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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

Despite a U.S. investment of \$8.6 billion to counter Afghanistan's illicit narcotics economy, Afghanistan remains the world's largest opium producer and exporter—producing an estimated 80% of the world's opium. The narcotics industry—coupled with rampant corruption and fraud—is a major source of illicit revenue for the country.⁷¹⁷

A United Nations (UN) opium-cultivation report released this quarter found that the estimated value of opiates produced in Afghanistan increased to \$3.02 billion in 2016 from \$1.56 billion in 2015. The value of opiates is worth more than two-thirds of the country's entire licit agricultural sector.⁷¹⁸

Eradication efforts began in March and by May 23, Afghan authorities reported having eradicated 685 hectares in Balkh, Badghis, Herat, Kunar, Kabul, Kandahar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nimroz Provinces. This represents a marked increase over 2016, when only 355 hectares were eradicated.⁷¹⁹ However, the 685 hectares eradicated amount to less than 0.3% of the estimated 201,000 hectares under cultivation for opium poppy.⁷²⁰

Cultivation results for this year are not yet available, but media reports and certain Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) officials indicate 2017 results will likely exceed last year's totals. Opium is even grown on government-controlled land or in the vicinity of security check points in some provinces.⁷²¹ The MCN deputy minister noted, "Unfortunately, the narcotics production is on the rise this year. ... We are concerned that narcotics would increase this year, including in areas and provinces where previously we had zero opium production."⁷²²

Afghanistan also suffers from widespread illegal drug use. A 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey estimated that roughly 11% of the population would test positive for one or more drugs, including 5.3% of the urban population and 13% of the rural population. Drug use among women and children is among the highest documented worldwide, and 30.6% of households tested positive for some form of illicit drug.⁷²³ Afghan drug use generates crime, funds the insurgency, and costs the Afghan government hundreds of millions of dollars in health-care costs, crime prevention, and lost economic productivity.⁷²⁴

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
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) noted that the Afghan government recognizes the negative impact of illegal drugs and has taken steps to address the problem, but the Afghan government has been slow to implement the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP) it adopted in 2015. Of the 22 indicator targets, the Afghan government reports that it has successfully implemented seven targets. According to INL, the Afghan government will require ongoing financial and technical assistance from the international community if it is to achieve the NDAP's objectives.⁷²⁵

A revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy will focus on building Afghanistan's capacity to counter narcotics and will support the country's goals and objectives, as outlined in the NDAP.⁷²⁶ However, the revised strategy has been delayed since last year. INL had previously informed SIGAR that the outcome of the U.S. elections would not impact the clearance process as the strategy made its way through the various agencies.⁷²⁷ After the elections, INL directed SIGAR to the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), which was the State Department's organizing office for Afghanistan policy. INL also informed SIGAR that final interagency approval of the strategy would be postponed until the new U.S. administration was established.⁷²⁸ The new Administration recently announced it was phasing out State's SRAP office; the strategy remains under review.⁷²⁹

Figure 3.31 below provides a timeline of events concerning the revised U.S. strategy.

FIGURE 3.31

THE PATH TOWARDS A REVISED U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY



Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/29/2014, 3/27/2015, 6/25/2015, 9/24/2015, 4/1/2016, 6/24/2016, 9/23/2016, 12/20/2016, 3/24/2017, and 6/22/2017; INL, *International Narcotics Strategy Control 2016 Volume I*, 3/2016, p. 92; *Politico*, "State's Afghanistan-Pakistan envoy leaves, spurring confusion about U.S. diplomacy in region," 6/23/2017.

Assistant Secretary of State for INL William Brownfield met with President Ghani in July 2017 and discussed countering narcotics at the regional and global level. According to a palace statement, Brownfield stated that the United States is currently working on a strategy to counter narcotics and would like Ghani's advice on the strategy. Meanwhile, Ghani welcomed the U.S. effort on a revised strategy to combat illegal narcotics. He added that terrorist organizations and drug traffickers are interconnected and need to be fought jointly.⁷³⁰

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of June 30, 2017, the United States has provided \$8.6 billion for counternarcotics (CN) efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most CN funds for Afghanistan through the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund (\$3.1 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$1.3 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$1.6 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$2.2 billion).⁷³¹

ASFF is primarily used to develop the Afghan National Army and Police, including the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Special Mission Wing (SMW), which support the counternarcotics efforts of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI).⁷³²

USAID's ESF-funded alternative-development programs are intended to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. In addition to reconstruction funding, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) receives funds through direct appropriations to operate in Afghanistan.⁷³³

SIGAR will issue a Lessons Learned Program report later this year that will examine U.S. counternarcotics efforts from 2002 through 2016. This comprehensive review will incorporate satellite-imagery data analysis and provide recommendations to policymakers to improve future strategies and programs.

INTERDICTION AND ERADICATION

The U.S. and Afghan governments use both interdiction and eradication to counter the cultivation and production of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. According to the Department of State:

Drug interdiction—or preventing illicit drugs from reaching their destination—is important in stemming the flow of illegal drugs and countering the negative effects of organized criminal groups. INL supports interdiction efforts through training, equipping, and providing technical assistance

Reliability and Accuracy of INL's Financial Information

Over the years, SIGAR has frequently received financial information from INL with the caveat that the amounts did not present an accurate picture. Once again this quarter, INL informed SIGAR it is unable to “provide cumulative money appropriated, obligated, and expended as it will overstate the total value of each program.”⁷³⁴ The issue apparently stems from the lack of an integrated financial system at the State Department; staff are unable to efficiently compile the data as certain information is manually maintained and not automated.⁷³⁵ INL has informed SIGAR in the past of its intent to use a financial management system similar to USAID's Phoenix, which may enable greater detail at the project level. This quarter, INL informed SIGAR that the cumulative financial information pertaining to the specialized counternarcotics police units “may be lower than the amount authorized” since these amounts “are estimated from obligating documents such as memoranda of understanding and interagency agreements.”⁷³⁶

Precursor chemical: a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture, and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, *Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals*, 2008, viii.

Conflict, criminality, and narcotics continue to be critical threats to personal safety, public service delivery, and private investment.

Source: DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 6/2017, p. 7.

to partner nation law enforcement agencies. Such efforts increase the capacity to detect, investigate, disrupt, and seize shipments of illicit drugs and the chemicals (known as **precursors**) needed to process and produce drugs.

Eradication—or the physical destruction—of illicit crops remains an important tool for decreasing the production of illegal drugs and preventing them from entering the United States, or other drug markets. INL provides training, equipment, and technical assistance to foreign governments to support their own eradication programs, and address related counternarcotics and law enforcement challenges.⁷³⁷

The CNPA has the lead for counternarcotics efforts among Afghan security forces. It consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units.⁷³⁸ Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police also participate in counternarcotic activities.⁷³⁹ The specialized units include the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The CNPA has approximately 2,000 assigned personnel; roughly half of them are based in Kabul.⁷⁴⁰

Interdiction Results

In Afghanistan, INL partners with DEA and DOD to build the capacity of the CNPA, with particular focus on support for two specialized units mentored by DEA: the SIU and the NIU.⁷⁴¹ Recently, the NIU's commander was replaced after failing a polygraph test. According to DOD, this is a positive development since the previous commander was ineffective and probably leaking information to hostile forces.⁷⁴²

Between 2007 and 2016, INL has provided approximately \$242.8 million to support the NIU and SIU. It has budgeted \$38.5 million for fiscal year (FY) 2016.⁷⁴³

The poor security situation in Afghanistan makes interdiction a challenge. During the third quarter of FY 2017 (data available April 1 to June 16, 2017) interdictions declined approximately 60%, from 58 to 24 operations, over the previous quarter, despite mentoring from U.S. Special Forces units, greater access to Resolute Support mission (RS) enablers, and improving interoperability.⁷⁴⁴ DOD noted that recent partnering with U.S. Special Forces had no immediate impact on overall levels of narcotics processing, but continued mentoring by Coalition partners would likely be required to maintain the current level of operations.⁷⁴⁵ Most interdiction activities occurred in the capital and eastern regions, and included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. These operations resulted in both seizures of illicit narcotics and the destruction of multiple drug labs.⁷⁴⁶

According to INL, the RS assistance to NIU has enabled missions in Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah Provinces. Between April 1 and May 31, 2017, NIU and SIU seized 2,695 kilograms of opium, 23,250 kilograms of

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TABLE 3.26

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2017											
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*	TOTAL
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	270	190	115	3,400
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	442	394	301	119	3,762
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,785	123,063	227,524	1,123,349
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,056	2,859	3,532	1,809	37,413
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	13,041	89,395	155,898
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,379	27,600	10,487	21,593	452,771
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	42,314	71,417	809,279

Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2014 seizure of 135,000 liters of precursor chemicals.
*Results for period 10/1/2016–6/16/2017.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/29/2015 and 6/28/2017.

morphine base, and 30 kilograms of heroin and heroin base. The NIU and SIU were responsible for 29 arrests.⁷⁴⁷ In addition, 22 heroin processing laboratories were dismantled between March 3 and May 24, 2017.⁷⁴⁸

As shown in Table 3.26, from 2008 through June 16, 2017, 3,400 interdiction operations have resulted in the seizure of 452,771 kg of opium. However, these seizures over nearly a decade would account for less than 1% of the opium produced in Afghanistan in 2016 alone. According to the 2016 Opium Survey by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan’s potential opium production was approximately 4,800 metric tons (or 4.8 million kg) in 2016 alone.⁷⁴⁹

According to SIGAR analysis, of the \$8.6 billion dedicated to counternarcotics, approximately \$331.4 million was spent to support eradication, even though eradication has historically had minimal impact on curbing opium cultivation. INL has obligated \$6.8 million on the Governor-Led Eradication program since 2008 and spent \$324.6 million on the Poppy Eradication Force between FY 2005 and FY 2010.⁷⁵⁰

In the 2016 opium survey conducted by UNODC, only 9% of poppy farmers list fear of eradication as the most common reason for not cultivating poppy, behind considering the activity un-Islamic (17%) and fear of addiction (10%).⁷⁵¹ In 2007, only 1% of opium growers surveyed answered that fear of eradication stopped them from growing poppy.⁷⁵² For more than a decade, economic conditions have been the driving force behind opium cultivation: 85% of poppy farmers provided that as a reason in 2007, 92% in 2008, 71% in 2015, and approximately 49% in 2016.⁷⁵³ As Table 3.26 illustrates, eradication has little impact on the amount of opium cultivated and produced in Afghanistan. Moreover, drugs flows through the “Balkan route” have shifted. According to UNODC, although the Balkan route remains the world’s main opiate trafficking route, another branch through the Caucasus

Balkan Route: a transit corridor for Afghan heroin to reach western and central Europe via Iran and Turkey. According to UNODC, its importance has declined due to more effective law enforcement and the declining opiate use in western and central Europe.

Source: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2014*, 6/2014, x, p. 23.

countries has gained importance. That route bypasses Turkey, where the growing displacement of refugees heading to the European Union may have pushed traffickers to seek alternate routes.⁷⁵⁴

Coalition advisors have provided train, advise, and assist support to the CNPA since February 2016. Recent emphasis has been on improving CNPA coordination with the SMW. The SMW is an aviation wing that enables the ANDSF to conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions and to disrupt insurgent and drug-smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.⁷⁵⁵ According to DOD, the SMW will expand to include additional helicopter crews, consolidate the fixed-wing PC-12 aircraft into a new fixed-wing *kandak* (battalion), and create an aviation-support *kandak*.⁷⁵⁶ More information on the Special Mission Wing is available on pages 114–115 of this report.

Eradication Results

Compared to the previous year, the total area under poppy cultivation in 2016 increased 10% from 183,000 to 201,000 hectares. Opium production was estimated at 4,800 tons—a 43% increase from its 2015 level. In fact, the improvement of Afghanistan’s poppy yields was largely responsible for the worldwide opium production increase between 2015 and 2016. Global opium production increased by one-third to 6,380 tons compared to the previous year.⁷⁵⁷ The value of opiates produced in Afghanistan is more than two-thirds the value of the country’s entire agricultural sector. The value of the illicit opiate economy was estimated at \$3.02 billion in 2016, up from \$1.56 billion in 2015.⁷⁵⁸


The latest MCN/UNODC eradication report available indicates that only 652 hectares were eradicated as of May 2017. This is an increase over the 204 hectares that had been eradicated during the same time period last year, but considering that it is less than 0.02% of the total number of hectares under opium cultivation in Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 3.32, these figures highlight how little impact eradication efforts have had in countering Afghanistan’s opium problem. Moreover, these eradication figures are provisional, as satellite-imagery verification has not taken place. The report noted that some farmers have resisted eradication operations in Nangarhar; security forces personnel have died as a result of clashes with farmers and anti-government elements.⁷⁵⁹

According to INL, eradication has occurred in Badakhshan, Balkh, Kabul, Kapisa, Badghis, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Nimroz, Herat, and Kunar Provinces. The verified eradicated hectares will be available in October.⁷⁶⁰ Under the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program, governors are reimbursed \$250 for every UNODC-verified hectare of eradicated poppy.⁷⁶¹ GLE is the only eradication program supported by the U.S. government and annually accounts for less than 2% of INL’s Afghanistan counternarcotics

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FIGURE 3.32

AFGHAN OPIUM CULTIVATION, ERADICATION, AND PRODUCTION SINCE 2008



Source: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2017, Booklet 2*, 6/2017, pp. 50, 52, 54.

budget.⁷⁶² INL disbursed \$67,300 in advance payments for the 2017 eradication season in December 2016. Additionally, INL disbursed \$10,000 to cover the costs of one of four eradication conferences hosted by MCN.⁷⁶³

Good Performers Initiative

The INL-funded Good Performers Initiative (GPI) is a program that seeks to incentivize provincial governors' counternarcotics and supply-reduction activities by supporting sustainable, community-led development projects in provinces that significantly reduced or eliminated poppy cultivation. However, it is no longer taking on new projects.

From June 2012 to April 2016, INL funded GPI projects on-budget through the Afghan Ministry of Finance. INL phased out GPI due to MCN's inability to adequately manage the program, approving no new GPI projects after April 30, 2016. INL performed a risk assessment of MCN's financial risk-management system in 2015 and found 24 internal-control deficiencies that increased the potential for a material misstatement in financial reporting, ineffective operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations.⁷⁶⁴ According to GPI's 2014 annual report, procurement was slow and the ministry assigned unprofessional staff. Insufficient coordination and lengthy processing of on-budget payments caused the slow implementation of projects.⁷⁶⁵

Projects still under way as of April 2016 continue to receive INL funding until their completion.

As of May 31, 2017, INL reported that 286 projects valued at \$126.4 million had been contracted. Of those, 244 projects have been completed; 42 are still in progress.⁷⁶⁶

INL is also working on an alternative-development project called Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), formerly known as Strengthen and Diversify Licit Livelihoods through Alternative Development Interventions (see pages 196–197). BADILL is expected to follow through on INL's commitments to those provinces most affected by the GPI cancellation.⁷⁶⁷

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity-Building

Since 2008, INL has obligated \$35.2 million and expended \$26 million to build capacity at the MCN. During the third quarter of FY 2015, INL conducted an independent risk assessment of the MCN's public financial-management system. The report identified significant deficiencies that increased the potential for inaccurate financial reporting, inefficiency, ineffective operations, and noncompliance with laws and regulations. Areas of particular concern were internal controls, program management and monitoring, and facility management.⁷⁶⁸

Based on recommendations in the risk assessment, in mid-2016 INL solicited and awarded a contract for a financial-remediation plan that was expected to be completed in 2016.⁷⁶⁹ However, that original schedule changed "following delays in solicitation."⁷⁷⁰ According to INL, the financial-remediation plan was still "on schedule," per the terms of the contract, as of March 24, 2017.⁷⁷¹ INL said it was too early to measure improvements as a result of the financial-remediation plan. The contractor, the Afghanistan Holding Group, is currently developing standard operating procedures for the implementation of effective financial controls.⁷⁷² Successful remediation is expected to permit the MCN to receive direct assistance funds.⁷⁷³

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

USAID's alternative-development (AD) programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping host countries to develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports supply-reduction and alternative-development programs. INL told SIGAR it holds biweekly meetings with USAID to coordinate their AD efforts and ensure that INL AD efforts complement and leverage ongoing USAID activities.⁷⁷⁴ According to USAID, both agencies also jointly attend AD program meetings with UNODC, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the MCN, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.⁷⁷⁵

INL has been implementing AD programming in Afghanistan since 2007 through GPI and a series of grants with the Aga Khan Foundation to strengthen subnational governance and alternative livelihoods. INL AD

programs target high poppy-cultivating areas, in line with Afghan government priorities laid out in Afghanistan's National Drug Action Plan.⁷⁷⁶ Only two of the 22 indicators of the NDAP concern alternative development: the number of provinces implementing preventive drug education programs and the number of poppy-cycle timed campaigns implemented. Only one campaign was implemented during the NDAP's first year; 24 provinces implemented preventive drug-education campaigns, exceeding the target of 22 provinces.⁷⁷⁷

Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods

INL chose UNODC as the BADILL project's implementer because of its global expertise in alternative development. According to INL, UNODC has technically qualified and experienced staff at the provincial level, including strong working relations with Afghan government counterparts and other stakeholders.⁷⁷⁸

UNODC's project proposal includes large- and small-scale projects in various provinces that run counter to recommendations of its own internal evaluation.⁷⁷⁹ For instance, a rose-oil processing facility will be built in Nangarhar; dams and terraces will be built to protect agricultural land for certain watershed management and rehabilitation projects in certain provinces.⁷⁸⁰

INL has obligated \$20 million for BADILL and informed SIGAR in January 2017 that it had transferred all funds to UNODC. INL says that the performance-monitoring plan has not yet been drafted.⁷⁸¹ Between January and March of this year, some of UNODC's key achievements were

- selecting 50 districts for program implementation
- selecting about 250 communities for baseline study and alternative-development interventions
- creating a list of small- and large-scale interventions
- holding working-group meetings at provincial level and headquarters
- hiring staff, including a communication and monitoring and evaluation officer
- starting national procurement with input from UNODC headquarters.

As of March 30, 2017, UNODC has disbursed \$1.19 million.⁷⁸²

Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development

INL has obligated and disbursed all \$17.8 million for its Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD) project: \$2.8 million to UNODC and \$15 million to UNDP, its two implementing partners.⁷⁸³ The program aims to improve household income while reducing dependency on illicit poppy cultivation for selected communities in Farah and Badghis Provinces, the second and sixth-highest poppy-cultivating provinces in 2016, respectively, according to UNODC.⁷⁸⁴



A woman participating in USAID's RADP-North agricultural program checks the progress of melon seedlings. (USAID photo)

According to INL, CBARD will improve the local production and marketing of high-value crops. The project will also develop and strengthen community-based business infrastructure, such as irrigation, transportation, and facilities. The project is scheduled to end in 2020.⁷⁸⁵

According to INL, this quarter, UNDP and its implementing partner developed draft criteria for identifying beneficiary communities and farmers. UNODC developed questionnaires for a socioeconomic survey. In March, INL provided \$2.2 million to UNODC and \$356,400 to UNDP to conduct surveys of its programs and assessments for future programs. UNODC and UNDP are expected to use the new funding to survey additional communities and conduct assessments that will include information on off-farm employment and access to finance.⁷⁸⁶ INL has not yet drafted the performance-monitoring plan for CBARD.⁷⁸⁷

SIGAR has highlighted UNODC's mixed results on alternative-development projects. Prior UNODC projects such as the Afghanistan Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation Programme (ADCRRP) and Afghanistan Pilot Program's Poppy Reduction Project ended early and failed to reduce opium poppy cultivation. ADCRRP had a budget of \$9.2 million and had over 200 subprojects across five provinces.⁷⁸⁸ UNODC's Poppy Reduction Project had a \$10.5 million budget and also more than 200 subprojects implemented by nongovernmental organizations (NGO).⁷⁸⁹ CBARD's geographical target areas are provincial locations with significant and high security risk levels: Ab Kamari, Bala Murghab and Qadis Districts in Badghis; Khaki-Safed and Pusht Rod Districts in Farah.⁷⁹⁰ The CBARD timeframe is four years, the same timeframe for previous failed UNODC alternative-development projects. Communities were expected to abandon poppy in return for assistance over a two- to four-year period.⁷⁹¹ UNDP's lack of alternative-development expertise in Afghanistan is also a concern. UNDP's focus is helping countries build and share solutions to the challenges of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and environment, and women's empowerment.⁷⁹² UNDP's work with livelihoods is linked to efforts to protect the environment, bring sustainable energy to rural areas, and prepare for natural disasters.⁷⁹³

Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a \$45.4 million, USAID-funded project implemented by International Relief and Development (IRD). KFZ addresses the drivers of poppy cultivation in Kandahar Province by rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, expanding alternative livelihood opportunities, supporting small businesses, and building the capacity of the MCN to develop effective alternative-development policies. The project started in 2013 and is scheduled to end in August 2018.⁷⁹⁴ The target for the next two years is to renovate an additional 127 kilometers of 14 irrigation



Farmers discuss selection of new seed varieties as part of USAID's RADP-North program. (USAID photo)

canals, continue vineyard trellising, **intercropping**, planting new orchards, and agribusiness development to increase international sales.⁷⁹⁵

According to USAID, during the second quarter of FY 2017, KFZ made progress on certain performance indicators: 67 hectares were improved with high-value crops compared to none the previous quarter (the target for FY 2017 is 350 hectares) and 94% of households reported an income increase from licit livelihoods in the targeted areas (the target for FY 2017 was 10%). A total of 334 farmers are growing high-value crops as a result of U.S. government assistance.⁷⁹⁶ Rehabilitation and construction of the 14 canals reached 85% completion, and 41 damaged greenhouses were rehabilitated. KFZ facilitated the export of \$51,400 of high-value crops and over \$116,000 in national sales. The program trained more than 400 women and 100 men on women's rights and roles in Afghan society. It also provided technical assistance to 100 female farmers for off-season vegetable production (KFZ had distributed materials and fertilizers to 100 women to grow off-season vegetables in their kitchen gardens during the previous quarter).⁷⁹⁷

Although KFZ is showing progress against many indicators, the program's overall impact on curbing opium cultivation is mixed. Results initially seemed promising: poppy cultivation decreased 49% during the second year of the project after the rehabilitation of 12 canals. But the following year, opium cultivation rose 3% in the targeted districts.

As of June 30, 2017, USAID has disbursed \$36.1 million on KFZ.⁷⁹⁸

Intercropping: the cultivation of two or more crops at the same time in the same field. The most common goal of intercropping is to produce a greater yield on a given piece of land.

Source: George Ouma and P. Jeruto, "Sustainable horticultural crop production through intercropping: The case of fruits and vegetable crops: A review," *Agriculture and Biology Journal of North America*, 2010, pp. 1,098, 1,100.

Regional Agricultural Development Program

USAID's Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are under way in the southern, eastern, and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. Using a **value-chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.⁷⁹⁹

RADP-East (RADP-E) is a USAID-funded \$28.1 million program designed to expand sustainable agriculture-led economic growth in the provinces of Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Wardak, and Kabul. RADP-E works with the private sector to identify constraints to business and value-chain performance, and implement market-based solutions.⁸⁰⁰ RADP-E started in 2016 and is expected to end in 2021.⁸⁰¹ RADP-E is intended to increase the sales of agricultural goods and services by \$57 million by the final year of the program.⁸⁰² As of June 30, 2017, approximately \$3.2 million had been expended.⁸⁰³

According to USAID, between January 1 and March 31, 2017, RADP-E continued its efforts in preparing for its implementation phase. This included completing various studies, surveys, and analyses, as well as collecting information from relevant stakeholders. RADP-E held working group meetings with Afghan government representatives.⁸⁰⁴

Value chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing, transportation, and wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.



Fruit from the Kanda region of Afghanistan are shipped to India with help from USAID's RADP-South program. (USAID photo)

RADP-North (RADP-N) is a USAID-funded, \$78.4 million program that started in 2014 and is scheduled to end in May 2019. RADP-N invests in increased sustainability and profitability of select value chains—wheat, high-value crops, and livestock—in rural areas of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Samangan Provinces.⁸⁰⁵ Between January 1 and March 31, 2017, RADP-N implemented a dozen activities and issued 25 grants valued at nearly \$900,000 and held demonstration field days for approximately 1,300 farmers. RADP-N held follow-up visits to farmer organizations: one agribusiness company received a contract for 120 tons of Afghan red raisins while attending the India International Trade Fair. The program facilitated the registration of a female farmer group cooperative and delivered **paravet** kits to graduates of its paravet training program. RADP-N identified the women beneficiaries of its bakery activity. The 20 women contracted for and finished the construction of the bakery production center and received some of the equipment.⁸⁰⁶ As of June 30, 2017, approximately \$37.7 million had been expended.⁸⁰⁷

RADP-South (RADP-S) is a USAID-funded \$125 million program that started in 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018.⁸⁰⁸ The purpose of RADP-S is to improve food and economic security for rural Afghans in Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabol Provinces. The program supports farmers and micro, small, medium, and large agribusinesses to improve production, processing, and commodity sales. RADP-S strengthens market systems by using local agricultural firms to champion reforms. RADP-S is working to increase the incomes of farmers, agribusinesses, and veterinary professionals, while raising awareness among farming families of proper nutrition and balanced diets.⁸⁰⁹ Some key accomplishments during January 1 and March 31, 2017, are:

- over 3,700 new farmers receiving training in post-harvesting techniques for wheat and high-value crops, including more than 480 women
- more than 20,380 beneficiaries of program interventions, of whom 1,944 were women
- monitoring of nearly 2,600 farmers resulting in over 3,100 hectares of land using improved technologies and management practices; 280 farmers planted high-value crops for the first time.⁸¹⁰

A key implementing partner was asked to stop work in February 2017 as a result of vetting issues. This had an impact on RADP-S performance.

The adoption of the Afghan national technical-assistance salary scale has resulted in longer hiring timelines (from 60 days to over 100 days) since candidates frequently decline reduced salary offers and employee background vetting is now required for all previous years (instead of only the previous three years).⁸¹¹

As of June 30, 2017, approximately \$89.7 million had been expended.⁸¹²

Paraveterinarian or paravet: is a community-based animal health worker who provides initial diagnosis and basic treatment of animals.

Source: A. Catley, T. Leyland, et al., "Para-veterinary professionals and the development of quality, self-sustaining community-based services," *Revue scientifique et technique (International Office of Epizootics)*, 2004, p. 225.

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a USAID-funded, \$61.3 million program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. The program started in 2010 and is scheduled to end in December 2019.⁸¹³

According to USAID, the program has helped export 52,000 tons of produce valued at \$57 million to markets in Pakistan, Canada, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia. In addition, USAID said the program created more than 7,700 agribusiness jobs, trained 112,500 farmers, and benefitted 38,400 households.⁸¹⁴ Under the current extension, CHAMP is focusing on supply chain, marketing, and export promotion of Afghan fresh and dry fruits and nuts. It continues to support traders at trade offices in India and the UAE.⁸¹⁵ From January 1 to March 31, 2017, CHAMP assistance enabled the export of 435 metric tons of raisins and apples valued at \$1.4 million. The program supported the participation of traders at the Gulfood Exhibition held late February to early March in Dubai: nine traders gained contracts worth \$3.37 million for various fruits, nuts, and spices, and potential deals worth over \$10.2 million for other products. CHAMP collaborated with USAID's Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) project on some activities.⁸¹⁶

As of June 30, 2017, USAID has disbursed \$49 million on CHAMP.⁸¹⁷

“The number of addicts is highly alarming, and the increase in drug addiction can lead to [the] spread of dangerous diseases. We are working towards this, however, our efforts are not sufficient, and addressing this problem also requires the long-term commitment from [the] international community.”

—Feda Mohammad Paykan,
Deputy Minister of Public Health

DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION

A 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey conservatively estimated that roughly 11% of the population would test positive for one or more drugs, including 5.3% of the urban population and 13% of the rural population. Drug use among women and children is among the highest documented worldwide, and 30.6% of households tested positive for some form of illicit drug.⁸¹⁸ According to the UN, 0.6% of the global adult population suffer from drug use disorders. Opioids, including heroin, remain the most harmful type of drug.⁸¹⁹

The United States is helping Afghanistan face this public-health crisis by funding a new rural treatment program to expand substance abuse treatment to the hardest-hit local communities. According to INL, the demand for treatment and prevention services far exceeds the capacity of the centers, most of which have extensive waiting lists for new patients. The United States also supports UNODC's global child-addiction program to develop protocols for treating opioid-addicted children, training treatment staff, and delivering services through NGOs.⁸²⁰ It also supports an antidrug curriculum in Afghan schools, which has trained over 300 teachers and reached over 30,000 students.⁸²¹ INL started a pilot rural treatment program in June in Jowzjan and Laghman Provinces.⁸²²

Source: Ministry of Counter Narcotics Coordination Meeting with Supporting Organizations in the Fight Against Narcotics, May 16, 2017, in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Since 2015, INL has transitioned responsibility for 28 of the 86 U.S.-funded drug treatment centers to the MOPH. Transition of other treatment centers, originally scheduled for January 2017, has been suspended while INL, the MOPH, the MCN, and the NGOs renegotiate the transition plan.⁸²³ The remaining treatment centers will transition by the end of 2019. INL reduced funding to all facilities (including the 28 MOPH centers) by approximately 20% in 2015, another 15% in 2016, and another 25% in 2017.⁸²⁴

INL has been working with the Afghan government and the **Colombo Plan** drug advisory program to develop and maintain the country's drug treatment system since 2003.⁸²⁵ The most frequent beneficiaries at the treatment centers are adult males. Of the 86 facilities, 66 are residential and 20 are outpatient centers; 31 are dedicated to female clients. Among the residential treatment centers, 44 also offer home-based services.⁸²⁶ The residential treatment centers consist of 40 centers for adult males, eight centers for adult females, eight centers for children, five centers for adolescent males and five centers for adolescent females.⁸²⁷ Twelve of the 44 home-based programs provide services to adult females.⁸²⁸ Over 6,200 persons were treated during the first quarter of FY 2017.⁸²⁹ The security situation in Helmand Province resulted in limited outreach and client admissions to the treatment centers located there during the first quarter of FY 2017.⁸³⁰

Since 2002, INL has obligated and expended the following amounts on drug demand reduction:

- \$32.3 million obligated and \$31 million expended on drug treatment centers
- \$11.4 million obligated and \$10 million expended on training clinical staff (for drug treatment clinics)
- \$18.5 million obligated and \$12 million expended for clinical staff's salaries⁸³¹

INL has obligated and spent \$12.5 million in FY 2016 and \$16.1 million in FY 2017. INL estimates that approximately 105,000 patients have been treated to date.⁸³²

Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement

INL has obligated \$12.7 million and expended \$11.9 million to fund its Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program since April 2013.⁸³³ CNCE funds communication and outreach programs aimed at discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use, and encouraging licit crops. According to INL, surveys indicate that the public messaging campaigns are having a slow but steady impact on Afghan attitudes about illicit narcotics.⁸³⁴ CNCE is in its third phase, which began May 2016 and ends November 2017.⁸³⁵

Colombo Plan: Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding-member countries. It has since expanded to 26 member countries. INL supports the Colombo Plan's Universal Treatment Curriculum, a national-level training and certification system for drug-addiction counselors aimed at improving the delivery of drug treatment services in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Source: The Colombo Plan Secretariat Website, "History," www.colombo-plan.org, accessed 7/1/2017; INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2017, p. 26.

