# SECURITY CONTENTS

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SECURITY

As of June 30, 2016, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $68.4 billion to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This accounts for 60% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. In 2005, Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Additionally, the ASFF is used to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which is under the MOI, although the ALP is not considered part of the ANDSF. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the $63.9 billion appropriated for the ASFF, $60.1 billion had been obligated and $58.3 billion disbursed.126

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

U.S. and NATO Allies Pledge Over $4 Billion Annually to Support the ANDSF

The Administration has asked Congress for $3.45 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2017 funding for the ANDSF. President Obama pledged in July to recommend his successor continue funding the ANDSF at or near current levels through 2020. At the Warsaw Summit July 8 and 9, 2016, the 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations pledged more than $800 million annually to sustain the Afghan security forces from 2018–2020. The Afghan government also committed to increase its spending as their economy and revenues grow from the $421 million they provided last year to sustain the ANDSF.127 On the eve of the conference, President Obama announced a revision to the U.S. troop-withdrawal schedule, acknowledging
“I strongly believe that it is in our national security interest—especially after all the blood and treasure we’ve invested in Afghanistan over the years—that we give our Afghan partners the very best opportunity to succeed.”

—President Barack Obama


the need for continued support to the Afghan army and police by keeping 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan when he leaves office, rather than drawing down to 5,500 as previously planned. Later, Lieutenant General John W. Nicholson, commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, said about 400 U.S. forces committed to the NATO Resolute Support Mission would be deployed outside Afghanistan. According to DOD the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan has been generally at or below 9,000 since February 2015; the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan as of May 1, 2016, was about 9,200.

New Authorities Allow U.S. Forces to Assist Afghans on the Battlefield

This quarter, President Obama granted U.S. forces in Afghanistan the authority to assist conventional Afghan security forces whenever the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan commander determines such action would have a “strategic effect” on battlefield outcomes. DOD clarified the new authorities apply when “there are distinctive opportunities to support Afghan operations that will significantly further the overall security objectives for Afghanistan, which are to promote the sustainability of the Afghan security forces and the stability of the Government of Afghanistan.” Prior to this expansion of authority, U.S. forces were authorized only to accompany Afghan special forces or to attack insurgent groups that participate in hostilities or are declared hostile. However, the new authority did not lift the restriction to allow U.S. forces to target the Taliban unless they pose an immediate threat to U.S. or Coalition forces, or if the Afghan forces face a catastrophic failure. At a joint press conference with Secretary Carter on July 12, General Nicholson reported using the new authorities “almost daily” to enable the ANDSF to take offensive actions. He said the support to conventional forces can mean combat enablers, such as air support as well as advisors. Secretary Carter clarified that General Nicholson can use the full suite of U.S. air and ground capabilities. According to DOD this will allow for more proactive combat enabling and tactical advising.

President Obama indicated in his remarks that this new authority provides more flexibility on the ground and in the air to support both Afghan regular and special-operations forces. The new authority authorizes U.S. troops to deploy with conventional Afghan forces and also provides the authority to directly target Taliban insurgents. In vetting comments, DOD noted that the change in authority does not allow U.S. forces to target members of the Taliban because of their membership in the Taliban, but, in limited circumstances, “U.S. forces could target Taliban forces in support of key offensive operations by the ANDSF.”

Taliban Leadership Changes

U.S. forces targeted and killed Taliban leader Mullah Mansour in a drone strike near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on May 21, 2016. President
Obama authorized the action due to “specific imminent threats” to U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan that the Taliban leader was planning. Four days later a Mansour deputy, Haibatullah Akhundzada, was announced as the Taliban’s new supreme commander. Another of Mansour’s deputies, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and the eldest son of Taliban-founding leader Mohammad Omar, Mohammad Yaqoob, were appointed as Akhundzada’s deputies.

DOD reports Sirajuddin will maintain the Haqqani Network’s influence within the Taliban even as the Haqqani Network remains semi-autonomous. The media reported a recording released by the Taliban in which Akhundzada vowed never to “bow down” to their enemies and said Mansour’s death will inspire the Taliban to fight even harder. The same day, a Taliban suicide bomber killed 11 Afghan judicial workers in revenge for the Afghan government’s hanging six Taliban prisoners convicted of perpetrating grave crimes against civilians and public security.

**State Reports on ISIL-Khorasan**

For a second year, the State Department declared the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as the greatest global terrorist threat. However, the June report on terrorism said ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K) gained little support among Afghanistan’s population in 2015, despite having a small presence in eastern Nangarhar Province for much of the year. During 2015, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and ISIL were the three major, active terrorist or insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. While al-Qaeda has been severely degraded, its affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, continues to operate in Afghanistan.

The report also claims a number of Taliban-coordinated attacks were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan. Afghan officials noted the difficulty in confiscating or freezing insurgent-group finances due to the personal and informal banking systems used to transfer assets.

**The Worsening Security Situation in Afghanistan**

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General assessed in June that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had worsened considerably over the past four months. The UN recorded 6,122 security incidents between February 16, and May 19, 2016, as reflected in Figure 3.26 on the following page. While there has been a decrease in total reported security incidents compared to the same time period last year, the number of armed clashes and the number of documented civilian casualties have both increased. According to DOD, the capital city experienced 10 high-profile attacks between December 1, 2015, and May 20, 2016, with 50 others across the rest of Afghanistan. This represents a 41% decrease in high-profile attacks in Kabul compared to 26 during the same period a year earlier. The Taliban have been exceptionally active in 2016, particularly after launching their

“Terrorists are terrorists. There is no difference between good terrorists and bad terrorists.”

—Afghan President Ashraf Ghani

annual spring offensive “Operation Omari.” This year, the campaign has largely overlooked civilian government targets, instead focusing on district administrative centers and the strategically important parts of Uruzgan Province along the Kandahar-Tirin Kot highway and Baghlan Province.150

The UN reported that the ongoing effort to reach a peace agreement with the Taliban has stagnated, with the Taliban intending not to participate in any peace talks until their demands are met by the Afghan government and its international supporters.151 Moreover, Mullah Mansour’s death shuffled Taliban leadership, exacerbated infighting, and left the future of the peace process uncertain. The Afghan government experienced some success with the Hezb-e-Islami insurgent group, releasing a final draft for a peace agreement

### FIGURE 3.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Number of Total Incidents During Period</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/16/2016–5/19/2016 (96 days)</td>
<td>6,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/2015–2/15/2016* (77 days)</td>
<td>4,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/2015–10/31/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>6,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/2015–7/31/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>6,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15/2015–4/30/2015 (75 days)</td>
<td>5,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2014–2/15/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2014–11/15/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2014–8/15/2014 (76 days)</td>
<td>5,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/2014–5/31/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2013–2/15/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>4,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2013–11/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/2013–8/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/16/2013–5/15/2013 (89 days)</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2012–2/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>3,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Security incidents were not reported for November 2015.


The Institute of Economics and Peace reported the number of annual internal-conflict deaths in Afghanistan increased between 2008 and 2016 from 4,210 to 22,170.

that received the approval of the High Peace Council chair; although critics expressed concerns that a peace agreement may prevent some actors in Hezb-e-Islami from being held accountable for their crimes.\textsuperscript{152} However, by late June the peace talks had lost momentum and then completely fell through when the leader of Hezb-e-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, withdrew entirely and called for the dissolution of the Afghan unity government.\textsuperscript{153}

The ANDSF have struggled to respond to the Taliban’s growing national presence. There has been particularly stiff resistance in provinces along the border with Pakistan, such as Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar, with reports that 68.5\% of security incidents occur in southern, south-eastern, and eastern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{154} Many of the issues preventing the ANDSF from properly engaging the Taliban relate to deficiencies in key areas such as command and control, leadership, logistics, and overall coordination. High attrition rates, including high casualty rates, continue to make the sustainability of the ANDSF a major concern and priority for leadership.\textsuperscript{155} However, its international military aid will remain constant. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg flew to Kabul to pledge continued support to President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah. Thereafter, NATO members agreed on extending funding for the ANDSF and examined Resolute Support’s future in Afghanistan beyond 2016.\textsuperscript{156}

The ANDSF has also had to address activity from other insurgent groups, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and ISIL-K, which have remained active despite pressure from both Afghan forces, supported by Coalition air strikes, and the Taliban. ISIL-K’s safe haven in Nangarhar has been greatly reduced and some members of the group are now working to establish safe havens in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces to the north.\textsuperscript{157}

A State Department report on terrorism released in June disclosed that a number of insurgent attacks were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{158} A Pakistani researcher with the U.S.-based Hudson Institute claims Taliban and terrorists are being trained at three madrassas, in Karachi and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, one located near a Pakistani military facility.\textsuperscript{159} A week later, a minister in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa administration announced that 300 million rupees (over $2.8 million) would be provided to a madrassa with top Afghan Taliban leaders among its graduates.\textsuperscript{160}

In June, Brigadier General Cleveland provided an assessment of the security situation throughout Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, the ANDSF were able to repel the Taliban in Kunduz but faced “fairly serious” fighting in Baghlan.\textsuperscript{161} In the south, where the Taliban has shifted their main efforts, fighting did not resume in Helmand after the poppy-harvest season but is expected to later this summer.\textsuperscript{162} Small engagements involved roughly 50–100 Taliban fighters massing at night, hitting checkpoints, and moving out before ANDSF reinforcements could arrive.\textsuperscript{163} Resolute Support (RS) is concerned about security in Uruzgan in eastern Afghanistan as the Taliban still control parts of the main road.\textsuperscript{164}
“We don’t think that they are trying to expand, we think they are trying to survive.”
—Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, Resolute Support Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, discussing ISIL in Afghanistan


USFOR-A reports that approximately 65.6% of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of May 28, 2016, a decrease from the 70.5% reported as of January 29, 2016. Of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 268 districts were under government control or influence, 36 districts (8.8%) within 15 provinces were under insurgent control or influence, and 104 districts (25.6%) were “at risk.”

Of the 36 districts under insurgent control or influence, nine districts with a population of 524,072 are under insurgent control and 27 districts with a population of 1.98 million are under insurgent influence.

According to USFOR-A, the RS mission determines district status by assessing five indicators of stability: governance, security, infrastructure, economy, and communications. For additional information refer to the matrix in the SIGAR April 2016 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, page 96.

USFOR-A assesses that the increased insurgent control since January be put in context of the Afghan sustainable security strategy which focuses Afghan forces in high-priority areas to achieve strategic and operational objectives. This strategy includes redeploying forces from checkpoints and lower-priority areas so they are available to conduct offensive operations, gain and maintain the initiative, exploit opportunities, and consolidate tactical gains.

According to Afghan media, the MOI spokesman reported that more than 50 (12.3%) of the country’s districts face serious threats from insurgents, with nine out of the government’s control as of June 28, 2016. Those districts include four in Helmand, two in Badakhshan, and one each in Ghazni, Sar-e Pul, and Zabul Provinces. Afghan media also reported the Ghazni police chief claims the Taliban have suicide-bomber and motor-bomb training centers in the Nawa district of Ghazni.

Afghan media reported in early June that Taliban insurgents used a government hand-held biometric system to test the identity of bus passengers in Kunduz. Those affiliated with the security forces were reportedly executed. Bus-passenger abductions continued into the month of June with more than 25 passengers taken from the Kabul-Kandahar Highway on June 21 in addition to the 200-plus passengers abducted on the Baghlan-Kunduz Highway two weeks earlier.

A U.S. National Public Radio photojournalist and an Afghan journalist were killed in June when a rocket-propelled grenade hit their vehicle while traveling with a small ANA convoy. Since the U.S. return to Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks, 26 journalists have been killed in Afghanistan, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.

One of the deadliest attacks on foreign workers since the war began nearly 15 years ago occurred on June 20th when a suicide bomber hit a bus carrying Nepali and Indian security guards for the Canadian Embassy killing 14 and wounding nine other guards and civilians. Both the Taliban
and ISIL-K claimed responsibility for the attack, the first in Kabul in two months. The next day 24 Nepali guards resigned. One guard told the Associated Press that regulations preventing them from carrying weapons except when at the Canadian Embassy left them at risk from other attacks.

On June 30, 2016, at least 32 police cadets returning to Kabul from a training program in Wardak Province were killed and at least 53 were wounded when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into the convoy of police buses. A second suicide bomber targeted first responders, killing one civilian and wounding another. The Taliban claimed responsibility for both attacks. Following the incident, President Ghani suspended at least five MOI generals from the Wardak training center pending an investigation of alleged negligence in transporting the police cadets. According to the Afghan national security advisor, mass transit of security forces is prohibited without adequate security measures. The investigation will attempt to determine if police personnel may have colluded with the attackers, as survivors reported the suicide bombers were on the bus.

An earlier incident in Wardak Province led to an investigation of the police chief. Afghan media reported that after the Taliban’s spy chief in Baghlan Province was wounded by Afghan security forces, he was later captured on June 19th while riding in a Wardak police vehicle, en route to Kabul and accompanied by the chief’s relatives; he allegedly had plans to travel on to Pakistan.

A sign of the growing insecurity in Kabul are the increasing number of concrete blast walls that surround government buildings, foreign embassies, companies, and the homes of wealthy residents. However, Afghan media reported in July that the number of insurgent attacks in the country decreased in June by 17%. An increased number of Afghan and Coalition air strikes during the month is reported to have had a major impact on eliminating insurgent fighters. On June 29, a spokesman for the Nangarhar governor reported at least 88 ISIL-K fighters were killed in the Kot district, where the retreating fighters torched 90 homes in retribution for locals assisting the Afghan security forces. The eastern province of Nangarhar was reported as the most insecure province with Daykundi, centrally located, and Panjshir, in the northeast, the most secure.

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

DOD reported about 9,200 U.S. troops were serving in Afghanistan as of May 31, 2016. This was an increase of 350 over the 8,850 reported as of February 29, 2016. Of the 9,200, about 6,800 are U.S. forces supporting the RS train, advise, and assist mission. An additional 2,400 troops either

A report by the Open Society Foundations provided recommendations to the United States Congress and Departments of State and Defense for civilian-protection policies that it said could avoid significant damage to U.S. strategic interests. According to the research of Open Society Foundations, the report said the number of civilian deaths attributed to ISAF and pro-government forces reduced from 39% in 2008 to 9% by 2012 after reforms to reduce civilian harm were implemented. Among the insights from over 60 experts interviewed was that the good will generated from U.S. assistance was negated by enemy-focused strategies that also led to costly mistakes impacting U.S. strategic interests.

On July 6, 2016, President Obama announced that the United States will maintain a presence of 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2017. This is a change from a previous plan to have only 5,500 troops there by the end of 2016.190 This quarter, DOD reported that 9,200 U.S. troops were serving in Afghanistan.191 On July 12, 2016, Resolute Support mission commander General John Nicholson told the media that, in addition to the 8,400 troops, 400 U.S. forces outside of Afghanistan will support NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and can be called forward if necessary.192

The active combat role of U.S. forces in Afghanistan ended in December 2014. Their mission since then is training, advising and assisting the ANDSF and conducting counterterrorism missions. In June, President Obama also authorized them to assist the conventional ANDSF on the battlefield in certain circumstances.

Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, U.S. troop levels there have fluctuated. From 2002 to 2006, the number increased from 5,200 to 20,400. That number increased again to more than 30,000 U.S. troops in 2008.193 In December 2009, as troop levels in Iraq were decreasing, President Obama announced plans to deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops in an effort to “seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.”194 By June 2011, as the transition to Afghan-led security was beginning, more than 110,000 U.S. troops were serving in Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 3.27.195 That same month, President Obama announced plans to begin withdrawing troops—10,000 by the end of 2011 and 33,000 more by the following summer.196

In May 2014, approximately 32,000 U.S. troops were serving in Afghanistan. At that time, President Obama also announced that the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan would end in 2014 and set out a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal as security responsibility shifted to the

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**U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002–2016**

Note: Troop strengths in 2002–2008 are CRS fiscal-year estimates. For 2009–2010 and 2012–2015, figures are as of October. Troop strength in 2011 is for July to show peak U.S. deployment.

* Projected, based on President Obama’s announcement on July 6, 2016.

Afghan government: U.S. forces would be reduced to approximately 9,800 by the beginning of 2015. That number would decline by half during 2015 with remaining U.S. forces being consolidated at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul. By the end of 2016, U.S. force strength would “be reduced to a normal embassy presence with a security-assistance component.” The first goal to drawdown to 9,800 by the start of 2015 was met ahead of schedule; 9,500 U.S. troops were serving in Afghanistan as of December 20, 2014.

However, since the end of Operation Enduring Freedom at the end of 2014, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan experienced record-high civilian casualties from the ongoing hostilities in 2015: more than 3,500 killed—a quarter of them children—and nearly 7,500 wounded. As of January 2016, USFOR-A reported 287 (70.5%) of Afghanistan’s 407 provincial districts were “directly under [government] control or influence,” while 26 districts (6.4%) were under insurgent control or influence, and another 94 (23.1%) were “at risk.” Moreover, the temporary fall of Kunduz City to the Taliban in October 2015 and the need to “rebuild” the ANA’s 215th Corps in Helmand have made it clear that despite U.S. expenditures of nearly $70 billion to build and sustain the ANDSF, challenges remain, and the force intended to stand on its own by now still needs help.

Soldiers from the 36th Infantry Division, Texas Army National Guard, deploy to southern Afghanistan on June 11, out of Fort Hood, Texas, in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. They are part of the Train, Advise and Assist team whose mission is to work with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. (U.S. Army photo by Maj. Randall Stillinger)
**Enablers:** support units that provide services needed to keep the combat units operational; such as logistics, maintenance, medical, transportation, intelligence, and close-air support.


conduct the U.S. counterterrorism mission or provide aviation, medical, logistical, and other enabler support for U.S. forces. According to NATO, 13,079 Coalition forces, including the 6,800 U.S. forces, are serving in Afghanistan as of July 8, 2016. During the joint press conference with Secretary Carter on July 12, 2016, addressing the new authorities and troop levels, General Nicholson said roughly 2,150 troops are to support counterterrorism missions, about 3,000 to support the RS mission, and about 3,300 troops will support or enable both missions.

Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, through July 1, 2016, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in action, in addition to 10 non-hostile deaths, for a total of 21 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 106 U.S. military personnel were wounded in action. Seven U.S. civilians or contractors were killed during hostile actions, in addition to nine non-hostile deaths, for a total of 16 DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor deaths. Nine DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor personnel were wounded during this period. In vetting comments, DOD noted that some of the contractors may have been involved in missions other than Resolute Support’s train, advise, and assist mission.

Since the Resolute Support Mission began on January 1, 2015, through May 19, 2016, seven insider attacks were directed against U.S. forces. Whereas the two attacks that occurred during 2016 inflicted no casualties, the five insider attacks during 2015 resulted in three deaths and 14 woundings. Insider attacks during 2015 were also responsible for the death of three of the seven U.S. civilians killed and one of the nine wounded during this period. There were 77 insider attacks against the Afghan security forces during the same period, resulting in the deaths of 205 and the wounding of 103 Afghan security forces. Of these attacks, 20 occurred in 2016, resulting in the deaths of 68 and the wounding of 48 Afghan security forces.

**Challenges in Developing the Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI**

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF). The highlights of each function reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** EF-1 supports the ministries with contracted support programs that aim to hire Afghan civilians to fill business-type positions (finance, procurement, logistics, information technology, and human resources). The MOD has filled 62 of the 64 positions allotted for the first proof-of-concept phase. The second phase allows for an additional 280 positions. The MOI has hired 286 individuals to fill 361 subject-matter-expert positions.

- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** Advisors provided on-the-job training in inspections/audits from planning to report writing. Although much improvement is still needed, the MOD approved its counter- and anticorruption plan and the MOI its Counter...
Administrative Corruption Policy; the EF-2 advisors are to monitor milestone and reporting compliance with the conditionality clauses in the financial commitment letters and assess penalties or provide incentives as warranted.\textsuperscript{216}

- **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** According to RS, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) has become quite effective under its current leader, who resists external attempts to influence cases. However, the MCTF still encounters issues with transparency on case disposition at the Attorney General’s Office as well as interference from MOI leadership.\textsuperscript{217}

- **EF-4 (Force Generation):** The Human Resources Management advisors supported the MOD in conducting reenlistment conferences at the ANA 201st, 205th, 207th, 209th Corps, and in the Kabul area that assessed the corps’ reenlistment and retention processes, identified gaps, and provided ways to improve reenlistment. Findings revealed that corps leadership in many areas created hostile work conditions, and the country’s insecurity plagued reenlistment efforts. Countermeasures include incentive pay for reenlisting noncommissioned officers, a leave-rotation policy, and for leaders to treat soldiers with respect and provide for their basic logistical needs.\textsuperscript{218}

- **EF-5 (Sustainment):** For the first time since CSTC-A inaugurated the use of financial commitment letters with the MOD, fuel-consumption reporting for June was 100% in compliance with the conditions imposed in the Letter.\textsuperscript{219} Also, for the first time the MOD provided brigade-level ammunition inventory and consumption reports on schedule.\textsuperscript{220} Both the MOD and MOI made progress toward removing battle-damaged vehicles. The MOI received approval to demilitarize 1,500 vehicles; since January the MOD has demilitarized 190 vehicles and have approved another 300.\textsuperscript{221} A joint CSTC-A and MOD Pay and Compensation Board approved a temporary pay increase for medical aviation and medical command personnel in May.\textsuperscript{222} Additionally, EF-5 efforts resulted in the delivery of 7,000 radio batteries and 41 pallets of radio spare parts to support maintenance-training programs.\textsuperscript{223}

- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** No report was received from EF-6 this quarter.

- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** Advisor assessments conducted this quarter allowed Operational Coordination Centers in Jalalabad and Kandahar to improve intelligence sharing among the districts, provinces, and regions.\textsuperscript{224} The MOI Intelligence Investigations Department and the Inspector General’s Office codified how corruption investigations within the MOI will be executed. The document specified which organization leads investigations for corruption, major crimes, minor crimes, and infiltration, and the procedures to be followed during the investigations.\textsuperscript{225} Expansion of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment and sites is
expected to provide improved intelligence information for the summer campaign. Two additional ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle sites became operational in April, as did five new Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment surveillance towers in May, with four additional sites planned to have been operational by the end of June.226

- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** Coalition advisory efforts focused on developing budgeting and contract requirements and on-going training on areas such as broadcast writing, train-the-trainer programs, press conferences, basic photography and videography, and crisis communications.227 For a more in-depth perspective on the MOD and MOI information operations, see page 98 of this section.

- **Gender Office:** This quarter RS Gender Relations office provided train, advise, and assist activities resulting in several female-focused accomplishments. The ANA added 57 positions specifically for women, and the ANA and ANP added an 88 additional special operations positions for women. In May 2016, the ANA’s first training program in Turkey was initiated with 109 female recruits. Additionally, 60 women in the General Command for Police Special Units and 35 in the ANP began the first major postgraduate course in Turkey, and another 12 female ANP recruits enrolled in a radio maintenance class alongside male colleagues in Afghanistan. RS is currently overseeing the hiring of four female budget employees in the MOD finance and gender departments, assisting the Inspector General’s office with hiring a woman, and helping the MOI hire a female lawyer and a subject-matter expert.228

While the impact of executive-level conflicts within the National Unity Government has not affected all EF efforts, USFOR-A reported that instances of senior officers being appointed based on relationships rather than experience has negatively impacted the development of essential functions.229 For example, USFOR-A reported that delays in the selection of key personnel has slowed progress because temporary appointees are hesitant to make decisions affecting procurements, expenditures, and policy.230

RS advisors rotate in and out of Afghanistan, with tours ranging from six to 12 months. The EF offices reported differing impacts of the short-term rotations.231 For example, EF-4 (Force Generation) reported that the low number of advisors in 2015 and their inability to travel to Afghan facilities had a greater impact than the tour duration of individual advisors.232 The EF-7 (Intelligence) office reported that, if the office were sufficiently staffed, the turnovers would have minimal impact due to overlapping advisory responsibilities.233 However, USFOR-A reported that “short tours and frequent turnovers significantly and negatively impact the mission” due to the loss of institutional knowledge, changes of priorities based on personal preferences, and a lack of continuity. USFOR-A also noted that the ability to tap into the institutional knowledge of prior advisors existed in only one
EF office, and that is “strongly dependent on the individual’s personality, motivation, and commitment/investment to the mission.”\(^{234}\) The time to acclimate within the EF-5 (Sustainment) office can take four to six weeks, which impacts the ministerial development efforts of RS advisors with a tour of less than six months. That EF office reported that a minimum of a one-year tour “is the most effective” tour length “to maintain consistency, stability, and unity of effort.”\(^{235}\) DOD is working to create reach-back cells to provide access to both technical experts and personnel with prior Afghan experience to help mitigate the effect of rapid turnover of advisors.\(^{236}\)

**ANP Drives ANDSF Strength Growth**

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 319,595 (not including civilians), according to USFOR-A.\(^{237}\) As reflected in Table 3.6, this is 90.8\% of the ANDSF authorized force strength of 352,000, not including MOD civilian employees. Although the April/May 2016 assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 5,313 (not including civilians) over the same period last year, it represents an increase of 1,085 since January 2016.\(^{238}\)

The ANP had the largest increase of 1,863 personnel; the ANA lost 778 personnel, as shown in Table 3.7.\(^{239}\)

---

**TABLE 3.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Approved End-Strength Goal</th>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Current Assigned as of April/May 2016</th>
<th>% of Target Authorization</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>171,428</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>(23,572)</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>148,167</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>(8,833)</td>
<td>(5.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>352,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>319,595</strong></td>
<td><strong>90.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(32,405)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(9.2%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force.

* In vetting, USFORA reported the total ANDSF approved end-strength goal decreased from 360,004 to 359,904 including civilians, however, the ANDSF component which decreased was not identified. The ANA employs civilians, whose approved end-strength goal is an additional 8,004 personnel, but their assigned-strength numbers have not been publicly released this quarter. ANA data is as of May 20, 2016; ANP data is as of April 19, 2016.


**TABLE 3.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Assigned Force Strength, February 2014–April 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF(^{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP(^{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ANDSF</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. ANA and AAF numbers include civilians except for the April 2016 numbers; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

\(^{a}\) The total “ANA including AAF” numbers for July 2015 and October 2015 are not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unrecorded portion.

\(^{b}\) Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

\(^{a}\) The ANA data is as of May 20, 2016; the ANP data as of April 19, 2016.

This quarter, for the first time, the details on ANA top-line attrition and ANP pillar force strength and attrition were classified by USFOR-A, citing the Resolute Support Security Classification Guide, while details of the ANA force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

The RS Train Advise Assist Command-West deputy commander reported that low recruitment in Herat and other western provinces may be due to ANA salaries that are lower than what the Iranian Army is offering to fight ISIL in Syria. The commander added another factor contributing to low recruitment is that the region’s relatively good economy provides opportunities in the private sector that pay better than the ANA. DOD estimates the total annual cost to sustain the ANDSF at an end-strength of 352,000 in FY 2017 is approximately $4.9 billion. The President’s FY 2017 Budget Request included $3.45 billion for the ASFF, which represents the U.S. contribution to that expense.

ANDSF ASSESSMENTS REFLECT MODEST IMPROVEMENT BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

USFOR-A assesses that the ANDSF is still developing but is a capable force. However, USFOR-A reports that U.S. advisors participating in the RS train, advise, and assist mission have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below ANA corps and ANP zone-headquarters levels. The effort undertaken since late last year to reconstitute several battalions of the ANA 215th Corps is one exception to this. The advisors rely on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF; the consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of this data varies. The RS deputy chief of staff for communications assessed the ANDSF is performing better than they were last year primarily because they switched from a defensive mindset to an offensive one, although not every corps or at every location. He also assessed the ANDSF are better at employing the new capabilities—the A-29s, the MD-530s, providing close air support—and the special operation forces are reportedly doing “exceptionally well.” According to USFOR-A, the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), with the MOD elements in particular, remain the most capable element of the Afghan forces and one of the best special operations forces in the region. The MOD ASSF elements—the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Ktah Khas (KKA) counterterrorism unit, and the Special Mission Wing—have the highest operational tempo of the ANDSF. USFOR-A reports the ASSF are capable of conducting independent operations using Afghan-acquired intelligence and their aircraft, and predicts as the ASSF increase operational capacity, the number of ASSF operations will outnumber the Coalition-advised and unilateral operations. The RS deputy chief of staff for communications said the Coalition forces can accompany ASSF on missions. He added that for 10–15% of ASSF missions, the Coalition provides planning, logistical, or aerial support, and that Coalition forces partner with the ASSF on 10% of missions. Military leaders consider the mission payoff, risk, complexity, and the availability of medical evacuation before embarking on a partnered mission.
While the ASSF elements, primarily the ANASOC, rely heavily on High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles with heavy armor and large-caliber weapons, the processes to sustain those vehicles are still developing. Difficulties exist keeping the vehicles in mission-ready state due to a lack of spare parts and sufficient mechanics. The supporting National Mine Reduction Group is responsible for clearing routes to allow the ASSF to maneuver. While increasing in capability, the Group still needs to improve to effectively support the ASSF operations.

USFOR-A reports the ANDSF rely heavily on the ASSF for conventional missions that the ANA or ANP should perform. And after successful ASSF counterattacks, poorly planned and executed ANA and ANP holding operations allow insurgents to return to the just-cleared areas.

USFOR-A reports ANDSF performance in “combined arms” operations—operations that integrate multiple assets such as infantry, artillery, and air forces—is uneven. The ANDSF requires Coalition support to effectively incorporate capabilities such as artillery to alleviate the reliance on air-to-ground capabilities, to better integrate air-to-ground capabilities into combined arms operations, and to develop intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Within the ANA, combat capabilities such as artillery and the Mobile Strike Force Brigades are not sufficiently coordinated and integrated into operational planning. Moreover, USFOR-A reports the Mobile Strike Force Brigades are often used in defensive operations or are deployed in static positions, hindering their intended use as an offensive capability.

The RS Advise and Assist Cell-Southwest (AAC-SW) provides security-force assistance to the ANA 215th Corps responsible for only Helmand Province, as Nimroz Province was recently transferred to the ANA 207th
Corps. According to the RS deputy chief of staff for communications, a significant number of the ANA leadership within the 215th Corps have been replaced—the corps commander, all the brigade commanders, and also many of the lower level commanders. AAC-SW, whose major focus has been on reconstituting the corps, has been deployed to Camp Shorab since December 2015. Along with the U.S. Army Task Force Forge, the AAC-SW retrained and equipped four of the six 215th Corps infantry kandaks, assisted with effective use of armed helicopters in support of operations, and worked on enhancing ANA-ANP intelligence sharing and operations coordination. The two remaining kandaks were expected to complete training by the end of June; each kandak comprises roughly a “couple hundred” soldiers. The AAC-SW also assisted ANA and ANP units in consolidating checkpoints into defensible tolai-sized bases, and addressing high attrition and poor leadership. USFOR-A reported areas for continued AAC-SW focus include addressing corruption in the 215th Corps and improving ANA and ANP equipment readiness rates and logistics support capability.

Within the ANP, the recently established zone headquarters are reported to have helped address ANA-ANP coordination challenges, but progress is limited and continued Coalition advising efforts are required. Refer to Figure 3.28 for the locations of the ANP zones in comparison to the ANA corps. Additionally, MOI police forces often are misemployed as personal security or for mission sets outside their intended scope, detracting from the ANDSF combat capability and effectiveness against insurgents.

USFOR-A reports the Afghans have made modest progress moving to an offensive-oriented strategy, but they continue to struggle with pursuing the Taliban and holding areas once cleared. Coalition advisors have advocated a more sustainable security strategy that consolidates forces where needed to provide security to key areas of the country. Additionally, according to USFOR-A, ANDSF commander emphasis on cross-leveling resources (adjusting inventories among units to avoid excess accumulations and shortages), property accountability, and consumption reports is limited, and corruption continues to impact readiness down to the unit level.

Afghan president Ghani has ordered an investigation of Agence France Presse (AFP) press reports of the Taliban’s tactic of taking advantage of bacha bazi—a practice that may include older men sexually abusing young boys—by using boys to infiltrate police checkpoints; after gaining the trust of the policemen, the boys kill, drug, or poison them. Afghan security officials reported at least six incidents to the AFP between January and April this year. According to the AFP, multiple Afghan officials say that some police refuse to join outposts that do not have boys present. Earlier requests by the Afghan Attorney General for Uruzgan province officials to investigate police checkpoints have gone unanswered as one official expressed concern that police commanders will retaliate if they...
After the Attorney General’s failure, President Ghani ordered a thorough investigation according to a statement from the presidential palace, and anyone, regardless of rank, found guilty will be prosecuted in accordance with Afghan laws and international obligations. DOD has been unable to independently confirm the AFP reporting. DOD continues to engage with Afghan senior leaders concerning this issue and fully supports both the ongoing SIGAR and DOD Inspector General investigations.

This quarter, SIGAR will report on the classified aspects of the ANDSF assessment in the classified annex to this report.

**MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MAKE MODEST PROGRESS, STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING HIGHEST RATINGS**

Each RS Essential Function (EF) directorate and the Gender Advisor office use the Essential Function Program of Actions and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in the ministries of Defense and Interior. This quarter, the MOD offices were assessed on 44 milestones—one less than last quarter. MOI offices were assessed on 33 milestones—one more than last quarter. The milestones are assessed by MOD and MOI each quarter.

**FIGURE 3.28**

**ANP ZONES VS. ANA CORPS AREA BOUNDARIES**


**SIGAR AUDIT**

Last quarter a SIGAR inspection report that assessed U.S. efforts to construct the Ministry of Defense headquarters found while contract requirements were generally met and the building appears well built, several construction issues need to be assessed. For more information, see the April 2016 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, pp. 37–40. In vetting comments, USFOR-A said the U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Center completed a comprehensive evaluation of the Ministry of Defense headquarters building, concluding that the building either met or exceeded all requirements including earthquake-survivability features.
using a five-tier rating system displayed in Table 3.8. Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the assessment of the overall ministry. The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.

This quarter, the RS assessment indicates both the MOD and MOI continue to show improvement in the percentage of its “sustaining capability” or “fully capable” development milestones. The MOD has increased from 6.7% to 11.1% then to 18.2% over the last two quarters. The MOI also increased its ratings from 7.5% then to 9.4% to 21.2% of its development milestones at “sustaining capability” or “fully capable”.

This quarter, the MOI continues to possess the sole “sustaining capability” assessment rating (the highest rating), which was achieved for an EF-5 (Sustainment) milestone. Also this quarter, the RS assessment reflects the MOD EF-3 (Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions) and the MOI EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution) and Gender Relations offices earned their first “fully capable” rating.

RS forecasts that by the end of 2016, MOD will attain a “sustaining” or “fully capable” rating in 50% of its milestones, with MOI “sustaining” or “fully capable” in 61% of its milestones.

Communication and Messaging
According to RS, both the MOD and the MOI are emphasizing the use of information operations to counter insurgent messaging, synchronizing messaging between the ANA and ANP, and incorporating the use of social media. The first quarterly conference for ANA corps and police zone public-affairs officers was held in April to provide guidance for the Afghan campaign plan and Operation Shafaq messaging, facilitate
TABLE 3.8

PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING A “SUSTAINING” RATING FOR ESSENTIAL FUNCTION MILESTONES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>Total Number of Milestones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential Functions</td>
<td>Scoped/Agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Multi-Year Budgeting &amp; Execution</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transparency, Accountability, &amp; Oversight</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Force Generation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sustainment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Strategy &amp; Policy, Planning, Resourcing, &amp; Execution</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Intelligence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Strategic Communications</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Gender Advisor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Essential Function Totals</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This quarter, percent of total milestones</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last quarter, percent of total milestones</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>Total Number of Milestones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential Functions</td>
<td>Scoped/Agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Multi-Year Budgeting &amp; Execution</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transparency, Accountability, &amp; Oversight</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Force Generation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sustainment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Strategy &amp; Policy, Planning, Resourcing, &amp; Execution</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Intelligence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Strategic Communications</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Gender Advisor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Essential Function Totals</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This quarter, percent of total milestones</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last quarter, percent of total milestones</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Not EF-numbered, but rated. EF = Essential Function; last quarter data as of 2/4/2016; this quarter data as of 5/18/2016.

on-going communication between the two security forces, and provide continuing education.282

During the past quarter, the MOD increased engagements with the public, the media, and religious scholars and mullahs, particularly in support of the summer campaign against the insurgents.283 During ANDSF operations in Helmand, Badakhshan, and Nangarhar, the MOD arranged for local and international media to attend events with ANA and ANP leaders, and local and provincial officials.284 The MOD also is focusing on reporting the ANA capabilities instead of the number of casualties and security incidents; it is too early to know if such engagements and reporting had a positive effect on public perception and operations against the Taliban and other insurgent forces.285

Within the MOI, RS reported the Kabul City Police call center transitioned to a toll-free number and identified ongoing challenges that include cross-ministry communications during contingency situations, an insufficient number of ANP zone headquarters public-affairs personnel, and the need to improve recruitment-focused communications.286

Afghan Local Police
Afghan Local Police (ALP) members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.287

As of May 2016, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP has 29,838 guardians, 25,004 of whom are trained.288 Consistent with advising the Afghan security forces to the ANA corps and ANP zone or equivalent level, NSOCC-A advises the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate level.289 According to Afghan reporting, 0.21% of ALP guardians were killed in action during the first five months of 2016. An additional 1.41% have been dropped from the rolls, while none were reported becoming disabled or injured. These numbers yield an aggregate attrition rate of 1.62%. The Afghan government is no longer reporting the number of ALP guardians who have renewed their contracts.290 NSOCC-A reports the FY 2016 cost to support the ALP at its authorized end strength of 30,000 is $117 million. The United States expects to fund approximately $112.5 million, with the Afghan government contributing the remaining $4.5 million.291

In its October 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR reported on MOI reforms enacted after the Afghan Uniform Police in 2015 assessed the ALP in 164 of the 170 districts in which they operate.292 This quarter NSOCC-A reported efforts continue to enroll the ALP personnel into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System, to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer process, and to inventory materiel.293 According to NSOCC-A the FY 1395
assessment is under way, with all ALP district assessments to be completed by December 20, 2016.294

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $40.1 billion and disbursed $39.0 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.295

**ANA Military Personnel Experience Slight Decrease**

As of May 20, 2016, the overall assigned strength of the ANA, including the Afghan Air Force (AAF) but not including civilians, was 171,428 personnel, according to USFOR-A.296 This is an overall decrease of 778 from the January 2016 assigned-end-strength report of 172,206.297 The number of ANA civilians were not reported in an unclassified manner this quarter.298 ANA assigned military personnel are at 87.9% of the approved end strength.299

USFOR-A reports high attrition is impacting the experience level of front-line troops. Annually almost one-third of the force is lost to attrition, resulting in many new recruits, and the focus on basic training for new troops reduces the ability to conduct advanced training.300

**ANA Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $17.3 billion and disbursed $16.6 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.301 The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition, organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), aviation sustainment, and vehicle maintenance.302

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and nonpayroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1394 (2015) was $876.1 million and $131.8 million in Afghan FY 1395 through March 14, 2016.303 Sustainment for the combat forces (27%) and the Afghan Air Force (29%) are the largest uses of the funding, followed by funding for communications equipment and information technology (18%) and vehicles and transportation (10%).304 According to a May 2016 *Washington Post* article, Afghan security forces have had a shortage of adequate footwear. Moreover, 23% of the boots ordered for the ANA and 29% of the boots ordered for the ANP during 2014 and 2015 were not delivered until early 2016.305 According to DOD, the shortage of adequate boots was due to a variety of factors including (1) possible Afghan noncompliance with the **Berry Amendment**, (2) the Afghan decision to buy short-lasting, poor-quality boots from local or Chinese sources, (3) a system that tracked quantities of boots procured but not their sizes, which led to a surplus of boots too large for most Afghans, and (4) a U.S. production base that could not keep up with the increased demand.

**The Berry Amendment:** (Title 10 United States Code Section 2533a) requires DOD-purchased textile components (among other items) over the simplified acquisition threshold of $250,000 to be produced in the United States when using appropriated funding. This law, passed in 1941, applies when CSTC-A is purchasing uniforms for the ANDSF or when providing on-budget financing to the Afghan ministries for uniform purchases.

demand for high-quality boots. DOD reported that the rate of production of high-quality boots has increased and that production is quickly catching up with demands.306

ANA Salaries and Incentives
CSTC-A reported that the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will be $676.2 million in FY 2016, followed by an average $545.8 million annually over the next five years.307 In vetting comments, however, DOD noted that these forecasted numbers are for planning purposes only and are not valid indicators of future DOD support.308 During Afghan FY 1394 (2015), the United States provided $271 million directly to the Afghan government to fund ANA salaries and contractor pay, with the significant majority of the funding, $179.5 million, applied toward officer base pay. An additional $91 million was used for noncommissioned officers’ and soldiers’ pay, and $500,000 for ANA contractors’ base pay.309 Funding provided for FY 1395 salaries and incentives through March 14, 2016, totaled $89.6 million.310

To encourage the MOD to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for personnel in authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use later this year.311 USFOR-A reports as of May 20, 2016, that thousands more active-duty personnel records are in the computerized Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) than in the monthly paper Personnel Status reports. One of the ongoing efforts is correcting the employment status of those personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.312 Additionally, 134,844 (79% of the number reported in the monthly Personnel Status report) personnel have been slotted in AHRIMS into an approved FY 1394 tashkil position as of May 20, 2016.313

AHRIMS contains a personnel module that includes name, rank, education level, identification card number, current tashkil position, and other data. A tashkil module within AHRIMS contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI along with pertinent information such as unit, location, and duty title. Personnel records in AHRIMS are linked to the appropriate position within the tashkil module. These two modules form the core of the personnel system for the MOD and MOI. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is to ensure pay accountability by integrating the data in the AHRIMS modules with the compensation and payroll modules to process authorizations, personnel accountability, payroll, and funds disbursement.314 The APPS program office expected 19,000 records to be corrected when the FY 1395 tashkil was loaded into AHRIMS, which was scheduled for late May.315 At that time the ANA Corps was scheduled to be given AHRIMS access to update the tashkil modules, unlike in the past when ANA officials would pass paper personnel records to Kabul for input.316
Two other systems round out the initiative to manage personnel: the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) and the ANDSF Identification Card System (ID). APPS, AABIS, and ID will contain a biometrics registration number as a unique key. Only those ANDSF members registered in AABIS will be issued an ID, and only those members both registered and with a linked ID will be authorized to have an APPS record. CSTC-A is overseeing the integration of the biometrically linked ID into the APPS. This effort is to ensure the employee exists and payments are sent directly into the employee’s bank account. According to CSTC-A, this structure will dramatically reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying for “ghost” personnel. Routine inventories are required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF.

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $13.1 billion and disbursed $13.0 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 48.4% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>$642,851,434</td>
<td>$25,406,939</td>
<td>$531,702,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>7,346,261,325</td>
<td>527,416,334</td>
<td>6,648,731,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>856,203,711</td>
<td>75,853,672</td>
<td>745,480,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>2,442,053,461</td>
<td>299,705,828</td>
<td>1,433,936,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>2,469,192,080</td>
<td>268,857,178</td>
<td>2,180,830,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Services</td>
<td>89,380,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,459,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
<td>455,211,247</td>
<td>67,099,585</td>
<td>341,550,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>884,304,375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>801,295,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,185,457,633</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,264,339,536</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12,696,986,313</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised-explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts.


Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANA increased by over $125.6 million. The majority of the increase was in vehicle procurements, followed by transportation services and counter-improvised-explosive devices. Additionally, CSTC-A has a purchase request at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for ammunition.
The first donation of military equipment from China, including logistical equipment, vehicle parts, tankers, ammunition, and weapons, arrived in Kabul on July 3. The Afghan national security advisor said another shipment due later this year would include scanners to detect explosive devices.


**SIGAR AUDIT**

SIGAR released an audit this quarter on the ANA vehicle-maintenance capability and the DOD-managed ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). SIGAR found (1) the capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain did not meet key assumptions, (2) the cost of spare parts was significantly underestimated, (3) performance metrics did not accurately assess contractor performance or progress, and (4) ANA maintenance capability did not develop as anticipated. Additionally, contract oversight declined due to deteriorating security conditions and payments to the contractor were based on the number of vehicles in the ANA fleet, not the number of vehicles repaired, escalating per-vehicle repair costs from $1,954 to $59,402 as maintenance sites closed and vehicle turn-ins practically halted. These and other factors resulted in the final contract cost being more than double the original estimate, with DOD planning to award a more costly follow-on contract. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 29-32.

The first donation of military equipment from China, totaling $260 million, CSTC-A reported a decrease in the “remaining to be procured” amount for vehicles, including related maintenance and spare parts, because MOI leadership determined additional unarmored light-tactical vehicles were not required and DOD reported extending the ANA and ANP vehicle-maintenance contracts for one year while the new National Maintenance Strategy contract requirements were reviewed and refined.

According to CSTC-A, there are over 54,000 vehicles in the ANA inventory, although DOD noted that estimates of the number of operational vehicles are far lower. Due to inconsistent and unreliable reporting by the MOD, the accuracy of the ANA equipment operational-readiness rate remains questionable. CSTC-A said data quality is expected to improve once the National Maintenance Strategy is implemented and training results are realized, but pointed to several factors within MOD that contribute to poor readiness rates:

- high number of battle- or accident-damaged vehicles
- a shortage of about 600 trained mechanics for vehicle maintenance (mechanic retention and training remains a serious concern for both the ANA and ANP)
- assignment of mechanics to combat-related duties such as staffing checkpoints

According to the ANA, as of May 9, 2016, the 207th Corps in Herat and Nimroz Provinces reported the highest vehicle-readiness rate at 82%, while the beleaguered 215th Corps in Helmand Province reported only 35% readiness. But CSTC-A questioned the accuracy of ANA reporting on the 215th Corps rate as it does not appear to reflect that new vehicles had been delivered and vehicle maintenance had occurred.

Equipment purchased for the ANA that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF or that was damaged before transfer to the Afghan government can be converted into DOD stock for disposition, after USFOR-A considers alternative dispositions and DOD notifies Congress. DOD said no notification was processed during this reporting period, so the cumulative value notified to the U.S. Congress since 2014 remains at $215 million.

**Core Information Management System**

CSTC-A also provided an update on the Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) this quarter. CoreIMS is part of the solution to address the Afghan supply-chain logistical-capability gap. Since 2012, efforts have been under way to develop and implement an automated system within both ministries to replace their paper-based process. CoreIMS is a proprietary inventory-management system that is being enhanced to eventually provide visibility of basic items like vehicles, weapons, night-vision devices, and repair parts, both in-stock and on-order. The system will allow for
informed allocation of material, predictive analysis of requirements, and proactive budgeting, while reducing the opportunity for fraud.\textsuperscript{332} The web-based CoreIMS is available at ANA Regional Logistics Supply Centers, which each include a Corps Support Battalion and a Forward Supply Depot.\textsuperscript{333} The goal is to improve Afghan sustainment processes from the national level to the corps and regional levels by providing managers and decision-makers with current asset status.\textsuperscript{334}

In March, the MOD established a program-management office to manage the implementation, training, and support of the ANDSF’s logistics solution.\textsuperscript{335} Recording parts inventory in CoreIMS is an ongoing effort that is expected to be completed in December.\textsuperscript{336} Once fully implemented, CoreIMS will track requested parts, completed orders, and existing inventory, as well as the time required to fulfill the supply request. Using this data, CoreIMS will provide a predictive analysis capability to identify parts for reordered.\textsuperscript{337}

**ANA Infrastructure**

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $5.9 billion and disbursed $5.7 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as facilities for military-headquarters, schoolhouses, barracks, maintenance facilities, airfields, and roads.\textsuperscript{338} As of May 31, 2016, the United States had completed 382 infrastructure projects valued at $5.2 billion, with another 23 ongoing projects valued at $161.5 million, according to CSTC-A.\textsuperscript{339} The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter are: the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul (its estimated costs decreased from $76.3 million to $73.3 million, and are now $72.5 million), to be completed...
in December 2017; the fourth phase of the Kabul Military Training Center in Kabul ($19.7 million), which was scheduled for completion in June 2016; and utilities for the South Kabul International Airport ($7.1 million), to be completed in September 2016. In addition, the Logistics Officers Branch School in Kabul was completed at a cost of $33.6 million, and a $1.1 million contract for the ANA Shorabak Power Technical Assistance Project was terminated for cause. The exact reason for the termination was not provided to SIGAR.

Two contracts were awarded this quarter at a cost of $574,000, including a $204,000 acquisition to construct a well for the Special Mission Wing in Mazar-e Sharif. Among the 21 projects ($182.6 million) in the planning phase, four projects are to construct facilities for females ($33.6 million), five projects are to construct facilities for the AAF, three projects are to support the national electrical-grid strategy, and nine projects are for sustainment, restoration, and modernization.

CSTC-A reported the MOD Construction and Properties Management Department (CPMD) was on schedule to meet the FY 1395 MOD Financial Commitment Letter requirements to provide CSTC-A a plan to divest unsustainable bases. However, the department did not develop all the required standard operating procedures, resulting in a 10% funding hold-back until all six procedures are completed.

CSTC-A reported that several infrastructure-framed train, advise, and assist activities are ongoing. Eight CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOD CPMD engineers three or four times a week. A program to train Afghan facility engineers to operate and maintain power plants, heating and air-conditioning systems, water-treatment plants, and waste-water-treatment plants has 224 graduates with 30 students in the current classes. After instructing three four-week courses, the ANA Engineer School’s 18 instructors, mentored by CSTC-A advisors and contractors, demonstrate a willingness to learn proper instruction techniques and have improved their curriculum-teaching ability.

CSTC-A reported using the Functional Area Support Team program to hire 74 Afghan engineers and specialists in an effort to build the Afghan civil-service workforce. The initial six hires were placed at CPMD headquarters; the remaining hires will be placed in ANA corps. In addition to engineering and construction management, the program hires will be placed in project management, financial management, and procurement positions.

ANAND MOD Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.8 billion of ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations. CSTC-A reported 17 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs, including 13 focusing on technical training. The majority of the funding is applied toward
Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

As of May 2016, the United States has appropriated more than $3.9 billion and obligated more than $3 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY 2010. Current obligations for FY 2016 stand at $223.8 million, while appropriations have reached more than $590 million. The majority of the funding is dedicated to sustainment costs, which account for 71% of obligated funds and 74% of appropriated funds. In contrast, training costs account for 29% of obligated funds and 27% of appropriated funds. No funds were obligated for infrastructure or equipment and aircraft, though $27 million was appropriated for equipment and aircraft costs. The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft, as of June 6, 2016, includes:

- 3 Mi-35 helicopters
- 47 Mi-17 helicopters
- 15 MD-530 helicopters
- 24 C-208 airplanes
- 4 C-130 airplanes
- 8 A-29 airplanes

This quarter, USFOR-A reported 10 Mi-17s, 2 MD-530s, and 1 C-130 were currently unusable for combat operations. In addition, four of the eight A-29s are operational with the remaining four expected to clear all pre-operating testing in June. The newest addition to the AAF, the A-29 Super Tucanos, have proven to be valuable assets on a strategic and tactical level. Four pilots reached combat-mission-ready status on April 1; two of them completed the AAF’s first A-29 combat mission on April 14. By May 24, the AAF had undertaken 18 A-29 missions. Over the next two years, the AAF will receive 12 more A-29s DOD has procured once their pilots complete their training at Moody Air Force Base, and 12 MD-530s still on the assembly line. Not yet reflected in the AAF inventory are 10 of the 12 MD-530 Cayuse Warrior helicopters, five were delivered on June 17, 2016, and five more on July 17. These helicopters have the capability to fire rockets or .50-caliber machine guns. Another two helicopters are scheduled to arrive by the end of summer.

The Wall Street Journal reported on the urgency to replace the aging Mi-17s and Mi-35s that are reaching the end of their service life. According to that news report, over 16,000 Mi-17 missions were flown in 2015, a significant increase over the 4,500 in 2014, and the continuous demand is placing pressure on the existing AAF fleet. The Wall Street Journal also reported that U.S. commanders in Afghanistan are waiting for DOD to respond to recommendations they have provided. In vetting comments, DOD questioned the accuracy of that news report.

SIGAR AUDIT

Last quarter SIGAR issued an inspection report that assessed U.S. efforts to convert the National Military Academy of Afghanistan into the Afghan Air Force University. The report found that contract requirements were generally met, but said instances of noncompliance, poor workmanship, and inadequate maintenance needed to be addressed. For more information, see the April 2016 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, p. 42.
The Special Mission Wing (SMW) is the aviation branch of the MOD’s Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) alongside the special operations command ANASOC and the Ktah Khas counterterrorism unit.

USFOR-A reported that as of February 2016, NSOCC-A advisors provide train, advise, and assist support to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in addition to the support RS advisors provide the MOI. Their focus is to improve the CNPA coordination with the SMW for aviation support for counternarcotics raids.361

Details of the AAF capabilities and the SMW budget, manpower, and capabilities are classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $19.6 billion and disbursed $18.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.362

ANP Strength

As of April 19, 2016, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 148,167, according to USFOR-A.363 This is an increase of 1,863 ANP personnel since last quarter, but 7,015 below the May 2015 assigned end strength that was reported at 155,182.364 Patrol personnel represent the largest component of the ANP with 70,681 members; noncommissioned officers numbered 49,941, while officer ranks stood at 27,545.365 The largest increase this quarter occurred within the officer ranks.366

According to USFOR-A, all ANP members receive basic counternarcotics training whose course curriculum was developed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. While no statistics exists, the ANP Training General Command has released individuals from training and ANP service due to illicit drug use.367

ANP Sustainment

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $8.4 billion and disbursed $8.0 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.368 This includes ASFF contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries, the most prominent use of sustainment funding. Other uses of ANP sustainment funding include ammunition and ordnances, information technology, and organizational clothing and individual equipment.369 According to CSTC-A, $201.8 million has been provided for ANP sustainment during Afghan FY 1395 (2016) through May 25, 2016.370

Of that amount, $156.8 million represents the U.S. contribution to LOTFA to fund salaries, incentives, and the United Nations Development Programme management fee. CSTC-A reports that the U.S. funding required for LOTFA over the next five years will depend on the contributions of Coalition partners. However, due to the Afghan government starting to fund the ANP salaries, CSTC-A now estimates fiscal year 2016 expenses to be $223.5 million and fiscal year 2017 to be $77.2 million, down significantly from the earlier reported fiscal year 2016–2020 average of $613.2 million. According to the UNDP country director in Afghanistan, $45 million is allocated monthly to the ANP. Afghan police officials said on average Afghan police officers earn $176–$221 monthly, whereas detectives in the major-crime task force earn $294–$353 monthly on average. In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has provided $66.6 million for ALP salaries and incentives and $45 million toward non-payroll items.

In March 2016, LOTFA funding ended for 22 contracted advisors that staffed the MOI Media and Public Affairs Directorate (MPAD). RS reports the directorate performance, once regarded as the Afghan government’s most capable public-affairs office, has deteriorated because the MOI has failed to staff civilian positions.

To encourage the MOI to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016. In addition, CSTC-A will not fund salaries for personnel not validated in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) or the current electronic-pay system, or for those personnel without a valid, current ID.

USFOR-A stated the EF-4 advisors met with key MOI human resource leaders to build awareness of the need to use electronic-pay systems. USFOR-A reports that, as of May 16, 2016, the MOI has input 93% of the ANP forces into the AHRIMS personnel module and input 85% in the tashkil module filling an approved tashkil position. USFOR-A reports that not all data fields are populated in records entered into the AHRIMS personnel and tashkil modules.

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $4.3 billion and disbursed $4.2 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment as shown in Table 3.10 on the following page. Approximately 68% of the funding in this category was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANP increased by over $94.4 million, primarily within the vehicle category, but also for weapons, transportation services, and
counter-improvised-explosive devices.\textsuperscript{381} The vehicles “remaining to be procured” amount increased for a second quarter from $164.4 million, to $234.9 million, and now to $373.8 million.\textsuperscript{382} Additionally, CSTC-A has a $34 million purchase request at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for ammunition.\textsuperscript{383} DOD reported there is a continued requirement to replace battle losses and equipment that is not economical to repair.\textsuperscript{384} CSTC-A is also procuring HMMWVs (“Humvees”) to replace both destroyed HMMWVs and unarmored Ford Ranger pickup trucks for police units. While the HMMWV is more expensive than the Ford Ranger, HMMWVs will significantly improve survivability against small-arms fire and provide greater operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{385} Equipment purchased for the ANP that was later determined to be no longer required by the ANDSF, or that was damaged before transfer to the Afghan government, can be converted to DOD stock for disposition, after USFOR-A considers alternative dispositions and DOD notifies Congress. DOD said no notification was processed during the quarter, so the cumulative value of ANP equipment transferred to DOD since FY 2014 remains at $18.4 million.\textsuperscript{386}

**ANP Infrastructure**

As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated $3.1 billion and disbursed $3.0 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.\textsuperscript{387}

According to CSTC-A, as of May 31, 2016, the United States had completed 738 infrastructure projects valued at $3.7 billion, with another seven projects valued at $14.6 million ongoing.\textsuperscript{388} The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter remains the training center for females in Nangarhar (with an estimated cost of $6.4 million) followed by the female compound at MOI headquarters in Kabul ($3.4 million).\textsuperscript{389} While no infrastructure projects were completed this quarter, four contracts were
awarded. These included the $4 million re-award for the MOI headquarters administrative information-technology complex; the initial $3 million award was terminated due to a contract protest. Others include the MOI headquarters temporary entry-control point ($998,330) and improvements to the Kandahar regional training center to accommodate females ($279,228). In addition, CSTC-A reports the majority of the 22 projects in the planning phase ($129.7 million) are in support of the Women Participation Program.

CSTC-A reported several ongoing activities aimed at developing Afghan capacity to build and maintain infrastructure. Seven CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOI Facilities Department engineers at least twice a week. A program to train Afghan facility engineers to operate and maintain power plants, heating and air-conditioning systems, water-treatment plants, and waste-water-treatment plants had 65 students attend quality assurance/control, site-facility engineering, and leadership courses in Kabul and Nangarhar. CSTC-A contracted 70 Afghan subject-matter experts to assist the MOI Facilities Department in meeting daily operation requirements, training facility engineers, and in contract management. Twenty-two subject-matter experts are located at the MOI Facilities Department in Kabul, one is co-located at CSTC-A serving the subject-matter-expert liaison and the Women’s Participation Program manager, and the others are located throughout the provinces.

CSTC-A reported on the MOI Facilities Department status to provide the procurement packages for connecting second-phase facilities to the electric grid, in accordance with the FY 1395 MOI Bilateral Financial Commitment for the Women Participation Program: An initiative which seeks to advance and promote women’s participation in Afghan security institutions. The Women Participation Program promotes safe and secure facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities for women in order to increase female membership within the ANSF.
Letter requirements. While all the provincial requirements are not finalized, seven Kabul sites were connected and eight provincial site connections are under way. However, the status of the MOI requirement to submit procurement packages for the divestiture of the facilities identified in the FY 1394 divestment plan was not submitted.

ANP Training and Operations
As of June 30, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.7 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations. CSTC-A reported five ongoing U.S.-funded training programs: four focused on technical training and one focused on basic training. The largest U.S.-funded training includes essential-function development training and operational-specialty training, such as vehicle-maintenance, radio-operation and maintenance, and special infantry training.

WOMEN COMPRISE 1.3% OF ANDSF PERSONNEL
This quarter, RS reported 4,228 women serving in the ANDSF, a 323-person increase from last quarter. Despite the respectable increase in female recruits, the overall percentage of women in the ANDSF is only 1.3%. Of the 4,228 women, 2,879 were in the ANP, 213 were in the ASSF, 1,039 were in the ANA, and 97 were in the AAF.

Of the women in the ANP, ANA, and AAF, 1,263 were officers, 1,317 were noncommissioned officers, and 1,215 were enlisted. No breakout of the ranks of the women serving in the ASSF was provided.

To support women in the ANDSF, a Woman’s Promotion Board was created to afford women in the ANDSF fair opportunities for promotions. Some 5,005 new gender-neutral positions were added to the MOD tashkil, 525 of which are reserved for women. The ANP also added new positions for women, increasing the total number of positions open to women to 5,969; 5,024 positions for ANP personnel, 175 for positions in prisons and detention centers, and 770 civilian positions. RS will provide support to encourage assignment of women to these gender-neutral positions.

ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE
CSTC-A reports as of May 31, 2016, there are 860 physicians and 2,509 other medical staff within the ANDSF healthcare system, with vacancies of 375 (30.4%) and 520 (17.2%) respectively. In an effort to increase the number of medical personnel in hard-to-fill positions, the MOI Surgeon General has urged the MOD Medical Commander to allow police medical officers to attend the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences Physician’s Assistance program. Additionally, to incentivize medical professionals to accept a position outside the Kabul area, the MOD approved additional
pay for personnel assigned to a hard-to-fill position. And after completing training in Turkey, 26 female nurses (a 24% increase) were assigned to the ANP hospital.

Earlier CSTC-A reported that the MOI approved eight 20-bed regional hospitals. The Balkh facility opened in May; the Helmand and Kunduz facilities are to begin operations later this year. These regional facilities will also serve as satellite medical-supply points, thereby reducing the dependence on the Kabul warehouse. CSTC-A reported that problems with the ANDSF supply chain impacting the ANDSF medical corps include:

- The ordering and distribution authorization process is too lengthy, requiring numerous command-level approvals, including some external to the medical command.
- Lack of an automated inventory system results in inaccurate stock levels that may lead to critical shortages of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, delaying medical care.
- Inadequate inventory storage spaces can result in pharmaceuticals and consumables losing sterility, quality, and efficacy due to uncontrollable changes in temperature and humidity.
- Inventory-security measures are insufficient to secure the pharmaceuticals and consumables.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $331.6 million in weapons destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding, and all but $1 million of FY 2015 money has been obligated. Approximately $3.3 million of FY 2016 has been obligated; PM/WRA plans to obligate the remaining $17 million in the coming months.

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. As of March 31, 2016, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 186.9 million square meters of land (approximately 72.16 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.7 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.11 on the next page).

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were...
589 square kilometers (227 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, 3.2 square kilometers (1.2 square miles) were cleared. However, ongoing surveys identified 31.2 square kilometers (12 square miles) of additional contaminated areas, bringing the known contaminated area to 617 square kilometers (238 square miles) by the end of the quarter. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.412

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians, including victims of mines and ERW.413

UNMACA draws on its wider network under the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), which consists of 50 international and national organizations, to access beneficiaries and communities. One of those organizations, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), collects casualty data on mine/ERW victims to help prioritize its clearance activities. According to USAID, ACAP funding will allow MACCA to expand its victim-assistance activities beyond service provision and data collection to include immediate assistance for individual survivors and their families.414

In September 2015, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) issued a nine-month grant for physical rehabilitation in Farah Province. The Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR) project will establish a center to assist war, landmine, and ERW victims, as well as

### TABLE 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Fragments Cleared</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,337,557</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>663,162</td>
<td>1,602,267</td>
<td>4,339,235</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>21,966,347</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>22,912,702</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,697</td>
<td>10,148,683</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>346,484</td>
<td>9,415,712</td>
<td>511,600,000</td>
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<td>2015a</td>
<td>7,419,944</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>31,806</td>
<td>64,688</td>
<td>2,449,357</td>
<td>558,900,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016b</td>
<td>14,572,084</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>57,475</td>
<td>4,399,621</td>
<td>617,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>186,888,602</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,130</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,876,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,799,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>75,631,657</strong></td>
<td><strong>570,800,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre. * Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. ** Final quarter results for fiscal year unavailable; partial-year results only. *** Results for first two quarters only.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2016.

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persons with disabilities, by providing physiotherapy and orthopedic devices among its various services. UNMAS presented an awareness workshop in March 2016 coupled with an institutional-capacity needs assessment for the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disability.

According to the UN, over 6,100 security incidents took place between February 16 and May 19, 2016. Armed attacks represent the greatest number of incidents. Improvised-explosive devices (IEDs) were the second most prevalent form of attack and represent 17.4% of security incidents during that period. The $30.2 million ACAP program has expended $19.6 million to date and will conclude in February 2018.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of June 30, 2016, the United States has provided $8.5 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium, providing 80% of the world’s output over the past decade, according to the United Nations.

Congress appropriated most of these funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund ($3 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($1.3 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) ($1.5 billion), and a portion of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account ($2.2 billion). ASFF is primarily used to develop the Afghan National Army and Police. It also funds the Counternarcotics Police and Special Mission Wing who support MOD and MOI efforts to address narcotics problems. USAID’s alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. See Appendix B for additional funding information.

Revised U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Still Pending

In his 2014 nomination hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador P. Michael McKinley promised to work with SIGAR and other oversight agencies to review U.S. counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan. In February 2015, Ambassador McKinley informed SIGAR that a revised counternarcotics strategy would be prepared within six months. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) subsequently reported that the United States was in the final stages of updating its counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan. INL is currently operating under the 2012 U.S. Government counternarcotics strategy, which has not succeeded in curbing the illicit drug trade. The highlight on pages 118–119 provides an overview of current and prior U.S. counternarcotics strategies.
The United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its World Drug Report 2016 in June 2016. Though Afghanistan accounts for nearly two-thirds of the planet’s illicit opium cultivation, it played a significant part in the world’s opium production decline of 38% from the previous year. Afghanistan’s estimated opium production declined 48% to 3,300 metric tons from its 2014 level of 6,400 tons. Its opium-cultivation level of 183,000 hectares decreased 18% from its 2014 total of 224,000 hectares. UNODC attributes the decline mainly to poor harvests in the southern provinces.424 UNODC did change its methodology between 2014 and 2015; it is unclear how much that change factored into the reported decline. UNODC cautions that the changing methodology could make changes seem greater than represented.425 Production and cultivation results had been rising for the past decade, as illustrated in Figure 3.29.426

The UNODC report also looked at the role of women in drug trafficking. For the first time in Afghanistan, the UNODC opium survey included women in focus groups. Results showed that women (in the northern provinces) participate in many of the arduous tasks related to opium-poppy cultivation such as weeding, field clearing, and lancing; they also prepare opium gum and by-products such as oil and soap. Men plow and cultivate the fields and occasionally take part in lancing the poppy capsule.427

Note: a hectare is slightly less than 2.5 acres.

In rural areas where adequate health facilities are nearly nonexistent, women have traditionally used opium to treat common ailments in children and adults. The focus groups indicated that women were aware that one can become dependent with continued usage and were concerned with opium’s effects on the next generation. The survey found that women used opium income for living expenses (food, clothing, furniture, etc.), but also used the poppy for cooking (oil is extracted from the seeds and poppy straw is used for kitchen fuel). Women, however, have limited influence on the decision whether to cultivate poppy or alternative crops.

Afghan Government’s Revised Counternarcotics Strategy

The Afghan government rolled out its national counternarcotics strategy, the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP), last year. According to INL, its introduction has refocused international attention and engagement on the country’s illicit drug problem. The NDAP featured prominently during several high-profile international meetings, including the December 2015 High-Level Meeting of Partners for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, the December 2015 Paris Pact Policy Consultative Group, and during a side-event at the April 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem. INL stated that the NDAP has been thoroughly reviewed during meetings between the United States and key international partners. International donors and impacted countries have reiterated their intention to create and adapt programs and counternarcotics action to address the needs identified in the NDAP.

Drug-Demand Reduction

Although Afghanistan has one of the highest substance-abuse rates in the world, INL is reducing funding to all Afghan treatment centers for drug addiction. The remaining funding is being redirected to treatment and prevention programs in rural areas, where studies show drug use is significantly higher than in urban areas.

INL started to transition the first group of 13 treatment centers to Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) responsibility in January 2015. Another 15 treatment centers began transitioning in January 2016; another 21 treatment centers will begin transitioning in January 2017; the remaining treatment centers will be transitioned by the end of 2019. INL reduced funding to all facilities (including the MOPH portfolio of 23 centers) by approximately 20% in 2015 and another 15% in 2016.

INL is revisiting the transition plan to determine whether changes are needed. According to INL, the MOPH has expressed confidence in managing the transition—assuming there is sufficient funding from their own government and the international community. INL informed SIGAR that 500 clinical staff working for NGO-run treatment centers were supposed to be working for the government by January 2016. The MOPH reported

The Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries

It provides a strategic framework for drug-control initiatives as well as a platform for coordinating and facilitating counternarcotics efforts across the region. There are eight countries covered under this regional program: Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The program, inaugurated in December 2011, focuses on four areas: law-enforcement cooperation; cooperation in criminal matters; prevention and treatment of addiction; and trends and impacts.

The Paris Pact: The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on Central Asian drug routes. It aims to reduce opium-poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and to establish a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.
U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The Afghanistancounternarcotics (CN) effort reveals the interconnectedness of civilian and military interests in a nation with an unstable security situation. Rural Afghan families may grow opium poppies to support themselves, yet by doing so may at times, directly or indirectly, support the insurgency. Corrupt government officials facilitate narco-insurgency networks that undermine the security efforts.

U.S. CN strategy in Afghanistan has changed over time as the security situation changed. But the 2007, 2010, and 2012 U.S. counternarcotics strategies each encouraged counternarcotic and counterinsurgency (COIN) planning integration and cooperation, building government institution accountability and capability, and protecting affected civilian populations.

The 2007 Counternarcotics Strategy focused on improving the implementation of five pillars: alternative development, eradication, interdiction, public information, and justice reform to support the efforts of the Afghan government. The strategy outlined three major goals, each of which could be applied to the pillars:434

- increase development assistance to encourage licit agrarian development, while increasing disruption and eradication operations of opium-poppy cultivation and production. This goal emphasized the importance of alternative development programs, particularly the Good Performers Initiative, USAID’s crop and seed programs, and the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in addition to encouraging private-sector engagement.435
- more cooperation between CN and COIN operations and planning, with particular emphasis on integrating elements of interdiction operations into the larger COIN mission. The United States sought to improve CN and COIN cooperation on public information campaigns and construct a recognized command structure for all CN forces within a given region.436
- encourage political will for the counternarcotics effort among Afghan officials, cooperating partners, and related international and military organizations.437

The 2007 strategy also encouraged the extradition of high-value targets related to the CN effort to the United States while Afghanistan continued to build its capacity to effectively prosecute major drug traffickers.438

The 2010 Counternarcotics Strategy focused on the expansion of Afghan government control and the continued degradation of insurgent influence through CN-informed COIN operations. This strategy outlined two major goals:

- weakening the link between narcotics and insurgency, reducing the support insurgents receive from the narcotics industry; and
- addressing the narcotics-related corruption problems within the Afghan government.

It also maintained the U.S. commitment to the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which expanded the five pillars in the 2007 strategy to include demand reduction, institution building, and international and regional cooperation. The NDCS focused on four priorities:

- disrupting narcotics trade flows by targeting traffickers and financiers,
• diversifying and incentivizing licit rural livelihoods,
• reducing the demand for illegal drugs and increasing treatment opportunities for drug users, and
• developing Afghan institutions at the district and provincial level to support the CN strategy.

Under the 2010 strategy, the United States stopped funding large-scale eradication operations, in particular the centrally led Afghan eradication force, but continued to fund the government-led eradication effort. This placed most CN operations within the larger COIN strategy in order to locate centers of insurgent and narcotics activity and government corruption and to disrupt them. 

Achieving these goals increasingly became the responsibility of Afghan counternarcotics forces, which required sustained capability development to move towards self-sufficiency. The strategy also sought to improve incentives for farmers to switch from the profitable opium poppy to licit alternatives in order to lower opium-production levels. To address corruption, it suggested developing the capabilities of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Attorney General’s Office (AGO), among others, to boost the Afghan government contribution to the CN effort and ensure the punishment of corrupt officials undermining its progress.

The CN effort currently operates under the provisions outlined in the strategic agreement signed by the United States and the Afghan government on May 2, 2012. The strategy outlines two major goals: (1) building the government’s ability to be a self-sufficient force in reducing the drug trade, stabilizing the region, and improving the security situation and (2) further weakening the link between insurgents and narcotics, specifically targeting the funds insurgents receive from the narcotics industry. This strategy again maintains the U.S. commitment to supporting the Afghan strategy and its four priorities. It also takes into account the reduction of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the then-pending transfer of security responsibilities from the International Security Assistance Forces to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) alongside the transfer of CN-implementation responsibilities from U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams and U.S.-funded third parties to Afghan elements. Further emphasis lies on cooperation between U.S. agencies and international and regional partners to support and augment Afghan government plans to disrupt insurgent-narcotics networks.

Ultimately, the first goal remains in focus during the pursuit of the second; Afghan ministries and organizations that are CN-related continue to develop institutional capacities and investigative and operational capabilities in order to legitimize the prospect of full Afghan responsibility and leadership as they work alongside their U.S. and international allies against narcotics-funded insurgents, see Figure 3.30.

The United States promised more than a year ago to issue a revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy that takes into account the new security situation with the ANDSF in charge of battling the insurgency. INL informed SIGAR last quarter that the revised U.S. strategy will continue to prioritize building Afghanistan’s capacity to counter narcotics, and will support Afghanistan’s counternarcotics goals and objectives, as outlined in the government’s National Drug Action Plan (NDAP). INL reports that the United States worked closely with the Afghan government in the development of the NDAP, and is committed to supporting its implementation.

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<td>UNODC announces the Regional Programme for Afghanistan And Neighbouring Countries</td>
<td>U.S. strategy revised to address security transition</td>
<td>Afghan Government updates NDCS</td>
<td>PPI Enters into Phase IV</td>
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that as of May 2016, the process had begun for 105 clinical staff from the 11 treatment centers to be transitioned to the MOPH’s operational control in January 2016; however, only 10 staff had been listed on the tashkil, an Afghan government document establishing personnel and equipment authorization. INL told SIGAR that according to the ministry, only clinical staff working in centers fully transitioned to the MOPH can be given tashkil status in accordance with Afghan government policy; therefore, putting all clinical staff on the tashkil has run into delays.446 According to INL, the transition of the 500 NGO staff to the tashkil will be revised to coincide with the transition of their respective drug-treatment centers. In addition, INL is reviewing the transition plan to assess progress.447 A total of 251 clinical staff have been trained so far this calendar year with 153 trained last quarter and 98 this quarter.448

In May 2016, the MOPH requested $1.3 million from the Ministry of Finance to cover the budget cuts to treatment-center operations planned by INL in 2017. The MOPH opened eight new treatment centers in 2016 using approximately $2 million in new Afghan government development funds.449 INL has provided funding for operational costs for all 89 facilities as follows:

- $2.18 million from October 1 to December 31, 2015;
- $1.55 million from January 1 to March 31, 2016; and
- $1.36 million this quarter.450

INL contributed over $4.6 million to the Colombo Plan in April 2015 and $12.9 million during 2015 for drug-treatment and education programs. It has not yet received or obligated FY 2015 or FY 2016 funds.451

**Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement**

INL funds the nationwide Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. Since 2013, INL has spent $9.18 million on the program, reflecting all funding available on the current grant prior to its extension. The program was extended for 18 months, to October 2017, with an additional cost of $2.9 million.

The program pays an Afghan company, Sayara Media Communications (Sayara), to place 42 reporters in Afghan provinces which are ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on cultivation levels, to gather information and gauge perceptions of counternarcotics policies and messaging. Sayara assesses the effectiveness of campaigns and seeks to identify the provincial drivers of drug trafficking, opium cultivation, and public sentiment.452

Sayara also monitors counternarcotics-related items in the media and evaluates any changes in coverage monthly. However, CNCE is moving away from Sayara, according to INL, due to the MCN’s successful

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**Colombo Plan:** instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan’s Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals (ACCE), a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

implementation of public information campaigns. INL started a pilot program in 2015 for public information campaigns led by the MCN with Sayara staff mentoring MCN staff. With the success of the MCN-led campaigns and through discussions with Sayara, INL made the determination for the MCN to implement public information campaigns under the continued guidance and mentorship of Sayara staff. The CNCE campaigns funded by INL were paused during negotiations with Sayara for the $2.9 million cost extension which was approved in May 2016. INL anticipates that CNCE programs will restart in July 2016 as Sayara finalizes its mentors.\textsuperscript{453}

**Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building**

INL has focused resources in the following five areas to promote capacity-building efforts at the MCN: finance and fiscal transparency, administration support, public outreach and strategic communications, policy-development support, and ministerial-level advising by U.S. personal-services contractors. This quarter, INL awarded a skills-based training grant and expects training will begin this fall after a needs assessment for development in English-language ability and computer skills.\textsuperscript{454}

INL’s first assessment of the MCN Capacity Building Program after implementation of the performance-measurement plan (PMP) was completed in November 2015. The next review took place in June 2016. INL did not share the findings but informed SIGAR it would concentrate on delivering training in financial and administrative capacity building. INL considers those areas essential to improving overall functionality at the MCN.\textsuperscript{455}

Last year, SIGAR reported on INL’s risk assessment of the MCN’s public financial-management system. INL conducted that independent assessment during the first quarter of 2015. The report identified deficiencies that increased the potential for inaccurate financial reporting, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations; areas of particular concern were internal control, program management and monitoring, and fixed-assets management. INL’s remediation plan for the MCN assessment was finalized during the quarter of July 1–September 30, 2015. INL will award the financial-remediation plan contract and the skills-based training grant in July 2016. Successful remediation will permit the MCN to receive direct assistance. INL told SIGAR implementation will begin by September 2016.\textsuperscript{456}

INL has supported a capacity-building program since at least 2012, yet the first assessment—once the performance-measurement plan was in place—was not conducted until November 2015.\textsuperscript{457} As SIGAR previously reported, in February 2014, INL signed a memorandum of understanding with the MCN regarding renewing its capacity-building program for 18 months and providing funding for 24 local national advisors to help build capacity at the MCN. The performance-measurement plan designed
to assess progress, however, was not completed until February 2015. INL previously told SIGAR that the “MCN has shown significant progress in institutional development and an increased ability to develop staff and programs,” yet last quarter it cited capacity issues as the reason for terminating the Good Performers Initiative program. SIGAR has written in prior reports about the remediation plan and the deficiencies in the MCN’s public-financial-management system. The Afghan government’s own ministry report noted capacity issues as far back as 2014. In its annual report on the Good Performers Initiative (GPI), it remarked the MCN had “unprofessional” staff responsible for procurement, slowing down implementation. In addition, on-budget payments delayed by over two months by the Ministry of Finance also hampered project implementation.

Governor-Led Eradication Program
INL funds the annual million-dollar Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program, which reimburses provinces for the cost of eradicating poppies. Between 2007 and 2015, INL has contributed $10 million to the MCN for the GLE program, which accounts for less than 2% of INL’s annual counter-narcotics budget for Afghanistan. The MCN tracks cumulative results that are verified by UNODC. According to UNODC, a total of 3,720 hectares (1 hectare is slightly less than 2.5 acres) were eradicated in 2015, a 40% increase from 2014. INL disbursed $540,750 to the ministry in April 2015 for the final 2015 GLE payment. The United Nations reports little eradication took place this year due to funding constraints and the security situation in the important poppy-growing areas.

INL informed SIGAR it began collaborating this quarter with the MCN to start eradication according to the 2016 National Eradication Plan, but approval of the plan has been delayed. INL is working with the ministry to gain approval of next year’s eradication plan by December 2016.

Eradication results have generally been declining with some fluctuations over the past few years, as shown in Figure 3.31, and are a small fraction of the opium-cultivation and production results shown in Figure 3.29 on page 116.

Good Performer’s Initiative Ends Due to MCN Shortcomings
INL ended the $126 million GPI this quarter due to the MCN’s inability to implement the program properly. GPI was a program implemented by the MCN that sought to incentivize provincial counternarcotics performance. No new GPI projects have been approved since April 30, 2016, but funding will continue until current projects are completed. INL and UNODC are in negotiations for two new alternative-development programs that will launch in September to supplement activities performed under GPI. Moreover, INL is independently developing a post-GPI alternative-development, food-zone based program.
As of June 30, 2016, there are 286 approved projects with a value of $126.0 million. Eighteen projects are ongoing including two scheduled for completion by the end of July. The remainder should all be completed by the end of the calendar year.466

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD

USAID’s alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports supply-reduction and alternative-development programs. INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.467

Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods

The nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and its partners implemented activities under INL’s $11.9 million Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant across 16 provinces: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, Bamiyan, Kunduz, Parwan, Faryab, Kabul, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Laghman, Uruzgan,
and Kunar. The SAGAL grant ended January 20, 2016; INL is reviewing close-out financial reports. As of May 31, 2016, $10.4 million has been expended. While security challenges affected project implementation, AKF and its partners were successful in meeting the program’s five objectives.

Under the first objective of improving agricultural yields of high-potential licit crops, the implementers introduced new agricultural technologies with the emphasis on high-value crops to more than 27,000 farmers. Capacity-building training sessions were held for more than 460 agricultural input suppliers to support these farmers. (Over 240 new input suppliers were created.)

The second objective was to increase economic return for licit crops. Nearly 20,000 farmers received training to increase the post-production value of their crops. Over 3,500 farmers were linked with 150 buyers thanks to the numerous linkage-building meetings held at the provincial, district, and village levels. The application of those techniques resulted in several contracts for farmers to provide agricultural products such as pomegranates, grapes, and onions to Kabul and local traders.

Under the third objective of improving farmers’ access to financing, approximately 20,400 farmers received financial-literacy training. Among those trained, nearly 1,200 received loans and services from microfinance institutions (MFIs) and non-MFI organizations such as business-membership organizations and farmer cooperatives. The First Microfinance Bank of Afghanistan also developed 23 and piloted five agricultural loan products specifically for farmers.

The program’s fourth objective—reduce the vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy—led to the establishment of 81 new community-based savings groups (CBSGs) and also delivered capacity-building training. Four civil-society organizations targeting youth also received capacity-building support to create economic initiatives. Three received micro-grants allowing them to provide technical skill training for youth.

Under the final objective, which focused on improving the subnational governance systems, district and provincial Afghan government staff received capacity-building training. Many district-governor offices adopted electronic governance (e-governance) practices and over two dozen held public audit meetings.

INL is developing a new alternative-development program which will incorporate objectives similar to those of the SAGAL project. SAGAL’s strategy was to provide farmers with technical assistance and skills to render them self-reliant (and no longer dependent on assistance). Previous projects have focused on input distribution without capacity-building activities.
Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a three-year, $27.7 million USAID project, implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD) under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar province through grants for activities that improve community infrastructure, strengthen alternative livelihoods and support small businesses. KFZ has four pillars: public outreach, eradication, drug-demand reduction and alternative livelihoods. USAID implements the alternative livelihoods pillar and approved a two-year extension this quarter extending the program through the end of August 2018.

KFZ expended $2.2 million between January and March 2016. During that period, KFZ awarded a communication-campaign contract to bring public awareness and change behavior about poppy cultivation. USAID acknowledges that it is too early to determine the impact of this campaign on changing behavior and attitudes.

KFZ to date has rehabilitated 17 irrigation canals in target districts which provide water to more than 24,000 hectares (59,305 acres) of farmland, benefiting more than 22,000 households. During the initial years of the program, KFZ completed 33 alternative-livelihood activities including creating 47 greenhouses, conducting training workshops, and training nearly 400 government officials. KFZ's activities led to the first-ever gender policy and ministry-wide anti-sexual-harassment training at the MCN.

According to USAID, infrastructure-construction activities have netted more than 50,000 person-days of employment over the last three years. In March 2016, KFZ organized an agriculture fair attended by over 2,000 people at the Panjwayi District Center. The fair connected farmers to buyers and input suppliers and featured new agricultural technique demonstrations.

As of June 30, 2016, USAID has disbursed $24.8 million since the program’s launch.

Regional Agricultural Development Program

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of high-value crops and livestock. Using a value-chain approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains. RADP consumes the majority of USAID’s alternative-development staff resources that include contractor staff: 81.8% are dedicated to the various RADP programs.

Value chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, and wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.
RADP-North is a five-year, $78.4 million project scheduled to end in May 2019. RADP-North advances food and economic security in rural areas of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Samangan Provinces. Between January and March 2016, RADP-North implemented 10 activities and issued 41 grants valued at $4.2 million. The project facilitated the signature of nine contracts between seed companies, seed enterprises, bakeries, mills, and cooperatives for the sale of Afghan wheat. Various trainings on the topics of hygiene and nutrition, seed business development, and weed control occurred across several provinces. Efforts to support agribusiness development led to $233,200 in new sales this quarter for businesses that took part in international trade shows in Kazakhstan and Turkey. During that period, project activities supporting the meat value chain also took place: training for 100 butchers on diseases, training on cashmere harvesting, and implementing wool production and processing. As of June 30, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of $21 million.482

The purpose of RADP-South is to improve food and economic security for rural Afghans in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018 at an estimated cost of $125 million. Between January and March 2016, over 40 agribusinesses applied new management practices using improved financial-management systems, administrative procedures, and marketing strategies. RADP-South support led total reported sales for 63 agribusinesses of AFN 56,064,500 ($819,297). Sixty producer organizations were formed to support ruminant care and increase the production and sale of animals and animal by-products. Farmers increased their high-value crop production on 862 hectares. When extrapolated to RADP-South trained farmers, the program has resulted in over 10,260 hectares producing high-value crops, according to the implementer.483

Also in March, RADP-South ceased all gender-programming activities pending an embezzlement investigation in Zabul. Female beneficiaries accused a high-ranking Department of Women’s Affairs official of withholding a portion of female beneficiaries’ benefits. The investigation is ongoing. RADP-South also discontinued some agribusiness partnerships in Kandahar and Helmand. The monitoring site visits revealed that the businesses had no revenue streams or partners. The firms were either franchises of larger companies or businessmen seeking start-up capital. RADP-South will continue company site visits to ensure program qualifications outlined in the work plan are being met. As of June 30, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of $62 million for RADP-South.484

The $70 million five-year RADP-West program focuses on helping rural Afghans in the western provinces of Herat, Farah, and Badghis to improve food and economic security. The project supports the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock in its efforts to enhance the
productivity and profitability of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. RADP-West’s key accomplishments between January and March 2016 include:

- assessing and monitoring 859 cultivated wheat-plot germination rates in Herat
- providing wheat-cultivation training for over 1,570 farmers from all targeted provinces
- administering post-harvest training for 63 female farmers in Badghis
- seed distribution for the spring planting season
- conducting vegetable-cultivation training and pruning training
- implementing orchard-programming activities and
- conducting livestock and value-chain programming efforts such as linking cashmere-processing companies and herders or deworming sheep and goats.485

Security restrictions in certain areas of Herat and Farah were still in place at the end of March and altered the schedule of planned activities. USAID has terminated the contractor for RADP-West. According to USAID, the termination occurred primarily so the remaining resources could be better aligned with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock’s new strategy for the western region.486

USAID has made cumulative disbursements of $22 million as of June 30, 2016.487 RADP-East is still in procurement; USAID anticipates awarding a contract next quarter.488

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a $45.3 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. The program has three components:

- quality improvement
- high-value agricultural marketing and agribusiness development; and
- gender integration.489

CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by helping them shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.490

CHAMP is currently working with 289 producer groups comprising over 4,000 member farmers. At CHAMP farmer-field schools, participants learn new agricultural practices such as orchard or trellis management and receive modern agricultural tools. During the previous quarter, the program arranged farmer field-school programs for over 2,500 farmers, including 294 women, in six provinces. The training topics covered agricultural practices such as land preparation, pruning, irrigation, winter-soil application, natural

A producer group: consists of a lead farmer and 10 to 15 member farmers (sub-farmers). The lead farmer is responsible for disseminating information on CHAMP trainings throughout the group.

insecticide and herbicide application, fertilizing, and animal-manure application. All farmer field-school activities concluded in April 2016.491

The program also provides direct assistance in fruit processing, sorting, grading and packing, and introducing improved packaging that meets international market standards. Last quarter, CHAMP facilitated the export of over 5,000 metric tons of grapes and pomegranates to Pakistan, valued at nearly $5.9 million.492

CHAMP’s trade offices in Dubai and New Delhi created stronger linkages between Afghan exporters and local buyers. CHAMP also participated in international trade fairs in Dubai, Kabul, and New Delhi, enabling Afghan traders to bring their products to an international audience, most notably the February 2016 Dubai Gulfood exhibition, at which CHAMP traders signed nearly $2.3 million in contracts with international buyers. In March, the New Delhi trade office gave a presentation at the International Conference on Food Quality and Safety, which focused on mycotoxin (toxic substance produced by fungus) assessment for Afghan dry fruits, nuts, and wheat. It also organized visits by the Afghan delegation to Indian government offices.493

As of March 31, 2016, USAID has disbursed all funds for the CHAMP program.494 According to USAID, all funds have been disbursed but not spent; the implementing partner has concluded two of the program’s three components but enough funds are available to continue activities until December 30, 2016. USAID will extend the program for an additional three years after its conclusion.495

**Interdiction Operations and Results**

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units in all 34 provinces. The specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit (IIU). Nearly half of the CNPA’s 2,800 personnel are assigned to Kabul. In addition to the CNPA, law-enforcement elements contributing to interdiction activities include members of the Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniform Police, and the General Command of Police Special Unit.496

For the first time this quarter, DOD provided counternarcotics information that is included in the classified annex of the quarterly report. Since February 2016, Coalition advisors have been providing train, advise, and assist support to the CNPA. Recent emphasis has been on improving CNPA coordination with the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The relationship has proven to be beneficial since it culminated in the arrest of Haji Watan, one of the country’s top drug traffickers on April 4, 2016, in Nangarhar.497

Since 2004, DOD’s CN requirements for Afghanistan have been funded mostly through supplemental and Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations. These train-and-equip programs aim to support U.S. regional
goals and reduce CN-related terrorism and financing. The majority of funding is for special-purpose vetted units such as the SMW and the Afghan Counternarcotics Police.496

INL supports the maintenance and operations of NIU/SIU and DEA facilities as well as a judicial wire-intercept unit (JWIP). INL also provides support to the NIU and SIU of the CNPA including, salary supplements for NIU members (and DEA for SIU members). INL reported last quarter that the NIU strength was between 532 and 536.499

As of late 2015, INL has been supporting for SIU training and professional development. The NIU/SIU program is also supported by various DOD-funded activities, which include specialized training and the Special Mission Wing, a rotary- and fixed-wing force that supports NIU missions, among others. During this quarter, INL completed refurbishment of properties where DEA and SIU officers now convene for case coordination and operation of the JWIP system.500

According to UNODC, seizures involving Afghan opiates account for some 80% of global opiate seizures. Seizure data suggest that the Balkan route (through Iran and Turkey by way of southeastern Europe to western and central Europe) is the main heroin trafficking route accounting for nearly half of worldwide heroin and morphine seizures.501

During the January to March 2016 period, INL reported that combined seizures of the NIU and SIU totaled 1,054 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 1,500 kg of morphine base, and 167 kg of hashish. One kilogram is about 2.2 pounds. The SIU was involved in 22 enforcement operations, the NIU in 10.502

DOD reported that from April 1 to June 20, 2016, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 56 drug-interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 83 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. The Afghans’ combined operations resulted in the seizures of 1,489 kg of opium, 650 kg morphine, 919 kg of heroin, 2,426 kg of hashish/marijuana, and 1,435 kg of precursor chemicals. As noted in previous SIGAR reports, interdiction results have been declining since 2012, as shown in Table 3.12 on the next page.503

According to USFOR-A, the CNPA took decisive action against a number of senior Afghan government officials and their associates or family members for involvement in the drug trade, demonstrating increased professionalism and dedication to the CN mission. For example, in August 2015, CNPA officers in Baghlan Province detained an ANA general officer after finding 18.7 kilograms of morphine hidden in his vehicle, and in September, the Primary Court of the Counter Narcotics Justice Center convicted and sentenced a high-ranking ANA official for narcotics trafficking violations. Additionally, all Afghan National Police (ANP) receive basic counter-narcotics training. The Counter-Narcotics Training Center has trained 215 ANP in the last 12 months. The curriculum was developed

**Precursor chemical:** a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture, and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

by the DEA. USFOR-A did report that ANP Training General Command released individuals from training due to illicit drug use, but no data is available to support this statement.\textsuperscript{504}

According to DOD, the security situation has negatively impacted counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan. In the south and southwest, operations are extremely difficult to conduct due to the increased requirement that security forces protect threatened district centers and security-force positions.\textsuperscript{505}

DOD also informed SIGAR of a reduction in available transportation for CN operations, particularly helicopters. DOD also said counternarcotics forces are needed to play general security roles where drug trade and antigovernment forces are concentrated in southern, southwest, and northern Afghanistan. Recent partnering of CN forces with U.S. Special Forces has not yet yielded immediate results, but may present opportunities for future operations.\textsuperscript{506}

In 2015, DOD created a regional-narcotics interagency-fusion cell (RNIFC) to combat the regional drug trade given the U.S. military’s reduced capabilities in Afghanistan. The RNIFC, located in Bahrain, tracks and interdicts the illicit movement of Afghan heroin on dhows (traditional sailboats) destined for the Middle East and East Africa.\textsuperscript{507}

According to INL, the Afghan Government and its partners have made progress toward implementing the National Drug Action plan, and completed the following actions regarding the specialized units and interdiction activities:

- The Afghan government continues to resource the specialized units and supports ongoing use of the JWIP.
- The MOI and MOD continue to provide the NIU and SIU with access to Special Mission Wing assets.

### Table 3.12

**INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Operations</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>3,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish seized (kg)</td>
<td>241,353</td>
<td>58,677</td>
<td>25,044</td>
<td>182,213</td>
<td>183,776</td>
<td>37,826</td>
<td>19,088</td>
<td>24,785</td>
<td>122,871</td>
<td>895,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin seized (kg)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>8,392</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td>3,441</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>35,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine seized (kg)</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>5,195</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>18,040</td>
<td>10,042</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>5,925</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>55,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium seized (kg)</td>
<td>15,361</td>
<td>79,110</td>
<td>49,750</td>
<td>98,327</td>
<td>70,814</td>
<td>41,350</td>
<td>38,379</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td>427,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precursor chemicals seized (kg)</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>93,031</td>
<td>20,397</td>
<td>122,150</td>
<td>130,846</td>
<td>36,250</td>
<td>53,184</td>
<td>234,981</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>697,301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The large increase in total precursor-chemical seizures from 2014 to 2015 reflects a 12/2015 seizure of 135,000 liters.

* Results for period 10/1/2015-6/20/2016 only.

The MCN and MOPH convened the first of regular stakeholders meetings with a broad range of Afghan ministries to plan drug-demand-reduction programming.

The Afghan government and UNODC inaugurated four independent joint port-control units which include officials from Customs, Border, and Counter Narcotics Police.

**Aviation Support**

Between April 1 and June 25, 2016, the air wing in Afghanistan provided the following air support to DEA (fixed-wing and rotary-wing support for NIU movements): 14.3 flight hours, 11 sorties, 252 personnel transported, and 13,278 pounds of cargo moved. The air wing provided transport for 309 INL and DEA passengers on embassy-required air shuttles for all movements within Kabul.

INL’s ability to support tactical operations in the south and southwest regions of the country has been constrained since the June 2015 closure of INL’s base at Kandahar Air Field. INL continues to assist the NIU and SIU. The arrival of a Resolute Support advisory team in February 2016 at the NIU compound has greatly improved NIU access to Resolute Support assets, including the SMW for movement support for operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan. See page 107 of this report for more information on the SMW.