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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

General John W. Nicholson Jr., commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), announced in late November that he and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani believe the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have reached a positive turning point in the war against the insurgency. General Nicholson credited the recent successes on the battlefield to the increasingly offensive posture of the ANDSF and the expansion of U.S. military authorities under President Donald Trump’s new South Asia strategy. The new strategy was announced in August.¹⁵⁵

For the first time since the Afghans took primary responsibility for their security in January 2015, the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the newly created Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Corps, are waging offensive operations in all six of their corps areas of operation simultaneously.¹⁵⁶ Additionally, the expanded authorities provided to U.S. forces in Afghanistan have resulted in a significant uptick in U.S. air strikes and special operations against the insurgency.

According to the United States Air Force Central Command Combined Air Operations Center (AFCENT), the United States dropped 653 munitions against Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) targets in October 2017, the most since recording began in 2012, and a more than three-fold increase since October 2016. The total amount of weapons released in Afghanistan by the U.S. Air Force in 2017 was 4,361.¹⁵⁷ Separately, according to the Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. special operations forces conducted 2,175 ground operations and 261 air strikes from June 1 to November 24, 2017, in support of the U.S. counterterrorism mission and the advising mission for the ANASOC.¹⁵⁸ For comparison, roughly nine times the number of munitions AFCENT reported have been dropped against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (roughly 39,500 this year). General Nicholson said in November that more air resources will move to Afghanistan as the enemy is defeated in Iraq.¹⁵⁹

As a result of expanded authorities to target the Taliban and the Haqqani network, USFOR-A is seeking to reduce a key source of income for the insurgency: narcotics. U.S. and Afghan air strikes this quarter have targeted the Taliban’s opium-production industry, which the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates has as many as 400–500 active facilities
at any given time. According to General Nicholson, U.S. and Afghan forces recently began targeting them, destroying 10 on November 19 alone. General Nicholson said in a press conference the following day that he intended to maintain the high tempo of drug-lab strikes, while remaining vigilant to avoid collateral damage or civilian casualties.160

As the United States has increased troop levels in Afghanistan to bolster its advisory role and utilize expanded authorities to conduct operations in support of the ANDSF, some other NATO countries have also agreed to send additional troops, which would bring the entire Resolute Support (RS) mission to roughly 16,000 personnel. Despite the additional troops, U.S. officials still say that troop reinforcements fall below international commitment levels for the RS advisory mission. NATO Deputy Spokesperson Piers Cazalet emphasized that sending more troops “does not mean NATO will return to combat operations in Afghanistan.”161

Separately, in December, Congress passed and President Trump signed the fiscal year (FY) 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes key provisions and funding requirements for developing Afghanistan’s security institutions. The FY 2018 NDAA increased authorized funds for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to $4.9 billion—$674.3 million more than was authorized for FY 2017.162

Some legislative changes in the NDAA this year include the possibility of withholding $350 million in American foreign aid to Pakistan should that country fail to make progress on eliminating insurgent and terrorist safe havens in its territory that threaten peace in Afghanistan. For Pakistan to continue receiving U.S. funding for counterterrorism activities, Secretary of Defense James Mattis must certify to Congress that Pakistan is continually conducting military operations that are “contributing to significantly disrupting the safe havens, fundraising, and recruiting efforts” of the Haqqani Network and other extremist groups in Pakistan, arresting key militant leaders, as well as working with the Afghan government to restrict the movement of militants in their border region.163 The requirement for certification of Pakistan’s efforts against safe havens existed in last year’s NDAA, but the amount of money at stake has decreased by $50 million for FY 2018. This year’s NDAA also stipulates that DOD should advance its defense cooperation with India across many regional matters, one of which is “to promote stability and development in Afghanistan.”164

The NDAA also requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit an assessment to the armed services and foreign affairs committees of both chambers of Congress, no later than June 1, 2018, describing the Afghan government’s progress toward meeting shared security objectives. In conducting the assessment, the NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to consider: the extent to which there is increased accountability and reduced corruption within the Afghan Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI); the extent to which ASFF
funding has resulted in increased capability and capacity of the ANDSF; the extent to which the ANDSF have increased pressure on militant and terrorist organizations by retaking and defending territory and disrupting attacks; and whether the Afghan government is ensuring that U.S.-provided supplies, equipment, and weaponry are appropriately distributed to the ANDSF. If the assessment results are unfavorable, Secretary Mattis can decide, upon notifying Congress, to withhold financial assistance to the ANDSF.165 This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), MOD, and MOI, and provides an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces.

USFOR-A and RS Continue to Classify and Restrict Key Afghan War Data

For the first time, this quarter RS restricted the public release of district, population, and land-area control data that they had provided to SIGAR in an unclassified, publicly releasable format for the last two years. Additionally, RS classified for the first time the exact, assigned (actual) and authorized (goal) force strength and attrition data for the ANDSF as a whole, as well as each force element individually (ANA, ANP, AAF, etc.), with the exceptions of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and female ANDSF personnel (last quarter SIGAR was provided with rounded authorized and assigned strength figures).

“The intent is over the winter, [the ANDSF] will maintain some limited offensive operations, but also focus on regeneration of the force … then as we roll into the spring, March, April and beyond, they will go on the offensive.”

—General John W. Nicholson Jr., RS and USFOR-A Commander
For the second consecutive quarter, RS and USFOR-A continued to classify other data essential to assessing the development and performance of the ANDSF. This data includes:

- all but the most perfunctory assessments of ANDSF force elements’ performance
- updated information about ANDSF force generation, including the percentage of the ANA and ANP that are trained and untrained
- the number of ANDSF and ALP casualties
- the ANA corps- and ANP zone-level breakdown of equipment operational readiness

RS and USFOR-A also classified data SIGAR requested for the first time this quarter, including:

- information about the specific security goals for Afghanistan outlined in the administration’s new South Asia strategy
- information about the increase in U.S. and Coalition air strikes in Afghanistan since mid-2017, including how many air strikes have been carried out by U.S. and Coalition forces in 2017

RS and USFOR-A declassified data this quarter on the following:

- cursory assessments of ANDSF force elements’ performance
- force strength information for the ALP and ANDSF female personnel
- assessments of MOD and MOI performance
- general information about the Special Mission Wing (SMW) and its airframe inventory
- general information about ANA and ANP equipment operational readiness

USFOR-A and RS gave no justifications for the classification changes to SIGAR data this quarter. For a full description of the data classified or restricted this quarter, and a comparison to what was classified last quarter, see Appendix E of this report.

UN: Slight Increase in Security Incidents in 2017

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) reported in December that the security situation in Afghanistan remained highly volatile as conflict between the government and insurgency continued throughout most of the country. More than 21,105 security incidents were recorded for the first 11 months of 2017, a 1% increase from the same period in 2016. However, the UN reported a decrease in security incidents in the last quarter of 2017. From September 15 through November 15, 2017, the UN recorded 3,995 security incidents. As reflected in Figure 3.26, this is an average of 64.4 incidents per day, a more than two incident-per-day decrease compared to the same period in 2016 (66.6) and more than seven
incidents-per-day lower than the same period in 2015 (71.8). However, this quarter's figure remains slightly higher than the daily average of 63.9 incidents over the last three years.\(^{167}\)

This quarter, USFOR-A contested the UN’s security-incident data. According to USFOR-A reporting—which defines security incidents as a subset of enemy action and explosive-hazard events, to include executed IED attacks and potential IED attacks (found and cleared)—there were 23,984 incidents in the first 11 months of 2017. This represents a 2% decrease from incidents recorded in 2016. Additionally, from September 15 through November 15, 2017, USFOR-A recorded 3,729 security incidents, which they calculate as a 29% decrease in incidents from the same period in 2016. USFOR-A said direct fire accounts for 79% of all incidents, and IED and mines account for 12%.\(^{168}\)

The UN reported that the most unstable regions continued to be eastern and southern Afghanistan, which account for 56% of all security incidents. Building off the new U.S. strategy and rules of engagement, Afghan and international forces significantly increased their air operations in these regions. According to the UN, Afghan and Coalition forces conducted 215 air strikes this quarter, a 73% increase from the same period in 2016, though USFOR-A said that it was tracking a greater number of air strikes and a larger percentage increase. The majority of these strikes occurred in southern Helmand Province and eastern Nangarhar Province.\(^{169}\) Additionally,
recent clashes between the Taliban and IS-K in Laghman Province contributed to overall instability in the east.\textsuperscript{170}

According to the UN, the Taliban launched multiple large-scale operations to capture district centers this quarter. They temporarily overran Maruf in Kandahar Province, Andar in Ghazni Province, Shib Koh in Farah Province, and Shahid-i Hasas in Uruzgan Province. In each case, the ANDSF, at times aided by AAF and Coalition air support, pushed Taliban forces back. USFOR-A noted that they did not agree with the UN that the Taliban temporarily overran Shahid-i Hasas or Maruf.\textsuperscript{171}

Notably, the ANDSF also recaptured Ghorak in Kandahar Province, which the Taliban had controlled since November 2016.\textsuperscript{172} During November and December 2017, President Ghani chaired at least two meetings of his senior security officials to discuss the provinces where security incidents have been more prominent: Faryab, Balkh, Ghazni, Kunar, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Badghis, Nooristan, and Herat.\textsuperscript{173}

**UNAMA: Attacks Against Places of Worship, Religious Sects, and Religious Leaders Increasing**

In a special report issued this quarter, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented an escalating trend of violence against places of worship and religious sects, and assassinations and abductions of religious leaders. UNAMA noted that most of these events were attributable to extremist groups, particularly IS-K. Since January 1, 2016, UNAMA has recorded 51 such attacks resulting in 850 civilian casualties (273 killed), nearly double the casualties recorded for such incidents between 2009 and 2015.\textsuperscript{174} In particular, IS-K has claimed multiple attacks targeting Shi’a Muslims and their mosques. Since January 1, 2016, UNAMA documented 12 incidents targeting Shi’a Muslims at places of worship, resulting in 689 civilian casualties (230 killed). Eight of these 12 attacks were claimed by IS-K. A thirteenth sectarian attack was claimed by the Taliban against Wahhabi Muslims at a mosque in IS-K-controlled territory.\textsuperscript{175}

UNAMA did not release a civilian-casualty report this quarter. As reported in UNAMA’s civilian-casualty report from last quarter, UNAMA documented 8,019 civilian casualties from January 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017, a 6% decrease overall from the same period in 2016.\textsuperscript{176}

As with security incidents, RS documents civilian casualties in a different way than UNAMA. According to DOD, RS relies on civilian casualty reports from their regional commands, other Coalition headquarters’ commands, and the ANDSF, while UNAMA uses site visits by staff to speak with victims, witnesses, and local leaders. RS reported 4,474 civilian casualties over a six-month period from June 1, 2017, to November 27, 2017, of which approximately one-third were deaths and two-thirds were injuries. According to RS, their figures represent an approximately 13% increase compared to the same period last year.\textsuperscript{177}
Despite the decrease in total UNAMA-calculated civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2017, UNAMA reiterated its concern over the 52% increase in civilian casualties (466 casualties) caused by air strikes compared to the same period in 2016. More than two-thirds of these victims were reportedly women and children. UNAMA attributed 177, or 38%, of all civilian casualties from air strikes to international military forces. RS also disagreed with this UNAMA figure, noting that it had confirmed some 51 civilian casualties (19 killed and 32 injured) caused by Coalition forces’ air strikes during the entirety of 2017.178

This quarter, the UN noted a 73% increase in Coalition air strikes over the same period in 2016, which inflicted heavy casualties on anti-government elements, but also inflicted heavy casualties on civilians.179 In November 2017, allegations surfaced that “dozens” of civilians had been killed in Chardara District of northern Kunduz Province during U.S. air strikes supporting ANDSF operations. However, a subsequent USFOR-A investigation concluded there were no civilian casualties, stating “no hospitals or clinics in the local area indicated treatment of people with wounds from armed conflict.”180

High-Profile Insurgent and Terrorist Attacks
Several high-profile attacks occurred this quarter, mainly targeting civilian communities at places of worship. For the second time this year, there was a deadly attack on Shi’a worshipers at Imam Zaman Mosque in Kabul that killed at least 39 during Friday prayers on October 20. Another attack that day on a Sunni mosque in Ghor Province killed at least 33 people. IS-K claimed responsibility for the Kabul attack, along with an attack on October 31, when a device detonated in Kabul’s diplomatic quarter, also known as the Green Zone, killed 10 civilians.181

The deadliest attack this quarter occurred on December 28, when an IS-K militant detonated a suicide bomb during a gathering of 150–200 people at a Shi’a cultural center in Kabul. The Afghan Ministry of Public Health said at least 41 people were killed and 84 wounded.182

Additionally, there were two significant attacks on the ANDSF this quarter. One occurred on December 17, when the Taliban killed 11 ANP personnel at a checkpoint in Helmand Province.183 The highest-casualty attack on the ANDSF occurred on October 19, when the Taliban killed 43 ANA soldiers with a vehicle-borne improvised-explosive device (VBIED) on a base outside Kandahar; only two of 60 troops stationed at the base escaped unharmed.184 In November, Ahmad Shah Katawazai, defense liaison at the Afghan Embassy in Washington, DC, said the recent rise in terrorist attacks committed by the Taliban has been a “counterstrategy” in response to the Trump administration’s escalated strategy.185

Afghanistan Compact: Green Zone Security
Following a series of attacks in the Green Zone, Kabul’s diplomatic zone, USFOR-A and the Afghan government established several milestones in the Afghanistan Compact to address Green Zone security. According to USFOR-A in October, the following plans and procedures were developed to safeguard the Green Zone:

- all large trucks must enter one designated entry point
- truck barriers have been installed and ANP checkpoints have been better positioned
- all large trucks entering the Green Zone from the airport checkpoint are now being screened
- all ANP personnel providing security to the Green Zone were given a two-week supplementary security training
- teams of police dogs have been contracted to screen vehicles entering the area

SECURITY

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY
As of December 31, 2017, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $74.8 billion to support the ANDSF. This accounts for 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since FY 2002. In 2005, Congress established the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. Additionally, ASFF supports the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that other donor nations have agreed to fund. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. According to DOD, the majority of ASFF funds are executed using DOD contracts to equip and sustain the ANDSF. The rest are transferred to Da Afghanistan Bank, Afghanistan’s central bank, to pay salaries of Afghan army and personnel costs for ALP to support a limited number of Afghan contracts approved by CSTC-A. The Ministry of Finance then sends treasury checks to fund the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.

Of the $4.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF in FY 2017, $3.6 billion had been obligated and $3.3 billion disbursed as of December 31, 2017. The FY 2018 NDAA authorized $674.3 million more for the ASFF than FY 2017. The largest portion of the increase will go toward MOD sustainment ($487.5 million) and training ($116 million) costs. Notably, funding for MOI equipment saw the largest increase since last year, up over eight-fold to $67.8 million for FY 2018, followed by MOI training, which more than doubled to $52.3 million. Similar to last year, the greatest amount of FY 2018 ASFF funds is authorized for MOD and MOI sustainment, $2.7 billion and $955.6 million respectively.

In an October 3 hearing on the Administration’s South Asia strategy before the House Armed Services Committee, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said CSTC-A administers roughly 75% of the U.S. funds obligated for Afghan security. He added that the remaining 25% administered by the Afghan government is subjected to “rigorous conditionality to make sure that [the United States] has transparency” into the use of funds.

DISTRICT AND POPULATION CONTROL
For the first time, this quarter RS restricted the public release of unclassified district, population, and land-area control data that has been consistently provided to SIGAR in an unclassified, publicly releasable format. Notably, both General Nicholson and DOD reported population-control figures publicly this quarter. General Nicholson said in a press briefing on November 28 that 64% of the population is under government control or
### Historical Population Control in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Afghan Govt Control or Influence</th>
<th>Contested</th>
<th>Insurgent Control or Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2016</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2017*</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Historical District Control in Afghanistan

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<th>Contested</th>
<th>Insurgent Control or Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2015</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<td>71%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 2016</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<td>57%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<td>11%</td>
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<td>May 2017</td>
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<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 2017</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2017*</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


influence, 12% are under insurgent control or influence, and the remaining 24% are living in contested areas. However, the goal of the Afghan government is to control 80% of its population within the next two years. As seen in Figures 3.27 and 3.28 on the previous page, Afghan government control or influence has declined and insurgent control or influence has increased overall since SIGAR began reporting control data. For more information on how RS assesses district control, please see SIGAR’s April 2016 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.191

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to USFOR-A, as of November 26, 2017, there were approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan, an increase of 3,000 personnel since last quarter.192 Of the 14,000 U.S. military personnel currently serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), approximately 7,400 are assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces (up 2,400 since last quarter). The remaining U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan support the OFS mission through air operations, training the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterror operations.193

As seen in Figure 3.29, the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is set to increase to roughly 15,000 personnel as DOD announced in mid-January that it will send 1,000 additional troops as early as February. These troops will be members of the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB), based at Fort Benning, that will primarily serve as combat advisors to the ANDSF and expand the U.S. training commitment. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said in early January that the SFAB will take on some of the U.S. Special Forces’ train, advise, and assist duties to ease the burden on the overworked U.S. Special Forces. Secretary Mattis also noted that through training and mentoring in basic infantry and artillery tactics, the SFAB in Afghanistan will be expected to do for the Afghan conventional forces what the U.S. Special Forces have done for the Afghan special forces.194

The RS mission also includes roughly 7,100 military personnel from 39 NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing its total personnel to roughly 14,500.195 The increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan has led some NATO countries engaged in Afghanistan to authorize additional troops. Reuters reported from the Defense Ministers Summit in Brussels in November that the increases could bring the RS mission to 16,000 personnel. Despite the additional NATO troops, U.S. officials say that troop reinforcements fall below international commitment levels for the RS advisory mission.196

As the U.S. troop commitment increases, American combat casualties are also rising. From January 1 through November 26, 2017, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in Afghanistan, and 99 were wounded. This is an

SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED

SIGAR’s September 2017 report Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan included a recommendation to DOD for the use of a force element like the Security Force Assistance Brigades to help alleviate strain on U.S. Special Forces that train, advise, and assist the ANDSF. For more information, see page 190 of that report.
increase of one person killed in action, and 51 personnel wounded in action since last quarter, and double the personnel killed in action compared to the same periods in 2015 and 2016. USFOR-A also reported that two contractors were wounded in action since last quarter. This brings the total number of U.S. casualties during the Afghan war to 2,269 service members and civilians killed and 20,289 wounded, as of January 22, 2018.  

Afghanistan Compact  

Last quarter, SIGAR reported on a new compact between USFOR-A, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and the Afghan government called the Afghanistan Compact (formerly known as the “Kabul Compact”), an Afghan-led initiative designed to demonstrate the government’s commitment to reforms. The Compact process consists of four U.S.- and Afghan-chaired working groups covering governance, economic, peace and reconciliation, and security issues. For more information about the Compact, see pages 123–124. 

The security portion of the Compact outlines 257 measurable benchmarks across 37 action areas as commitments to which the Afghan government has agreed for improving the ANDSF. Most of these commitments apply to either the entire ANDSF, or the MOD and MOI or their main components (ANA and ANP). Together they lay out a comprehensive plan to reform and upgrade the capabilities of the ANDSF over the next few years.
This quarter, SIGAR requested more detailed information from DOD and USFOR-A about how the new Compact fits into the wider U.S. South Asia strategy as well as the Afghan government’s four-year ANDSF Roadmap. USFOR-A said the Compact and Roadmap both align under the South Asia strategy as frameworks to achieve the U.S. goals of seeking an Afghan political settlement that reduces violence, improves security, enables government reform, and leads to reconciliation with the Taliban.200

Like the other plans, USFOR-A said, the Compact is a “whole-of-government, conditions-based approach” that encourages the Afghan government to enact critical reforms through realistic, attainable, measurable, and trackable objectives. The hope is that as the Afghan government achieves its milestones and goals under the Compact, it will enable greater government sustainability and stability that, in conjunction with secure and credible elections, will increase social pressure on the Taliban to reconcile.201

USFOR-A clarified that the ANDSF Roadmap is the Afghan operational and structural concept to professionalize the ANDSF and achieve the main goal of 80% government control over the Afghan population.202

Insider Attacks
Since responsibility for security began transitioning to the Afghans in 2014, “green-on-green” insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel are attacked from within their own ranks, often by an insurgent infiltrator, have been a consistently severe problem.203 According to USFOR-A, from January 1 to October 31, 2017, there were 58 reported insider attacks: 52 green-on-green and six “green-on-blue” attacks, when ANDSF personnel turned on Coalition personnel. This is an increase of four green-on-green attacks and no additional green-on-blue attacks from last quarter.204 Insider attacks this year are nearly as high as the 59 recorded in 2016—56 green-on-green and three green-on-blue.205

In contrast to its treatment of other ANDSF casualty figures this quarter, USFOR-A did not classify ANDSF casualties as a result of insider attacks. The ANDSF experienced a decrease in casualties from insider attacks since 2016. As of October 31, 2017, insider attacks killed 102 ANDSF personnel and wounded 53, a decrease of 49 personnel killed and 26 wounded compared to the same period in 2016.206

However, American casualties from insider attacks have increased over the last two years. As seen in Figure 3.30, as of October 31, three U.S. military personnel were killed and 11 wounded in three of 2017’s six green-on-blue attacks.207

According to USFOR-A, RS is ensuring that the Afghans are making measurable progress on security and insider-threat-related milestones of the Afghanistan Compact. A joint U.S.-Afghan Compact Committee continually assesses this effort and its outcomes. With significant assistance from RS advisors, both the MOI and MOD have published “Force Protection/
Insider Threat” policies, established green-on-blue commissions, and held associated seminars at the ministerial level. Starting in December 2017, these seminars will be conducted at the ANDSF corps- and zone-levels throughout Afghanistan. Additionally, RS worked with senior ANA counterintelligence officials to develop MOD’s counterintelligence structure and policy.208

RS has also created an Insider Threat Advisor (ITA) position that works under RS Essential Function 7 (see pages 92–93). This advisor will serve as the train, advise, and assist (TAA) focal point for developing Afghan processes for the identification and processing of personnel who pose a potential threat to U.S., Coalition, or Afghan security forces.209

According to USFOR-A, both MOD and MOI made a concerted effort to improve and expand their use of the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) to more effectively detect potential insider threats. This system administers a polygraph-like test on ANDSF personnel as a vital part of the force’s counterintelligence screening process. The ITA trained six Afghans from MOD and MOI on PCASS; they are now training others to administer the test. USFOR-A noted that the PCASS is intended as a tool to complement counterintelligence and
countercorruption investigations, but cannot be the sole basis for denying personnel employment.  

Under USFOR-A authority, RS intelligence headquarters has been working with U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Army to obtain substantial additional manpower and material support for an ongoing counterintelligence screening surge of ANASOC and ANA forces that will partner with the U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigades in 2018. This surge will provide an additional 95 U.S. contractor counterintelligence screeners and 15 counterintelligence analysts to directly support the screening process.

Additional information on insider attacks will be reported in the classified annex to this report.

Updates on Developing Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF) intended to develop its Afghan counterparts. The highlights of each function reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** Following negotiations reported last quarter, beginning in March 2018, donors to the UN Development Programme’s multilateral Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) will begin paying ANP salaries based on the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI), which will save the donor community roughly $50 million annually. For more information about the PAI, please see pages 97–98.

- **EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** The MOD completed an assessment of the MOD Inspector General’s Office (MOD IG), following a presidential directive on MOD IG professionalization. The assessment found that 15 employees’ qualifications were better aligned for administrative positions, and 28 personnel would need to receive remedial training and mentoring. The MOI Inspector General’s Office (MOI IG) has completed oversight and transparency training at the zone and ministerial levels. CSTC-A reported that approximately 95% of MOD IG positions (167 authorized positions) and 70% of MOI IG positions (168 authorized) are filled.

- **EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** The MOI Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) opened more than 17 corruption cases in the first quarter of FY 2018. This quarter, CSTC-A donated law-enforcement equipment such as handcuffs and radios to the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), and scheduled explosive-ordnance-disposal and first responder training for ACJC personnel. The Counter-Corruption Advisors Group advisors are currently providing assistance to TAACs in corruption investigations against ANA and ANP commanders, as well as to SIGAR criminal investigations at Kandahar and Bagram Airfield facilities. There were no new gross violations.
of human rights (GVHR) cases by MOD or MOI this quarter, and no existing GVHR cases closed this quarter. There are currently 26 open GVHR cases in the MOI, but none are open in the MOD. CSTC-A notes that MOI has completed all work on 50% of their open GVHR cases, which are now awaiting action by the Attorney General’s Office.214

• **EF-4 (Force Generation):** EF-4 classified their response this quarter. The personnel information they provided will be reported in the classified annex to this report.

• **EF-5 (Sustainment):** CSTC-A reported that the fuel distribution and quality-assurance vendors contracted last quarter have successfully dispensed 29 million liters of ground and aviation fuel at ANDSF facilities this quarter with minimal delays. The contractor for the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support that DOD awarded in June 2017 met its contractual requirement to be fully operational by December 29, 2017. The support is intended to provide maintenance and logistical training, as well as contracted maintenance to achieve specified operational-readiness benchmarks and fill gaps in the ANA and ANP supply chains. Two major milestones for the National Transportation Brigades (NTB) and the Central Supply Depot/National Logistics Center were completed this quarter after the ANDSF successfully met the standards for each. They included planning transportation resources based on priorities and situational changes for the NTB and tracking materials for distribution for the supply and logistics centers. CSTC-A reported MOD and MOI are 100% compliant with critical cybersecurity requirements established by the MOD and MOI FY 1396 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters.215

• **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** ANDSF efforts this quarter were mainly dedicated to the execution of Phase II and Phase III of Operation Khalid, the annual operational plan, following Phase I completion last quarter. CSTC-A reported that the ANDSF continued to prevent enemy forces from capturing any provincial centers and improved the use of the AAF and ANASOC in support of conventional forces. The process of transferring the Afghan Border Police (ABP) from MOI to MOD control has nearly been completed, and the transfer for the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) to MOD control is ongoing.216

• **EF-7 (Intelligence):** This quarter, two additional ScanEagle unmanned aerial system detachments were activated in the 205th and 201st Corps, doubling the ANA’s aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. ScanEagle is now used by four ANA Corps (201st, 205th, 209th and 215th), of which the 215th Corps has shown the greatest proficiency in using the system. CSTC-A reported significant progress in developing overall MOD intelligence capabilities, whereas MOI made only modest improvements this quarter. Increased

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**Afghanistan Compact: ANCOP Transfer to MOD**

The Compact includes several milestones for the transfer of ANCOP from MOI to MOD. DOD reported in December that this process is taking longer than the ABP transfer as MOD considers multiple options for how best to utilize the force. RS reported that ANCOP achieved the following Compact milestones this quarter:

- developed a plan for ANCOP integration into MOD
- established their facilities

RS reported as of November that the following milestones had not been completed by the deadline:

- development of a tashkil
- creation of training plans
- establishment of an organizational structure

ANA use of the National Information Management System led to an approximate 30% increase in target execution, while improved intelligence coordination between ANA Corps and the AAF resulted in a 10% decrease in cancellations of targeting missions against enemies.\(^\text{217}\)

- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** CSTC-A described the overall trend in ANDSF communication as “slightly positive” this quarter. MOI and MOD ministers personally engaged with media to reinforce Afghan government messaging during crises, although concerns remain about the accuracy of insurgent casualty figures released to the media. In October, MOI hired a new deputy spokesman, which CSTC-A categorized as a major step forward since the MOI’s principal spokesman has been serving in an acting capacity for the previous two quarters.\(^\text{218}\)

- **Gender Office:** CSTC-A reported a “desperate shortage” of senior women in the ANDSF to serve as role models for younger Afghan women, and is researching ways to address this. The Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) Program to train female security personnel in job-applicable skills has been expanded to include the MOI. This quarter, the MOI established the Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention Committee, which was recognized and approved by the Minister of Interior. Standard operating procedures for the committee were established, outlining the composition and responsibilities of the members, and Coalition advisors will continue to provide TAA to the committee to ensure its efforts to counter sexual harassment and assault are robust and effective.\(^\text{219}\)

### AFGHAN SECURITY MINISTRIES AND THE ANDSF

#### ANDSF Force Element Performance

USFOR-A provided basic ANDSF performance assessments that were previously classified in an unclassified format this quarter; however, SIGAR is unable to determine the results of the findings of these unclassified assessments with the data provided.

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that visibility into ANDSF units remains limited, as U.S. and Coalition forces are typically not co-located with Afghan units, and insights gleaned on operational readiness come from second- or third-hand knowledge from ANDSF partners. The RS mission provides the majority of its training, advising, and assisting at the ANA corps- and ANP zone-level and above.\(^\text{220}\)

USFOR-A noted that ANDSF headquarter elements continue to progress toward developing and executing their annual operational plans but they still struggle with personnel management. However, USFOR-A said leadership and general use of training cycles showed improvement over previous reporting periods.\(^\text{221}\)
USFOR-A classified more detailed performance assessments of the ANDSF’s combat elements, and SIGAR will report on them in the classified annex to this report.

**Ministry Performance Assessments**

USFOR-A provided the following narrative, previously classified MOD and MOI performance-assessment information in an unclassified format this quarter.

According to USFOR-A, since summer 2017, the MOD has steadily increased its ability to build effective fighting capability, provided enablers in support of operations, and implemented and established personnel and logistics systems. Though more effort is placed at the operational and strategic levels, Minister of Defense Tariq Shah Bahrami must still routinely respond to tactical-level challenges due to domestic political pressures rather than focus on broader strategic concerns. Despite these challenges, USFOR-A said, he and his Chief of General Staff (CoGS) aim to create a MOD that is professionally trained, free of corruption, and an effective and efficient steward of resources. USFOR-A said the CoGS, Lieutenant General Sharif Yaftali, “has completely immersed himself in the role of directing, guiding, and driving the staff.” However, the MOD is still without a first deputy minister, requiring both Minister Bahrami and Lieutenant General Yaftali to execute duties of that position, distracting them from their primary roles. With the Afghanistan Compact now in full effect, USFOR-A noted that both leaders are pursuing regional and international relationships beyond Resolute Support partner nations.222

**Afghanistan Compact: MOD Optimization**

The reform effort across all Afghan security institutions includes several milestones for reforming the MOD. This quarter, RS reported that MOD accomplished the following:

- MOD signed its counter-corruption policy on December 19, 2017
- completed a review of its staff structure and identified unnecessary redundancy across staff and positions
- defined its organizational structure
- developed a future organizational structure with subordinate functional commands appropriately realigned under the first deputy minister and CoGS
- reduced MOD HQ tashkil positions to offset projected ASSF and AAF growth

According to RS, MOD failed to achieve the following milestones by the deadlines: completing a tashkil for the National Joint Command (by October 2017, approved by the Minister of Defense subsequently), and operationalizing the National Joint Command (November 2017, now scheduled for March 2018).

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided ANDSF data, 1/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.

**ANDSF senior leaders** and U.S. Marine advisors plan offensive operations at Bost Airfield, Afghanistan. (USMC photo by Sgt. Justin T. Updegraff)
USFOR-A reported that MOI development has seen some encouraging signs as a result of the appointment of now-Minister of Interior Wais Ahmad Barmak. The Afghan parliament confirmed his appointment on December 4. Within weeks of his arrival, USFOR-A said, Acting Minister Barmak ordered the development of a revised four-year MOI Strategic Plan (MISP). The MISP will provide the framework for meaningful reform and development. The plan will comprise an institutional reform element within the MOI and a phased geographical plan to reform the ANP. Institutional reforms are expected to place a high first-year priority on countering corruption and developing a merit-based assignment and promotion process. This is part of a new human-resource management policy intended to reform officer training and enhance the MOI’s overall performance.223

The MISP will also play a key role in the “police normalization process” laid out in Afghan government’s Four Year Roadmap for ANSF development. While the MISP will initially focus on transitioning the police from a paramilitary organization to one that better provides rule of law in Kabul and Herat, it will later be expanded in the rest of the country.224

ANDSF Strength

USFOR-A classified most ANDSF strength data this quarter (including the ANA, AAF, and ANP), with the exception of the Afghan Local Police and female ANDSF personnel, a further restriction from the rounded assigned-strength figures provided last quarter. However, in its December 2017 Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan report, DOD reported authorized strength figures for the ANA, AAF, and ANP, which SIGAR is also reporting here. Full details about ANDSF strength will be reported in the classified annex to this report. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA, AAF, and ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

The current goal strength for the ANDSF, or the authorized force level that donor nations have agreed to fund, is approximately 352,000, including roughly 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP. DOD’s December report did not provide information about the actual, assigned strength of all the ANDSF force elements. DOD noted that the actual strength of the ANDSF will become clearer once the ANDSF has finished the process of establishing centralized personnel accountability and payment databases in 2018. For more information about the databases and unaccounted-for personnel, see pages 97–98.225

ANDSF Casualties

For the second consecutive quarter, USFOR-A classified ANDSF casualty data, which SIGAR had consistently reported since 2015. The questions SIGAR asked about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANDSF casualties in the classified annex to this report.
AHRIMS and APPS

The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort that DOD said could greatly improve protection for the U.S. funds that pay the personnel costs for the ANA and ANP that constitute much of the ANDSF’s expenses.226

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and current position of ANDSF personnel. AHRIMS also contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI, along with information such as unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is under development; when implemented, it will integrate AHRIMS data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.227 The AHRIMS (and in future, APPS) data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF in determining promotions and assignments.228 APPS reached initial operational capability in July 2017 and is expected to be fully operational by May 2018.229

CSTC-A is overseeing the transition from AHRIMS to APPS to ensure interoperability. The process of verifying AHRIMS data includes a personnel asset inventory (PAI) that physically accounts for ANA and ANP personnel so they can be issued biometrically linked identification cards. APPS will generate payroll information and bank-account information for accounted-for personnel. According to CSTC-A, this structure will reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying “ghost” personnel. Routine checks will still be required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF.230 The biometric cards will also, once implemented, be used to access all human-resources information for security force members, including identity, pay and APPS data, promotions, assignments, killed/wounded/absent-without-leave information, and other documents.231

As USFOR-A has reported previously, there are three ongoing efforts to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in AHRIMS to support the migration to APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) a Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) to correct the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.232

This quarter, USFOR-A reported delays in completing the final six-month PAI sweep of all six ANA corps; they expect the ANP PAI effort to continue for another 8–12 months. The delays are reported to be normal challenges of accessing remote and insecure areas and ANDSF members posted at isolated border checkpoints. Additionally, USFOR-A notes that MOI has no dedicated helicopters to support their PAI teams’ transport through combat
areas. USFOR-A reported that the MOD’s PAI is nearly finished, with 90% of ANA slotted and 93% of the ANA PAI complete. The ANA is expected to be fully operational in APPS by May 30, 2018. MOI’s PAI is at 70% slotted and the PAI is 80% complete; completion is currently expected around late September 2018.233

“Unaccounted-for” or “Ghost” Personnel
As a result of increased attention in late 2016 to the possible inclusion of many “ghost” or nonexistent personnel within the ANDSF rolls, U.S. officials confirmed that since January 1, 2017, salaries are paid only to MOD and MOI personnel correctly registered in AHRIMS.234

For the second consecutive quarter, USFOR-A did not provide estimated numbers of unaccounted-for MOD or MOI personnel. In July 2017, USFOR-A estimated that 10,000 MOD personnel remained unaccounted for in AHRIMS. For MOI, approximately 41,000 ANP and 13,000 ALP personnel remained unaccounted for; and there was no police zone-level accounting of these personnel. USFOR-A noted that unaccounted-for personnel either have yet to be validated biometrically or simply do not exist.235

However, USFOR-A reiterated that the PAI process matches individuals through biometric identification against the numbers of personnel claimed to exist according to monthly personnel reports provided by ANDSF units. USFOR-A has said the attention directed to “ghost soldiers” is largely unfounded because there are no indications of so-called “ghost soldier” challenges within the six ANA corps as the PAI process progresses. Once the ANA is fully operational in APPS (May 30, 2018), the issue of “ghost soldiers” will be resolved.236 DOD echoed this assessment, explaining that most of the soldiers and police that were unaccounted for were performing duties and being paid, but were not properly enrolled in the AHRIMs system due to poor systems management, missing biometric data, or missing ID cards.237

The U.S. government continues to disburse funds only to those ANDSF personnel it is confident are properly accounted for. USFOR-A reported approximately $59.5 million in cost avoidance by not paying unaccounted-for and suspected ghost personnel from January through November 2017, up $14.9 million from last quarter. The command advised that this amount will continue to change as the MOD and MOI increase the validation of the remaining soldiers and police through the ongoing PAI process.238 SIGAR cannot verify these cost-avoidance figures because it has not been provided with data on the number of ghost soldiers in the Afghan security forces.

Afghan Local Police
ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent
attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.\textsuperscript{239} While the ANP’s personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD funds the ALP, including both personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{240} Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.\textsuperscript{241}

As of November 30, 2017, the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP has roughly 28,911 guardians on hand, 24,858 of whom are trained, 4,053 untrained, and 168 in training.\textsuperscript{242} These figures indicate an increase of 1,288 ALP personnel overall, a 993-person increase in trained personnel, and an increase of 496 untrained personnel from the same period in 2016.\textsuperscript{243} The MOI’s FY 1396 (2017) Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter obligates the MOI to have no more than 5% of the on-hand ALP force untrained, but currently about 14% of the force is untrained, the same as last quarter.\textsuperscript{244}

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported continuing efforts to enroll ALP personnel in AHRIMS to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process and to inventory materiel. These processes are expected to help track and train ALP personnel.\textsuperscript{245} As mentioned, PAI teams are in the final stages of collecting AHRIMS enrollments from lower-enrolled ALP units. According to USFOR-A, as of December 31, 2017, the AHRIMS enrollment rate was 71% for ALP, a six-point decrease since last quarter.\textsuperscript{246} Additionally, 86% of the ALP has been enrolled in EFT. NSOCC-A
noted that ALP are just beginning to transition to APPS; they expect that it will be complete in May 2018.\textsuperscript{247}

As with the ANA and ANP, CSTC-A will fund salaries only for ALP guards who are actively slotted in AHRIMS. NSOCC-A reported an increase in their estimated U.S. funding for the ALP from $93 million annually in early 2017 to an estimated $96.6 million for FY 2018, assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel.\textsuperscript{248} NSOCC-A says that CSTC-A reviews validated personnel numbers every three months and provides updated funding based on validated AHRIMS personnel numbers.\textsuperscript{249}

NSOCC-A reported several efforts are under way to assess ALP reform, including personnel and equipment reforms, addressing powerbrokers’ sway over the ALP, and the establishment of ALP Zone shuras. ALP Zone shuras assessed the ALP reform process in September and October 2017. The resulting data is being compiled to create a 2018 action plan for implementation across all reform areas.\textsuperscript{250} NSOCC-A said that monthly equipment inventories have been submitted by district with a 100\% completion rate since October. This is a 17-point improvement from last quarter. The ALP now has two Coalition advisors specifically helping the force implement logistics reforms.\textsuperscript{251}

Last quarter, the ALP’s Coalition advisors submitted a report on the influence of powerbrokers in the ALP. The report found that 395 ALP personnel were under powerbroker influence in August 2017, meaning that they were performing duties for a powerbroker rather than those assigned by the ALP. While this was considerably lower than the 1,395 reported to be under powerbroker influence in early 2016, it was an increase from earlier in 2017. This quarter, NSOCC-A reported only 195 ALP guardians under powerbroker influence, a roughly 50\% reduction since last quarter. The main powerbrokers influencing ALP personnel continue to be parliamentarians, provincial councils, provincial governors, and district and provincial chiefs of police.\textsuperscript{252}

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $44.1 billion and disbursed $43.5 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.\textsuperscript{253}

**ANA Strength**

For the first time, USFOR-A classified all ANA strength data this quarter, unlike last quarter, when they provided rounded assigned strength figures. Information about assigned ANA strength will therefore appear only in the classified annex to this report. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA strength can be found in Appendix E of this report. Authorized-strength figures reported here are drawn from DOD’s December 2017 *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* report.
The current authorized force level for the MOD is 195,000 ANA soldiers and 5,502 MOD civilians. DOD has reported the authorized strength by MOD echelons for FY 2017–2018. These echelons include MOD headquarters, the general staff, intermediate commands, combat commands, special operations forces, the AAF and SMW, TTHS (training, transient, holding, and students), unassigned resources, and MOD civilians. Of these echelons, the combat commands (119,814), intermediate commands (27,888), and TTHS (13,359) account for the majority of MOD personnel. The assigned, or actual, strength of the ANA remains classified.

According to USFOR-A, possible ghost personnel are not subtracted from these strength figures because ghosts are estimated using the AHRIMS (personnel management) and APPS (payment) systems, both still undergoing improvements, while a different reporting system currently calculates manpower. For more information on AHRIMS, APPS, and ghost personnel, please see pages 97–98.

ANA Attrition
USFOR-A classified ANA attrition data for the second consecutive quarter. SIGAR's questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANA attrition in the classified annex to this report.

ANA Sustainment
As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $21 billion and disbursed $20.4 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and nonpayroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1396 (2017) was $509.5 million through November 25, 2017, an $85.8 million decrease compared to the same period in 2016. While the majority of sustainment funding goes toward ANA salaries and incentive payments, the other largest uses of sustainment funding were for equipment and supplies—mainly vehicle fuel, ($37.4 million), clothing ($4.1 million), and energy-operating equipment ($3.8 million).

ANA Salaries and Incentives
Of the total amount spent on ANA sustainment in Afghan FY 1396 through November 25, 2017, $226.3 million was spent on salaries and $279 million on incentive pay for ANA officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers, civilians, and contractors. Funding for ANA salaries increased by $34.9 million since this period in 2016, while incentive pay increased by about $10.3 million.

CSTC-A reported that the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for the next three years (2018–2020) will average $667 million annually, a $56.8 million increase from last quarter's estimate.
of $610.2 million. DOD noted that the increase in cost was mainly due to the transfer of 40,000 ANP personnel to the ANA as part of the ANDSF Roadmap plan to move certain paramilitary police elements (Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police) from MOI to MOD authority (as well as a 5% pay increase).\textsuperscript{262} DOD also said forecasted salary and incentives figures are for planning only and are not definitive indicators of future DOD support, which will depend on Afghan progress toward reconciliation, reducing corruption, security conditions, and other factors.\textsuperscript{263}

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As seen in Figure 3.31, as of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $13.2 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.\textsuperscript{264}

ANA Equipment Operational Readiness Falls Short of Benchmarks

This quarter USFOR-A classified some of the data concerning the ANA’s equipment readiness. The questions SIGAR asked about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANA equipment readiness in its classified annex.

CSTC-A stated that the ANDSF readiness-reporting system is currently unable to accurately capture equipment-serviceability rates by unit. Therefore, equipment readiness is calculated by dividing the number of fully mission-capable vehicles on hand by the authorized number. In some cases, this causes calculated equipment-readiness rates to exceed 100%.\textsuperscript{265} For example, ANASOC equipment readiness exceeds 100% due to the excess equipment created when one Mobile Strike Force Brigade was reorganized under ANASOC.\textsuperscript{266} CSTC-A noted this quarter that under the current maintenance contracts, the goal readiness rate for all ANA equipment is at least 70%. Since ANASOC is the primary force element for the majority of ANDSF offensive operations, the ANASOC equipment readiness has established a higher benchmark.\textsuperscript{267}

According to CSTC-A, the 215th Corps (southern Helmand Province), the 205th Corps (southern provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul), and the 209th Corps (nine northern provinces, including Balkh and Kunduz) have been supporting ANASOC’s major offensive operations. Of these three corps, only the 215th has shown a slight increase in equipment readiness; both the 205th and 209th have shown a slight decrease. Overall, CSTC-A reported that five of the six ANA corps did not meet the equipment readiness goal of 70%.\textsuperscript{268}

According to CSTC-A, specific reasons for an ANA corps’ failure to reach benchmarks for some of its equipment vary, but all suffer from similar conditions imposed by the combat environment. These conditions include battlefield damage and losses, poor maintenance management and reporting

**Afghanistan Compact: ASSF Expansion**

As part of the wider ASSF expansion, the first of two Mobile Strike Force Brigades was transferred to ANASOC’s Special Operations Brigade East in August 2017. The other is scheduled to transfer to Special Operations Brigade South in August 2018.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided ANDSF data, 1/2018.
(including misuse of mechanics), lack of logistics leaders, underuse of contracted maintenance, failure to evacuate mission-critical equipment to repair facilities, and poor supply-chain management. Further, CSTC-A noted that these data are from the end of an operationally demanding summer campaign; equipment readiness is expected to improve throughout the winter campaign due to a seasonal decrease in fighting, increased maintenance, and an emphasis on winter “reset operations.”

According to CSTC-A, an aspect of winter reset operations consists of moving ANA and maintenance contractors and equipment to the corps supporting the annual operational plan to improve readiness rates before the 1397 campaign (beginning in spring 2018). Further, on December 29, 2017, the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support contract became fully operational for all ANA corps and ANP zones. Under the new contract, the contractor is responsible for providing training and mobile maintenance teams, and shifting the workload to the ANA and ANP over time to help both forces build a more sustainable maintenance capability.

**Core Information Management System**

The Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) is part of the effort to address capability gaps in the Afghan logistical supply chain to ensure that the ANDSF are properly equipped. Since 2012, efforts have been under
way to develop and implement an automated system within both MOD and MOI to replace a paper-based process to better monitor Afghan- and U.S.-purchased ANDSF equipment and supplies.\textsuperscript{271}

As of March 1, 2017, the web-based CoreIMS became available and fully functional at MOD and MOI national logistic locations, forward supply depots, and regional supply logistic centers.\textsuperscript{272} According to CSTC-A, the challenge with any inventory-management system like CoreIMS is that once materiel leaves regional warehouses, inventory-management systems lose visibility because equipment is considered to be “issued.” CoreIMS, therefore, does not track lost, stolen, or destroyed equipment because it is not designed to do so. Nonetheless, to close the accountability gap between regional warehouses and corps-level supply depots, this quarter CSTC-A said the CorePropertyManagement (CorePBM) system will begin to be implemented in April 2018. CorePBM will provide visibility of accountable items issued from corps’ depots and brigade maintenance nodes.\textsuperscript{273} CSTC-A continues to provide advanced CoreIMS training for Afghan logistic specialists to train, mentor, and assist other ANA and ANP personnel in logistics operations and CoreIMS functionality.\textsuperscript{274}

This quarter, CSTC-A reported as of December 2017 that 187 Afghan logistic specialists are available to the ANDSF, and a substantial number have been actively logged into CoreIMS (123 operators have logged in over past 30 days). Training is ongoing with 24 classes held this quarter. Specifically, each logistics specialist is a college-educated Afghan responsible for training the ANDSF in CoreIMS. Afghan logistics specialists are
therefore a key element in CSTC-A’s efforts to enable automated inventory management at the corps and zone level. Further, CSTC-A reported that a new contract began in November to provide a total of 274 college-educated Afghan logistics specialists, which is an increase from the 144 previously contracted. CSTC-A also noted that this increase in logistics specialists will coincide with initiating CorePBM as noted above. Both the implementation of CorePBM and the integration of additional logistics specialists is expected to conclude no later than March 2019.

ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed $5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2017. As of December 31, CSTC-A reported that facilities sustainment costs for FY 2017, covering all ANA facility and generator requirements, were roughly $58.3 million; $50.8 million was U.S.-funded through ASFF and $7.5 million through the NATO ANA Trust Fund.

According to CSTC-A, as of December 5, 2017, the United States has completed 436 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at $5.4 billion, an increase of 19 projects completed since last quarter, with another 31 ongoing projects valued at $115.4 million. The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects include two Northern Electrical Interconnect (NEI) substation projects, one in Balkh Province ($27.7 million) slated for completion in October 2019, and one in Kunduz ($9.5 million), due to be completed in February 2019. Additionally, an ongoing infrastructure and security improvement project at MOD Headquarters in Kabul (slated for completion in February 2019) has more than doubled in cost to $13.6 million, of which $5.8 million was awarded by the United States.

Nine ANA infrastructure contracts with a total value of $12.5 million were awarded this quarter. The largest of these include: the initial operating capacity infrastructure (utilities, barracks, dining facility, and other essential infrastructure) for Camp Commando in Kabul ($6.5 million) as well as for the tactical operations center at Camp Pratt in Mazar-e Sharif ($800,000), and classrooms for the Mobility School of Excellence (for training engineers) in Kabul ($72,960).

The remaining 15 projects, valued at around $135.3 million, comprise other ANA infrastructure and sustainment projects supporting the new MOD headquarters, the Women’s Participation Program (WPP), and other security facilities.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported three ongoing, four planned, and no completed projects to develop facilities for women in the ANA as part of the WPP. The ongoing projects include: WPP construction at the AAF base at Kabul International Airport (barracks, daycare, dining facility, $1.5 million), WPP construction at the Marshall Fahim National Defense University (conference center, gym, daycare, $5.3 million), and an MOD daycare expansion.

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Women’s Participation Program: An initiative that seeks to advance and promote women’s participation in Afghan security institutions. The program promotes safe and secure facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities for women to increase their membership in the ANDSF.

($984,873). Planned projects include: a dorm at Pohantoon-e Hawayee (the AAF’s training school in Kabul, $1.7 million), construction at Camp Zafar in Herat (daycare and kitchen, $1 million), daycare and kitchen construction at the Kabul Military Training Center ($1.1 million), and equipment and building upgrades for the Female Tactical Platoon ($805,200).283

**ANA and MOD Training and Operations**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.284

According to CSTC-A, ASFF training funds are used to send ANA and AAF students to vocational training and professional military education opportunities abroad, including aviation training, special forces training, basic officer-leadership courses, captain’s career courses, war-college programs, seminars, and conferences. The funds are also used to contract advisors and mentors for the ANDSF to advise, train, and mentor them in undertaking essential functions.285

As of December 2, 2017, CSTC-A reported 26 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs for the ANA and AAF. Most ongoing contracts span 6–12 months and include an $81.2 million ANA advisors and mentors program, a $48.1 million contractor logistics support maintenance training program for the UH-60 AAF fleet, and a $43.5 million project to train ASSF.286

**Afghan Air Force**

For the first time, USFOR-A classified AAF authorized and assigned strength figures. The questions SIGAR asked on strength figures can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on AAF authorized strength figures in its classified annex.

Authorized-strength figures for the AAF and SMW were published in DOD’s *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* report. As of December 2017, the authorized strength of the AAF and the SMW is 8,626 personnel, not including civilians.287 Last quarter, USFOR-A reported that the assigned strength of the AAF was roughly 8,000 personnel, as of August 28, 2017. In addition, the AAF has approximately 250 civilian personnel.288

As of November 30, 2017, the United States has appropriated approximately $5.1 billion to support and develop the AAF from FY 2010–FY 2017, with roughly $1.4 billion appropriated in FY 2017. Additionally, DOD requested approximately $1.6 billion for FY 2018, a large portion of which is earmarked for AAF sustainment costs. According to DOD’s FY 2018 budget justification document, included in the $1.6 billion is $709.8 million for the second year of the Afghan Air Force Modernization (AAMF) plan to continue the transition from Russian-manufactured helicopters to U.S.-manufactured UH-60 helicopters.289

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**Afghanistan Compact: Unified Training Command**

RS is tracking the Afghan government’s efforts to establish a Unified Training Command (UTC) to streamline training efforts across the ANDSF. There are several milestones for the MOD’s creation of a UTC and implementation of a Unified Training System (UTS). This quarter, RS reported that MOD accomplished the following:

- creation of a detailed, provisional Tashkil for the UTC HQ that was approved by CSTC-A
- developed and implemented UTC curriculum for training and education at existing UTS elements

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2017 and 12/13/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided ANDSF data, 1/2018; OSD/P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018.
Also as of November 30, nearly $4.6 billion has been obligated for the AAF from FYs 2010–2017, with roughly $1.3 billion of those funds obligated in FY 2017 alone. The majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 continues to be for sustainment items, which account for 44.1% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 39.1%. The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft includes:

- 4 Mi-35 helicopters (two unavailable)
- 46 Mi-17 helicopters (22 unavailable)
- 25 MD-530 helicopters (one unavailable)
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes (one unavailable)
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes (two unavailable)
- 20 A-29 light attack airplanes (one unavailable)
- 4 UH-60 utility helicopters

The Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters are Russian-made, with the United States procuring 33 of the Mi-17s from Russia with ASFF funds (the others the Afghans had before 2001) but providing no funding or other support for Mi-35s. The A-29 planes are Brazilian-designed and manufactured in the United States. The rest of the AAF inventory is composed of U.S.-made aircraft.

As of December 3, 2017, six of the 22 unavailable Mi-17s are in overhaul, four are in heavy repair, four are awaiting extraction and assessment, and eight have expired, meaning they will be reused once they are overhauled. One unavailable MD-530 and one unavailable C-208 are damaged due to

Afghanistan Compact: AAF Modernization Program

The AAF’s effort to expand and increase its capabilities includes several milestones in the Compact. This quarter, RS reported that the AAF developed a comprehensive plan in preparation for AAF growth, to include personnel, organization, equipment, maintenance and sustainment, facilities, and leadership and training; received four UH-60s for initial training; and began creating its own specific recruiting policy and the ability to recruit independently.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2017 and 12/13/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided ANDSF data, 1/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.
hard landings. In addition to the one unavailable C-208, USFOR-A noted that the six C-208s belonging to the Shindand Air Wing are overdue for periodic maintenance, and while grounding them remains an AAF headquarters decision, USFOR-A has suggested that they do so. Two unavailable C-130s are going through routine depot-level maintenance.293 Of the 20 A-29 aircraft, 12 are currently in Afghanistan and seven are at Moody Air Force Base in the United States supporting AAF pilot training, weapons operational testing, and cockpit upgrades. Another six have been procured as part of the AAFM. An additional A-29 was destroyed in the U.S. during training operations in March 2017. When the A-29 training program at Moody concludes, the remaining U.S.-based A-29s will be moved to Afghanistan.294

As part of AAFM, the AAF has received its first four UH-60s and Afghan pilots have begun qualifying to fly them. Additionally, the AAF is scheduled to receive 24 UH-60s in calendar year 2018, with deliveries of two per month. The AAF is also scheduled to receive 10 additional MD-530 helicopters beginning in July 2018, with deliveries of five aircraft per quarter beginning the third quarter of calendar year 2018.295

Over the next several years, the AAF inventory will grow with significant numbers of new or refurbished airframes. USFOR-A provided a snapshot of the expected end state of the AAF’s aircraft inventory by the end of FY 2023, which will include: 81 UH-60s, 38 Fixed Forward Firing UH-60s, 55 MD-530s, 24 C-208s, four C-130s, 25 A-29s, and 32 AC-208s.296

**AAF Operational Readiness**

AAF operational readiness over the reporting period remained approximately the same as last quarter with two of five airframes (C-208 and A-29) falling short of operational readiness goals and two of five airframes significantly exceeding their recommended flight hours (C-130 and Mi-17).297

This quarter, USFOR-A indicated that AAF operational reporting had reverted to the pre-June 2017 standard. The number of sorties (defined as one takeoff and one landing) is again being used for reporting, rather than the number of “missions” (a single operation, which may include multiple sorties) as reported last quarter. According to updated data for last quarter provided by USFOR-A, the AAF flew 8,344 sorties from May 1 through July 31, 2017, at an average of 2,781 sorties per month, with the most sorties (3,347) flown in July 2017. The Mi-17 flew the most sorties (4,892) followed by the C-208 (1,921).298

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that the AAF flew 9,308 sorties from August 1 through October 31, 2017, at an average of 3,102 per month, with the most sorties (3,364) flown in August 2017. As in previous quarters, the Mi-17 flew the greatest number of sorties (4,471) followed by the C-208 (1,976).299 The Mi-17 continued to fly the most hours of any airframe, an average of 858 hours per month this reporting period, followed by the MD-530 at 814 average hours. This was a decrease compared to the Mi-17’s
986-hour per month average last quarter, but an increase in the MD-530’s 767-hour per month average reported last quarter.300

In aggregate, AAF airframes flew roughly the same number of hours per month this quarter (2,845) as last quarter (2,835 hours per month).301 USFOR-A confirmed that the flight hours they provide include all hours flown by the airframes, whether those are operational hours, or maintenance, training, and navigation hours.302

**Personnel Capability**

USFOR-A provided the following information on how many fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready (CMR) crew members the AAF has for each of its airframes. For more information about the specific training involved for crew members attaining CMR status, please see SIGAR’s April 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.303 According to USFOR-A, this quarter:304

- **C-130:** 12 total pilots, including four aircraft commanders, two instructor pilots, two evaluator pilots, four copilots who are CMR; 19 total aircrew, including eight flight engineers (up three from last quarter), and 11 loadmasters (up two from last quarter) who are CMR.
- **C-208:** 41 total pilots, including 10 aircraft commanders, 11 instructor pilots, and 16 co-pilots who are CMR (plus three unqualified pilots); three aircrew loadmasters who are CMR (up eight pilots and three aircrew since last quarter).
- **A-29:** 14 total pilots, including eight aircraft commanders, two instructor pilots, and four wingmen who are CMR (up two from last quarter).
- **MD-530:** 55 total pilots, including 20 aircraft commanders, 27 copilots, and eight instructor pilots who are CMR (down four from last quarter).
- **Mi-17:** 82 total pilots, including 32 aircraft commanders, 11 instructor pilots, 39 copilots who are CMR; 104 total aircrew, including 27 flight engineers and 77 gunners who are CMR (up 24 gunners since last quarter).
- **Mi-35:** 10 pilots (not clear if they are CMR, same as last quarter).

**The Special Mission Wing**

The Special Mission Wing is the aviation branch of the MOD’s Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) that provides aviation support to Afghanistan’s counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and special operations forces. According to DOD, the SMW is the only ANDSF force with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The SMW’s four squadrons include two in Kabul, one at Kandahar Airfield, and one at Mazar-e Sharif Airfield, and provide the ASSF with operational reach across Afghanistan. Recruiting standards are also higher for the SMW than they are for the AAF or other ANDSF elements.305
The latest strength figures for the SMW are from June 2017, when the SMW had 788 personnel. This put the SMW at 87% of its authorized strength, slightly lower than Afghanistan’s other force elements. DOD notes that because the SMW’s recruiting standards are higher than those of the AAF and other ANDSF elements, the SMW struggles to find qualified personnel for pilot and maintenance positions.

For the first time, this quarter NSOCC-A provided key SMW data in an unclassified format. These include: the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew for these airframes, and a percent-breakdown of counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions flown.

The SMW has a total of 33 Mi-17s on hand (nine Mi-17 version 1 and 24 version 5 variants) as well as a total of 18 PC-12 aircraft. According to NSOCC-A, the main difference between the Mi-17 version 1 and 5 variants is that version 1 mounts one door gun, versus two for version 5. The version 5 airframe is the newer of the two; none were built before 2013. Part of the AAFM, the SMW’s Mi-17s will be replaced with a mix of UH-60s and a small quantity of U.S.-made, heavier lift rotary wing aircraft to meet the SMW’s requirement for more lift capability than the UH-60s provide. A possible platform identified by DOD in 2015 could be the U.S. Army’s excess CH-47s.

The SMW has 58 Mi-17 pilots (including nine instructor pilots), 32 flight engineers (including 23 instructor crew), and 14 crew chiefs who are CMR. The SMW also has 33 PC-12 pilots (including nine instructor pilots) and 16 mission system operators (including 10 instructor mission system operators) who are CMR. NSOCC-A also reported that the SMW flew 316 sorties during the reporting period, with 8% of these sorties for counternarcotics operations and 92% for counterterrorism operations.

The two main funding sources for the SMW are the ASFF and the DOD Counternarcotics (DOD-CN) fund. According to NSOCC-A, from FY 2012 to November 29, 2017, approximately $2.3 billion has been obligated for the SMW from both funds, roughly $146 million more than last quarter. NSOCC-A notes that the additional funds are due to a new Mi-17 maintenance contract. NSOCC-A also reported that it requested $305.5 million for the SMW for FY 2018, nearly $100 million more than the funds obligated for FY 2017. The vast majority of the funding obligated since FY 2012 has been designated for equipment and aircraft (43.2%) and sustainment items (46.2%) with the rest going toward training and infrastructure costs.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported that the SMW continues to provide special forces aviation support to intelligence-driven counterterror and counternarcotics missions. NSOCC-A reported that at the end of the annual fighting season, SMW will begin a squadron rotation to better maintain operational readiness, as is the practice in the ANA. This enables the squadrons to rotate annually from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar. It also allows
squadrons to rest, increase regional familiarization, and increase qualifications during winter when operational requirements are at their annual low. The annual rotation and reset cycle also prepares the squadrons for the 2018 fighting season.\textsuperscript{312}

In recent months, SMW has focused on developing new capabilities. SMW has begun training ground elements on rapid insertion and exfiltration techniques, as well as finalizing the use of encrypted air-to-ground communications. Both capabilities should be available for employment by the beginning of the 2018 fighting season.\textsuperscript{313}

SIGAR will report additional details about SMW capabilities in the classified annex to this report.

**AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $21 billion and disbursed $20.7 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.\textsuperscript{314}

**ANP Strength**

For the first time, USFOR-A classified all ANP strength data this quarter, unlike last quarter when they provided rounded assigned-strength data. Information about ANP strength will be reported in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR's questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report. Authorized-strength figures reported here are drawn from DOD's December 2017 *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* report.

The current goal strength for the MOI is approximately 157,000. The MOI echelons include MOI headquarters and institutional support, the Afghan Border Police (23,219), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (17,030), General Command of Police Special Units (1,715), Afghan Uniformed Police (101,135), and TTHS (13,901).\textsuperscript{315} The assigned, or actual, strength of the ANP remains classified.

**ANP Attrition**

USFOR-A classified ANP attrition data for the second consecutive quarter. SIGAR's questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANP attrition in the classified annex to this report.

**ANP Sustainment**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $8.8 billion and disbursed $8.7 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.\textsuperscript{316}

According to CSTC-A, the United States spent $74.2 million on ANP payroll and $9.7 million of on incentive pay from January 1, 2017, through
November 30, 2017. The payroll funds included $20.8 million, contributed by the United States on-budget (through ASFF) to LOTFA to pay for ANP salaries.\(^{317}\)

In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has provided $78.1 million of ASFF funds for ALP salaries and incentives since the beginning of FY 1396. Last quarter, CSTC-A estimated ALP salary and incentive costs at $73.8 million per year for the next two years, including the U.S. contribution to LOTFA.\(^{316}\)

CSTC-A reported that aside from payroll expenses, the majority of ASFF ANP sustainment funding for FY 1396, the greatest expenditures for the funds have been for fuel ($12.2 million) and electricity ($8.7 million).\(^{319}\)

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As seen in Figure 3.32, as of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.7 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.\(^{320}\)

CSTC-A reported the major items of equipment provided to the ANP from September 1 through November 30, 2017. During that period, the ANP received 75 M9 pistols, costing $55,200.\(^{321}\)

**Equipment Operational Readiness**

This quarter USFOR-A classified most of the data on the operational readiness of ANP equipment. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on equipment readiness of each ANP zone in its classified annex.

CSTC-A reported this quarter that the new contractor the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contact is responsible for providing maintenance and supply-chain-management training for the ANP while also conducting 95% of its vehicle maintenance for the next year. In years two through five, the contractor-led training will continue and the workload for the ANP will gradually shift over time to begin building the ANP's organic maintenance capability. During the contract's final year, the ANP is expected to assume 85% of its vehicle-maintenance workload.\(^{322}\)

**ANP Infrastructure**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.\(^{323}\)

According to CSTC-A, as of November 30, 2017, the United States had completed a total of 752 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at $3.6 billion. This quarter, CSTC-A reported 26 ongoing projects valued at roughly $76 million. Five infrastructure projects in the planning phase will cost roughly $108.4 million; the majority are Women's Participation Program (WPP) projects. One project was completed this quarter—a women's barracks and daycare center (costing roughly $870,000) at the Afghan Border Police headquarters in Gardez, Paktiya Province.\(^{324}\)
The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter continues to be the installation of an information-technology server at the MOI Headquarters Network Operations Center in Kabul. This $43.5 million project is expected to be completed in January 2018. The next-largest projects are two WPP projects: compounds for women at the Kabul Police Academy to be completed by June 2019 ($7.1 million, up roughly $360,000 since last quarter) and a women’s training facility at the Police Central Training Command in Kabul, which is to be completed by March 2019 ($3.9 million).325

CSTC-A reported that several other WPP projects are under way, the largest of which are training facilities and daycare centers for ANP regional training centers at Paktiya Province ($3.8 million) and Herat Province ($3.5 million), to be completed in March 2019 and September 2018 respectively.326

Three small ANP infrastructure contracts with a total value of $843,400 were awarded this quarter. These include the renovation of three police special units, one in Logar Province ($128,110), and two in Kabul Province ($94,000 and $56,360).327 CSTC-A reported, as of December 31, that the U.S. government spent roughly $57.4 million of ASFF funds on ANP sustainment costs for FY 2017. Part of this amount is $8.1 million to accommodate the growth of the Afghan special forces.328

Note: These figures are cumulative.

CSTC-A provided an update on its infrastructure-related training and advisory role with MOI’s Facilities Department (FD) engineers. This quarter, CSTC-A reported that its eight advisors meet daily with the MOI FD to train and advise on all aspects of facility engineering and program management including budget planning, contract reviews, project planning, and project development.\(^{329}\)

CSTC-A has contracted Afghan subject-matter experts (SMEs) with technical skills matched to requirements, to assist MOI FD in meeting daily operation requirements, train MOI facility engineers, and complete other technical tasks. As of November 30, 2017, there were 50 SME engineers working at MOI FD, an increase of 31 since last quarter. CSTC-A reported 20 SMEs working at MOI FD headquarters in Kabul and 30 SMEs working in provinces. A total of 72 SME positions are allotted for MOI FD. CSTC-A continues to evaluate, interview, and hire the remaining SMEs.\(^{330}\)

**ANP Training and Operations**

As of December 31, 2017, the United States had obligated $4.3 billion and disbursed $4.2 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.\(^{331}\)

This quarter, SIGAR requested additional information about DOD’s police-training capability for the ANP. According to USFOR-A, elements of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, DOD civilians, and contractors assigned to Train, Advise, and Assist Command-East (TAAC-E), TAAC-South, and Task Forces Southeast and Southwest advise the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the largest civil policing element within the ANP. There are also U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force personnel (military and civilians) assigned in various other positions, including at RS headquarters and elsewhere, who have a direct advisory role with the AUP.\(^{332}\)

However, USFOR-A characterized the current police-training effort as “minimal” for the AUP “as the Resolute Support Mission does not provide the type of tactical, hands-on training that was the case under ISAF,” the International Security Assistance Force, the precursor of RS. USFOR-A noted that U.S. Special Operations Forces do provide direct training for the ALP and General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). The majority of the DOD personnel assigned to RS—including those with advising responsibilities for the AUP—are working with Afghan leadership to develop self-sustaining processes that will enable the ANP to conduct their own police training.”\(^{333}\)

CSTC-A uses U.S.-provided ASFF funds for professional military education, travel, living allowances, and medical expenses for the MOI, ANP, and GCPSU personnel to attend law-enforcement and military training in the United States. The goal of the U.S.-based military training is to increase technical skills and to enhance knowledge and leadership at all levels. CSTC-A says that the program allows the U.S. military to have a lasting influence on ANP development.\(^{334}\)
Additionally, CSTC-A uses ASFF funding to recruit and hire Afghan logistics specialists who train, advise, and assist the ANP in a wide array of ANDSF logistic skills, including English translation, computer skills, equipment accountability and tracking, inventory management and warehousing, modern business skills, and other logistic functions. ASFF is also used to contract advisors and mentors who advise, train, and mentor the ANP to increase their overall capabilities in essential functions such as finance, internal controls, governance, force generation, training and sustainment of the force, logistics, sustainment, planning, executing security operations, and intelligence.335

The MOI’s largest ongoing ASFF-funded training contracts include a $64 million contract for MOI advisors and mentors, a $13.9 million contract to train MOI special forces, and a $4.8 million contract to train Afghan logistics specialists for the ALP.336

USFOR-A classified the percentage of trained and untrained ANP personnel this quarter. Last quarter, roughly 5,000 ANP personnel were untrained, about 4% of the force, as of August 31, 2017. Therefore, the ANP maintained better training readiness than the 5% untrained-personnel threshold mandated by the MOI’s FY 1395 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter.337

**WOMEN IN THE ANDSF**

According to the RS Gender Advisor Office, as of December 1, 2017, there were 4,632 women serving in the ANDSF, an increase of 443 personnel over the last six months.338 Of the total female personnel in the ANDSF, 3,193 were in the ANP, 1,185 were in the ANA, 139 were in the ASSF, and 115 were in the AAF. Of the women in the ANP, ANA, ASSF, and AAF, there were 1,502 officers, 1,659 noncommissioned officers, 1,303 enlisted personnel, and 168 cadets. The largest increase in female personnel occurred within the ANP, which added more than 300 personnel since May 2017.339

This quarter, there was renewed focus on sexual harassment and abuse of female members of the security forces when a graphic video was posted to Facebook purportedly showing an AAF colonel having intercourse with a young, unidentifiable woman who covertly recorded the encounter and gave the footage to a colleague. According to the Guardian, several of the colonel’s co-workers confirmed that he had pressured the woman for sex after she had requested a promotion, with one pilot alleging that the colonel “has done this many times” with other women.340 The ANDSF women SIGAR interviewed for its fact-finding mission on the status of women in Afghanistan in October 2016 also reported sexual harassment, rape, and the abuse of female colleagues by male superiors. After public outrage over the Facebook incident, the MOD has said it has launched an investigation.341

This is a rare example of a woman in the Afghan defense and police forces shedding light on the sexual harassment and abuse faced in the

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided ANDSF data, 1/2018.
workplace. Though harassment and abuse are pervasive, women frequently quit their jobs rather than speak out or identify their abusers. This is mainly out of fear that the abuser could kill the woman or even that one of her own family members could carry out an honor killing against her due to the harsh stigmas attached to rape.342

Both the ANDSF and its Coalition advisors are working to address sexual harassment and abuse issues within the security forces. The RS Gender Advisor Office told SIGAR this quarter that efforts are under way to make the ANDSF a safer place for women to work, including the construction of secure facilities for female personnel and continued training and advising on the finalization of the MOI’s Sexual Harassment and Assault Policy. RS reported that they expect the MOI will implement its policy soon, but the MOD has just begun the process for developing its own policy.343

The FY 2018 NDAA stipulates that a goal of $41 million (but no less than $10 million) be spent for “the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANDSF; and the recruitment, training, and contracting of female security personnel for future elections.” This is a $16 million increase in the goal funding from the FY 2017 NDAA.344

The money can also be used for other projects that benefit women in the ANDSF: programs and activities of the MOD’s Directorate of Human Rights and Gender Integration and the MOI’s Office of Human Rights, Gender and Child Rights; development and dissemination of gender and human rights educational and training materials and programs within the MOD and MOI; efforts to address harassment and violence against women within the ANDSF; improvements to infrastructure that address the requirements of
women serving in the ANDSF, including appropriate equipment for female security and police forces, and transportation for policewomen to their station; support for ANP Family Response Units; and security provisions for high-profile female ANA and ANP officers.345

ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE
For the first time, USFOR-A classified the exact figures for assigned strength of medical personnel in the ANDSF this quarter, unlike last quarter, when they provided rounded assigned strength figures. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF medical personnel can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the exact assigned strength of medical personnel in its classified annex.

Last quarter there were approximately 1,000 physicians and 3,000 other staff within the ANDSF healthcare system, as of August 21, 2017. Many positions reportedly remained vacant, including about 250 physician positions and nearly 450 other medical positions, according to CSTC-A.346

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that it procured and fielded $910,000 in repair parts and tools for the ANDSF.347

The ANDSF Medical Command (MEDCOM) and the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) reported training over 7,000 ANA and 3,500 ANP recruits in the course of FY 1396. According to CSTC-A, approximately 300 ANA combat medics are trained annually, along with 375 ANP medics.348

This quarter, ANA MEDCOM and the Afghan Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences (AAFAMS) developed a memorandum of agreement with Craig Joint Theater Hospital (CJTH) at Bagram Airfield, enabling ANDSF medical professionals to obtain on-site training at CJTH. Coalition advisors began training ANDSF personnel on the Combat Casualty and Disease Non-Battle Injury Committee, which was chartered last quarter to enhance ANDSF medical decision making.349

As anticipated last quarter, the Afghan National Police Hospital (ANPH) renovation project experienced work delays. However, according to CSTC-A, President Ghani directed that the hospital be fully open on January 21, 2018.350

This quarter, ANA received 120,000 additional influenza vaccines to vaccinate much of the remaining unvaccinated ANDSF personnel.351 Coalition advisors advised and assisted the ANDSF-wide vaccination program, which vaccinated 170,000 ANA and 110,000 ANP personnel.352

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
According to the United Nations (UN), Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by landmines and “explosive remnants of war” (ERW).353 The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $361.7 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding and has obligated approximately $1.6 million in FY 2017 funds, representing no change from last quarter, and will obligate remaining funds upon availability. PM/WRA obligated a small portion of the FY 2017 funding because State’s Bureau of South Central Asia has not finalized its congressionally-mandated spend plan and transmitted it to Congress. PM/WRA has not requested the release of FY 2018 funding under the Continuing Resolution.  

State directly funds six Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by ERW and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised-explosive devices. As of September 30, 2017, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 236.7 million square meters of land (approximately 91.4 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.9 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.5). State programs aim to clear landmines and other ERW to allow access to land for Afghan farmers, aid workers, and civilians.

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 583.6 square kilometers (225.3 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. By the end of the quarter, the total known contaminated area was 547 square kilometers (211.2 square miles) in 3,933 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Service, provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) III. The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians. ACAP III is a nationwide program with a budget of $19.6 million—the amount was lowered in 2017 from $30.2 million—and projects are expected to continue through February 2018. ACAP III works to enhance the government’s capacity to better deliver services to the families of martyrs and disabled persons in Afghanistan. Some of the victims of conflict to whom ACAP III provides assistance are disabled.

After the deadliest militant attack in Kabul since 2001, ACAP III responded swiftly by distributing relief packages to 516 families, supporting nearly 4,000 civilians. The program assisted 1,110 people with psychosocial counseling and 184 victims with physical therapy support. ACAP III also
provided income-generation packages to more than 30 beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{359} Income-generation packages are not intended to compensate for income loss or to serve as reparations for damage or loss. An ACAP III staff member visits eligible families following the assessment process and determine how the program can provide short-term opportunities to improve their economic situation. Common income generation opportunities include agricultural farming, livestock, cargo tricycles, assistance for grocery shops, and other small business support.\textsuperscript{360}

In December 2017, the UN Secretary-General reported the average monthly rate of casualties from mines, ERW and IEDs increased slightly to 169 from January to October 2017. The average casualty rate was 168 during the same period in 2016. ERW and IEDs account for 96.3\% of casualties.

The UN Mine Action Service and Directorate of Mine Action Coordination declared 15 communities mine-free between August 1 and October 31. This enabled nearly 235,000 individuals to move freely within their communities. The UN estimates that over 3,300 minefields, 296 battlefields, and 37 contaminated firing ranges remain.\textsuperscript{361}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Conventional Weapons Destruction Program Metrics, Fiscal Years 2010–2017}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Fiscal Year & Minefields Cleared (m²) & AT/AP Destroyed & UXO Destroyed & SAA Destroyed & Fragments Cleared & Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)\
\hline
2010 & 39,337,557 & 13,879 & 663,162 & 1,602,267 & 4,339,235 & 650,662,000\
2011 & 31,644,360 & 10,504 & 345,029 & 2,393,725 & 21,966,347 & 602,000,000\
2012 & 46,783,527 & 11,830 & 344,363 & 1,058,760 & 22,912,702 & 550,000,000\
2013 & 25,059,918 & 6,431 & 203,024 & 275,697 & 10,148,683 & 521,000,000\
2014 & 22,071,212 & 12,397 & 287,331 & 346,484 & 9,415,712 & 511,600,000\
2015 & 12,101,386 & 2,134 & 33,078 & 88,798 & 4,062,478 & 570,800,000\
2016 & 27,856,346 & 6,493 & 6,289 & 91,563 & 9,616,485 & 607,600,000\
2017 & 31,897,313 & 6,646 & 37,632 & 88,261 & 1,158,886 & 547,000,000\
\hline
TOTAL & 236,751,619 & 70,314 & 1,919,908 & 5,945,555 & 83,620,528 & 547,000,000\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre. *Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.}
\small{Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2017.}