the offense, when to defend, and where to assume risk.¹³³ Yet when the ANDSF deliberately plan their operations and coordinate across the security pillars, they achieve results, he said.¹³⁴

Measuring Control in Afghanistan

The UN reported that while the ANDSF retained control in the overwhelming majority of district centers, antigovernment elements and other illegally armed groups continue to intimidate the population in many rural areas.¹³⁵

“They (ANDSF) do not possess the necessary combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country.”

—General John F. Campbell, RS and USFOR-A commander

Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces-Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, 10/6/2015.

Safe Haven: an area where insurgents effectively influence the populace and maintain unrestricted freedom of movement due to limited Afghan government presence.

Operating Area: an area where insurgents actively contest Afghan government control to influence the populace and gain freedom of movement.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/6/2015.

Areas not assessed to be insurgent **safe havens** or **operating areas** are considered to be under Afghan government control.¹³⁶

RS LOWERS EXPECTATIONS FOR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR SECOND CONSECUTIVE QUARTER

RS revised its forecasts this quarter as it did last quarter by lowering the expected capacity levels the MOD and MOI will achieve by the end 2016.¹³⁷

USFOR-A reported that due to changes in the operating environment, the Essential Function (EF) offices have refocused the plans and reassessed the end-of-mission forecast. RS now forecasts that by the end of its mission in 2016, 69% of MOD functions are expected to be sustaining or fully capable (the highest and second-highest ratings), a drop from the 74% and 90% forecasts in the last two quarters. Similarly lowered expectations were forecast for the MOI, where 57% of functions are predicted to be “sustaining” or “fully capable,” down from previous quarters’ forecasts of 68% and 86%.¹³⁸

Each RS EF directorate and the Gender Affairs office use the Essential Function Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in each ministry.¹³⁹ The milestones are assessed based on the five-stage rating system displayed in Table 3.8.¹⁴⁰ Milestone assessments are then combined to determine the overall assessment of that department. All department assessments, in turn, are combined to determine the assessment of the ministry as a whole.¹⁴¹

This quarter RS reduced by one the number of milestones required to develop EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight) ministry capacity and core competencies under the assessment process.¹⁴² This reduces the total number of assessment milestones from 46 to 45 for MOD, and from 38 to 37 for MOI.¹⁴³

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.¹⁴⁴ As of this quarter, no essential function of either the MOD or MOI had achieved a rating of “sustaining capability,” however, two MOD EF-5 (Sustainment) milestones and four MOI milestones—two in EF-4 (Force Generation) and two in EF-5—have achieved a rating of “fully capable,” as shown in Table 3.8.¹⁴⁵

This quarter, the RS assessment indicates the MOD has increased the percentage of its “fully capable” and “partially capable” development milestones from 37% last quarter to 55.6%. The MOI also increased its ratings, with 59.5% of its development milestones at “fully capable” or “partially capable” compared to 36.8% last quarter.¹⁴⁶

According to the current RS assessment, one MOD EF-7 (Intelligence) milestone has remained in the “not scoped” stage for a second consecutive

SECURITY

TABLE 3.8

MINISTRY ASSESSMENT USING NATO SYSTEM, AS OF AUGUST 2015																																							
RATING MEANING	EF-1			EF-2			EF-3			EF-4			EF-5			EF-6			EF-7			EF-8			Gender			Total											
	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-	Q2	Q3	+/-															
Ministry of Defense Assessment																																							
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	2	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	2	+
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	1	2	+	0	0	=	3	4	+	2	5	+	8	9	+	1	1	=	2	2	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	17	23	+			
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	3	4	+	3	4	+	1	0	-	4	1	-	4	1	-	2	2	=	1	1	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	2	+	18	15	-						
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	2	0	-	2	0	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	3	3	=	1	1	=	8	4	-						
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	0	0	=	2	0	-	3	1	-									
EF Total	6	6	=	5	4	-	4	4	=	6	6	=	12	12	=	3	3	=	4	4	=	3	3	=	3	3	=	46	45	-									
Ministry of Interior Assessment																																							
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	2	+	0	2	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	4	+						
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	1	3	+	0	0	=	0	2	+	2	2	=	8	9	+	2	2	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	13	18	+						
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	4	3	-	1	2	+	4	2	-	1	0	-	4	1	-	0	0	=	3	3	=	0	0	=	0	2	+	17	13	-									
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	1	0	-	3	1	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	1	-	6	2	-						
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	0	-	1	0	-						
EF Total	6	6	=	4	3	-	4	4	=	4	4	=	12	12	=	2	2	=	3	3	=	0	0	=	3	3	=	38	37	-									

Note: EF = Essential Function; ASI = Afghan Security Institutions; EF-1 = Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution; EF-2 = Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF-3 = Civilian Governance of the ASI; EF-4 = Force Generation; EF-5 = Sustainment; EF-6 = Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; EF-7 = Intelligence; EF-8 = Strategic Communications. Q2 = June 2015; Q3 = August 25, 2015. One EF-2 rating category was dropped for Q3 2015.

Source: USFORA, response to SIGAR data calls, 6/6/2015 and 9/4/2015.

quarter.¹⁴⁷ And three EF-8 (Strategic Communications) milestones have not reached the “initiated” stage for a second consecutive quarter. However, EF-4 has five of six milestone assessments rated as “partially capable.”¹⁴⁸

Within the MOI, there has been no assessment for EF-8 for the past two quarters. Whereas EF-5 has progressed from eight milestones rated as “partially capable” and four milestones as “initiated,” to two milestones assessed as “fully capable,” nine as “partially capable,” and one as “initiated.”¹⁴⁹

Within both the MOD and MOI, the Gender Affairs office has progressed with only one of three milestones remaining as “scoped.”¹⁵⁰

Essential Functions highlights this period include:¹⁵¹

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** MOU to implement the mobile money program for 100% of the ALP by December 2016 was drafted and in review
- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** MOD approved the Ministerial Internal Controls Program implementation plan
- **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of the ASI):** the MOD Criminal Investigation Division, Inspector General, and Intelligence office agreed to form both a headquarters- and corps-level corruption coordination cell
- **EF-4 (Force Generation):** in conjunction with EF-6, advisor support to the National Security Council in development of the national security policy
- **EF-5 (Sustainment):** coordinated network vulnerability assessments with both MOD and MOI network operations centers and assisted the ANA and ANP with fielding 25 radio repair facilities
- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** advisor support to the National Security Council in development of the national security policy in conjunction with EF-4
- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** creation of intelligence sharing cells for pre-planned ANDSF operations
- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** re-initiated recurring Afghan national-level strategic communications working groups for the first time since 2012
- **Gender Office:** implementation of the complaints commission and female harassment committee

MOD and MOI Literacy Training Contracts Pending National Procurement Commission Approval

This quarter, USFOR-A reported the MOD and MOI literacy contract packages were submitted for National Procurement Commission review and approval.¹⁵² In the interim, the ministries continue to provide literacy training using train-the-trainer graduate instructors at the regional training centers.¹⁵³ USFOR-A reports all ANA and ANP officers and non-commissioned officers are expected to be literate to hold their positions.¹⁵⁴ ANA policy requires officer applicants be fully literate—able to read, write, and grasp the idea of a topic—and requires noncommissioned-officer applicants be able to read and write.¹⁵⁵

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are local citizens selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.¹⁵⁶ Effective June 15, 2015, the ALP transitioned to align under the

“The ALP are not as well equipped or trained as other ANDSF. They have often been misemployed as ANP in distant checkpoints even though they should only operate within their local villages.”

—General John F. Campbell,
RS and USFOR-A commander

Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces-Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan*, 10/6/2015.

command and control of the AUP. However, the ALP will not be absorbed into the AUP **tashkil** (organizational strength) and even though the AUP is one of the ANP components, the ALP **tashkil** will remain independent of the ANP's total authorized strength.¹⁵⁷

As of August 26, 2015, however, the ALP had not reached its target of 30,000 guardians. According to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP comprised 28,073 personnel, 21,889 of whom were fully trained.¹⁵⁸ This is a reduction from 25,179 since May 24, 2015, when the ALP comprised 28,356 personnel.¹⁵⁹ NSOCC-A reports that it no longer has direct situational awareness of the ALP personnel, and depends on reporting from Afghan counterparts. The Afghans report that during the first seven months of 2015, 2.2% of the ALP guardians were killed in action, 7.4% have been dropped from the rolls, 2.3% were wounded, and 0.09% have become disabled; an overall 11.9% attrition rate. Yet 93% of ALP members renew their contracts.¹⁶⁰

NSOCC-A estimates the annual cost to sustain the ALP target strength is \$117 million; with the United States contributing \$112.5 million of ASFF and the Afghans funding the remainder.¹⁶¹ Of the estimated \$469.7 million DOD has obligated for the ALP through August 31, 2015, CSTC-A reported \$307.9 million was from ASFF. The latest ASFF disbursement to the MOI of \$45 million was made in late June.¹⁶²

NSOCC-A reports after the ALP transition to the AUP, the AUP initiated a nationwide audit of the ALP program that encompassed the tactical employment of the ALP and their checkpoint locations.¹⁶³ Earlier this year NSOCC-A attempted to validate the checkpoint locations using surveillance imagery, but had limited success due to the drawdown of Coalition forces and the lack of grid reference points.¹⁶⁴ Given those limitations, NSOCC-A was only able to verify that 271 of 929 checkpoints were still operational.¹⁶⁵ The AUP-led audit assessed 127 ALP districts and an additional 43 districts by phone on the personnel-accountability systems, logistics support, salary-disbursement methods, and tactical employment of the ALP guardians.¹⁶⁶ The resulting assessment and recommendations are expected to reform the ALP program.¹⁶⁷

One recommendation the AUP has made to the MOI is to disarm and disband unofficial militia groups who have joined the ALP. NSOCC-A reports of a militia group known as the **Anti-Taliban Movement (ATM)** whom Afghan ministerial leaders have discussed integrating into the ALP. However, currently there is no formal plan to incorporate the ATM into either the ALP or ANP.¹⁶⁸

The audit is timely as after the fall of Kunduz the news media reported that ALP members in the city—who receive three weeks' training and a monthly salary rarely exceeding \$120 if their commanders take a share—had been supplementing their salary by selling drugs, collecting a “tax” from residents, and killing citizens in crossfire during skirmishes with other ALP members.¹⁶⁹

Tashkil: list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MOD and MOI that detail authorized staff positions and equipment items. The word means “organization” in Dari.

Source: GAO, *Afghanistan Security*, GAO-08-661, 6/2008, p. 18.

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR issued an audit on DOD's support to the ALP program, which found the ALP lacks adequate logistics support, oversight, and a plan for either disbanding the force or incorporating it into the ANP. For more information, see Section 2, p. 25.

Anti-Taliban Movement: a broad term for several isolated groups in eastern Afghanistan that violently oppose Taliban control without government or NATO assistance. The Anti-Taliban Movement gained notoriety in the summer of 2012 when one such group successfully repelled a Taliban attack in Ghazni's Andar district.

Source: RFE/RL, “Afghan Villagers Hit Back Against Taliban,” 8/23/2012; *Foreign Policy*, “The anatomy of an anti-Taliban uprising,” 9/12/2012.

SECURITY PROTECTION FORCES

Afghan Public Protection Force Transition Awaits Presidential Action

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, was established to provide contract-based facility and convoy-security services. In 2013, then President Hamid Karzai ordered it to be dissolved and its guard functions transitioned to the ANP.¹⁷⁰ DOD reported, however, that President Ghani modified the APPF charter in February 2015, demonstrating that the APPF remains a state-owned enterprise.¹⁷¹ As of September 30, 2014, the United States had spent more than \$51 million on the APPF.¹⁷² DOD reports the provisions of Afghan Presidential Decree (PD) 62 on the “Bridging Strategy,” which states that APPF should be the primary source of security for U.S. and NATO contractors, remain in place.

USFOR-A reports while private security companies (PSC) are authorized, by Afghan PD 66, signed August 29, 2015, to contract with NATO and U.S. forces to provide external facility security and a limited grant of authority for certain U.S. and NATO contractors to subcontract with PSCs, as of October 6, 2015, there are no PSC contracts in place.¹⁷³ Risk-management companies are authorized to provide advisory services and command-and-control functions for the APPF.¹⁷⁴

Facilities Protection Force

On September 13, 2014, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General John Campbell and the Afghan National Security Advisor signed an MOU regarding the security of Afghan and U.S./NATO facilities. According to the MOU, the MOD will field a Facilities Protection Force (FPF) of 5,030 personnel to primarily provide security for select forward operating bases being turned over to the MOD.¹⁷⁵ However, the MOU also provides for Afghan force protection of the perimeter of U.S./NATO facilities and authorizes U.S./NATO forces “to utilize contracted armed security services inside NATO/U.S. agreed facilities.”¹⁷⁶

The FPF will be employed by the MOD, but will not be part of the regular ANA. The MOU calls for USFOR-A to fund FPF salaries the first year at \$13.7 million, with the option for the United States to fund the force for an additional year.¹⁷⁷ According to the MOU, the MOD will allow CSTC-A “to inspect and audit financial records” and ensure that “funds will be auditable by all U.S. Government agencies responsible for oversight of CSTC-A and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁸

DOD reported General Campbell signed a memorandum on July 13, 2015, documenting the FPF was developed as a temporary force and no salary funding would be provided after September 2015. The MOD is recruiting the FPF personnel into the ANA, with 3,344 accessions as of September 20, 2015.¹⁷⁹

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$38.1 billion and disbursed \$37.3 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.¹⁸⁰

Negligible ANA Personnel Decrease

As of July 20, 2015, the overall assigned end strength of the MOD, including the ANA, the AAF and civilians, was 176,420 personnel, according to RS.¹⁸¹ This is a decrease of 342 ANA personnel since last quarter, when the May 2015 assigned end strength was reported at 176,762. The slight decrease follows two quarters of increasing numbers.¹⁸²

SIGAR has long questioned the validity of Afghan security-personnel numbers. A SIGAR audit released earlier this year on the reliability and usefulness of ANA personnel and payroll data found no assurance that data are valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems possess inherent weaknesses and are not fully integrated. For more information, see SIGAR's April 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, page 23.

This quarter, some details of ANA troop strength at corps level remain classified. SIGAR will report on these in a classified annex to this report.

ANA Attrition

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that neither RS nor the ANA currently are tracking a monthly attrition goal. The informal 1.4% goal that ISAF promoted was deemed unrealistic. The attrition rates reported will be for a given month relative to the previous month-end strength without averaging or smoothing.¹⁸³

During the month of July 2015, the ANA attrition was 2.4%, with the AAF attrition at 0.6%. ANA and AAF attrition rates during May 2015 were 2.3% and 0.7%, respectively.¹⁸⁴

RS is working with the ANA to forecast attrition and calculate future monthly recruiting goals to counter the attrition and meet the full tashkil authorizations, considering training course capacities. RS reports that recent senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) promotions to officer positions are filling those positions with battlefield-experienced leaders while creating vacancies for qualified junior NCOs to move into the senior NCO ranks and gain critical leadership experience.¹⁸⁵

This quarter, details of ANA attrition at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will therefore report on them in a classified annex to this report.

ANA Sustainment

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$15.7 billion and disbursed \$15.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.¹⁸⁶ The most

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will focus on DOD's procurement, maintenance, and oversight of OCIE purchases for the ANDSF.

prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition replenishment, fuel purchases, and organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). Funding for food ceased on December 21, 2013, after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOD.¹⁸⁷

The U.S. Congress appropriates funds to the ASFF for training, equipping, sustaining, and funding the ANDSF, as well as for facility repair and construction. DOD is authorized to use ASFF to provide funds directly (on budget) to the Afghan government.¹⁸⁸ To ensure U.S. funds are used as intended, CSTC-A, the MOD, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) signed a Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter.¹⁸⁹

The Afghan FY 1394 financial-commitment letter requires the MOD to comply with the **Berry Amendment** when using any ASFF funds received on-budget for uniform purchases. A CSTC-A audit revealed the MOD did not comply with the Berry Amendment on a \$27 million purchase of uniforms from FY 1392 (December 2012–December 2013). At press time, CSTC-A was still determining the withholding penalty.¹⁹⁰ After problems with Afghan procurements of OCIE, including scams by Afghan contractors buying from Chinese instead of Afghan firms, shoddy quality, and other forms of corruption, the U.S. Congress restricted the use of ASFF to procure OCIE from non-U.S. companies. A provision in the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 826) requires that the Berry Amendment be applied to textile components supplied by DOD to the ANA or ANP for purposes of production of uniforms, without exceptions or exemptions.¹⁹¹

The Afghan FY 1394 financial-commitment letter also requires the MOD to document fuel consumption and deliveries. CSTC-A adjusts the following month's fuel allocation based on the sufficiency and accuracy of the fuel consumption documentation.¹⁹²

ANA Salaries and Incentives

As of September 30, 2015, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided \$2.76 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2009.¹⁹³ CSTC-A reported the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average \$682 million annually over the next five years.¹⁹⁴

CSTC-A noted that funding is provided on the basis of 100% of the ANA's authorized, not assigned, strength. However, any unspent funds carry forward into the following fiscal year to support the requirements in the next year.¹⁹⁵ To encourage the MOD to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016; pay for other positions will be 80% funded.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, all ANA personnel records are required to be entered into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) and all

The Berry Amendment: (Title 10 United States Code Section 2533a) requires DOD-purchased textile components (among other items), over the simplified acquisition threshold of \$250,000, to be produced in the United States when using appropriated funding. This law, passed in 1941, applies when CSTC-A is purchasing uniforms for the ANDSF or when providing on-budget financing to the Afghan ministries for uniform purchases.

Source: Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, "Berry Amendment FAQ," 10/5/2014.

SIGAR ALERT LETTER

SIGAR sent an alert letter to DOD, CENTCOM, and USFOR-A warning that the ANDSF has gone through multiple winters without appropriate cold-weather uniforms, and faces another shortage of cold-weather gear. For more information, see Section 2, p. 22.

personnel must be assigned a tashkil position.¹⁹⁷ USFOR-A reports as of August 24, 2015, the MOD has entered nearly all ANA members personnel records in AHRIMS and has assigned a tashkil position to 97% of the assigned personnel.¹⁹⁸

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$12.8 billion and disbursed \$12.7 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.¹⁹⁹ Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 54% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.9.²⁰⁰

As it did last quarter, DOD reported an increase in most equipment categories. Last quarter DOD said the increase was due in part to replenishment purchases required to replace current and projected battlefield damage and other losses, as well as the cost of supplying a new special-operations *kandak* (battalion).²⁰¹ CSTC-A reported the replenishment purchases cost approximately \$5 million.²⁰² Other equipment provided included clothing, such as uniforms, and individual equipment. Equipment purchased for the ANA that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF can be transferred to DOD for disposition, after the U.S. Congress is notified; to date \$215 million has been transferred to DOD, as shown in Table 3.10.²⁰³ CSTC-A reports that cumulatively more than 456,000 weapons, 104,400 communications devices, and 60,000 vehicles have been procured for the ANA using the ASFF appropriation.²⁰⁴

While progress toward improving the Afghan supply life-cycle management processes is occurring, CSTC-A reported the anticipated enhancement to the ANDSF's inventory and logistics information-management system

TABLE 3.9

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT, AS OF JUNE 30, 2015			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANA	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$631,737,933	\$522,370,326	\$24,983,028
Vehicles	7,214,663,193	6,440,981,649	TBD
Communications	840,433,973	703,298,191	82,830,726
Aircraft	1,183,859,713	649,861,508	441,514,596
Ammunition	2,291,847,017	2,180,830,996	380,830,461
Transportation Services	40,000,000	13,459,569	0
C-IEDs	341,550,056	341,550,056	74,059,985
Other	884,304,375	773,658,682	1,005,377
Total	\$13,428,396,260	\$11,626,010,977	\$1,005,224,173

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. TBD = To be determined; amount depends on how much damaged and destroyed equipment is turned in for replacement.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/4/2015.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR sent an inquiry letter to USFOR-A and CSTC-A requesting information on purchases of equipment and vehicles in quantities that exceed the needs of the ANDSF and if such purchases may result in the premature disposal of equipment or vehicles with significant service-life remaining. For more information, see Section 2, p. 40.

TABLE 3.10

U.S.-PURCHASED EQUIPMENT NOT TRANSFERRED TO OR RETURNED FROM ANA (\$ MILLIONS)		
	Scrap	To DOD Stock
Vehicles ^a	\$23.2	\$6.0
Troop Enclosure	9.0	
HMMWVs	3.4	
Aircraft	146.9	3.1
Office Equip		1.7
Crane/Forklifts	1.1	
Body Armor		.3
Weapons		1.1
Ammo		13.6
GPS/NVG		.1
Communication Equipment		4.4
Other		1.1
Total	\$183.6	\$31.4

Note: Dollar amounts rounded and cumulative. Already-owned C-208s became a suitable training aircraft substitute, resulting in the transfer to DOD stock of six C-182 aircraft (\$3.14 million). A troop enclosure is an add-on installed to the roof of a HMMWV or other vehicle that allows a soldier to stand up through a roof hatch with some degree of protection. HMMWV = high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles. GPS/NVG = global positioning system and night vision goggle items.
^a Includes vehicles and parts

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/4/2015; OSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2015; SIGAR, ANDSF analysis, 10/2015.

known as CORE-IMS has not yet been fully implemented. The testing of the software is complete, however, the server installation at the national and regional logistics centers will occur when the 165 new computers are received and installed. CSTC-A did not provide a revised implementation date for this system.²⁰⁵

Eighty-six Afghans were hired in the first group of logistical specialists to serve at the national and regional centers, providing training and assistance to the ANSDF.²⁰⁶ The logistics specialists have inventoried supplies at the regional centers, entered vendor data and thousands of supply class items into the existing system, and processed hundreds of transactions, some being the first transactions entered for a supply-class (spare-parts and supply items are grouped by classes) in three years.²⁰⁷ Also, in July, 18 MOD acquisition, technology, and weapons logistical specialists attended training provided by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) on the U.S. foreign military sales process, including life-cycle management (from requirements generation to delivery). The MOI also received the DISAM training.²⁰⁸

The financial-commitment letter providing funds to the MOD for Afghan FY 1394 requires the MOD to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and ensure that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicles.²⁰⁹

ANA Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$6 billion and disbursed \$5.6 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as military headquarters, schoolhouses, barracks, police checkpoint structures, air fields, and roads.²¹⁰

As of August 31, 2015, the United States had completed 369 infrastructure projects valued at \$5 billion, with another 20 projects valued at \$372.8 million ongoing, according to CSTC-A.²¹¹

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter continue to be the brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade of the 201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of \$115.7 million) and the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (which had costs increase from \$72.2 million to \$76.3 million), to be completed in December 2017, and the third phase of the Afghan Defense University (\$35.1 million), awarded in July 2012 and scheduled to be completed in September 2015.²¹² In addition, three projects were completed at a cost of \$61.4 million, including phase three of the MOD headquarters and garrisons (\$61.3 million), and four projects were awarded this quarter at a cost of \$34.9 million, including the final phase of the MOD garrisons (\$18.6 million).²¹³ Of the 18 projects (\$181.6 million) in the planning stage, three projects (\$32.1 million) are to construct facilities for females, according to CSTC-A.²¹⁴

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD's support to the ANA's portion of the Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-Temp is meeting its stated goals and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met.



An ANA 201st Corps electrical power-plant fuel farm was built in Kunar Province. (CSTC-A photo)

Several training and development programs for MOD engineers and public-works personnel are under way. CSTC-A has eight engineering advisors who mentor MOD engineers on operations and maintenance, sustainment, and construction issues during multiple weekly engagements. A CSTC-A contract provides subject-matter experts to train MOD personnel on the Afghan infrastructure computer system to plan and budget facility operations and maintenance. The contractor also provides MOD engineers survey technique training.²¹⁵

After a nine-month, train-the-trainer program in such areas as carpentry/masonry, indoor/external electrical, plumbing, and road survey and design, ANA instructors began teaching at the ANA Engineer School in August, under the observation of contractors and a U.S. Air Force civil engineer officer.²¹⁶

In addition, three training programs will begin this fall.²¹⁷

- an on-the-job training program for engineers and public works personnel to operate and maintain power plants, water treatment plants, and waste-water treatment plants
- a mobile-training team to deploy to ANA sites to training engineers and public works personnel
- a facilities-management workshop for engineers

The FY 1394 MOD financial-commitment letter requires the Afghan government to provide CSTC-A a transition and sustainment plan, including infrastructure security, for the facilities constructed with U.S. funding and transferred to the Afghan government.²¹⁸ CSTC-A reports that it continues to work with the MOD to reach consensus on the list of excess facilities which would no longer require sustainment funding.²¹⁹

SIGAR ALERT LETTER

SIGAR issued an alert letter on the results of an inspection of the U.S.-funded construction of the command-and-control center at Camp Brown. The \$5 million contract, terminated for convenience almost one year after the building was to have been completed. The building had numerous safety issues and was less than half completed. For more information, see Section 2, p. 21.



A USFOR-A mobile training team provides instruction in Kabul. (CSTC-A photo)

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD operations and training.²²⁰

CSTC-A reported 25 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs: 18 focusing on technical training, four on professional military education, two on basic training, and one on English language.²²¹ The largest U.S.-funded training contracts include pilot training, special operations, counter improvised-explosive-device and explosive-ordnance disposal, and aircraft-maintenance training.²²²

Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

CSTC-A reported that between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the United States has obligated more than \$2.3 billion to develop the AAF, including over \$905 million for equipment and aircraft.²²³ Since last quarter, DOD reduced its FY 2015 request from \$925.2 million to \$683.3 million. The amount requested for training declined, but the amount for equipment and aircraft rose from \$21.4 million to \$173.5 million. However, the majority of the funding requested continues to be for sustainment.²²⁴ Additionally, the FY 2016 request is for \$548.3 million, with the significant majority of the funds for training and sustainment.²²⁵

According to USFOR-A, this quarter, the AAF aircraft inventory includes:²²⁶

- 11 Mi-35 helicopters (one less than last quarter)
- 52 Mi-17 helicopters (four less)
- 16 MD-530 helicopters (two less)
- 26 C-208 airplanes
- 4 C-130 airplanes

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In February 2015, SIGAR conducted a fact-finding visit on the A-29 Super Tucanos at Moody Air Force Base in the State of Georgia. SIGAR will conduct ongoing monitoring of the program's roll-out and the training of the Afghan pilots.

Additionally, 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light-attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close-air support, and aerial reconnaissance, have been purchased but are not yet delivered.²²⁷

This quarter USFOR-A reported the first eight AAF pilots were qualified to fly the armed variant of the MD-530 helicopter.²²⁸ Additionally, Afghan pilot training is ongoing in the United States on the A-29 Super Tucanos. The first class will graduate in December, which aligns with the first delivery of the A-29 Super Tucanos in the fourth quarter of 2015.²²⁹ That success is offset by the loss of two Mi-17 pilots killed during an aircraft accident.²³⁰ For the fledging AAF, a DOD official told SIGAR, the loss of a pilot has an even greater impact than the loss of a plane.²³¹

USFOR-A reported a mix of internal and external contract-maintenance and logistics-management support as the goal for the AAF. The Afghans will perform routine maintenance and time-required inspections, while outside contractors will perform the heavy depot-level repairs and aircraft overhauls. USFOR-A estimates it will take five to seven years to develop the AAF organic maintenance workforce: 18 months is required to train an apprentice maintainer, and another two to three years is required to develop a craftsman-level maintainer. The airframe expected to achieve the organic maintenance capability soonest is the C-208 in 2018; the C-130 and the new MD-530 are expected to achieve Afghan organic-maintenance status in 2023.²³²

CSTC-A reported that between FY 2012 and FY 2015, the United States has invested over \$1.77 billion in the development of the SMW, obligating more than \$935.8 million of that amount for equipment and aircraft.²³³ According to CSTC-A, the SMW fleet of 45 fielded aircraft comprises Mi-17 helicopters and PC-12 turboprop planes that perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.²³⁴ According to NSOCC-A, the SMW comprises 475 members, of which 102 are pilots, all part of the MOD.²³⁵ Fifty-four additional personnel are undergoing entry, English-proficiency, and security background checks.²³⁶

NSOCC-A reports the SMW has flown over 840 *sorties* in the Mi-17 as of September 1, 2015, compared to 400 during 2014. The PC-12 pilots have flown 972 sorties this year compared to 205 in 2014.²³⁷

According to NSOCC-A, most modern aviation organizations contract for some of their maintenance due to the complexity of aviation systems.²³⁸ The goal for the SMW is 80% organic to 20% contract maintenance.²³⁹ It will take 60 months to fully train a Mi-17 or PC-12 mechanic according to NSOCC-A, marking the summer of 2020 as the earliest the SMW will have organic maintenance and repair capability.²⁴⁰ In August 2014, the SMW had no inspection teams; now there are three 50-hour and one 100-hour scheduled inspection teams.²⁴¹ Currently the Afghans perform approximately 20% (up from 15% last quarter) of the scheduled maintenance to the Mi-17 fleet. All PC-12 maintenance is performed by third-party contractors.²⁴²

Sortie: In military aviation, a sortie is a combat mission of an individual aircraft, starting when the aircraft takes off and ending on its return. For example, one mission involving six aircraft would tally six sorties.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$18.4 billion and disbursed \$18.1 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.²⁴³

SIGAR AUDIT

A January 2015 SIGAR audit on ANP personnel and payroll data found that data has no assurance of being valid, that controls and oversight are weak, and that computer systems are not fully functional or integrated.

USFOR-A Review of ANP Personnel Strength Reporting

This quarter, USFOR-A reported a review of the ANP personnel rollup reporting method revealed several counting issues that resulted in a net decrease of 5,788 when corrected.²⁴⁴

The review revealed a number of units were being counted in both the MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS) and within the AUP pillars, and that another unit should be counted within the MOI HQ & IS, but was not.²⁴⁵

The MOI HQ & IS contains many departments including the Criminal Investigation Department, the General Command of Police Special Units, and seven deputy-minister offices (support, administration, the APPF, counternarcotics, security, intelligence, and strategy/policy). The Afghan Police Academy, the Higher Education Command, and the Kabul Training Center are all included under the Deputy Minister for Administration, while the Logistics Headquarters personnel are aligned with the Deputy Minister for Support.²⁴⁶ The ABP includes its headquarters, customs police, and six zones. The ANCOP includes its headquarters, a company command, and eight brigades. The AUP includes traffic, fire/rescue, and 34 provincial headquarters, each with a regional training center and logistics support.²⁴⁷

Additionally, CSTC-A reported that students and personnel on standby are no longer included in its totals.²⁴⁸

The review and correction come after SIGAR reported in a January 2015 audit that there was no assurance that ANP personnel or payroll data were accurate. On September 27, 2015, Tolo News reported that President Ghani, questioning the current number of the security forces and the likely presence of “ghost” forces, was initiating an audit to ascertain the exact numbers.²⁴⁹ The UN reported the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee issued a “vulnerability to corruption” assessment covering the payment system for martyrs and persons disabled by conflict.²⁵⁰ Then on October 6, 2015, Pajhwok Afghan News reported the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled had found “ghost” martyrs within the system and had cancelled more than 50,000 cards that had been issued to persons with fake disabilities and fake families of martyrs.²⁵¹

This quarter USFOR-A reported the overall strength of the ANP totaled 148,296 personnel, a decrease of 6,886 since last quarter and 8,704 below the authorized end strength of 157,000, as reflected in Table 3.11.²⁵²

USFOR-A reported that neither RS nor the ANP are now tracking a monthly attrition goal. The informal 1.4% goal that ISAF promoted was deemed

TABLE 3.11

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2015	Q3 2015	Quarterly Change	Q2 2015	Q3 2015	Quarterly Change
AUP	93,045	90,139	(2,906)	95,389	86,754	(8,635)
ABP	22,742	22,955	213	22,021	21,775	(246)
ANCOP	15,192	15,223	31	15,017	15,169	152
MOI HQs & IS	27,077	28,523	27,077	22,827	24,598	1,771
Required to reconcile to ANP Subtotal	-	-	-	(72)	-	72
ANP Total (as reported)	158,056	156,840	24,415	155,182	148,296	(6,886)

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2015 data as of 5/2015; Q3 2015 data as of 7/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 6/29/2015 and 9/11/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 6/29/2015.

unrealistic. The attrition rates reported will be for one-month periods relative to the previous month-end strength without averaging or smoothing.²⁵³

During the months of May, June, and July, the ANP experienced a 1.9%, 2.0%, and 1.9% attrition.²⁵⁴

ANP Sustainment

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$7.5 billion and disbursed \$7.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.²⁵⁵ This includes contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries. The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition replenishment, fuel purchases, and OCIE. Since December 21, 2013, the United States has no longer funded food costs after CSTC-A suspected widespread fraud by the MOI.²⁵⁶

DOD reported that relatively small quantities of OCIE, either unserviceable or not suitable for use by the ANDSF, have been disposed of by transferring them to DOD stock. DOD further stated that once the ANDSF disposal capabilities are developed, the process of “returning to DOD stock” will not include OCIE or similar supplies or equipment that does not require demilitarization.²⁵⁷

ANP Salaries

Through October 15, 2015, the U.S. government had provided \$1.53 billion, contributed through LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields).²⁵⁸ The U.S. contribution to LOTFA for calendar year 2015 is \$112 million to fund salaries, incentives, and the United Nations Development

Programme management fee.²⁵⁹ The first distribution of \$56.2 million was made in June.²⁶⁰

CSTC-A reports the U.S. funding required for LOTFA over the next five years will depend on the contributions of Coalition partners. The estimated annual expenses range from a high of \$616.3 million to a low of \$608.1 million, for an average of \$613.2 million annually.²⁶¹

The CSTC-A financial commitment letter to the MOI for Afghan FY 1394 includes the LOTFA Steering Committee mandate for the MOI to provide 100% of ANP salaries through electronic funds transfer.²⁶² To incentivize the MOI to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016.²⁶³ USFOR-A reports as of August 30, 2015, the MOI has input nearly all ANP members' personnel records in AHRIMS and has assigned a tashkil position to 93% of the assigned personnel.²⁶⁴

In addition to the LOTFA contributions, CSTC-A reported the first U.S. direct contribution, \$238.4 million, was provided to the Ministry of Finance in May to cover ANP payroll expenses through August 2015.²⁶⁵

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.1 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.²⁶⁶ Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, as shown in Table 3.12.²⁶⁷ More than 58% of funding in this category was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.²⁶⁸

Equipment purchased for the ANP includes sophisticated items such as high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); night-vision devices; global-positioning systems; explosive-ordnance disposal equipment; and biometrics equipment. Ordinary items include ambulances, spare parts, pistols, machine guns, radios, clothing, dental and medical equipment, and transportation services.²⁶⁹ Cumulatively, CSTC-A reported more than 575,000 weapons, 108,700 communications devices, and 55,000 vehicles had been procured for the ANP.²⁷⁰ The total equipment procured CSTC-A has reported since June has increased by over \$900 million.²⁷¹ Last quarter DOD said the large increase was due in part to purchases needed to replace current and projected battlefield damage and other losses.²⁷²

The financial-commitment letter providing ASFF funds to the MOI for FY 1394 requires the MOI to determine the types and the number of vehicles it needs, to ensure that maintenance is done following standard practices, and that vehicles are used as intended prior to CSTC-A providing additional vehicles.²⁷³

Equipment purchased for the ANP that was later determined to be no longer required by the ANDSF can be transferred to the DOD for disposition,

TABLE 3.12

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT, AS OF JUNE 30, 2015			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANP	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons ^a	\$272,449,808	\$205,851,400	TBD
Vehicles ^b	3,410,392,212	3,109,856,026	TBD
Communications	230,376,282	224,995,225	11,588,547
Aircraft	766,950,000	692,950,000	74,000,000
Ammunition	738,345,011	419,352,362	TBD
Transportation Services	20,026,263	7,770,471	0
C-IEDs	115,581,810	115,581,810	2,165,915
Other	243,097,382	91,438,300	14,412,160
Total	\$5,797,218,768	\$4,867,795,594	\$102,166,622

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. TBD = To be determined; amount depends on how much damaged and destroyed equipment is turned in for replacement.

^a \$727,337 reduction from last quarterly report is due to requirement changes.

^b Vehicle costs include vehicles and parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/4/2015.

after the U.S. Congress is notified; to date \$18.4 million has been transferred to DOD.²⁷⁴ This process is available for equipment that CSTC-A had not transferred to the ANP as well as equipment that had been transferred.²⁷⁵

SIGAR analysis of the equipment being transferred to DOD to be scrapped shows that it includes several items that could be useful to the ANDSF—such as OCIE and ammunition. However, DOD reported the ANP is consulted on the equipment prior to the transfer to DOD stocks.²⁷⁶ CSTC-A reported the ammunition, valued at \$27.2 million, is being transferred to DOD stock as the ANA and ANP no longer require these low-use munitions and their national stock objectives have been met. As the ammunition is currently in the United States at storage facilities awaiting transport to Afghanistan, this action will save \$14 million that would have been incurred in storage costs.²⁷⁷

ANP Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$3.1 billion and disbursed \$3 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure.²⁷⁸

As of August 31, 2015, the United States had completed 729 infrastructure projects (valued at \$3.5 billion), according to CSTC-A.²⁷⁹

The last active ANP infrastructure project, phase three of the MOI headquarters (at a cost of \$55.1 million), is scheduled to be completed this fall.²⁸⁰

While no new contracts were awarded this year, six ANP infrastructure projects (\$76.5 million) were completed this quarter, to include the ANCOP brigade and battalion headquarters building in Paktiya (\$23.4 million), and the transportation brigade and four transportation battalion headquarters (\$23.3 million).²⁸¹



The MOI headquarters administration buildings are located in Kabul. (CSTC-A photo)

CSTC-A reports of the 15 projects (\$62.3 million) in the planning stage, 14 of the projects (\$61.3 million) are to construct training, dining, and living facilities for females.²⁸²

Six CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOI engineers on facility-sustainment policy, planning, programming budgeting, and execution several times a week, as well as contract reviews and project planning.²⁸³ A CSTC-A contract provides subject-matter experts to train MOI personnel on the Afghan infrastructure computer system to plan and budget facility operations and maintenance. The contractor also provides MOI engineers survey technique training.²⁸⁴

CSTC-A is attempting to negotiate an agreement between the MOD and MOI to provide ANP billets at the ANA Engineer School. The ANP need training for instructors in carpentry/masonry, indoor/exterior electrical, plumbing, and road survey and design.²⁸⁵ In addition, three training programs will be this fall:²⁸⁶

- a CSTC-A training and advisory team to increase ANP logistics officer capabilities to operate, maintain, and sustain infrastructure
- a training program for 39 facility engineers and personnel in developing contractual requirements, statement of works, and execution oversight (an earlier program placed 29 graduates within the MOI and ANP)
- a facilities management workshop for engineers and their MOD counterparts

ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2015, the United States had obligated \$3.7 billion and disbursed \$3.6 billion of the ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.²⁸⁷

CSTC-A reported there are seven ongoing U.S.-funded technical training programs for the ANP: five technical, one basic training, and one on professional military training.²⁸⁸ The largest U.S.-funded training includes operational-specialty training, such as special operations intelligence, equipment maintenance, counter-improvised-explosive-device procedures, explosive-ordnance disposal, and radio operation and maintenance.²⁸⁹

STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ANDSF

This quarter USFOR-A reported the number of women serving in the ANDSF increased by 415. With the decrease in the overall ANDSF strength, the percentage of women serving also increased from 0.99% to 1.16%.²⁹⁰

This quarter, RS reported 3,753 women among the ANDSF's assigned force strength for the ANA and ANP, including students-in-training and recent training graduates. Of the total, there were 817 officers, 1,258 NCOs, 1,154 soldiers, and 524 cadets.²⁹¹

RS reported the ANA reduced their recruitment goal to 485 women per year to match the current training capacity. The limited number of barracks

is restricting the number of women who can be accommodated in basic training.²⁹² USFOR-A reported that the number of female recruits has doubled in the ANP since March 2013.²⁹³ ANP recruiting is traditionally more successful than ANA female recruiting because the ANP recruits can typically work in their home provinces.²⁹⁴

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014 authorizes \$25 million to be used for programs, facilities, recruiting, and integration of women into the ANDSF. CSTC-A reports that all the \$25 million, plus some extra funding, has been obligated. Over \$4 million was obligated for on-budget items such as building improvements, public relations and advertising, bonuses and incentives, and travel. However, over \$23 million was executed off-budget for building improvements, to include \$787,000 for the female facilities at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University, and supplies.²⁹⁵ Additionally, of the \$10 million NATO allocated from the ANA Trust Fund for ANA women's programs, CSTC-A has obligated \$5.6 million for building improvements.²⁹⁶

ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

Since 2006, the United States has funded the construction of 184 ANDSF medical facilities valued at \$188.2 million and procured approximately \$54.7 million in ANA medical equipment.²⁹⁷ An additional \$150,000 for ANA and \$200,000 for ANP equipment purchases were scheduled for this fiscal year, in addition to \$1.76 million for on-budget acquisitions that were held up due to procurement issues.²⁹⁸ The ANA has eight regional medical hospitals; the AAF has five clinics and five detachments. The ANP has just one hospital, in Kabul, but has an agreement with the ANA to treat police.²⁹⁹ At this time, no other medical-facility construction is planned; however, the South Korean hospital at Bagram Air Field will be transferred to the MOD in December.³⁰⁰ CSTC-A reports the ANA intends to use the hospital to provide medical services to the AAF and the local civilian population.³⁰¹

CSTC-A reported there were 868 physicians assigned in the ANDSF health-care system as of August 17, 2015. The total number of positions authorized is 1,185, with 546 physicians assigned in ANA positions and 322 in ANP positions. The ANA and ANP have a shortage of 194 and 123 physicians respectively.³⁰² Seven of the eight ANA regional hospitals, to include the Kabul National Military Hospital, are fully operational. The eighth hospital in Helmand was planned to have 50% of the tashkil staffed by the end of June 2015.³⁰³

The ANDSF also has 2,582 nurses, physicians' assistants, and other medical personnel, an increase of 140, yet an additional 867 positions remain unfilled.³⁰⁴ While the number of unfilled medical personnel positions has increased since the end of May, the number of positions authorized has increased by 242, increasing the overall shortage.³⁰⁵

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the ANA and ANP created joint plans to provide medical services to soldiers and police during 2015 fighting season.³⁰⁶ The AAF medical service, at times augmented by ANA flight medics, continues to fly 30–40 medical evacuation missions per week.³⁰⁷ CSTC-A contracted for biomedical equipment technician training to enable the ANP technicians to maintain their equipment.³⁰⁸ However, critical medical supplies totaling \$465,000 and nearly \$24 million in vaccines were procured by the Coalition after problems with ANDSF procurement.³⁰⁹

STATUS OF CLASSIFIED ANDSF DATA

This quarter, RS classified some information about ANDSF personnel strength, attrition, and assessments; the AAF; and the SMW. As authorized by its enabling statute, SIGAR provides Congress with a classified annex to this report containing that information.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Afghanistan remains heavily contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan to protect victims of conflict, provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, and enhance the security and safety of the Afghan people. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$305.6 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. All PM/WRA FY 2014 funds have been expended as of this quarter. PM/WRA has two-year funding; FY 2015 funding has not been made available for obligation at this time.³¹⁰

In July 2015, the Jangalak industrial complex in Kabul was declared free of mines and ERW and handed over to the Afghan government. The factory complex, once one of the most productive in Afghanistan, employed 3,000 workers before it was destroyed during the 1990s civil war. With mine-clearance operations now complete, the Ministry of Finance plans to construct a large printing press at the complex, which will employ around 1,000 workers.³¹¹

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor to clear areas contaminated by ERW and to support the clearance of conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As of June 30, 2015, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 172.3 million square meters of land (approximately 66.5 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 8.9 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO),

SECURITY

TABLE 3.13

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, JANUARY 1, 2013–JUNE 30, 2015						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)*
1/1-3/31/2013	1,984	100,648	105,553	3,722,289	7,978,836	552,000,000
4/1-6/30/2013	1,058	18,735	49,465	1,079,807	5,586,198	537,000,000
7/1-9/30/2013	1,243	21,192	98,306	1,673,926	4,229,143	521,000,000
10/1-12/31/2013	8,211	2,460	54,240	3,064,570	5,729,023	518,000,000
1/1-3/31/2014	1,780	254,734	245,380	262,750	5,473,170	638,400,000
4/1-6/30/2014	1,077	3,264	25,362	3,227,697	5,163,035	519,000,000
7/1-9/30/2014	1,329	26,873	21,502	2,860,695	5,705,984	511,600,000
10/1-12/31/2014	465	20,274	58,369	538,499	1,604,410	524,600,000
1/1-3/31/2015	388	8,495	3,571	930,110	2,425,318	535,600,000
4/1-6/30/2015	434	3,037	2,748	980,748	3,390,216	535,600,000
Total	17,969	459,712	664,496	18,341,091	47,285,333	535,600,000

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

* Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2015, 6/26/2015, and 9/28/2015.

abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives (see Table 3.13).³¹²

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 535.6 square kilometers (206.8 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.³¹³ During the quarter, 6.5 square kilometers (2.5 square miles) were cleared. However, ongoing surveys identified 29.8 square kilometers (11.5 square miles) of additional contaminated areas, bringing the total of known contaminated area to 558.9 square kilometers (215.7 square miles) by the end of the quarter.³¹⁴

In April 2015, USAID issued its first grant of \$9.6 million under the \$30.2 million Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III). ACAP III's goal is to support victims of war, including victims of mines and ERW. The program provides immediate medical and other nonmonetary assistance tailored to meet victims' needs. It also develops the capacity of government ministries and institutions to aid victims of war and enhance outreach to and advocacy efforts for victims. ACAP III will run until February 2018. In its August report, UNAMA reported the highest number of civilian casualties during the first six months of 2015 compared to the same period in previous years. The increase in civilian casualties during those six months

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR issued a financial audit this quarter reviewing the costs incurred by International Relief and Development Inc. in its implementation of a cooperative agreement used to fund ACAP II. The audit identified two material weaknesses in International Relief and Development's internal controls and one instance of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the cooperative agreement. For more information see Section 2, p. 32.

stems from an increase in attacks; IEDs are the second-leading cause of civilian casualties, with 4% from ERW. The security situation has led to increased casualties among women and children; ACAP III will emphasize economic-reintegration services for women and youth.³¹⁵

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of September 30, 2015, the United States has provided \$8.4 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$2.9 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$1.6 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$1.6 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$2.2 billion).³¹⁶ USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production.³¹⁷ In addition to reconstruction funding, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. (See Appendix B.)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported this quarter that opium production decreased 48% this year compared to last year. The drop would be significant, but UNODC cautions that its reporting methodology changed between 2014 and 2015, possibly "making the extent of changes appear greater than it actually was." The 2014 opium production was estimated at 6,400 tons (14.1 million pounds); 2015 results are estimated at 3,300 tons (7.3 million pounds). Cultivation levels also decreased from 224,000 hectares in 2014 to 183,000 hectares in 2015, but the number of poppy-free provinces declined in 2015, with Balkh losing its status. Despite the reduced opium production levels, cultivation remains significant and eradication levels have little impact on curtailing production or cultivation as illustrated in the Figure 3.27.³¹⁸

President Ghani in October signed Afghanistan's new counternarcotics strategy for the next five years, the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP). The three goals of the NDAP are to decrease opium-poppy cultivation; decrease the production and trafficking of opiates and reduce domestic demand for illicit drugs; and increase the provision of treatment for users. The plan outlines specific targets to achieve these goals to be reviewed annually. For instance, it proposes to decrease cultivation by 10% by 2016 and 40% by 2019; transition 15 treatment programs to the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) the first year and 75 by 2019; and solicit regional and international support in several program areas such as interdiction, border control, and anti-money laundering.³¹⁹

The United States has committed \$350 million for Afghan counternarcotics efforts, including implementation and support of the plan. However, the


U.S. track record in combating narcotics production in Afghanistan is not encouraging. U.S. spending on counternarcotics since 2002 already exceeds \$8 billion, yet Afghanistan remains the world's leading producer of opium. Limiting opium cultivation and curtailing drug use are becoming even more formidable challenges with a rising number of heroin users in China increasing the demand for Afghan opium.³²⁰

U.S. Ambassador P. Michael McKinley told SIGAR in February that an updated U.S. counternarcotics strategy would be finalized within six months. However, State informed SIGAR this quarter that the U.S. government is still operating under the December 2012 strategy. After review of Afghanistan's recently announced NDAP, the United States will prepare a revised strategy that complements the NDAP.³²¹

With the reduced Coalition footprint and the tenuous security situation in certain provinces, limited resources are available to execute programs and oversee their implementation. For instance, State informed SIGAR last quarter that security conditions prevented American staff visits to the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics' (MCN) offices.³²²

FIGURE 3.27

OPIUM CULTIVATION AND ERADICATION RESULTS, 2005-2015 (HECTARES IN THOUSANDS)



Note: A hectare is 10,000 square meters, or almost 2.5 acres.

* UNODC notes that its report methodology changed between 2014 and 2015, possibly "making the extent of changes appear greater than it actually was."

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Executive Summary*, 10/2015, pp. 4, 5; UNODC, *World Drug Report 2014*, 7/2014, p. 21.

Colombo Plan: Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL supports the work of the Colombo Plan to establish a national-level training and certification system for drug addiction counselors. The basic level of the Universal Treatment Curriculum is utilized in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This professionalization of treatment leads to improved treatment outcomes, lower relapse rates and greater confidence in the treatment system.

Source: *The Colombo Plan Secretariat*, www.colombo-plan.org, accessed 4/7/2014; State, INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2015, p. 23.

Drug Demand Reduction

INL currently supports 97 residential and outpatient treatment centers serving nearly 30,000 Afghans per year. Last quarter, the MOPH published the results of the latest national drug-use survey. As opium cultivation levels have continued to rise in recent years, so has the country's domestic addiction problem. Drug users may well exceed 10% of the population, according to INL. In January 2015, INL transitioned the first group of 13 treatment programs to MOPH responsibility and transferred the clinical staff to the Afghan government staff list (tashkil). Another 15 treatment programs will transition to the government by the end of January 2016 and the remainder by the end of 2019.

According to INL, the MOPH has been leading the monthly transition task force meetings with the MCN, the **Colombo Plan**, and INL since July. INL meets twice a year with the same stakeholders to discuss and resolve any potential budgetary issues. INL contributed over \$7.6 million to the Colombo Plan for its drug demand-reduction program in October 2014 and \$12.9 million in September 2015.³²³

In his recent interview with SIGAR, President Ghani raised the issue of domestic drug addiction, saying some 3.5 million Afghans are addicted. President Ghani said Afghanistan's opium production can only be curtailed by creating better-paying jobs in the agriculture sector. (For more information, see Section 1 of this report.)

Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement

INL funds the nationwide Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. Since 2013, INL has expended \$9.2 million on the program. The program was extended for one year on April 4, 2015, with an additional cost of almost \$1.6 million. A campaign targeting the 2016 preplanting season began on July 25. The campaign included antidrug billboards and radio and TV advertisements at the national and local levels. Other community-outreach events were held in Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Badghis, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Daykundi, Nangarhar, Nimroz, and Kunar. The MCN also held outreach sessions with religious and civil-society leaders.³²⁴

As part of the program, Sayara Media Communications (Sayara) analyzes the effectiveness of antinarcotics media campaigns. Its 42 reporters were placed in several provinces, which were ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on their cultivation levels. The reporters gathered information and gauged perceptions on the state of counternarcotics policies and messaging. In addition, Sayara assessed the effectiveness of campaigns with audience survey reports.³²⁵

An INL assessment released last quarter dealt with the impact of programs to reduce opium cultivation by Afghan farmers. The report concluded that the effectiveness of public-information campaigns is difficult to evaluate. It analyzed the public-information campaign component of the 2008–2012 Helmand Food Zone program, whose activities were similar to those of CNCE. Even the MCN, which has claimed public-awareness campaigns appeared to noticeably influence decisions to cultivate poppy, warned that no conclusive research exists on the effectiveness of counter-narcotics messaging.³²⁶

Ministry of Counter-Narcotics Capacity Building

An 18-month MOU signed with the MCN last year that provided funding for 24 Afghan national advisors ended on September 15, 2015. Responding to SIGAR's data-call question, INL was unable to provide financial information on cumulative spending and obligations. According to INL, the MCN has shown significant progress in institutional development and has an increased ability to develop staff and programs. The Afghan national advisor program started with a staff of 34. The MOU was not renewed, but INL will provide advisory support to the MCN in the future if it is necessary. INL concluded that shifting from capacity-building support to training opportunities would enable the MCN to take on greater responsibility in its transition plan.

In August, 13 Asian University for Women graduates started their one-year fellowships at the MCN. The fellows are assigned throughout the ministry to develop staff capacity and raise gender awareness. The MCN revised their proposals, based on INL feedback, for a series of short- and long-term courses to be taught at Afghan universities. The courses were designed to increase work-related skills and overall capacity of the MCN staff. INL is exploring funding options for three of the five updated proposals.³²⁷

SIGAR is unable to assess the MCN's capacity-building efforts as no performance-measurement plan (PMP) or evaluation or progress reports were provided for this program. Last quarter, INL informed SIGAR it was developing methods for measuring Afghan national advisor effectiveness to be included in the PMP. However, security conditions have prevented regular visits to the MCN's offices by American staff since early this year.³²⁸

INL conducted an independent risk assessment of the MCN's public financial-management system during the first quarter of 2015. The report identified deficiencies that increased the potential for inaccurate financial reporting, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations; areas of particular concern were internal control, program management and monitoring, and fixed-assets management. INL's remediation plan for the MCN assessment was finalized this quarter. INL is procuring a contractor to implement this remediation plan.

SIGAR INSPECTION

This quarter SIGAR published an inspection report that reviewed the power grid project at the Counter Narcotics Strip Mall in Kabul. The inspection found that the project was completed within budget and met contract performance standards. However, the power grid was not tested or deemed operable until January 2015—a year and a half after completion. INL funded this project to support eight law enforcement compounds. For more information see Section 2, p. 36.

The year-long plan includes creating databases, establishing policies and standard procedures, and providing training.³²⁹

Governor-Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Governor-Led Eradication Program (GLE) program, which operates at different times of the year depending on each province's cultivation cycle. Since the program's inception in 2008, INL has obligated \$9.9 million and disbursed \$4.2 million. The MCN tracks cumulative eradication results that are subsequently verified by UNODC. GLE provides limited financial support to provincial governments who participate in poppy-eradication efforts. According to INL, GLE is part of a larger process whereby provincial authorities and Kabul balance incentives for growing licit crops with disincentives for illicit cultivation. GLE is the only eradication program financially supported by the U.S. government. It accounts for less than 2% of INL's Afghanistan counternarcotics budget.³³⁰

According to INL, UNODC's August 2015 eradication report shows total eradication results of 3,760 hectares, a 40% increase over last year's result of 2,692 hectares. The improved results of this year's eradication campaign still pale compared to the 2013 eradication total of 7,348 hectares; the 2015 eradication result represents 3% of the current (incomplete) UNODC national opium-cultivation estimate of 115,843 hectares (UNODC provided estimates for 28 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces). Based on the \$4.2 million spent on GLE to date, serious questions remain about program effectiveness and return on investment. UNODC's forthcoming opium-survey report will contain the finalized national area estimate and eradication totals for all provinces.³³¹

For more information on GLE, see SIGAR's April 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

Good Performer's Initiative

INL's Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) supports the MCN's efforts to reduce provincial poppy cultivation and boost licit crops. To date, INL has obligated \$73 million and disbursed \$17.2 million for GPI. Under the terms of GPI, a province must demonstrate verifiable achievements against defined standards to receive awards. In August 2014, INL and the MCN announced GPI II, which expands the award categories for "good performers" to include public outreach and law enforcement, in addition to cultivation. The redesigned GPI provides more support for rural alternative livelihoods. Its aim is to reduce poppy cultivation in select communities by enhancing the profitability of licit crops and improving rural employment options and incomes. The GPI II MOU has been finalized; the Afghan government and the U.S. Embassy Kabul are making arrangements for its execution. As of August 31, 2015, a total of 245 GPI projects with a value of more than \$116 million have been approved.

Some 183 projects had been completed, 60 were ongoing, and two were nearing completion.³³²

INL ensures that projects proposed under the GPI program do not conflict with other U.S. government work through interagency consultation. INL and its implementing partners consult with USAID to avoid pitfalls like duplicative work or competing activities, and to develop complementary activities. State's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan hosts regular counternarcotics working groups to bring together personnel from State, DOD, DEA, USAID, and other relevant agencies to maintain coordination on counternarcotics programs.³³³

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD

USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding also supports programs in several areas including supply reduction and alternative development.³³⁴

Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods

INL supports alternative-livelihood programs as part of its efforts to combat drug trafficking. The nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation and its partners implement activities under the \$11.9 million Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant from INL. The implementers favor activities, rather than stand-alone projects, with the following five objectives:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crop systems
- increase economic return for licit crop systems
- improve farmers' access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve sub-national governance systems

SAGAL activities are implemented in 16 provinces including Helmand and Kandahar. INL informed SIGAR that \$6.2 million have been expended to date.³³⁵

According to INL, SAGAL activities complement past and ongoing investments in licit livelihoods and rural development by the U.S. government, including support for GPI II. Where possible, SAGAL will support a more decentralized GPI II project-selection and nomination process to improve the recognition of rural community needs. Wherever GPI II and SAGAL both operate, SAGAL project teams will provide needed support such as access to improved techniques and technologies, agricultural inputs, linkages to markets, and greater capacity for communities to increase postproduction crop value. SAGAL supplements the work of USAID projects wherever

SECURITY

TABLE 3.14

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS					
Agency	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 9/30/2015 (\$)
State	Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)	7/21/2014	1/20/2016	\$11,884,816	\$6,162,146
USAID	Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/30/2016	45,296,184	44,141,069
USAID	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)	3/2/2009	9/30/2015	159,878,589	155,860,217
USAID	Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	7/31/2013	8/30/2016	27,695,788	18,212,000
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-South	10/7/2013	10/6/2018	125,075,172	37,871,187
USAID	RADP-North	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	10,988,400
USAID	RADP-West	8/10/2014	8/9/2019	69,973,376	10,502,291

Note: USAID programs listed are not necessarily funded from the agency's Alternative Development Fund.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2015; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/24/2015; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2015.

possible and expands U.S.-funded alternative-livelihood projects into new areas. Program staff consult with USAID to avoid working with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities.³³⁶

Table 3.14 provides summary financial information on SAGAL and other alternative livelihood programs.

Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a \$27.7 million USAID project implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD) under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar. IRD was granted a one-year extension of the program through August 30, 2016, increasing its total cost to \$27.7 million.³³⁷

In its first two years, KFZ completed the rehabilitation of 12 canals in two districts (totaling almost 168 kilometers or 104.4 miles) which provide water to more than 19,000 hectares of farmland and 33 alternative livelihood activities such as vocational masonry training, vegetable production and processing for women, pre- and post harvest marketing and management, greenhouses establishment, and solar drying-mechanism trainings for fruits and vegetables. KFZ also held the April 2014 Alternative Development Conference where 560 people participated including the Acting Minister of Counter-Narcotics, the Kandahar provincial governor, various district government officials, community development councils (CDCs), local shura, villagers from various districts, and other donors. The conference inaugurated the canal rehabilitation and construction projects completed by KFZ.

USAID expended \$2.9 million between April and June 2015, and \$2.3 million between July and September 2015.³³⁸

Last quarter, USAID informed SIGAR of its intent to maintain IRD as an implementing partner during the one-year extension of KFZ after August 30, 2015, despite the fact that IRD had previously been suspended for gross misconduct. USAID informed SIGAR that the one-year extension will enable KFZ to improve access to water by rehabilitating additional irrigation systems and concentrate on promoting high-value crops that can serve, over the long term, as alternatives to poppy. USAID plans to continue its alternative-development activities in the Kandahar region after KFZ ends. Coordination between INL and USAID complements USAID's alternative-development efforts with eradication, public outreach, and drug-demand reduction programs. As an example of the program's effectiveness, USAID cites the improved coordination led by the MCN under the GLE program in Kandahar that resulted in the eradication of 396 hectares of poppy (verified by UNODC) in 2015 compared to 68 hectares in 2014. Besides INL's nationwide public outreach, Sayara also highlighted USAID's KFZ work in its media campaigns.³³⁹

KFZ faces challenges of operating in an insecure environment and under often primitive conditions. Despite that, KFZ's local staff members have been successful in getting into the field and working with beneficiaries; the project has encountered no security incidents. As of mid-September 2015, USAID had disbursed \$18.1 million to IRD since KFZ's inception in July 2013. According to USAID, 100 staff—two U.S. civilians, eight third-country nationals, and the 90 local nationals—work on the KFZ program. Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives, USAID's third-party monitoring program, reported that KFZ's activities have been restricted, because of the limited budget, to numerous training courses being provided and some irrigation canals being rehabilitated or constructed in two districts. USAID told SIGAR that by addressing the drivers of poppy cultivation with a bottom-up strategy with CDCs and community representatives, KFZ has identified infrastructure, agricultural, and other alternative livelihood projects that will enable a community's behavior to change towards a licit economy. KFZ worked closely with the MCN, the provincial governor, the district governors, the directors of line ministries, and the district development assemblies who have provided political will, guidance, leadership, and community contributions to facilitate KFZ's role.³⁴⁰

The benefits to Afghan farmers and local communities are not clear. For example, IRD has not provided performance indicators for the percentage of households reporting an increase in income from licit livelihood or the percentage of change in opium-poppy cultivation in targeted areas. After nearly two years, IRD reported only five activities to increase opportunities for women as a result of U.S. government assistance in licit livelihoods.³⁴¹

By September 2014, USAID has disbursed at least \$5 million, yet no alternative-livelihood or infrastructure projects were implemented. USAID's own midterm evaluation (in March 2015) concluded that it was premature to measure impact under the period of performance regarding irrigation improvements and that the trainings provided were inadequate to address all the root causes of poppy cultivation identified in the community; the evaluation only covered the period of performance through November 2014.³⁴²

Regional Agricultural Development Program

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Three RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. These projects share objectives focused on improving the productivity and profitability of the wheat, high-value crops and livestock value chains. Using a **value-chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.³⁴³

Value chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, wholesale and retail sales.

RADP-South, a five-year, \$125 million effort, operates in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan Provinces. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018.³⁴⁴ RADP-South's focus is on strengthening the capacity of producers, associations, traders, and businesses to respond to market demands and facilitate market linkages between value-chain actors such as retailers, input suppliers, mills, and agricultural depots. This quarter, RADP-South conducted training in wheat cultivation, pest management, nutrition, and high-value crops for several thousand farmers. RADP-South also supported veterinary field units and several thousand herders with livestock vaccinations, medication, and treatment of diseases. It also conducted training for paraveterinarians (community-based animal health workers who provide initial diagnosis and basic treatment of animals) to deliver animal health-care services.³⁴⁵

The \$78 million RADP-North project began in May 2014. It operates in Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Badakhshan. During the quarter, RADP-North selected beneficiaries for its conservation agriculture and contract activities, established test plots and conducted needs assessments for the melon value chain, and conducted cashmere harvesting training. Conservation agriculture training is being provided on the wheat value chain. The \$70 million RADP-West operates in Herat, Farah, and Badghis Provinces. That project also seeks to promote increases in the productivity of wheat and high-value crops, including orchard crops and vegetables, and livestock.³⁴⁶

USAID is planning RADP-East, which will encompass Nangarhar and several other provinces, after the Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program closes later this year.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

RADP-East will focus on strengthening value chains, working with input suppliers, market intermediaries and other agribusinesses, particularly in the Jalalabad area, and working less directly with farmers. RADP-East is in the solicitation phase and expects to identify a contractor by late November. Program implementation would probably begin in January 2016, creating a short lag between the close-out of IDEA-NEW and the start-up of RADP-East.³⁴⁷

Though a majority of projects are up and running, progress against targets has not been realized. According to the implementing partner, it could be a long time before outcome indicators are attained. RADP-South, for instance, has not shown increased productivity for the number of farmers growing wheat or the number of farmers in selected value-chains. Likewise, there is no quarterly information on the number of firms (small, medium, and large businesses) with an increased financial return as a result of project assistance. Over 15,000 individuals received short-term agricultural productivity or food security training and over 11,500 households benefitted from alternative development or agriculture interventions this quarter; yet the number of farmers growing high value crops or the number of hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of U.S. assistance is zero. Despite the reported number of trainings or individuals trained, only 11 private enterprises, producers' organizations, women's groups, and community-based organizations reported that they applied the new technologies or management practices from the trainings.³⁴⁸ RADP-South expenditures totaled \$8.1 million last quarter and 70% of its \$50.9 million obligated amount had been spent as of June 30, 2015.³⁴⁹ Progress for various performance indicators may not materialize until several months in the future, but results after two years are underwhelming in light of the funds spent.

As of September 30, 2015, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$11.0 million on RADP-North, \$37.9 million on RADP-South, and \$10.5 million on RADP-West.³⁵⁰ For summary information on this alternative-livelihood program, see Table 3.14 on page 122 of this report.

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a \$45 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by assisting them to shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.

CHAMP has worked in 17 provinces of Afghanistan, providing training in agricultural best practices, building storage facilities such as cool rooms and raisin-drying facilities, and helping grape farmers convert from

traditional ground-level vineyards to higher-output trellis systems. CHAMP also helps stimulate farm exports by linking farmers to traders, and traders to high-paying markets. CHAMP includes women in many of its activities in an effort to integrate them into the mainstream agricultural sector. The program has been extended an additional two years until December 2016 to reinforce gains made in the export sector and increase Afghan exports to regional supermarkets by up to 10,000 metric tons annually.

CHAMP is carrying out activities throughout six main value chains (apples, apricots, almonds, grapes, melons, and pomegranates). The program focuses on improving horticultural and marketing practices to produce high-quality fruit for high-value markets such as the United Arab Emirates and India.³⁵¹

Since 2010, CHAMP's various achievements include training 107,000 farmers, including 3,000 women, to improve agricultural techniques; planting nearly three million saplings and root cuttings benefiting 19,500 farmers; and exporting 29,500 tons of produce valued at \$33 million to international markets. CHAMP enabled the construction of over 230 storage facilities and created over 7,500 full-time jobs in agribusiness.³⁵²

As of September 30, 2015, USAID has disbursed \$44.1 million for CHAMP projects.³⁵³ For summary financial information on this program, see Table 3.14 on page 122 of this report.

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West

The mission of USAID's \$160 million IDEA-NEW program was to expand the licit agricultural economy in the northern, eastern, and western regions of the country. It was launched in March 2009 and ended in September 2015. Since 2013, IDEA-NEW has concentrated its efforts on the eastern region and on fruit and vegetable value chains.³⁵⁴

An evaluation of IDEA-NEW's impact on opium production, using Nangarhar Province as a case study, found "that none of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms adopted by the IDEA-NEW program . . . assess how different project activities might impact on opium poppy cultivation." The report found that in districts where IDEA-NEW was able to maintain a presence and continue working with farmers, opium cultivation levels declined. However, in more remote areas, where the contractor was forced to leave due to deteriorating security, opium cultivation levels increased. The initial investments made by IDEA-NEW in terms of improving infrastructure and improving irrigation systems and introducing orchard crops and higher value crops were not, in and of themselves, sufficient to reduce poppy cultivation. A longer-term commitment was needed to ensure that farmers were able to sustain the new technologies. The report cautioned that evaluating the impact of IDEA-NEW is complex, given:

- insecurity in areas of the province

- factors other than development assistance that contribute to reduced opium cultivation
- numerous interventions in the region from other international organizations³⁵⁵

As of September 30, 2015, USAID has disbursed \$155.9 million to date for IDEA-NEW activities.³⁵⁶ For financial information on IDEA-NEW and other alternative-livelihood programs, see Table 3.14 on page 122 of this report. Please see SIGAR's April 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information on IDEA-NEW.

Interdiction Operations and Results

DOD reported that from July 1 to September 14, 2015, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 23 drug-interdiction operations resulting in 50 detained individuals. Most interdiction activities occurred in the northern region of the country. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations.

This year, the U.S. military stopped providing Afghans with logistical and intelligence support for counternarcotics activities; however, DEA continues to provide mentoring and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. military still provides logistics support to the SMW. The SMW, a unit of the ANDSF, is a fleet of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft supporting counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations.³⁵⁷ More information on SMW can be found on page 106 of the Security section of this report.

According to DOD, the security situation and the closure of the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) have hindered counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan. In particular, operations in the south, southwest, and north are now extremely difficult to conduct due to the decrease in security forces and the increase in Taliban attacks, particularly in Musa Qala and Kunduz. The IOCC was a key targeting and planning center, integral to counternarcotics operations.

The lack of an in-country capability to combine intelligence and operations planning has made it more difficult for counternarcotics forces to carry out missions. Select IOCC members have been relocated to the Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) in Bahrain. The RNIFC does not specifically target raw or processed opium. It was created to track and interdict the illicit movement of Afghan heroin shipped by dhows (ocean-going sailboats) to the Middle East and East Africa. The RNIFC targets dhow trafficking within the Arabian Sea and focuses on key narcotics traffickers.³⁵⁸

DOD stated in its June 2015 *Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* that direct international assistance to the Counter

SIGAR INSPECTION

This quarter SIGAR announced the inspection of the \$24.2 million construction of facilities supporting the SMW squadron in Kandahar.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.15

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2015									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*	Total
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	250	3,075
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	371	3,318
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,405	772,382
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	2,657	31,866
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	53,462
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	26,082	419,101
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981 ^a	695,548

Note:

^a The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a December 22, 2014, seizure of 135,000 liters of precursor chemicals.

* Partial fiscal year results through 9/14/2015 only.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/29/2015 and 9/24/2015.

Precursor chemical: a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, viii.

Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, particularly from State, is expected to decrease dramatically in 2016. Last quarter, DOD told SIGAR it will continue to support counternarcotics efforts post-2014, in collaboration with their U.S. counterparts, to curb the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and reduce illicit proceeds that finance global terrorist activities.³⁵⁹

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the reported seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 2,435 kg of opium
- 60 kg of heroin
- 8,877 kg of hashish/marijuana
- No seizures of precursor chemicals³⁶⁰

As shown in Table 3.15, interdiction results have been declining since 2012.

According to DOD, vetted Afghan units have successfully conducted complex counterdrug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance. However, the drawdown of Coalition forces and the increase of large-scale attacks by the Taliban have had an impact on Afghanistan's ability to conduct counternarcotics interdiction operations, particularly in Kunduz, Kandahar, and Helmand Provinces. DOD is putting more focus on using Afghan counternarcotics forces to attack counternarcotics/insurgent-nexus targets. This should open up more enablers, support the security effort, and increase training and operations.³⁶¹

Aviation Support

State counternarcotics support to DEA consisted of 35.57 flight hours, 36 sorties, 602 personnel transported, and 33,071 pounds of cargo moved. The last DEA interdiction mission was flown in May 2015. Additionally, the Air Wing in Afghanistan provided INL with a total of 33.4 flight hours of support, conducted 128 sorties, moved 326 passengers, and transported 10,630

pound of cargo. INL and DEA will continue to use the air assets of Embassy Air for movements.

The INL air-wing element at Kandahar Airfield officially closed in June 2015, limiting INL's ability to support tactical operations in the south and southwest regions of the country. That element provided rotary-wing assets in support of DEA missions in southern Afghanistan. According to INL, a specially trained Afghan counternarcotics police unit will continue to operate in the area, with a National Interdiction Unit (NIU) platoon based at the Kandahar Regional Law Enforcement Center. NIU officers continue to perform operations using aircraft from the DOD-funded SMW.³⁶²