COUNTERNARCOTICS CONTENTS

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COUNTERNARCOTICS

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in May that poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan reached a new record in 2017. The total area under poppy cultivation expanded by 127,000 hectares, from 201,000 hectares in 2016 to 328,000 hectares in 2017. A hectare equals nearly 2.5 acres.\textsuperscript{737}

Cultivation rose significantly in nearly all major poppy-growing provinces. In Helmand, cultivation increased 79 percent (63,700 hectares) from 2016 levels and accounted for approximately half of the national increase for 2017. Major increases also occurred in Balkh Province, where 10,000 more hectares were under cultivation—almost five times higher than its 2016 level; in Kandahar Province, which saw a 37 percent (7,500 hectares) increase; in Nimroz Province, which experienced a 116 percent (6,200 hectares) increase; and in Uruzgan Province, which had an additional 39 percent (6,000 hectares) under cultivation.\textsuperscript{738}

The UNODC report included a socioeconomic analysis of its Afghanistan opium survey that provided information on the reasons farmers turn to opium-poppy cultivation. UNODC attributed the overall increase to multiple factors: Farmers continued to cultivate opium poppy primarily due to ongoing rule-of-law-related challenges like political instability, lack of government control, and security. Limited employment and economic opportunities, and a lack of access to quality education also played a role. Moreover, the Afghan government targeted antigovernment elements in densely populated areas in 2017, which could have rendered rural inhabitants more vulnerable to insurgents’ influence, according to UNODC.\textsuperscript{739}

The expansion of poppy-cultivated areas as well as high yields led to record opium production. UNODC estimated that 7,600 to 7,900 tons of opium were available for producing high-quality, low-cost heroin likely to reach consumer markets across the world.\textsuperscript{740}

Between April and June 15, 2018, Afghan law-enforcement personnel conducted 17 interdiction operations. Seizures included 6,560 kilograms (kg) of opium, 60 kg of heroin, 3 kg of hashish, and 12,500 kg of precursor chemicals.\textsuperscript{741} A kilogram is about 2.2 pounds.

The Department of Defense (DOD) continued to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) this quarter, particularly...
the Afghan Air Force (AAF), in targeting insurgent financial networks and revenue sources. The DOD operations proceeded under the expanded authorities of the U.S. administration’s South Asia strategy. DOD reported that 19 narcotics production facilities were bombed by the AAF since January. According to DOD, between November 2017 and May 2018, more than 100 strikes against narcotics processing and storage facilities and stockpiles have resulted in the loss of tens of millions of dollars in revenue for the Taliban.742

**Revised U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Still Pending**

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) informed SIGAR that the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, under development since 2014, is still undergoing interagency coordination and has not been finalized. As drafted, the strategy seeks to deny the Taliban drug revenue as a means of pressuring them to participate in peace negotiations. The draft strategy also continues to focus on building and improving Afghan counternarcotics (CN) capabilities and capacity. According to INL, its programs support the South Asia strategy by helping deny drug revenue and addressing the various factors and symptoms of Afghan opiates, all of which drive instability that is detrimental to an Afghan-led peace process.743

**U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS**

As of June 30, 2018, the United States has provided $8.81 billion for CN efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most CN funds for Afghanistan through the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) Fund ($3.25 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($1.31 billion), the Economic Support Fund ($1.44 billion), and a portion of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account ($2.26 billion).744

ASFF is primarily used to develop the Afghan National Army and Police, including the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Special Mission Wing (SMW), which support the counternarcotics efforts of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI).745

**INTERDICTION AND ERADICATION**

The U.S. and Afghan governments use both interdiction and eradication to counter the cultivation and production of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. According to State:

- **Interdiction**—preventing illicit drugs from reaching their destination—is important in stemming the flow of illegal drugs and countering the
negative effects of organized criminal groups. INL supports interdiction efforts through training, equipping, and providing technical assistance to partner nation law enforcement agencies. Such efforts increase the capacity to detect, investigate, disrupt, and seize shipments of illicit drugs and the chemicals (known as precursors) needed to process and produce drugs.

- **Eradication**—physical destruction—of illicit crops remains an important tool for decreasing the production of illegal drugs and preventing them from entering the United States or other drug markets. INL provides training, equipment, and technical assistance to foreign governments to support their own eradication programs and address related counternarcotics and law-enforcement challenges.

Afghan Counternarcotics Elements

The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), comprising regular narcotics police and specialized units, is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics efforts. According to DOD, the CNPA, authorized at 2,596 personnel, is located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police also participate in counternarcotic activities.

In addition, the General Command of Police Special Units conducts high-risk operations against terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime. NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target important narcotics traffickers. The NIU maintains forward-based personnel in Kandahar, Kunduz, and Herat Provinces.

The Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) is an individual component consisting of 100 translators that work within the Joint Wire Intercept Platform in support of SIU/NIU investigations. Another SIU component has four officers who are responsible for the administrative management of court orders obtained by SIU investigators to conduct Afghan judicially authorized intercepts.

U.S. Funding for Afghan Counternarcotics Elements

INL estimates that it funds approximately $26 million per year for operations and maintenance for the NIU and SIU based on obligating and contract documents. Costs directly attributable to NIU and SIU include $2.47 million in support of the Joint Wire Intercept Platform program under an interagency agreement with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and $425,000 per year for NIU salary supplements. SIU supplements are funded by DEA. Salary supplements are used to attract and retain the most qualified and highly trained officers to the specialized units. Supplements are provided to all NIU officers, from police officers to unit commanders, based on rank.
INL told SIGAR that actual INL funding figures may be lower than authorized amounts. For example, contracts that span multiple years are assumed to pay out equally each year. The estimates for operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts are based on “estimated at completion” numbers, which can vary. Moreover, O&M institutional contractors support other programs besides interdiction.754

DOD provided $675,000 for equipment to the NIU for 2017 and $1 million for equipment to be delivered in 2019.755

**U.S. Technical and Military Counternarcotics Assistance**

State INL funds support programs to disrupt illicit drug production, strengthen criminal-justice systems and law-enforcement institutions, and combat transnational organized crime.756 In Afghanistan, INL partners with DEA and DOD to build the capacity of the CNPA, with particular focus on support for the two specialized units mentored by DEA—the SIU and the NIU.757

During the third quarter of FY 2018, most interdiction activities occurred in the southwest region. These events included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. Afghan combined operations resulted in multiple drug seizures (discussed later in this section) and destroyed labs. DOD notes that interdiction activities are hindered by insecurity in areas of Taliban influence and control.758

U.S. support for the train, advise, and assist mission includes a U.S. Special Forces advisory team that mentors specialized CNPA units.759 According to INL, the challenging security environment in drug-producing and drug-refining areas constrains virtually every aspect of drug law enforcement. INL said the U.S. Special Forces team—part of vital Resolute Support Mission assistance to the NIU—has been key to overcoming these challenges. This assistance has expedited NIU access to key enablers including rotary-wing lift and enabled missions in remote areas including southern Afghanistan.760

DOD created, equipped, and continues to provide training, and contract support to the Special Mission Wing (SMW).761 The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. DOD reports that the SMW provides persistent reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism/counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in the country.762 This fiscal year, counternarcotics (DOD CN) funding has financed approximately half of the SMW’s requirements and ASFF funding makes up the remaining half.763

**Operation Iron Tempest: Disrupting Insurgent Revenue Streams**

The Administration’s South Asia strategy enables USFOR-A to target insurgent forces, finances, and infrastructure. U.S. air assets such as B-52s, B-1s, F-16s, F-18s, A-10s, and other aircraft—along with Afghan Air Force
(AAF) pilots operating under Afghan authorities using Afghan air assets—
aim to disrupt and degrade insurgents’ ability to generate revenue, and to
destroy their investments in personnel, infrastructure, weapons, equipment,
and explosives.764

Beginning in November 2017, Operation Iron Tempest, the U.S. and Afghan
CN air campaign, has destroyed 154 Taliban targets, as of June 27. These tar-
ggets included narcotics production, storage and trafficking locations; weapons
and explosives caches; and headquarters and staging areas. Since January
2018, AAF A-29s have destroyed 19 narcotics production facilities.765 Afghan
national leaders have been supportive of the campaign, while some provincial
leaders and others have criticized the U.S. and Afghan airstrikes because of
alleged civilian casualties. However, USFOR-A reports there have been no con-
firmed civilian casualties from the counter-revenue strikes since Iron Tempest
began. As the campaign continues, it risks fomenting discontent towards the
Afghan government if strikes are perceived as targeting civilians or ineffective
at disrupting the insurgents’ source of revenue.766

The U.S. Air Force’s 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task
Force-Afghanistan (9 AETF-A) determines the effectiveness of its counter-
threat-finance campaign using intelligence gathered from insurgents to
assess their perception of their financial situation and its impact on their
operational decision making. The 9 AETF-A reported that insurgent confu-
sion, concern, and changes to their tactics, techniques, and procedures have
led to disruptions in their command and control. Discord and uncertainty
have also been observed among insurgent groups about future financing
of their operations as their revenue sources are destroyed and degraded.767

The 9 AETF-A stated that insurgents seem to realize that raids and strikes
will continue to destroy their revenue streams unless a reconciliation takes
place. The 9 AETF-A said the air campaign has denied insurgents an esti-
mated $44.5 million since November 2017, while raids have captured or
destroyed $41.8 million in precursor chemicals, equipment, and raw opium
over the same period.768

According to DOD, international demand and market incentives for
opium production remain high. Sanctions, targeting insurgent revenue
streams in certain areas (such as Helmand Province), and the destruction of
their weapons and fighters have led to changes in how insurgents operate.769

More information on Operation Iron Tempest is available in the classified
annex to this report.

**Drug Activity in Areas of Government and Taliban Control**

According to the UN International Narcotics Control Board, drug trafficking
and production in Afghanistan take place mainly in areas where govern-
ment institutions are weak or the government is unable to exercise full
control because of the deteriorating security situation, although traffick-
ing is not limited to areas controlled by insurgents. The UN stated that up
to 90 percent of drug production currently falls within Taliban-controlled areas, although it is unclear how they define “illicit production.”

The U.S. government also estimates that “85 percent of [the country’s] opium is grown in areas controlled or contested by the Taliban.” Of the 328,000 hectares of opium-poppy cultivated reported by UNODC in 2017, 38 percent was cultivated in districts assessed by RS on May 15 as contested; 4 percent in districts under Afghan government control; 23 percent in districts under government influence; 20 percent in districts with insurgent activity; and 16 percent in districts assessed as having high insurgent activity.

UNODC uses a sampling approach in its methodology for provinces where most of the poppy is found and a “targeted approach” in provinces with a low level of opium poppy cultivation. It defines a targeted approach as an area of a province being fully covered by satellite imagery. Provinces with no indication for opium poppy cultivation are covered by a village survey only. According to UNODC, the survey is designed to produce province level estimates. District estimates are derived by a combination of different approaches. They are indicative only, and suggest a possible distribution of the estimated provincial poppy area among the districts of a province. Information on RS district stability levels are discussed in the Security section starting on page 68.

Combining the UNODC data with the RS data shows that poppy cultivation flourishes in Afghanistan under both insurgent and government control. SIGAR’s analysis challenges the general assumption that insurgents control the highest poppy-cultivating areas or that poppy is predominantly grown in areas with insurgent activity. RS data show that the government controls or influences more districts than the insurgents, including poppy-cultivating districts. This relationship holds true for the absolute area of poppy cultivation, but is particularly evident when comparing poppy-cultivation intensity across districts.

As shown in Figure 3.40, SIGAR found that strictly in terms of poppy cultivation, there are districts under Afghan government control or influence with significant levels of cultivation. In certain provinces, the districts that UNODC found to have the largest area of opium-poppy cultivation in 2017 are under government influence or control: Argo District, assessed to be under Afghan government influence, is the highest opium-poppy-cultivating district in Badakhshan (3,658 hectares); Nahr-e Saraj, considered under government control in Helmand (18,464 hectares) is the highest producing district; and Zharey, considered under government influence in Kandahar (7,605 hectares) is the second-highest producing district. One of the two top-producing districts in Nimroz Province, Khash Rod with 4,167 hectares, is also under government influence.

Also in Figure 3.40, when the area of poppy cultivation in a given district is divided by the area of the district, the calculated cultivation intensity
allows for cross-district comparisons throughout Afghanistan. The map illustrates the intensity of opium-poppy cultivation overlayed on RS’s district-stability assessment as of May 15, 2018. Among the 57 districts in the SIGAR-defined high-intensity category (14.21 hectare per kilometer squared or less), two of these districts were assessed by RS as being under government control (e.g., Balkh in Balkh Province and Arghandab in Kandahar), 16 are under government influence (e.g., Shinwar in Nangarhar and Zharey in Kandahar), 25 are contested (e.g., Nahr-e Saraj in Helmand and Chaparhar in Nangarhar), 10 are in insurgent activity districts (e.g., Sangin and Kajaki in Helmand), and four are in high insurgent activity districts (e.g., Musa Qalah and Now Zad in Helmand).776

The SIGAR-defined medium-intensity category (0.73 hectare per kilometer squared or less) includes 57 districts with 11 of these districts being assessed by RS as being under government control, 21 assessed as
government influenced, 17 contested, seven under insurgent activity, and one under high insurgent activity. The SIGAR-defined low-intensity grouping (0.10 hectare per kilometer squared or less) includes 58 districts of which 11 of these districts are assessed by RS as being under government control, 30 assessed as government influenced, 10 contested, five under insurgent activity, and two under high insurgent activity. Finally, 235 districts had no opium-poppy cultivation or data available in 2017. Of these, 138 of these districts were assessed by RS as being under government control or influence, 70 are contested districts, and 27 are under insurgent activity or high activity.777

Interdiction Results and Narcotics Seizure Values

Between April 1 and June 15, 2018, Afghan security forces conducted 17 operations resulting in the seizure of 6,560 kg of opium, 3,905 kg of morphine, 60 kg of heroin, 12,500 kg of chemicals, and 26 detentions, according to DOD.778 NIU and SIU reported only two operations and made no detentions this quarter.779 NIU and SIU seized 9,000 kg of morphine, 345 kg of heroin as well 500 kg of chemicals, according to figures reported to DEA by NIU and SIU during April.780

Though the number of 17 operations decreased from the previous quarter’s report of 59 operations, the quantity of morphine seized for instance, is higher than those reported the last two quarters. DOD did not know definitively the reasons for the decrease in operations, but said it may be attributed to fluctuations in CN operations and the security situation as the fighting season began.781 According to DEA, between April 1 and May 26, 2018, three labs were destroyed, and seizures comprised 26.6 kg of methamphetamine, 5,000 liters (L) of acetone, 504 L of hydrochloric acid, 500 kg of improvised-explosive-device chemicals, and other chemicals. DEA estimates the revenue denied to insurgents from those operations at $37,550,660.782

USFOR-A told SIGAR that the values of seizures and destroyed equipment are derived from DEA baselines. A narcotic lab’s value largely depends on the number of barrels it cooks. Values of destroyed labs are initially assessed based on the size of the facility. The value of other destroyed infrastructure and material (for example, structures or opium presses) is added to the total. USFOR-A generally considers most labs small.783

USFOR-A said drug-trafficking organizations can expect approximately $205,000 in future revenue per barrel. It also estimates insurgents receive approximately 20 percent of the chain value of the opium trade, which includes licensing fees for labs and markets, transportation and protection fees, taxations at harvest, and profits from direct participation. The overall value of any revenue target that was struck or of any raid is assigned to the drug-trafficking organization and 20 percent of that figure provides the estimated value denied to insurgents.784

**Source:** USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/13/2018.

**Licensing fees:** the amount paid to the Taliban for permission to operate a drug lab or market in a particular geographic area.
According to long-time narcotics scholar David Mansfield, the rates paid to the Taliban vary across regions, even across villages within the same district. In Helmand, the Taliban imposed a land tax in 2017. The relationship between the Taliban and the farm-gate opium production is not as simple or as direct as reported by UNODC and others, he said. Rates fall below 1 percent, and payments are not always in the form of opium. Drug trafficking organizations in different areas would earn different percentages of revenues. Applying a uniform rate of 20 percent in overall revenue as the USFOR-A methodology holds, probably overestimates the revenue potential.

According to DOD, determining the product-processing stage is not required for their revenue estimates. All organizations providing support to USFOR-A’s counter-threat-finance campaign are asked to comply with the same methodology to ensure a common reference. USFOR-A told SIGAR that the total revenue denied is one metric (and not a driving factor) used to evaluate the campaign and adjust future operations. The UNODC said little is known about the efficiency and capacity of heroin and morphine labs in Afghanistan. According to seize data, 48 to 56 percent of 2017’s opium harvest was converted into heroin or morphine within Afghanistan, while the remainder was exported unrefined. UNODC cautions that there is great uncertainty regarding these estimates.

The Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) prosecuted 186 cases under the new penal code provisions between April and June 2018. The provinces with the highest number of high-level drug smuggling and trafficking cases are Kabul (91) followed by Nangarhar (33). According to INL, 500 cases were adjudicated nationwide using the counternarcotics provisions in the new penal code during the same period; 314 did not meet the minimum threshold for CNJC jurisdiction. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice G. Wells, testifying in June before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cited the success of the CNJC and its 99 percent conviction rate. However INL, in its first report to Congress on FY 2017 Economic Support Fund goals and benchmarks, revealed that CNJC cases disproportionately target low-level couriers. Clear cases against high-ranking Afghan officials involved in the drug trade cannot move forward in the CNJC due to corruption and political interference from within the Afghan government.

DEA told SIGAR that no high-value targets were apprehended during the quarter; it also had no information on whether past apprehensions of high-value-targets had any impact on illicit financing or the narcotics trade within the country.

Since April 2018, DEA has temporarily suspended all training of Afghan CN law enforcement organizations through the DOD-funded Counter Narcotics Training Team due to pending revisions to the “505 Bi-Lateral Security Agreement.” According to U.S. Central Command CENTCOM,
the Section 505 agreement, required between partner nations for capacity assistance programs, was approved by the Afghan authorities on June 25, 2018.\footnote{Section 505 agreement.}

As shown in Table 3.24, interdiction results barely make an impact on the country’s potential opium production, despite increasing seizures.

### Eradication Results

#### Governor-Led Eradication

Under the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program, INL, through MCN, reimburses provincial governors $250 toward the eradication costs of every UNODC-verified hectare of eradicated poppy.\footnote{Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program.} INL provided $75,000 this quarter to MCN in support of this season’s eradication activities in the following provinces: Badakhshan, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Herat, and Badghis.\footnote{List of provinces. According to DOD, security forces in Nangarhar Province conducted a poppy-eradication campaign and claim to have destroyed several hundred hectares of poppy; the UN has not yet verified these claims. Authorities in Badakhshan Province announced the start of poppy eradication in early June. Eradication efforts do not appear to have taken place in any other provinces.}

GLE resulted in the eradication of 750 hectares in 2017 in 14 provinces compared to 355 hectares in seven provinces in 2016.\footnote{Comparison of eradication figures. INL has obligated and disbursed $6.9 million since the program’s inception in 2008. As Figure 3.41 on the next page illustrates, eradication efforts have had minimal impact on curbing opium-poppy cultivation.}

### Table 3.24

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Operations</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td><strong>Detaimees</strong></td>
<td>190</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>386</td>
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<td>394</td>
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<td>152</td>
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<td><strong>Hashish seized (kg)</strong></td>
<td>58,677</td>
<td>25,044</td>
<td>182,213</td>
<td>183,776</td>
<td>37,826</td>
<td>19,088</td>
<td>24,785</td>
<td>123,063</td>
<td>227,327</td>
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<td><strong>Heroin seized (kg)</strong></td>
<td>576</td>
<td>8,392</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td>3,441</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>3,056</td>
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<td>3,532</td>
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<td><strong>Morphine seized (kg)</strong></td>
<td>5,195</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>18,040</td>
<td>10,042</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>5,925</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>13,041</td>
<td>106,369</td>
<td>9,206</td>
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<td><strong>Opium seized (kg)</strong></td>
<td>79,110</td>
<td>49,750</td>
<td>98,327</td>
<td>70,814</td>
<td>41,350</td>
<td>38,379</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>10,487</td>
<td>24,263</td>
<td>15,661</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Precursor chemicals seized (kg)</strong></td>
<td>93,031</td>
<td>20,397</td>
<td>122,150</td>
<td>130,846</td>
<td>36,250</td>
<td>53,184</td>
<td>234,981</td>
<td>42,314</td>
<td>89,878</td>
<td>15,649</td>
<td>836,880</td>
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Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2014 seizure of 135,000 kg of precursor chemicals. \footnote{Explanation of note.}

* Results for period 10/1/2017–6/15/2018.


Good Performers Initiative

The INL-funded Good Performers Initiative (GPI), launched in 2007, sought to incentivize provincial governors’ counternarcotics and supply-reduction activities by supporting sustainable, community-led development projects in provinces that significantly reduced or eliminated poppy cultivation. GPI projects included schools, road or bridge projects, irrigation structures, health clinics, and drug treatment centers among other projects. However, no new GPI projects were approved after April 30, 2016, and GPI is being phased out.

According to INL, the program was deemed “ineffectual at curbing opium cultivation” in those provinces receiving awards. MCN’s inability to adequately manage the program was also a factor in INL’s phasing it out. As of May 31, 2018, INL reported that 290 projects valued at $126.4 million have been contracted. Of those, 278 projects valued at $36.3 million have been completed and 12 valued at $78.3 million are still in progress. INL will continue to fund ongoing projects until their completion.

The number of poppy-free provinces increased from six at the beginning of the program in 2007 to 15 in 2013—the last year GPI funds were awarded.

INL launched an alternative-development project called Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL)
in August 2016. BADILL is expected to follow through on INL’s commitments to those provinces most affected by the GPI cancellation.806

According to INL, BADILL takes a community-based, alternative-development approach, rather than the GPI’s incentive-based approach. The GPI program targeted provincial leadership by providing a political incentive for top-down poppy reduction, and employed a general development approach. BADILL is working directly with small and marginal farmers to increase productivity and employment opportunities.807 INL expects that this approach will render the program more effective than GPI. More information on BADILL is available in the Alternative Development section, beginning on page 191.

**Regional Cooperation**
UNODC’s Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries, participated in the latest phase of Operation Channel, which ran from May 28 to June 1, 2018. Operation Channel is an annual multi-country law enforcement counternarcotics initiative coordinated under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Across the region, this phase of Operation Channel resulted in the seizure of more than five tons of illegal narcotics, and psychotropic and potent substances from illegal trafficking, including: 5,289 kg of opium, 416 kg of hashish, more than 83 kg of heroin, 169 kg of marijuana, and 5 kg of synthetic drugs.808

**Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity-Building**
Since 2008, INL has obligated $35.8 million and disbursed $27.7 million to build capacity at the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).809

To address deficiencies identified in the MCN’s financial-management system, INL is implementing a skills-based training grant and a financial-remediation plan contract through the Afghanistan Holding Group under MCN Capacity Building.810 INL has another capacity-building program under the Colombo Plan whereby Asian University for Women (AUW) fellows from Kabul are assigned to the MCN.811 Last year, the Colombo Plan selected the 10 AUW fellows and recruited the first MCN advisor assisting in revising the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP).812 The Colombo Plan hired an advisor for provincial affairs.813

The procurement and finance advisor positions remain open. According to INL, the training (being provided since 2016) has improved communication and coordination between the MCN and MOI, particularly since the arrival of the law-enforcement advisor, as well as improving English-language and computer proficiency of MCN personnel.814 The NDAP revision is working its way through the Afghan government clearance process and will be translated into English upon its completion.815

The MCN is mandated to publish annual reports on the implementation of the NDAP.816 INL reported last year that it had yet to receive the second

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**Colombo Plan:** Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) in 1950 with seven founding-member countries. It has since expanded to 26 member countries. INL supports the Colombo Plan’s Universal Treatment Curriculum, a national level training and certification system for drug-addiction counselors aimed at improving the delivery of drug treatment services in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

formal review of Afghanistan’s NDAP. According to INL, the MCN will provide a copy of the report once it has been cleared.817

INL provided $6.3 million this fiscal year in FY 2016 funds to the Colombo Plan, and $13.7 million from FY 2017.818

New Penal Code Implementation
SIGAR reported on the adoption of the new penal code last quarter. In effect since February 2018, the new code contains more counternarcotics provisions than the previous law. The U.S. government continues to provide advice and train investigators, prosecutors, and judges on its effective implementation.819 Five hundred cases using the CN provisions in the new penal code were adjudicated between April 1 and June 7, 2018.820

The new code favors prison terms over fines and now criminalizes behavior by public officials that would jeopardize official investigations. It authorizes confiscating assets (including land, structures, and vehicles) used in, or earned through, illicit drug production, and trafficking. For the first time, smuggling, distribution, and sale of psychotropic drugs, a category not previously covered by Afghanistan’s narcotics laws, has been criminalized.821

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement
INL has obligated $12.7 million and spent $11.9 million on its Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program since its inception in April 2013.822 CNCE funds communication and outreach programs aimed at discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use, and encouraging licit crops. According to INL, surveys indicate that the public messaging campaigns are having an increasing impact on Afghan attitudes about illicit narcotics.823 The public-health surveys conducted in 2014 indicate high exposure to antidrug messaging, particularly for messages related to health risks of drug use and addiction.824

Sayara Strategies, INL’s implementing partner, is completing its final reports. The program concluded at the end of last quarter and INL is finalizing terms for a follow-on public information program with smaller funding levels.825

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Opium-poppy cultivation increased significantly to an unprecedented high of 328,000 hectares in 2017 from an estimated 201,000 hectares in 2016. According to UNODC, the expanded areas under cultivation and good yields led to a near doubling of the potential opium production from its 2016 level of 4,800 tons to 9,000 tons.

There is no single reason for the massive cultivation increase. Farmers’ decisions to grow poppy are influenced by intricate motives and vary
regionally. Political instability, lack of government control, and security play a significant role. Scarcity of education, lack of quality, and limited access to markets and services also spur farmers in cultivating poppy. Some of these factors, or a combination, might be the source of the large poppy-cultivation increase in 2017. The Afghan government’s efforts against insurgents in densely populated areas may have rendered the rural population more vulnerable to insurgent or anti-government influence. For the past couple of years, opium-poppy cultivation greatly increased in northern areas of the country. The economic decline after the withdrawal of international troops as well as increasing poverty might have led farmers to cultivating poppy for their livelihood.826

Kandahar Food Zone
The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a five-year, $45.4 million, USAID-funded project implemented by Blumont Global Development. KFZ aims to address the drivers of poppy cultivation in Kandahar Province by rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, expanding alternative-livelihood opportunities, supporting small businesses, and building the capacity of the MCN to develop effective alternative-development policies.

USAID awarded a two-year extension in 2016 to continue work in targeted districts. Development activities include rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure and existing orchards and vineyards, creating new orchards and vineyards, promoting the cultivation of off-season horticulture, marketing high-value crops, and developing agribusiness.827 Zharey was selected by USAID because it was among the highest poppy-cultivating districts in the province when the program began in 2013. UNODC reported 7,017 ha of poppy-cultivation in that district in 2013. Cultivation did decrease in 2014 and 2015, but increased to 7,065 hectares in 2017. Zharey remains the second highest poppy-cultivating district of Kandahar.828 USAID started no new interventions in Maywand, another previously targeted district, since June 2017 due to security conditions and the agency’s approach to support activities in government controlled areas.829

During the second quarter of FY 2018, KFZ rehabilitated 28 kilometers of three canals; trained and distributed vegetable seed to 358 vineyard farmers; replanted 48,000 pomegranate saplings; provided technical assistance to 330 farm women; increased fruit exports by $35,472 and national sales by $43,200. KFZ also provided quality-control and project-management training to 50 MCN officials; demonstrated farm- and water-management techniques to Provincial Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (PAIL) and District Agriculture Offices; and completed 85 percent of data collection for the 2018 farm survey.830

This being the program’s final year of implementation, KFZ completed activities in Kandahar by May 30, 2018. Canal-maintenance responsibilities were turned over to farmers and mirabs; water allocation and scheduling

**Mirab:** persons elected by water users and landowners to be responsible for allocating water from canals to farm fields and for routine and emergency canal maintenance and repairs. Farmers pay them annual fees for surface irrigation water. They organize labor provided by farmers and landowners to clean canals, collect fees for minor canal repairs, and supervise the repairs.

Source: USAID, Kandahar Food Zone Program (KFZ) Year 5 Work Plan, August 31, 2017 to August 31, 2018, 1/20/2018, pp. 20, 22.
to the Directorate of Arghandab River Sub Basin Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; technical support to farmers to the PAIL; and greenhouses to their respective owners. As of July 9, 2018, USAID has disbursed $44.5 million for the program.

Regional Agricultural Development Program

USAID’s Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are ongoing in the eastern and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. Using a value-chain approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.

USAID terminated RADP-South at the end of its fourth year; the program had not met its productivity and income targets. RADP-West was terminated after nearly two years, according to USAID, in order to align its remaining resources more closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock’s new strategic plans for the western region. Both regions will be covered by new contracts arising out of the Afghanistan Value Chains (AVC)–Crops and AVC–Livestock programs. AVC-Crops is currently under procurement. USAID awarded the AVC-Livestock contract to DAI Global in June, with $34.7 million for the base period and $21 million for the option period.

As shown in Table 3.25, USAID funding for all RADP programs, targeting various regions of the country amounts to approximately $283.6 million and USAID has spent $192.9 million as of July 9, 2018.

### SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR conducted a performance audit of USAID’s Regional Agricultural Development Program, entitled Additional Evaluations and Assessments Could Improve the Performance and Sustainability of USAID/Afghanistan’s $301 million Program. SIGAR found that USAID has not consistently monitored or evaluated whether RADP is meeting its goals and mission objectives, and has yet to complete a required mid-term evaluation of the program. More information is found in Section 2 of this report.

### TABLE 3.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 7/9/2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADP-East</td>
<td>7/21/2016</td>
<td>7/20/2021</td>
<td>$28,126,111</td>
<td>$7,496,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADP-North</td>
<td>5/21/2014</td>
<td>5/20/2019</td>
<td>78,429,714</td>
<td>53,478,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADP-South*</td>
<td>10/7/2013</td>
<td>11/20/2017</td>
<td>111,414,339</td>
<td>105,483,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADP-West*</td>
<td>8/10/2014</td>
<td>10/25/2016</td>
<td>65,629,170</td>
<td>26,394,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$283,599,334</strong></td>
<td><strong>$192,852,590</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Denotes inactive programs. Afghanistan Value Chains-Crops and Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock will target regions previously served by inactive RADP programs.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR call, 7/12/2018.

Value-chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing, transportation, and wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.
RADP-East
RADP-East (RADP-E) is USAID’s five-year, $28.1 million program designed to expand sustainable agriculture-led economic growth in Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Wardak, and Kabul Provinces. RADP-E is scheduled to run through July 2021. RADP-E works with the private sector to identify constraints to business and value-chain performance, and implement market-based solutions. RADP-E aims to increase the sales of agricultural goods and services by $57 million by the final year of the program.  

During April 2018, RADP-E activities granted 35 active market-development grants valued at $1,230,488. Grantees invested $628,769. The marketing team coordinated with USAID’s CHAMP program regarding trade missions of Afghan agribusinesses to Delhi and Mumbai in July and September 2018. RADP-E conducted access to finance training for women to strengthen coordination between lending institutions and program beneficiaries and clients. The implementer found no significant issues during its 26 site-monitoring visits.

According to USAID, over 1,800 households benefited from interventions between January and March 2018: 711 farmers and 19 agro-enterprises applied new technologies or improved management practices; 83 new linkages have been established (signed contracts or verified transactions). Seventeen percent of program beneficiaries in grants and activities were women. The program created 294 full-time employment positions, and exported over $324,400-worth of agricultural commodities. As of July 9, 2018, USAID has disbursed $7.5 million for RADP-E.

RADP-North
RADP-North (RADP-N) is USAID’s five-year, $78.4 million program scheduled to end in May 2019. RADP-N invests in increased sustainability and
profitability of wheat, high-value crops, and livestock value chains in
the rural areas of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and
Samangan Provinces. During the second quarter of this fiscal year,
RADP-N issued 20 grants, valued at $1.8 million, to local partners and
implemented 11 activities such as laser-land-levelling and business-market
linkages. The latter resulted in over $5.8 million in sales from companies
participating in GulFood 2018 trade show held February 18–22 in Dubai.

A large segment of the rural population in northern Afghanistan depends
on livestock for their livelihoods. Many lack technical knowledge about
common issues like diseases, vaccinations, and general animal husbandry.
RADP-N is leading an initiative to establish 15 new Veterinary Field Units
(VFUs) in the target provinces. VFUs are organized and led by veterinarians,
or paraveterinarians, commonly called paravets. Becoming a paravet
involves a six-month intensive training program. The program covers both
theoretical and practical aspects of animal health care, and also the busi-
ness of providing veterinary services in remote areas.

Throughout the quarter, RADP-N trained 15 paravets (10 men and five
women) on livestock diagnosis, treatment, and livestock internal diseases.
These 15 paravets in turn trained 400 men and 200 women on livestock
quality feed, preventive animal health, and livestock health management.
Twenty paravets vaccinated around 5,000 small ruminants, such as sheep
and goats, during a vaccination campaign.

During the second quarter, RADP-N also trained eight organizations to
develop their capacity to pass a USAID pre-award assessment to qualify
for direct grants from USAID or other donors. The program also assisted
30 women to establish a noodle factory. Six companies exported over a
thousand tons of dried fruit and nuts valued at $2.2 million to India, Iraq,
Turkey, the Netherlands, and the United Arab Emirates. These sales were
linked to previous trade shows (WorldFood Istanbul 2017 and World Food
India 2017). USAID affirmed that this year's drought had not impacted
RADP-North activities.

As of July 9, 2018, USAID has disbursed $53.5 million for RADP-N.

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program
The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP)
program is a USAID-funded $71.3 million program designed to boost agri-
cultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and
decrease poppy production. The program started in February 2010 and
is scheduled to end in December 2019. CHAMP now focuses on developing
the capacity of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector to increase exports
of high-value crops and remove impediments to their trade. The program
ensures that women and women-owned businesses receive significant
program support and have access to the resources needed to integrate
into the mainstream agricultural sector. USAID modified the agreement in

Paraveterinarian or paravet: a
community-based animal health worker
who provides initial diagnosis and basic
treatment of animals.

Source: A. Catley, T. Leyland, et al., “Para-veterinary profes-
sionals and the development of quality, self-sustaining
community-based services,” Revue scientifique et technique
(International Office of Epizootics), 2004, pp. 225–226,
229, 230.
December 2017 concentrating activities on supply chain, marketing, and export of Afghan fresh and dry fruits and nuts to international markets. The program has trade offices in New Delhi, Dubai, and most recently, in Almaty, Kazakhstan.848

Between January and March 2018, CHAMP helped Afghan traders export 3,300 metric tons of saffron, nuts, and dried fruits, valued at $14.3 million, to Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, the United States, and The Netherlands.849 CHAMP sponsored the participation of 25 Afghan exhibitors at the 2018 GulFood Exhibition in Dubai in February, generating $12.1 million in signed contracts and $8.4 million in potential deals for Afghan exporters. Five metric tons of Afghan vegetables and fruit were exported into Almaty during this period. CHAMP also supported seven female traders at the National Farmers’ Festival and Ag Fair held in Kabul March 21–24.850

The newly opened Almaty trade office experienced some challenges during the reporting period due to tariffs and trade. Kazakhstan charges unexpectedly high tariffs on Afghan products. When the trade office completed its first import of Afghan produce, it found that Kazakh customs assesses tariffs based not on the actual sale price, but on its own standard commodity price. For instance, the trade office facilitated the import of Afghan zucchini invoiced at $0.20 per kg. Kazakh customs valued the shipment at $1.22 per kg and assessed a value-added tax of 12 percent and customs tariff of 10 percent based on this value rather than the actual purchase price. According to USAID, while the duty and value-added tax are not unusual, the practice of taking the commercial price invoice and applying the Kazakh market price for the same product and then applying duty and value-added tax for Afghan products is unusual. This was performed mostly for air shipments and not on products shipped over land. According to USAID, unless rectified through governmental channels, this will impair the competitiveness of Afghan produce and trade in the Kazakh market.851

As of July 9, 2018, USAID has disbursed $55.6 million.852

Promoting Value Chains—Western Afghanistan

USAID signed an agreement with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in 2017 to implement Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan. This three-year, $19 million program will support agribusiness and livestock development in Badghis, Farah, Herat, and Nimroz Provinces. Program beneficiaries will include small and medium enterprises, input suppliers, private service providers, traders, millers, processors, and producer groups. The program aims to benefit nearly 40,000 small-farm owners from 5,700 enterprise households.853

Major activities for the first year will focus on Herat Province, with limited activities in the other three provinces. Full activities in Badghis, Farah, and Nimroz Provinces will begin in the second year. For the first year,
15 districts were selected based on the presence of production and processing facilities for targeted crops, as well as access and security. A rapid value-chain assessment was conducted in the fall of 2017 and identified constraints and areas where interventions are needed. Packaging, quality control, and market linkages were identified as constraints on all value chains, and contamination was identified for some high-value-crops such as saffron and pistachios. Private sector beneficiaries were also selected for a project innovation fund (PIF). The first group of PIF-supported projects was selected in June 2018. The PIF is expected to stimulate investments in private agribusinesses that will develop and promote new markets and sales for agricultural inputs and products. The guidelines contain specific areas of support for each value chain and the amount of support each chosen stakeholder will receive according to specific outputs. Training of agribusiness on product certification, quality, and safety standards began in May.

**Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods**

Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL) is a $20 million INL-funded program implemented by UNODC to strengthen and diversify licit livelihoods of small and marginal farmers by supporting horticultural value chains. BADILL is implemented in 13 provinces and aims to reach 50,000 households in four years. The program, formerly named Strengthen and Diversify Licit Livelihoods through Alternative Development Interventions, upholds INL’s commitments to the provinces most impacted by the cancellation of the Good Performers Initiative program. INL transferred its entire $20 million BADILL contribution to UNODC in late 2016.

This quarter spanned the crop-cultivation season. BADILL distributed saplings along with dairy and poultry inputs in all target provinces, with
nearly 2,000 farmers receiving inputs. A total of 15,000 saplings were distributed to 224 farmers to establish 150 orchards in Helmand and 75 orchards in Uruzgan. Local officials and farmers have said pistachio is a good alternative to opium poppy. However, SIGAR has found that the provision of inputs like saplings or establishment of orchards does not always translate into lasting shifts away from poppy production. This makes accurate monitoring and evaluation, such as that provided by GIS analysis, critical to determine the program’s success.

Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development
INL has obligated and disbursed $17.8 million for its Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD) project: $2.8 million to UNODC and $15 million to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), its two implementing partners. The program aims to improve household income while reducing dependency on poppy cultivation for selected communities. In FY 2017, INL obligated an additional $9.3 million for CBARD-West in September and $22.1 million to UNDP for a new project, CBARD-East.

CBARD-West
CBARD-West aims to test alternative livelihoods to opium-poppy cultivation in Farah and Badghis Provinces. In addition to supporting local farmers with field schools, CBARD-West will develop and strengthen existing public and private agro-business infrastructure in the areas of irrigation, transportation, and agricultural value-chain facilities.

During the second quarter of FY 2018, the project trained 89 people (including 17 women) on business development, project monitoring and
implementation, and the concept of value-chain and agribusiness development. The trainings are expected to increase the local beneficiaries' capacity to establish businesses, monitor projects, and work on high-value crops. Furthermore, 279 households reportedly benefitted from various program-funded infrastructure, including greenhouses, raisin houses, and irrigation. The infrastructure will increase income and improve accessibility to markets, according to UNDP. The irrigation infrastructures help protect 806 hectares and irrigate 2,276 hectares of land, which improves access to water and water management. Approximately 6,500 households are said to benefit from these efforts.865

USAID's implementing partner reported that security, community traditions, and the remoteness of the target provinces will present challenges in working with women. CBARD-West will address this challenge by establishing kitchen gardens and home-based greenhouses to ensure women's involvement in producing high-value crops. Forty-five women received kitchen gardens between January and March 2018. The small kitchen gardens provide vegetables like okra, eggplant, sponge gourd, pepper, lettuce, and cauliflower for household consumption.866 The gardens are constructed within the premises of houses so women can easily work there.

**CBARD-East**

CBARD-East aims to reduce the overall poverty rate in Nangarhar by 2 percent. The program started in January 2018. This quarter, CBARD-East recruited a program team and established their office. So far this year, the program selected more than 1,000 beneficiaries and performed a security assessment of the 100 selected target communities. The security assessment found that all of the communities have functional community development councils to partner with. In addition to operational preparations, the project finalized contracts valued at $1.5 million with 39 communities to establish 195 greenhouses. The greenhouses are expected to increase incomes and improve the livelihoods of 195 households. According to UNDP, since CBARD-East is building on its sister project CBARD-West, the project established 65 hectares of orchards from local varieties of citrus fruits, peach, persimmon, and pomegranate to help increase the income of 187 households.867

The program prioritized recruitment of female staff and highly encouraged female applicants to apply for project employment opportunities. However, due to the remoteness and security status of the project, no female candidates have expressed interest. Currently, only one of the 23 recruited staff members is female. However, six female lead farmers were identified to address this problem.868

As with CBARD-West, USAID's implementing partner reported that security, community traditions, and the remoteness of the target provinces will present challenges in working with women. CBARD-East will address this
challenge by establishing kitchen gardens and home-based greenhouses to ensure women’s involvement in the production of high-value crops.869

**DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION**

A 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey conservatively estimated that roughly 11 percent of the population would test positive for one or more drugs, including 5.3 percent of the urban population and 13 percent of the rural population. Drug use among women and children is among the highest documented worldwide, and 30.6 percent of households tested positive for some form of illicit drug.870

According to the latest *World Drug Report*, opioids continue to cause the most harm, accounting for 76 percent of drug-related deaths worldwide.871 During 2017, Afghan officials noted an increase in the amount of precursor chemicals trafficked into the country.872 INL says, inadequate border security and weak enforcement capacity hamper control of precursor chemicals that are used to produce drugs.873

The United States is helping Afghanistan face this public-health crisis by funding a new rural treatment program to expand substance-abuse treatment to the hardest-hit local communities. According to INL, the demand for treatment and prevention services far exceeds the capacity of the centers, most of which have extensive waiting lists for new patients.874

The United States also supports UNODC’s global child-addiction program to develop protocols for treating opioid-addicted children, training treatment staff, and delivering services through NGOs.875 The United States also funds an antidrug curriculum in Afghan schools, which has trained over 1,900 teachers and reached over 600,000 students in 900 schools.876 INL provides assistance for substance abuse treatment programs in Afghanistan through the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme, which includes residential, outpatient, and outreach programs. INL also supports the Colombo Plan with training and certification of drug addiction counselors.877

INL also started a pilot rural treatment program in June 2017 in Jowzjan and Laghman Provinces. Its activities, however, have been delayed due to security and winter weather. Implementing partners are negotiating memoranda of understanding with the Afghan government.878

Since 2015, INL has transitioned responsibility for 42 of 86 U.S.-funded drug treatment centers in Afghanistan to the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH): 14 of the centers transitioned over to the MOPH as of January 2018.879

This quarter, INL provided the final draft of the transition plan to all stakeholders at the end of July 2018 and announced budget cuts for 2019. INL will implement a 15 percent cut for the remaining NGO-managed drug treatment centers, 50 percent cut for the MOPH drug treatment centers,
and a 25 percent funding reduction for the 14 drug treatment centers transitioned in January 2018. The remaining treatment centers are scheduled to transition by the end of 2019. The MOPH developed a plan to modify the size of some treatment centers and programs. For instance, some residential centers will become outpatient centers and some residential centers will merge. UNODC neared completion of their quality-assurance report on drug-demand reduction that had been expected in early 2018. Results were announced at a stakeholders meeting in Jakarta.

Most of the patients at the remaining treatment centers are adult males. Of the 86 facilities, 66 are residential and 20 are outpatient centers; 31 are dedicated to female clients. Among the residential treatment centers, 44 also offer home-based services. The residential treatment centers comprise 40 centers for adult males, eight for adult females, eight for children, five for adolescent males, and five for adolescent females. Twelve of the 44 home-based programs provide services to adult females. INL has obligated approximately $156.9 million for the Colombo Plan since 2008.

During this quarter, INL provided the following funds to various Colombo Plan drug treatment programs:

- $346,545 to the Outcome Evaluation of the Drug Treatment Programme
- $4,447,103 to the Assistance to Specialized Substance Use Disorders Treatment Facilities
- $1,457,948 to the Colombo Plan’s Afghanistan Field Office Support program

INL also provided $355,271 to UNODC’s Preventing Illicit Drug Use and Treating Drug Use Disorders for Children and Adolescents program.