

# SECURITY CONTENTS

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## SECURITY

As of December 31, 2015, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$68.4 billion to assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This accounts for 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the \$63.9 billion appropriated for the ASFF, \$57.7 billion had been obligated and \$56.2 billion disbursed.<sup>100</sup>

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

### KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

#### State Department Designates ISIL-Khorasan as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

On January 14, 2016, the U.S. State Department (State) announced the designation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) as a foreign terrorist organization under U.S. law. The designation includes a prohibition against knowingly providing, or attempting or conspiring to provide, material support or resources to this organization.<sup>101</sup> Sanctions include denying the group access to U.S. financial systems.<sup>102</sup>

ISIL-K announced its formation on January 10, 2015. The group is based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and is composed primarily of former Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Afghan Taliban members.

**The White House has granted the Pentagon legal authority to target the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Afghanistan, according to a January 19, 2016, article in the *Wall Street Journal*. Under Operation Freedom's Sentinel, military action by U.S. forces in Afghanistan was limited to targeting al-Qaeda. This is the first authorization given for military action against ISIL outside Iraq and Syria.**

Source: *Wall Street Journal*, "U.S. Clears Path to Target Islamic State in Afghanistan," 1/19/2016.

## UN Reports Afghanistan Continues to Face Formidable Security Challenges


According to the latest report of the UN Secretary-General, security developments combined with slow economic growth, growing political pressures, and expressions of public discontent underlined the challenges faced by the Afghan government and security forces in maintaining stability.<sup>103</sup>

The UN reported the overall level of security incidents increased and intensified from August 2015 through the end of October, with 6,601 incidents as compared to 5,516 incidents (19% increase) during the same period in 2014.<sup>104</sup> The 6,601 security incidents reported were the most since SIGAR began reporting in November 2012, and the average daily number of incidents that occurred equaled the number in the summer of 2014, as reflected in Figure 3.26.

The Taliban temporarily seized Kunduz City, a provincial capital, as well as 16 district centers, primarily across the north during the period.<sup>105</sup> While the ANDSF were able to regain control of Kunduz City and 13 of the district centers, the UN reports approximately 25% of districts remained contested throughout the country at the end of October.<sup>106</sup>

FIGURE 3.26

### AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY



Source: UN, reports of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International peace and security*, 12/10/2015, p. 5; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 6/10/2015, p. 4; 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; 3/7/2014, p. 5; 12/6/2013, p. 6; 9/6/2013, p.6; 6/13/2013, p. 5; and 3/5/2013, p. 5.

While the majority (62%) of security incidents were in the south, south-east, and east, the UN reported a notable intensification in the north and northeast with Sar-e Pul, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Takhar provinces being the most volatile.<sup>107</sup> The UN reported the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), particularly in Nangarhar Province, and of unconfirmed reports of clashes between ISIL affiliates and the Taliban.<sup>108</sup>

The UN reported armed clashes and incidents involving improvised-explosive devices continued to account for the majority (68%) of the security incidents, a 20% increase over the same period in 2014.<sup>109</sup> Among the incidents, 22 involved suicide attacks and 447 involved assassinations and abductions.<sup>110</sup> Seventy-four incidents involving attacks against humanitarian personnel, assets, and facilities were registered with the UN and resulted in 21 humanitarian workers killed and 48 injured. The U.S. forces' mistaken attack on the Doctors Without Borders hospital was the deadliest, killing at least 30 persons and injuring at least 37.<sup>111</sup>

Between August 1 and October 31, 2015, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 3,693 civilian casualties (1,138 persons killed and 2,555 injured), a 26% increase over the same period in 2014.<sup>112</sup> Between January and September 2015, some 235,000 individuals were displaced, excluding the 17,000 families temporarily displaced during the Kunduz crisis, an increase of nearly 70% compared to the same period in 2014. The UN believes 2015 may have been the worst year for conflict-induced displacement in Afghanistan since 2002.<sup>113</sup>

The UN reported the breakdown in the rule of law in Kunduz during the insurgent attack. Their occupation created an environment in which arbitrary killings, violence, and criminality occurred with impunity. The fear of violence was a key factor in the mass displacement of women from Kunduz City and the temporary suspension of services protecting women in several adjacent provinces.<sup>114</sup> Attacks on schools decreased from 41 in the prior period to 22. The offensive in Kunduz led to the temporary closure of all 497 schools. In addition, the UN reported the forced closure of six schools in Nangarhar and the departure of education personnel after receiving threats and intimidation.<sup>115</sup>

Due to the increased risks posed by the conflict, particularly in urban areas, the UN and other civilian actors curtailed program activities and temporarily relocated staff from Kunduz, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Faryab Provinces.<sup>116</sup>

Calling the ANDSF a good investment to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven with an international reach, the Secretary-General and the NATO foreign ministers recommitted support for the ANDSF at a meeting in Brussels on December 1, 2015.<sup>117</sup> The Coalition will maintain its 12,000 force strength in Afghanistan through 2016 and continue to finance the current ANDSF authorized force level of 352,000 members through 2017.<sup>118</sup> The Department of Defense (DOD) will also continue to

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“When you go from 100,000 troops down to about 10,000, there should be no surprise that there’s a consequence in the security situation.”

—Andrew Wilder, *U.S. Institute of Peace*

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Source: *Foreign Policy*, “Mapped: The Taliban Surged in 2015, but ISIS Is Moving In on Its Turf,” 1/4/2016.

provide funding for the authorized force level of 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP) during this period.<sup>119</sup> A campaign to finance the ANDSF from 2018 through 2020 will be addressed at a NATO summit in July.<sup>120</sup>

## Results of the U.S. Investigation into the Air Strike

DOD reported in December 2015 that the October 3, 2015, air strike on a Doctors Without Borders trauma center in the northern city of Kunduz resulted in the death of 30 staff and patients and injury of 37 others.<sup>121</sup> Since then, Doctors Without Borders has informed DOD that the number of victims was significantly higher. DOD continues to work with Doctors Without Borders to identify all those affected by this tragedy and to offer appropriate condolences and compensation using the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) authority.<sup>122</sup> General John Campbell, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said a U.S. investigation determined that the proximate cause of the incident was avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failure. Fatigue and high operational tempo, together with system and process failures, also contributed to the incident. These included:

- Loss of electronic communication systems on the aircraft
- The nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations
- The lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list<sup>123</sup>

The investigation also produced specific recommendations to enable U.S. forces to avoid repeating such mistakes.<sup>124</sup> General Campbell announced some U.S. personnel were suspended and could face disciplinary action as a result of the incident.<sup>125</sup>

However, the results of the investigation were not made public and Doctors Without Borders said its own investigation found that at least 42 people had been killed in the strike. Doctors Without Borders has demanded that an international investigation of the incident take place under the Geneva Conventions.<sup>126</sup> The UN reported an Afghan delegation submitted a report on the factors that led to the fall of Kunduz to the Afghan National Security Council, although the findings were not released publicly.<sup>127</sup> U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) reported that the delegation presented their findings to the President of Afghanistan and that a declassified version of the 200-page report, with accompanying 1,800 pages of supporting documents, is expected to be released in the next few months.<sup>128</sup> USFOR-A said the Resolute Support (RS) mission did not conduct a comprehensive review separate from that conducted by the Afghan government.<sup>129</sup>

## U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, approximately 8,950 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of December 30, 2015, along with approximately 6,650

## INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's stability largely depends on whether the ANDSF can maintain security gains won through U.S. and Coalition military assistance over the last several years. This quarter saw a worrisome upsurge in insurgent activity.

In late December 2015, the deputy governor of Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan publicly rebuked President Ashraf Ghani in a Facebook post, claiming that he was unable to contact the president and that without immediate assistance Taliban fighters were positioned to take control of the province. British forces were rushed to assist the ANA in the crucial district of Sangin, which the Taliban seemed close to taking over.<sup>130</sup> In January, U.S. air support helped clear a town in Helmand of insurgents; one U.S. Special Forces soldier died in the battle.<sup>131</sup>

On December 21, 2015, roughly 30 miles north of Kabul, outside of Bagram Air Base, six U.S. Air Force personnel were killed in the most deadly attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan since 2012. Approximately two weeks after that, a bomb containing an estimated 3,000 pounds of explosives was detonated in the Afghan capital near the U.S. Embassy compound, killing two and wounding dozens more. The Taliban took credit for both attacks.<sup>132</sup>

With the Taliban stepping up attacks long after the typical fighting season, other groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—a relatively new offshoot of al-Qaeda that operates primarily in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India—and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-K) expanded their presence. In late October, Army General John Campbell disclosed a multi-day operation in Kandahar Province that involved 200 Special Operations forces and targeted what was “probably the largest” al-Qaeda training camp ever found in Afghanistan, a sprawling complex that covered over 30 square miles. On January 8, 2016, a provincial council official warned the ISIL-K presence in five Nangarhar districts may lead to the provincial takeover if the insurgents are not stopped. That same day, a drone

strike reportedly killed 15 ISIL-K members in the Achin District of Nangarhar.<sup>133</sup>

USFOR-A reports that approximately 71.7% of the country's districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of November 27, 2015. Of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 292 districts are under government control or influence, 27 districts (6.6%) within 11 provinces are under insurgent control or influence, and 88 districts (21.6%) are at risk.<sup>134</sup> In a report issued in December, DOD stated that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. There are more effective insurgent attacks and more ANDSF and Taliban casualties. However, DOD remains optimistic that the ANDSF continues to improve its overall capability as the capabilities of the insurgent elements remain static.<sup>135</sup>

The insurgency in Afghanistan has achieved some success this past year by modifying its tactics. The most notable example is the Taliban's brief capture of Kunduz in September. The insurgency is spreading the ANDSF thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers. The ANDSF has become reactive rather than proactive, DOD has reported.<sup>136</sup>

While DOD remains outwardly confident its mission to train, advise, and assist will build the ANDSF's capacity, lawmakers in Afghanistan's *Wolesi Jirga* (lower house) are growing concerned. Recently they summoned high-ranking officials within the ANDSF and National Directorate of Security (NDS) to answer questions about the spate of high-profile threats.<sup>137</sup>

RS Commander General Campbell told *USA Today* he is reassessing the situation. In an interview this past December, General Campbell said, “My job as commander on the ground is to continually make assessments. ... If I don't believe that we can accomplish the train, advise and assist and the [counterterrorism] missions, then I owe it to the senior leadership to come back and say, ‘Here's what I need.’ If that's more people, it's more people.”<sup>138</sup>



**Secretary Ashton Carter** and acting Afghan Defense Minister Masoom Stanekzai during a press conference at Forward Operating Base Fenty in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on December 18, 2015. (DVIDS photo by Staff Sergeant Tony Coronado)

“They are forward deployed with Afghan commando units and they are very much in the thick of these fights. (U.S.) Special operations forces are going to be in the thick of this coming battle whether we want to talk about that or not.”

—Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired

Source: Tolo News, “U.S. Forces Increasingly Drawn Back into Afghanistan’s Battles,” 1/9/2016.

personnel from other Coalition nations. The U.S. force level includes approximately 6,800 military personnel contributing to the NATO-led Resolute Support mission.<sup>139</sup>

Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, through January 5, 2016, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in action, in addition to 10 non-hostile deaths, for a total of 21 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 79 U.S. military personnel were wounded in action.<sup>140</sup> These numbers include the six U.S. service members killed and two wounded in a suicide attack near Bagram Airfield on December 21, 2015, and the loss of one U.S. service member and wounding of two others in an operation in Helmand Province on January 5, 2016.<sup>141</sup> The attack near Bagram Airfield was reported as the deadliest on Coalition troops in four months.<sup>142</sup> Seven U.S. civilians or contractors were killed in action, in addition to nine non-hostile deaths, for a total of 16 DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor deaths. Eight DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractors were wounded in action during this period.<sup>143</sup>

Four insider attacks against U.S. forces occurred from January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, killing three and wounding 15 soldiers.<sup>144</sup> A fifth attack resulted in the death of one U.S. contractor.<sup>145</sup>

This quarter, there were several reports of U.S. Special Forces fighting alongside Afghan security forces. While the United States has two non-combat missions—training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda—U.S. forces are also being drawn into fighting the Taliban.<sup>146</sup> The Helmand Province operation in January was not the first time U.S. forces partnered with Afghans in fighting the Taliban. During the Kunduz siege in October, General Campbell reported U.S. forces engaged in heavy fighting for five consecutive days and nights.<sup>147</sup>

## ESSENTIAL FUNCTION TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST HIGHLIGHTS

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF). This quarter’s EF highlights include the following:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** Both the MOD and MOI demonstrated significant progress in identifying unexecuted funds and proposing how to use the funds. Significant challenges exist in procurement and output remains slow. RS created a plan to improve contract execution by setting a deadline for prioritizing procurement plans before the FY 1395 procurement approval board convenes.<sup>148</sup>
- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** The MOI and MOD demonstrated progress in directing senior leaders to take active roles in countering corruption and mismanagement. MOI and MOD inspectors general (IGs) showed improvement on conducting inspections. The MOI IG referred corruption cases to the Attorney General’s Office for criminal investigation and the MOD IG’s inspection

of the Central Supply Depot revealed significant issues with inventory accuracy and a lack of qualified staff.<sup>149</sup>

- **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** EF-3 is focused on providing training, advice, and assistance to the MOD and MOI on developing processes to prevent, track, investigate, and prosecute gross violations of human rights and significant acts of corruption. RS arranged for the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies to provide training on the law of armed conflict, human rights, investigations, and fighting corruption during a five-day workshop in November. The ANA is using an Afghan mobile-training team to train ANA corps personnel.<sup>150</sup>
- **EF-4 (Force Generation):** The RS Police Institutional Advisory Team's work with the MOI Training General Command resulted in a plan to train 22,300 ANP and new recruits by June 2016. RS also developed training materials and instructions for transitioning Afghan security personnel from the Soviet-design AK-47 rifle to the U.S. M-16 rifle.<sup>151</sup>
- **EF-5 (Sustainment):** RS focused on right-sizing the ANDSF's vehicle fleets to improve sustainability, effectiveness, and affordability by December 2016. RS is also working on procedures to integrate the Afghans into the long-term planning processes for spending ASFF funds and using DOD's foreign military sales program as well as establishing relationships between U.S. commodity program managers and their MOD and MOI counterparts.<sup>152</sup>
- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** This function has two components. For EF-6.1, RS works at the ministerial level.<sup>153</sup> RS partnered with Afghans to develop documents that inform subordinate planners on strategic focus, threats, and resources. The MOI Strategic Planning Directive was signed by the Minister in October and the MOD Minister signed the National Military Strategy in December.<sup>154</sup> For EF-6.2, RS works from the ministerial level through operational- and tactical-level execution. RS established 24-hour advisor support to the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Intelligence Operation Center opened a facility in Kabul.<sup>155</sup>
- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** Afghan intelligence planning and analytic support to multi-pillar, multi-corps ANDSF operations has continued to improve through the creation of intelligence fusion cells. RS transitioned training on conducting credibility assessments based on portable lie-detection tests and on using cellular-exploitation machines that analyze portable electronic devices, to the MOD and MOI in October. RS also made progress on transitioning other training programs at the ministries' Intelligence Training Centers to Afghan instructors.<sup>156</sup>
- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** RS assisted President Ghani's communication directorate in establishing a crisis communications/rapid response protocol, which was later implemented. The MOI

## Members of Congress Ask SIGAR to Investigate Sexual Abuse

A bipartisan, bicameral group led by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Representative Thomas J. Rooney (R-FL) and 91 additional members of Congress in December asked SIGAR to conduct an inquiry into the U.S. government's experience with allegations of sexual abuse of children committed by members of the Afghan security forces.

The inquiry will also look into the manner in which the Leahy amendment prohibiting DOD and the State Department from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights is implemented in Afghanistan. See Section 2, p. 40, of this report for more information.

**At the Program Management Review (PMR) session held October 26–30, 2015, in Arlington, Virginia, U.S. and Afghan officials discussed ANDSF requirements and capabilities as well as priorities to address program challenges for equipping and arming Afghan forces. The PMR resulted in an Afghan commitment to assume more responsibility for logistics, life-cycle sustainment processes, and the overall health of its vehicle fleet. Participants recognized the importance of ensuring the ANDSF requirements are affordable and sustainable. Officials also discussed the Afghan ability to use the U.S. foreign military sales process effectively.**

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/4/2015; OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2016.

communications directorate executed all fiscal year (FY) 1394 budget requirements and, for the first time, met the FY 1395 requirements submission date.<sup>157</sup>

- **Gender Office:** Three women were selected for the ANP rank of brigadier general and 389 ANP women graduated from a Turkish police academy.<sup>158</sup>

## ANDSF STRENGTH PULLED DOWN BY ANP DECREASES

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 322,638 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A.<sup>159</sup> As reflected in Table 3.5, this is 89.6% of the ANDSF target force strength of 360,004, counting MOD civilian employees. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count MOD civilians.) The new assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 2,078 since July 2015 and 9,306 since May 2015.<sup>160</sup>

The ANP bore the brunt of the decrease this quarter with a loss of 2,270 personnel, while the ANA posted an increase of 192 personnel, as shown in Table 3.6.<sup>161</sup>

However, a January Associated Press report alleged that the actual number of ANDSF security forces is far less because the rolls are filled with nonexistent “ghost” soldiers and police officers. In that report, a provincial council member estimated 40% of the security forces in Helmand do not exist, while a former provincial deputy police chief said the actual number was “nowhere near” the 31,000 police on the registers, and an Afghan official estimated the total ANDSF number at around 120,000—less than half the reported 322,638.<sup>162</sup> The success of military operations is at risk, because as one Afghan soldier in Helmand said, they do not have enough men to protect themselves. Additionally, an Afghan lawmaker claimed the government is not responding to the crisis because a number of allegedly corrupt parliamentarians are benefiting from the “ghost” security forces salaries.<sup>163</sup>

TABLE 3.5

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, OCTOBER 2015						
ANDSF Component	Approved End-Strength Goal	Target Date	Current Assigned as of October 2015	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals	Difference (%)
ANA including AAF <sup>a</sup>	195,000	December 2014	169,718	87.0%	(25,282)	(13.0%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	-	6,894	86.1%	(1,110)	(13.9%)
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>203,004</b>		<b>176,612</b>	<b>87.0%</b>	<b>(26,392)</b>	<b>(13.0%)</b>
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	146,026	93.0%	(10,974)	(7.0%)
<b>ANDSF Total with Civilians</b>	<b>360,004</b>		<b>322,638</b>	<b>89.6%</b>	<b>(37,366)</b>	<b>(10.4%)</b>

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANA = Afghan National Army; ANDSF = Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces.

<sup>a</sup> The total “ANA including AAF” numbers for October 2015 is not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled portion.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/14/2015.

TABLE 3.6

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2014–OCTOBER 2015								
	2/2014	5/2014	8/2014	11/2014	2/2015	5/2015	7/2015	10/2015
ANA including AAF <sup>a</sup>	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203	174,120	176,762	176,420	176,612
ANP <sup>b</sup>	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439	154,685	155,182	148,296	146,026
<b>Total ANDSF</b>	<b>338,108</b>	<b>329,612</b>	<b>324,918</b>	<b>325,642</b>	<b>328,805</b>	<b>331,944</b>	<b>324,716</b>	<b>322,638</b>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. ANA and AAF numbers include civilians; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

<sup>a</sup> The total “ANA including AAF” numbers for July 2015 and October 2015 are not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled portion.

<sup>b</sup> Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 10/6/2014; RS, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 3/14/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015 and 7/12/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2014, 3/24/2015, 6/29/2015, 9/11/2015, and 12/14/2015.

SIGAR has questioned the validity and reliability of Afghan security-personnel numbers (see “Questionable ANSF Numbers Thicken Fog of War in Afghanistan” in SIGAR’s April 2015 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, pages 3–15). The Associated Press report underscores long-standing concerns that the reported ANDSF personnel numbers are not valid or reliable.

This quarter, details of ANDSF force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

ANDSF attrition rates are holding steady, according to reports provided to RS by the MOD and MOI. The ANA had a monthly attrition rate of 3.0% in October 2015, up from the 2.4% rate in July 2015. The October rate is, however, below the average monthly attrition rates of 3.52% in February 2013 and 3.62% in February 2014.<sup>164</sup>

The ANP’s monthly average attrition rate was reported to have increased to a 2.5% rate in October from the 1.9% rate of May through July.<sup>165</sup>

DOD reports the total cost to sustain the ANDSF at an end-strength of 352,000 in FY 2016 is approximately \$5 billion, for which the FY 2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act appropriated \$3.65 billion to DOD for that purpose.<sup>166</sup>

## ANDSF ASSESSMENT

USFOR-A reports that U.S. advisors participating in the RS train, advise, and assist mission have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level.<sup>167</sup> This situation contrasts dramatically from the previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, when many Coalition advisors were embedded with ANDSF units. Now the smaller troop strength of the RS mission requires Coalition advisors to rely almost exclusively on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. The

consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of data varies among ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters.<sup>168</sup> USFOR-A said improving the quality of data is a priority for Coalition advisors. Capability gaps are identified and vetted by the advisors during train, advise, and assist activities; through analysis of Afghan data; and through direct reporting by and discussions with Afghan leaders.<sup>169</sup>

The year 2015 found the ANDSF operating with sharply reduced Coalition military support compared to the preceding decade. However, the UN assesses that Afghan security forces have largely withstood the mounting pressures and shown the ability to retake those areas temporarily under control of the insurgency.<sup>170</sup> DOD's December 2015 report, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, noted the Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major transit routes, provincial capitals, and nearly all district centers.<sup>171</sup>

The December 2015 report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan assessed the ANDSF response to the October siege in Kunduz. The report highlighted critical deficiencies in ANDSF logistics, planning, intelligence, and air support capabilities. The UN Secretary-General also reported the Afghan government needs to strengthen the working relationships between the security and civilian authorities, which were reported to have been strained in Kunduz prior to the fall of the city.<sup>172</sup>

USFOR-A assesses the ANDSF performance as uneven, with numerous, high-profile tactical and operational setbacks detracting from its overall success in preventing the Taliban insurgency from achieving its strategic goals. ANDSF capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, operational planning, and leadership persist. DOD assessed that the ANDSF continued to improve integration of indirect fire and close-air attack capabilities, but that the ANDSF's capacity to hold areas after initial clearing operations is uneven: they remain in a primarily defensive posture that limits their agility across the country.<sup>173</sup>

DOD reports that although Afghans, especially in rural areas, think checkpoints and a fixed ANDSF presence, rather than patrols or a rotational presence, are important to maintaining area security, the ANDSF reliance on defending static checkpoints has resulted in increased ANDSF casualties. Insurgents, however, can choose to fight when they have the tactical advantage. DOD assesses that on occasion the insurgent tactic of massing forces, certain ANDSF units are being out-maneuvered by an overall numerically inferior insurgent force.<sup>174</sup> Furthermore, USFOR-A assesses the large number of vulnerable checkpoints severely limits the security forces available for operations.<sup>175</sup>

USFOR-A assesses the ANA corps formations of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks, are capable of rapid employment in offensive operations. Critical to preparing the ANA for the 2016 fighting season is establishing an operational readiness cycle to

replenish the corps' personnel and equipment, improve unit-level training, and increase recruitment and retention.<sup>176</sup>

DOD reports that after a number of large-scale, multi-corps, and cross-pillar operations, such as in northern Helmand and on the Zabul-Ghazni border early in the year, ANDSF offensive operations tended to be much smaller later in the year. A majority of operations were conducted at the kandak and brigade level and were characterized by the need for stronger cross-pillar coordination and intelligence sharing.

USFOR-A assesses that the Afghan Air Force (AAF) has been critical to the success of the ANDSF in combating the Taliban. However, taking on primary responsibility for close air support, which has elevated operational tempo, has presented a challenge for the AAF.<sup>177</sup>

Although the current focus of the ANP is to combine its capabilities with the ANA to fight the insurgency, DOD reports the long-term goal for the ANP is to transition to a traditional community police force. The ANP forces are often on the front lines during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations. However, they are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics: they have limited crew-served weapons (a weapon that requires more than one person to operate); anti-armor weapons; armored vehicles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.<sup>178</sup>

DOD reports the ANP commanders must become more adept at translating ministerial-level guidance into operational plans for the ANP to execute and coordinate with their ANA counterparts. Furthermore, the overall deficiencies in the ANP planning process reflect the challenges associated with the MOI decentralized structure and its various force pillars.<sup>179</sup>

USFOR-A reports the 2015 fighting season appears likely to end in stalemate, while the outcome of the 2016 fighting season is predicated on the ability of the ANDSF to institutionalize the lessons learned this season, provide effective wide-area security, and successfully project force into traditional Taliban safe havens and operating areas.<sup>180</sup>

The Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR) is one tool used by RS advisors to inform RS leaders of the collective assessment of capacity-development progress. USFOR-A reported the percentage of ANDSF units rated as “capable” or better in the MAAR increased from 73% in January 2015 to 88% (86% if Afghan Special Security Force units are removed) by November 2015.<sup>181</sup> USFOR-A reported that while the MAAR assessments of the ANDSF's performance throughout the year reflect improvements, capability gaps persist and will remain a focus of RS advisors. The trials imposed by an insurgency with years of experience fighting a professional, well-equipped Coalition military force, revealed the ANDSF's uneven performance and deficiencies during a difficult first fighting season of the RS mission.<sup>182</sup> However, USFOR-A assessed that the ANDSF, while leading counterinsurgency operations, has persevered, proven their willingness to

“If we don’t stay engaged here to build their capacity to fight this, keep sanctuary down, it’s coming back to the homeland. So it’s pay a little bit now, build the capability, and keep this an away game as opposed to a home game.”

—RS Commander,  
General John Campbell

Source: *USAToday.com*, “Top U.S. general may seek more troops for Afghanistan,” 12/29/2015.

fight, developed the capacity to learn from mistakes, and prevented insurgents from achieving their strategic objectives.<sup>183</sup>

This quarter, SIGAR will report on the classified aspects of the ANDSF assessment in the classified annex to this report.

## MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR

Each RS Essential Function (EF) directorate and the Gender Advisor office use the Essential Function Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in the ministries of Defense and Interior.<sup>184</sup> MOD offices are assessed on 45 milestones; MOI offices are assessed on 40 milestones.<sup>185</sup> The milestones are assessed using a five-stage rating system displayed in Table 3.7.<sup>186</sup> Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the assessment of the overall ministry.<sup>187</sup>

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.<sup>188</sup> This quarter the first “sustaining capability” assessment rating was achieved by the MOI for an EF-5 (Sustainment) milestone.<sup>189</sup> In addition, two MOI milestones—one in EF-4 (Force Generation) and another in EF-5—sustained a “fully capable” rating since last quarter; however, that actually is a capability reduction as both offices had achieved two “fully capable” ratings last quarter.<sup>190</sup> Within the MOD, a “fully capable” rating for two EF-5 milestones was sustained since last quarter and another “fully capable” rating was achieved for an EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution) milestone.<sup>191</sup>

This quarter, the RS assessment indicates the MOD has slightly increased the percentage of its “sustaining capability,” “fully capable,” or “partially capable” development milestones from 55.6% to 57.8%, whereas the MOI has increased its ratings, with 65% of its development milestones at “sustaining capability,” “fully capable,” or “partially capable” compared to 59.5% last quarter.<sup>192</sup>

For a third consecutive quarter, RS revised its forecast by lowering the expected capacity levels the MOD and MOI will achieve by the end of 2016.<sup>193</sup> USFOR-A reported that due to continued changes in the operating environment, the EF directorates again refocused the plans and reassessed the end-of-mission forecast.<sup>194</sup> RS now forecasts that 62% of MOD functions are predicted to be “sustaining” or “fully capable” (the highest and second-highest ratings), a drop from the 69%, 74%, and 90% forecasts in the last three quarters.<sup>195</sup> Lower expectations were forecast for the MOI, where 51% of the functions are expected to be “sustaining” or “fully capable,” reduced from previous quarters’ forecasts of 57%, 68%, and 86%.<sup>196</sup>

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.7

MINISTRY MILESTONE ASSESSMENT USING NATO SYSTEM, AS OF NOVEMBER 2015																																	
RATING MEANING	EF1			EF2			EF3			EF4			EF5			EF6			EF7			EF8			Gender			Total					
	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-	Q3	Q4	+/-												
<b>Ministry of Defense Assessment</b>																																	
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	2	=	0	1	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	3	+
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	2	2	=	0	0	=	4	4	=	5	5	=	9	9	=	1	1	=	2	2	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	23	23	=
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	4	4	=	4	4	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	1	1	=	2	1	-	1	1	=	0	3	+	2	2	=	15	17	+			
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+	3	0	-	1	1	=	4	2	-			
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	0	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	0	-			
<b>EF Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>=</b>			
<b>Ministry of Interior Assessment</b>																																	
Rating 5 Sustaining Capability	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	1	+
Rating 4 Fully Capable/Effective	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	2	1	-	2	1	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	4	2	-
Rating 3 Partially Capable/Effective	3	3	=	0	1	+	2	2	=	2	3	+	9	9	=	2	2	=	0	1	+	0	2	+	0	0	=	18	23	+			
Rating 2 Initiated (In Development)	3	3	=	2	2	=	2	2	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	0	0	=	3	2	-	0	1	+	2	2	=	13	13	=			
Rating 1 Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	1	0	-	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	1	1	=	2	1	-
Rating 0 Not Scoped/Agreed	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=	0	0	=
<b>EF Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+</b>			

Note: EF = Essential Function; ASI = Afghan Security Institutions; EF1 = Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution; EF2 = Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF3 = Civilian Governance of the ASI; EF4 = Force Generation; EF5 = Sustainment; EF6 = Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; EF7 = Intelligence; EF8 = Strategic Communications. Quarter-to-quarter changes: same =, gain +, loss -. Q3 = August 25, 2015; Q4 = November 24, 2015.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 9/4/2015 and 12/4/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/13/2016.

After the backlash following the security breakdown in Kunduz City, Ghani filled numerous ANP vacancies, appointing eight regional commanders and five provincial police chiefs.<sup>197</sup> However, the MOD minister position remains filled by an individual in an acting capacity, as local officials and former administration officials claim the national-unity government agreement to split appointments between President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah's political parties had the unintended consequence of undermining the fight against the Taliban and creating chaos in the chain-of-command.<sup>198</sup>

EF-8 reports the Afghan government lacks an effective lead spokesperson, a unifying anti-insurgent narrative, and an effective communications plan. Weaknesses include the ability to align communications assets, empower subordinates with guidance and priorities, and messaging that can reach and influence the Afghan populace and the ANDSF members at the corps/zone/province level.<sup>199</sup> The MOD hired an experienced civilian strategic communications advisor this quarter, which according to RS, will bolster an underperforming office.<sup>200</sup>

## **MOD and MOI Literacy Training Contracts Continue to Await National Procurement Agency Approval**

This quarter USFOR-A reported the MOD and MOI literacy contract packages submitted last year still await final approval by the National Procurement Agency. In the interim, the ANA and ANP are conducting literacy training with internal assets.<sup>201</sup>

USFOR-A reports all ANA and ANP officers and noncommissioned officers are expected to be literate to hold their positions.<sup>202</sup> ANA policy requires officer applicants to be fully literate—able to read, write, and grasp the idea of a topic—and requires noncommissioned officer applicants to be able to read and write.<sup>203</sup>

## **Afghan Local Police**

Afghan Local Police members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.<sup>204</sup> Effective June 15, 2015, the ALP transitioned to command and control by the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). However, the ALP was not absorbed into the AUP tashkil (staff roster) and, even though the AUP is one of the ANP’s pillars, the ALP tashkil will remain independent of the ANP’s total authorized strength.<sup>205</sup>

As of October 22, 2015, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP has 26,946 guardians, 20,980 of whom were fully trained.<sup>206</sup> NSOCC-A expects a significant decrease in untrained ALP guardians by the end of the winter training surge in May 2016.<sup>207</sup>

According to Afghan reporting, 2.4% of ALP guardians were killed in action from January through November 2015. An additional 5.7% have been dropped from the rolls, 0.06% became disabled, and 2.3% were injured, yielding an aggregate attrition rate of 10.5%.<sup>208</sup> During the first seven months of 2015, approximately 93% of the ALP guardians renewed their contracts.<sup>209</sup>

NSOCC-A reports the FY 2016 cost to support the ALP at its target end-strength of 30,000 is \$117 million. The United States expects to fund approximately \$112.5 million, with the Afghan government contributing the remaining \$4.5 million.<sup>210</sup> CSTC-A reports the total cumulative amount

of ASFF obligated in support of the ALP through September 28, 2015, was \$308.7 million, of which \$219.9 million had been expended.<sup>211</sup> NSOCC-A reports, however, that there are no Coalition advisors outside the Kabul-capital region that maintain consistent situational awareness of the ALP.<sup>212</sup>

As of November 2015, MOI completed an internal assessment of 164 of the 170 districts in which the ALP operates, according to NSOCC-A. Subsequently the Minister of Interior issued 49 reforms focused on personnel recruiting, training, pay, as well as equipment fielding and maintenance.<sup>213</sup>

One of the most critical discrepancies identified in the assessment was misallocation and personnel reported as present for duty but unaccounted for. To remedy such personnel problems, tashkil positions were removed or reallocated to districts that use ALP guardians appropriately. Additionally, all the ALP tashkil were added to the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) in an effort to improve personnel accountability and allow payroll auditing.<sup>214</sup> Another finding identified salary payments processed through bank branches in rural areas lacked the transparency and accountability available through an electronic funds transfer (EFT) process. An initiative to implement EFT in Kapisa Province produced such positive results that efforts are now under way to replace the trusted-agent system in Parwan and Kandahar Provinces with an EFT payment process.<sup>215</sup>

Because the assessment indicated the ALP has a higher casualty rate in engagements in remote terrain where other ANDSF elements are sparse, the MOD and MOI coordinated an effort to distribute 30,000 sets of personal protective equipment to better protect the ALP guardians.<sup>216</sup> Other recommendations were to develop an enduring ALP district-level assessment plan and to implement a readiness-reporting system to maintain accountability of personnel, training, and equipment readiness.<sup>217</sup>

DOD reported the most successful ALP units are in areas where the former ISAF mission maintained a persistent Coalition presence alongside local security forces.<sup>218</sup>

## Afghan Public Protection Force

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, was established to provide fixed-site, convoy, and personal security on a fee-for-service basis. The APPF assumed security roles previously performed by private security companies, which were disbanded by Afghan Presidential Decree 62 in August 2010. The APPF has four directorates:<sup>219</sup>

- government projects
- nongovernmental projects
- international projects
- protection and convoy security

**Essential Function 1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution) reports significant progress, in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Finance, toward implementing a Mobile Money program for paying the Afghan Local Police salaries. For more information, see pp. 70-72 of this section.**

CSTC-A reported that through September 29, 2014, the United States had spent more than \$51 million on the APPF.<sup>220</sup> Any additional funding DOD may provide to the APPF is for payment of security services rendered to DOD organizations or contractors. This is the last update SIGAR will be reporting on the APPF. USFOR-A does not conduct a train, advise, and assist mission for the APPF and therefore does not have access to report on APPF status.<sup>221</sup>

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$38.6 billion and disbursed \$37.6 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>222</sup>

### ANA Military Personnel Increase Slightly

As of October 20, 2015, the overall assigned strength within the MOD, including the ANA, the AAF, and civilians, was 176,612 personnel, according to USFOR-A.<sup>223</sup> This is an overall increase of 192 ANA personnel since last quarter, when the July 2015 assigned end strength was reported at 176,420.<sup>224</sup> The number of ANA civilians decreased by 154; the number of ANA military personnel increased by 346.<sup>225</sup> ANA assigned military personnel are at 87% of the approved end strength.<sup>226</sup>

During the month of October 2015, the ANA attrition rate was 3%, with the AAF attrition at 1.5%. ANA and AAF attrition during July 2015 were 2.4% and 0.6%, respectively.<sup>227</sup>

RS EF-4 (Force Generation) advisors and recruiters from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command conducted a roadshow in November 2015 with their ANA Recruiting Command counterparts and ANA 201st Corps leaders to learn the challenges and issues experienced by the ANA recruiting force and to advise on recruiting, attrition, and reenlisting.<sup>228</sup> The joint Afghan-U.S. team also partnered with their National Afghan Volunteer Center (NAVVC) counterparts to identify inefficiencies in current NAVC operations in order to give ANA leaders ways to improve recruitment.<sup>229</sup>

This quarter, details of ANA troop strength and attrition at corps level and below remain classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

### ANA Sustainment

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$16.2 billion and disbursed \$15.5 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.<sup>230</sup> The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition, organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), aircraft operations and maintenance, and vehicle maintenance.<sup>231</sup> CSTC-A reported the

Recent news-media reporting questions the validity and reliability of ANDSF personnel numbers. For more information, see pp. 72–73 of this section.

total amount expended for all sustainment requirements in FY 2015 was \$552.9 million.<sup>232</sup>

In mid-December, the new computer and server hardware for the ANDSF's inventory and logistics information-management system known as CoreIMS arrived in-country.<sup>233</sup> The CoreIMS logistics system tracks and monitors OCIE stock, among other types of equipment and parts. CoreIMS is updated when OCIE is received in-country and before the equipment is shipped to national supply warehouses. CSTC-A reported approximately 1,700 types of OCIE items were inputted into CoreIMS to enable the national and regional supply centers to account for the OCIE.<sup>234</sup>

The enhancements for the demand-based supply capability will be implemented at the national and regional logistics centers once the CoreIMS hardware is installed.<sup>235</sup> CSTC-A reported 92 of 130 authorized Afghan logistical specialists are now employed at the national and regional centers providing training and assistance to the ANDSF in learning CoreIMS, developing computer skills, and cataloging items.<sup>236</sup>

### ANA Salaries and Incentives

As of September 28, 2015, CSTC-A reported the United States had provided \$2.83 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2009.<sup>237</sup> CSTC-A reported the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average \$682 million annually over the next five years, with \$676.2 million required in FY 2016.<sup>238</sup> During Afghan solar year 1394 (2015), the U.S. provided \$207.7 million in on-budget support to the MOD for ANA salaries and contractor pay, with the significant majority of the funding, \$138.2 million, applied toward officer base pay. An additional \$69.1 million was used for noncommissioned officers and soldier pay, and \$.4 million for ANA contractors' base pay.<sup>239</sup>

To incentivize the MOD to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016; pay for other positions will be 80% funded.<sup>240</sup> USFOR-A reports as of November 27, 2015, that the MOD has input 99% of the ANA forces into AHRIMS with 97% of the force slotted into an approved FY 1394 tashkil position.<sup>241</sup> However, as USFOR-A does not have the applicable AHRIMS access to create the report SIGAR requested on attrition and educational data by rank and province, USFOR-A requested the data from the MOD. Additionally, USFOR-A explained AHRIMS is an MOD- and MOI-owned system and the requested data may or may not be available in AHRIMS at this time as the initial data input effort is prioritizing other key data fields, such as name, rank, identification number, next of kin, and banking information required for electronic salary payments. Additional information pertaining to ANDSF members will be inputted incrementally.<sup>242</sup>

USFOR-A also reported that AHRIMS will transition to the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) in 2016, to provide greater accountability of personnel present for duty, properly assigned to a tashkil position, and paid the proper entitlements. However, SIGAR did not receive clarification if APPS will replace AHRIMS in its entirety or if APPS will replace only some of its functionality.<sup>243</sup>

## ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$12.8 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.<sup>244</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 49.5% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.8.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANA increased by over \$530 million, not including the Special Mission Wing (SMW) aircraft costs of \$766.9 million that were realigned from the ANP when the SMW transferred from the MOI to the MOD.<sup>245</sup> There was no change in the amount of equipment transferred to the ANA since the last CSTC-A reporting of June 30, 2015. The vehicles “remaining to be procured” amount changed since the June reporting from “to be determined” to \$604.4 million.<sup>246</sup>

Equipment purchased for the ANA that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF or was damaged before transfer to the Afghan government can be transferred to DOD for disposition, after USFOR-A considers alternative dispositions and the U.S. Congress is notified. DOD notified SIGAR that no notification was processed during this reporting period, so the cumulative value remains at \$215 million.<sup>247</sup>

TABLE 3.8

<b>COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT, AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 2015</b>			
<b>Type of Equipment</b>	<b>Procured</b>	<b>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</b>	<b>Remaining to be Procured</b>
Weapons	\$642,032,285	\$522,370,326	\$19,045,740
Vehicles	7,293,934,837	6,440,981,649	604,435,625
Communications	840,433,973	703,298,191	82,830,726
Aircraft	2,139,192,713	1,342,811,508	327,131,596
Ammunition	2,469,192,080	2,180,830,996	380,830,461
Transportation Services	40,000,000	13,459,569	0
C-IEDs	418,150,056	341,550,056	0
Other	884,304,375	773,658,682	1,005,377
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$14,727,240,319</b>	<b>\$12,318,960,977</b>	<b>\$1,415,279,525</b>

Note: C-IEDs = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts. This quarter aircraft costs, which had been procured for the Special Mission Wing (SMW), were transferred to the ANA as the SMW was transferred from the MOI to the MOD.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2016.

DOD reports that during the past year the ANDSF have increased usage of their close-air support and lift assets, protected mobility vehicles, mortars and howitzers, and direct-fire systems.<sup>248</sup> A review in early 2015 determined the SMW had intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that the ANA and AAF did not. This gap is being addressed with the fielding in early 2016 of unmanned aerial vehicles, an additional surveillance tower and aerostat systems (lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons).<sup>249</sup>

EF-5 (Sustainment) is analyzing the solar year 1394 equipment tashkil, or roster of authorizations of on-hand and required equipment and weapons, to use in identifying the requirements of the upcoming solar year equipment tashkil. The data will be used to “right-size” the ANDSF equipment tashkils through 2024.<sup>250</sup>

## ANA Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$6.0 billion and disbursed \$5.7 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as military head-quarter facilities, schoolhouses, barracks, air fields, and roads.<sup>251</sup>

As of November 30, 2015, the United States had completed 372 infrastructure projects valued at \$5.2 billion, with another 22 projects valued at \$183.9 million ongoing, according to CSTC-A.<sup>252</sup> The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter are the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul (at a cost of \$76.3 million), to be completed in December 2017, and the Logistics Officers Branch School in Kabul (\$33.6 million) and the fourth phase of the Kabul Military Training Center in Kabul (\$19.7 million), both to have been completed in December 2015.<sup>253</sup>



**Construction of the Marshal Fahim** National Defense University Joint Service Academy building in Kabul. (CSTC-A photo)

## SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD’s support to the ANA’s portion of the Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met.

In addition, three projects were completed at a cost of \$173 million, including the brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade of the 201st Corps in Kunar (\$115.7 million), and phases IIIA and IIIB of the MFNDU at a cost of \$38 million and \$19.3 million respectively.<sup>254</sup>

The transfer of the new MOD Headquarters facility to the Afghan government occurred with high-level interest and media attention. A ceremonial passing of the key between the CSTC-A chief engineer and the Afghan chief of the Construction Property Management Division occurred on November 25, 2015.<sup>255</sup> That was followed by an inauguration event on December 28, 2015, with the President of Afghanistan, the Chief Executive, the acting MOD minister, and RS Commander General Campbell in attendance. The 700-room building took 10 years to build and cost approximately \$160 million.<sup>256</sup>

Of the five contracts awarded this quarter at a cost of \$7.7 million, one was for various regional logistical-support centers (\$4 million) and another to construct barracks for females (\$1.7 million).<sup>257</sup> Of the 16 projects (\$190.5 million) in the planning phase, three projects are to construct facilities for females (\$30.1 million) and two projects are to construct facilities for the AAF.<sup>258</sup>

The ASFF-funded national operations and maintenance contract provides maintenance for 24 MOD facilities including the presidential palace, training and higher-learning facilities, a justice center, a detention center, and a hospital.<sup>259</sup>

The FY 1394 MOD financial-commitment letter required the Afghan government to provide CSTC-A a transition and sustainment plan, including the infrastructure security plan, for the facilities constructed with U.S. funding and transferred to the Afghan government.<sup>260</sup> CSTC-A reports that while \$29 million in conditional funding was withheld because the MOD did not provide the plan, the MOD has signed a plan to divest 90 excess facilities and has divested 22 facilities. The draft FY 1395 financial-commitment letter withholds an estimated \$3 million pending the validated divestments of the 90 facilities and a plan for divesting the remaining 68 excess facilities.<sup>261</sup>

## ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations.<sup>262</sup>

CSTC-A reported 21 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs: 17 focusing on technical training, one on professional military education, two on basic training, and one on English language.<sup>263</sup>

During this quarter, the EF-4 (Force Generation) Army Institutional Advisory Team (AIAT) developed three new officer training courses:

- **Kandak Pre-Command Course:** a two-week course for newly appointed kandak commanders that includes combined-arms operations, cross-pillar coordination, air-to-ground integration,

### SIGAR AUDIT

A January 2016 SIGAR audit, conducted to assess U.S. efforts to increase the ANA's effectiveness through the creation of a National Engineering Brigade, determined the brigade was incapable of operating independently. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 22-23.

operational readiness, and training management. Trained ANA instructors will teach the course with U.S. and UK advisors observing. The course will be held four times a year for approximately 20 students. The first course was held in December 2015.<sup>264</sup>

- **Brigade Pre-Command Course:** a two-week course for newly appointed brigade commanders is to cover the kandak pre-command course topics from a more senior commander's perspective. The course will be held twice a year for approximately 10 students. The first course is scheduled for February 2016.<sup>265</sup>
- **The Leader's Course:** a two-week leadership course for officers assigned to or moving to senior positions in the ANDSF or other government departments. The course, developed by members of the U.S. Army War College and the UK Defense Academy, was modeled after a UK program. The first course started at the end of November 2015.<sup>266</sup>

### Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

Between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the United States has obligated approximately \$2.4 billion to develop the AAF, including over \$912 million for equipment and aircraft.<sup>267</sup> Since last quarter, DOD realigned its FY 2015 funding applied to the AAF from \$683.3 million to \$925.2 million; the amount applied toward sustainment rose from \$437.6 million to \$780.4 million.<sup>268</sup> Additionally, the FY 2016 request is for \$548.3 million, with the significant majority of the funds for training and sustainment.<sup>269</sup>

According to USFOR-A, this quarter, the AAF aircraft inventory, includes:<sup>270</sup>

- 11 Mi-35 helicopters
- 49 Mi-17 helicopters (three less than last quarter)
- 16 MD-530 helicopters
- 24 C-208 airplanes (two less)
- 4 C-130 airplanes

Of these aircraft, 33 of the Mi-17s and all of the MD-530s, C-208s, and the C-130s were procured using ASFF.<sup>271</sup> Additionally, 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light-attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close-air support, and aerial reconnaissance, have been purchased. DOD said the first four arrived in-country on January 15, 2016.<sup>272</sup> The pilots receive basic flight maneuvers and instrument training in a Beechcraft/Raytheon T-6 Texan II basic trainer aircraft, followed by more advanced fighter tactics, bombing, and strafing training in the A-29s. USFOR-A reports using this two-plane training structure is an efficient methodology that provides the greatest probability of graduating A-29 pilots.<sup>273</sup> On December 17, the first eight pilots and twelve maintainers graduated from A-29 training at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. Two other Afghan maintainers who were also scheduled to graduate went missing on December 8.<sup>274</sup> As of January 13, 2016, one of the two maintainers was found; a U.S.

## SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In February 2015, SIGAR conducted a fact-finding visit on the A-29 Super Tucanos at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. SIGAR will conduct ongoing monitoring of the program's roll-out and the training of the Afghan pilots.

Department of Homeland Security spokesman said the search for the other continues.<sup>275</sup>

USFOR-A stated that an additional 12 MD-530s are being purchased and are scheduled for delivery in 2016.<sup>276</sup> In a September 2015 *New York Times* article about the MD-530 helicopters, an AAF corps commander stated that the helicopters were inadequate and dangerous. He claimed that the helicopters did not have the proper range to engage the Taliban, while an AAF pilot complained that the mounted .50-caliber machine guns would often jam.<sup>277</sup> In response to the AAF's criticism, USFOR-A said the initial operational challenges were overcome and the armed MD-530 is a capable aircraft. DOD determined the armed MD-530 was the only suitable alternative to address the close-air support gap that would exist following the end of Operation Enduring Freedom and the fielding of the A-29 Super Tucanos and the Mobile Strike Force Vehicles with 90 mm direct-fire weapons.<sup>278</sup>

The MD-530's operational capability has allowed the AAF to increase air raids against insurgent groups and is in great demand to provide close-air support to the ANDSF during combat operations.<sup>279</sup> AAF leadership reportedly now understands the capability and value of the MD-530, according to USFOR-A.<sup>280</sup>

On December 25, 2015, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official visit to Afghanistan, the Prime Minister presented the AAF with three Russian-made Mi-25 assault helicopters, with a fourth to be delivered later.<sup>281</sup> DOD reports this agreement was made strictly between the governments of Afghanistan and India. DOD advised the Afghan government that U.S. funds would not be available to sustain these aircraft due to sanctions concerns. Afghanistan is actively seeking bilateral support from other regional partners.<sup>282</sup> However, USFOR-A reported that Coalition advisors, who have supported the AAF's Mi-17 and Mi-35 programs for several years, could train, advise, and assist the AAF in sustainment of the Mi-25.<sup>283</sup>

CSTC-A reported that between FY 2012 and FY 2015, the United States has invested over \$1.8 billion in the development of the SMW, obligating roughly \$991.1 million of that amount for equipment and aircraft.<sup>284</sup> According to CSTC-A, the SMW fleet of 59 fielded aircraft comprises Mi-17 helicopters and PC-12 turboprop planes that have intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.<sup>285</sup> Of these aircraft, 30 of the Mi-17s and all of the PC-12s were procured using ASFF.<sup>286</sup> According to NSOCC-A, the SMW has 509 members, of which 108 are pilots, all part of the MOD. Fifty-four additional personnel are undergoing entry, English-proficiency, and security background checks.<sup>287</sup>

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$18.7 billion and disbursed \$18.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.<sup>288</sup>

### ANP Strength

As of October 22, 2015, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 146,026, according to USFOR-A.<sup>289</sup> This is a decrease of 2,270 ANP personnel since last quarter, when the July 2015 assigned end strength was reported at 148,296, and 10,974 below the authorized end strength of 157,000, as reflected in Table 3.9.<sup>290</sup> Police officers represent the largest component of the ANP with 70,886 members, 49,872 noncommissioned officers, and 25,268 officers.<sup>291</sup>

During the months of August, September, and October, the ANP experienced a 2.35%, 2.32%, and 2.5% attrition rate, respectively. The prior three months' attrition rate was approximately 1.94%.<sup>292</sup> Within the ANP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police continues to endure the highest attrition rates: 4.69%, 4.36%, and 5.53% over the three months.<sup>293</sup>

The UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict reported two verified cases of the ANP and ALP recruiting children in a June 2015 report.<sup>294</sup> CSTC-A reported the ANP Inherent Law, dated October 2010, requires that no recruits be under the age of 18.<sup>295</sup> While restricting child police/soldier recruitment is not a condition for U.S. funding in the annual CSTC-A financial-commitment letters, USFOR-A says advisors will forward any human-rights violations to the RS Mission Legal Office.<sup>296</sup>

Recent news-media reporting questions the validity and reliability of ANDSF personnel numbers. For more information, see pp. 72–73 of this section.

TABLE 3.9

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q3 2015	Q4 2015	Quarterly Change	Q3 2015	Q4 2015	Quarterly Change
	AUP	90,139	91,000	861	86,754	85,976
ABP	22,955	23,313	358	21,775	21,520	(255)
ANCOP	15,223	16,200	977	15,169	14,511	(658)
MOI HQs & IS	28,523	26,487	(2,036)	24,598	24,019	(579)
<b>ANP Total (as reported)</b>	<b>156,840</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>148,296</b>	<b>146,026</b>	<b>(2,270)</b>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q3 2015 data as of 7/2015; Q4 2015 data as of 10/2015. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; MOI = Ministry of Interior; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 9/11/2015 and 12/14/2015.

## ANP Sustainment

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$7.7 billion and disbursed \$7.5 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.<sup>297</sup> This includes contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries, the most prominent ASFF sustainment funding. Other uses of ANP sustainment funding include vehicle and radio maintenance; organizational clothing and individual equipment; and ammunition.<sup>298</sup>

The U.S. contribution to LOTFA for calendar year 2015 was \$112.3 million to fund salaries, incentives, and the UN Development Programme management fee.<sup>299</sup> CSTC-A reports the U.S. funding required for LOTFA over the next five years will depend on the contributions of Coalition partners. The estimated annual expenses range from a high of \$616.3 million to a low of \$608.1 million, for an average of \$613.2 million.<sup>300</sup>

The CSTC-A financial-commitment letter to the MOI for Afghan FY 1394 includes the LOTFA Steering Committee mandate for the MOI to provide 100% of ANP salaries through electronic funds transfer.<sup>301</sup> To incentivize the MOI to use electronic payment systems, CSTC-A is to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use later in 2016.<sup>302</sup>

USFOR-A reports as of November 22, 2015, that the MOI has input 90.8% of the ANP forces into AHRIMS.<sup>303</sup> However, USFOR-A does not have the applicable AHRIMS access to create the report SIGAR requested on attrition and educational data by rank and province and, therefore, requested the data from the MOI. USFOR-A explained AHRIMS is a MOD- and MOI-owned system and the requested data may or may not be available at this time because the initial data-input effort is prioritizing other key data fields, such as name, rank, identification number, next of kin, and banking information required for electronic salary payments. Additional information pertaining to ANDSF members will be inputted incrementally.<sup>304</sup>

USFOR-A additionally reported that AHRIMS will transition to the APPS in 2016, to provide greater accountability of personnel present for duty, properly assigned to a tashkil position, and paid the proper entitlements. However, SIGAR did not receive clarification if APPS will replace AHRIMS in its entirety or if APPS will replace only some of its functions.<sup>305</sup>

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.1 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.<sup>306</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment as shown in Table 3.10. More than 68% of funding in this category was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANP increased to over \$76.6 million, all within the weapons and vehicle

TABLE 3.10

<b>COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT, AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 2015</b>			
<b>Type of Equipment</b>	<b>Procured</b>	<b>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</b>	<b>Remaining to be Procured</b>
Weapons	\$291,495,548	\$205,851,400	\$19,045,740
Vehicles <sup>a</sup>	3,468,042,669	3,109,856,026	164,435,625
Communications	230,376,282	224,995,225	11,588,547
Ammunition	738,345,011	419,352,362	0
Transportation Services	20,026,263	7,770,471	0
C-IEDs	115,581,810	115,581,810	2,165,915
Other	243,097,382	91,438,300	14,412,160
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,106,964,965</b>	<b>\$4,174,845,594</b>	<b>\$211,647,987</b>

Note: C-IEDs = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Aircraft costs are no longer shown for the ANP: The Special Mission Wing (SMW) for which they were procured has been transferred to the ANA, moving from MOI to MOD control.

<sup>a</sup> Vehicle costs includes vehicles and parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2016.

categories.<sup>307</sup> As with the ANA, there was no change in the amount of equipment that had been transferred to the ANP since the last CSTC-A reporting dated June 30, 2015.<sup>308</sup> The weapons “remaining to be procured” amount changed since the June reporting from “to be determined” to \$19 million. In addition, the vehicles “remaining to be procured” amount changed since the June reporting from “to be determined” to \$164.4 million.<sup>309</sup>

In early 2015, DOD approved a CSTC-A plan to transition the ANP to U.S. standard weapons.<sup>310</sup> The plan will transition up to 78,000 of the MOI’s AK-47 supply to the M-16A4 over the next several years. CSTC-A will develop a plan with the Afghans to consolidate, demilitarize, and ensure proper accountability of weapons turned in, consistent with DOD’s response to SIGAR’s July 2014 audit report, *Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability* (14-84-AR).<sup>311</sup> CSTC-A will not transfer any new weapons until the Afghan ministries meet the turn-in, turnover, and demilitarization conditions.<sup>312</sup>

Equipment purchased for the ANP that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF can be transferred to DOD for disposition, after the U.S. Congress is notified. DOD notified SIGAR that no notification was processed during the quarter, so the cumulative value of ANP equipment transferred to DOD remains at \$18.4 million.<sup>313</sup>

## ANP Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$3.1 billion and disbursed \$3.0 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.<sup>314</sup>

As of November 30, 2015, the United States had completed 729 infrastructure projects valued at \$3.7 billion, with another four ongoing projects valued at \$73.5 million, according to CSTC-A.<sup>315</sup> The largest ongoing ANP



**Newly inaugurated MOI Headquarters** building in Kabul. (CSTC-A file photo)

infrastructure projects this quarter are the remaining facilities at the MOI headquarters complex in Kabul that began in March 2012 and are expected to be completed in February 2016, and two compounds for females in Nangarhar and Kabul (\$6.4 million and \$3.4 million respectively).<sup>316</sup>

While no projects were completed this quarter, the President of Afghanistan, the Afghan Minister of Interior, and RS Commander General Campbell presided over the formal inauguration of the new Ministry of the Interior building in Kabul on December 21, 2015.<sup>317</sup> Three contracts were awarded at a cost of \$10.1 million, including the two compounds for females and a fueling point at a regional logistics center in Nangarhar (\$273 thousand).<sup>318</sup> In addition, CSTC-A reports 13 projects are in the planning phase (\$52.75 million).<sup>319</sup>

The ASFF-funded national operations and maintenance contract provides maintenance for five MOI facilities including the MOI headquarters and national and regional logistics centers. CSTC-A reports maintenance for four facilities is scheduled to transition to the MOI by the end of March 2016, and for the MOI headquarters by the end of February 2017.<sup>320</sup>

## ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had obligated \$3.7 billion and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.<sup>321</sup>

CSTC-A reported six ongoing U.S.-funded training programs: five focused on technical training and one focused on basic training.<sup>322</sup> The largest U.S.-funded training includes operational-specialty training, such as special-operations intelligence, vehicle maintenance, counter-improvised-explosive-device procedures, explosive-ordnance disposal, and radio operation and maintenance.<sup>323</sup>

## STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ANDSF

This quarter RS reported 3,728 women serving in the ANDSF, a slight decrease from the 3,753 reported last quarter.<sup>324</sup> However, with the overall decrease in the ANDSF end strength, the percentage of women serving in the ANDSF stayed constant at 1.16%.<sup>325</sup> Of the total, 2,802 were serving with the ANP: 1,208 officers, 1,258 NCOs, 1,119 soldiers, and 143 cadets.<sup>326</sup> The number of women in an officer position increased by 381 since last quarter, not including three additional MOI females who were selected to the rank of brigadier general.<sup>327</sup>

The Women in Security Advisory Committee—General Campbell chairs and first lady Rula Ghani is an honorary member—provided strategic input to several initiatives. One proposal was to increase overseas training options as a way to increase recruiting and training capacity, as in-country training is limited to 485 women annually. The committee also contributed to the dialogue for national-level endorsement for female police officers to carry weapons.<sup>328</sup>

RS also reported the draft FY 1395 gender commitment letter will require the MOD to create 5,000 positions for women by the end of solar year 1395. These ANA tashkil positions are deemed essential to provide career-advancing pathways for women.<sup>329</sup> However, the ANDSF has not met its recruitment goals for women once in the 14 years the Coalition has been in Afghanistan.<sup>330</sup>

## ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

While the overall number of doctors and other medical staff increased this quarter, according to CSTC-A, the number of physician vacancies also increased due to the increase in the number of authorized positions.<sup>331</sup> As of November 25, 2015, CSTC-A reports there are 911 physicians and 2,678 other medical staff within the ANDSF health-care system.<sup>332</sup>

This quarter CSTC-A reported two accomplishments within the ANDSF health-care system. The first was the Afghan presidential decree approving the formation and charter of the Afghan Medical Council on November 12, 2015. The council serves the function similar to a U.S. state medical board, setting and enforcing medical standards, hospital accreditation, and physician licensing and education.<sup>333</sup> The second accomplishment was a policy changing the maximum age of new hires, which should help to alleviate the personnel shortages at ANDSF hospitals. In November, the MOD approved hiring physicians above age 27, with an exception for physician specialists over age 40. The accession policy also eliminated the age restriction for hiring physician assistants and nurses.<sup>334</sup>

CSTC-A reports RS is to purchase critical medical equipment that the MOD and MOI were unsuccessful in purchasing on-budget last year.<sup>335</sup>

## REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan to enhance the security and safety of the Afghan people. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$328.3 million in weapons destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding, and the majority of FY 2015 funds have been obligated. FY 2016 funds have not yet been made available for obligation.<sup>336</sup>

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGO), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable the clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support the clearance of conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. As of September 30, 2015, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 177 million square meters of land (approximately 68.3 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.7 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives since 1997 (see Table 3.11).<sup>337</sup>

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 213.1 square miles of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, 1.8 square miles were cleared. However, ongoing surveys identified 4.6 square miles of additional contaminated areas, bringing the known contaminated area to 220.4 square miles at the end of the quarter. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.<sup>338</sup>

TABLE 3.11

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2009–2015						
Year	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m <sup>2</sup> )*
2010	13,879	663,162	1,602,267	4,339,235	39,337,557	650,662,000
2011	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	21,966,347	31,644,360	602,000,000
2012	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	22,912,702	46,783,527	550,000,000
2013	6,431	203,024	275,697	10,148,683	25,059,918	521,000,000
2014	12,397	287,331	346,484	9,415,712	22,071,212	511,600,000
2015	2,134	33,078	88,798	4,062,478	12,101,386	570,800,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57,175</b>	<b>1,875,987</b>	<b>5,765,731</b>	<b>72,845,157</b>	<b>176,997,960</b>	<b>570,800,000</b>

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre.

\* Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2015, 6/26/2015, and 12/29/2015.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in partnership with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians, including victims of mines and ERW. UNMACA draws on its wider network under the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), which consists of 50 international and national organizations, to access beneficiaries and communities. One of those organizations, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), collects casualty data on mine/ERW victims to help prioritize its clearance activities. According to USAID, ACAP funding will allow MACCA to expand its victim-assistance activities beyond service provision and data collection to include immediate assistance for individual survivors and their families. The \$30.2 million ACAP program has expended \$9.6 million to date and will conclude in February 2018.<sup>339</sup>

## COUNTERNARCOTICS


As of December 31, 2015, the United States has provided \$8.4 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$3 billion), the ASFF (\$1.4 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$1.6 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$2.2 billion). USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan.<sup>340</sup> (See Appendix B.)

In October 2015, the Afghan government approved its National Drug Action Plan (NDAP), developed in collaboration with the U.S. government. State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) said it will support the NDAP by using available resources and future funding requests to bolster counternarcotics efforts. The United States is updating and revising its counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan to support the goals and objectives outlined in the NDAP.<sup>341</sup>

In December 2015, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published its *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015*. UNODC estimated that the area under cultivation was 183,000 hectares, a 19% decrease from the previous year. Afghan opium production (3,300 tons) also decreased 48% from its 2014 level. However, UNODC cautioned that it changed its methodology between 2014 and 2015, which could make changes appear larger than they actually were. The decreases do not result from a single factor

FIGURE 3.27

## AFGHAN OPIUM CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION SINCE 2008



Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 8.

### The Partners for Afghanistan and

**Neighboring Countries:** Also referred to as the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries, it was created in December 2011 by the UN to combat illicit drug and opium production and cultivation in the region. The program fosters cooperation, information sharing, networking, and partnerships between the countries in the region through a strategic framework.

Source: UNODC, *Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, Semi-Annual Progress Report Issue No. 5, January–June 2014*, pp. 5, 6, and 10.

or policy measure and do not represent a downward trend. According to UNODC, the declines are mainly a consequence of repeated crop failures in the southern and southwestern regions of Afghanistan. Production and cultivation results had been rising for the past decade, as illustrated in Figure 3.27.<sup>342</sup>

In December 2015, INL took part in two UNODC international meetings, the High-Level Meeting of **Partners for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries** and the **Paris Pact** Consultative Group Meeting. The NDAP was presented at both. At these meetings, the United States reaffirmed support for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and encouraged international commitments to the NDAP. During a recent winter visit to Afghanistan, the UNODC regional representative for Afghanistan and neighboring countries told Special Inspector General John F. Sopko that regional and international coordination is critical to achieve sustainable reductions in drug production. According to the regional representative, the UN was best suited to coordinate efforts to improve the efficiency of donors' assistance.<sup>343</sup>

## Drug Demand Reduction

Although INL itself reports in its 2015 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* that “the prevalence of addiction and severity of

consumption [in Afghanistan] is the highest documented in the world,” INL is reducing funding to all treatment centers.<sup>344</sup>

In January 2015, INL transitioned its first group of 13 treatment programs to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) responsibility. Another 15 treatment centers will begin transitioning in January 2016; the remaining 69 treatment centers will be transitioned by the end of 2019. INL reduced funding to all facilities (including the original MOPH portfolio of 23 centers and the 13 that were in transition during 2015) by approximately 20% in 2015. According to INL, further cuts are necessary in the coming year.

During 2015, the MOPH and INL’s implementing partner, the **Colombo Plan**, collaborated to transfer the clinical staff from the first group of treatment centers onto the Afghan government payroll. According to INL, this will be complete by January 2016. A total of 67 clinical staff members were trained between January and March 2015 by the Colombo Plan; additional staff were hired this quarter and 25 trained in December 2015. In 2015, UNODC provided training to 140 staff on new treatments and the MOPH provided “train the trainer” training to 120 staff on treatment methodologies.<sup>345</sup>

During the quarter, INL began working with the Ministry of Higher Education on the possibility of establishing an addiction studies department at Kabul University and continued its efforts with the Ministry of Education on preventative drug education teacher training.<sup>346</sup>

INL contributed over \$4.6 million to the Colombo Plan in April 2015 and \$12.9 million during 2015 for drug treatment and education programs. In 2014, INL contributed \$7.6 million to the Colombo Plan and \$9.4 million for drug treatment and education programs. SIGAR has written in previous quarterly reports about the insufficient number of treatment centers to address Afghanistan’s growing domestic addiction problem. In addition to the significant number of heroin and opiate users, Afghanistan has seen a rise in methamphetamine (crystal meth) users. The first crystal meth seizure was in 2008 in Helmand. In 2015, there were seizures in 14 provinces. Although Iran is the leading producer of crystal meth in the region, its manufacture is on the rise in Afghanistan. The meth seized in Afghanistan is of high quality, 90% or higher purity. This recent phenomenon has prompted the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) to urge stronger legal penalties for trafficking in methamphetamine.<sup>347</sup>

If the numbers of crystal meth users and local manufacturing labs continue to rise, it will intensify the challenge of addressing the country’s already robust illicit drug economy.

## Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

INL funds the nationwide Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation,

**The Paris Pact:** The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on central Asian drug routes. It aims to reduce opium-poppy cultivation and production, and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and establish a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

**Colombo Plan:** Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan’s Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals (ACCE), a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Source: Paris Pact, “What is it?” [www.paris-pact.net](http://www.paris-pact.net), accessed 7/16/2014; The Colombo Plan Secretariat, “History,” [www.colombo-plan.org](http://www.colombo-plan.org), accessed 4/7/2014; State, INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2013, p. 20.

preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. Since 2013, INL has expended \$9.18 million on the program. The program was extended for one year on April 4, 2015, with an additional cost of \$1.55 million. The program has a total cost of \$9.7 million.<sup>348</sup>

The program pays an Afghan company, Sayara Media Communications, to place 42 reporters in Afghan provinces, to gather information and gauge perceptions of counternarcotics policies and messaging. Sayara assesses the effectiveness of campaigns and seeks to identify the provincial drivers of drug trafficking, opium cultivation, and public sentiment. According to INL, activities during the quarter focused on the 2016 preplanting-season campaign as well as numerous public outreach events, to include print, television and radio campaigns organized by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).<sup>349</sup>

Sayara monitors counternarcotics-related items in the media and evaluates any changes on a monthly basis. The effectiveness of this media campaign is unclear. INL said some areas exposed to counternarcotics media experienced a decrease in opium cultivation, while in other areas where security and governance remain a challenge, cultivation numbers increased or remained the same. An independent evaluation of the INL-funded messaging program has not taken place since early in the program's implementation, but a 2008 evaluation of a similar campaign concluded that "public CN [counternarcotics] awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be (i) coordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, and (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication)."<sup>350</sup>

## Independent Directorate of Local

**Governance (IDLG):** Created in 2007, the IDLG was established with the mandate of transferring civilian responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior to an independent entity. IDLG supports the provincial councils and is responsible for local governance.

Its strategic plan is carried out in the national priority program on subnational governance. IDLG has developed the mentioned program for the purpose of strengthening subnational governance with the cooperation of relevant entities and agreement of the international partners.

Source: Government of Afghanistan, Independent Directorate of Local Governance website, "History," accessed 1/11/2016.

## Governor-Led Eradication Program


INL funds the Governor-Led Eradication Program (GLE) program, which reimburses provinces for the cost of eradicating poppies. Since 2007, INL has contributed \$10 million to the MCN for the GLE program, which accounts for less than 2% of INL's annual counternarcotics budget for Afghanistan. The MCN tracks cumulative results—which are verified by UNODC. According to UNODC, a total of 3,720 hectares were eradicated in 2015, a 40% increase from last year's results.<sup>351</sup>

Eradication results have been declining over the past few years, as shown in Figure 3.28. There were few security incidents during eradication, which UNODC attributes to improved coordination between the MCN, MOD, MOI and the **Independent Directorate of Local Governance**. Eradication took place near active military operations in Helmand and Kandahar, which reportedly improved security but also underscored the lack of government control in those areas.<sup>352</sup>

This quarter, INL made no GLE payments to the ministry. After UNODC verified the 2015 results in September, INL requested that the MCN fully

FIGURE 3.28

## GOVERNOR LED OPIUM-POPPY ERADICATION, 2008–2015 (HECTARES)



Note: Program results are based on UNODC-verified eradication figures.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 8.

account for advances it paid to provinces during 2015 and reconcile unearned advances by provinces from previous years. INL said it will disburse final payment once this occurs. The MCN has not finalized its 2016 eradication plans, which are expected to align with milestones laid out in the recently adopted National Drug Action Plan.<sup>353</sup>

### Good Performer's Initiative

INL's Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) is a program implemented by the MCN that seeks to incentivize provincial counternarcotics performance. As of November 30, 2015, a total of 253 GPI projects with a value of more than \$119.5 million have been approved. Some 195 projects have been completed, 56 were ongoing, and two were nearing completion.

Under the terms of the original GPI, which ran through August 30, 2014, a province was eligible for financial support of GPI development projects for each year that it achieved UNODC-verified poppy-free status or reduced cultivation by more than 10% compared to the previous year's levels. In September 2014, the MCN began implementing a redesigned GPI to encourage more integrated counternarcotics action and provide more focused support for rural alternative livelihoods. Under the new GPI (GPI II), the award categories for "good performers" were expanded to include progress in public outreach and law enforcement, in addition to cultivation. The

new program will continue to link action with rewards: provinces must demonstrate verifiable counternarcotics achievements against defined standards to receive awards.<sup>354</sup> Negotiations on GPI II between the Afghan Government and U.S. Embassy Kabul are ongoing.<sup>355</sup>

INL ensures that projects proposed under the GPI program do not conflict with other U.S. government work through interagency consultation. INL and its implementing partners consult with USAID to avoid pitfalls such as duplicative work with the same beneficiaries or offering competing activities, and to develop complementary activities where possible. State's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan hosts regular counternarcotics working groups to bring together interagency personnel from State, DOD, DEA, USAID, and other relevant agencies to maintain coordination on multiple programs.<sup>356</sup>

## Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building

The memorandum of understanding between INL and the MCN that provided funding for 24 Afghan advisors to help build capacity expired in September 2015. It was not extended due to the poor security conditions that limited the ability of U.S. advisors to access the MCN and hampered oversight of the program. To date, INL has obligated \$331,479 and spent \$126,491 on capacity-building items and \$742,549 on the salaries of advisors.<sup>357</sup>

INL shifted from providing capacity-building support through embedded advisors to offering skills-based training to ministry staff and integrating the Asian University for Women fellows into the work of the MCN.<sup>358</sup>

In April 2015, INL published its independent risk assessment of the MCN's public financial-management system, which identified significant deficiencies that increased the potential for misstatements in financial reporting, inefficient and ineffective operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations. Areas of particular concern were internal control, program management and monitoring, and fixed-asset management. INL said it is procuring a contractor to implement the remediation plan.<sup>359</sup>

## ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD

USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports supply-reduction and alternative-development programs. INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.<sup>360</sup>

TABLE 3.12

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS					
Agency	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 12/31/2015 (\$)
State (INL)	Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)	7/21/2014	1/20/2016	\$11,884,816	\$7,321,345
USAID	Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/30/2016	45,296,184	45,081,411
USAID	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)	3/2/2009	9/30/2015	159,878,589	156,401,307
USAID	Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	7/31/2013	8/30/2016	27,695,788	20,530,000
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-South	10/7/2013	10/6/2018	125,075,172	45,241,343
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-North	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	13,710,191
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-West	8/10/2014	8/9/2019	69,973,376	14,038,692

Note: USAID programs listed are not necessarily funded from the agency's Alternative Development Fund.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 12/28/2015; USAID, *Quarterly Pipeline Analysis Report as of 12/31/2015*, 1/11/2016; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2015.

## Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods

The nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation and its partners implement activities across 16 provinces under INL's \$11.9 million Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant. The implementers favor activities, rather than stand-alone projects, with the following five objectives:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crops
- increase economic return for licit crops
- improve farmers' access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve subnational governance

According to INL, SAGAL activities will complement past and ongoing investments in licit livelihoods and rural development by the U.S. government, including support for GPI II. Where possible, SAGAL will support a more decentralized GPI II project-selection and nomination process to improve the recognition of rural community needs. SAGAL has expended \$7.3 million to date and will conclude in January 2016.<sup>361</sup>

Table 3.12 provides summary financial information on SAGAL and other alternative livelihood programs.

## Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a three-year, \$27.7 million, USAID alternative livelihood project, implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar Province through grants for activities that improve community infrastructure, strengthen alternative livelihoods, and support small businesses.<sup>362</sup> KFZ expended \$2.15 million between July

and September 2015. During year two, KFZ completed the construction or rehabilitation of 12 canals; conducted surveys and designs for another four canals; identified and awarded contracts for building greenhouses; and conducted training for recently hired staff to conduct village surveys to identify new infrastructure projects and identify the drivers of poppy cultivation. Cumulative disbursements, since the program's inception in 2013, total \$20.5 million as of December 31, 2015. For funding information on this alternative livelihood program, please refer to Table 3.12 on page 99 of this report. More information on KFZ is available in SIGAR's October 30, 2015, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>363</sup>

## Regional Agricultural Development Program

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. Using a **value chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.<sup>364</sup> As of December 31, 2015, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$32.6 million to RADP-North, \$30.9 million to RADP-South, and \$28.0 million to RADP-West.

RADP-North is a five-year, \$78.4 million program covering Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Samangan provinces. This quarter, the program conducted a short-message service (SMS or "text message") marketing campaign to farmers and suppliers. The program also sponsored 22 agribusinesses to participate at the October Kabul International Agricultural Fair and provided training for the November 2015 "WorldFood Kazakhstan" industry exhibition.<sup>365</sup>

The purpose of RADP-South is to improve food and economic security for rural Afghans in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018 with an estimated cost of \$125 million. Between October 2014 and October 2015, RADP-South's key accomplishments included teaching over 22,000 farmers new production and productivity practices for wheat, high value crops, and livestock; providing new cooling techniques, improving packing materials and practices, which increased product shelf life for more than 3,100 high-value-chain farmers; and providing nutrition as well as entrepreneurship training for over 3,100 women, in addition to supporting 58 veterinary field units.<sup>366</sup> The training for farmers involved on-farm and field demonstrations as well as classroom sessions to improve management practices and use of new techniques to increase crop yield.<sup>367</sup>

The implementing partner noted that insecurity presents challenges for monitoring project activities in the field. As a result, RADP-South will

**Value chain:** the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

explore options for third-party monitoring by partners with a significant presence in southern provinces. As of October 1, RADP-South suspended all activities with Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the key implementing partner in Helmand Province, as instructed by USAID's Office of the Inspector General. USAID said after the suspension, it deployed a support team to ensure logistical and operational continuity.<sup>368</sup> The project's intended outcomes are to

- increase agricultural productivity and profitability
- increase and sustain the adoption of licit crops
- increase profitability of small, medium and large agribusinesses
- increase women's participation in agriculture value chain activities

In July 2015, SIGAR published a financial audit of the Southern Regional Agricultural Development (SRAD) program which ended in 2012. The audit revealed two material weaknesses and one internal control deficiency resulting in \$28.4 million in questionable costs. SRAD, the precursor to RADP-South, focused its activities on cash-for-work temporary employment activities and agricultural voucher packages, to develop the region into a sustainable and prosperous agricultural economy. Prior SIGAR *Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress* (see July 30, 2012, for instance) addressed the waste and mismanagement under the \$65 million SRAD program.<sup>369</sup>

The \$160 million Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East and West (IDEA-NEW) ended September 30, 2015. RADP-East, which is scheduled to start around March 2016, will pursue similar activities in the region as IDEA-NEW. USAID told SIGAR it foresees no negative impact despite the time gap between the end of IDEA-NEW's activities and the start of RADP-East. As with most agriculture projects, RADP-East alternative livelihood activities will be more intense during nonwinter months.<sup>370</sup>

IDEA-NEW had partnered with micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises on the demand and supply sides of high-growth value chains; it also provided matching grants and promotional-activity grants that benefited the enterprises. According to USAID, RADP-East will leverage these partnerships and accomplishments to increase the impact of its activities. RADP-East will continue three successful IDEA-NEW interventions:

- Use short message service (SMS) or "text message" marketing to deliver key information (i.e., crop-specific timing of fertilizer and pesticide application, availability of agriculture inputs, location of provider-sponsored farmer field days and training activities) to targeted farmers.
- Employ "radio-based marketing and extension" through live radio shows that will be supported through the cost-share approach with suppliers. With limited reliance on donor funding, useful **agricultural extension** information is disseminated, while linking suppliers and existing/prospective buyers.

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**Agricultural extension:** refers to the application of scientific research and new knowledge to agricultural practices through farmer education. Agricultural extension has now become recognized as an essential mechanism for delivering information and advice as an "input" into modern farming. In the less developed countries, the main focus remains on agricultural (mainly food) production.

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Source: FAO, *Improving Agricultural Extension, A Reference Manual*, 1997, Chapter 1, [www.fao.org/docrep/w5830e/w5830e00.HTM](http://www.fao.org/docrep/w5830e/w5830e00.HTM), accessed 1/5/2016.

- Conduct “farmer field days,” where food processors and suppliers demonstrate and provide samples (fertilizers, tree saplings, farm equipment) to farmers.<sup>371</sup>

RADP-West focuses on helping rural Afghans in the western provinces of Herat, Farah, and Badghis. Despite security challenges during its first year, the program trained 603 wheat farmers in Herat and Badghis in harvesting, threshing, and storage; enabled private enterprises to contract with over 4,400 farmers to plant 100 metric tons of wheat; provided high value crops to beneficiaries; and established a sustainable vegetable-seedling production center in Herat. The program supported and trained 16 veterinary field units in Herat and Badghis. RADP-West also enabled several farmers to contract with a food processing company in Herat to supply 12 metric tons of yellow carrots. Other activities resulted in establishing 21 female-operated vegetable plots and training 25 female workers on livestock disease, care, and food security.<sup>372</sup>

For summary information on this alternative livelihood program, see Table 3.12 on page 99 of this report.<sup>373</sup>

## Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a \$45.3 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. As of December 31, 2015, USAID has disbursed \$45.1 million for CHAMP projects. CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by helping them shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.<sup>374</sup>

CHAMP has worked in half of the provinces of Afghanistan, providing training in agricultural best practices, building storage facilities, and helping grape farmers convert from traditional ground-level vineyards to higher-output trellis systems. The program has been extended from its earlier end date of December 2014 until December 2016 to reinforce gains made in the export sector and increase Afghan exports to regional supermarkets by up to 10,000 metric tons annually.

CHAMP is carrying out activities throughout six main value chains (apples, apricots, almonds, grapes, melons, and pomegranates). The program focuses on improving horticultural and marketing practices to produce high-quality fruit for high-value markets such as the United Arab Emirates and India.<sup>375</sup>

Since 2010, CHAMP’s various achievements include training 109,000 farmers, including 3,400 women, to improve agricultural techniques; planting nearly three million saplings and root cuttings benefitting 19,500 farmers; and exporting 38,000 tons of produce valued at \$40.5 million to

international markets. CHAMP enabled the construction of over 230 storage facilities and created over 7,600 full-time jobs in agribusiness.<sup>376</sup>

During the third quarter of 2015, CHAMP provided training to over 1,500 farmers, including 174 women, at established farmer field schools in Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, and Wardak provinces. At CHAMP farmer field schools, participants learn new agricultural practices such as orchard or trellis management and receive modern agricultural tools. In July 2015, CHAMP arranged training on food safety, hazard analysis, and critical control points. The program also arranged linkage meetings between farmers and traders during the export season. During the third quarter of 2015, the program facilitated deal negotiations resulting in the export of 86 metric tons of apricots, melons, and grapes to the United Arab Emirates and India.<sup>377</sup>

Between July and September 2015, CHAMP provided training to

- 174 women grape producers from the provinces of Kabul, Kapisa, and Parwan on winter-season practices such as composting, pruning, and fertilizer application
- 305 women from Kabul and Parwan provinces in raisin-drying training
- 478 women on sulphur drying of apricots<sup>378</sup>

For summary financial information on this program, see Table 3.12 on page 99 of this report.<sup>379</sup>

## Interdiction Operations and Results

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units across the country. The specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. Nearly half of the CNPA's 2,800 personnel are assigned to Kabul. The INL interdiction program supports the maintenance of NIU/SIU and DEA facilities and a judicial wire intercept unit.<sup>380</sup>

DOD reported that from October 1 to December 16, 2015, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 25 drug-interdiction operations and detained 45 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. DOD is currently working with INL and DEA to relocate personnel to the international zone to enable DEA to continue mentoring and training the CNPA's specialized investigative units. U.S. interdiction activities in Afghanistan throughout 2015 were minimal, as only one counternarcotic operation was conducted in April.<sup>381</sup>

Most interdiction activities occurred in the eastern and capital regions. In the past, interdictions were concentrated in southern regions, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. DOD said the Coalition drawdown has had a negative impact on the CNPA and other Afghan counternarcotics agencies. The impact is most

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.13

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2016										
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*	TOTAL
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	265	25	3,115
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	391	45	3,383
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,784	114,466	887,227
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	2,845	332	32,386
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	–	53,462
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	26,083	3,531	422,633
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	–	695,548

Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2015 seizure of 135,000 liters (L) of precursor chemicals.  
\* Results for period 10/1–12/16/2015 only.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 9/24/2015 and 12/29/2015.

pronounced in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar where the Coalition surge was focused and the subsequent withdrawal has had the greatest impact. According to DOD, the decrease of overall counterdrug missions is likely a result of less frequent partnering of U.S. and Coalition forces with Afghan forces and the need to use counternarcotic forces for general security roles due to the country’s declining security situation.<sup>382</sup>

In 2015, given the U.S. military’s reduced capabilities in Afghanistan, DOD created a Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) to combat the regional drug trade. The RNIFC, located in Bahrain, tracks and interdicts the illicit movement of Afghan heroin and other illicit commodities on dhows (traditional sailing vessels) destined for the Middle East and East Africa. In addition to the CNPA, Afghan organizations contributing to interdiction activities include the Afghan Border Police, ANP, AUP, and the General Command of Police Special Unit.<sup>383</sup>

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the reported seizures of the following narcotics contraband:

- 3,531 kg of opium
- 331.5 kg of heroin
- 114,465.5 kg of hashish/marijuana

There were no precursor chemicals seizures this quarter.<sup>384</sup>

As noted in previous SIGAR reports, interdiction results have been declining since 2012, as shown in Table 3.13.

## Aviation Support

Between September and December 2015, State’s Air Wing counternarcotics support to INL consisted of 45.7 flight hours, 187 sorties, 529 personnel transported, and 25,217 pounds of cargo moved. Air Wing support to DEA (air shuttle and National Interdiction Unit movements) consisted of

**Precursor chemical:** a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, “Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals,” 2009, viii.

23.3 flight hours, 45 sorties, 406 personnel transported, and 19,650 pounds of cargo moved.<sup>385</sup>

INL's ability to support tactical operations in the south and southwest regions of the country has been constrained since the June 2015 closure of INL's base at Kandahar Airfield. NIU personnel continue to staff the regional law enforcement centers in Kandahar, Herat, and Kunduz. Additionally, NIU personnel occasionally support other MOI operations outside of Kabul. INL continues to assist the NIU and SIU with enablers, including operations and maintenance, while NIU typically uses the Special Mission Wing (SMW) for aviation support. See pages 85–86 of this report for more information on the SMW.<sup>386</sup>