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SECURITY

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

This quarter, the U.S. administration directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to update troop levels in Afghanistan as part of a wider, forthcoming American strategy for the country. Several top U.S. security officials characterized the war in Afghanistan as a stalemate that, if left unchecked, could deteriorate further in favor of the insurgency.

On June 13, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee in his testimony with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. that the United States is “not winning in Afghanistan right now, and we will correct this as soon as possible.” Secretary Mattis and General Dunford explained their assessment that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANSF) were not performing better this year than last year, and the Taliban—having had a good year last year—were attempting to have another this year. Secretary Mattis warned that “right now … the enemy is surging,” and there is a “need for urgency” in defining a strategy for Afghanistan that will require a change in approach from the last several years.

A key part of this strategy, according to Secretary Mattis, will be giving U.S. personnel on the ground in Afghanistan the authorities and forces they need to help the Afghans win. Only then, he said, can the United States succeed in helping the Afghans defeat the enemy in combat, and also complete “our core mission” to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. In their endeavor to assess the Afghan security situation, determine necessary U.S. troop-level recommendations, and form the new strategy, several high-level U.S. officials traveled to Afghanistan this quarter, including Secretary Mattis in late April, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster in late May, and General Dunford in late June, for meetings with President Ashraf Ghani and other Afghan officials.

Following the NATO alliance’s reaffirmation of its Warsaw commitments to Afghanistan in May, Secretary Mattis visited Brussels in late June to brief NATO partner nations about the U.S. assessment of Afghanistan, take in their advice, secure those countries’ commitments for the force, and address capability gaps that remain in the mission. According to Secretary Mattis, 70% of those gaps were filled, and the remainder of the commitments will be
Security

“The [Intelligence Community] assesses that the political and security situation in Afghanistan will almost certainly deteriorate through 2018 even with a modest increase in military assistance by the United States and its partners.”

—Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence


worked out in time. DOD officials said they will not comment on the exact number until the president has made his final decision.

Security incidents in Afghanistan increased this quarter when compared to the same period last year, with several deadly high-profile and insider attacks carried out by insurgents and extremists. While Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force strength increased modestly, force readiness improved across all elements, and the ANDSF prevented Taliban attempts to take and hold district capitals and key population centers, Coalition airstrike support continued to be essential to ANDSF success. Notably, these airstrikes more than doubled in frequency this quarter when compared to the same period in 2016.

On April 21, 2017, there was a suspected insider attack on the ANA’s 209th Corps’ Camp Shaheen near Mazar-e Sharif. The attack remains under investigation by Afghan authorities and Coalition forces, but there are reports that 10 heavily armed Taliban fighters wearing army uniforms infiltrated the camp and killed at least 250 Afghan soldiers. Facing mounting pressure following the attack, President Ghani accepted the resignations of Minister of Defense General Abdullah Habibi and ANA Chief of Staff Qadam Shah Shahim.

One of the worst terrorist attacks of the Afghan war occurred on May 31, when a truck bomb exploded in the center of Kabul’s diplomatic quarter during rush hour, killing over 150 people and injuring several hundred more. Afghan officials initially suspected the Haqqani Network—a group with close ties to the Taliban—of carrying out the attack, but the Taliban has denied any involvement, and no other group has claimed responsibility.

The fact that these major security incidents have been occurring in the previously more stable areas of northern Afghanistan and Kabul has not been lost on the Afghan people. Following the May 31 bombing, scores of Afghans filled the streets of Kabul to protest the Afghan government’s inability to keep them safe and demand that President Ghani fire his high-level security officials and execute the government’s Taliban detainees. At times the protests became violent as security forces reportedly killed several civilians in their attempts to restore order, further enraging the public and some Afghan political leaders.

To address worsening security challenges, President Ghani has taken several steps this quarter. First, he launched inquiries into the above-mentioned attacks, and into ANDSF personnel’s use of force against protestors in Kabul. Second, he made progress in his commitment to security-sector reform by either accepting the resignations of or firing several allegedly incompetent or corrupt Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and security-force leaders. Third, the Afghan government began implementing President Ghani’s new four-year ANDSF Road Map plan, a key component of which is security-sector reform, to continue to increase the capabilities of the ANDSF, secure major population centers, and incentivize the Taliban to reconcile with the Afghan government.

Last, with the
encouragement of the United States, President Ghani agreed to expand Afghanistan’s bilateral relations with Pakistan by conducting joint counter-terrorism operations. This move is seen as vital in the effort to build mutual trust between the countries and address extremist activity stemming from safe havens in Pakistan.91

Security Incidents and Civilian Casualties Remain High
The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General reported in June that Afghanistan’s security situation continues to deteriorate, with intensifying armed clashes between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban, and a number of high-profile attacks committed by insurgent and extremist groups. From March 1 through May 31, 2017, the UN recorded 6,252 security incidents, as reflected in Figure 3.26. This quarter’s figure

FIGURE 3.26

AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>Average Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2012–2/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/16/2013–5/15/2013 (89 days)</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/2013–8/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,922</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2013–11/15/2013 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,284</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2013–2/15/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>4,649</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/2014–5/31/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,864</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2014–8/15/2014 (76 days)</td>
<td>5,456</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2014–11/15/2014 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2014–2/15/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>5,075</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15/2015–4/30/2015 (75 days)</td>
<td>5,033</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/2015–7/31/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>6,096</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/2015–10/31/2015 (92 days)</td>
<td>6,601</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/2015–2/15/2016 (77 days)</td>
<td>4,014</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/16/2016–5/19/2016 (96 days)</td>
<td>4,122</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/20/2016–8/15/2016 (88 days)</td>
<td>5,996</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2016–11/17/2016 (94 days)</td>
<td>6,261</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/18/2016–2/14/2017 (88 days)</td>
<td>5,160</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/2017–5/31/2017 (90 days)</td>
<td>6,252</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Security incidents were not reported for the month of November 2015.


Security incidents: reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation. Reported incidents are not necessarily actual incidents.
represents a 21% increase from last quarter, and a 2% increase from the same period last year. Armed clashes between the security forces and the Taliban comprised 64% of recent security incidents, followed by 16% from improvised explosive devices.

According to the UN, the most unstable regions continue to be the eastern and southern regions of the country, with security incidents increasing 22% in eastern Afghanistan this quarter compared to the same period in 2016. This is likely explained by ANDSF and Coalition forces’ escalating campaign to defeat Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K), the Islamic State affiliate operating in Afghanistan, in its only stronghold, Nangarhar Province. This quarter, IS-K briefly captured Tora Bora—the cave and tunnel complex in Nangarhar that Osama bin Laden once occupied—from the Taliban on June 14. According to a local official, the IS-K operation was prompted by U.S. forces dropping the so-called “mother of all bombs” on a separate IS-K tunnel network in the Achin District of Nangarhar in April. A spokesman for Nangarhar’s governor said that President Ghani immediately ordered the ANA’s 201st Corps to move against IS-K in Tora Bora. After a few days, Afghan forces recaptured the cave complex, killing at least 44 IS-K militants.

The UN reported that the Taliban concentrated most of their efforts against ANDSF forces this quarter in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Farah, Faryab, Helmand, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Sar-e Pul, Zabul, and Uruzgan Provinces. The major Taliban operations included briefly capturing Qala-i Zal District in Kunduz Province in early May, attacking static police checkpoints in Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul, in late May, and the reported expansion of Taliban presence throughout Logar Province in late June. While the ANDSF repelled all major Taliban attempts to take and hold district capitals and key population centers, the UN pointed to Coalition airstrike support as integral to their success.

ANDSF and Coalition forces saw several key achievements this quarter in the recently escalated campaign to eradicate IS-K from Afghanistan. On July 11, U.S. forces killed the new IS-K emir, Abu Sayed, in an airstrike in Kunar Province. This came less than three months after Afghan commandos, in a joint raid with U.S. Special Forces, killed then-emir Sheikh Abdul Hasib in Nangarhar Province on April 27. Two U.S. Army Rangers lost their lives during the three-hour fight, and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) said their deaths were being investigated as possibly being caused by friendly fire. Commenting on the raid, General John W. Nicholson Jr., commander of USFOR-A, said, “Any ISIS member that comes to Afghanistan will meet the same fate.” Both attacks on the IS-K emirs resulted in the deaths of several other IS-K fighters. U.S. defense officials also announced the killing of IS-K’s senior director of media production, Jawad Khan, in an airstrike on June 3 in the Achin District of Nangarhar. According to General Nicholson, Khan’s death “will disrupt the [IS-K] network,
degrade their recruitment process, and hinder their attempts to conduct international operations.”

UN: Civilian Casualties Caused by Suicide and Complex Attacks Reached Record High

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 5,234 civilian casualties from January 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017, a less than 1% decrease from the same period in 2016, and the second-highest level ever recorded for this period since 2009. Of the casualties, there were 1,662 deaths (a 2% increase) and 3,581 injuries (a 1% decrease).

According to UNAMA, 1,151 of these civilian casualties were due to suicide and complex attacks, more than any previous six month period since the mission began documentation in 2009. This figure represents a 15% increase in casualties caused by suicide and complex attacks compared to last year. The increase came largely from Kabul City, where 19% of this period’s total casualties were incurred. Of Kabul Province’s casualties, 94% resulted from suicide and complex attacks carried out by anti-government elements in the capital. The suicide attack in Kabul City on May 31, 2017, the deadliest incident documented by UNAMA since 2001, contributed to these high casualty figures. Kabul Province had the most civilian casualties this quarter (1,048, up 26%), followed by Helmand (532, up 5%) and Kandahar (395, down 10%) Provinces.

Unlike previous years, UNAMA has combined improvised-explosive-device (IED) casualties with those caused by suicide and complex attacks because of the use of IEDs in the latter types of attacks. This helps explain why combined IEDs overtook ground engagements in causing the most civilian casualties since January (40% of civilian casualties), followed by ground engagements (34%), and targeted and deliberate killings (12%). According to UNAMA, there was a 10% decrease in casualties caused by ground engagements when compared to the same period in 2016. UNAMA attributes this mostly to a reduction in mortar use by pro-government forces.

UNAMA found that anti-government elements—which often targeted civilians—were responsible for 67% (3,489) of civilian casualties, up 12% from the same period in 2016. Pro-government forces were responsible for 18% (945) of civilian casualties, a 21% decrease from 2016. UNAMA attributed 43% of all civilian casualties to the Taliban, 19% to unidentified anti-government elements, and 5% to IS-K. The Taliban’s most common civilian target, of the attacks it claimed, were members of the Afghan government’s civil service.

UNAMA expressed concern over the 23% increase in female casualties and the 9% increase in child deaths compared to the same period in 2016. While ground engagements still caused the most harm to women and
children, pressure-plate IEDs, aerial operations, and suicide and complex attacks all caused significant increases in casualties this period when compared to previous periods.\textsuperscript{109}

**High-Profile Insurgent and Terrorist Attacks**

There were several high-profile attacks this quarter, most of which fell during the holy month of Ramadan from late May through late June. Though Ramadan is normally a time of spiritual reflection for Muslims, some extremist organizations, including Islamic State, claim to their fighters that killing enemies during Ramadan is nobler and makes them more worthy Muslims.\textsuperscript{110} While some high-profile attacks targeted ANDSF personnel and Afghan government officials, the majority were indiscriminate acts of violence on civilians in highly populated areas.

On May 27, 2017, a suicide bomber targeted an ANDSF convoy visiting a market in Khowst Province. The attack killed 18 people, all of them civilians. The attack was swiftly claimed by the Taliban.\textsuperscript{111} Only days later, gunmen killed a district governor of Paktika Province, along with his son. Afghan officials said that it was unclear who was behind the attack, and no one claimed responsibility.\textsuperscript{112}

The largest high-profile attack this quarter, deemed one of the worst of the entire Afghan war, occurred in Kabul in May 31, when a tanker truck carrying explosives was detonated during rush hour near the diplomatic quarter in the city center. The explosion killed 150 people and wounded over 450 more. No group claimed immediate responsibility, but the Taliban and Haqqani Network have denied any role. An investigation into the attack is ongoing.\textsuperscript{113} Following the attack, protesters took to the streets in Kabul to demand that the Afghan government fire top security officials and execute the members of the Taliban currently held in detention. The protests reportedly became violent as security forces opened fire on the crowd in an attempt to restore order, killing several civilians in the process.\textsuperscript{114}

Then days later, three explosions shook Kabul as more than 1,000 people gathered for the funeral of Salem Izidyar, the son of the deputy speaker of the Afghan senate who had been killed during the protests. The blasts killed as many as 19 people, including former deputy attorney general Halim Samadi and well-known cleric Mawlawi Jalal, and injured over 100, among them the speaker of the senate, Fazl Hadi Muslimyar, and several senior members of the political party Jamiat-e Islami. The attack came only a day after the commander of the Kabul garrison had advised protesters to avoid holding public gatherings due to the high threat of terror groups targeting large crowds with suicide bombs, explosions, and assaults. The Taliban denied any involvement in these attacks, and no other group claimed responsibility.\textsuperscript{115}
Despite the threat of attacks, protests continued in Kabul throughout June, with police clashing with protesters while clearing their camps. The media's reports of civilian deaths during these clearances spurred some politicians to press harder for the resignation of security officials. The situation culminated in President Ghani’s creation of a new, forthcoming plan to specifically address security issues plaguing the capital. President Ghani has said that the plan was developed in coordination with security leaders and the ANA’s 111th Capital Division. He emphasized that only the uniformed security services and no one else has the right to carry firearms.

On June 22, a suicide car bomb struck a gathering of soldiers and government employees collecting their salaries outside of New Kabul Bank in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, noting that they had chosen a day when the bank catered only to security forces and civilians were not allowed to enter the facility. However, according to Afghan officials, both civilians and security personnel were among the 34 people killed and the 60 wounded in the attack. Facing increasing pressure, the Minister of Interior immediately made changes to the security command in Helmand after the attack. The commander of the 505th Police Zone was replaced by General Ghulam Daud Tarakhel, and General Abdul Ghafar Safi became the new police chief in Helmand.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY
As of June 30, 2017, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $73.5 billion to support the ANDSF. This accounts for 61.4% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since FY 2002.

In 2005, Congress established the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the MOD and MOI. Additionally, ASFF is used to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not considered part of the ANDSF. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. According to DOD, ASFF funds are transferred to Da Afghanistan Bank, the country’s central bank; the Ministry of Finance then sends treasury checks to fund the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests. Of the $68.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF, $63.5 billion had been obligated and $62.6 billion disbursed as of June 30, 2017.

This section discusses assessments of the ANA, ANP, and the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and provides an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces.

Although security costs represent the largest reconstruction funding category, the $65 billion obligated for security-related reconstruction for the ANDSF isn’t even 10% of the $714 billion in total funding the United States had obligated for its efforts in Afghanistan since FY 2001. Of this total, DOD had obligated an estimated $675 billion—the vast majority of which went toward U.S. military operations in the country.

Note: Figure is an estimate that combines DOD-reported obligation data for Afghanistan with obligations from the non-DOD accounts tracked by SIGAR and outlined in Appendix B of this report. DOD obligation data is as of February 28, 2017. Non-DOD obligation data is as of June 30, 2017. To provide a more developed estimate, amounts allocated for Afghanistan were used when detailed agency-reported obligation data were not available.

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD’s Cost of War Update as of February 28, 2017, 5/18/2017, and agency-reported budget and obligation data of non-DOD funds outlined in Appendix B of this report.
NO CHANGE IN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TERRITORIAL

According to USFOR-A, as of May 15, 2017, the struggle between the Afghan government and insurgents remains a stalemate, with the number of districts and the portion of the population under Afghan government and insurgent control unchanged since last quarter’s February 15 assessment.  

USFOR-A reported that approximately 59.7% of the country’s 407 districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of May 15, 2017, the same as last quarter, but a six-point decline from the same period last year.  

As of May 2017, there were 45 districts (in 15 provinces) under insurgent control (11 districts) or influence (34 districts). Therefore, 11.1% of the country’s total districts are still under insurgent control or influence, more than a two percentage-point increase from the same period in 2016. USFOR-A attributes the loss of government control or influence over territory to the ANDSF’s strategic approach to security prioritization, which involves identifying the most important areas that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat, and placing less emphasis on less vital areas.  

The number of contested districts (119) remains the same and represents 29.2% of all districts. It was not clear whether these districts are at risk or if neither the insurgency nor the Afghan government exercises any significant control over these areas, as USFOR-A previously described. As reflected in Table 3.5, of the 407 districts of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 243 districts were under government control or influence, and 11 districts were under insurgent control or influence.  

USFOR-A reports again this quarter that there are three million Afghans living under insurgent control or influence. As reflected in Table 3.5, of the 32.6 million people living in Afghanistan, USFOR-A determined that the majority, 21.4 million (65.6%), live in areas controlled or influenced by the Afghan government. The remaining 11.2 million people (34%) live in areas where the ANDSF exercised partial influence, but control was not clear.  

TABLE 3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Status</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>In millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIROA*</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>404,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTESTED</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSURGENT</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>104,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>643,789</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: USFOR-A reports no change between Q2 and Q3 2017 data calls. Sq Km = square kilometers.


the government, while another 8.2 million people (25.2%) live in areas that are contested.\textsuperscript{131}

USFOR-A identified the provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Kunduz Province, with five out of seven of its districts under insurgent control or influence, Uruzgan Province, with four of its six districts under insurgent control or influence, and Helmand Province, with nine of 14 districts under insurgent control or influence.\textsuperscript{132} The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeastern Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for one-third of the 45 districts currently under insurgent control or influence.\textsuperscript{133}

USFOR-A reported this quarter that it will change how district control is assessed in the future. Personnel will use the same five factors in assessing the district (1-insurgent control, 2-insurgent influence, 3-neutral, 4-Afghan government influence, 5-Afghan government control), but will no longer derive a mathematical average of those factors in order to assign an overall number to each district. Instead, the regional Resolute Support (RS) Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAAC) and Task Forces (TF) will make their assessments for the districts based upon their subjective synthesis of the five factors as a whole, enabling the commanders to balance the factors with their understanding of the local and regional conditions.\textsuperscript{134}

The TAACs and TFs will now be offered the opportunity to provide narrative feedback on district control, are requested to provide an outlook assessment of any expected change in control over next three months, and are asked to assess the stability of provincial capitals separate from the districts in which they are located. USFOR-A noted that these additional requirements will allow for greater fidelity in the TAACs’ and TFs’ understanding of district control within the limitations of the assessment capability and its methodology.\textsuperscript{135}

\section*{U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN}

DOD reported approximately 8,300 U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) as of May 14, 2017—roughly the same as last quarter—including just under 5,000 U.S. personnel assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces.\textsuperscript{136} The RS mission also included 6,575 military personnel from 39 NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing the total to 11,559 as of May 2017. The remaining U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan conduct counterterror operations under OFS.\textsuperscript{137}

From January 1 through May 14, 2017, three U.S. military personnel were killed in Afghanistan, and 26 were wounded. USFOR-A said there have
“I believe, strongly, that the pressure that we have put on terrorist groups inside of Afghanistan over the last 15 years is the reason we haven’t seen another 9/11 from that part of the world.”

—General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


been no reported DOD or U.S. civilians or contractors killed or wounded thus far in 2017. DOD reported additional fatalities on June 10, when three U.S. soldiers were killed in an insider attack in Nangarhar Province. DOD reported another fatality on July 3, when a U.S. Army soldier died in Helmand Province from wounds sustained during an indirect-fire attack. Both incidents are currently under investigation.

Insider Attacks

This quarter, there were several insider attacks on U.S. and ANDSF personnel, a type of attack that has become increasingly common. Insider attacks gained more attention beginning in 2012, when they spiked to 46 attacks in one year (from 21 in 2011 and six in 2010) according to NATO data. Since responsibility for security transitioned to the Afghans in January 2015, insider attacks have increased further, particularly “green-on-green” attacks, when Afghan soldiers are turned on by personnel from within their own ranks, often an insurgent infiltrator. According to USFOR-A, in 2015, there were 62 reported insider attacks: 57 green-on-green and five “green-on-blue” attacks when ANDSF personnel turn on their Coalition counterparts. In 2016, there were 60 reported insider attacks: 56 green-on-green and four green-on-blue attacks.

According to USFOR-A, from January 1 to May 8, 2017, there were two confirmed insider attacks targeting U.S. military personnel, which did not cause any deaths, but wounded three personnel. There were also 26 confirmed insider attacks during the same period that targeted ANDSF personnel, killing 59 and injuring 22. This does not include the potential insider attack on the ANA’s 209th Corps in April. USFOR-A noted that the accuracy of these figures cannot be confirmed because they come from operational reporting and do not reflect official Afghan government figures.

The most serious potential insider attack that occurred this quarter was an attack against the ANA’s 209th Corps’ Camp Shaheen near Mazar-e Sharif on April 21, 2017. While casualty estimates from that incident vary, some estimates say that as many as 250 Afghan soldiers were killed in this one incident by a group of 10 heavily armed Taliban fighters disguised in army uniforms that stormed the base. The attack has been described as the single deadliest Taliban assault in their war against Afghan forces. The MOI Biometrics Center provided support to investigators of the Camp Shaheen attack by identifying three suspects based on fingerprint examination. Questioned about this attack, USFOR-A responded on July 14, 2017, that the investigation of the attack was still ongoing, with no conclusive evidence at that point to prove it was an insider attack.

At least four other suspected insider attacks occurred this quarter, three of which were within a two-week period. The first occurred on May 27, 2017, when six ANP personnel were killed by a colleague with ties to the Taliban. Six more ANP policemen were killed after two of their fellow
police opened fire on them in southern Kandahar on June 4, an attack that was claimed by the Taliban. The other two attacks were green-on-blue attacks, one occurring on June 10 in Nangarhar Province in which three American soldiers were killed, and one on June 17, again at Camp Shaheen, in which seven American soldiers were wounded and at least one Afghan soldier was killed.

Following this quarter’s events, CSTC-A reported that a Threat Vulnerability Assessment initiative is under way to identify physical security and insider-threat weaknesses of the ANA’s facilities. To begin this process, the ANA’s General Staff Chief of Intelligence was scheduled to visit and assess the 207th Corps.

Additional information on other insider attacks this quarter will be reported in the classified annex to this report.

Updates on Developing the Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF) intended to develop its Afghan counterparts. The highlights of each function reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** A $667,000 information technology contract was awarded to upgrade the ANP’s networks that support the Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) inventory system. MOI obtained approval for 43 of 60 prerequisites it needed to receive CSTC-A funds. The remaining 17 have yet to be approved.

- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** EF-2 saw the addition of five new contractor advisors as TAAC and ANP zone Inspector General (IG) advisors. These advisors will provide additional visibility and advising in the ANA corps and ANP zones, along with one contractor advisor assigned to TF Southwest and another to TAAC-Air. The 21 IG officers assigned to MOI zones earlier this year are now all submitting oversight reports, which will be sampled by advisors for competency once finalized. The MOI noted some instances of ANP zone commanders directing the IG officers’ workloads, which is unacceptable; IG officers are MOI personnel who are intended to be independent and not answerable to zone commanders. The MOI is working with ANP commanders to address this issue and protect the integrity of the IG officers’ oversight function. Additionally, CSTC-A reported that progress has been made with the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP), an oversight mechanism MOD and MOI IGs use to establish policies that minimize fraud or waste and ensure efficiency in their ministries, and the Annual Inspection Plan (AIP), a list of locations and programs for planned inspection that serves as the primary tool for IGs to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the ministries’ programs and operations.
• **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), an elite MOI unit focused on high-level corruption, organized crime, kidnapping, and other serious crimes, made 63 arrests and initiated 224 cases this quarter. Since January 2016, MCTF has initiated 383 cases and made 195 arrests. The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), which became operational in November 2016, has completed 14 major corruption cases, four from MOI and one from MOD, with the rest from other ministries or private sector entities. EF-3 is currently standing up an internal counter-corruption advisory group designed to synchronize and enable Afghan security institutions, RS headquarters, and international partners to combat corruption networks inside the ministries. However, CSTC-A reports that MOI leadership remains hesitant to take effective action against corruption. The number of pending MOI Gross Violations of Human Rights (GVHR) cases has fallen from 33 to 26. Nine cases were closed or preparing to be closed and 10 cases were referred to the Attorney General’s Office for action. Nine cases are currently under investigation, three cases are awaiting court decisions, and one case is pending arrest. CSTC-A praised the MOI for proactively dealing with GVHRs. Only one new MOD GVHR case was identified this quarter, down from nine in the previous quarter, and is currently under investigation. No GVHRs committed by MOD or MOI personnel were reported in the last quarter. MOD/MOI GVHRs stem from alleged extrajudicial killings of captured/wounded enemy fighters, assault/torture of captured enemy fighters, and cases of rape.154

• **EF-4 (Force Generation):** In February 2017, MOD’s Chief of the General Staff established a definitive baseline ANA doctrine defining the conduct and execution of operations at the squad, platoon, and company levels. The ANA is also currently completing a study to determine whether the ANA’s training environment (who is being trained, what is being taught, and the qualifications of instructors) supports this definitive baseline doctrine. The ANA Training and Education Directorate Command is conducting its first logistics inspections, completely run by the ANA. For the ANP, as of April 17, 2017, EF-4 reported that only 2.39% of ANP personnel were untrained.155

• **EF-5 (Sustainment):** Under the MOI NATO Weapons Exchange Program, in the last several months, the ANP has turned in 25,000 AK-47 rifles and received 16,500 M-16 rifles, of which 11,000 have been distributed to the ANP’s 101st, 202nd, and 505th Zones. Of the AK-47s turned in, several thousand were sufficiently serviceable for redistribution to fill shortages in the ALP. A contractor is demilitarizing the AK-47s that are no longer serviceable. In addition, radio encryption training is ongoing at the brigade and kandak (battalion) level, while
new radios have been delivered to replace older models. The new radios include Dari language functionality.156

- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** Over the past three months, the ANDSF has demonstrated moderate improvement and increased independence in their planning process. Most ANDSF efforts during this period were dedicated to preparing for Operation Khalid, the annual operational plan for 2017. RS reports that the Khalid planning process showed better integration of local governance and intelligence. The ANDSF showed mixed results regarding training. During the 2016–2017 winter campaign, Operation Shafaq II, three of six ANA corps met the standard set for them by the chief of the general staff. According to RS, the 201st, 203rd and 215th Corps showed improvement, while the 209th Corps was progressing more slowly.157

- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** This quarter, the ANA's second unmanned aerial system (ScanEagle) became operational in Kunduz. A targeting officer training program has been set up to improve the ANA's targeting-process. The Intelligence Training Center (ITC) added 50 additional billets for ITC students. The Afghan Defense Security Service completed biometric screening of the 203rd and 215th Corps, and was preparing to deploy to the 201st and 207th Corps after Ramadan.158

- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** This quarter, President Ghani announced a new senior advisor for public relations and strategic affairs and the MOI appointed an acting spokesman as a result of the previous spokesman's promotion. EF-8 assesses that these new officials and their offices have the capability to engage domestic and international media independently, but continue to need assistance from RS on strategic communications planning. Overall, the Afghan government continues to show progress toward developing communications capabilities, and the focus of assistance moving forward will be incorporating key elements of the ANDSF Road Map into MOD and MOI communications content. A majority of ministries now use press conferences to discuss current issues and announce accomplishments, and the MOD holds daily press conferences to provide security overviews. The MOD strategic communications director personally clarified to ANA corps’ public affairs personnel that the government’s Strategic Communications Policy authorizes corps commanders to independently engage with the media regarding matters they control, even though some commanders remain reluctant to do so. MOD has demonstrated increased capability in psychological operations by using “radios in a box” to bolster response time to national crises; however, the acting director of psychological operations has experienced difficulties coordinating with corps and other staff elements due to his rank.159
• **Gender Office**: This quarter, the Gender Office created the RS Gender Four-Year Plan, which will provide an outline of gender initiatives to be integrated into the ANDSF's new four-year Road Map. It establishes the initiatives’ objectives and lines of effort, and identifies the effects that will lead to the desired 2020 end state for women in the ANDSF. That end state generally includes increased women’s participation within the ANDSF, including in critical policy and decision-making roles, provision of a safe and secure working environment, implementation of reforms to address gender inequality, and the reduction of sexual or gender-based violence. The Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) program contract awarded on February 1, 2017, is currently providing computer skills, office administration, and English training to 200 ANA women at Kabul National Military Hospital, Oqab Afghan Air Force Base, and Camp Zafar. Additionally, 66 ANA women completed their first year of undergraduate education at Dunya University this quarter.160

### AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BEGINS IMPLEMENTING FOUR-YEAR ANDSF ROAD MAP

This quarter, USFOR-A provided SIGAR with information regarding President Ghani's new four-year ANDSF Road Map. Although President Ghani had not officially announced the Road Map as this report was being prepared, the various policies framed within it have already begun to be implemented, according to USFOR-A.161

The ANDSF Road Map is the security-focused portion of an overall four-year development plan for Afghanistan’s future. Rather than one single document, the Road Map is President Ghani’s term for a series of developmental initiatives that seek to streamline and bolster the ANDSF and expand the Afghan government’s control over population centers. Key areas in which it seeks to achieve this include establishing leadership selection and management processes, doubling the size and combat power of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), further developing the capabilities of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), improving resource management, creating a unity of command and effort, reducing corruption, and shifting the ANP away from combat operations to civilian policing.162

Accomplishing these objectives would help realize the Road Map’s strategic goals to build a credible, effective, and affordable ANDSF capable of controlling territory that accounts for 75–80% of Afghanistan’s population, incentivize the Taliban to reconcile with the Afghan government, and solidify the conditions for a long-term partnership between NATO and Afghanistan.163

President Ghani’s vision for the Road Map involves building a more effective force without a drastic increase in manpower or resources.164 The strategy will be executed in four stages (one per year). In 2017, the ANDSF
will conduct limited, local offensive operations and build capacity to “set the conditions” for the latter stages of the Road Map. Some of the initial actions that have already been completed within the ANDSF include countering corruption by prosecuting crime-committing officials, removing ineffective leaders, and creating a multilateral command center for the ASSF (National Mission Brigade Headquarters). In 2018, the ANDSF will seek to “seize the initiative” by employing their emerging ASSF capabilities to transition to an increasingly offensive posture on the battlefield. In 2019, the ANDSF will “exploit the initiative,” completing the transition to an offensive posture and using the full range of their newly developed capabilities. Lastly, in 2020, the ANDSF will focus on “consolidation” by maintaining their population, infrastructure, and territorial gains. While President Ghani has put the execution of the strategy within a four-year time frame, its actual implementation will be conditions-based, rather than time-driven.

ANDSF ADDRESS LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES AND CAPABILITY GAPS

Addressing leadership challenges is a significant part of the new ANDSF Road Map. President Ghani has emphasized the importance of creating a more competent, younger generation of leaders as essential to security-sector reform and “one of [the Afghan government’s] top priorities.” As mentioned, an uptick in security incidents has led to a call from the public and Afghan officials for a rapid change in ANDSF leadership. Two major examples of this occurred directly after the suspected insider attack on the 209th Corps in late April, when the ANA’s two top security officials, Minister of Defense Abdullah Habibi and the ANA Chief of Staff General Qadam Shah Shahim, resigned their posts. Both officials said in a joint news conference that their decision to step down was due to widespread public anger about the attack.

The Afghan government and top ANDSF officials continue to identify MOD and MOI headquarters elements in need of new and capable leaders, including those in senior positions in those ministries. Many of those changes occurred in the leadership of ANDSF combat elements. According to USFOR-A, three ANA corps and several brigade commanders have been replaced with new leaders this quarter, and the best-performing corps commander was promoted to be the ANA’s new chief of staff. The AAF also went through a large-scale leadership reorganization early this year, and the effect thus far, according to USFOR-A, is a better focus on the chain of command and the ability to develop capabilities across the force while also conducting operations.

In late May, President Ghani made major changes to MOI leadership by announcing 13 new officials in senior posts, including Senior Deputy Minister of Interior for Security, First Deputy Minister of Interior,
commander of the ALP, and new commanders for the ANP’s 808th, 404th, 606th, and 202nd Zones. The MOI hopes that these changes in leadership will contribute to better security across Afghanistan. At a conference the Minister of Interior held for the ANP’s zone commanders in late March, the minister ordered the commanders to research whether the ANP’s leadership issues were stemming from a lack of resources or from mismanagement and corruption. President Ghani has said that retiring 150 generals from the MOD and the recent changes in MOI catalyzed a much needed “generational change” in the force, and that the average age of civil servants is now six years younger than when the Ghani administration took office two years ago.

Another important aspect of the ANDSF’s leadership overhaul is the focus on merit-based appointments and promotions of personnel. Championed by President Ghani, these procedures are intended to help eliminate corruption and nepotism in some parts of the ANDSF. By focusing on leader development and counter-corruption efforts, the ANDSF’s objective is to produce competent and honest leaders through unified training efforts, merit-based selection, professional instruction and education, and implementation of adequate human resources systems.

One potential obstacle to reform was the mid-June resignation of Amrullah Saleh, the newly appointed state minister for security-sector reforms and the former director of the Afghan intelligence services. According to Afghan media, Saleh cited no reason for his surprise resignation on social media, after only having served in the role since March. Some reports claim that a possible reason was the government’s alleged failure to consult Saleh about the hiring and firing of security officials from the day he took office. A presidential-palace spokesman said they had not received a
formal resignation from Saleh and were seeking clarification on his reasons for resigning so quickly.175

According to USFOR-A, ANDSF elements continue to struggle with providing accurate situational reporting to their headquarters and Coalition advisors. Coalition advisors rely heavily on the ANDSF’s reporting because of their lack of visibility below the ANA-corps or ANP-zone headquarters levels. With the exception of Afghan special operations and aviation units, and during periods when tactical units return to base for re-equipping and retraining with U.S. advisor assistance, USFOR-A says U.S. advisors have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below ANA corps and ANP zone-headquarters levels. RS is able to advise at lower, unit-level echelons infrequently and for a limited period of time when they deploy expeditionary advisory teams, conduct battlefield visits, or participate in a key leader engagements. In addition to USFOR-A observations and train, advise, and assist (TAA) activities, advisors rely on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. Reporting procedures and their execution continue to be a TAA priority area, but USFOR-A notes that the consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of this data varies and cannot be independently verified by U.S. officials.176

In an effort to improve visibility and reporting, RS has recently ordered its TAACs and TFs to create assessments of the ANA brigades and ANP provincial headquarters to the extent their visibility allows in the next assessment period. While the assessment framework will be the same as those for ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the TAACs and TFs will be able to caveat their assessments depending upon their degree of visibility into the local force elements.177

Additionally, to improve the accountability of personnel and prevent payments to “ghost,” or nonexistent soldiers, the MOD and MOI continue to conduct their personnel asset inventories to ensure all personnel are enrolled in the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS), an electronic system that helps counter corruption in the personnel reporting system. These inventories are expected to ensure personnel information is accurate and up-to-date.178 For a more complete update about AHRIMS implementation, see page 101 of this section.

According to USFOR-A, the MOD and MOI demonstrated success in their operational planning for the 2017 fighting campaign, Operation Khalid. USFOR-A reported that Khalid is the ANDSF’s first annual plan, a move away from the traditional operational focus on “fighting seasons,” which demonstrates the ANDSF’s improved capability for long-term planning. The planning effort for Khalid was a coordinated effort across all ANDSF pillars, and included input from the MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS), and several other government organizations. USFOR-A emphasized that while the ANA and ANP received guidance from their Coalition advisors in planning Khalid, the operation “is
clearly an ANDSF plan” that involved corps and zone commanders briefing each other independently on the parts of the operation for which they were responsible.179

As a key part of Operation Khalid, the ANDSF are planning to maintain vital force generation efforts, including the implementation of a continuous operational readiness cycle (allowing troops to refit, retrain, and rest) as well as collective training, all while conducting offensive and defensive operations against the enemy. Thus far, USFOR-A notes that there are mixed levels of success in ANA and ANP ability to tackle these objectives simultaneously, with the ANA progressing faster than the ANP. RS will continue to provide assistance to the corps and zone staffs to help them meet their individual and collective training requirements during Operation Khalid.180

Ministries of Defense and Interior Progress Toward Fiscal Year 2017 Projections

The RS Essential Function (EF) directorates and the Gender Advisor Office use the EF Program of Actions and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential function capabilities of the offices in the MOD and MOI.181 The milestones are assessed using a five-tier rating system.182 Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the overall assessment of the ministry.183

Collective training: refers to training units together. It typically follows a sequence of individual skills, collective skills, collective drills and actions, and a final collective validation event that combines all of the previous training components.

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustainable,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement, while the “fully effective” and “partially effective” ratings that follow indicate lower levels of success doing so. The lowest ratings, “agreed” and “initiated” refer to the function being agreed upon by the ministries and Coalition advisors and then beginning the process to implement that function.184

As of May 19, 2017, out of 32 MOD POAM categories, two received the highest, “sustaining capability” rating, 10 were “fully effective,” and 11 were “partially effective,” leaving the remaining nine capabilities at the “initiated” stage.185 Out of 18 MOI POAM categories, one received a “sustaining capability” rating, two were “fully effective,” and seven were “partially effective,” with the remaining eight “initiated” (five) and “agreed” (three). According to these ratings, MOD is performing best in strategic communications and intelligence, and MOI in strategic communications and civilian governance. Both MOD and MOI are struggling with transparency and oversight, MOD is struggling more with gender, and MOI with intelligence.186

By the end of 2017, the MOD is projected to achieve six POAM categories at the highest, “sustaining capability” rating, 13 at “fully effective,” and 12 at “partially effective.”187 The MOI is estimated to achieve one at the “sustaining capability” rating, nine “fully effective,” and four “partially effective.”

The MOD and MOI POAM categories are fewer in number this quarter because of the introduction of an “other” POAM classification, which includes 23 POAM categories that both the MOD and MOI are responsible for mastering jointly. The majority of these are related to budgeting (6) and force sustainment (10), categories which both the MOD and MOI have few individually assigned POAM. On these joint POAM categories, both ministries are performing the best by far in budgeting, followed by policy planning and strategic communications.189

**ANDSF Strength**

ANDSF strength continued to grow this quarter. As of May 20, 2017, ANDSF assigned force strength was 330,043 (not including civilians), according to USFOR-A.190 As reflected in Table 3.6 on the next page, both the ANA and the ANP saw an increase in force strength for the second consecutive quarter. As shown in Table 3.7 on page 101, the ANA is now at 92.5% and the ANP at 96.3% of authorized end strength (not including civilian employees), which represents a roughly 2% (for ANA) and 1% (for ANP) increase since last quarter.191 The May 2017 ANDSF assigned-strength number without civilians reflects an increase of 5,606 personnel since last quarter, and an increase of 3,126 from the same period last year.192

Compared to last quarter, the ANA, including Afghan Air Force and civilians, increased by 2,320 personnel and the ANP increased by 2,014
personnel. Notably, the ANA and AAF (including civilians) has seen an 8,603-person increase from this time last year.\(^{193}\)

**ANDSF Casualties**

According to figures provided by the Afghan government to USFOR-A, from January 1, 2017, through May 8, 2017, there were 2,531 ANDSF service members killed in action and an additional 4,238 wounded in action. These figures are consistent with ANDSF casualty figures provided for the same period as last year. However, USFOR-A noted that it cannot confirm the accuracy of these figures.\(^{194}\)

According to DOD, since the ANDSF took over operational control in January 2015 ANDSF casualties have “steadily increased,” with forces conducting local patrols and checkpoint operations being especially vulnerable.
For this reason, part of the ANDSF Road Map includes measures to decrease the number of static checkpoints to reduce the vulnerability of personnel manning them. DOD also noted the number of casualties resulting from planned offensive operations since 2015 has decreased. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be caused by direct-fire attacks, with IED attacks and mine strikes accounting for much lower levels of casualties.

**AHRIMS and APPS**

The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are in the process of implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort that could greatly improve protection for the U.S. funds that pay most of the ANDSF’s expenses.

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management System contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and current position of ANDSF personnel. AHRIMS also contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI, along with information such as unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is under development; when implemented, it will integrate AHRIMS data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.

In addition, the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) and the ANDSF Identification Card System (ID) support the effort to link biometric records of personnel with APPS for payment of personnel. The aim is for APPS, AABIS, and ID to contain unique biometric-registration numbers: only those ANDSF members registered in AABIS will be issued an ID, and only those members registered with a linked ID will be authorized to have an APPS record for payment. The APPS will be interoperable with AABIS and ID card systems to eliminate the error-prone manual process of inputting 40-digit biometric numbers into the ID system.

**TABLE 3.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Approved End-Strength Goal</th>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Assigned, as of April/May 2017</th>
<th>% of Goal</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Assigned Strength and Goals</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>188,060</td>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>174,032</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>(14,028)</td>
<td>(7.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians</td>
<td>8,474</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,999</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>(2,475)</td>
<td>(29.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA + AAF Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>196,534</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>180,031</strong></td>
<td><strong>91.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(16,503)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(8.4%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police*</td>
<td>161,977</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>156,011</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
<td>(5,966)</td>
<td>(3.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF Total with Civilians</strong></td>
<td><strong>358,511</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>336,042</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(22,469)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(6.3%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force.
* ANP figures do not include “standby” personnel, generally reservists.

CSTC-A is overseeing this process to ensure interoperability so that biometrically linked ID cards can be issued to all ANDSF personnel and that APPS can generate payroll information and bank-account information for accounted-for personnel. According to CSTC-A, this structure will reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying for ghost personnel. Routine checks will still be required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF. The biometric cards will also, once implemented, be used to access all human resources information for personnel, including identity, pay and APPS data, promotions, assignments, killed/wounded/absent-without-leave information, and other documents.

USFOR-A reported last quarter that there were three ongoing efforts to ensure that accurate personnel data currently exist in AHRIMS to support the migration to APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) a Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) to correct the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that the MOD’s PAI is still ongoing, with an anticipated completion date of November 2017: phase one, which included Kabul-area ANA and ANP units, has been completed; phase two, for the ANA’s 203rd and 215th Corps, was reportedly ending in late May 2017; phase three, for the 201st and 207th Corps, is scheduled to end in late August 2017; and phase four, for the 205th and 209th Corps, is scheduled to end in early November 2017. USFOR-A also indicated the only challenge remaining for biometrics collection is the ability of teams working in remote areas to collect data from ANP personnel who face logistical challenges in reaching PAI locations.

As of May 21, 2017, the MOI has verified that 70% of its personnel are in AHRIMS—up from 35% last quarter. USFOR-A estimates that the MOI PAI will be completed on or before July 30, 2017, at which point the integration of AHRIMS data to APPS can commence. In vetting comments, USFOR-A projected that the transition to APPS for both the MOI and MOD would occur before the end of 2017.

“Unaccounted for” and “Ghost” Personnel

As a result of increased attention in early 2017 to the possible existence of many ghost personnel within the ANDSF rolls, U.S. officials confirmed that as of January 1, 2017, ANDSF salaries will be paid only to those MOD and MOI personnel who are correctly registered in AHRIMS. SIGAR requested more detailed information this quarter from U.S. officials in order to clarify the current situation involving ghost personnel and what actions have been taken by the U.S. and Afghan governments to address the issue.
USFOR-A reported that its Afghan partners are “very serious about resolving this issue,” and as of May 11, 2017, the MOD had properly enrolled and accounted for 153,398 personnel in AHRIMS, roughly 88% of the ANA, AAF, Special Mission Wing, MOD General Staff, and other MOD elements. However, they also identified 12,073 personnel, about 7% of total MOD personnel, who are “unaccounted for,” some of whom could be ghosts. The remaining 5% of personnel were trainees and students. USFOR-A emphasized that “a thorough and deliberate process to validate all Afghan soldiers and police is ongoing and is expected to last through late summer 2017.”

In vetting comments, USFOR-A assessed that a significant number of reported ghost personnel are better categorized as unaccounted-for personnel because often these personnel are present for duty, but have not completed proper enrollment into AHRIMS and are therefore unverified in the system. USFOR-A noted that efforts to increase enrollment in AHRIMS prior to the introduction of APPS, completion of PAIs, and continued enforcement by CSTC-A will help resolve this problem and better identify the number of ghost personnel.

According to USFOR-A’s data, the distribution of unaccounted-for personnel is relatively even, with the exception of the ANA’s 215th Corps in Helmand, which has the lowest number of unverified personnel, almost half as many as other ANA combat corps. This is perhaps surprising given that the 215th Corps is a “main effort” corps, meaning that it bears a heavy burden in battling the Afghan insurgency, and has in the past been plagued by issues of corruption and lack of transparency. The corps with the most unaccounted-for personnel are: the 201st Corps, covering Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan Provinces, at 8.7% of their reported strength, and the 207th Corps, covering Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces, at 11.2% of their reported strength. Notably, the ANA’s Medical Command has not accounted for 22.5% of its reported personnel. USFOR-A added that there is currently no zone-level breakdown of unaccounted-for personnel for the ANP.

The U.S. government continues to disburse funds only to those ANDSF personnel it is confident are properly accounted for. USFOR-A reported approximately $18.5 million in cost avoidance by not paying unaccounted-for and suspected ghost personnel since January 2017, up $3.5 million from last quarter. The command advised that this amount will continue to change as the MOD and MOI increase the validation of the remaining soldiers and police through the ongoing PAI process.

Afghan Local Police
ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP is paid via the UN Development Programme’s multilateral
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the ALP is paid with U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted as part of the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.

As of May 7, 2017, the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP has 28,986 guardians, 25,069 of whom are trained, 3,687 remain untrained, and 203 are currently in training. These figures indicate an increase of 262 ALP personnel overall, a 532-person increase in trained personnel, and an increase of 520 untrained personnel. According to NSOCC-A, MOI directed untrained personnel to attend training at the provincial training centers during the winter season, and increased training at the regional training centers in the spring (for ease of access during the fighting season). The MOI’s 1396 (2017) Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter obligates the MOI to have no more than 5% of the on-hand ALP force untrained; currently 13% of the force is untrained.

Consistent with advising the Afghan security forces at the ANA corps and ANP zone-headquarters level, NSOCC-A advises the ALP at the ALP staff-directorate level in Kabul and does not track ALP retention, attrition, or losses. However, the Afghan government reported that 181 ALP guardians were killed in action and 293 were wounded from February through April 2017, figures that are roughly consistent with casualties from previous quarters.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported continuing efforts to enroll ALP personnel in AHRIMS in order to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process and to inventory materiel. These processes are expected to help track and train ALP personnel. As of May 8, 2017, there are 22,207 ALP biometrically enrolled (77% of the force), 24,803 ALP enrolled in EFT (86%), up five percentage points since last quarter, and 22,862 ALP slotted in AHRIMS (79%), up nine points since last quarter, marking considerable progress. NSOCC-A remarked that the progress made on these goals “significantly contributes to the elimination of ALP ghost personnel.”

The MOI’s 1395 (2016) Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter laid out clear goals for the completion of ALP registration for biometric IDs (100% of the ALP), EFT salary payments (90% of the ALP), and sloting ALP personnel in AHRIMS (95% of ALP) by December 20, 2016. The 1396 (2017) Commitment Letter calls for 100% of the ALP to be registered into AHRIMS, though it is unclear by what date. It also stipulates that guardians will receive their biometric IDs, be slotted into AHRIMS and APPS (when APPS is implemented), and enrolled in EFT during training. The current enrollment percentages indicate the ALP still have not reached these goals. However, NSOCC-A continues to recommend no penalties, based on the efforts of the ALP Staff Directorate and other ALP leaders to complete the requirements. CSTC-A concurred with their recommendation.
As with the ANA and ANP, CSTC-A will fund salaries only for ALP guardians who are actively slotted in AHRIMS. NSOCC-A reported a reduction in their estimated U.S. funding for the ALP from $93 million annually in early 2017 to an estimated $85–91 million for the rest of the fiscal year, depending on how many additional ALP are successfully enrolled in AHRIMS. NSOCC-A notes that they suspect the reduction of funding will incentivize the MOI to account for those ALP not registered in AHRIMS in order to recoup lost U.S. funding.\textsuperscript{228} NSOCC-A says that CSTC-A reviews validated personnel numbers every three months and provides updated funding based on validated AHRIMS personnel numbers. As of April 24, 2017, CSTC-A is funding 21,698 ALP guardians.\textsuperscript{229} In vetting comments, NSOCC-A noted that meeting the MOI Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter’s goals is particularly difficult for the ALP because they are traditionally located in very rural areas. According to NSOCC-A, there are some districts that do not have the infrastructure needed to complete AHRIMS enrollment, and travelling to PAI locations in order to enroll in AHRIMS can be a life-endangering risk for some ALP personnel.\textsuperscript{230}

The ALP Staff Directorate has been conducting district assessments since October 2016, when the Minister of Interior directed all eight police zones be assessed. NSOCC-A reported this quarter that two senior leaders completed ALP assessments in Zones 202 and 303. NSOCC-A is awaiting the results following their review by the Minister of Interior.\textsuperscript{231}

\textbf{AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY}

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated $42.6 billion and disbursed $41.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.\textsuperscript{232}

\textbf{ANA Strength Shows Modest Improvement}

As of May 20, 2017, the overall assigned strength of the ANA, including the AAF but not including civilians, was 174,032 personnel, as shown in Table 3.7 on page 101 of this section.\textsuperscript{233} ANA strength (including the AAF but not civilians) has steadily increased two quarters in a row, with this quarter seeing a 3,592-person increase from last quarter.\textsuperscript{234} According to USFOR-A, possible ghost personnel are not subtracted from these strength figures because ghosts are estimated using the AHRIMS (personnel management) and APPS (payment) systems, both still undergoing improvements, while a different reporting system currently calculates manpower.\textsuperscript{235} For more information on AHRIMS, APPS, and ghost personnel, please see page 101.

ANA assigned military personnel are at 92.5% of their authorized end strength, a two-point increase from last quarter. However, civilian strength has suffered in the last three months: the number of ANA and AAF civilians fell by 1,272 personnel to 5,999, and civilian strength has slipped from 94.1% last quarter to 70.8% of the authorized civilian strength.\textsuperscript{236} Despite
this shortfall, when including ANA and AAF’s civilians, the ANA’s overall strength still increased by 2,320 personnel since last quarter and by 8,603 since the same period last year.237

According to USFOR-A, the overall ANA monthly attrition rate for the last quarter, including the AAF, Special Operations Forces, trainees, and students was:

- January 2017: 2.9%
- February 2017: 2.1%
- March 2017: 1.9%

The 2.3% average attrition for this quarter marks the second quarter in a row attrition has decreased, this time by 0.3 percentage points.238 Corps-level attrition figures are classified and will be reported in the classified annex of this report.

According to DOD, attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP, in part because ANA soldiers enlist for limited tours of duty and have more widespread deployments across the country, while police view their careers as longer-term endeavors.239

To decrease the potential for local influence, the ANA does not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas. DOD observed that the policy has resulted in increased transportation costs and obstacles for soldiers attempting to take leave, contributing to absences without leave. However, the ANP historically suffers significantly more casualties than the ANA.240 DOD also noted that the Coalition is no longer encouraging pay incentives to address retention because they have not been shown to be effective.241

**ANA Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated $18.9 billion and disbursed $18.4 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.242

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and non-payroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1396 (2017) was $167.7 million through March 28, 2017, a $35.9 million increase compared to the same period last year.243 While the majority of sustainment funding goes toward ANA salaries and incentive payments, aside from these, the largest uses of sustainment funding were for equipment and supplies, mainly vehicle and aircraft fuel, ($23.6 million) and logistics ($1.5 million).244

**ANA Salaries and Incentives**

CSTC-A reported that the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average $627.1 million annually over the next four years, a considerable increase in the cost-per-year estimate given last quarter, which was $545.3 million annually.245 In vetting comments, DOD noted that the increase in cost was mainly due to the transfer of 40,000 ANP personnel to the ANA as part of the ANDSF Road Map plan to move certain
paramilitary police elements (Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police) from MOI to MOD authority.\textsuperscript{246} DOD also noted that the forecasted salary and incentives figures are for planning purposes only and are not definitive indicators of future DOD support, which will depend on Afghan progress toward reconciliation, reducing corruption, security conditions, and other factors.\textsuperscript{247}

Of the $167.7 million spent on ANA sustainment in Afghan FY 1396 through March 28, 2017, $136.6 million was spent on salaries ($55.1 million) and incentive pay ($81.5 million) for ANA officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers, civilians, and contractors.\textsuperscript{248} Funding for ANA salaries increased slightly (by roughly $8 million) since this period last year, while incentive pay increased by about $39 million.\textsuperscript{249}

### ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $13.7 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.\textsuperscript{250} Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, ammunition, communication equipment, weapons, and other related equipment.\textsuperscript{251} Approximately 47.3% of U.S. funding in this category this quarter was for vehicles and related parts, followed by 16.5% for ammunition, and 16.2% for aircraft and related parts, as shown in Table 3.8.\textsuperscript{252}

The total cost of equipment and related services procured for the ANA was $15.7 billion as of June 30, 2017. This represents a nearly $319.3 million increase since last quarter, and a $522.8 million increase since the same period last year.\textsuperscript{253} This considerable increase was due in part to the purchase of MD-530 helicopters and funds for the national maintenance strategy.\textsuperscript{254}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>$7,436,160,021</td>
<td>$24,352,619</td>
<td>$6,707,279,043</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>2,543,386,402</td>
<td>378,386,745</td>
<td>1,534,466,913</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>911,296,017</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
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<td>Transportation Services</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,708,252,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>$912,773,777</strong></td>
<td><strong>$13,219,118,649</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised-explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts. Procured and Fielded to the ANA = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOD/ANA.

CSTC-A Reports Improvements in ANA Equipment Readiness Ahead of Summer Campaign

According to CSTC-A, the operational readiness (OR) of ANA equipment substantially improved across all ANA combat elements this quarter. As of April 19, 2017, CSTC-A reported the ANA's corps-level equipment OR rates at 62% for the 201st Corps, 69% for the 203rd, 61% for the 205th, 86% for the 207th, 54% for the 209th, and 42% for the 215th. CSTC-A also reported the equipment OR rates for the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) at 78% and the ANA's 111th Capital Division at 93%. CSTC-A calculates the OR rates by determining the ratio of fully mission-capable equipment against total authorization. However, some equipment categorized as non-mission-capable may still be serviceable for use at a static location or checkpoint.

According to CSTC-A, the equipment OR benchmark is 70% for each ANA corps and 80% for the ANASOC, with the latter being higher because it is the combat element that takes on the majority of the ANA's offensive operations. While not all ANA combat elements met their benchmark goals, all ANA corps saw a 3.5-point average increase in their operational readiness rates when compared to last quarter, when all elements saw a decline or had stagnated in their equipment operational readiness. This increase likely factored into CSTC-A’s assessment that the ANA entered the summer 2017 campaign at a higher readiness level than they entered the 2016 summer campaign.

The ANA corps with the highest equipment OR rates were the 207th (86%), which covers western Afghanistan around the relatively stable Herat Province, followed by the 203rd Corps (69%), in charge of eastern Afghanistan’s Paktika, Khowst, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. The 215th Corps in Helmand Province, where much of the fighting in southern Afghanistan is concentrated, continued to have the lowest equipment OR rate at 42% this quarter, followed by 54% for the 209th Corps, which covers the majority of northern Afghanistan’s provinces. Notably, the 215th Corps saw the largest improvement in OR of any ANA element since last quarter (a nine percentage-point increase) while the 209th Corps’ OR remained the same.

CSTC-A remarked that the “main effort corps” shouldering most of the fighting burden (the 215th, 209th, and 205th Corps) struggled to keep up with equipment maintenance, which in turn kept their OR rates relatively low and static during the winter campaign. However, some improvements were made by deploying additional maintenance enablers and focusing more on sustainment late in the campaign, which will continue during the spring and summer campaign (Operation Khalid). They noted that the remaining obstacles to improving equipment OR include poor maintenance management, failure to report misuse of military mechanics, lack of assigned key logistic leaders, lack of maintenance performance, and
underutilization of contracted maintenance providers. CSTC-A reported that it continues to reinforce maintenance management through its assistance efforts across the ANA.261

**Core Information Management System Makes Progress but Lacks Full Visibility**

The Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) is part of the solution to address capability gaps in the Afghan logistical supply chain to ensure that the ANDSF are properly equipped. Since 2012, efforts have been under way to develop and implement an automated system within both MOD and MOI to replace a paper-based process in order to better track equipment and supplies.264

CoreIMS is an inventory-management system that electronically tracks basic items like vehicles, weapons, night-vision devices, and repair parts. The system helps allocate materiel and analyze its usage to predict future item and budget requirements, while reducing opportunities for fraud.265

The goal for the system is to improve Afghan sustainment processes by providing managers and decision makers with a real-time status of assets.266

To do this, CSTC-A has integrated CoreIMS with the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)—a U.S. database of the sale and provision of U.S. military materials, services, and training to foreign countries and international organizations—to save time and resources of ANDSF procurement personnel, decrease human error, and significantly improve order and asset visibility.267

As of March 1, 2017, the web-based CoreIMS became available and fully functional at MOD and MOI national logistic locations, forward supply depots, and regional supply logistic centers.268 In addition, CSTC-A had been providing advanced CoreIMS training for Afghan logistic specialists to train, mentor, and assist other ANA and ANP personnel in logistics operations and CoreIMS functionality.269

While the ANA and ANP are both using the system, there are still challenges with the transfer and receipt processes within the depots that require CSTC-A to monitor the handling of equipment purchased by the United States for the ANDSF.270 According to CSTC-A this quarter, the remaining issue with CoreIMS is that once materiel is distributed below the regional level to the local forward supply depots or units, CoreIMS loses visibility. CSTC-A notes that plans are under way to integrate CoreIMS down to the brigade level (ANA) and the provincial headquarters level (ANP) in the next four years. This will also include the ALP, which are supported through the MOI’s supply chain.271

**ANA Infrastructure**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure projects.272 Total ANA sustainment
Security

Costs for FY 2017, covering all ANA facility and generator requirements, are roughly $74.2 million, $17.5 million of which is funded through the NATO ANA Trust Fund, while the remaining $56.7 million is funded through U.S. ASFF funds.273

As of May 21, 2017, the United States had completed 408 infrastructure projects valued at $5.3 billion, with another 22 ongoing projects valued at $142.6 million, according to CSTC-A.274

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects are the same as last quarter: the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul (with an estimated cost of $72.7 million) to be completed in December 2017, a Northern Electrical Interconnect (NEI) substation project in Balkh Province ($27.7 million), now slated to be completed in October 2019, seven months later than previously reported, and an NEI substation in Kunduz ($9.5 million), the completion of which has been pushed back nine months to February 2019.275

Four ANA infrastructure contracts with a total value of $3.2 million were awarded this quarter. These include: a relocatable, large-area maintenance shelter at Kandahar Airfield; a squad operations and alert facility in Mazar-e Sharif; a commando camp in Kabul; and an A-29 taxiway in Mazar-e Sharif.276

An additional 44 infrastructure projects, the top 24 of which are valued at $248 million, are currently in the planning phase: four Kabul National Military Hospital projects ($14.4 million), 10 Afghan Electrical Interconnect projects ($80 million), five ANASOC projects ($44.9 million), and five AAF projects ($13.9 million). The remaining five projects, valued at around $94.4 million, comprise other ANA sustainment projects supporting the new MOD headquarters, the Women’s Participation Program, and other security facilities.277

As part of the Women’s Participation Program (WPP), CSTC-A has continued developing facilities specifically for female personnel in the ANA. While no projects were completed this quarter, there were two ongoing WPP projects. One was a gym, dining facility, and conference center at the National Defense University in Kabul ($4.4 million); the other was a barracks project at the AAF base at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul ($1.5 million). Three WPP projects are currently being planned, including a $2 million project for barracks at the AAF’s university in Kabul, a roughly $1 million project for a day care facility at the Kabul Military Training Complex, and an $845,000 day care facility at Camp Zafar in Herat.278

CSTC-A reported no updates this quarter on infrastructure-related train, advise, and assist activities.

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.279
According to CSTC-A, ASFF training funds are used to send ANA and AAF students to vocational training and professional military education opportunities abroad, including aviation training, special forces training, basic officer-leadership courses, captain’s career courses, war-college programs, seminars, and conferences.280

As of May 21, 2017, CSTC-A reported 12 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs for the ANA and AAF. The largest of these projects are multiyear contracts that include a $41.9 million project for out-of-country training for AAF pilots, a $36.8 million project to train Afghan special forces, and two separate $18.3 million projects to run contractor-led training for the ANA.

This quarter, a new project focused on training women in the ANA. The Gender Occupational Opportunity Development ($4 million) will give female personnel the tools and opportunities for future employment in the MOD.281

Afghan Air Force

As of May 20, 2017, the overall assigned strength of the AAF, including civilians, was 8,413 personnel, a 24-person increase since last quarter.282

As of May 18, 2017, the United States has appropriated approximately $5.2 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY 2010, with roughly $1.5 billion of it requested in FY 2017. Of the total amount since 2010, $2.2 billion was spent on the Special Mission Wing, the special operations branch of the AAF.283 CSTC-A noted that the FY 2017 figure includes DOD’s recent request to Congress for $814.5 million to fund the Afghan Aviation Transition Plan (AATP), which will replace the AAF’s aging, Russian-made
Mi-17 fleet with refurbished, U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters obtained from U.S. Army stocks. Since FY 2010, nearly $3.4 billion has been obligated for the AAF, with roughly $252 million of FY 2017 funds obligated as of May 18, 2017. The majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 has been designated for sustainment items, which account for 48.9% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 31.5%, a percentage that will increase as funding for the AATP continues to be obligated.

The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft includes:
- 4 Mi-35 helicopters
- 46 Mi-17 helicopters (19 unusable)
- 27 MD-530 helicopters (one unusable, two combat losses)
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes (one unusable)
- 19 A-29 light attack airplanes (12 are currently in Afghanistan and seven are in the United States supporting AAF pilot training)

As of May 21, 2017, of the 19 unusable Mi-17s, seven aircraft are in overhaul, four are in heavy repair, three are awaiting extraction and assessment, and five have expired, meaning they will be reusable once they are overhauled. The one unusable MD-530 is damaged due to a hard landing during training; two others were lost during Afghan combat operations. According to DOD, the two MD-530 combat losses have yet to be written off of the inventory, keeping the number of MD-530s at 27 rather than 25. The C-130 that is unusable is in depot.

As part of the AATP, over the next several years, the AAF will receive a significant number of new or refurbished airframes to grow the AAF’s inventory. According to USFOR-A, in FY 2017, two more A-29 aircraft have been purchased, but not yet fielded. In order to replace the AAF’s aging Mi-17s, the United States has also procured 53 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as well as 30 MD-530s, three AC-208s, and four additional A-29 aircraft (for a total of six) using FY 2017 funds.

While the delivery timelines and training requirements are still being determined, by the end of the AATP in 2023, the AAF will have a total of 61 UH-60s, 58 Fixed Forward Firing UH-60, 54 MD-530s, 24 C-208s, 32 AC-208s, 4 C-130 aircraft, and 25 A-29s.

USFOR-A Reports High Operational Readiness for AAF

In line with the high praise the AAF consistently receives as one of Afghanistan’s best-performing force elements, the AAF’s operational readiness (OR) improved even further this quarter, with all of its airframes exceeding their OR goals despite a sharp incline in operational usage.

According to USFOR-A, the AAF flew 5,612 sorties from March 2017 through April 2017. The average monthly sorties this quarter shows an
83% increase from the previous four months of reporting. While this change is likely attributed to slightly lower tempo of operations in the winter months, it still indicates a considerable increase in the AAF’s recent operational activity.

With the exception of the C-130, no AAF airframe flew over its number of recommended hours this quarter. And while the C-130 flew twice as many hours as recommended, it was the only airframe that achieved 100% OR throughout the reporting period. Based on USFOR-A’s assessment of the AAF’s airframes, the only one that could face a strain from overutilization is the Mi-17 because it had the lowest OR of any airframe, even though it met its OR goals and flew the most missions by far this reporting period. The Mi-17 airframe flew 50% of total sorties by all airframes during that period, although this is a decrease of nearly 4 percentage points since last quarter. These figures help explain how the AAF and its Coalition advisors have begun addressing outstanding issues with the fleet’s OR and how the implementation of the AATP, with its emphasis on replacing the Mi-17s with recently refurbished UH-60s, could further improve the AAF’s OR and capability gaps.

**Personnel Capability**

USFOR-A provided the following information regarding how many fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready (CMR) crew members the AAF has for each of its airframes. For more information about the...
specific training involved for crew members attaining CMR status, please see SIGAR’s April 2017 Quarterly Report to Congress, pages 111–113. According to USFOR-A, this quarter:

- **C-130**: 12 total pilots, including five mission pilots, three instructor pilots, and four copilots (up four from last quarter), five flight engineers, and ten loadmasters (up two from last quarter) are CMR.
- **C-208**: 42 total pilots, including 16 mission pilots, 14 co-pilots, and 12 instructor pilots, are CMR (same as last quarter).
- **A-29**: 11 total pilots, including nine mission pilots (down one from last quarter) and two instructor pilots, are CMR.
- **MD-530**: 58 total pilots, including 35 mission pilots (up 4 from last quarter) and seven instructor pilots (up two from last quarter), are CMR. There are an additional 16 new pilots since last quarter who have yet to become CMR.
- **Mi-17**: 82 total pilots, including 32 aircraft commanders, 39 co-pilots, and 11 instructor pilots, 27 flight engineers, and 53 gunners are CMR.
- **Mi-35**: 10 pilots are CMR (same as last quarter).

### The Special Mission Wing

The Special Mission Wing is the aviation branch of the MOD’s Afghan Special Security Forces that provides aviation support to Afghanistan’s counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and special operations forces. According to DOD, the SMW is the only ANDSF force with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The SMW’s four squadrons include two in Kabul, one at Kandahar Airfield, and one at Mazar-e Sharif Airfield, providing the ASSF with operational reach across Afghanistan.

As of June 2017, the SMW had 788 personnel and was at 87% of its authorized strength, slightly lower than Afghanistan’s other force elements. DOD notes that because the SMW’s recruiting standards are higher than those of the AAF and other ANDSF elements, the SMW struggles to find qualified personnel for pilot and maintenance positions.

The two main funding sources for the SMW are the ASFF and the DOD Counternarcotics (DOD-CN) fund. From FY 2010 to May 17, 2017, just over $2.2 billion has been obligated for the SMW from both funds. The vast majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 has been designated for sustainment items (46.1%) and equipment and aircraft (45.8%). According to NSOCC-A, of the $122 million obligated for the SMW from the DOD-CN fund FY 2017, only about $29 million has already been spent.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported that from late February through early April, all SMW locations successfully completed their multi-day, multi-mission training exercises in preparation for more active fighting in the spring and summer. The SMW also completed collective training courses in order to increase the number of mission-ready crew members. This included a
A 60% increase in the SMW’s mission-ready Mi-17 fight crews since the end of the 2016 fighting season early last fall, and a nearly five-fold increase in qualified air intelligence officers. While the number of PC-12 crews remained relatively stagnant, the SMW and Coalition advisors expect to increase their numbers by the end of 2017.302

SIGAR will report additional details of the SMW budget, inventory, and capabilities in the classified annex to this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated $20.4 billion and disbursed $20.1 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.303

ANP Strength Continues to Rise
As of April 19, 2017, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and MOI Headquarters and institutional support (MOI HQ & IS), was 156,011, according to USFOR-A.304 ANP strength saw a 2,014-person increase since last quarter, and 3,482-person increase in the last six months, as seen in Table 3.9. The increase brings the ANP to 96.3% of their authorized end strength.305

Patrolmen represent the largest component of the ANP this quarter with 70,604 personnel; noncommissioned officers numbered 50,412, while officer ranks stood at 27,857. Compared to last quarter, the largest increase in personnel occurred within the patrolmen ranks (424 new personnel) and largest decrease was within the noncommissioned officer ranks (754 fewer officers).306

TABLE 3.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Component</th>
<th>Q4 2016</th>
<th>Q2 2017</th>
<th>6-Month Change</th>
<th>Q4 2016</th>
<th>Q2 2017</th>
<th>6-Month Change</th>
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<td>516</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
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<td>(516)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q4 2016 data as of 11/2016; Q2 2017 data as of 4/2017. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; IS = Institutional Support personnel.
*NISTA (Not In Service for Training) are generally students.
**ANP Totals do not include standby personnel, generally reservists. In Q4 2016, there were 2,048 standby personnel reported; in Q2 2017, there were none.

ANP attrition stayed relatively stable since the last reporting period. According to USFOR-A, the overall ANP monthly attrition rate for the quarter was:

- February 2017: 1.8%
- March 2017: 1.8%
- April 2017: 2.6%

**ANP Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated $9 billion and disbursed $8.8 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment. This includes ASFF contributions to LOTFA, which pays for ANP salaries, the largest use of sustainment funding. As of July 16, 2017, the United States contributed $20.8 million to LOTFA. Other uses include electricity, organizational clothing and individual equipment, and vehicle fuel.

In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has thus far provided nearly $8 million for ALP salaries and incentives since the beginning of the fiscal year. The total estimated ALP salary and incentive costs is $77.6 million per year for the next two years, with the United States paying for the entirety of the contribution.

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated and distributed $4.5 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were procured to purchase vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and communications equipment, as shown in Table 3.10, with approximately 64.6% going towards vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, followed by 13.5% for ammunition.

The total cost of equipment and related services procured for the ANP was $5.6 billion as of June 30, 2017. This represents a substantial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
<th>Procured and Fielded to the ANP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>$309,982,254</td>
<td>$1,627,691</td>
<td>$297,900,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>3,585,125,486</td>
<td>3,635,133</td>
<td>3,261,663,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>249,934,662</td>
<td>13,307,558</td>
<td>231,735,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>751,411,579</td>
<td>30,275,643</td>
<td>493,617,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Services</td>
<td>78,181,320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73,035,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IEDs</td>
<td>131,840,216</td>
<td>374,271</td>
<td>118,457,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>445,823,259</td>
<td>150,066,890</td>
<td>331,687,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,552,298,776</strong></td>
<td><strong>$199,287,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,808,096,763</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Procured and Fielded to the ANP = Title transfer of equipment is initially from the applicable U.S. Military Department/Defense Agency to CSTC-A; title to the equipment is later transferred to the MOI/ANP.

* Vehicle costs include vehicles and parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/17.
$205.4 million increase in procurements since last quarter, and a $296.1 million increase since the same period last year. The total cost of ANP equipment fielded this quarter was $4.8 billion, with the majority of the funds spent on vehicles and ammunition.

**Equipment Operational Readiness**

This quarter, for the first time SIGAR requested information regarding the operational readiness of equipment across the MOI's various elements. MOI reported to NSOCC-A an average equipment OR rate of 92%. However, according to NSOCC-A, these OR rates are calculations of fully mission capable equipment divided by the total number of authorized equipment, and because the MOI reported excess vehicles on hand in many police zones, equipment OR is reported as higher than 100% in some cases. NSOCC-A is confident, despite this “questionable reporting,” that MOI OR rates are high since the majority of the MOI's maintenance is performed by a U.S. government contractor rather than independently by MOI personnel.

As of March 30, 2017, the ANP zone with the highest OR rate by far was the 505th Zone, covering Helmand Province, which may be in part due to the closer coordination of Coalition advisors with ANP personnel through expeditionary advisory packages deployed there. The zone with the lowest OR rate was the 101st Capital Zone, covering Kabul, at 51%. The ABP and ANCop also have personnel operating in Kabul, and those elements have 125% and 61% OR rates respectively.

**ANP Infrastructure**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure. According to CSTC-A, as of May 21, 2017, the United States had completed a total of 745 infrastructure projects valued at $3.6 billion. This quarter, CSTC-A reported 21 ongoing projects valued at roughly $74 million. There are currently 16 infrastructure projects in the planning phase worth $115.9 million, the majority of which are Women's Participation Projects.

The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter is the installation of an IT server at the MOI Headquarters Network Operations Center in Kabul (with an estimated cost of $33.6 million). This is followed by two WPP projects: compounds for women at the Regional Training Center in Jalalabad ($7.8 million) and the Kabul Police Academy ($6.7 million).

CSTC-A estimates that the U.S. government would need to spend approximately $56.9 million toward ANP infrastructure costs per year to cover current ANP facility and generator sustainment requirements. This figure includes the $42.3 million that would be spent on ANP on-budget sustainment costs, $8.1 million in funding for new, off-budget facilities and generators as part of the initiative to expand the ASSF, and $6.5 million on ANP off-budget sustainment costs.
“[The Afghan government is] now moving onto the far harder task of dealing with institutional corruption in the police, to turn them into servants of the people. Again, this involves new leadership at the top and changes in systems and processes further down.”

—Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan

Source: Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “President Ghani’s Address to NATO Ambassadors,” 5/19/2017.

**ANP Training and Operations**

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.7 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations. According to CSTC-A, ASFF training funds for the ANP are used for U.S.-based professional military education, travel, living allowances, and medical expenses for MOI, ANP, and General Command Police Special Units personnel to attend law enforcement and military training. Some training courses include Command and General Staff College, Sergeant Major Academy, and the Captain’s Career Course. The goal of the U.S.-based military training is to increase technical skills and to enhance knowledge and leadership at all levels. CSTC-A says that the program allows the U.S. military to have a lasting impression on the development of the ANP.

CSTC-A also uses ASFF funding to recruit and hire Afghan logistics specialists who train, advise, and assist the ANP in a wide array of ANDSF logistic skills, to include English translation, computer skills, equipment accountability and tracking, inventory management and warehousing, modern business skills, and other logistic functions. ASFF can also be used to procure contractor advisors and mentors who advise, train, and mentor the ANP to increase their overall capabilities in essential functions such as finance, internal controls, governance, force generation, training and sustainment of the force, logistics, sustainment, planning, executing security operations, and intelligence.

**ANP Engineers** conduct IED detection, extraction, and destruction training in early June at Bost Airfield in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. (Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Justin Updegraff)
As of April 17, 2017, only 2.4% of ANP personnel (not including ALP) were untrained (3,559 untrained out of 148,710 active ANP personnel), which indicates that the ANP is maintaining better training readiness than the 5% untrained-personnel threshold mandated by the MOI’s 1395 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter.327

The MOI’s largest ongoing training contracts include a $10.8 million contract for training MOI advisors and mentors and a $4.5 million contract to train ANP personnel in counter-IED and ordnance disposal methods.328

**WOMEN COMPRISE 1.3% OF ANDSF PERSONNEL**

This quarter, the RS Gender Affairs Office reported that 4,189 women were serving in the ANDSF, a decrease of 199 personnel since last quarter. USFOR-A attributes this decrease to retirement and instances of absence without leave in the ANP, which was the only force to suffer female personnel attrition this quarter.329 However, the ANP continued to have the highest percentage of female personnel, at 2% of its entire force strength. This attrition in female personnel this quarter reduced the overall percentage of women in the ANDSF from 1.4% last quarter to 1.3% as of May 18, 2017.330

Of the 4,189 women in the ANDSF, 2,881 were in the ANP, 1,091 were in the ANA, 142 were in the ASSF, and 75 were in the AAF. Of the women in the ANP, ANA, ASSF, and AAF, 1,424 were officers, 1,468 were noncommissioned officers, 1,175 were enlisted, and 122 were cadets.331

USFOR-A provided an update on the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) program contract awarded last quarter. The GOOD program currently funds literacy, computer skills, office administration, and English language training to over 200 ANA military and civilian women. Eighty-eight additional women are expected to join the program in early June. Additionally, the Dunya University Scholarship program has supported 109 ANA women who began their studies towards undergraduate degrees and 66 women who have completed their first year of undergraduate study.332

**ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE**

The U.S. government has yet to field medical equipment for the ANDSF this quarter, but CSTC-A projects that it will spend $23.5 million in medical equipment procurements in Afghan fiscal year 1396 (2017), down nearly $4 million from last quarter’s projection.333

As of April 16, 2017, there were 922 physicians (a five-person increase from last quarter) and 2,885 other medical staff (an eight-person decrease) within the ANDSF healthcare system; 343 physician positions (27.1% of those required) and 473 other medical positions (14.1%) remain vacant, according to CSTC-A.334
On March 8, 2017, terrorists attacked the Kabul National Military Hospital (KNMH), damaging it with explosions and small-arms fire. The worst damage was to the endoscopic-procedures floor, which was rendered inoperable for two weeks. The entire hospital was closed for two days after the attack for emergency repairs. By the third day, patients were being transferred back to KNMH; the hospital operating room and intensive care unit were deemed fully operational within six days of the attack. As of April 8, hospital repairs were 90% complete, with minimal maintenance and cosmetic work still required. The cost of replacing medical equipment, supplies, and furnishings was reported at $2.7 million. Repairs are also required for the KNMH water system and utilities. The estimated cost of these repairs, including vehicle scanners to verify the content of delivery trucks, is estimated at $19 million.

This quarter, the 20-bed hospital in Helmand, built as part of the effort to provide local ANP zone hospitals, became operational. This brings the total number of operational zone hospitals to four out of seven planned hospitals. Five further zone hospitals in Balkh, Kandahar, Helmand, Nangarhar, and Kunduz are reportedly included in the Afghan FY 1396 (2017) procurement plan.

The zone-hospital initiative was identified as a priority of the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) last quarter and MOI’s progress has been faster than expected. CSTC-A reported two caveats: first, that the Afghan definition of initial operating capability differs from the NATO definition,
requiring only 50% of staff available and beds physically in place and a facility, irrespective of its overall suitability as a medical treatment facility. Second, not all medical facility projects on the FY 1396 procurement plan will be executed this year due to funding limitations. The OTSG has created a prioritized list of proposed facilities in recognition of the ANDSF’s scarce medical funding resources.

The OTSG is also in the early stages of implementing a Health Information Management System (HIMS) in the Afghan National Police Hospital (ANPH) in Kabul. This feature will provide ANPH leadership and Coalition advisors with the ability to track supply consumption within the hospital. As of May 2017, contractors had delivered 75.8% of the ANDSF’s medical supplies to the National Medical Depot, which were subsequently delivered to 88 of 120 ANP clinics this quarter. The remaining supply items are expected to arrive by the end of July 2017.

CSTC-A reported that ANA physicians at KNMH and regional hospitals are generally well trained, but there are several skill sets which do not exist or are in need of refinement, including pathology, psychiatry, and general public health services. CSTC-A identified the most critically needed skill as pathology, due to the lack of capability to examine surgically excised tissue. KNMH’s physician with the most skill in reading MRIs was killed in the March 8 terrorist attack and has not been replaced. There is no surgical, medical, or radiation oncologist in the entire ANA medical community, and patients seeking cancer treatment must generally go outside the country. As previously reported, standard hygiene such as handwashing is still not commonly observed, and infection control practices throughout all facilities are below acceptable World Health Organization standards.

Following CSTC-A’s report last quarter that casualty rates among ANDSF personnel are unacceptably high due in part to inadequate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities, combat medic and MEDEVAC training courses are now being provided by a cadre of AAF doctors and medics. The first course graduated 22 students in March 2017 and a second training course in November 2017 is expected to graduate an additional 16, raising the total number of medics to 130. U.S. Air Force medical personnel with TAAC-Air periodically fly on Afghan MEDEVAC missions to observe and provide on-the-job training.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $350 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding and has
obligated approximately $20 million of FY 2016 funds and $1.6 million in FY 2017 funds.\textsuperscript{340}

State directly funds six Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), three international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised-explosive devices. As of March 31, 2017, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 219.8 million square meters of land (approximately 84.9 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.9 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.11).\textsuperscript{341}

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 598 square kilometers (230 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, seven square kilometers (2.7 square miles) were cleared bringing the known contaminated area to 591 square kilometers (228.2 square miles) by the end of the quarter. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.\textsuperscript{342}

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Fiscal Year} & \textbf{Minefields Cleared (m²)} & \textbf{AT/AP Destroyed} & \textbf{UXO Destroyed} & \textbf{SAA Destroyed} & \textbf{Fragments Cleared} & \textbf{Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)*} \\
\hline
2010 & 39,337,557 & 13,879 & 663,162 & 1,602,267 & 4,339,235 & 650,662,000 \\
2011 & 31,644,360 & 10,504 & 345,029 & 2,393,725 & 21,966,347 & 602,000,000 \\
2012 & 46,783,527 & 11,830 & 344,363 & 1,058,760 & 22,912,702 & 550,000,000 \\
2013 & 25,059,918 & 6,431 & 203,024 & 275,697 & 10,148,683 & 521,000,000 \\
2014 & 22,071,212 & 12,397 & 287,331 & 346,484 & 9,415,712 & 511,600,000 \\
2015 & 12,101,386 & 2,134 & 33,078 & 88,798 & 4,062,478 & 570,800,000 \\
2016 & 27,856,346 & 6,493 & 6,289 & 91,563 & 9,616,485 & 607,600,000 \\
2017 & 14,991,197 & 2,109 & 12,079 & 36,518 & 1,158,886 & 591,700,000 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 219,845,503 & 65,777 & 1,894,355 & 5,893,812 & 83,620,528 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Conventional Weapons Destruction Program Metrics, Fiscal Years 2010–2017}
\end{table}

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

*Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

**Results through 3/31/2017.

Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) III. The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians.\(^{343}\)

ACAP III works to enhance the government’s capacity to better deliver services to the families of martyrs and disabled persons in Afghanistan. Some of the victims of conflict to which ACAP III provides assistance are disabled.\(^{344}\) ACAP III is a nationwide program with a budget of $19.6 million (revised in 2017 from $30.2 million) and project activities are expected to continue through February 2018.\(^{345}\)

According to the UN, of nearly 5,700 security incidents that took place between January and the end of March, 2017, 16% (over 900 events) included improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—the second most prevalent form of attack after armed attacks.\(^{346}\) To mitigate civilian casualties from ERW, the Afghan government ratified Protocol V (Explosive Remnants of War) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in February 2016. The United Nations urges all parties to begin clearing and marking all ERW in areas under their control.\(^{347}\) According to UNMAS, the 2017 average monthly mine incident rate of 140 victims for ERW and pressure-plate IEDs depicts a sustained average compared with a monthly average of 142 victims recorded in 2016.\(^{348}\)