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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
SIGAR’s analysis of the most recent data provided by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) suggests that the security situation in Afghanistan has not improved this quarter. The numbers of the Afghan security forces are decreasing, while both casualties and the number of districts under insurgent control or influence are increasing.98

During his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2016, then-Lieutenant General John W. Nicholson Jr., commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, said Afghanistan had an air-power shortfall.99 General Nicholson, in a press conference on December 2, provided details of Department of Defense (DOD) plans to replace Afghanistan’s aging Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter fleet with U.S.-made UH-60 “Black Hawk” helicopters.100 DOD reported that the current Mi-17 fleet in Afghanistan is in a state of steady decline due to higher-than-anticipated utilization rates and accelerating attrition that need to be addressed in the coming years.101 General Nicholson also stated that Afghan requests for Russian technical assistance for the Mi-17s had not been fruitful.102

In November 2016, DOD requested $814.5 million from Congress as part of an amendment to the fiscal year (FY) 2017 Overseas Contingency Operation Budget to purchase and upgrade obsolete U.S. Army UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters for Afghanistan. The budget request, still awaiting congressional approval, would also fund additional A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, MD-530 helicopters, and an armed variant of the single-turboprop C-208 utility aircraft.103

On December 23, 2016, President Obama signed the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, authorizing up to $4.26 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). The ASFF is the United States’ principal fund to build, train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). President Obama pledged to recommend to his successor that the United States continue to seek funding for the ANDSF at or near current levels through 2020. For its part, the international community pledged at the October 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw to provide more than $800 million annually for the ANDSF from
SECURITY

2018 to 2020.\[104\] NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is the largest and longest operation in the alliance’s history.\[105\]

After nearly a decade, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan ended on December 31, 2016, in accordance with a December 2014 Council of the European Union decision, as planned for the expected (now extended) end of the Resolute Support (RS) mission. The EU will, however, continue a smaller mission beginning in March 2017 that will have a narrower focus on ministry-level advising.\[106\]

### U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY

As of December 31, 2016, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly $70.6 billion to support the ANDSF. This accounts for 60% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since FY 2002.

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Additionally, ASFF is used to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not considered part of the ANDSF. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. According to DOD, ASFF funds are transferred to Da Afghanistan Bank, similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve, and then the Ministry of Finance sends treasury checks to fund the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.\[107\] Of the $66 billion appropriated for the ASFF, $61.8 billion had been obligated and $60.7 billion disbursed.\[108\]

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; and gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces.

### UN Reports Afghan Security Deteriorating

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General reported in December that Afghanistan’s security situation further deteriorated between January and October 2016, with intensifying armed clashes between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban. Armed clashes reached their highest level since UN reporting began in 2007, and marked a 22% increase over the same period in 2015.\[109\] The Taliban continued to challenge government control in key districts and attempted to cut off strategically important highways and supply routes.\[110\]

The UN recorded 6,261 security incidents between August 16 and November 17, 2016, as reflected in Figure 3.26, representing a 9% increase from the same period in 2015, and an 18% decrease from the same period
in 2014. As in past UN reporting, armed clashes account for the majority of the security incidents (65%), followed by those involving improvised-explosive devices (18%). During the period, the majority of the recorded security incidents (60%) continued to occur in the southern, southeastern, and eastern regions.

According to DOD, there were 5,271 enemy-initiated attacks which resulted in at least one non-insurgent being killed or wounded between June 1 and November 30, 2016, less than the 5,822 during the same period in 2015, for monthly averages of 879 and 971 respectively. Direct fire remains the most common form of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by improvised-explosive device (IED) explosions and mine strikes. DOD reported the number of direct-fire attacks has grown dramatically as the Taliban increased attacks on ANA and ANP.
“[ISIL] still poses, obviously, a threat to Afghanistan [and] the people of Afghanistan. We’ll continue to stay very, very focused on ISIL wherever it rears its head, whether it’s Afghanistan, whether it’s Iraq and Syria, whether it’s other parts of the world.”

— Peter Cook, Pentagon Press Secretary

Source: Peter Cook, Department of Defense, in the Pentagon Briefing Room, 11/22/2016.

As the year ended, the ANSF were fighting insurgents in areas such as Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Kunduz, Laghman, Zabul, Wardak, and Faryab Provinces. DOD reported that discord between various political, ethnic, and tribal factions within the Afghan government, as well as delays in or fallouts from potential parliamentary elections, could contribute to a degradation of the security situation. DOD predicted the insurgency will continue to exploit ANDSF vulnerabilities. As Afghan Air Force (AAF) capabilities grow, DOD predicted the Taliban are likely to use smaller groupings of fighters. They will likely use harassing attacks against lightly defended checkpoints, challenge the ANDSF in rural areas, and impede ground lines of communication to isolate district and provincial centers prior to attacking them.

DOD assessed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) numbers will not present a security impact outside isolated provinces in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, General Nicholson reported a concern that any of the 20 terrorist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region—13 in Afghanistan and seven in Pakistan—could morph into “a more virulent strain” wherein “the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.”

Civilian Casualties

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that 8,397 conflict-related civilian casualties occurred between January 1 and September 30, 2016, a 1% decrease compared to the same period in 2015. UNAMA found that antigovernment elements, responsible for 61% of the civilian casualties, were perpetrating illegal and indiscriminate attacks and were deliberately targeting civilians. A Nangarhar provincial spokesperson reported on December 23, 2016, that ISIL destroyed 230 homes, two mosques, a 10-bed hospital, and three schools during a nearly 45-day period after seizing the Pachir Agam district. In addition, more than 200 acres of farm land were destroyed, about 5,000 livestock were killed, and 63 men were still being held captive.

UNAMA reported a 67% increase in the number of casualties caused by unexploded ordnance; 84% of the 510 casualties were children. On October 18, 2016, UNAMA concluded that a July 23 ISIL attack on ethnic-Hazara demonstrators—the deadliest single incident recorded by the UN in Afghanistan since 2001—deliberately targeted civilians. UNAMA called on all parties to abide by international humanitarian law reiterating that attacks directly targeting civilians may constitute war crimes. Of the civilian casualties, some 23% were attributed to pro-government forces (which includes the ANDSF and Coalition forces). UNAMA also raised concerns about a 72% increase in civilian casualties caused by aerial strikes.

On January 12, American and Afghan media outlets reported the results of USFOR-A’s investigation into a joint U.S.-Afghan special forces airstrike against Taliban insurgents in Kunduz Province in early November. The
investigation concluded that 33 civilians were killed, 27 civilians were wounded, and two U.S. military personnel and three Afghan commandos were killed. USFOR-A said the operation was conducted to capture Taliban leaders deemed responsible for violence in Kunduz in October. Their investigation found that U.S. forces used the minimum force necessary to successfully neutralize the threats posed by the enemy from civilian buildings, and the civilian casualties were likely a result of those civilians having been inside buildings the Taliban were occupying. Having determined that U.S. forces were acting in self-defense in accordance with all applicable laws and policies, USFOR-A plans no further action.128

High-profile attacks continue. At least six people were killed and 128 wounded when Taliban attackers drove an explosive-laden truck into the German consulate in Mazar-e Sharif on November 10, 2016. The Taliban claimed the attack was retaliation for Germany’s support of the above-mentioned airstrike in Kunduz.129 A Taliban attack on a Helmand parliamentarian’s home in Kabul on December 21, 2016, left the MP injured and eight people dead, including the MP's two grandsons and the son of an Uruzgan MP.130 Two days later, unidentified gunmen fired on the home of a former Taliban leader who had reintegrated into Afghan society and was active in efforts to revive peace talks.131 On December 28, a Bamiyan parliamentarian was wounded and his bodyguard killed when a roadside bomb detonated.132

On January 10, a suicide bomber followed by a vehicle-borne explosion rocked Kabul, killing at least 50 people and wounding 150 near government and legislative offices.133 Later that day, an explosion in the Kandahar governor’s compound killed at least 10 people, including five United Arab Emirates (UAE) diplomats and the deputy governor. The Taliban denied responsibility, saying the blast, which also wounded the governor and the UAE ambassador, stemmed from “internal” local government disputes. The attack was the deadliest on UAE’s diplomatic corps in the country’s 45-year history.134

DISTRICT CONTROL CONTINUES TO DECLINE

U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) reported that approximately 57.2% of the country’s 407 districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of November 15, 2016, a 6.2% decrease from the 63.4% reported last quarter in late August, and a nearly 15% decrease since November 2015.135 As reflected in Table 3.6 on page 90, of the 407 districts of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 233 districts were under government control (83 districts) or influence (150), 41 districts (in 15 provinces) were under insurgent control (9) or influence (32), and 133 districts were “contested.”136 According to USFOR-A, the number of districts under insurgent control or influence rose 2% from August 30 to November 15, 2016, to 10.1% of the country’s total districts, and the number of

“This is an insurgency that still enjoys sanctuary and support from outside the country; that’s very difficult for the Afghans to defeat.”

—General John Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

contested districts rose 4.2% over the same period to 32.7% of all districts.\textsuperscript{137} Previously USFOR-A has described contested districts as having “negligible meaningful impact from insurgents,” contending that neither the insurgency nor the Afghan government maintains significant control over these areas.\textsuperscript{138}

USFOR-A identified the regions/provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with five out of six (83.3%) of its districts under insurgent control or influence, and Helmand with eight out of 14 (57.1%) of its districts under insurgent control or influence.\textsuperscript{139} The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence.\textsuperscript{140} The NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission determines district status by assessing five indicators of stability: governance, security, infrastructure, economy, and communications.\textsuperscript{141}

USFOR-A attributes the loss of government control or influence over territory to the ANDSF’s strategic approach to security prioritization, identifying the most important areas that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat, and focusing less on areas with less strategic importance.\textsuperscript{142}

Under its new Sustainable Security Strategy, the ANDSF targets “disrupt” districts for clearance operations when the opportunity arises, but will give first priority to protecting “hold” and “fight” districts under its control.\textsuperscript{143} USFOR-A determined that from August to November 2016, all the districts that moved under insurgent control or influence were located in “disrupt” areas and that the ANDSF actually increased the Afghan government’s influence over the population in districts prioritized as “fight” and “hold” areas.\textsuperscript{144}

USFOR-A noted that the insurgents failed in their eight attempts to capture a provincial capital this year.\textsuperscript{145} Although the insurgents gained some ground,

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Control Status} & \textbf{Districts} & \textbf{Population} & \textbf{Area} \\
& Number & % & In millions & % & Sq Km & % \\
\hline
GIROA & 20.4 & 63.6 & 367,638 & 57.1 \\
Control & 83 & 20.4 \\
Influence & 150 & 36.9 \\
CONTESTED & 133 & 32.7 & 9.2 & 28.7 & 172,088 & 26.7 \\
INSURGENT & 2.5 & 7.8 & 104,063 & 16.2 \\
Control & 9 & 2.2 \\
Influence & 32 & 7.9 \\
Total & 407 & 100 & 32.1 & 100 & 643,789 & 100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{District Control within the 34 Afghanistan Provinces as of November 26, 2016}
\end{table}

Note: GIROA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, sq km = square kilometers.
USFOR-A determined that “the amount of population that the insurgency influences or controls decreased from 2.9 million to 2.5 million (a decrease of 1.2%)” in the last three months. As reflected in Table 3.6, of the 32.1 million people living in Afghanistan, USFOR-A has assessed that the majority, 20.4 million (63.5%), live in areas controlled or influenced by the government, while another 9.2 million people (28.7%) live in areas that are contested.

**U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN**

According to DOD, the RS train, advise, and assist mission consisted of 13,332 U.S. and Coalition personnel as of December 2016. Of that number, 6,941 were U.S. forces and 6,391 were from 26 NATO allies and 12 non-NATO partners. The number of U.S. forces conducting or supporting counterterrorism operations is reported in this report’s classified annex; however, the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was reported to be “approximately 9,000,” decreasing more recently to no more than 8,448.

Between the start of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) on January 1, 2015, through December 29, 2016, 19 U.S. military personnel assigned to OFS were killed in action, in addition to 12 non-hostile deaths, for a total of 31 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 145 U.S. military personnel assigned to OFS were wounded in action. Since January 1, 2015, through the last update on March 7, 2016, seven U.S. civilians or contractors were killed due to hostile actions in addition to nine deaths due to non-hostile causes. Nine DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor personnel were wounded during this period. Last quarter, DOD noted that some of the contractors may have been involved in missions other than Resolute Support’s train, advise, and assist mission. From January 1, 2016, through November 12, 2016, a total of three “insider” attacks—ANDSF personnel turning weapons on U.S. or allied military personnel—were directed against U.S. forces. A suicide-bombing attack on U.S. personnel at Bagram airfield in November killed three people (one U.S. military and two U.S. civilians) and injured 17 U.S. military personnel (one of whom later died). In one incident, an Afghan policeman killed one person and wounded two, including an Afghan soldier, at a checkpoint for the Karzai International Airport in Kabul on December 14, 2016. USFOR-A warned that their numbers may differ from official Afghan government casualty figures, which could be subject to some degree of error.
Updates in Developing the Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF). The highlights of each function reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** While the Afghan ministries’ abilities to account for personnel and pay remains a challenge, this quarter the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) was integrated with both ministries’ identification (ID) card systems, to allow AHRIMS to automatically download personnel ID card information.\(^{158}\)

- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** The MOI Inspector General (MOI IG) selected three zone IG officers for each of the seven zones outside Kabul. To maintain independence, the new IG officers report directly to the MOI IG, not to their zone commanders. This quarter 17 of the 21 new officers reported for duty.\(^{159}\) The MOI IG completed the first monthly plan-of-action priority report, which listed 110 findings.\(^{160}\)

- **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** This quarter the number of gross violations of human rights (GVHR) cases identified by the MOD increased from four to 16, the number of MOI cases from 24 to 30. Additionally, the investigations were completed for 11 of the MOD cases and 10 of the MOI cases.\(^{161}\)

- **EF-4 (Force Generation):** EF-4 reported the Afghan Command Staff Academy’s plan to increase the number of pre-command courses makes it “more likely” that the ANA will have the required number of kandak (battalion) and brigade commanders trained per the Common Policy Agreement. See Table 3.7 for more information about Afghan Army terminology. As of November 2016, six of 36 brigade commanders and 18 of 257 kandak commanders have completed the pre-command course.\(^{162}\) During testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in February 2016, then RS and USFOR-A commander General John F. Campbell attributed at least 70% of the Afghan security forces’ problems to poor leadership.\(^{163}\) Officer training such as the pre-command courses attempt to close that critical shortfall. Regular meetings with the MOD General Staff, the ANA Training and Education Directorate, and the Marshal Fahim National Defense University commander were established to address common issues and synchronize efforts.\(^{164}\)

- **EF-5 (Sustainment):** Over the past several months, EF-5 established an expeditionary sustainment advisory team (eSAT) to assess ANA corps logistics capabilities. In November, in a joint eSAT with the MOD and ANA, the EF-5 conducted an assessment of the 209th Corps focusing on winter requirements and logistics capabilities.\(^{165}\) EF-5, along with EF-6, is assessing the first use of the Afghan National Tracking

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**FIVE STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strengthen public order and security and prevent and combat destructive and riotous activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Enforce the rule of law and fight against crimes including narcotics and corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Strengthen strategic management and communications systems through institutional development, respect human rights and gender, and implement structural reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Improve professionalism and civilianization in the Ministry of Interior, provide quality security services to the public and strengthen public trust toward the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Improve the quality and effectiveness of infrastructure, resources, and support services to the MOI</td>
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</table>


The **Common Policy Agreement**, signed by the Afghan Defense Minister on September 16, 2016, is a set of guidelines to help the ANDSF improve internal behaviors, professionalize the force, and generate combat power. Coalition advisors provide monthly reports to Afghan leadership on the policy agreement implementation progress and compliance, which triggers both rewards and penalties.

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System for the ANA’s National Transportation Brigade during a convoy mission to the 209th Corps and what effects having better real-time visibility of the brigade provides. In addition, the MOI was able to cancel a $16 million annual contract by using existing radio systems to provide a similar service.

- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** EF-6 has two missions: (1) strategic planning and policy and the (2) execution and employment of the force. For the execution and employment mission, EF-6 oversees execution of operations to ensure forces are used correctly. This quarter EF-6 reported on the efforts to finalize the Afghan winter campaign plan. In November, the ANDSF corps and zone commanders presented their implementation plans to political, military, and police leadership. A week following the conference, the Chief of General Staff met with the commanders to address specific concerns.

- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** EF-7 reported on the improvements to battle-damage-assessment reporting into the national intelligence-based system. The AAF submission of battle-damage results into the system allows the ANA to assess the effectiveness of the air strikes and to reattack targets as necessary. ANA corps now submit proposed targets into the system electronically rather than using paper. According to EF-7, the standardized targeting checklist and coordination process is helping to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage. Under the leadership of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategic Intelligence, 1,883 persons were identified as being on the MOD and ANA payrolls improperly, 260 vehicles were being illegally used, and ANA personnel were being improperly equipped, paid, or housed.

- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** Afghan communication capabilities were deemed successful at the European Union’s Brussels Conference, according to EF-8. The MOI Media and Public Affairs Directorate partnered with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan on a “code of conduct” information-awareness campaign throughout the country to increase Afghan citizens’ perceptions of the ANP. EF-8 reported the ANA has improved in the area of conducting media operations independently from the MOD, but some ANA corps commanders are still slow to engage the media without direction from Kabul.

- **Gender Office:** While several factors affect EF advisors’ ability to promote women, RS reports the most significant factor is Afghan receptivity to and acceptance of more women in the workplace. The Gender Advisor Office noted that collaboration across the EFs helped them achieve several gender-related outcomes this quarter, including appointing six women into new MOD oversight positions and one into a gender-focused subject-matter-expert position at the MOI.

According to Afghan media reports, close to 160 contractors claim the MOI has not paid them nearly 3 billion afghanis for work completed. The ministry is reportedly investigating the claims, some nearly two years old. Shortly after the media reporting, the DOD Inspector General released an audit that found Afghan provincial leaders, though lacking authority to obligate the MOI, were making informal agreements with contractors to provide goods and services. CSTC-A is now working with the MOI to review and either accept or reject the claims from Afghan fiscal year 1394 (2015) valued at approximately $142 million. For more information, refer to Section 4 of this report.

### Table 3.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Approximate Afghan Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>14,000-22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Division*</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Kandak</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Tolay</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The Afghan National Army has one division, the 111th (Capital Division in the Kabul area; most personnel serve in the six corps organizations, each of which comprises three brigades plus support units. U.S. and Afghan units are not identical in strength or equipment. This table shows the equivalent terms in each organizational hierarchy.

“When you look at the performance of the Afghan forces this year, it was a tough year. They were tested, but they prevailed.”

—General John Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan


ANDSF HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS DEMONSTRATED MIXED RESULTS

According to DOD, the ANDSF are generally performing better than at the same point last year, although ANP development continues to lag behind the ANA. The Taliban experienced some small-scale success against the ANDSF, but the summer campaign also offered genuine operational-level experience that Afghan forces intend to build upon. In a December 2, 2016, press briefing, General Nicholson reported the ANDSF thwarted eight Taliban attempts to seize key cities during 2016—three times in Kunduz; twice in Lashkar Gar, Helmand; twice in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan; and Farah City. On October 6, 2016, the ANDSF prevailed against four simultaneous attacks on different cities. General Nicholson said the ANDSF’s ability to deal with simultaneous crises reflects their growing capability and maturity.

However, with the exception of Afghan special-operations and aviation units, DOD says U.S. advisors have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below ANA corps- and ANP zone-headquarters levels. Figure 3.27 shows the areas of responsibility for the RS train, advise, and assist commands and the ANDSF’s corps and zones. On a case-specific basis, RS will deploy an expeditionary advisory team to work at those lower echelons for a limited period of time. In addition to USFOR-A advisor observations and TAA activities, the advisors rely on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. The consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of this data varies and cannot be independently verified by U.S. officials.

General Nicholson said a review of the NATO advising mission and its requirements is performed every six months. According to General Nicholson, training and sustainment teams will be added to each of the ANA corps in the American zones of responsibility. USFOR-A said the ANDSF headquarters elements demonstrated mixed results across the area of operations due to:

- **Training**—Corps and zones significantly challenged by enemy activity are slow to implement training cycles for their units.
- **Reporting**—The quality of ANP reporting results in zone headquarters rarely having acceptable situational awareness of units’ status.
- **Corruption**—Small but positive steps against corruption have been demonstrated by corps and zone commanders who have initiated investigations of leaders acting suspiciously.
- **Overuse of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)**—Overuse of the ASSF continues despite both the MOD and MOI having signed a formal agreement to curb such overuse.
- **Operational Planning**—This year’s planning efforts were the best to date, according to ANDSF leaders. The MOD Chief of General Staff requested input on operational designs and objectives and for training and operational priorities after the ANDSF corps and zone

EF-1 officials train Afghan MOD employees at a financial management seminar on December 18, 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by LTJG Egdanis Torres Sierra)

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EF-1 officials train Afghan MOD employees at a financial management seminar on December 18, 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by LTJG Egdanis Torres Sierra)
Commanders’ winter campaign implementation plans focused on their limitations and equipment requests.

- **Conduct of operations**—The ANDSF headquarters elements demonstrated improved ability to conduct combined-arms operations, executed several successful summer campaign operations, and prevented the Taliban from achieving any of their stated operational goals.

The Coalition continues to focus train-adviser-assist efforts on combat-enabler capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), artillery, aerial fires, and counter-IED capabilities. DOD reported the ANDSF has demonstrated increased operational capabilities such as independently planning intelligence-driven operations and integrating air power, as they have with the A-29 and the MD-530 aircraft, into operations planning. According to DOD, AAF close air attack and armed overwatch capabilities are still developing; nonetheless, their increasing close-air-attack capability has bolstered ANDSF ground forces’ motivation and enhanced their will to fight. DOD attributes the improving integration of ISR and aerial fires as a key factor contributing to ANDSF successes across the country as compared with 2015 when these capabilities were nascent.
In his December 2 press briefing, General Nicholson addressed the tough fight the ANA 215th Corps endured this year in Helmand Province and the process to regenerate the forces over the coming winter months, as occurred last winter. He said six of the 215th’s kandaks will be withdrawn from the battlefield, issued new weapons, have equipment refurbished, and receive replacement troops.\footnote{189}

DOD reported the inability of ANDSF leaders across the force to effectively command and control operations, coupled with poor discipline of junior leaders in some units, hinders effectiveness in nearly every ministry functional and ANDSF capability area. Leadership at the ANP zone, ANA corps, brigade, and kandak level is a key factor in ANDSF unit success, but it is uneven across the force, according to DOD, and required more robust leadership development to build and retain a professional force.\footnote{190}

General Nicholson said the ANDSF is making progress transitioning to a merit-based selection process with the selection of the new sergeant major of the army.\footnote{191} A senior RS official told SIGAR that President Ashraf Ghani had ordered the entire AAF chain-of-command replaced after learning of corruption and ineffectiveness in the senior leadership ranks and the potential for U.S. funding to halt if more effective AAF leaders were not found.\footnote{192} The official also told SIGAR that Ghani had ordered all ANA supply-system personnel currently in position to be replaced over three years. RS predicted this move will significantly reduce the “entrenched criminal patronage networks” within the supply system. CSTC-A will likely train the new personnel.\footnote{193}
DOD reported the ASSF in both the MOD and MOI continue to be more proficient than conventional forces, leading the Afghan government to rely heavily on the ASSF for conventional operations where the ANA or ANP would be more appropriate. The 17,000-member special forces currently conducts nearly 70% of the ANA’s offensive operations, and it operates independently of U.S. forces about 80% of the time. As they represent only a small fraction of the 300,000-strong ANDSF, General Nicholson expressed concern for the specially selected and trained forces and discussed the plan to regenerate the force over the winter and to increase their numbers. The Afghan Interior minister noted that ANP commandos conducted 1,482 special operations in the past nine months, killing at least 1,551 insurgents (including 400 key commanders), wounding 653, and confiscating 487 kg of explosives and 863 weapons.

The ANDSF’s counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capability continues to improve, according to the DOD. Since June, more than 500 personnel completed various C-IED courses. The primary ANDSF C-IED training facilities are sufficiently resourced but lack experienced staff, according to the DOD.

DOD assessed in December that the ANSDF are effective when conducting deliberate, offensive operations but are less so when assigned to checkpoints. The smaller ANP checkpoints are vulnerable to attacks, while their large numbers can limit combat maneuverability and create challenges for resupply and troop replacement. Local officials, however, continue to exert political pressure for the ANDSF to maintain a protective presence against insurgents in their area.

The Common Policy Agreement requires the ANA to reduce checkpoints, staff each remaining checkpoint with at least a platoon-sized force, and state the operational purpose of each checkpoint in writing. Under the terms of the agreement, Coalition advisors can use incentives and impose penalties to encourage the ANDSF to reduce checkpoints. In addition, Coalition advisers are training one corps on the use of mobile checkpoints to increase their offensive maneuverability.

Coordination between the MOD and the MOI also remains a challenge, according to DOD. Generally the regional Operations Coordination Centers (OCC) are effective at integrating ANA and ANP activities, while the provincial OCCs are not as effective, and a lack of tactical coordination at the district level commonly results in confusion as to which organization is in charge. DOD reported the provincial OCCs suffer from insufficient manning, equipment, and ministerial-level guidance, and from conflicts with existing local and informal command-and-control channels. Additionally, DOD reported MOI senior leaders often bypass the zone-headquarters commanders to contact the provincial level directly. However, in an example of improved cooperation between the ministries, the MOD included the MOI in winter campaign planning.
Although the ANDSF’s strategic communications operations are strong at the national level, DOD reported challenges remain in provincial and local level operations because they do not effectively synchronize and coordinate messages. The MOD and MOI are mitigating this through national-level deployable media centers that travel where needed to manage messaging.203

Last quarter, USFOR-A reported the ANDSF lacked a risk-management system and relied heavily on U.S. forces to prevent strategic failure. This quarter USFOR-A explained that risk-management personnel are identifying the risks to the mission and to the force in both current and future operations, as well as identifying mitigating measures. Coalition advisors are instructing ANDSF mission planners to identify and mitigate risks.204

**ANDSF Strength**

As of November 26, 2016, ANDSF assigned force strength was 315,962 (not including civilians), according to USFOR-A.205 As reflected in Table 3.8, the ANA is at 86.3% and the ANP at 94% of authorized strength, not including civilian employees.206 The November 2016 assigned-strength number reflects a decrease of 1,295 personnel over the same period last year.207

Compared to last quarter, the ANP had a decrease of 845 personnel, the first time it has decreased in strength in a year. The ANA (including Afghan Air Force and civilians) decreased by 1,108 personnel, as shown in Table 3.9.208 However, when ANA civilians are excluded, the decrease in ANA military strength was 902 personnel.209

According to DOD, attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP, in part because ANA soldiers enlist for limited lengths of duty and have more widespread deployments across the country, while police view their careers as longer-term endeavors.210 The ANA does not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas to decrease the potential for local influence. DOD observed that the policy results in increased transportation costs and obstacles for soldiers attempting to take leave, contributing to some soldiers going absent without leave. However, the ANP historically suffers significantly more casualties than the ANA.211

According to DOD, the Coalition is no longer encouraging pay incentives or salary to address retention, as they have not been shown to be effective.212 SIGAR has an ongoing Special Project on the Afghan military students who go missing while attending U.S.-funded training in the United States.

**ANDSF Causalities**

From January 1, 2016, through November 12, 2016, according to figures provided by the Afghan government to USFOR-A, 6,785 ANDSF service members were killed and an additional 11,777 members were wounded.213 DOD reported the majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct-fire attacks, with IED explosions and mine strikes accounting for much lower levels of casualties.214
AHRIMS and APPS

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management system (AHRIMS) contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and current position of ANDSF personnel. AHRIMS also contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI along with information such as unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is under development and when implemented will integrate the data in AHRIMS with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.215

Two other systems round out the effort to manage personnel: the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) and the ANDSF Identification Card System (ID). APPS, AABIS, and ID will contain unique biometric-registration numbers. Only those ANDSF members registered in AABIS will be issued an ID, and only those members both registered and with a linked ID will be authorized to have an APPS record. AABIS will
electronically update the ID system and APPS, eliminating the error-prone manual process of inputting 40-digit numbers into the ID system.216

CSTC-A is currently overseeing the integration of the biometrically linked ID into the APPS to ensure the employee exists and that payments are sent directly into the employee’s bank account.217 According to CSTC-A, this structure will dramatically reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying for “ghost” personnel. Routine checks will still be required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF.218

USFOR-A reported in November that the two ongoing efforts to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in AHRIMS to migrate into APPS are: slotting, matching a person to an authorized position; and data cleansing, correcting and completing key personnel data.219 A Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) is also ongoing to correct the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.220 USFOR-A reported that the PAI’s review and updating of personnel records for the ANA and ANP will continue until April 2017.221 MOI leadership has agreed to automate this process where possible, replacing the current paper-based process and reducing the time it takes to slot personnel into assigned positions and the potential for repetitions.222

As of January 1, 2017, USFOR-A reported that 80% of ANA personnel (a five percentage-point increase since late August)223 and 88% of ANP personnel224 were “slotted” to authorized positions, against a goal of 95% slotted in both forces.225 A senior CSTC-A official told SIGAR that as of January 1, 2017, ANDSF salaries will be paid only to those MOD and MOI personnel who are correctly registered in AHRIMS.226 According to the Wall Street Journal, Major General Richard Kaiser of CSTC-A said by mid-January, more than 30,000 names of suspected “ghost” soldiers have been taken off the ANA payroll, and the Afghans have until the summer of 2017 to prove that these names belong to actual soldiers. Top U.S. military officials estimate that this will save the U.S. millions of dollars each month.227

Ministries of Defense and Interior Progress Projections Released for Fiscal Year 2017

The RS Essential Function (EF) directorates and the Gender Advisor Office use the Essential Function Program of Actions and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in the ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI).228 Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the overall assessment of the ministry.229 The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific
function without Coalition advising or involvement. This quarter, RS classified the overall assessments of the MOD and MOI; SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

However, this quarter, RS provided projected ratings for each ministry’s essential-function achievements by the end of FY 2017. The MOD is estimated to achieve seven POAM at the highest, “sustaining capability” rating, 21 at “fully effective,” and 14 at “partially effective” of a total of 44. The MOI is estimated to achieve five POAM at the “sustaining capability” rating, 12 at “fully effective,” and seven at “partially effective” of a total of 31. Comparatively, in last year’s projected ratings of POAM achieved by the end of FY 2016, both ministries were estimated to have achieved a higher number of “sustaining capability” POAM (nine for MOD and seven for MOI) but a lower number of “fully effective” POAM (19 for MOD and 12 for MOI).

Afghan Local Police

Afghan Local Police members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP is paid via the UN Development Programme’s multilateral Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the ALP is paid with U.S.-provided ASFF on-budget assistance to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted as part of the ANDSF’s 352,000 authorized end strength.

As of November 9, 2016, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP has 27,623 guardians, 23,865 of whom are trained; 3,557 remain untrained, and 201 are currently in training. The ALP has incurred a 954-person force reduction since late August. Consistent with advising the Afghan security forces at the ANA corps and ANP zone-headquarters level, NSOCC-A advises the ALP at the ALP staff-directorate level; it does not track ALP retention, attrition, or losses. However, the Afghan government reported that 192 ALP guardians were killed in action from September to October 2016, and 550 were wounded between June and October 2016.

NSOCC-A reported the estimated FY 2016 cost to support the ALP at its authorized end strength of 30,000 is $97.5 million, the same as last quarter. The United States expects to fund approximately $93 million, with the Afghan government contributing the remaining $4.5 million.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported efforts continue to enroll ALP personnel into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS), to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic-funds-transfer (EFT) process, and to inventory materiel. These processes are expected to help track and train ALP personnel. According to NSOCC-A, 79.4% of ALP personnel are now enrolled with biometrically linked identification cards, 85% are registered to receive salary payments via EFT, and 57.9% are now “actively
slotted” into AHRIMS, meaning that each ALP guardian has a biometric transaction control number, an ID card number, and an AHRIMS tashkil number.\footnote{243}

These reform requirements to identify and pay ALP personnel are intended to eliminate the existence of “ghost,” or nonexistent, personnel within the ALP. The MOI’s 1395 Bilateral Financial Commitment letter laid out clear goals for the completion of ALP registration for biometric IDs (100% of the ALP) and EFT salary payments (90% of the ALP) as well as slotting ALP personnel in AHRIMS (95% of ALP) by December 20, 2016.\footnote{244}

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported that while the ALP will not reach these goals, NSOCC-A has recommended no penalties given the efforts of the ALP Staff Directorate and the Deputy, Deputy Minister for Security (DDM SEC) to complete the requirements. They noted that from September to October 2016, the DDM SEC dispatched teams to each of the police zones specifically to oversee and assist with biometric and ARHIMS enrollment.\footnote{245}

For more information about AHRIMS and the Afghan Personnel Payment System (APPS), see pages 99–100 of this section.

NSOCC-A reported this quarter that the new DDM SEC, a former AUP Commander, will maintain supervisory oversight of the ALP and is said to be a major proponent of ALP reform, including reassigning ALP personnel discovered working for local powerbrokers.\footnote{246}

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $41.1 billion and disbursed $40.5 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.\footnote{247}

**Troop Strength Declined for Third Consecutive Quarter**

As of November 20, 2016, the overall assigned strength of the ANA, including the Afghan Air Force (AAF) but not including civilians, was 168,327 personnel.\footnote{248} Compared to last quarter, ANA strength including AAF and civilians decreased by 1,108 personnel, as shown in Table 3.9 on page 99 of this section.\footnote{249} When ANA civilians are not included, however, the ANA military strength decreased by 902 personnel, an improvement from last quarter’s decrease of 2,199 personnel.\footnote{250} ANA assigned military personnel are at 86.3% of the authorized end strength.\footnote{251} The number of ANA civilians reported this quarter was 6,623.\footnote{252}

USFOR-A reported overall ANA attrition over the autumn months at 2.9% during August, 2.3% during September, and 3.1% during October.\footnote{253} Corps-level attrition figures have been classified this quarter and will be reported in the classified annex of this report.

The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MOLSAMD) is responsible for providing services such as pensions and working with other Afghan ministries to distribute land and apartments, healthcare,
international scholarships, and the *hajj* benefit (for an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca) to wounded ANDSF members and the families of those killed. According to USFOR-A, of the 12,322 ANA killed since 2003, the MOLSAMD has received documentation for only 4,600. While some funding has been provided to those families that have not submitted the proper documentation, that practice may soon end without an extension of the MOD agreement to continue benefits for those without documentation. According to USFOR-A, although insufficient to meet the entire martyr and disabled requirements, international donations have provided funding indirectly to the MOLSAMD (via the Ministry of Finance).254

DOD reported on the establishment of the National Mission Brigade, scheduled to be fully operational in 2018. The brigade will provide ASSF with command-and-control capabilities for contingency operations.255 According to DOD, the ANA have created reserve kandaks for the 201st and 209th Corps, and for the 111th Capital Division, within the authorized 195,000 ANA tashkil level. Former ANA soldiers have been brought back to man the reserve kandaks and will serve in support functions such as providing base security and manning checkpoints. A reserve kandak for the 207th Corps is planned.256

**ANA Sustainment, Salaries, and Incentives**

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $18 billion and disbursed $17.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.257 The majority of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments, but other uses include procuring items such as fuel, ammunition, organizational clothing and individual equipment, aviation sustainment, and vehicle maintenance.258

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and non-payroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1395 (2016) was $595.3 million through September 19, 2016.259 Aside from salaries and incentives, the largest uses of sustainment funding were for fuel ($93.1 million), energy operating equipment ($10.5 million), and building sustainment ($6.2 million).260

CSTC-A reported that the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average $544.1 million annually over the next five years.261 In vetting comments, DOD noted that these forecasted numbers are for planning purposes only and are not definitive indicators of future DOD support, which will depend on Afghan progress toward reconciliation and reducing corruption, security conditions, and other factors.262

Of the $595.3 million spent on ANA sustainment in FY 1395 through September 19, 2016, $191.4 million was spent on salaries and incentives for ANA (MOD) officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers, civilians, and contractors.263 According to CSTC-A, there has been no significant change in the funding provided for ANA (MOD) salaries and incentives from last fiscal year to this fiscal year.264
ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $13.3 billion and disbursed $13.2 billion of ASFF funds for ANA equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, communication equipment, weapons, and other related equipment. Approximately 48.1% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.10.266

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment and related services procured for the ANA increased by over $52.3 million. The majority of the increase was from $23 million in aircraft and related equipment procurements, followed by $15.9 million in communication equipment and $13.5 million in transportation-services equipment procurements. Additionally, CSTC-A reported increases of $41.9 million for vehicles and related equipment, and $43.1 million for ammunition procured and fielded to the ANA. CSTC-A is coordinating with the ANA Trust Fund to procure approximately $9 million in C-IED equipment for the ANA, which will fulfill 100% of the ANA's C-IED organizational equipment requirements. According to CSTC-A, this quarter the MOD also established 26 radio-repair workshops.

As of October 31, 2016, CSTC-A reported the ANA's corps-level equipment operational readiness rates (OR) as 64% for the 201st, 62% for the 203rd, 63% for the 205th, 80% for the 207th, 53% for the 209th, and 34% for the 215th. CSTC-A calculates OR by determining the ratio of fully mission-capable equipment against total authorization. However, some equipment categorized as non-mission capable may still be serviceable for a static location or checkpoint. The OR ratings for this quarter show an average 2% decline across all ANA corps when compared to July 2016, which CSTC-A has previously attributed to heavy fighting and the demanding operational tempo of the summer fighting season. However, CSTC-A expects a steady rise in OR across all ANA corps throughout the winter campaign as the ANA focuses on implementing an operational-readiness cycle in order to prepare for spring 2017 operations.

According to CSTC-A, if the contracting officer representative concurs with an ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program maintenance-site determination that a vehicle cannot be economically repaired, the usable parts can be removed before the vehicle is demilitarized (removing functional capabilities or removing and destroying inherently military features). After that, the ANDSF sends unusable armored and unarmored vehicles provided by the United States to a U.S. Defense Logistics Agency disposition facility.

Core Information Management System

CSTC-A also provided an update on the implementation status of the Core Information Management System (CoreIMS). CoreIMS is part of
the solution to address the Afghan supply-chain logistical capability gap. Since 2012, efforts have been under way to develop and implement an automated system within both ministries to replace their paper-based process.

CoreIMS is a proprietary inventory-management system that is being enhanced to provide visibility of basic items like vehicles, weapons, night-vision devices, and repair parts, both in stock and on order. The system will provide information to help allocate material and analyze usage to predict future item and budget requirements, while reducing opportunities for fraud. The Web-based CoreIMS is available at MOD and MOI national logistic locations, forward-support depots, and regional logistic centers. The goal for the system is to improve Afghan sustainment processes by providing managers and decision makers with the current status of assets. In addition, CSTC-A has provided advanced CoreIMS training for Afghan logistic specialists who are posted throughout the country to train, mentor, and assist other ANA and ANP personnel in logistics operations and CoreIMS functionality.

As of January 2017, DOD reports that the effort to record the repair parts (Class IX) inventory for the ANDSF is well under way, with all major commodities loaded into CoreIMS. With this task completed, CSTC-A said the focus will shift to reconciling the ANDSF’s physical inventory with CoreIMS inventory, as well as managing incoming and outgoing transactional capabilities of CoreIMS such as tracking requested parts, completed orders, and time to fulfill a supply request. Using this data, CoreIMS will provide a predictive analysis capability to identify parts for re-order. Future modules of CoreIMS will account for serial-numbered items and their maintenance records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>$7,360,979,333</td>
<td>$530,527,599</td>
<td>$6,690,648,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>$2,477,929,896</td>
<td>312,253,892</td>
<td>1,562,649,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>$2,469,192,205</td>
<td>272,551,597</td>
<td>2,677,973,293</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>886,857,106</td>
<td>62,334,497</td>
<td>745,480,497</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>884,304,375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>801,295,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>642,851,434</td>
<td>30,824,415</td>
<td>545,320,095</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
<td>455,211,247</td>
<td>128,411,186</td>
<td>354,772,214</td>
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<td>Transportation Services</td>
<td>134,262,169</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,459,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,311,587,765</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,336,903,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12,944,913,864</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised-explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts. Procured and Fielded to the ANA = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOD/ANA. Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/20/2016.
Part of this analytical capability will include integrating CoreIMS with the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), a database of information about the sale and provision of U.S. military materiel, services, and training to foreign countries and international organizations. According to CSTC-A, their trainers and ANDSF personnel have begun that process by auto-populating the SCIP’s foreign military sales (FMS) materiel into CoreIMS. CSTC-A believes that SCIP integration is vital for improved asset visibility.

CSTC-A reports that the SCIP integration began on September 29, 2016, and thus far, the process has achieved auto-population of 98% of the materiel coming into Afghanistan as FMS. CSTC-A explained that this decreases the time and labor required for ANDSF personnel to manually input materiel receipts into CoreIMS, decreases the chance of human error, and ensures incoming orders that are due are visible in CoreIMS 90 days prior to their arrival.

The SCIP-integration process improvement was initiated in conjunction with CSTC-A mandating on October 8, 2016, that the ANDSF use a Transfer Functionality, another process which provides material visibility through its distribution to the ANDSF. CSTC-A believes that SCIP integration of weapons and ammunition data into a “virtual depot” on CoreIMS while leveraging the Transfer Functionality to transfer weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan’s national storage depots will provide 100% visibility of weapons and ammunition being provided to the ANA and ANP. The CoreIMS Transfer Functionality allows for the recording of materiel transferred between the warehouses and depots and creates a notice for the receiving site to expect the materiel.

ANA Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $5.9 billion and disbursed $5.8 billion of ASFF funds for ANA infrastructure such as military-headquarter facilities, schoolhouses, barracks, maintenance facilities, air fields, and roads.

As of November 30, 2016, the United States had completed 390 infrastructure projects valued at $5.2 billion, with another 24 ongoing projects valued at $136.3 million, according to CSTC-A. The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter are: the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul (with an estimated cost of $72.5 million) to be completed in December 2017, a Northern Electrical Interconnect (NEI) substation project in Balkh Province ($27.7 million), and an NEI substation in Kunduz ($9.5 million). Four projects valued at $4.7 million were completed, the three largest of which are a hangar for AAF aircraft in Kabul ($3.8 million), an ANA Regional Logistics Supply Center in Herat Province ($436,776), and upgrades to the Presidential Information Coordination Center (PICC)
Utility in Kabul ($314,325). The PICC, started in 2014, is a central operations hub on the presidential palace grounds housing Afghanistan’s national intelligence functions (ANA, ANP, National Directorate of Security, and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance) that enables the Afghan government to provide coordinated responses to special national security events.

Four contracts with a total value of $6.8 million were awarded this quarter. They included the $3.5 million gym complex at MFNDU in Kabul, a $2.5 million sprung-fabric shelter for AAF aircraft maintenance in Kabul, and a munitions storage facility for the AAF’s A-29 Super Tucano aircraft ($474,951). Among the 19 projects ($217 million) in the planning phase, six projects worth $48.1 million are part of the construction of the Kabul National Military Hospital, four valued at $28.1 million are part of the projects building the Afghan Electrical Interconnect, six are ANA Special Operations Command projects costing around $19.3 million, two are AAF projects at $2.7 million, and the remaining five projects valued at $119.3M are a combination of other ANA sustainment projects supporting the new MOD headquarters and other security facilities.

CSTC-A reported that several infrastructure-related train, advise, and assist activities are ongoing. CSTC-A engineering advisors mentor the MOD’s Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) leadership and ANA facility engineers to increase their ability to operate, sustain, and maintain their infrastructure. CSTC-A also assisted and advised CPMD specifically on developing requirements packages for generators and facilities-repair task orders. In addition, they advised CPMD leadership on developing procurement packages to ensure proper awarding of repair contracts. CSTC-A is focused on pursuing regional level facility-sustainment issues for the ANA with the CPMD. Advisors provide substantial training and mentorship to the CPMD leadership and engineers during three to four advising engagements per week focused on operations and maintenance, sustainment, and construction-program-management issues.

In October, CSTC-A began executing a facility-maintenance training program, under the National Operations and Maintenance Contract, to train ANDSF facility engineers in the skills and trades needed to operate and maintain power plants, HVAC systems, water treatment plants, and waste-water treatment plants, as well as to perform adequate quality control and quality assurance in their work. These training courses are offered at the MOD and MOI headquarters facilities. The program is set to continue to March 2017.

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF funds for ANA and MOD training and operations.
In addition to directly contracting for specialized training, DOD reported on the use of open-ended training agreements with the U.S. military to provide Afghan training or professional development.\textsuperscript{300} According to DOD, FY 2016 funding was used mainly for pilot, special forces, and MOD training and advisors, alongside these open-ended training agreements.\textsuperscript{301} The largest of these projects are multiyear contracts that include an $80.9 million project to train Afghan Air Force pilots, another $41.8 million project for out-of-country training for AAF pilots, and a $65.3 million project to train Afghan special forces. A recently completed $30.5 million project trained MOD advisors.\textsuperscript{302}

During this quarter, MOD train-the-trainers completed radio encryption training.\textsuperscript{303} According to Afghan media, 1,200 cadets graduated from a 10-month program at the Kabul Military Training Academy.\textsuperscript{304} According to CSTC-A, for every month of International Military Education Training funded training, the ANA cadet is required to complete three months of extra service.\textsuperscript{305}

### Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

As of November 20, 2016, the overall assigned strength of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) including civilians was 7,912 personnel.\textsuperscript{306} Compared to the same reporting period last year, AAF strength has increased by 11.6%, or 820 personnel.\textsuperscript{307}

As of November 15, 2016, the United States has appropriated more than $4.2 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY 2010. Additionally, DOD requested over $508 million—mostly for AAF sustainment costs—in the FY 2017 budget justification document.\textsuperscript{308} Since FY 2010, just over $3 billion has been obligated for the AAF, with roughly $26.6 million of FY 2017 funds obligated as of November 15, 2016. The majority of the funding since FY 2010 has been dedicated to sustainment items, which account for 46.8% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 36.5%.\textsuperscript{309} However, with the exception of FY 2015, training costs in recent years have exceeded or been similar to the equipment and aircraft costs.\textsuperscript{310}

The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft includes:\textsuperscript{311}

- 3 Mi-35 helicopters
- 46 Mi-17 helicopters
- 27 MD-350 helicopters
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes
- 20 A-29 light attack airplanes (12 are in the United States supporting AAF pilot training)\textsuperscript{312}

This quarter, USFOR-A reported two Mi-17 helicopters had been lost in combat: one, attributed to technical problems, occurred on November 29 in Badghis and killed the 207th Corps commander; and the other, on
December 26, happened during a landing attempt at Shindand Airport, with the cause still under investigation.313

Ten Mi-17s are currently in for overhaul or heavy repair; five Mi-17s are awaiting extraction for heavy repair or overhaul; and one C-130 is in depot.314 As Mi-17 availability declines, DOD reports some Mi-17s are flying over 80 hours monthly versus the 25 hours they are programmed to fly. In addition, C-208 and C-130 aircraft are increasingly carrying more cargo than before.315

The eight A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft are the newest addition to the AAF and have already proven to be valuable assets.316 Over the next two years, the AAF will receive 12 more A-29s once their pilots complete their training at Moody AFB in the United States and operational weapons testing and cockpit upgrades are completed.317 According to DOD, the second class of eight A-29 pilots is scheduled to complete training by March 2017.318

General Nicholson praised the Afghan special forces and the Afghan Air Force in his December 2 press briefing.319 The AAF are now conducting most of the ANA escort and resupply missions that U.S. or Coalition forces once performed exclusively. Since April 2016, the AAF has added nearly 20 air crews and 120 tactical air controllers.320 General Nicholson predicted the nature of the fight will “really begin to change” with a combination of additional special forces and with growth in AAF size and capability.321

The Special Missions Wing (SMW) is the aviation branch of the MOD’s Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) alongside the special operations command ANASOC and the Ktah Khas (KKA) counterterrorism unit. Two SMW squadrons are located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e Sharif, providing the ASSF with operational reach
The night-vision capable SMW provides all the Afghan special forces helicopter support. SIGAR will report on the details of the SMW budget, manpower, and capabilities in a classified annex to this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $20.2 billion and disbursed $19.8 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.

ANP Strength Decreases for the First Time in a Year

As of November 20, 2016, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 147,635, according to USFOR-A. This is a decrease of 845 ANP personnel since last quarter, which marks the first time in a year that ANP end strength has decreased. However, this quarter’s figure is 1,609 personnel more than at this time in 2015, and the ANP are currently at 94% of their authorized end strength.

Patrol personnel represent the largest subset of the ANP this quarter with 69,749 members; noncommissioned officers numbered 50,551, while officer ranks stood at 27,335. Notably, the largest decrease in personnel this quarter occurred within the smallest subset of the ANP, 395 fewer officers, followed by 346 fewer patrol personnel.

Table 3.11 provides the six-month change in the strength of the ANP’s components (e.g. AUP, ABP, ANCOP) from April 2016 to October 2016. During that time, the ANP suffered a loss of 1,578 personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Component</th>
<th>Authorized Q2 2016</th>
<th>Authorized Q4 2016</th>
<th>6-Month Change</th>
<th>Assigned Q2 2016</th>
<th>Assigned Q4 2016</th>
<th>6-Month Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>88,031</td>
<td>88,014</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>86,234</td>
<td>85,188</td>
<td>(1,046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>25,015</td>
<td>23,322</td>
<td>(1,693)</td>
<td>21,654</td>
<td>20,982</td>
<td>(672)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>17,061</td>
<td>17,060</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>15,458</td>
<td>15,460</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI HQs &amp; IS</td>
<td>28,593</td>
<td>28,604</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25,867</td>
<td>26,005</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>158,700</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>(1,700)</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,213</strong></td>
<td><strong>147,635</strong></td>
<td><strong>(1,578)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2016 data as of 6/2016; Q1 2016 data as of 11/2016. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

*NISTA (Not In Service for Training), generally students, and standby personnel, generally reservists, are not included in the above “ANP Total” figures. The Q4 2016 assigned strength does not include the 4,894 NISTA or 2,048 standby personnel.

According to USFOR-A, the overall ANP monthly attrition rate for the last quarter was:  
- August 2016 2.34%  
- September 2016 2.32%  
- October 2016 2.5%  

Without replacement of losses, 12 months of 2% attrition would reduce a unit to less than 79% of its original strength.

**ANP Sustainment**

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $8.8 billion and disbursed $8.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment. This includes ASFF contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries, the largest use of sustainment funding. Other uses include ammunition and ordnance, information technology, organizational clothing and individual equipment, electricity, and fuel.

According to CSTC-A, $470.5 million has been provided for ANP sustainment during Afghan FY 1395 (which began in December 2015) through November 20, 2016. Of that amount, $340.3 million was expended on ANP payroll and incentives. Of the payroll amount, $85.8 million represents the U.S. contribution to LOTFA to fund salaries and the United Nations Development Programme management fee. In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has provided $155.7 million for ANP incentives and $43.8 million for ALP salaries and incentives (an increase from the $32 million reported last quarter) as of late November. CSTC-A reported that aside from salaries, the majority of ASFF ANP sustainment funding for Afghan FY1395 (nearly $78 million) has been used for vehicle fuel, which comprises 60% of expenditures.

Last quarter, CSTC-A reported that ANP sustainment expenditure estimates were $611.9 million for FY 2017 and $614.3 million for FY 2018. This was consistent with their earlier projected FY 2016–2020 annual average of $613.2 million. Future U.S. contributions to LOTFA remain to be determined.

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, as shown in Table 3.12 on the following page, with approximately 67% going to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANP increased by over $18.7 million, approximately 41.5% of which was for transportation services, followed by 35.4% for C-IEDs and related...
equipment, followed by 23.1% for communications equipment. The amount remaining to be procured for weapons increased by $45.2 million, and there was a $99.4 million increase in vehicles and related equipment procured and fielded to the ANP. CSTC-A is coordinating with the ANA Trust Fund to procure approximately $13 million in C-IED equipment for the ANP, which will fulfill 100% of the ANP’s C-IED organizational equipment requirements.

This quarter, the General Command of Police Special Unit (GCPSU), a major directorate in the MOI that oversees all MOI special police units as well as serving as a rapid-response force, failed to submit a serialized equipment inventory as required by the MOI. NSOCC-A reported that even though the GCPSU made a genuine attempt to complete their inventory, they failed to do so, even with a 30-day extension. NSOCC-A recommended that CSTC-A impose a penalty and withhold up to 5% of GCPSU’s annual operation and maintenance budget. However, following discussions between MOI and CSTC-A, as of November 20, 2016, no penalty had been imposed on GCPSU for its lack of equipment accountability.

ANP Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure. According to CSTC-A, as of November 30, 2016, the United States had completed 741 infrastructure projects valued at $3.6 billion, with another 23 ongoing projects valued at roughly $75.4 million ongoing. The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter is the installation of an information-technology server at the MOI Headquarters Network Operations Center in Kabul (with an estimated cost of $34 million). This is followed by two Women’s Participation Program projects: compounds for

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**TABLE 3.12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>$3,582,760,677</td>
<td>$377,477,433</td>
<td>$3,309,262,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>738,345,136</td>
<td>35,579,885</td>
<td>473,454,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>309,685,463</td>
<td>85,598,839</td>
<td>220,924,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>249,464,891</td>
<td>2,370,956</td>
<td>231,735,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>243,097,382</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91,438,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
<td>131,840,216</td>
<td>51,483,982</td>
<td>118,418,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Services</td>
<td>80,598,054</td>
<td>54,354,329</td>
<td>7,770,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,335,791,819</strong></td>
<td><strong>$606,865,424</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,453,003,899</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Procured and Fielded to the ANP = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOI/ANP.

* Vehicle costs include vehicles and parts.

women at the Regional Training Center in Jalalabad ($7.8 million, a $1.4 million cost increase from last quarter) and compounds for women at the Kabul Police Academy ($6.7 million). 349

The one infrastructure project completed this quarter was a warehouse and gas-station project at the Regional Logistics Center at Jalalabad ($283,896). 350 Additionally, 13 contracts were awarded at a total of $25.6 million, the majority and largest of which are Women’s Participation Program projects: the previously mentioned $6.7 million project for women’s compounds at Kabul Police Academy, a training building for women in Police District 9 in Kabul ($3.8 million), and women’s facilities at the Paktiya Regional Training Center ($3.7 million). 351

**ANP Training and Operations**

As of December 31, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP and MOI training and operations. 352 According to DOD, FY 2016 funding is used to provide advisors to assist with MOI and police development. 353

The largest U.S.-funded training projects in FY 2016 focused on the AAF and special forces. The largest MOI contract, a $33.5 million, multi-year project to train advisors in the MOI (under which the ANP falls) recently ended in September. In October 2016, the United States began an $18.3 million project for ANP training. 354 Other new projects include $11.7 million project to develop the ANP’s human intelligence-gathering capacity, 355 and a $10.8 million contract for training MOI advisors and mentors. 356
WOMEN COMPRISE 1.4% OF ANDSF PERSONNEL

This quarter, the RS Headquarters Gender Affairs Office reported 4,406 women serving in the ANDSF, 461 more than last quarter.\textsuperscript{357} Despite these gains in female recruits, the overall percentage of women in the ANDSF remains at only 1.4%.\textsuperscript{358} Of the 4,406 women, 3,130 were in the ANP, 1,065 were in the ANA, 139 were in the ASSF, and 72 were in the AAF.\textsuperscript{359} Of the women in the ANP, ANA, and AAF, 1,289 were officers, 1,387 were noncommissioned officers, 1,241 were enlisted, and 489 were cadets.\textsuperscript{360} While the ANP has come more than halfway toward reaching its goal of 5,000 women, the ANA is still far from reaching the same goal.\textsuperscript{361}

With the help of the eight Essential Function (EF) components of RS, Gender Affairs Office accomplishments in the past quarter included ensuring that incentive payments were made to women in the ANA and ANP. The Gender Affairs Office also conducted training, advising, and assisting (TAA) for the MOD to hire subject-matter experts on gender issues and worked with CSTC-A's engineers to ensure that all building projects for the ANDSF factor in gender considerations, such as including female bathrooms, changing rooms and separate accommodation, as well as other amenities like childcare facilities and gyms.\textsuperscript{362}

The Gender Affairs Office worked with the EF office responsible for rule-of-law issues to develop and implement a training program on gender equality and gender-based violence that is ongoing for both male and female MOD and MOI personnel. They are also conducting TAA to deliver a training video for MOD and MOI on human rights violations and unacceptable workplace behavior that includes guidance on the respectful treatment of women at work.\textsuperscript{363} With the assistance of the EF focused on force sustainment, equipment, and logistics, the Gender Affairs Office continued developing and implementing radio-maintenance training courses this quarter for ANA and ANP women, an area RS thinks could become an “important niche role” for women in the security forces.\textsuperscript{364}

With the EF overseeing strategic communications, the Gender Affairs Office also provided MOI with a gender public affairs subject-matter expert, conducted ongoing TAA to ensure Afghan media covered key activities involving female soldiers and police, and developed marketing tools for recruiting women into the ANA that provide public awareness about gender equality and respect between genders in the MOD.\textsuperscript{365} To develop a career path to the 83 MOD Intelligence positions open to women, junior-grade positions are being created.\textsuperscript{366}

In late December, Captain Niloofar Rahmani, the first Afghan woman to become a fixed-wing pilot in the AAF, announced upon finishing training at various U.S. Air Force bases that she had applied for asylum in the United States and did not intend to return to Afghanistan. Captain Rahmani cited longstanding death threats and the contempt of male AAF colleagues due to her heightened notoriety as key reasons for seeking asylum.\textsuperscript{367} Her

announcement has provoked a strong backlash by Afghan officials and civil society alike. General Mohammad Radmanish, an MOD spokesman, accused Captain Rahmani of lying just to win her asylum case, saying that her “life isn’t at risk at all,” and entreat U.S. officials to reject her case.368 Similarly, a group of Afghan activists called the White Assembly—self-described as a group of educated youths, policy makers, human-rights activists, and others across Afghanistan—wrote a letter to then-President Obama expressing outrage about Rahmani’s asylum request, asking him to deny it and deport her back to Afghanistan.369

In previous quarters, SIGAR has drawn attention to related issues facing the ANDSF. As a result of a fact-finding mission to Kabul, SIGAR reported on the challenges facing women in the ANDSF, which include sexual harassment and assault by their male colleagues, lack of equal pay and benefits, and gender-biased preclusion from promotions and other opportunities.370 Additionally, MOD is reassessing its process for selecting personnel to train in the United States following several instances of trainees going missing.371

For more information, see pages 3–25 and 121–122 of SIGAR’s October 2016 Quarterly Report.

ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE
There was no significant change in the number of medical personnel in the ANDSF since last quarter. As of November 21, 2016, there were 1,009 physicians and 2,734 other medical staff within the ANDSF healthcare system; 265 physician positions (20.8% of those required) and 465 other medical positions (14.5%) are vacant, according to CSTC-A.372

In December, CSTC-As Expeditionary Medical Advising Teams (eMAT) conducted site visits and reviewed ANDSF medical capabilities alongside the ANAs Medical Logistics Command and the Afghan National Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) in Herat, Gamberi, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Each visit included a joint medical logistic systems review and a warehouse inspection. In addition, both ANA medical personnel and eMATs taught classes in four areas: ANA medics taught classes on self-aid and combat lifesaving while eMATs taught damage-control surgery and trauma/ICU-stabilization care.373

REMARRYING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $341.3 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding and has obligated approximately $13 million of FY 2016 funds.374
State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised-explosive devices.

As of September 30, 2016, State-funded implementing partners have cleared approximately 205 million square meters of land (approximately 79 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.8 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.13). In addition, survey and clearance are still needed on 63 firing ranges belonging to ISAF/NATO covering an area of 162.3 square kilometers (62.7 square miles). From December 2012 to June 2016, 40 hazards and a total area of 1,109 square kilometers (428.2 square miles) were cleared on ISAF/NATO firing ranges.

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 598 square kilometers (231 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, six square kilometers (2.3 square miles) were cleared though the discovery of additional hazardous areas brought the known contaminated area to 607 square kilometers (234.4 square miles) by the end of the quarter. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW,
as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians, including victims of mines and ERW.\textsuperscript{378}

UNMACA draws on its wider network under the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), which consists of 50 international and national organizations, to access beneficiaries and communities. One of those organizations, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), collects casualty data on mine/ERW victims to help prioritize its clearance activities. According to USAID, ACAP funding will allow MACCA to expand its victim-assistance activities beyond service provision and data collection to include immediate assistance for individual survivors and their families.\textsuperscript{379}

The number of deminers working in MAPA total around 9,700, of which 99% are Afghan nationals. The high number of individuals involved with demining makes Afghanistan one of the world’s largest mine action programs, with the most coverage on the ground. Less than 1% of all security-related incidents targeted the demining community since 2009.\textsuperscript{380}

Between July and September 2016, MAPA reports the over 5,300 civilian victims received assistance and disability support services. The total number of beneficiaries since 2007 is 421,856.\textsuperscript{381} Since January, the UN and mine action partners have provided risk education regarding mines and ERW to over 466,000 returnees from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{382} The $30.2 million ACAP program has expended $19.6 million to date and will conclude in February 2018.\textsuperscript{383}

According to the UN, the security situation deteriorated significantly between January and October 2016, with incidents reaching the highest level since reporting began in 2007. Of nearly 6,300 security incidents between August 16 and November 17, 2016, 18% were improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—the second most prevalent form of attack after armed attacks.\textsuperscript{384} Many of the IEDs used by today’s insurgents are much more powerful and cause greater bodily harm than previous IEDs. Disabled war victims are more often double rather than single amputees, as was more common a decade ago.\textsuperscript{385}