

## SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events This Quarter	101
Sustainable Security Strategy	104
District Control	104
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan	105
The Status of AHRIMS and APPS	110
ANDSF Continue to Rely on the ASSF	111
Ministries of Defense and Interior Development	112
Afghan National Army	114
Afghan National Police	123
Women Comprise 1.2% of ANDSF Personnel	128
ANDSF Medical/Health Care	129
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	130
Counternarcotics	131
Alternative Development/Alternative Livelihood	138

## SECURITY

As of September 30, 2016, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$68.7 billion to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This accounts for 60% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002.

In 2005, Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Additionally, ASFF is used to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which come under the MOI, although the ALP is not considered part of the ANDSF. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the \$64.2 billion appropriated for the ASFF, \$61.2 billion had been obligated and \$60.1 billion disbursed.<sup>207</sup>

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

### KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

#### Peace with Hezb-e Islami

In September, President Ashraf Ghani signed a peace deal with the leader of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, the first since the war began in 2001.<sup>208</sup> The 25-point peace agreement gives Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his followers immunity for past actions and grants them the right to participate in Afghanistan's political system.<sup>209</sup> The Afghan government agreed to lobby international organizations to lift sanctions on Hekmatyar and Hezb-e Islami.<sup>210</sup> However, critics expressed concerns about the agreement's failure to hold perpetrators accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human rights.<sup>211</sup> Ghani said the deal should serve as an example, and "now is the time for the Taliban to decide whether they want to continue the war or participate in peace talks."<sup>212</sup>

**October 7, 2016, marked the 15-year anniversary of America's war in Afghanistan.**

Source: *New York Times*, "Voices from a Worsening Afghan War," 10/7/2016.

**Security incidents:** reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.

## Growing Volatility in Afghanistan


The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General reported in September that increased tensions between the Afghan President and the Chief Executive, persistent security challenges, and rising pressure from political opposition groups contributed to growing volatility in Afghanistan.<sup>213</sup> The overall security situation remained highly volatile as intensive Taliban operations continued, challenging government control in northeastern, northern, and southern provinces, and attempting to cut key supply routes.<sup>214</sup>

The UN recorded 5,996 security incidents between May 20, and August 15, 2016, as reflected in Figure 3.26, representing a 4.7% increase as compared to the same period last year, and a 3.6% decrease against the same period in 2014.<sup>215</sup> As in past UN reporting, armed clashes account for the majority of the security incidents (62.6%), followed by those involving

Source: SIGAR, analysis of the United Nations report, 12/9/2014.

FIGURE 3.26

### AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY



Note: Security incidents were not reported for November 2015.

Source: UN, reports of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 9/7/2016, p. 5; 6/10/2016, p. 4; 3/7/2016, p. 6; 12/10/2015, p. 5; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 6/10/2015, p. 4; 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; 3/7/2014, p. 5; 12/6/2013, p. 6; 9/6/2013, p. 6; 6/13/2013, p. 5; and 3/5/2013, p. 5.

improvised-explosive devices (17.3%.)<sup>216</sup> During the period, 68.1% of the recorded security incidents occurred in the southern, southeastern, and eastern regions.<sup>217</sup>

High-profile attacks in the capital city continued with the Department of Defense (DOD) reporting there have been about 16 high-profile attacks this year as compared to 23 last year.<sup>218</sup> The July 23 attack during an ethnic-Hazara demonstration, in which 73 civilians were killed and 293 injured, was the deadliest single incident recorded by the UN in Afghanistan since 2001.<sup>219</sup> The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since 2009 occurred in the first six months of 2016—1,601 killed and 3,565 injured.<sup>220</sup> Nearly one in three casualties were children and 507 casualties were women.<sup>221</sup>

General John Nicholson, Commander of Resolute Support (RS) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, said ISIL was operating primarily in three to four districts including Nangarhar and Kunar—a decrease from the nine to ten districts the group populated last year. The general estimated the number of ISIL fighters in Afghanistan range from 1,200 to 1,300.<sup>222</sup> In late July, the general attributed the killing of 12 top ISIL leaders and roughly 25% of the fighters to joint U.S.-Afghan special forces operations in Nangarhar.<sup>223</sup>

During the reporting period, the Taliban launched attacks on the cities of Tarin Kowt, Kunduz, and Kandahar.<sup>224</sup> Afghan media reported that police forces abandoned 89 Tarin Kowt checkpoints to the Taliban; however, an interior ministry spokesman denied such reports.<sup>225</sup> General Nicholson said the police at isolated checkpoints are vulnerable to being overrun by a larger enemy force.<sup>226</sup> After overrunning a checkpoint, insurgents use “psychology operations” by calling the next checkpoint and telling Afghan forces there that they will not be attacked if they leave their posts.<sup>227</sup>

In late September, Afghan forces and the Taliban were again fighting for control of Kunduz City, invoking memories of the October 2015 battle there that resulted in a high number of civilian casualties and damaged property.<sup>228</sup> A Ministry of Public Health spokesperson reported fighting in every street, and an MOD spokesperson noted the challenge of fighting insurgents in garb indistinguishable from that of local residents.<sup>229</sup> Residents reported shelling of civilian areas, the governor’s office, and the city hospital.<sup>230</sup> Approximately two-thirds of the city’s medical staff fled to avoid the violence and Taliban harassment.<sup>231</sup> After five days of fighting, the ANDSF had retaken most of the city but fighting continued on the Kabul-Kunduz highway and the Taliban still controlled several outlying regions.<sup>232</sup> After 11 days, security officials announced the city was cleared of insurgents.<sup>233</sup> The Taliban attack has also led to shortages of food, water, medical care, and electrical power.<sup>234</sup> The UN reported the fighting has forced as many as 10,000 people from their homes.<sup>235</sup> The Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan reported at least 50 civilians killed and over 350 others wounded.<sup>236</sup> According to Afghan media, nearly 200 Taliban,



**Afghan Defense Minister Habibi** and RS commander General Nicholson participating in the Kunduz security shura with the Afghan government, ANDSF, local elders, and civilian representatives on August 2, 2016. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Roberto C. Velez)

“Of the 98 U.S.- or UN-designated terrorist organizations around the globe, 20 of them are in the Af-Pak region. This is highest concentration ... in any area in the world.”

—General John Nicholson,  
Commander Resolute Support and  
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

Source: General John Nicholson, Department of Defense, press briefing via teleconference from Afghanistan, 9/23/2016.

“Political stability and unity are also necessary to create the right conditions for continued progress by the ANDSF on the battlefield.”

—Richard Olson,  
Special Representative to  
Afghanistan and Pakistan,  
U.S. Department of State

Source: Committee Testimony, “Statement of Richard Olson Special Representative, Afghanistan and Pakistan U.S. Department of State on Afghanistan Policy,” 9/15/2016.

including their shadow provincial governor, and around 20 Afghan security forces had been killed or wounded.<sup>237</sup>

As this report went to press, the ANDSF were also fighting insurgents in Helmand, Farah, Faryab, Uruzgan, and Baghlan Provinces.<sup>238</sup>

## SUSTAINABLE SECURITY STRATEGY

USFOR-A reported the ANDSF implemented a sustainable security strategy during the summer campaign.<sup>239</sup> The strategy prioritizes the use of available resources by following what it calls a “hold-fight-disrupt” methodology.<sup>240</sup> The methodology focuses on maintaining key security environments—those that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat—while targeting foreign terrorist and violent extremist organizations.<sup>241</sup> USFOR-A defined three sustainable security-strategy elements:<sup>242</sup>

- **Hold** in strategic areas that cannot be lost to the enemy
- **Fight** in areas where enemy control for a long period will negatively affect the Afghan government; such areas would warrant fewer resources to secure than hold regions
- **Disrupt** in areas that the ANDSF has limited ability to secure by using intermittent offensive operations

Resolute Support Brigadier General Charles H. Cleveland, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, described the sustainable security strategy as maintaining control of certain, but not all, areas of the country. The ANDSF will immediately act against insurgent activity in a hold or fight area, such as key population centers, major economic arteries, and the Ring Road. In other areas the ANDSF will disrupt insurgent operations but will not seek to hold on or fight for those areas.<sup>243</sup>

## DISTRICT CONTROL

USFOR-A reported that approximately 63.4% of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of August 28, 2016, a decrease from the 65.6% reported as of May 28, 2016. During a press briefing on September 23, General Nicholson reported “68–70% of the population lived in those districts.”<sup>244</sup> As reflected in Table 3.6, of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 258 districts were under government control (88 districts) or influence (170), 33 districts (in 16 provinces) were under insurgent control (8) or influence (25), and 116 districts were “contested.”<sup>245</sup> USFOR-A described contested districts as having “negligible meaningful impact from insurgents.”<sup>246</sup>

According to USFOR-A, the RS mission determines district status by assessing five indicators of stability: governance, security, infrastructure, economy, and communications.<sup>247</sup> USFOR-A identified the regions/provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced

TABLE 3.6

<b>DISTRICT CONTROL WITHIN THE 34 AFGHANISTAN PROVINCES AS OF AUGUST 28, 2016</b>						
<b>Control Status</b>	<b>Districts</b>		<b>Population</b>		<b>Area</b>	
	Number	%	In millions	%	Sq Km	%
GIROA			22.0	68.5%	394,586	61.3%
Control	88	21.6%				
Influence	170	41.8%				
CONTESTED	116	28.5%	7.3	22.7%	182,686	28.4%
INSURGENT			2.8	8.7%	66,517	10.3%
Control	8	2.0%				
Influence	25	6.1%				
<b>Total</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>643,789</b>	<b>100%</b>

Note: GIROA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; sq km = square kilometers.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/30/2016.

districts as Helmand (21%) and the RS Train, Advise, Assist Command-North (TAAC) (15%) and TAAC-South (11.6%) regions.<sup>248</sup> The nine provinces within the TAAC-North area of responsibility are Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, and Takhar.<sup>249</sup> The TAAC-South area of responsibility includes Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Daykundi.<sup>250</sup> According to USFOR-A, the districts under insurgent control or influence from December 2015 to August 2016 were districts in “disrupt” areas. The ANDSF will target these districts for clearance operations when the opportunity arises, but will give first priority to protecting “hold” and “fight” districts under its control.<sup>251</sup> Although the ANDSF intentionally ceded ground in the “disrupt” areas, USFOR-A reported that the more populated parts of Helmand, one of the most historically contested provinces, remained under Afghan government control. As reflected in Table 3.6, the majority (68.5%) of the population lives in districts under Afghan government control or influence while 8.7% of the population live in districts under insurgent control or influence; the rest live in contested areas.<sup>252</sup>

## U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, the NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) train, advise, and assist mission consists of 13,453 U.S. and Coalition personnel as of September 17, 2016. Of that number, 6,939 are U.S. forces, 4,934 are from the 26 NATO allied partners, and 1,580 are from the 12 non-NATO partner nations.<sup>253</sup> The number of U.S. forces conducting or supporting counterterrorism operations was not provided.<sup>254</sup>

Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, through October 3, 2016, 12 U.S. military personnel were killed in action, in addition to 12 non-hostile deaths, for a total of 24 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 124 U.S.

**As this report was going to press, USFOR-A reported one U.S. service member and one U.S. civilian were killed during an attack by what news reports said was an assailant wearing an Afghan army uniform near a Coalition base on October 19, 2016. In addition, one U.S. service member and two U.S. civilians were wounded in the attack.**

Source: RS News, “Kabul casualty release,” 10/19/2016; *Washington Post*, “Two Americans killed in attack on base in Afghanistan,” 10/19/2016.

military personnel were wounded in action.<sup>255</sup> Since the RS mission began through the last update on March 7, 2016, seven U.S. civilians or contractors were killed due to hostile actions in addition to nine deaths due to non-hostile causes. Nine DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor personnel were wounded during this period.<sup>256</sup> In vetting comments of this report, DOD noted that some of the contractors may have been involved in missions other than Resolute Support's train, advise, and assist mission.<sup>257</sup>

Since the Resolute Support Mission began on January 1, 2015, through August 19, 2016, eight insider attacks occurred in which ANDSF personnel turned their weapons on U.S. military personnel.<sup>258</sup> Five insider attacks in 2015 killed three U.S. personnel and wounded 14; the three attacks reported this year killed two U.S. personnel and wounded one.<sup>259</sup> Both 2016 fatalities occurred in Helmand Province.<sup>260</sup> Insider attacks during 2015 were also responsible for the death of three of the seven U.S. civilians killed in Afghanistan and one of the nine wounded during this period.<sup>261</sup> There were 101 insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel turned on fellow ANDSF security forces during the same period. These attacks killed 257 Afghan personnel and wounded 125.<sup>262</sup> Of these attacks, 44 occurred in 2016, killing 120 and wounding 70.<sup>263</sup> USFOR-A warned that their numbers may differ from official Afghan government casualty figures, which could be subject to some degree of error.<sup>264</sup> According to USFOR-A, from January 1, 2016, through August 19, 2016, 5,523 ANDSF service members were killed and an additional 9,665 members were wounded.<sup>265</sup>

## Challenges in Developing the Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF). The highlights of each function reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** EF-1 provided train-advise-assist (TAA) efforts to the MOD and MOI for the start of their fiscal year. Additionally, both ministries were reported to have identified unexecuted resources and proposed realignments of expiring current fiscal-year funds.<sup>266</sup> While procurement remains a significant challenge for both ministries, improvements were reported in requirements validation, early contract awards, and use of multi-year or framework contracts.<sup>267</sup>
- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** EF-2 advisors supported the ministry and general-staff inspector generals (IG) on the Ministry Internal Control Program implementation.<sup>268</sup> The IGs were reported to be making progress on the required annual and special inspections. The MOI IG identified instances of misuse of fuel, vehicles, and weapons and stopped unauthorized vehicles from receiving fuel. In addition, ministry-owned fuel tanks were authorized to be installed at

### SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDIT

SIGAR published a financial audit this quarter on the U.S. Department of the Army's support for the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior (SIGAR 16-61-FA). The audit found \$17.7 million in unsupported costs incurred by Dyncorp International LLC for mentoring and training the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. For more information on the audit, see Section 2 of this report.

locations that previously only had privately owned fuel stations that lacked fuel-distribution controls.<sup>269</sup>

- EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** EF-3 advisors met weekly with high-level MOD and MOI officials to discuss numerous gross violations of human rights cases in an effort to move them forward. EF-3 advisors received critical documents on ministry efforts, official investigations, prosecutions, and judicial decisions. The ministry officials accepted the advisors' revisions to reflect vital facts and the current status of each case. EF-3 reported some resistance in responding to gross human rights violations, however, advisors noted that making U.S.-funds available for official travel contingent on measurable progress has helped to serve as motivation.<sup>270</sup> With the recruitment of five Afghan attorneys from the Functional Area Support Teams program, MOD's legal department now has nine attorneys, however many of its staff are not legally educated or trained. EF-3 is assisting the MOD in reviewing all 46 employees' qualifications and to evaluate the directorate's capacity for legal work.<sup>271</sup>
- EF-4 (Force Generation):** EF-4 estimates 70–80% of the ANA and 95% of the ANP are biometrically registered—a prerequisite for enrollment in the Afghanistan Personnel Pay System. A review and validation of all ANA personnel and biometric information that began in August is scheduled to be completed in October 2017.<sup>272</sup> DOD reported in their vetting comments that validation efforts are expected to eliminate “ghost soldiers.”<sup>273</sup> The EF-4 Police Institutional Advisory Team visited three of the Regional Training Centers, with plans to visit two additional ones by the end of October, to identify systemic training issues and develop future TAA focus.<sup>274</sup>
- EF-5 (Sustainment):** This quarter the EF-5 advisors assisted the MOI in awarding a contract for radio operation and maintenance in support of the Kabul MOI first responders. The competitive process resulted in a contract award that reduced annual costs from over \$14 million to under \$2 million.<sup>275</sup> According to EF-5, the ANP Information, Communication, and Technology staff transitioned all network operations from the old MOI headquarters into the new headquarters building without disrupting network, video teleconferencing, data, or voice communications.<sup>276</sup> Additionally the ANP was able address critical shortages by inventorying, recording in CoreIMS, and distributing 60 pallets of critical radio-repair equipment in four days.<sup>277</sup> Additional updates are included in the ANA and ANP Equipment portions of this section.
- EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** EF-6 has two missions: (1) strategic planning and policy and (2) execution and employment of the force. For the execution and employment mission, EF-6 oversees execution of operations to ensure forces are used correctly.<sup>278</sup> This quarter EF-6 reported the Afghan ministries made moderate progress over the summer. Two milestone assessments were upgraded, two milestones required timeline adjustments, and two other



**RS advisors train Afghans** on flying the MD-530 helicopter in Kabul, August 25, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Jason Smith)

milestones had minor amendments.<sup>279</sup> EF-6 assesses the ANA are misusing personnel during high-tempo operations, there is a broken link between readiness reporting and prioritizing the fielding of equipment, and the summer campaign is blunting the effects of TAA efforts.<sup>280</sup> Additionally, advancement is hindered by ANP delays in approving standard operating procedures and the MOI's failure to enforce process-oriented operations orders.<sup>281</sup> For more in-depth information, see page 112 of this section.

- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** While the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office has had difficulty supporting ANDSF geospatial requirements since its 2007 inception, EF-7 advisors reported on the progress made to make it easier for the MOD and NDS to request products.<sup>282</sup> The Afghans are using an advisor-provided checklist for the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to ensure safe, effective targeting in the absence of a fully functioning target board or pending the enactment of targeting procedures.<sup>283</sup> According to the EF, the Police Intelligence Training Center has conducted more courses than planned for the current year, is seeking to expand their mobile-training team capability, and is creating an intermediate intelligence course.<sup>284</sup> Police intelligence reports are disseminated to focus data collection on the most important threats and to prioritize intelligence efforts.<sup>285</sup>
- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** Afghan communication capability is growing, according to EF-8. In June, the primary Palace spokesperson was appointed. In July, daily communication working groups convened in preparation for the Brussels conference, and the Palace has held weekly security-communication events.<sup>286</sup> A Directorate of Local Governance spokeswoman participated in the MOD/MOI information operations in Nangarhar during July–August and eight ANA female officers were provided public affairs training and professional development.<sup>287</sup> The Palace's order for provincial governors to increase pro-government messaging had mixed results, as some governors and police chiefs had commented on the inability of the ANDSF to maintain security. However, EF-8 noted a decrease in such reports since the ANDSF transitioned to offensive-focused operations.<sup>288</sup>
- **Gender Office:** The RS Gender Advisor Office reported on the appointment of an advisor to serve as a Gender Focal Point (GFP) in each EF to promote women.<sup>289</sup> While several factors affect EF advisors' ability to promote women, RS reports the most significant factor is the Afghan receptivity to and acceptance of more women in the workplace. The Gender Advisor Office noted that a great deal of unified effort and collaboration across the EFs is necessary to achieve its goals.<sup>290</sup> This quarter the first women graduated from the radio-maintenance class so that repair services can continue when men leave the shop for the battle field.<sup>291</sup>

## ANDSF Strength

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 317,709 (not including civilians), according to USFOR-A.<sup>292</sup> As reflected in Table 3.7, the ANA is at

TABLE 3.7

<b>ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, JULY 2016</b>						
<b>ANDSF Component</b>	<b>Approved End-Strength Goal</b>	<b>Target Date</b>	<b>Assigned as of July 2016</b>	<b>% of Goal</b>	<b>Difference Between Current Assigned Strength and Goals</b>	<b>Difference (%)</b>
ANA including AAF	195,000	December 2014	169,229	86.8%	(25,771)	(13.2%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	—	6,829	85.3%	(1,175)	(14.7%)
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>203,004</b>		<b>176,058</b>	<b>86.7%</b>	<b>(26,946)</b>	<b>(13.3%)</b>
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	148,480	94.6%	(8,520)	(5.4%)
<b>ANDSF Total with Civilians</b>	<b>360,004</b>		<b>324,538</b>	<b>90.1%</b>	<b>(35,466)</b>	<b>(9.9%)</b>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 6/3/2016 and 8/30/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2016 and 10/11/2016.

TABLE 3.8

<b>ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2014–JULY 2016</b>				
	<b>2/2014</b>	<b>5/2014</b>	<b>8/2014</b>	<b>11/2014<sup>b</sup></b>
ANA including AAF	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203
ANP	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439
<b>Total ANDSF</b>	<b>338,108</b>	<b>329,612</b>	<b>324,918</b>	<b>325,642</b>
	<b>2/2015</b>	<b>5/2015</b>	<b>7/2015<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>10/2015<sup>a</sup></b>
ANA including AAF	174,120	176,762	176,420	178,125
ANP	154,685	155,182	148,296	146,026
<b>Total ANDSF</b>	<b>328,805</b>	<b>331,944</b>	<b>324,716</b>	<b>324,151</b>
	<b>1/2016</b>	<b>4+5 2016<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>7/2016</b>	
ANA including AAF	179,511	171,428	176,058	
ANP	146,304	148,167	148,480	
<b>Total ANDSF</b>	<b>325,815</b>	<b>319,595</b>	<b>324,538</b>	

Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. ANA and AAF numbers include civilians except for the May 2016 numbers; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

<sup>a</sup>Total “ANA including AAF” numbers for July 2015 and October 2015 are not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled portion.

<sup>b</sup>Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

<sup>c</sup>ANA data as of 5/20/2016; ANP data as of 4/19/2016.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 10/6/2014; RSM, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 3/14/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/10/2015, 7/12/2015, 1/29/2016, 4/12/2016, 10/9/2016, and 10/11/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2014, 3/24/2015, 6/29/2015, 9/11/2015, 12/14/2015, 3/4/2016, 6/3/2016, and 8/30/2016.

86.8% and the ANP at 94.6% of their authorized force strengths, not including civilian employees.<sup>293</sup> The July 2016 assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 178 over the same period last year.<sup>294</sup>

Compared to last quarter, the ANP had an increase of 313 personnel; while overall the ANA (including Afghan Air Force and civilians) increased by 4,630 personnel, as shown in Table 3.8.<sup>295</sup> However, when ANA civilians are excluded, the ANA military strength decreased by 2,199 personnel.<sup>296</sup>

## THE STATUS OF AHRIMS AND APPS

To encourage the MOD and MOI to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for personnel in authorized positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use.<sup>297</sup>

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management system (AHRIMS) contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and current position of ANDSF personnel. AHRIMS also contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI along with information such as unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is under development and when implemented will integrate the data in AHRIMS with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.<sup>298</sup>

Two other systems round out the effort to manage personnel: the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) and the ANDSF Identification Card System (ID). APPS, AABIS, and ID will contain unique biometric-registration numbers. Only those ANDSF members registered in AABIS will be issued an ID, and only those members both registered and with a linked ID will be authorized to have an APPS record. AABIS will electronically update the ID system and APPS, eliminating the error-prone manual process of inputting 40-digit numbers into the ID system.<sup>299</sup> CSTC-A is overseeing the integration of the biometrically linked ID into the APPS<sup>300</sup> to ensure the employee exists and payments are sent directly into the employee's bank account.<sup>301</sup> According to CSTC-A, this structure will dramatically reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying for "ghost" personnel. Routine checks are required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF.<sup>302</sup>

USFOR-A reports there are two ongoing efforts to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in AHRIMS to migrate into APPS: slotting—matching a person to an authorized position—and data cleansing—correcting and completing key personnel data.<sup>303</sup> A related AHRIMS effort is correcting the employment status of those personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.<sup>304</sup> According to USFOR-A, as of mid-August 2016, 75% of ANA personnel<sup>305</sup> and 88% of ANP personnel<sup>306</sup> were "slotted" to an authorized position, against a goal of 95% slotted in both forces.<sup>307</sup> Accurate and complete personnel records are critical to improve accountability, transparency, and oversight of the ANDSF.<sup>308</sup> USFOR-A reports ANA data-cleansing efforts will continue through 2017, and the MOI has undertaken a similar data-cleansing effort of the ANP records.<sup>309</sup> In vetting, USFOR-A reported the biometric enrollment, being performed concurrently with the data cleansing effort, will be completed in 2017.<sup>310</sup>

## ANDSF CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE ASSF

USFOR-A reported that the “sustainable security strategy” employed by the ANDSF over the summer campaign has proven effective.<sup>311</sup> According to DOD, with the exception of Afghan special operations and aviation units, U.S. advisors participating in the RS train, advise, and assist mission have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below ANA-corps and ANP-zone-headquarters levels. In addition to USFOR-A advisor observations and TAA activities, the advisors rely on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. The consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of this data varies and cannot be independently verified by U.S. officials.<sup>312</sup>

According to USFOR-A, the sustainable security strategy using a “hold-fight-disrupt” methodology (see page 104 of this section for more details) has enabled the ANDSF to avoid strategic setbacks.<sup>313</sup> RS anticipates that ANDSF capabilities will continue to improve given an increased focus on training and force generation and assesses that the ANDSF can succeed in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table by fully applying the sustainable security strategy.<sup>314</sup>

USFOR-A noted that the most capable elements of the ANDSF are the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). They are reported the most successful in ground combat and often perform the role of the ANA.<sup>315</sup> Last quarter USFOR-A reported the ANDSF relied heavily on the ASSF for conventional missions that the ANA or ANP should perform.<sup>316</sup> One adviser expressed concern that the ANA’s reliance on “commandos” risks burning out its elite forces.<sup>317</sup>

Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, Resolute Support deputy chief of staff for communications, said mission advisors want “to take some of the best practices from the commandos and export them to the conventional forces, starting with leadership.”<sup>318</sup> General Nicholson estimated 80% of Afghan special forces operations are performed independent of RS advisors, enablers, or U.S. special forces.<sup>319</sup> According to the general, U.S. special forces accompanying the Afghans only go so far as the “last covered and concealed position prior to the objective.”<sup>320</sup>

USFOR-A also reported improved intelligence and aviation support. The ANDSF have conducted intelligence-driven operations and proven capable of integrating close air support. The AAF has demonstrated effectiveness in engaging enemy targets while minimizing civilian and friendly-fire casualties.<sup>321</sup> Nonetheless, DOD reported the demand for aviation support is still much greater than the Afghan resources available.<sup>322</sup>

According to USFOR-A, while maintenance operations did not degrade over the rating period, unsynchronized or poorly executed maintenance and logistics remains a significant challenge for the ANDSF.<sup>323</sup> Reporting also remains a challenge, especially in the ANP, as commanders report to whom they prefer rather than following existing but unapproved standard operating procedures.<sup>324</sup>

“Something money can’t buy is their willingness to take the fight to the enemy.”

—General John Nicholson,  
Commander Resolute Support and  
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

Source: General John Nicholson, Department of Defense, press briefing via teleconference from Afghanistan, 9/23/2016.

“During recent operations, the ANDSF [did] not exhibit an offensive mind-set in certain areas allowing insurgents temporary tactical success. However, the insurgents cannot hold their temporary tactical successes once the ANDSF attack.”

—USFOR-A Afghan  
Assessment Group

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/30/2016.

## Members of Congress Ask SIGAR to Investigate Allegations of Sexual Abuse

A bipartisan, bicameral group led by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Representative Thomas J. Rooney (R-FL) and 91 other members of Congress in December 2015 asked SIGAR to conduct an inquiry into the U.S. government's experience with allegations of sexual abuse of children committed by members of the Afghan security forces. The inquiry is ongoing and will also look into the manner in which the Leahy amendment prohibiting DOD and the State Department from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights is implemented in Afghanistan. See SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2016, p. 40, for more information. The Department of Defense Inspector General is conducting a similar investigation.

**SIGAR cannot verify the accuracy of ministry-assessment data provided by the RS mission.**

Cross-ministerial coordination also remains a challenge, according to USFOR-A. Generally the regional operational-coordination centers (OCC) are effective at integrating ANA and ANP activities, while the provincial OCCs are not as effective, and a lack of tactical coordination at the district level commonly results in confusion as to which organization is in charge.<sup>325</sup>

Leadership challenges continue. Appointments to high-level positions are often not based on merit, while staff positions are generally provided to junior and inexperienced officers due to their ability to read and write, not necessarily for their suitability to the position.<sup>326</sup>

The ANDSF lacks a risk-management system and therefore relies heavily on U.S. forces to prevent strategic failure. ANDSF leadership is focused on short-term tactical-level issues. Consequently, neither strategic nor operational risks are addressed or mitigated. RS assesses this shortfall will not significantly improve in the next 12 months and will require continued support at the institutional and operational levels.<sup>327</sup>

In July, General Nicholson said the ASSF is the only ANA force employing an operational readiness cycle (ORC) to allow the forces to rotate out, refit, retrain, or take leave, before returning to the fight. However, NSOCC-A reported that since late August the ASSF has been unable to accomplish any ORC due to the complete overuse and misuse of the ASSF.<sup>328</sup> The general said this winter RS will work on implementing an ORC for the conventional forces.<sup>329</sup> As units rotate through an ORC, each ANA corps is responsible for conducting its own collective training through the regional military-training center while the ANP conducts local training as officers are rotated out of position.<sup>330</sup>

## MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR DEVELOPMENT

Each RS Essential Function (EF) directorate and the Gender Advisor Office use the Essential Function Program of Actions and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in the ministries of Defense and Interior.<sup>331</sup> This quarter, RS classified the overall assessments of the Ministries of Defense and Interior; SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

The milestones are assessed using a five-tier rating system.<sup>332</sup> Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the overall assessment of the ministry.<sup>333</sup>

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, "sustaining capability," indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.<sup>334</sup>



**General Joseph F. Dunford Jr.**, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, meets with General Dhatar 'Qadam Shah' Shahin, ANA Chief of Staff, in Kabul, July 17, 2016. (DOD Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Dominique A. Pineiro)

This quarter, EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution) reported that the two Afghan ministries made moderate developmental progress over the summer. Two milestone assessments were upgraded while two milestones required timeline adjustments, and two additional milestones were amended.<sup>335</sup>

The MOI Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy achieved a “fully effective” milestone rating for producing two strategic documents codifying the five ANP strategic goals and actions to accomplish those goals without “major TAA influence.”<sup>336</sup>

The MOD Strategy and Plans office, with significant Coalition assistance, produced the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance which provides details on MOD’s strategic objectives and tasks. Despite Coalition assistance, the MOD’s understanding of how to create this type of document increased, resulting in this milestone-assessment rating being raised from “in development” to “partially effective.”<sup>337</sup>

The date for achieving the milestone for the ANA to identify and address capability gaps in a “partially effective” manner was pushed back from July 2016 to January 2017.<sup>338</sup> The milestone for the ANP Deputy Minister for Security, Plans and Operations to issue “process-oriented operations” orders to the provincial chiefs of police in a “partially effective” manner was pushed to October 2016.<sup>339</sup>

Additionally, a milestone to train sufficient Mi-17 helicopter instructors and maintenance pilots (pilots who test aircraft after maintenance) to achieve “sustainable” status, was pushed from June 2016 to December 2016 due to a shortage of qualified maintenance pilots.<sup>340</sup>

## Afghan Local Police

Afghan Local Police members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.<sup>341</sup>

As of August 27, 2016, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP has 28,577 guardians, 24,181 of whom are trained with an additional 305 guardians in training.<sup>342</sup> The ALP has incurred a 1,261 force reduction since May.<sup>343</sup> Consistent with advising the Afghan security forces at the ANA-corps and ANP-zone-headquarters level, NSOCC-A advises the ALP at the ALP staff-directorate level and does not track ALP retention, attrition, or losses.<sup>344</sup> According to Afghan reporting, 0.24% of ALP guardians were killed in action during June–August 2016. Additionally, 514 ALP guardians were wounded March 21–August 20, 2016.<sup>345</sup>

NSOCC-A reported the FY 2016 cost to support the ALP at its authorized end strength of 30,000 is \$97.5 million. The United States expects to fund approximately \$93 million, with the Afghan government contributing the remaining \$4.5 million.<sup>346</sup> This is a decrease of \$19.5 million from the amount NSOCC-A reported last quarter.<sup>347</sup> CSTC-A reported that as of August 22, 2016, \$32.1 million had been disbursed during FY 2016 in support of the ALP.<sup>348</sup> Unlike the ANP, the ALP is not paid via the UN Development Programme’s multilateral Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), but through the U.S.-provided ASFF as on-budget assistance to the Afghan government.<sup>349</sup>

This quarter NSOCC-A reported efforts continue to enroll ALP personnel into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System, to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process, and to inventory materiel.<sup>350</sup> According to CSTC-A, 82% of the ALP are registered to receive salary payments via EFT or mobile money, with 18% receiving salary payments via the trusted-agent payment method, (long criticized as susceptible to corruption). CSTC-A reports ALP guardians in 12 provinces have been registered for mobile money.<sup>351</sup> According to CSTC-A, ALP guardians perceive they receive more of their salary when they are paid via mobile money and find it easier to access funds than through alternate payment methods.<sup>352</sup>

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$40.8 billion and disbursed \$40.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>353</sup>

## ANA Military Personnel Decrease for Second Quarter

As of July 2016, the overall assigned strength of the ANA, including the AAF but not including civilians, was 169,229 personnel.<sup>354</sup> Compared to last quarter, the ANA (including Afghan Air Force and civilians) increased by 4,630 personnel, as shown in Table 3.8 on page 109 of this section.<sup>355</sup> However, when ANA civilians are excluded, the ANA military strength decreased by 2,199 personnel.<sup>356</sup> ANA assigned-military personnel are at 86.8% of the approved end strength.<sup>357</sup> The number of ANA civilians reported this quarter was 6,829.<sup>358</sup>

USFOR-A reports overall ANA attrition over the summer months at 2.9% during June, 1.8% during July, and 2.8% during August. The overall 12-month attrition rate as of August 2016 was 33.5%, an increase from the 12-month rate of 28% as of August 2015.<sup>359</sup>

Eight Afghan nationals in the United States for military training went missing during September: two from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; one from Fort Gordon, Georgia; two from Fort Benning, Georgia; one from Fort Lee, Virginia; one from an Army facility in Little Rock, Arkansas; and, one from an unspecified location. Officials believe two may have fled the country.<sup>360</sup> Later a DOD spokesperson reported that 44 Afghans have disappeared during training since January 2015.<sup>361</sup>

RS components conducted a survey from December 2015 through May 2016 to obtain soldiers' and recruits' perceptions on enlisting and reenlisting. It found strong esprit de corps among the ANA. A total of 380 soldiers were surveyed in addition to recruits who in-processed from December 2015 to April 2016.<sup>362</sup> The new recruits:<sup>363</sup>

- came from 29 provinces but most from the north and east: Nangarhar (13%), Kabul (11%), and Kapisa (9%)
- were mostly 18–22 years old (71%), while 24% were 23–27 years old
- commonly reported having a high-school education (62%), with 7% holding a university degree and 3% having no education
- were mostly Pashtuns (38%) and Tajiks (35%), with 9% Hazaras

The top three influences on the decision to enlist were television advertising (40%), radio (24%), or family encouragement (17%).<sup>364</sup> Their motivations to join the ANA included patriotism and duty to country (80%), keeping their community safe (36%), religious duty (18%), and the belief that the ANDSF will take care of its soldiers (15%) (respondents could provide multiple reasons). Other reasons included the belief that it was the best job available or because of family and friends or other personal reasons.<sup>365</sup> Most new recruits had a relative serving in the ANA (82%), were proud to be in the army (98%), and said their families were proud they had joined (97%).<sup>366</sup>

The majority of the recruits say their army experience has been what they expected (48%) or has exceeded their expectations (46%). Nearly all (88%) believe their lives will become better for having joined the ANA.<sup>367</sup> Two-thirds said the ANA provided transportation to the

### SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter SIGAR, concerned about the number of “ghost” soldiers in the ANDSF, questioned DOD on their efforts to validate the number of personnel in the Afghan security forces.



**Afghan National Defense and Security Forces** celebrate the 97th Afghanistan Independence Day at Camp Hero, home of the 205th “Hero Corps” of the Afghan National Army, in Kandahar on August 18, 2016. (U.S. Army photo by Major Luke Talbot, 36th Infantry Division)

recruitment-processing center.<sup>368</sup> Three-quarters strongly agree they have received good care (food, medical, facilities, etc.), whereas 20% somewhat agree.<sup>369</sup> If wounded, almost all (98%) expect they will receive good medical care. If killed, 92% expect their families will be taken care of. More recruits in the March and April surveys had much stronger favorable opinions than those that took the survey earlier.<sup>370</sup>

Practically all recruits (91%) understood how they would be paid and were satisfied with their pay.<sup>371</sup> About half (47%) said they were aware of the penalties for being away without leave and for desertion. However, a third were concerned about their ability to take leave (33%), or that the distance from family could impact their ability to take leave (30%). Only 10% reported being assigned to a duty location near family.<sup>372</sup>

While recruits surveyed in December 2015 (21%) and March 2016 (19%) reported the highest percentage of contact with anti-government elements, overall 16% of recruits reported being approached by anti-government elements. Anti-government elements are reported to watch for opportunities to influence or compromise ANA recruits.<sup>373</sup> Currently serving soldiers:<sup>374</sup>

- came from 28 provinces, although the percentage distribution was not reported
- were mostly 28–32 years old (33%), 23–27 years old (29%), or 33–40 years old (24%)
- reported having some high-school education or graduated (48%), attending or graduating from a university (6%), or having no formal education (30%)
- were mostly Pashtuns (41%), Tajiks (23%), or Hazaras (19%)
- had up to 3 years (32%), 3–5 years (28%), or 5–10 years (25%) army service

Approximately 83% of the soldiers stated they wanted to remain in the army, with more than a third (42%) citing patriotism and duty to country.

Other reasons included pride in being a soldier (15%), to keep their families and communities safe (14%), for the salary and benefits (10%), and lack of other jobs (10%).<sup>375</sup> Of the 17% of soldiers reporting they wanted to leave the army, reasons included fear of retaliation against self or family (18%), disagreement with the government or perception the government is not committed to winning (18%), and a salary inadequate for supporting a family (unreported %). However, the primary reason was not provided in an unclassified manner.<sup>376</sup>

Approximately 58% reported they knew or knew of personnel who had left the army before their commitment was over. Threats against self/family members was the most commonly cited reason for leaving (31%), followed by loss of trust/confidence in the government or ANA leadership and the perception that the ANDSF does not take care of their people (17%). Other reasons included lack of family support, better job opportunities, dissatisfaction with their army job, and a perception that the ANA cannot win. Additionally, some soldiers were concerned that the Taliban were “interfering with the burial of ANA casualties.”<sup>377</sup>

A third of the soldiers expressed the intention to make a career of army service or remain for the duration of the conflict, another third intended to remain for more than 10 years, and 16% intended to re-contract for another term of up to three years.<sup>378</sup>

**SIGAR will report on the quarterly change in ANA corps-level troop strength in a classified annex to this report.**

## ANA Sustainment

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$17.7 billion and disbursed \$17.3 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.<sup>379</sup> Most ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments. Other uses include procuring items such as ammunition, organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), aviation sustainment, and vehicle maintenance.<sup>380</sup>

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and nonpayroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1395 (2016) was \$387.9 million through June 20, 2016.<sup>381</sup> Aside from salaries and incentives, the largest uses of sustainment funding are for fuel (\$73.7 million), “energy operating equipment” (\$8.3 million), and building sustainment (\$3.5 million).<sup>382</sup>

Last quarter SIGAR reported on the boot shortage within the ANSDF.<sup>383</sup> This quarter CSTC-A reported an adequate number of winter boots were procured for the ANA soldiers and new recruits: 194,000 pairs of winter boots and 194,000 of summer boots. The MOD was provided a listing of the winter OCIE in stock and on order so they could distribute the boots and other cold-weather gear before the onset of winter.<sup>384</sup>

## ANA Salaries and Incentives

CSTC-A reported the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average \$545.8 million annually over the next five years.<sup>385</sup> In vetting comments, however, DOD noted that these forecasted numbers are

for planning purposes only and are not definitive indicators of future DOD support, which will depend on Afghan progress toward reconciliation and reducing corruption, security conditions, and other factors.<sup>386</sup>

During Afghan FY 1395 (2016), the United States provided \$120.9 million, as of June 20, 2016, directly to the Afghan government to fund ANA salaries and contractor payments, with the significant majority of the funding, \$80.9 million, applied toward officer base pay. An additional \$37.7 million was used for noncommissioned officers' and soldiers' pay, with the remainder applied toward ANA civilians and contractors' base pay.<sup>387</sup> In contrast, funding provided for FY 1394 salaries and incentives totaled \$271 million.<sup>388</sup>

## ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$8.7 billion and disbursed \$8.4 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.<sup>389</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 48.2% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.9.

TABLE 3.9

<b>COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT, AS OF AUGUST 31, 2016</b>			
<b>Type of Equipment</b>	<b>Procured</b>	<b>Remaining to be Procured</b>	<b>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</b>
Vehicles	\$7,360,979,333	\$669,663,170	\$6,648,731,649
Ammunition	2,469,192,205	303,734,912	2,223,968,551
Aircraft	2,454,887,858	312,253,892	1,526,849,750
Other	884,304,375	0	801,295,177
Communications	870,966,975	80,719,961	745,480,497
Weapons	642,851,434	30,687,563	542,320,095
C-IEDs	455,211,247	113,513,808	341,550,056
Transportation Services	120,802,600	0	13,459,569
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$15,259,196,027</b>	<b>\$1,510,573,306</b>	<b>\$12,843,655,344</b>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised-explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts. Procured and Fielded to the ANA = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOD/ANA.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/16/2016; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2016.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment and related services procured for the ANA increased by over \$73.7 million.<sup>390</sup> The majority of the increase was in transportation services, followed by vehicle- and communication-equipment procurements.<sup>391</sup> Additionally, CSTC-A reported an increase of \$46.4 million in the counter-improvised-explosive devices that are “remaining to be procured.”<sup>392</sup>

This quarter EF-5 Information, Communication, and Technology advisors conducted a bottom-up review of the entire MOD tactical radio inventory.

After accounting for equipment that was battle-damaged or had reached the end of life, as well as equipment for new hires, a procurement request was submitted for over 5,170 radios valued at \$52 million.<sup>393</sup>

According to CSTC-A, there are over 54,000 vehicles in the ANA inventory, although DOD noted that the number of operational vehicles is estimated at far fewer.<sup>394</sup> Due to inconsistent and unreliable reporting by the MOD, the accuracy of the ANA equipment operational-readiness rate remains questionable. CSTC-A said data quality is expected to improve once the National Maintenance Strategy is implemented and training results are realized, but pointed to several factors within MOD that contribute to poor readiness rates:<sup>395</sup>

- high number of battle- or accident-damaged vehicles
- shortage of about 600 trained mechanics for vehicle maintenance (mechanic retention and training remains a serious concern for both the ANA and ANP)<sup>396</sup>
- assignment of mechanics to combat-related duties such as staffing checkpoints

This quarter CSTC-A reported mixed results following SIGAR's audit which found the ANA faces challenges in developing its vehicle-maintenance capability. According to data the ANA provided to CSTC-A, the corps vehicle-readiness rate declined between May 9, 2016, and July 31, 2016. All corps experienced decreased vehicle readiness except for the 207th Corps in Herat and Nimroz Provinces,<sup>397</sup> which reported the highest vehicle readiness rate at 83%, while the 215th Corps in Helmand Province reported only 34% readiness.<sup>398</sup> Last quarter CSTC-A questioned the accuracy of ANA reporting on the 215th Corps rate of 35%, as it did not appear to reflect the new vehicle deliveries or the vehicle maintenance that had occurred.<sup>399</sup> This quarter EF-5 reported that 651 vehicles were demilitarized during the summer months, attributing the progress in part to the 215th consolidating their battle-damaged vehicles at Shorab.<sup>400</sup> During the period January–June 2016, the contractor performing ANA vehicle maintenance repaired 2,593 vehicles at the contracted cost of \$12.8 million (\$4,936 per-vehicle cost). The ANA is expected to report if any vehicles are returned in less than a fully operational state. During this period, CSTC-A reported that “very few complaints” were submitted.<sup>401</sup> However, DOD expressed concern that the contractor's vehicle-maintenance performance and ANA-maintainer training had not resulted in improved operational-readiness rates.<sup>402</sup>

### Core Information Management System

CSTC-A also provided an update on the Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) this quarter. CoreIMS is part of the solution to address the Afghan supply-chain logistical capability gap. Since 2012, efforts have

### SIGAR AUDIT

Last quarter, SIGAR released an audit on the ANA vehicle-maintenance capability and the DOD-managed ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). SIGAR found (1) the capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain did not meet key assumptions, (2) the costs of spare parts were significantly underestimated, (3) performance metrics did not accurately assess contractor performance or progress, and (4) ANA maintenance capability did not develop as anticipated. Additionally, contract oversight declined due to deteriorating security conditions, and payments to the contractor were based on the number of vehicles in the ANA fleet, not the number of vehicles repaired. This escalated per-vehicle repair costs from \$1,954 to \$59,402 as maintenance sites closed and vehicle turn-ins practically halted before incurring additional costs to reopen six sites. These and other factors resulted in the final contract cost being more than double the original estimate, with DOD planning to award a more costly follow-on contract. For more information, see the July 2016 SIGAR *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, pp. 29–32.

been under way to develop and implement an automated system within both ministries to replace their paper-based process.

CoreIMS is a proprietary inventory-management system that is being enhanced to provide visibility of basic items like vehicles, weapons, night-vision devices, and repair parts, both in-stock and on-order. The system will provide information to help allocate material and analyze usage to predict future item and budget requirements, while reducing the opportunity for fraud.<sup>403</sup> The web-based CoreIMS is available at ANA and ANP national logistic locations, forward-support depots, and regional logistic centers.<sup>404</sup> The goal for the system is to improve Afghan sustainment processes by providing managers and decision makers with the current status of assets.<sup>405</sup>

In March, the MOD established a program-management office to manage the implementation, training, and support of the ANDSF's logistics solution.<sup>406</sup> Recording parts inventory in CoreIMS is an ongoing effort that is expected to be completed in December 2016.<sup>407</sup> The MOD contracted 130 Afghan logistics specialists to assist and train the ANA at national and regional supply sites with CoreIMS implementation and warehouse procedures.<sup>408</sup> Once fully implemented, CoreIMS will track requested parts, completed orders, and existing inventory, as well as the time required to fulfill a supply request. Using this data, CoreIMS will provide a predictive analysis capability to identify parts for re-order.<sup>409</sup> Future modules of CoreIMS will account for serial-numbered items and the maintenance record of those items.<sup>410</sup>

## ANA Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$5.9 billion and disbursed \$5.8 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as military-headquarter facilities, schoolhouses, barracks, maintenance facilities, air fields, and roads.<sup>411</sup>

As of August 31, 2016, the United States had completed 386 infrastructure projects valued at \$5.2 billion, with another 25 ongoing projects valued at \$141.2 million, according to CSTC-A.<sup>412</sup> The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter are: the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul (with an estimated cost of \$72.5 million) to be completed in December 2017, a Northern Electrical Interconnect (NEI) substation project in Balkh Province (\$27.7 million), and an NEI substation in Kunduz (\$9.5 million).<sup>413</sup>

Four projects valued at \$2.4 million were completed, including an earth-covered magazine in Kabul for the ANA (\$1.1 million), improvements at Kabul International Airport for the AAF (\$864,262), and upgrades to the ANA Regional Logistics Supply Center in Helmand (\$443,703).<sup>414</sup>

Four contracts were awarded this quarter at a cost of \$30 million. Aside from the Balkh NEI substation contract, two contracts were awarded for repair to the electrical system and water-supply lines for the AAF at Kabul



**Ceremony marking the handover** of a materiel storage facility to the ANA, Kabul Province, July 29, 2016. (Photo by USACE-TAA)

International Airport.<sup>415</sup> Among the 18 projects (\$145.8 million) in the planning phase, five projects worth \$101 million are to provide medical facilities and national electrical-grid capacity, five projects are to construct AAF facilities, and the remaining eight are various sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects.<sup>416</sup>

CSTC-A reported that the MOD Construction and Properties Management Department (CPMD) conducted none of the 10 required infrastructure assessments and uploads into the computer system called for to meet the FY 1395 MOD financial-commitment letter requirements. In addition to withholding 20% of the applicable project funding, CSTC-A will also provide contracted training on the assessment process and using the computer system.<sup>417</sup>

CSTC-A reported that several infrastructure-related train, advise, and assist activities are ongoing. CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOD CPMD engineers seven to eight times a week.<sup>418</sup> ANA instructors, mentored by CSTC-A advisors and contractors, teach a 16-week program to train Afghan facility engineers to operate and maintain power plants, heating and air-conditioning systems, water-treatment plants, and waste-water treatment plants. Twenty-four students are currently taking the classes.<sup>419</sup>

U.S. contractors have provided direct mentorship for 15–20 Afghan instructors in facility maintenance in order to develop a sustainable Afghan resource. These Afghan instructors now independently conduct approximately 60% of the 14-week course curriculum. According to CSTC-A, U.S. advisors believe low course enrollment is due to ANA commanders not wanting to lose personnel for extended periods of time.<sup>420</sup>

Last quarter CSTC-A reported using the Functional Area Support Team program to obtain 74 Afghan engineers and specialists in an effort to build the Afghan civil-service workforce. The initial six hires were placed at CPMD headquarters; future hires will be placed in ANA corps. In addition to engineering and construction management, program hires will be placed in project management, financial management, and procurement positions.<sup>421</sup>

## ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.9 billion of ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations.<sup>422</sup>

In addition to directly contracting for specialized training, DOD reported on the use of open-ended training agreements with the U.S. military to provide Afghan training or professional development.<sup>423</sup> According to DOD, FY 2016 funding was used for pilot, special forces, and weapons-maintenance training in addition to these open-ended training agreements.<sup>424</sup>

To determine which Afghan personnel will be sent for training outside of Afghanistan, the MOD has a process to select and screen those applicants that will benefit the most from the training, have the ability to complete the training, and are expected to return to Afghanistan. The selected students

### SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR has an ongoing Special Project on Afghan military students attending training in the United States who go missing.



**USAF Staff Sgt. Kyle Green**, a pararescue specialist assigned to the 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, hoists an Afghan Air Force A-29 pilot into a HH-60 Pave Hawk during a personnel-recovery training mission near Kabul, September 6, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Larry E. Reid Jr.)

are then screen by CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy. According to DOD, discussions are ongoing with the MOD to reexamine the process after several students training in the United States went missing.<sup>425</sup>

## Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

As of August 31, 2016, the United States has appropriated more than \$3.7 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY 2010. Additionally, DOD requested over \$508 million—mostly for AAF sustainment costs—in the FY 2017 budget justification document. However, this quarter CSTC-A reported that no FY 2017 funds was planned for the AAF.<sup>426</sup>

Since FY 2010, over \$3.1 billion has been obligated; FY 2015 obligations (which expired on September 20, 2016) stood at \$480.6 million of the more than \$576.2 million appropriated.<sup>427</sup> The majority of the funding since FY 2010 has been dedicated to sustainment items, which account for 48.6% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 33.1%.<sup>428</sup> However, training costs in the recent years have exceeded the equipment and aircraft costs.<sup>429</sup>

The AAF's current inventory of aircraft includes:<sup>430</sup>

- 3 Mi-35 helicopters
- 48 Mi-17 helicopters
- 27 MD-350 helicopters
- 24 C-208 airplanes
- 4 C-130 airplanes
- 8 A-29 airplanes

This quarter, USFOR-A reported one grounded Mi-17 had returned to flying status. However, 11 Mi-17s and 1 C-130 were reported as currently in for repair or overhaul.<sup>431</sup> Additional armed MD-530 deliveries this summer,

### SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR is conducting ongoing monitoring of the roll-out of the A-29 Super Tucanos and the training of Afghan pilots to fly them.



**Afghan Air Force** pilots fly A-29 Super Tucanos, the newest attack aircraft in their inventory, over Kabul Province, August 14, 2015. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Larry E. Reid Jr.)

with the last four delivered on August 25, brings the MD-530 inventory to 27 helicopters.<sup>432</sup>

The newest addition to the AAF, the A-29 Super Tucanos, have proven to be valuable assets, according to DOD. Over the next two years, the AAF will receive 12 more A-29s from DOD once their pilots complete their training at Moody AFB and operational weapons testing and cockpit upgrades are completed.<sup>433</sup>

The Special Missions Wing (SMW) is the aviation branch of the MOD's Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) alongside the special operations command (ANASOC) and the Ktah Khas (KKA) counterterrorism unit.

The FY 1395 MOD financial-commitment letter required the ANASOC, KKA, and SMW to inventory all on-hand equipment by June 30, 2016. The inventory was to include the on-hand quantities, including vehicle-identification numbers and mileage, and the serial numbers for the weapons and communication equipment.<sup>434</sup> NSOCC-A reported the KKA and SMW completed the inventory as scheduled and since the ANASOC met a requested July 31 extension, no penalty was incurred. However, NSOCC-A noted that the inventory is not captured within an automated system.<sup>435</sup>

SIGAR will report on the details of the SMW budget, manpower, and capabilities in a classified annex to this report.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$20.0 billion and disbursed \$19.6 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.<sup>436</sup>

According to Afghan media, President Ghani suspended several police officials found absent during his late-night unannounced visit to Police District 9. The MOI was ordered to investigate and report on their findings.

Source: *Tofo News*, "Ghani Suspends Officials After Surprise Visit To PD9," 9/26/2016.

## ANP Strength

As of July 15, 2016, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 148,480, according to USFOR-A.<sup>437</sup> This is an increase of 313 ANP personnel since last quarter, and 184 more than the July 2015 assigned end strength of 148,296.<sup>438</sup> As of August 15, 2016, patrol personnel represent the largest component of the ANP with 70,095 members; noncommissioned officers numbered 50,665, while officer ranks stood at 27,730.<sup>439</sup> The largest increase this quarter occurred within the non-commissioned officer ranks.<sup>440</sup>

While the strength of each of the ANP's components (e.g. AUP, ABP, ANCOP) was not provided for July, Table 3.10 provides the six-month change in the strength of those components from January through June 2016. During that time, the bulk of the 9,185 personnel increase was attributed to ANP personnel in training.

According to USFOR-A, the overall ANP monthly attrition rate for the last quarter was:<sup>441</sup>

- May 2016: 2.32%
- June 2016: 2.50%
- July 2016: 2.47%

TABLE 3.10

ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2016	Q2 2016	6-Month Change	Q1 2016	Q2 2016	6-Month Change
AUP	91,000	88,031	(2,969)	86,827	86,234	(593)
ABP	23,313	25,015	1,702	20,990	21,654	664
ANCOP	16,200	17,061	861	14,450	15,458	1,008
MOI HQs & IS	26,487	28,593	2,106	24,037	25,867	1,830
NISTA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/R	6,276	–
<b>ANP Total (as reported)</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>158,700</b>	<b>1,700</b>	<b>146,304</b>	<b>155,489</b>	<b>9,185</b>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2016 data as of 1/2016; Q2 2016 data as of 6/2016. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; HQ = Headquarters; IS = Institutional Support personnel; NISTA = Not in Service for Training. N/A = Not applicable. N/R = Not reported.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 3/4/2016 and 8/30/2016.

## ANP Sustainment

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$8.7 billion and disbursed \$8.4 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.<sup>442</sup> This includes ASFF contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries, the most prominent use of sustainment funding. Other uses of ANP sustainment funding include ammunition and

ordnance, information technology, organizational clothing and individual equipment, electricity, and fuel.<sup>443</sup>

According to CSTC-A, \$320.5 million has been provided for ANP sustainment during Afghan FY 1395 (which began in December 2015) through August 31, 2016.<sup>444</sup> Of that amount, \$231.6 million was expended on ANP payroll and incentives, and \$88.8 million on non-payroll items.<sup>445</sup> Of the payroll amount, \$57.2 million represents the U.S. contribution to LOTFA to fund salaries and the United Nations Development Programme management fee.<sup>446</sup> In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has provided \$106.3 million for ANP incentives and \$32 million for ALP salaries and incentives (a reduction from the \$66.6 million reported last quarter) since August 31, 2016.<sup>447</sup>

CSTC-A estimates the FY 2017 expenses to be \$611.9 million and FY 2018 to be \$614.3 million, consistent with the earlier projected fiscal-year 2016–2020 annual average of \$613.2 million. However, CSTC-A reported the amount the United States or Coalition partners will contribute to LOTFA over the next five years is unknown.<sup>448</sup>

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.5 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.<sup>449</sup> Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, as shown in Table 3.11, with approximately 67.4% going to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANP increased by over \$60.9 million, approximately 50% of which was for transportation services, followed by vehicles and communication equipment.<sup>450</sup> The transportation services “remaining to be procured” amount increased by \$46.6 million, while the counter-improvised-explosive devices amount increased by approximately \$30 million.<sup>451</sup>

TABLE 3.11

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT, AS OF AUGUST 2016			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANP
Vehicles <sup>a</sup>	\$3,582,760,677	\$424,824,540	\$3,209,856,026
Ammunition	738,345,136	34,029,991	462,489,917
Communications	245,139,546	2,370,956	231,735,291
Weapons	309,685,463	40,352,942	216,469,486
C-IEDs	125,211,256	46,414,223	115,581,810
Other	243,097,382	0	91,438,300
Transportation Services	72,827,583	46,583,858	7,770,471
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,317,067,043</b>	<b>\$594,576,510</b>	<b>\$4,335,341,301</b>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Procured and Fielded to the ANP = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOJ/ANP.

<sup>a</sup> Vehicle costs include vehicles and parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/16/2016; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2016.

## SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD’s procurement, maintenance, and oversight of organizational clothing and individual-equipment purchases for the ANDSF.



**Construction continues** on a women's compound at the ANP regional headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, August 20, 2016. (USACE-TAA photo)

The increase to the communication equipment procured amount is due in part to the efforts of the EF-5 Information, Communication, and Technology advisors, who submitted a procurement request for 125 Motorola HF Base Station Radio Systems after researching a “modern life-cycle replacement radio” for the MOI “HF Radio C2 System.”<sup>452</sup>

The FY 1395 MOI bilateral financial-commitment letter required the General Command Special Police Units (GCSPU) to inventory all on-hand equipment by June 30, 2016. The inventory was to include the on-hand quantities, including vehicle-identification numbers and mileage, and the serial numbers for the weapons and communication equipment.<sup>453</sup> NSOCC-A reported the GCSPU requested an extension until July 31, which was granted but not met. However, due to the operational tempo and acceptance of the efforts made by the GCSPU, NSOCC-A did not recommend any penalty, nor did CSTC-A assess one. NSOCC-A noted that the inventory is not captured within an automated system.<sup>454</sup>

## ANP Infrastructure

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated \$3.2 billion and disbursed \$3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.<sup>455</sup>

According to CSTC-A, as of August 31, 2016, the United States had completed 740 infrastructure projects valued at \$3.6 billion, with another 10 projects valued at \$58.4 million ongoing.<sup>456</sup> The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter is the installation of an information-technology server at the MOI Headquarters Network Operations Center in Kabul (with an estimated cost of \$34 million) followed by compounds for

women at the Regional Training Center in Jalalabad (\$6.4 million) and MOI headquarters in Kabul (\$3.4 million).<sup>457</sup>

The two infrastructure projects completed this quarter included the MOI headquarters temporary entry-control point (\$998,330) and security upgrade (\$369,645).<sup>458</sup> Additionally, five contracts were awarded, including two building-refurbishment projects awarded to women-owned businesses and the MOI headquarters network operations center.<sup>459</sup> In addition, CSTC-A reports the majority of the 23 projects in the planning phase (\$173.9 million) are in support of the **Women's Participation Program**.<sup>460</sup>

CSTC-A reported several ongoing activities aimed at developing Afghan capacity to build and maintain infrastructure. Nine CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOI Facilities Department engineers at least twice a week.<sup>461</sup> A program to train Afghan facility engineers to operate and maintain power plants, heating and air-conditioning systems, water-treatment plants, and waste-water treatment plants had 47 students attending courses from June 1 to August 31, 2016. To better accommodate students, one course is now available at two new training locations and another course was made available at a third location.<sup>462</sup>

CSTC-A contracted for 65 Afghan subject-matter experts to assist the MOI Facilities Department in meeting daily operation requirements, training facility engineers, and training personnel in contract management. Twenty-two subject-matter experts are located at the MOI Facilities Department in Kabul, one is co-located at CSTC-A serving the subject-matter-expert liaison and the Women's Participation Program manager, and the others are located throughout the provinces. All 73 positions are expected to be filled by the end of November.<sup>463</sup>

CSTC-A reported the MOI Facilities Department met the FY 1395 MOI bilateral financial-commitment-letter requirement to conduct and upload the infrastructure assessments on 10 facilities into the computer system. CSTC-A also noted that assessments were completed for the ANP hospital and Camp Gibson, which has approximately 40 facilities.<sup>464</sup>

## ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.7 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.<sup>465</sup> According to DOD, FY 2016 funding is used to provide advisors to assist with MOI and police development.<sup>466</sup>

During the second counter-improvised-explosive device (C-IED) awareness training course, three ANP women graduates learned IED awareness during operations and routine duties. Additionally, 15 female, midlevel, non-commissioned officers and junior officers completed the train-the-trainer course.<sup>467</sup> Additionally, CSTC-A and its training contractor taught four explosive-ordnance-device robot-maintenance courses during 2016, achieving a 92% graduation rate with 23 ANP personnel trained.<sup>468</sup>

**Women's Participation Program:** An initiative which seeks to advance and promote women's participation in Afghan security institutions. The program promotes safe and secure facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities to increase female membership within the ANSDF.

Source: OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/15/2016.

## SIGAR ALERT LETTER

This quarter, SIGAR released an alert letter regarding the lack of fire doors at the MOI compound in Kabul. For more information, see Section 2 of this report.



**Afghan border policewomen** graduated in August from a forensic-training course that covered theoretical and practical lessons and crime-scene best practices in Herat, Afghanistan. (Resolute Support photo)

## **WOMEN COMPRISE 1.2% OF ANDSF PERSONNEL**

This quarter, RS reported 3,945 women serving in the ANDSF, 263 fewer than last quarter.<sup>469</sup> Despite an increase in female recruits, the overall percentage of women in the ANDSF remains at only 1.2%.<sup>470</sup> Of the 3,945 women, 2,866 were in the ANP, 122 were in the ASSF, 877 were in the ANA, and 80 were in the AAF.<sup>471</sup> While the ANP has come more than half way toward reaching its goal of 5,000 women, the ANA is still far from reaching the same goal.<sup>472</sup>

Of the women in the ANP, ANA, and AAF, 1,219 were officers, 1,321 were noncommissioned officers, and 1,203 were enlisted.<sup>473</sup> According to RS, the majority of the women within the ANP, as of August 2016, were Tajik (1,246), followed by Hazara (856), Pashtun (480), and Uzbek (131).<sup>474</sup>

RS reported ANP women have a 95–100% training completion rate. The primary reasons that women drop out of training is pressure from a male family member or sexual harassment or assault in the workplace.<sup>475</sup> The primary reasons women leave the ANP is pressure from a male family member, problems with male colleagues, insufficient pay, children or family obligations, and a lack of promotion, training, and security.<sup>476</sup>

Last quarter SIGAR reported on the creation new gender-neutral positions in the MOD and the ANP. According to RS, the gender-neutral positions within the ANP are in fields including administration, family affairs, human resources, finance/budget, logistics, training, counternarcotics, medical, intelligence, accounting, and human-rights investigations.<sup>477</sup>

This quarter RS reported the MOI increased the number of police and civilian positions allocated for women.<sup>478</sup>

For more information on gender issues, see the essay in Section 1 of this report highlighting the views of notable Afghan women.

## ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

As of August 22, 2016, there were 1,010 physicians and 2,709 other medical staff within the ANDSF healthcare system; 263 physician positions (20.7% of those required) and 477 other medical positions (15%) are vacant, according to CSTC-A.<sup>479</sup> This reflects an increase of 150 physicians since last quarter when the unfilled positions were at 30.4%.<sup>480</sup> MOI headquarters is working to increase the number of Surgeon General staff by 243 and the ANP hospital staff by 225.<sup>481</sup>

The ANA's Medical Command is to be one of the first commands to implement AHRIMS, the biometrically linked ID card system, and APPS (see “The Status of AHRIMS and APPS” on page 110 of this section). However, even though it is at the forefront of the transition to AHRIMS, challenges remain. While some ANA Medical Command personnel have started training on AHRIMS, CSTC-A noted that the command reported concerns about training deficiencies and a lack of access to correct data fields.<sup>482</sup>

According to CSTC-A, hospital renovations are under way with the expansion of the ANP Hospital to a 300-bed facility that began in August.<sup>483</sup> Additionally, the Kabul National Military Hospital renovation will include a state-of-the-art trauma center, an increase of 100–150 patient beds, an increase of 14–70 critical-care patient beds, a morgue, and a new Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences teaching center.<sup>484</sup>

In late August, CSTC-A provided the ANA with \$11.2 million of medical supplies—\$5.2 million of which are pharmaceuticals. The supplies were distributed to all regions and alleviated any significant shortages.<sup>485</sup>

Last quarter, SIGAR reported on problems with the ANDSF supply chain that were impacting the ANDSF medical corps.<sup>486</sup> This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the inclusion of MOI Surgeon General representatives on the procurement-evaluation committee has resulted in the selection of vendors who provide higher quality medical material and the development of a pooled medical-procurement initiative for all affected ministries.<sup>487</sup> Additionally, CSTC-A reported the MOI Surgeon General routinely increases the amount of medical supplies and number of medical providers to provinces where security operations are scheduled to start.<sup>488</sup>

Among the mentoring activities the RS physician advisors performed this quarter were developing combat casualty training instructions; assisting the Afghans with developing business plans and budgets; reestablishing

a committee for a national system for triage, treatment, and transport of combat casualties and trauma victims; developing policy on determining the degree of disability of wounded and disabled ANDSF personnel, and obtaining USFOR-A approval to provide security and utilities at the South Korean-donated Bagram Medical Education Hospital.<sup>489</sup>

## REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$341.3 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding and has obligated approximately \$13 million of FY 2016 funds.<sup>490</sup>

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised-explosive devices. As of June 30, 2016, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 193.2 million square meters of land (approximately 74.6 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.8 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.12).<sup>491</sup>

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 617 square kilometers (238 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, 28 square kilometers (11 square miles) were cleared bringing the known contaminated area to 589 square kilometers (227 square miles) by the end of the quarter. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.<sup>492</sup>

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians, including victims of mines and ERW.<sup>493</sup>

UNMACA draws on its wider network under the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), which consists of 50 international and national organizations, to access beneficiaries and communities. One of those organizations, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), collects casualty data on mine/ERW victims to help prioritize its clearance

TABLE 3.12

CONVENTIONAL-WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2016						
Fiscal Year	Minefields Cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m <sup>2</sup> )*
2010	39,337,557	13,879	663,162	1,602,267	4,339,235	650,662,000
2011	31,644,360	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	21,966,347	602,000,000
2012	46,783,527	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	22,912,702	550,000,000
2013	25,059,918	6,431	203,024	275,697	10,148,683	521,000,000
2014	22,071,212	12,397	287,331	346,484	9,415,712	511,600,000
2015 <sup>a</sup>	7,419,944	1,287	31,806	64,688	2,449,357	558,900,000
2016 <sup>b</sup>	20,884,231	4,231	4,192	79,063	6,951,077	598,000,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>193,200,749</b>	<b>60,559</b>	<b>1,878,907</b>	<b>5,820,684</b>	<b>78,183,113</b>	<b>598,000,000</b>

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition.

Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre.

\* Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

<sup>a</sup> Final quarter results for fiscal year unavailable; partial-year results only.

<sup>b</sup> Results for first three quarters only.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/27/2016.

activities. According to USAID, ACAP funding will allow MACCA to expand its victim-assistance activities beyond service provision and data collection to include immediate assistance for individual survivors and their families.<sup>494</sup> The \$30.2 million ACAP program has expended \$19.6 million to date and will conclude in February 2018.<sup>495</sup>

According to the UN, of nearly 6,000 security incidents that took place between May 20 and August 15, 2016, 17.3% were improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—the second-most prevalent form of attack after armed attacks.<sup>496</sup> Many of the IEDs used by today’s insurgents are much more powerful and cause greater bodily harm than earlier IEDs. Disabled war victims are more often double rather than single amputees, as was more common a decade ago.<sup>497</sup>

## COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of September 30, 2016, the United States has provided \$8.5 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium, providing 80% of the world’s output over the past decade, according to the United Nations.<sup>498</sup> The country also has a growing domestic addiction problem.<sup>499</sup>

Congress appropriated most of these counternarcotics (CN) funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities (DOD CN) fund (\$3 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$1.3 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$1.6 billion), and a portion of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

**Afghan opium production has risen 43% over last year’s levels, to an estimated 4,800 metric tons, according to new Afghanistan Opium Survey figures released October 23 by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC).**

**The survey also said the area under opium-poppo cultivation had increased 10% from last year, to 201,000 hectares (nearly half a million acres). The survey said the production increase reflected the larger area under cultivation, higher yields, and lower eradication results.**

Source: UNODC, news release, 10/23/2016.

## The Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring

**Countries:** provides a strategic framework for drug-control initiatives as well as a platform for coordinating and facilitating counternarcotics efforts across the region. Eight countries are covered under this regional program: Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The program, inaugurated in December 2011, focuses on four areas:

- law-enforcement cooperation
- cooperation in criminal matters
- prevention and treatment of addiction
- trends and impacts

Source: UNODC, *Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011-14, Semi-Annual Progress Report Issue No. 5*, pp. 6, 10; UNODC, *Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011-14, A framework for action to achieve greater impact in West and Central Asia*, ii, accessed 7/3/2016.

**The Paris Pact:** The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on Central Asian drug routes. It aims to reduce opium-poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and to establish a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

Source: Paris Pact website, "What is it?" <https://www.parispact.net>, accessed 7/16/2014.

(INCLE) account (\$2.2 billion). ASFF is primarily used to develop the Afghan National Army and Police, including the Counternarcotics Police and Special Mission Wing who support MOD and MOI efforts to address narcotics problems.<sup>500</sup>

USAID's alternative-development programs are intended to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funding through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan. See Appendix B for additional funding information.<sup>501</sup>

The Afghan government rolled out its national counternarcotics strategy, the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP), last year.<sup>502</sup> According to State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), its introduction has refocused international attention and engagement on the country's illicit drug problem. The NDAP featured prominently during several high-profile international meetings, including the December 2015 High-Level Meeting of the **Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries**, the December 2015 **Paris Pact** Policy Consultative Group, and during a side event at the April 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem. INL further states that the NDAP has been thoroughly reviewed during meetings between the United States and key international partners. International donors and impacted countries have reiterated their intention to create and adapt programs and counternarcotics action to address the needs identified in the NDAP.<sup>503</sup> According to INL, the Afghan government is expected to complete a formal review of the NDAP one year since its approval last October 2015.<sup>504</sup>


The United States has been operating with mixed results under a strategy in place since 2012 to counter illicit drugs in Afghanistan. A proposed revised U.S. strategy is still making its way through the interagency process and currently awaiting approval. See SIGAR's July 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for an overview of past U.S. counternarcotics strategies during the reconstruction effort. According to INL, the November U.S. elections will not significantly impact the clearance process as the strategy makes its way through the various agencies.<sup>505</sup>

UNODC's latest survey showed that 201,000 hectares were cultivated in 2016 a 10% increase from 2015.<sup>506</sup> The latest UN Secretary General's report states that areas under cultivation and production have increased after this summer's harvest.<sup>507</sup>

As noted in the UNODC's *World Drug Report 2016*, Afghanistan accounts for nearly two-thirds of the world's illicit opium cultivation, but did share in a global opium-production decline of 38% from the previous year. Afghanistan's estimated opium production declined 48% to 3,300 metric tons from its 2014 level of 6,400 tons. The country's 2015 opium-cultivation

FIGURE 3.27

## AFGHAN OPIUM CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION SINCE 2008



Note: a hectare is slightly less than 2.5 acres.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 3; UNODC, "Afghan Opium Production Up 43 per cent: Survey," 10/23/2016.

level of 183,000 hectares decreased 18% from its 2014 total of 224,000 hectares. UNODC attributes the decline mainly to poor harvests in the southern provinces.<sup>508</sup> UNODC changed its methodology between 2014 and 2015; it is unclear how that change figured into the reported decline, and UNODC cautions that the changing methodology could make changes seem greater than represented.<sup>509</sup> Production and cultivation results had been rising for the past decade, as illustrated in Figure 3.27.<sup>510</sup>

## Drug-Demand Reduction

In January 2015, INL transitioned the first group of 13 U.S.-funded treatment programs to the Ministry of Public Health's (MOPH) responsibility. Fifteen more treatment centers began transitioning in January 2016; another 21 treatment centers will begin transitioning in January 2017. The remaining treatment centers will transition by the end of 2019. INL reduced funding to all facilities (including the MOPH portfolio of 23 centers) by approximately 20% in 2015 and another 15% in 2016.<sup>511</sup>

Last quarter, INL reported it was revisiting the transition plan to determine whether changes were needed. According to INL, the MOPH expressed confidence in managing the transition, assuming there was sufficient funding

**Colombo Plan:** instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan's Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals (ACCE), a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Source: *The Colombo Plan Secretariat website, History*, www.colombo-plan.org, accessed 4/7/2014; State, INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 2013, p. 20.

from their own government and the international community.<sup>512</sup> The transition-implementation plan is under review by the Afghan government (MOPH and MCN) and will soon be with the NGOs for comment. The drug-treatment centers are still currently under NGO leadership and have not yet transitioned to full Afghan government control. INL, through the **Colombo Plan**, is monitoring transition-plan progress and ensuring that all agreed-upon benchmarks are met to ensure a smooth transition and that MOPH has the required professional capacity to run all programs itself.<sup>513</sup>

INL informed SIGAR that 500 clinical staff working for NGO-run treatment centers were supposed to be working for the government by January 2016. The MOPH reported that as of May 2016, the process had begun for 105 clinical staff from the 11 treatment centers transitioned to the MOPH's operational control in January 2016.<sup>514</sup> According to INL, the transition of all 500 NGO staff will coincide with the transition of their respective drug-treatment centers to the MOPH.<sup>515</sup>

Training of clinical staff under the Colombo Plan is ongoing and separate from the transition of clinical staff to the MOPH. According to INL, currently a total of 577 staff have been trained in the first two programs of the universal treatment curriculum; 363 staff trained on four programs of the curriculum and 132 staff have nearly completed the full curriculum.<sup>516</sup>

In May 2016, the MOPH requested \$1.3 million from the Ministry of Finance to cover INL budget cuts to treatment-center operations planned for 2017. The MOPH opened eight new treatment centers in 2016 using approximately \$2 million in new Afghan government development funds.<sup>517</sup> INL has been working with the Afghan Government and the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme since 2003 to develop and sustain the country's drug-treatment system. Between October 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016, INL has provided \$5.1 million in funding for operational costs for all 86 facilities. INL committed \$1.4 million to the Colombo Plan last quarter and contributed \$12.9 million during 2015 for drug-treatment and education programs.<sup>518</sup>

The joint monitoring visits by MCN, MOPH, UNODC and Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme (DAP) officials led to recommendations to implement changes to drug-dependency programs. Those include an increase in available home-based treatment, an adjustment in treatment duration (45 days for women and children and 90 days for men), and an increase in the number of significant therapeutic activities (e.g. group counseling and/or integration of family therapy and psychoeducation sessions).<sup>519</sup>

INL and DAP only support treatment with a minimum duration of 90 days. The treatment duration is divided into three phases:

- the pre-treatment or motivation phase;
- the inpatient/residential or active treatment phase; and
- the continuum of care/ follow-up phase.

For clients who have a shorter residential/active treatment phase, more extensive follow-up care is provided.<sup>520</sup>

INL informed SIGAR that the Colombo Plan has different durations for the inpatient/active treatment phase based on gender or age, due to cultural and other factors. These factors were established with INL, UNODC, Colombo Plan, MOPH, and MCN.<sup>521</sup>

## Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement

INL funds the nationwide Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. Since 2013, INL has obligated \$12.7 million and spent \$9.8 million on the program.<sup>522</sup>

The program pays an Afghan company, Sayara Media Communications (Sayara), to place reporters in Afghan provinces, which are ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on cultivation levels, to gather information and gauge perceptions of counternarcotics policies and messaging. Sayara relies on geographic information system maps to inform the direction of media campaigns. During the quarter, Sayara identified target areas where to focus public information campaigns. Mapping identified where farmers were likely to increase cultivation, where farmers were likely to alternate between cultivation of opium and licit crops, and where farmers were likely to reduce or cease opium cultivation.<sup>523</sup> According to INL, nationwide public-opinion polling shows that the majority of people polled have heard counternarcotics public-information messages. For example, in high-poppy-cultivating provinces, “the program found a statistically significant increase in the percentage of respondents who think poppy can lead to addiction of a farmer and/or his family.” INL messaging has been trying to raise awareness of the dangers of addiction.<sup>524</sup>

According to INL, once the outreach component of the program begins, data will be available on information campaigns implemented by MCN. Sayara reported that the Afghan Ministry of Finance provided the MCN with approximately \$600,000 to conduct a widely attended national mobilization campaign. Of all the government agencies to apply for funding, MCN’s public-information directorate scored the highest; INL attributes this success to MCN’s ability to integrate capacity-building efforts implemented through the CNCE program.<sup>525</sup>

## Ministry of Counter-Narcotics Capacity Building

INL has put nearly \$6.6 million toward new MCN capacity-building programs before September 30, 2016.<sup>526</sup>

INL’s new flagship capacity-building program will be implemented through a letter-of-agreement under the Colombo Plan. The program will support an evaluation of MCN’s needs, followed by placing subject-matter

experts at MCN to build the ministry's institutional capacity. Through the program, INL will also expand the Asian University for Women (AUW) fellowship program from one- to two-year fellowships, increase on-the-ground support, and focus capacity-building efforts to better meet needs.<sup>527</sup> The fellowship will comprise one year at MCN, followed by an option for two 6-month rotations at relevant ministries (such as MOPH, IDLG, MOI, etc.). According to INL, this will support greater integration of the fellows at MCN in addition to encouraging and improving interagency communication. INL will continue to support two years of academic study for the fellows at AUW, a summer internship at MCN, and participation in one international MCN capacity-building conference.<sup>528</sup>

INL's June 2016 assessment of the MCN Capacity Building Program found the same strengths and areas for improvement as the first review done in November 2015. INL did not share its findings from both reviews but informed SIGAR after the November review, it would concentrate on delivering training in financial and management capacity building.<sup>529</sup> INL determined that those areas remain critical to improving the overall functionality of the MCN.<sup>530</sup> Last year, INL conducted an assessment of MCN's public financial-management system which identified deficiencies as reported in previous SIGAR *Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress* (see July 30, 2015, January 30, 2016, and July 30, 2016, reports); the situation prompted the creation of a remediation plan, the contract for which was awarded this September.<sup>531</sup>


These assessments involve qualitative data analysis, including statements made by the AUW fellows at the ministry. Data requirements are outlined in the MCN Capacity Building Program performance-measurement plan (PMP), and include the number of standard operating procedures for administrative and financial systems and processes developed as well as the number of trainings conducted and the pre- and post-test scores of trained MCN staff. A third-party remote monitoring team will enable INL program officers to better assess the implementation and effectiveness of capacity building efforts at the MCN.<sup>532</sup>

## Governor-Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program, which reimburses provinces for the cost of eradicating poppies. Between 2007 and 2015, INL has contributed \$10 million to the MCN for the GLE program, which accounts for less than 2% of INL's annual counternarcotics budget for Afghanistan.<sup>533</sup>

The MCN tracks cumulative results that are verified by UNODC.<sup>534</sup> The United Nations reports little eradication took place this year due to funding constraints and the security situation in the important poppy-growing areas. Eradication results were the lowest reported in the last decade.<sup>535</sup> According

FIGURE 3.28

**GOVERNOR-LED OPIUM-POPPY ERADICATION, 2008–2016** (HECTARES)

Note: Program results are based on UNODC-verified eradication figures.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 8; UNODC, "Afghan Opium Production Up 43 per cent: Survey," 10/23/2016.

to UNODC, a total of 355 hectares (1 hectare is slightly less than 2.5 acres) were eradicated in 2016, a 90.6% decrease from 2015. INL disbursed \$540,750 to the ministry in April 2016 for the final 2015 GLE payment.<sup>536</sup>

INL informed SIGAR last quarter that it would begin collaborating this quarter with the MCN to start eradication according to the 2016 National Eradication Plan, but approval of the plan has been delayed. INL is working with the ministry to gain approval of next year's eradication plan by December 2016.<sup>537</sup>

Eradiation results have generally been declining with some fluctuations over the past few years, as shown in Figure 3.28, and represent a small fraction of the opium-cultivation and production results shown in Figure 3.27 on page 133.

### Good Performer's Initiative

SIGAR reported that INL ended the \$143 million Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) last quarter due to the MCN's inability to implement the program properly. GPI was a program implemented by the MCN that sought to incentivize provincial counternarcotics performance. No new GPI projects have been approved since April 30, 2016, but funding will continue until current projects are completed. INL and UNODC negotiated two new alternative-development programs that

launched in October to supplement activities performed under GPI. Moreover, INL is independently developing a post-GPI alternative-development, food-zone based program.<sup>538</sup> The letters of agreement for these alternative-development programs were signed in August and September 2016.<sup>539</sup>

According to INL, the Strengthen and Diversify Licit Livelihoods through Alternative Development Interventions project aims to help farmers using alternative-development methods. The project will support and strengthen selected value chains in production, processing, quality control, and market linkages across 13 target provinces which were most impacted by the loss of GPI award funds or had very high levels of poppy cultivation. The \$20 million program is implemented by the UNODC with a four-year period of performance. INL is exploring adopting a simpler project name which it believes will facilitate project branding.<sup>540</sup>

As of July 31, 2016, there have been 286 GPI projects with a value of \$126.2 million: 209 projects have been completed; 73 projects are ongoing, including four near completion.<sup>541</sup>

INL's other alternative-livelihood project—the Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD) project—aims to improve household income while reducing dependency on illicit poppy cultivation for selected communities in Farah and Badghis Provinces, the second and third highest poppy-cultivating provinces in Afghanistan in 2015 according to the UNODC. According to INL, CBARD will improve the local production and marketing of high-value crops. The project will also develop and strengthen community-based business infrastructures, such as irrigation, transportation, and facilities. The \$15.2 million program is implemented by UNDP with additional monitoring and evaluation conducted by the UNODC. The project has a 44-month period of performance.<sup>542</sup>

## **ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD**

USAID's alternative-development programs are intended to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports supply-reduction and alternative-development programs. INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.<sup>543</sup>

### **Kandahar Food Zone**

Implemented in 2013, the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a five-year, \$45.4 million USAID project, implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD) under a joint strategy and in close coordination

with INL.<sup>544</sup> KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar Province through grants for activities that improve community infrastructure, strengthen alternative livelihoods, and support small businesses. The Ministry of Counter-Narcotics' KFZ has four pillars: public outreach, eradication, drug-demand reduction, and alternative livelihoods.<sup>545</sup> USAID implements the alternative-livelihoods pillar and approved a two-year extension this quarter, extending the program through the end of August 2018.<sup>546</sup>

KFZ expended \$3.3 million between April and June 2016. During that period, KFZ completed five canals, in addition to 17 already constructed or rehabilitated. The program also focused on government coordination and capacity building by conducting training and placing staff in district agriculture offices.<sup>547</sup> During the quarter, KFZ completed rehabilitation of 542 hectares and provided vineyard training benefiting over 1,600 Afghans.<sup>548</sup>

As of September 30, 2016, USAID has disbursed \$27.5 million since the program's launch.<sup>549</sup>

## Regional Agricultural Development Program

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of high-value crops and livestock. Using a **value-chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains. RADP consumes the majority of USAID's alternative-development staff resources that include contractor staff, 82.9% of whom are dedicated to the various RADP programs.<sup>550</sup>

USAID awarded the \$28.1 million, five-year contract for RADP-East in July 2016. The targeted provinces are Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Wardak, and Kabul.<sup>551</sup>

The five-year RADP-North is a \$78.4 million project scheduled to end in May 2019. RADP-North advances food and economic security in rural areas of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz and Samangan Provinces. Between January and March 2016, RADP-North implemented 10 activities and issued 41 grants valued at \$4.2 million. The project facilitated the signing of nine contracts between seed companies, seed enterprises, bakeries, mills, and cooperatives for the sale of Afghan wheat. Various trainings on the topics of hygiene and nutrition, seed-business development, and weed control occurred across several provinces. Efforts to support agribusiness development led to \$233,200 in new sales this quarter for businesses that took part in international trade shows in Kazakhstan and Turkey. During that period, project activities supporting the meat value

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**Value chain:** the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, and wholesale and retail sales.

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Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

chain also took place: training for 100 butchers on diseases, training on cashmere harvesting, and implementing wool production and processing. As of September 30, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$25.1 million.<sup>552</sup>

The purpose of RADP-South is to improve food and economic security for rural Afghans in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018 at an estimated cost of \$125 million.<sup>553</sup>

Between April and June 2016, over 20 agribusinesses applied new-management practices using improved financial-management systems, administrative procedures, and marketing strategies. RADP-South support led total reported sales of AFN 30,263,870 (\$445,059) for 14 agribusinesses. Nearly 13,300 households benefited from program interventions during that period. Farmers applied new technologies or management practices on approximately 1,100 hectares.<sup>554</sup>

Last quarter, SIGAR reported that RADP-South ceased all gender-programming activities since March pending an embezzlement investigation in Zabul. Female beneficiaries accused a high-ranking Department of Women's Affairs (DOWA) official of withholding a portion of female beneficiaries' benefits. The investigation is complete and RADP-South restarted its activities in Zabul.<sup>555</sup> The investigation has found that the implementing partner did not appear to be directly involved. The parties involved were the school's municipal manager, the provincial assembly chief, and the DOWA director. The RADP-South monitoring and evaluation team confirmed that in the verification on 10% of the attendees, all received their stipends. The project-payment process has been strengthened with additional requirements such as the segregation of duties and training of project staff and finance managers to ensure attendee and transportation stipends are confirmed before their submission to the implementing partner.<sup>556</sup>

Attendance decreased approximately 25% and new beneficiaries joining the program also dropped between March and April 2016 during the opium-poppy harvesting season in southern Afghanistan. RADP-South concentrated farmer-mobilization efforts during the first two quarters of this fiscal year in anticipation of this phenomenon. When training numbers are traditionally low, RADP-South conducts individual visits with farmers to bolster participation in demonstration farms and meets with community elders to stress the importance of consistent attendance.<sup>557</sup>

As of September 30, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$69.3 million for RADP-South.<sup>558</sup>

The \$70 million, five-year RADP-West program focuses on helping rural Afghans in the western provinces of Herat, Farah, and Badghis to improve food and economic security. The project supports the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock in its efforts to enhance the productivity and profitability of wheat, high-value crops and livestock.<sup>559</sup>

RADP-West's key accomplishments between April and June 2016 include:

- conducting wheat-production and -protection training for 905 farmers
- conducting wheat-harvest and post-harvest training for 1,225 farmers
- assessing a flour-mill company for potential purchase of wheat surplus from beneficiary farmers
- distributing vegetable seedlings and inspecting nearly 500 vegetable plots
- conducting pest-management training
- establishing 20 orchards and implementing orchard-programming activities
- conducting livestock and value-chain programming efforts such as linking cashmere-processing companies and herders or deworming sheep and goats.<sup>560</sup>

As of September 30, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$24 million.<sup>561</sup>

## Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a \$45.3 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. The program has three components:

- quality improvement
- high-value agricultural marketing and agribusiness development
- gender integration<sup>562</sup>

SIGAR reported last quarter that all CHAMP's current funds had been disbursed. The implementing partner has concluded two of the program's three components but enough funds are available to continue activities until December 30, 2016. USAID will extend the program for an additional three years after its originally scheduled conclusion for an additional estimated cost of \$15.9 million.<sup>563</sup>

USAID recently conducted an assessment of the CHAMP program. The purpose of the assessment was to verify the quantity and value of exports reported and the type of services CHAMP provided to the trade offices and exporters. The audit of the 19 export firms that represent the 10,485 metric tons (MT) of fresh and dried fruit reported in 2015 verified the amount of exports valued at nearly \$10.4 million. The majority of the fruit and nut exports go to Pakistan. Of the 19 firms, four were directly supported by the trade offices as part of their direct import activities and received no financial incentive. The two firms under the India trade office and the two under Dubai exported 37.3 MT worth \$59,056 and representing 0.36% of overall exports.

While the trade offices have been operational for several years, the firms have not shown outstanding results for direct exports, and did not reach

the goals of their MOUs and sub-agreements. The verification team recommended that each trade office refocus efforts based on its own market potential. Each office needs to address the obstacles to potential Afghan traders. In general, exporters favored India and had negative experiences shipping to Dubai when costly air shipments were delayed and fruit spoiled. Dubai also has higher quality requirements but can generate higher prices and therefore, higher rewards. Neither the India nor Dubai trade office have been able to secure the quantities, qualities, and specific products to fulfill the required timing for super/hypermarkets. One of the firms does plan to have this established this year.<sup>564</sup>

Some of the recommendations from the review are to:

- revise the first objective during the extension period to better track supermarket- and hypermarket-contract progress
- revise the incentive structure to promote quantity, repeat order, and higher-value markets
- simplify reporting requirements and maintain exporter sales-contact confidentiality
- promote trade-office services and coordinate with other programs.

CHAMP program staff agreed with all recommendations listed above except the penultimate one. According to USAID, the current procedures are simple for export firms to follow. If CHAMP decreases its documentary requirements, it will adversely affect the transparency of the assistance process and make it difficult to track indicators, such as sales or exports. Further, USAID said the current practice is very helpful for CHAMP traders to understand their annual profit, and their compliance enhances traders' organizational capabilities as well.<sup>565</sup>

By generating fees for services, the trade offices could take a more active role and achieve sustainability.<sup>566</sup>

See the July 2016 SIGAR *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* for more information.

## Interdiction Operations and Results

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units in all 34 provinces. The specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit (IIU). Nearly half of the CNPA's 2,800 personnel are assigned to Kabul. In addition to the CNPA, law-enforcement elements contributing to interdiction activities include members of the Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniform Police, and the General Command of Police Special Unit.<sup>567</sup>

DOD reports that the security situation and the drawdown of Coalition forces have negatively impacted the CNPA and other Afghan

counternarcotics agencies. In the south and southwest, the insurgency's expanding influence is increasingly preventing counterdrug units and provincial CNPA units from conducting operations outside of major urban areas. Additionally, reduced Resolute-Support-mission partnering with Afghan forces has reduced available transportation, particularly helicopters, and the use of some counternarcotics forces for general security has resulted in fewer counterdrug missions.<sup>568</sup>

Since February 2016, Coalition advisors provide train, advise, and assist support to the CNPA. Recent emphasis has been on improving CNPA coordination with the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The SMW is an aviation wing that enables the ANDSF to conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions and to disrupt insurgent and drug-smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW has night-vision, rotary-wing air assault and fixed-wing intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The relationship has proven to be beneficial: it culminated in the arrest of Haji Watan, one of the country's top drug traffickers in April 2016 in Nangarhar.<sup>569</sup> During the month of August, the Afghan special narcotics units (NIU/SIU) performed three airmobile operations in Sarobi and Nangarhar, arrested one major heroin trafficker, and seized over three tons of morphine and opium.<sup>570</sup>

Since 2004, DOD's CN requirements for Afghanistan have been funded mostly through supplemental and Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations. These train-and-equip programs aim to support U.S. regional goals and reduce CN-related terrorism and financing. The majority of funding is for special-purpose vetted units such as the Special Mission Wing and the Afghan Counternarcotics Police.<sup>571</sup>

INL supports the maintenance and operations of NIU/SIU and DEA facilities as well as a judicial wire-intercept unit (JWIP). INL also provides support to the NIU and SIU of the CNPA including, salary supplements for NIU members (and DEA for SIU members). INL reports that the NIU strength is 492, up from 482 last quarter. Unit strength changes on an ongoing basis.<sup>572</sup> According to DOD, the partnering of national-level counterdrug units with U.S. Special Forces led to a slight increase of operations and arrests, but long-term mentoring is likely required to maintain these gains.<sup>573</sup>

As of late 2015, INL started support for SIU training and professional development. The NIU/SIU program is also supported by various DOD-funded activities, which include the SMW and specialized training.<sup>574</sup>

In July 2016, INL signed a letter of agreement with UNODC for \$2.4 million to support the CNPA's mobile detection team, precursor control unit and forensic lab. The agreement will last 24 months.<sup>575</sup>

During the April to June 2016 period, INL reported that combined seizures of the NIU and SIU totaled 2,267 kilograms (kg) of opium, 93 kg of heroin, 650 kg of morphine base, 1,550 kg of morphine solution

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.13

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2016										
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*	TOTAL
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	270	179	3,274
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	442	394	292	3,634
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,785	123,056	895,818
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,056	2,859	3,100	35,172
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	6,450	59,912
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,379	27,600	9,022	429,713
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	4,943	700,491

Note: The FY 2015 figure for precursor chemicals seized includes a 135,000 kg seizure in December.  
\* Results for period 10/1/2015–9/15/2016 only.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/29/2015 and 9/27/2016.

and 500 kg of hashish. One kilogram is about 2.2 pounds. The NIU and SIU were responsible for 44 arrests and participated in 114 enforcement operations.<sup>576</sup>

DOD reported that from July 1 to September 14, 2016, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 21 drug-interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 45 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. The Afghans' combined operations resulted in the seizures of 936 kg of opium, 4,300 kg morphine, 19 kg of heroin, 180 kg of hashish/marijuana, and 3,190 kg of precursor chemicals. As noted in previous SIGAR reports, interdiction results have been declining since 2012, as shown in Table 3.13.<sup>577</sup>

Given the U.S. military's reduced capabilities in Afghanistan, in 2015 DOD created a regional narcotics interagency fusion cell (RNIFC) to combat the regional drug trade. The RNIFC, located in Bahrain, tracks and interdicts the illicit movement of Afghan heroin on boats destined for the Middle East and East Africa.<sup>578</sup>

## Aviation Support

Between July 1 and September 30, 2016, INL's air wing in Afghanistan provided the following air support to the DEA (fixed-wing and rotary-wing support for National Interdiction Unit movements): 13.8 flight hours, 21 sorties, 238 personnel transported, and 11,978 pounds of cargo moved. Additionally, the air wing provided transport for 463 INL and DEA passengers on embassy-required air shuttles for all movements within Kabul.<sup>579</sup>

INL's ability to support tactical operations in the south and southwest regions of the country has been constrained since the June 2015 closure of INL's base at Kandahar Air Field. INL continues to assist the NIU and

**Precursor chemical:** a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture, and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, viii.

SIU. The arrival of a Resolute Support advisory team in February 2016 at the NIU compound has greatly improved NIU access to Resolute Support assets, including the Afghan Government's Special Mission Wing for movement support for operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan. Since October 2015, 16 NIU missions have been supported by the SMW.<sup>580</sup>

## SIGAR INSPECTION

A completed SIGAR inspection report found that the Special Mission Wing (SMW) Air Squadron's facilities at Kandahar Airfield and the infrastructure built by Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC) were generally constructed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications. SIGAR found five instances where ECC was not in full compliance of those requirements and specifications. It also found that not all facilities were being used at full capacity. The Air Squadron is using them to support SMW training and operations. However, as the squadron grows from its current size of 100 personnel, usage is likely to increase. Please see Section 2 for more information on this report.