

SECURITY CONTENTS

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SECURITY

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

This quarter the commander of NATO's Resolute Support mission and United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), General John Nicholson, said the security situation in Afghanistan can best be characterized by "talking and fighting." He added that "violence and progress can coexist" while both sides of the conflict work toward peace. The situation reflects the cornerstone of the U.S. administration's South Asia strategy for American forces and their Afghan and Coalition counterparts: to increase pressure on the insurgency on the battlefield in order to compel them to negotiate and, eventually, to reconcile with the Afghan government.⁸¹

Two main events have shaped the "talking" aspect of this equation: first, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's late-February offer to the Taliban to engage in peace talks "without preconditions," and second, the June 9–12, 2018, ceasefire between the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Taliban over the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which led to widely publicized scenes of Afghan soldiers and insurgents socializing and embracing.⁸²

While there was no formal Taliban response to President Ghani's offer of talks, General Nicholson attributed that to "a robust dialogue going on inside the Taliban" over pursuing reconciliation, which he said showed "tremendous potential" to advance the peace process. General Nicholson cast this as a promising development, coupled with a reduction in enemy-initiated violence from late February through late April, which he said was down 30 percent from the average of the same periods in the previous five years.⁸³

In late April, however, security incidents increased. United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said the Taliban's April 25 annual-offensive announcement coincided with a significant uptick in violence, beginning with over 50 security incidents in 21 provinces on the day of the announcement. Despite President Ghani's offer of peace talks, the UN noted that in this year's announcement, unlike last year's, the Taliban referred directly to the South Asia strategy and focused almost entirely on their military plan and not on their governance and political objectives.⁸⁴ Acknowledging the increased violence, General Nicholson said enemy-initiated violence after late April was still 10–12 percent below the five-year average, and that the Taliban had generally shifted to attacking "more remote district centers" to avoid more frequent U.S. air strikes. He also

"A series of brutal attacks in early 2018 made the task of bringing about a negotiated settlement to the [Afghan] conflict both more difficult and more urgent."

—UN Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres

Source: UN, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, report of the Secretary-General, 6/6/2018, p. 13.

noted that over the spring, the ANDSF had defeated 80 percent of enemy attacks on district centers, and that the ANDSF retook the five district centers captured in the other attacks, “some of them within hours, and the longest one . . . [within] 10 days.”⁸⁵

The main exception to the ANDSF’s spring success was the Taliban’s mid-May assault on Farah City, the capital of Farah Province, their first sizeable incursion into a provincial capital since 2016. The Taliban overran eight police checkpoints before temporarily seizing several government and ANDSF buildings in the city. The UN said the attack “lasted for several days before the Taliban was eventually repelled by the ANDSF with international air support.” USFOR-A said ANDSF and Coalition forces converged on Farah quickly and expelled the enemy from the city within 24 hours, pursuing them in the days that followed. USFOR-A added that operational reporting from the ANDSF and NATO Resolute Support (RS) intelligence and imagery collection clearly showed the limits of the insurgents’ advance: the insurgents never had control of a significant portion of the city, as they did over portions of Kunduz in 2015 and 2016.⁸⁶

The Taliban’s bold operation had significant consequences: using intelligence data, USFOR-A conducted precision strikes on Taliban leadership in multiple locations from mid- to late-May. One strike on a May 24 meeting of Taliban commanders gathered at a command and control base in Musa Qala, inflicted more than 50 casualties, including key provincial-level Taliban leaders from Kandahar, Herat, Farah, Uruzgan, and Helmand Provinces. General Nicholson said of the strikes, “As we continue the season of fighting and talking, we will continue to increase pressure on the Taliban and remain vigilant to opportunities for negotiated peace.”⁸⁷

On June 7, President Ghani decided to commence a unilateral ceasefire with the Taliban from June 12 to 20. The Taliban responded by announcing on June 9 that they would honor a three-day ceasefire with Afghan forces over Eid al-Fitr, a celebration marking the end of Ramadan. However, when



A U.S. strike makes impact on a May 24 Taliban commanders’ meeting in Musa Qala, Helmand Province. (Screenshot of a U.S. Air Force Central Command video)

President Ghani declared a 10-day extension of the ceasefire on June 16, the Taliban refused to reciprocate and began to regroup and launch attacks. As the Afghan government ended its unilateral ceasefire extension on June 30, President Ghani assessed that the three-day coinciding ceasefires had been “98 percent successful.” He said it was the Taliban’s turn to give a positive response to another ceasefire, and signaled that the Afghan government would be prepared to extend one when the Taliban is ready.⁸⁸

The ceasefire did not include the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, which continued to be very active over the quarter. General Nicholson said a recent increase in IS-K attacks had somewhat offset the reduction of violence seen in the country overall. In a major push against IS-K in June, U.S. and Afghan special forces reportedly killed more than 160 IS-K militants in Deh Bala District in Nangarhar Province, one of their few remaining strongholds. A U.S. Special Forces commander said the operation denied IS-K a staging area for conducting operations in southern Nangarhar and high-profile attacks in Kabul; but after U.S. and Afghan special forces left, local officials worried about holding the district without proper security reinforcements to prevent IS-K from reinfiltrating.⁸⁹

The UN reported in early June that IS-K claimed responsibility for 11 mass-casualty suicide attacks this spring. One attack on April 30 in Kabul included two suicide bombings near the U.S. embassy and Resolute Support headquarters that left at least 25 people dead, including nine journalists, and 45 injured.⁹⁰ General Nicholson emphasized in late May that the ANDSF had successfully thwarted other attacks on Afghanistan’s capital and that a “full-court press” continued to harden security in Kabul to prevent the types of mass atrocities that have recently plagued the city.⁹¹ For details on high-profile attacks that occurred this quarter, see page 77.

In a statement after an unannounced visit to Afghanistan on July 9, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said, “The progress we’ve made in the South Asia strategy in increasing the size and the capability of the Afghan security forces, in strengthening the reforms inside the Afghan government; the work that we have done to demonstrate to the Taliban that the continuation of fighting will lead them to a bad outcome . . . those are hallmarks of real progress.”⁹² However, this quarter’s ANDSF data shows mixed results at best on these measures of progress. As of May 15, the ANDSF failed to improve its control over Afghanistan’s districts, population, and territory since last quarter: instead, district and territorial control became slightly more contested between the government and the insurgency.⁹³ In addition, according to Afghan-reported force-strength data, the ANDSF may have increased in size since last quarter to 314,242 personnel, but the force has lost 8,500 personnel since April 2017, and 5,353 since April 2016. The ANDSF is currently at only 89.3 percent of its goal strength (352,000), being short 37,758 personnel.⁹⁴

“There is cause for cautious optimism and evidence that the president’s South Asia strategy is working. . . . The most dramatic evidence of this manifested recently when our conditions-based approach allowed [President Ghani and] the ANDSF to set up the conditions for the . . . nationwide ceasefire. Although the ceasefire was temporary, all parties respected the terms, and there were no reported breaches.”

—General Joseph Votel,
commander of U.S.
Central Command

Source: Military.com, “General Views Taliban Cease-Fire with ‘Cautious Optimism,’” 7/19/2018.



LTG Austin Miller testifies before the Senate at his nomination hearing on June 19. (Screenshot of a DVIDS video)

Also this quarter, the U.S. Senate confirmed Lieutenant General Austin Miller to replace General Nicholson as commander of NATO's RS mission and of USFOR-A. Lieutenant General Miller currently leads the Joint Special Operations Command, part of the U.S. Special Operations Command, and is expected to take General Nicholson's place in September.⁹⁵

In a prepared statement for his confirmation hearing, Lieutenant General Miller expressed views similar to General Nicholson's on key aspects of the Afghan security situation: that reconciliation cannot be compelled without addressing regional powers' continued enabling of the insurgency; military pressure alone is not enough to solve the Afghan conflict; IS-K, although degraded, continues to threaten Afghanistan's security; and U.S. and Coalition training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF is vital to convincing the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield, and to enabling the Afghan government to secure a critical mass of its population.⁹⁶

ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

USFOR-A newly classified or continued to classify the following data:

- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- Corps- and zone-level Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) authorized goal and assigned (actual) strength, except for Afghan Local Police (ALP) and ANDSF female and medical personnel, who were exempted and are reported
- Exact ANA and ANP attrition figures
- General performance assessments for the ANA, ANP, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) **[newly classified]**
- Detailed performance assessments for the ANA, ANP, MOD, and MOI
- Information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment
- Information about the Special Mission Wing (SMW), including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, the percentage breakdown of counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions flown, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- Some information about the number of targets associated with Taliban financing and the financial assessment of revenue denied to the insurgency as a result of U.S. air strikes

USFOR-A determined the following data was unclassified but not publicly releasable:

- Reporting on anticorruption efforts from the MOI
- Detailed information about the security benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact

USFOR-A declassified or made releasable the following data this quarter:

- Exact ANDSF medical-personnel strength (authorized and assigned)

- The number of counternarcotics-related strikes conducted by USFOR-A since the beginning of that campaign, the effectiveness of those strikes, and the number of drug labs destroyed
- Some information about the number of targets associated with Taliban financing and the financial assessment of revenue denied to the insurgency as a result of the air strikes

SIGAR continues to urge transparency in data relating to the security aspects of Afghanistan reconstruction. A classified annex to this report will cover information DOD has determined to be classified or not publicly releasable.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY

As of June 30, 2018, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$78.2 billion to support the ANDSF. This accounts for 62 percent of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since FY 2002.⁹⁷ Of the \$4.7 billion appropriated for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2018, \$2.3 billion had been obligated and \$2 billion disbursed as of June 30, 2018.⁹⁸

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. Additionally, ASFF supports the ALP, which falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund. Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.⁹⁹


According to DOD, the majority of ASFF funds are executed using DOD contracts to equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF. Another major use of ASFF is for ANA salaries and ALP personnel costs, which are paid via accounts at Afghanistan's central bank. The Ministry of Finance then transfers funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted requests.¹⁰⁰ However, unlike the ANA, the ANP's personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development Programme's multi donor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), of which the United States is the largest contributor.¹⁰¹

DISTRICT, POPULATION, AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL

While the Afghan government halted the insurgency's momentum in gaining control of Afghanistan's districts, population, and territory this quarter, it failed to improve its own areas of control: instead, district and territorial control became slightly more contested between the government and the insurgency.¹⁰²

FIGURE 3.26

HISTORICAL DISTRICT CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN



Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/27/2015, 1/29/2016, 5/28/2016, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, and 6/22/2018; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.

“The [Afghan] conflict has been essentially stalemated for about a decade now, and I don’t see any indication on the ground or from what I know about dynamics behind the scenes that suggest that the stalemate is going to be broken.”

—Laurel Miller, former Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Source: RAND Corporation, “A Way Forward in Afghanistan: Q&A with Laurel Miller,” 6/21/2018, accessed online at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2018/06/a-way-forward-in-afghanistan-qa-with-laurel-miller.html>.

District Control

According to RS, using Afghanistan’s 407 districts as the unit of assessment, as of May 15, 2018, there were 229 districts under Afghan government control (74) or influence (155), 56.3 percent of the total number of districts. This represents no change in district control since last quarter, but it is a slight decline from the 57 percent reported in May 2017. The number of contested districts—controlled by neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency—increased by three this quarter to 122 districts, which means 30 percent of Afghanistan’s districts are now contested.¹⁰³


For more information on how RS assesses government and insurgent control and influence, please see SIGAR’s April 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.¹⁰⁴

Insurgent control or influence of Afghanistan’s districts declined for the first time since August 2016: there were 56 districts under insurgent control (11) or influence (45), a decrease of three districts since last quarter. Therefore, RS now assesses 13.8 percent of Afghanistan’s districts to be under insurgent control or influence, a roughly one percentage-point increase from the same period last year.¹⁰⁵

Since SIGAR began receiving district-control data in November 2015, Afghan government control and influence over its districts has declined by about 16 percentage points; contested districts have increased by nine

FIGURE 3.27

HISTORICAL POPULATION CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN



Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 5/28/2016, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, and 6/22/2018; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.

points; and insurgent control or influence has risen by nearly seven points.¹⁰⁶ Figure 3.26 reflects how little district control has changed since May 2017.

Population Control

As with district measures, the Afghan government’s control or influence over the population showed no improvement this quarter. According to RS, as of May 15, 2018, about 65 percent of the population (21.7 million of an estimated 33.3 million total) lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence, the same percentage as last quarter. The insurgency continued to control or influence areas where roughly 12 percent of the population (3.9 million people) lived, unchanged for the last two quarters, while the population living in contested areas (7.7 million people) remained at 23 percent, the same percentage as last quarter.¹⁰⁷

However, this quarter’s population-control figures show a slight deterioration from the same period last year, when the Afghan government controlled or influenced roughly the same percentage of the population, while the insurgents controlled only 11 percent.¹⁰⁸ The goal of the Afghan government is to control or influence territory in which 80 percent of the population (26.6 million people) live by the end of 2019.¹⁰⁹

As seen in Figure 3.27, since SIGAR began receiving population-control data in August 2016, the overall trend has been a decrease in the percentage

Control Metrics

Different types of metrics can be and are often used to assist in operational assessment and decision-making during the conduct of a wide variety of military operations. At least three major metrics can be used in judging government-versus-insurgency control in Afghanistan. They measure different factors, need not be parallel indicators, and may have different implications for progress assessments and decision-making. In no special order, these metrics are:

District Control: Whether a government has effective control at the district level bears on its ability to assert its sovereignty within direct sight of the people, deliver public services like health and education, provide policing, and operate the instruments of governance in ways that improve public perceptions of its legitimacy and effectiveness.

Population Control: From a hearts-and-minds point of view and for the ability to monitor and suppress insurgent activity, controlling one district with a large population might be more important than controlling three with only a few, scattered villages. On the other hand, a government might have statistically verified control of every district within its borders; but if, say, 33 percent of the population were disaffected or actively supportive of insurgents, that government could still face a critical threat to its viability—especially if the nonsupportive citizens are in compact groups that facilitate communication, recruitment, and planning of antigovernment operations.

Territorial/Land-Area Control: Sheer control of land area, regardless of governance structures or resident population, can be an important metric, especially if hostile elements assert control over areas containing important agricultural land (including revenue-producing poppy fields), transportation corridors and bottlenecks, electric transmission, watersheds, or mineral reserves. Area control also facilitates movement and staging of forces, government or hostile, for active operations.

All three metrics are important to ascertain and assess, individually and in concert. That they are not synonymous or parallel can be easily seen, for example, in SIGAR's quarterly report of April 30, 2017. The security section of that report presented data from USFOR-A showing that at the time, insurgents controlled 2.7 percent of Afghanistan's districts, but 9.2 percent of the population, and 16.2 percent of the land area. Which indicator is most significant is not prima facie evident, and their comparative significance might vary with changing concerns and objectives as time passes. In any case, drawing broad conclusions from any or all of these macro-level indicators is best done with the caveat that they may contain granular but important variations in underlying detail.

Source: Analysis by SIGAR Research and Analysis Directorate staff and by SIGAR Special Advisor Lieutenant General John F. Goodman, USMC (Ret.), 4/2018.

of the Afghan population living in areas under government control or influence (by about four percentage points), fluctuation in the population living in contested areas (from roughly 23 percent to 29 percent), and an increase in percentage living in areas under insurgent control or influence (by about three points).¹¹⁰ Similar to district control, the historical record of population control reflects only minimal change in control since May 2017.

RS identified the provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with four of its six districts and 53 percent of the population under insurgent control or influence; Kunduz Province (five of seven districts, 62 percent of the population); and Helmand Province (nine of 14 districts, 56 percent of the population). The numbers of districts in each of these provinces that are under insurgent control or influence have remained unchanged for the last two quarters. RS noted that the provincial centers of all of Afghanistan’s provinces are under Afghan government control or influence.¹¹¹

Territorial Control

As seen in Table 3.5, RS reported that the Afghan government controlled or influenced 376,685 square kilometers (58.5 percent) of Afghanistan’s total land area of roughly 643,788 square kilometers, down about one percentage point since last quarter. The insurgency controlled or influenced 124,694 square kilometers (19.4 percent) of the total land area, also down one point since last quarter. The remaining 142,409 square kilometers (22.1 percent) was contested by the government and insurgents, a nearly two percentage-point increase since last quarter.¹¹²

As seen in Figure 3.28 on the next page, RS provided a map showing Afghan government control or influence and insurgent activity by district. Map categories of “insurgent control” or “insurgent influence” have changed to “insurgent activity” and “high insurgent activity.” RS explained that the change was not due to adopting new methodology for district-control assessments, but was adopted only to make the map unclassified and publicly releasable. For the other district-control data, as included above, RS used the original terms.¹¹³

TABLE 3.5


| GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT CONTROL WITHIN AFGHANISTAN AS OF MAY 15, 2018 | | | | | | |
|---|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| Control Status | Districts | | Population | | Territory | |
| | Number | % | In millions | % | Sq Km | % |
| GOVERNMENT | | | | | | |
| Control | 74 | 18% | 11.4 | 34% | 104,243 | 16% |
| Influence | 155 | 38% | 10.3 | 31% | 272,442 | 42% |
| CONTESTED | 122 | 30% | 7.7 | 23% | 142,409 | 22% |
| INSURGENT | | | | | | |
| Control | 11 | 3% | 0.6 | 2% | 38,441 | 6% |
| Influence | 45 | 11% | 3.3 | 10% | 86,253 | 13% |
| Total | 407 | 100% | 33.3 | 100% | 643,788 | 100% |

Note: Sq Km = square kilometers. Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. Territory figures have been rounded to the nearest square kilometer.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018; SIGAR, analysis of USFOR-A-provided data, 6/2018.

FIGURE 3.28

RESOLUTE SUPPORT-DEFINED DISTRICT CONTROL, AS OF MAY 15, 2018



Note: GIROA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. INS = Insurgent. The population data depicted here reflects how the Afghan population is dispersed throughout the country. However, the entire population of a given area is not necessarily under the district-stability level indicated. A district is assigned its district-stability level based on the overall trend of land-area/population control of each district as a whole. The district-stability levels listed in the key of this map do not correspond exactly to the categories used in RS's June 2018 narrative response for district control (i.e. High INS Activity vs. Insurgent Control).

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018.

What is ACLED?

The ACLED project collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all political violence and protest events across Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East reported in open, secondary sources.

What are "Violent Events"?

ACLED codes the event data it collects as "violent events" or "nonviolent events." It defines a violent event as "a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups toward a political end, although some nonviolent instances—including protests and strategic developments—are included in the dataset to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict." The types of violent events ACLED codes include: (1) Battle–No Change in Territory, (2) Battle–Non-State Actor Overtakes Territory, (3) Battle–Government Regains Territory, (4) Violence against Civilians, and (5) Remote Violence (such as bombings, IED attacks, mortar and missile attacks, etc.).

Source: ACLED, "About ACLED: What is ACLED?," "ACLED Methodology," and "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8 (2017)," pp. 6–8, accessed online on 7/10/2018, available at <https://www.acleddata.com/>.

Violent Events and District Stability


For the first time this quarter, SIGAR conducted an analysis of violent-event data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), "a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis-mapping project" funded by the State Department.¹¹⁴

SIGAR used ACLED's data to provide a district-level analysis of violent incidents across Afghanistan from February 1, 2018, to May 31, 2018. SIGAR overlaid its ACLED analysis with its RS-provided district-stability data (as of May 15, 2018) and has presented the results in map form, shown in Figure 3.29.

SIGAR's analysis found that 8 percent of ACLED-recorded incident-days were in districts assessed as Afghan government-controlled, 28 percent were in districts assessed as Afghan government-influenced, 45 percent were in districts assessed as contested, 19 percent were in districts

FIGURE 3.29

VIOLENT EVENTS AND DISTRICT CONTROL, FEBRUARY 1-MAY 31, 2018



Note: SIGAR used ArcGIS Pro 2.2 for this analysis. A FEWS NET 2017 district shapefile, containing 401 districts, was used to aggregate RS-provided district control data and ACLED violent incident data. Since RS uses 407 districts, a small degree of inaccuracy during the aggregation process was unavoidable. The additional districts that RS identifies are Marjah, Helmand Province; Dand, Kandahar Province; Bad Pash, Laghman Province; Delaram, Nimroz Province; Lajah Mangal, Pakiya Province; Mirzakah, Pakiya Province; Abshar, Panjshir Province; and Chinartu, Unuzgan Province. Adjusting for these differences left 400 districts and all layers were projected to UTM 42N. ACLED data was filtered to include all violent event types between 2/1/2018 and 5/31/2018 with an ACLED geo-precision code of 1 or 2. This left 1,479 district-level violent incidents for analysis. To create the map, incidents were categorized into three classes using the quantile method. The quantile method produces an equal number of observations per class to facilitate comparative analysis, but the interval of the class must therefore be variable. Government = areas under Afghan government control or influence, Contested = areas neither under Afghan government nor insurgent control or influence, Insurgency = areas with insurgent activity or high insurgent activity.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018; ACLED, Middle East 2016-present dataset, 2/1/2018-5/31/2018, accessed 6/15/2018; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED and RS-provided data, 6/2018.

assessed as having insurgent activity, and 1 percent were in districts assessed as having high levels of insurgent activity. Several areas of the map show a high number of violent events in areas RS assessed as under the control or influence of the Afghan government. In particular, the inset map of Nangarhar Province featured in the map shows a concentration of violent events in districts RS assessed as under government control or influence.¹¹⁵

SIGAR will continue to monitor ACLED data in order to track security trends over time and provide an expanded violent-incident analysis.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY REPORTING

Security Incidents Decline, Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings Rise

Security incidents: reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation.


Source: SIGAR, analysis of the UN's report of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 12/9/2014.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations reported in early June that the security situation in Afghanistan remained “highly unstable” as security incidents across the country decreased since last year, but targeted assassinations and suicide attacks increased notably. The UN reported 5,675 security incidents between February 15, 2018, and May 15, 2018, a 7 percent decrease from the same period in 2017. As reflected in Figure 3.30, this is an average of 63.1 incidents per day, a more than six incident-per-day decrease compared to the same period last year (69.5). For the third consecutive quarter, the daily average number of security incidents over the reporting period remained lower than the daily average of 64.8 incidents over the last three years.¹¹⁶

According to the UN, armed clashes continued to cause the most security incidents (64 percent), the same as last year, followed by improvised explosive devices (15 percent), down one percentage point since last year. But the UN reported a significant increase in targeted assassinations and suicide attacks, up by 35 percent and 78 percent respectively, when compared to the same period last year. While the number of incidents caused by international forces’ air strikes accounted for 5 percent of all incidents, this represents an increase of 18 percent since last quarter and 24 percent since the same period in 2017.¹¹⁷

FIGURE 3.30

AVERAGE DAILY SECURITY INCIDENTS BY UN REPORTING PERIOD, SINCE 2015



Note: UN reporting periods are occasionally inconsistent, leading to some gaps in data.

Source: UN, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, reports of the Secretary-General, 2/27/2015, p. 4; 6/10/2015, p. 4; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 12/10/2015, p. 5; 3/7/2016, p. 6; 6/10/2016, p. 4; 9/7/2016, p. 5; 12/13/2016, p. 4; 3/3/2017, p. 4; 6/15/2017, p. 4; 9/15/2017, p. 4; 12/15/2017, p. 5; 2/27/2018, p. 5; 6/6/2018, p. 5; SIGAR, analysis of UN-provided data, 6/2018.

As in previous quarters, the UN said the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan experienced the most security incidents during the reporting period. But this quarter, incidents in these regions were 82 percent of the national total, versus 55 percent last quarter. The Secretary-General has therefore assessed that the conflict has “consolidated along increasingly discernible battle lines with fighting concentrated in a few provinces.” The Secretary-General’s report states that incidents in Nangarhar, Helmand, Kunar, Kandahar, Faryab, and Ghazni Provinces accounted for 60 percent of all security incidents this quarter. Comparatively, ACLED recorded 888 incidents in those six provinces from a similar reporting period (February 1–May 31, 2018), 57 percent of their total recorded incidents.¹¹⁸

The UN noted a spike in violence following the Taliban’s announcement of their annual offensive on April 25. Over 50 security incidents were recorded by the UN in 21 provinces on the day of the announcement. Unlike previous quarters, the Taliban increased the frequency of its attacks on district administrative centers and conducted its first major incursion on a provincial capital since 2016, in Farah City. The ANDSF drove the Taliban out of Farah City with Coalition air support.¹¹⁹



A U.S. Army UH-60 flies over Farah City following the expulsion of Taliban forces by ANDSF and Coalition forces. (USAF photo by Technical Sergeant Sharida Jackson)


UNAMA: Civilian Deaths at Record High

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued its mid-year update in July on civilians in armed conflict, which reported 5,122 casualties (3,430 injuries and 1,692 deaths) from January 1 through June 30, 2018. As seen in Figure 3.31, UNAMA reported that the first six months of 2018 had a record high number of deaths compared to the same period over the last 10 years that UNAMA has kept civilian-casualty records.¹²⁰

UNAMA reported a 5 percent decrease in overall civilian injuries from January through June, which kept the overall number of civilian casualties

FIGURE 3.31

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: FIRST SIX MONTHS, 2009–2018




Note: This chart also appears in UNAMA’s report.

Source: UNAMA, *Midyear Update on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2018*, 7/15/2018, p. 1.

SECURITY

FIGURE 3.32


CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY INCIDENT TYPE



Total: 5,122

- Suicide and Complex Attacks - 1,413
- Non-Suicide IEDs - 877
- Ground Engagements - 1,494
- Targeted/Deliberate Killings - 463
- Aerial Operations - 353
- Explosive Remnants of War - 239
- Other - 283

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT



Total: 5,122

- Antigovernment Elements - 3,413
- Progovernment Forces - 1,047
- Jointly Attributed - 503
- Other - 159


Note: The reporting period for this data is January 1–June 30, 2018. These charts also appear in UNAMA’s report.
 Source: UNAMA, *Midyear Update on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2018*, 7/15/2018, pp. 2, 7.

roughly on par with the high level of casualties over the same period in 2016 and 2017. Similar to last quarter, IED attacks (suicide, complex, and non-suicide IED attacks) by antigovernment elements continued to be the primary cause of civilian casualties. UNAMA said that the combined use of suicide and non-suicide IEDs caused 45 percent of all civilian casualties in the first six months of 2018, a record high for that incident type.¹²¹

UNAMA recorded 353 civilian casualties (149 deaths and 204 injuries) due to aerial operations from January 1 to June 30, 2018, an increase from the 232 casualties (95 deaths and 137 injuries) reported last year. These figures are significantly higher than the 20 USFOR-A recorded from January 1 to May 31, 2018, though USFOR-A’s figure represents only civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes, not those conducted by the AAF. The number of U.S. air strikes has increased substantially over the last year. According to the U.S. Air Force, the United States conducted 2,911 air strikes from January 1 through June 30, 2018, nearly double the 1,634 strikes over the same period in 2017, and more than five times the 545 strikes in 2016.¹²² Figure 3.32 show UNAMA’s full breakdown of civilian casualties by incident type and parties to the conflict.

FIGURE 3.33

IS-K CLAIMS MOST HIGH-CASUALTY ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN, MAY 1–JULY 15, 2018



Source: ACLED, Middle East 2016–Present dataset, 5/1/2018–7/13/2018, accessed 7/13/2018; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 7/2018, Reuters, “At least 12 dead, including children, in Afghan suicide blast,” 7/10/2018; *New York Times*, “Suicide Bombing on Afghan Education Department Kills 12,” 7/11/2018.

UNAMA recorded 544 women casualties (157 deaths, 387 injuries) and 1,355 child casualties (363 deaths, 992 injuries) from January through June 2018, both down 15 percent from the same period in 2017. The leading cause of casualties for women and children was ground engagements between pro- and antigovernment forces. Election-related violence has also been a cause of women and child casualties. UNAMA documented 39 attacks on election-registration centers located at schools during the voting-registration period from April to June 2018, which often closed schools, hampered students’ ability to learn, and impacted children’s safety.¹²³

IS-K Continues to Inflict Heavy Casualties

UNAMA reported a “disturbing increase” this quarter in the number of civilian casualties due to suicide and complex attacks by antigovernment elements, more than half of which they attributed to IS-K. UNAMA expressed “particular concern” over the doubling of civilian casualties in Nangarhar Province, where IS-K continues to operate. UNAMA found that two-thirds of Nangarhar’s civilian casualties from January 1 through June 30 were caused by IEDs, and almost half of those casualties were inflicted by IED attacks claimed by IS-K. Over the same time period, UNAMA recorded 13 incidents in Nangarhar related to IS-K threats to target girls’ schools in retaliation for air strikes. Kabul Province also has a considerable problem with IED attacks and IS-K: 95 percent of all civilian casualties there were caused by IED attacks, and more than half of those attacks were claimed by IS-K.¹²⁴

As seen in Figure 3.33, IS-K continues to deliberately and indiscriminately target civilians and has claimed the majority of high-profile attacks that occurred in Afghanistan this quarter.¹²⁵

“[The ANDSF] are fighting and they are taking casualties, but they are also very offensive-minded, inflicting losses on the Taliban and [ISIS-Khorasan] daily, while expanding their capabilities and proficiency every day.”

—General Joseph Votel,
commander of U.S.
Central Command

Source: DOD, “South Asia Strategy Working in Afghanistan, CENTCOM Commander Says,” 7/19/2018.

THE 1ST SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE

The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) arrived in Afghanistan in March 2018. New to the Afghanistan theater, SFABs are U.S. Army brigades designed to train and advise host-nation armed forces.¹²⁶ Defense Secretary James Mattis said in December that the purpose of deploying the SFAB was to put “more American forces, advisors, in the more conventional force in the Afghan Army,” where they have not previously had advisors, to “make [the Afghan] general-purpose force more capable.”¹²⁷ According to U.S. Army Colonel Scott Jackson, the commander of the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan, the personnel selected for the brigade were “technical and tactical experts who possess the right personalities to work alongside our [Afghan] partners, allowing them to take the lead, but always prepared to support.” The SFAB’s advising capabilities stem from its members’ specialties in engineering, field artillery, military intelligence, logistics, and communications. The type of increased tactical-level advising central to the SFAB’s mission, Colonel Jackson said, is a “critical component” of the U.S. administration’s South Asia strategy.¹²⁸

This quarter, USFOR-A provided a detailed account of the 1st SFAB’s mission in Afghanistan and their level of engagement with Afghan forces. Over the last three months, as the 1st SFAB deployed to its operational areas, the brigade began providing over 60 advisory elements across Afghanistan. The SFAB had personnel placed at every RS Train, Advise, Assist Command (TAAC) and Task Force (TF) and also with certain U.S. Special Forces Advisory elements. SFAB advisors at all three echelons (the corps, brigade, and battalion levels) assisted their counterparts with tactical operations, institutional development, and readiness training at ANDSF unit-training facilities, such as the **Regional Military Training Centers** (RMTCs). As of June 2018, SFAB advisors are deployed across the entire ANA, embedded with the ASSF, and support increased security operations in Kabul.¹²⁹

Regional Military Training Centers:

Facilities for collective training as well as individual special skills training for various technical military occupations.

USFOR-A reported that in each of the three aspects of the RS train (1), advise (2), and assist (3) mission, the 1st SFAB has thus far conducted the following activities:

1. **Train:** In every TAAC and TF, 1st SFAB provided advisor teams to train, advise, and assist (TAA) ANA unit-training personnel to develop and execute unit-level sustained-readiness training plans. In one recent example, when one ANA unit determined that their number of qualified route-clearance engineers (who work on countering IEDs) was insufficient due to recent combat operations,

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018.

the corps commander requested help from the SFAB, expecting U.S. forces to teach the engineering classes. Instead, the SFAB encouraged the corps to assess its actual manning needs and its anticipated personnel gains, and then provided recommendations for redirecting corps personnel toward the needed specialty. After this, other Coalition advisors placed at the RMTC advised the corps' cadre on how to expand the existing route-clearance course to meet the new, increased demand for students, and assisted the cadre with instructor certification and course scheduling. USFOR-A expects this new program to meet the ANDSF corps' immediate needs, and produce a sustainable mechanism to assess, train, and employ critical counter-IED route clearance in the future.¹³⁰

2. **Advise:** According to USFOR-A, the 1st SFAB remains fully engaged operationally from its brigade headquarters in Paktiya Province to the Combat Advisor Team (CAT) level. CATs are aligned to TAACs and deployed throughout the provinces based on operational need, not stationed at particular provinces. CATs routinely execute fly-to-advise and drive-to-advise missions at both the corps and the battalion level—including some in forward operating areas—that vary in duration from hours to days. USFOR-A says these teams continue to be well received by their partners. They gave a recent example of a CAT that traveled to Logar Province to execute short-duration, fly-to-advise missions focused on unit assessment, leader assessment, unit operational-plan development, and future training-plan development. The CAT also conducted continual counterintelligence vetting to increase force protection, primarily for Coalition forces but also for the ANDSF. USFOR-A concludes that these visits have resulted in positive changes to ANDSF unit training plans to support future operations and enhanced SFAB understanding of how best to advise and assist future operations.¹³¹
3. **Assist:** USFOR-A highlighted that brigade-level advising remains the key competency of the SFAB battalions, which provide the necessary level of technical and tactical mentorship and advisor capacity at their Afghan counterparts' headquarters. In one instance, an SFAB battalion headquarters deployed with an ANA brigade headquarters during a three-week operation in Farah Province. By collocating, the SFAB team was able to provide their counterparts with accurate intelligence of enemy actions in advance of ANA



The 1st SFAB celebrating its one-year anniversary on May 1, 2018. (NATO photo by Erickson Barnes)

“All of us are volunteers in [the SFAB]. We wanted to do this. We believe in this mission. And we, as a collective organization, are very proud of what we’re doing.”

—Colonel Scott Jackson,
commander of 1st SFAB,
U.S. Army

Source: DOD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Colonel Jackson via Teleconference,” 6/13/2018.

operations. When required, they also applied lethal and nonlethal force to support Afghan operations. The proximity of the SFAB team with the ANA, as well as the SFAB’s skills and resources, allowed the ANA to react faster, save ANA lives, and produce decisive results for that operation. The SFAB battalion also worked with senior ANDSF leaders after the operation to exchange lessons learned.¹³²

According to USFOR-A, the 1st SFAB’s experience advising below the ANDSF’s corps and zone levels has allowed Coalition forces to better recognize ANDSF strengths at both operational and tactical levels. USFOR-A said the ANDSF have developed effective means of conducting operations that, while not necessarily in line with U.S. methods, are often effective. This understanding has in turn enabled the SFAB to more successfully build on existing, effective ANDSF processes, promote continuity, and tackle challenges at all echelons simultaneously.¹³³

In June, SFAB Commander Colonel Jackson said the Afghans are “making great progress” in the three areas that SFABs are measured against—creating unequal fighting capabilities that favor the ANDSF over the enemy, maintaining the pressure against the enemy, and improving the ANDSF’s effective use of resources.¹³⁴

However, in the few publicly available, anecdotal examples of what the SFAB has accomplished so far, it is unclear whether the Afghans are gaining the capability to independently implement and sustain SFAB recommendations and lessons learned. In Colonel Jackson’s account of one SFAB advisor’s experience intervening in a dysfunctional logistics-supply chain of command between a kandak and its corps headquarters, the only thing that resulted in the corps pushing the needed equipment to the kandak was the successful communication between the kandak-located SFAB and Coalition advisors at the corps level.¹³⁵

Another potential issue involves balancing the SFAB’s efforts between Kabul and the rest of the country. After a spate of high-profile attacks in Kabul earlier this year, General Nicholson said in March that securing the capital was the “main effort” for Coalition forces. Within a few weeks of that announcement, some SFAB teams that were initially deployed to contested areas, such as Kandahar, were reassigned to bolster security in and around Kabul City.¹³⁶ According to USFOR-A in July, 17 percent of the SFAB is posted to Kabul, with the remaining battalions covering the rest of the TAACs and Task Forces. When asked about this issue in a recent press conference, Colonel Jackson confirmed that reassigning these teams “was based upon a reassessment of priorities, based upon the environment,” but did not discuss whether or how that would impact the SFAB’s mission in the rest of Afghanistan.¹³⁷

It is also unclear whether the SFAB is being repurposed from its original mission, which was to provide expanded advising to rank-and-file ANDSF

personnel that had not been given access to Coalition and U.S. advisors. DOD reported in June that SFAB advisor teams only provided TAA to “select forces below the corps level” and that “the main focus” is on “building [Afghan] national and regional capability.” Colonel Jackson gave a view into what this has meant in practice: shifting the SFABs to focus on ANDSF decisionmakers rather than their personnel. Colonel Jackson described the SFAB being prepared for two sides of the advising “spectrum,” one side being “a very distant advising” taking place on a base, and the other “a much more integrated mission set that focuses on a company and enabling.” When answering questions about whether the SFAB has had to make adjustments since their deployment, he said that they found once arriving that “it is not always necessary” to be “side-by-side with the Afghans and [move] out on operations with them.” Instead, the SFAB has focused on “going where [it] can best do [its] job, and that really equates to where the decisionmakers are.”¹³⁸

The force-protection risks for SFAB personnel have also come under increasing scrutiny. Some SFAB personnel face heightened security risks from their closer contact with the ANDSF’s conventional forces that engage with the enemy than most other conventional U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Colonel Jackson addressed this by highlighting that every single Afghan commander he has worked with said “the most important thing to them is the safety of their advisors.” He cited how engrained hospitality and protection of guests are in Afghan culture, the ANDSF’s vested interest in keeping their SFAB advisors safe, and their proactive stance in identifying and dealing with people who are a potential threat to the ANDSF and their advisors.¹³⁹

However, the first soldier assigned to the SFAB to be killed in action was Army Corporal Joseph Maciel, who died in an apparent insider attack at Tarin Kowt airfield in Uruzgan Province on July 7, 2018. Two additional 1st SFAB personnel were wounded but were in stable condition as this report went to press. All three personnel were deployed to provide force protection for SFAB advisors. DOD did not provide more information, but said the incident was under investigation.¹⁴⁰

The SFABs appear to be customized, well-resourced problem solvers that tackle the various ANDSF force elements’ issues individually as they arise, but their evolving mission raises questions about how they will sustainably impact the more systemic challenges that face the ANDSF, especially at the lower levels of the force. SIGAR will continue to monitor SFAB efforts and activities throughout the remainder of their deployment.



A 1st SFAB advisor working with an ANA soldier on vehicle maintenance in Zabul Province in July. (NATO photo by Jackie Faye)

“Those [SFAB personnel] are out there, and they’re in exposed positions, and it is a high-risk situation. . . . So casualties are going to occur.”

— *General Mark Milley, U.S. Army Chief of Staff*

Source: AP, “Army Ponders Changes After Insider Attack in Afghanistan,” 7/14/2018.

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, as of May 31, 2018, approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), the same number reported for the last two quarters.¹⁴¹

The number of U.S. personnel assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces increased this quarter by 675 personnel to 8,475. The increase is due to the deployment of some U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) forces to Afghanistan.¹⁴² The remaining U.S. military personnel support the OFS mission through air operations, training the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterrorism operations.¹⁴³

As of July 6, 2018, the RS mission also included roughly 7,754 military personnel from NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations. This is an increase of approximately 250 personnel since last quarter, bringing the current total of RS military personnel to 16,229. It was reported in mid-July that the British government will send an additional 440 noncombat troops to augment the RS mission. This will increase the United Kingdom's troop strength in Afghanistan to 1,090 personnel, making the country the third-largest contributor of forces to the RS mission after the United States and Germany.¹⁴⁴

According to DOD from April 13 through July 18, 2018, three U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and two were wounded in action (WIA) in Afghanistan. This is an increase of two KIA and a decrease of 17 WIA compared to the previous quarter (January 1–March 30, 2018). In total, as of July 18, 2018, 36 U.S. military personnel, plus two DOD civilians, were KIA, 16 military personnel died in non-hostile circumstances, and 270 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom's Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of the Afghan war in October 2001, 2,266 U.S. military personnel have died (1,867 KIA and 399 of non-hostile deaths) and 20,320 were WIA. Additionally, six DOD civilians were killed, four were KIA and two died in non-hostile circumstances.¹⁴⁵

Insider Attacks

Since responsibility for security began transitioning to the Afghan government in 2014, "green-on-green" insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel are attacked from within their own ranks, often by an insurgent infiltrator, have consistently been a severe problem. According to USFOR-A, there were 25 reported green-on-green insider attacks against ANDSF personnel this quarter, bringing this year's total through May 16, 2018, to 33 insider attacks. This is an increase of seven attacks compared to the same period in 2017.¹⁴⁶

The ANDSF incurred 53 casualties (38 killed and 15 wounded) as a result of this quarter's insider attacks (from February 10 to May 16, 2018), and a total of 79 ANDSF casualties (57 killed and 22 wounded) from January 1 to May 16, 2018. Though there were seven more attacks this year compared to

the same period last year, ANDSF casualty rates have been consistent with last year's figures.¹⁴⁷

According to DOD, one U.S. soldier assigned to the 1st SFAB died, and two other SFAB soldiers were wounded, during an apparent insider attack on July 7, 2018. DOD said the incident is currently under investigation. Prior to that, USFOR-A reported that as of May 16, 2018, there had been no "green-on-blue" insider attacks this year in which ANDSF personnel turned on Coalition personnel. The same period last year saw two confirmed green-on-blue insider attacks that wounded three U.S. soldiers.¹⁴⁸

USFOR-A emphasized that as the SFAB mission began, they reallocated assets to support screening of all SFAB partner brigades within the ANA. This new requirement was balanced with the screening requirements at the conventional, enduring Coalition bases throughout Afghanistan. USFOR-A said all U.S. forces now receive force-protection ("Guardian Angel") training prior to deploying as well as follow-on training once in-country. For more information on USFOR-A's green-on-blue attack mitigation policies, see SIGAR's January 2018 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.¹⁴⁹

Updates on Developing Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

This quarter, RS began a reorganization that changed the names of its offices and their administrative structure. The RS mission had previously been organized under eight Essential Functions (EF) that it intended to develop in its Afghan counterparts. As seen below, this includes 11 functional areas, now renamed.¹⁵⁰ Highlights for each functional area reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **Rule of Law (ROL):** ROL established High Councils on Rule of Law for MOI and MOD, which will provide opportunities for ROL to advance initiatives on Gross Violations of Human Right (GVHR) remediation, NIMS/CMS implementation, and also established an independent Criminal Investigative Division. No new GVHR cases were verified this quarter.¹⁵¹
- **Strategic Communication (STRATCOM):** STRATCOM reported that the Minister of Interior Affairs has continued to engage media on topics of strategic importance, such as election security, counter threat finance, police reform, and counter corruption. STRATCOM praised the MOI's media response to the June 2, 2018, terrorist attack on its headquarters in Kabul, reporting that the MOI spokesperson provided "accurate and timely updates" during the attack. Once the attack ended, MOI publicized details of the effective police response.¹⁵² STRATCOM developed and executed a strategic communications training course for MOD STRATCOM staff, and worked with ANA Corps public-affairs officers to ensure the alignment of strategic messaging across all corps.¹⁵³

- **Force Development (FD-AIAT):** FD-AIAT reported that MOD provided the force-generation requirement for the new ANA Territorial Force, and has begun developing a training model. Also, the MOD Chief of the General Staff approved the extension of ANA Basic Warrior Training to 18 weeks, and an evaluation is under way to improve the effectiveness of the training program.¹⁵⁴
- **Force Development (FD-PIAT):** FD-PIAT reported that 31 female ANP personnel graduated an ANP instructor course in Balkh. The instructors will teach the first large-scale training course for female police at Balkh Regional Training Center in July.¹⁵⁵
- **Resource Management (RM):** RM reported that \$141.9 million worth of MOI and MOD facilities contracts have been approved for Afghan FY 1397, with projects valued at roughly \$52.4 million awarded as of May 20, 2018. The Afghan government approached CSTC-A for assistance with establishing a real-time data management system, which would monitor telecom service revenues. The first quarter's NATO ANA Trust Fund board meeting took place this reporting period, which resulted in Italy formally announcing their commitment to fund Women's Police Town Phase 2 at \$24.5 million and the ANASOC headquarters expansion at \$9.8 million.¹⁵⁶
- **Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO):** TAO reported that MOD IG successfully conducted all inspections for this quarter as part of the FY 1397 Annual Inspection Plan, and that 93 percent of FY 1397 asset declarations had been submitted. MOI IG accomplished 25 percent of its FY 1397 Annual Inspection Plan so far and has received 95 percent of its asset declarations.¹⁵⁷
- **Operational Sustainment (OS):** OS-Logistics reported that the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) contract, which began full operation on December 29, 2017, has delivered substantial maintenance support to the ANDSF. The contractor completed maintenance on 25,138 ANDSF vehicles (27 percent of total vehicle fleet) to date. The ANA currently supports 18 percent of its own maintenance requirements, on average. Over 150 MOI police completed English literacy and basic and intermediate computer training courses. MOD approved the disposal of obsolete ammunition in the Khyrabad central ammunition bunker, a sign of progress towards safe ANDSF ammunition-handling practices. Since January 2018, OS has conducted assessments of the 205, 207, 203, and 209 Corps' logistics and procurement practices. The 205, 207, and 203 Corps received satisfactory ratings in a majority of functional areas.¹⁵⁸
- **Strategic Plans:** Strategic Plans focused on the execution of Phase I of Operation Nasrat, the ANDSF's annual operational plan. Most ANA corps have reportedly developed their annual campaign plans, but have experienced difficulties in execution. Pursuant to MOI's first strategic

goal (to strengthen public order and ensure security), the transfer of the bulk of the ABP to the ANA was completed this quarter, and the transfer of ANCOP to MOD was completed in March. MOI plans for the 2,550 remaining ANCOP personnel who were not transferred to MOD to be reorganized into kandaks and redesignated as the Public Safety Police, a riot-control force.¹⁵⁹

- **Intelligence TAA:** The MOI Biometrics Center began deploying the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) at Kabul City gate checkpoints in order to screen truck drivers entering the capital. AABIS consists of SEEK Avenger, a portable biometric enrollment and reader device, in combination with a biometrically enabled watchlist. The watchlist is currently working through a backlog of biometric enrollments, which was expected to be cleared by the end of June 2018 for the system to become fully operational. MOD continued to expand the ScanEagle program with new hubs at 205 and 203 Corps, and the relocation of a schoolhouse for ScanEagle training to Kandahar Airfield, which is to become operational in July. Another hub for 207 Corps is planned for this quarter, to become operational by the end of 2018. ANDSF targeting capabilities were further improved by integrating Pixia/HiPERLOOK and ScanEagle imagery into Targeting Directorate analysis. Pixia/HiPERLOOK provides the ANA with a low-bandwidth option for accessing recent imagery. Intelligence TAA has also begun sharing the majority of CENTCOM's list of over 20,000 **no-strike entities** with MOD in order to reduce collateral damage from kinetic strikes.¹⁶⁰
- **Gender Office:** This quarter, 38 women graduated from the ANA Officer Academy. Thirty women began a four-year course at the ANP Academy, the Academy's first intake to include female candidates, and six women graduated from the Women's Foundational Course for the General Command Police Special Unit (GCPSU). Another 28 ANP women are enrolled in a GCPSU noncommissioned officer course and are scheduled to graduate on October 31, 2018. Phase 1 Construction of the Women's Police Town, intended to house up to 90 ANP families also began. The Sexual Assault and Harassment Prevention Policies, which MOD and MOI were both expected to sign in April, remain unsigned. CSTC-A reports that both ministries are seeking assistance from MOD legal staff to develop a more comprehensive policy consistent with Afghan laws.¹⁶¹

No-strike entities: A physical or virtual object functionally characterized as noncombatant in nature and protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or the rules of engagement.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/13/2017.

Afghanistan Compact

The Afghanistan Compact is an Afghan-led, Coalition-supported initiative designed to demonstrate the Afghan government's commitment to reforms. The Compact process consists of four American- and Afghan-chaired working groups covering governance, economic, peace and reconciliation, and

security issues.¹⁶² For more information about the Compact, see SIGAR's April 2018 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

Most of the security commitments in the Compact apply to either the entire ANDSF, or the MOD and MOI, or their main components (ANA and ANP).¹⁶³ Together they lay out a comprehensive plan to reform and upgrade the capabilities of the ANDSF over the next few years. USFOR-A has said that within the scope of other strategies for achieving progress in Afghanistan, the Compact and ANDSF Roadmap (the Afghan government's plan for security-sector reform) both align under the U.S. administration's South Asia strategy as frameworks to achieve the U.S. goals of seeking an Afghan political settlement that reduces violence, improves security, enables government reform, and leads to reconciliation with the Taliban.¹⁶⁴

USFOR-A reported that the Joint Security Compact Committee (JSCC), which tracks the Afghan government's progress toward meeting its security goals in the Compact, met on May 17, 2018, to review milestones due in March and April 2018. The March milestones dealt with ANDSF reform in the following areas: the ANDSF Capability Enhancement Program, intelligence, MOD optimization, training and education, the ABF transfer, leadership development, communications strategy, police reorganization, counter corruption/transparency, automated personnel management, and force management. The April milestones included: MOD optimization, training and education, the ANCOP transfer, and force management.¹⁶⁵

According to USFOR-A, the ministries completed 13 of 15 milestones due this quarter. The MOI did not complete its March milestone in counter-corruption/transparency; the MOD did not complete its March milestone in force management.¹⁶⁶ On MOD's missed milestone, USFOR-A updated SIGAR that during a June 6 Compact Synchronization Meeting, CSTC-A decided to extend the deadline for MOD's force-management milestones. While CSTC-A says that MOD is making "satisfactory progress in all areas of the milestone, "the complexity of the task merits additional time to complete."¹⁶⁷ Related to MOI's counter-corruption and transparency efforts, USFOR-A said that as a result of the last JSCC on June 28, U.S. and Afghan government representatives agreed that a comprehensive review of all ongoing counter- and anticorruption actions and milestones will take place in mid-July at the Presidential Palace. The review will include participating officials from RS, USFOR-A, MOD, MOI, and the Office of the National Security Council.¹⁶⁸

AFGHAN SECURITY MINISTRIES AND THE ANDSF

ANDSF Strength

According to DOD, the ANDSF's total authorized (goal) end strength was 352,000 personnel, including 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP personnel, but excluding 30,000 Afghan Local Police, which fall under the MOI's oversight.¹⁶⁹


USFOR-A reported that the actual, assigned strength of the ANDSF as of April 30, 2018, (not including civilians) was 314,242 personnel, which includes 196,290 personnel in the ANA and AAF and 117,952 in the ANP.¹⁷⁰ This puts the ANDSF at 89.3 percent of its authorized strength, down from 93.7 percent compared to the same period in 2017.¹⁷¹

The ANA saw a 22,258-person increase since May 2017, and the ANP a 30,758-person decrease since April 2017, both of which were impacted by the transfer of 30,689 personnel in two force elements (ANCOP and ABP) from the MOI to the MOD. Therefore, the overall ANDSF strength compared to last year (not including civilians) decreased by 8,500 personnel (8,431 from the ANA and 69 from the ANP).¹⁷²

For a historical record of ANDSF strength in the second quarter of the last four years, see Figure 3.34.

FIGURE 3.34

SECOND QUARTER ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS



Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. These figures do not include civilian personnel. ANDSF authorized strength is 352,000 as of June 2018.

* ANA data was as of May 2016, May 2017, and ANP data was as of April 2016, April 2017.

**ANP and Total ANDSF figures do not include reservists or personnel not in service while completing training.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014, 6/29/2015, 6/3/2016, 5/20/2017, and 6/22/2018; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2015; DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 6/2018, p. 40.

ANDSF Casualties

USFOR-A classified ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government.¹⁷³ SIGAR's questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANDSF casualties in the classified annex.

ANDSF Force Element Performance

USFOR-A classified ANDSF performance assessments this quarter, a reversal from the preceding two quarters, when basic performance assessments were provided. SIGAR's questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the ANDSF performance assessments in the classified annex.

Ministry Performance Assessments

USFOR-A also classified MOD and MOI performance assessments this quarter, a reversal from the preceding two quarters, when basic performance assessments were provided. SIGAR's questions about the ministries' performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex.

AHRIMS and APPS

The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort DOD said could greatly improve protection of U.S. funds. The U.S. pays the ANA and ANP personnel costs that constitute a large portion of the ANDSF's expenses.¹⁷⁴

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and current position of ANDSF personnel. AHRIMS also contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI, along with information such as unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is under development. When implemented, it will integrate AHRIMS data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.¹⁷⁵ The AHRIMS (and in the future, APPS) data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF in determining promotions and assignments.¹⁷⁶

CSTC-A is overseeing the transition from AHRIMS to APPS to ensure interoperability. The process of verifying AHRIMS data includes a personnel asset inventory (PAI), a process that physically accounts for ANA and ANP personnel and issues them biometrically linked identification cards. APPS will generate payroll information and bank-account information for accounted-for personnel. According to CSTC-A, this structure will reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into APPS, although

it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying such “ghost” personnel. Routine checks will still be required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are still actively serving in the ANDSF.¹⁷⁷ Once implemented, the biometric cards will also be used to access all human-resources information for security force members, including identity, pay, APPS data, promotions, assignments, killed/wounded/absent-without-leave information, and other documents.¹⁷⁸

As USFOR-A has reported previously, three ongoing efforts aim to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in AHRIMS to support the migration to APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI), a continuous process of correcting the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.¹⁷⁹

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that the MOD delayed the date it will be fully operational in APPS from May 30, 2018, to July 31, 2018, to allow more time to improve ANA personnel data in the system and account for the transfer of the two MOI elements (ANCOP and ABP) to MOD. As of May 30, 2018, the MOD’s PAI completion rate fell back to 74 percent (down from the 95 percent reported last quarter), and only 71 percent of the force is now slotted (down from 90 percent last quarter). These decreases were also due to the ANCOP and ABP transfers, and should therefore not be considered a regression.¹⁸⁰

As of May 23, 2018, the MOI was 69 percent APPS-slotted (down one percentage point since last quarter), and the MOI’s PAI was 75 percent complete (down from 80 percent last quarter). The MOI has also delayed its fully operational date in APPS from September 2018 to November 30, 2018. Part of the reason for the delay was to complete APPS training for all zone and provincial headquarters personnel. Another part was the Minister of Interior’s temporary suspension of slotting activities in all the police zone and provincial headquarters to refine the MOI’s tashkil with RS. Once the new tashkil was agreed upon, slotting resumed. The MOI’s lagging personnel-accountability processes are having a direct and adverse impact on rank-and-file ANP personnel. For more information, see the next section.¹⁸¹

Unaccounted for or “Ghost” Personnel

As a result of increased attention in late 2016 to the possible inclusion of many “ghost” or nonexistent personnel within the ANDSF rolls, U.S. officials confirmed that since January 1, 2017, salaries are paid only to MOD and MOI personnel correctly registered in AHRIMS.¹⁸²

This quarter, CSTC-A did not report a dollar amount for costs avoided by not paying unaccounted-for or ghost personnel. The Command explained the lack of data as a result of a change in methodology from a model that verifies Afghan reported personnel and PAI inputs using multiple reports to

30,000 ANP Personnel Denied Pay Since March

According to Afghan MOI officials quoted in the *New York Times*, the Coalition's policy of refusing to pay unaccounted-for personnel is having an outsized, negative impact on rurally located ANP personnel who are not biometrically enrolled. MOI officials said that as of early June 2018, as many as 30,000 active Afghan police have been denied their salaries since March 2018. ANP salaries are primarily paid by LOTFA, a multidonor fund whose largest donor has been the United States, though the U.S. has reduced its contribution since 2016. The donor nations' policy of not paying unbiometrically enrolled personnel is intended to pressure ANDSF leadership to eliminate ghost soldiers in their ranks and to finalize accountable pay and personnel oversight practices.

However, the *New York Times* report says the rank-and-file Afghan police, especially those who live in areas inaccessible for biometric registration due to geography or security, are suffering under the policy. One police chief of Girziwan District in embattled Ghazni Province said his district had been surrounded by the Taliban for a year and a half and that his personnel could not travel to the provincial centers for biometric registration, nor would the registration come to them. According to the article, this donor-nation policy could lead to increased ANP attrition, as Afghan police, who often live paycheck to paycheck, cannot afford to remain in their jobs without being paid. Girziwan District, for example, lost five of its 30 personnel after they left the force due to the recent salary moratorium. The article asserts that this ANP pay policy intensified in March because the extent of MOI's problem in accounting for its personnel became much clearer after the MOI transferred the ABP and ANCOP to MOD. Two senior Afghan officials said the transition showed that personnel numbers on paper were thousands off from the actual number of ANP personnel on hand. MOI officials said that they attempted to raise this issue with the UN Development Programme, which administers the LOTFA for ANP salaries, but they refused to listen and refused comment on the issue to the *New York Times*.

In response to SIGAR and congressional inquiries on this matter, DOD said "the recent NYTimes article involves funding provided by other donor nations to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) and distributed to the Afghan government by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which manages the LOTFA. No ASFF funds appear to have been involved in this situation. . . . The article appears to report on the impacts of decisions made by UNDP and donor nations to withhold a portion of such funds because the Ministry of Interior (MOI) had not completed the personnel asset inventory it had committed to completing, in order to assure donor nations they were paying for personnel who are actually entitled to be paid." In subsequent comments DOD also said that CSTC-A did not itself withhold ASFF funds from the ANP. The ASFF currently provides a very small portion of ANP salaries: DOD requested no ASFF funds for FY 2017, requested funds to pay for only 20 percent of total ANP pay in the 2018, and requested nothing for 2019.

According to UNDP and MOI, as of April 2018 there were 23,212 "invalid" or unaccounted-for MOI personnel recorded in UNDP's Web-based Electronic Payroll System currently used to pay the police. Of that number, 18,622 are categorized as patrolmen and 4,590 as officers. The highest percentage of police personnel records marked invalid occurs in the following provinces: Helmand (51 percent), Uruzgan (47 percent), Farah (47 percent), Nuristan (44 percent), and Paktika (41 percent). UNDP has said that these 23,212 invalid personnel records would be automatically removed while reconciling ANP personnel during the ongoing PAI process. In some provinces, this would mean removing a considerable portion of the police force currently recorded.

Source: *New York Times*, "30,000 Afghan Police Officers, on Front Line of War, Are Denied Pay," 6/6/2018; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018, 7/2/2018, and 7/14/2018; UNDP, "Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan: SPM Technical Working Group Meeting" (slides), 4/2018; UNDP, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2018.

inform salary disbursement, to a model that disburses funds to the Afghan government using the information produced by one source, APPS.

Therefore, moving forward, the funding amount for ANDSF salaries will be determined by APPS, and personnel will be paid only if they are assigned to a tashkil-authorized position, have a number proving biometric enrollment, and have other verified personnel data inputs, including their name, date of birth, and ID card number.¹⁸³ Both DOD and USFOR-A have consistently said that once APPS is fully operational, they believe the ghost-soldier issue will be largely resolved. CSTC-A noted that while no system can completely eliminate personnel-reporting errors, APPS will significantly reduce them.¹⁸⁴

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$45.9 billion and disbursed \$45.4 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.¹⁸⁵

ANA Strength

This quarter, USFOR-A classified unit-level ANA authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength information will appear only in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR's questions about ANA strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANA's total authorized (goal) end strength was 227,374, up from the 195,000 ANA personnel authorized in 2016 and 2017. DOD reported in June that the large increase in ANA authorization is due



An ANA Commando patrols Farah City on May 15 following the Taliban offensive on the city. (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant John Conroy)

to the transfer of two force elements (ABP and ANCOP) from MOI to MOD as well as the pilot of a new force element, the ANA Territorial Force (ANATF). For more information about the ANATF, see page 99.¹⁸⁶

USFOR-A reported that the actual, assigned strength of the ANA and AAF as of April 30, 2018, (not including civilians) was 196,290 personnel, a 22,258-person increase over the last year, mostly due to the transfer of 30,689 personnel from ANCOP and ABP to MOD. Setting aside the large influx of personnel due to the ABP and ANCOP transfers, the ANA actually saw a reduction of 8,431 soldiers since May 2017.¹⁸⁷

The ANA's 196,290 personnel consisted of 85,860 soldiers, 63,672 non-commissioned officers, and 35,019 officers (the remaining 11,739 personnel were transferred from the ANCOP to the ANA this quarter). With the changes to authorization and strength this quarter, the ANA was at 86.3 percent of its authorized strength in April 2018, or 31,084 personnel short of their goal strength. This is a more than six-point fall from the 92.5 percent one year prior.¹⁸⁸

ANA Attrition

USFOR-A provided limited attrition information this quarter in an unclassified format. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANA force element will be provided in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR's questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E.

According to USFOR-A, as of April 30, 2018, ANA monthly attrition rates averaged less than 2 percent over the preceding three-month period, roughly consistent with the last year of reporting.¹⁸⁹ CTSC-A noted that this average ANA attrition rate does not include ABF and ANCOF data, that the attrition rate was calculated by the MOD, and that CSTC-A is unable to validate this data for accuracy.¹⁹⁰

When asked this quarter what accounted for the attrition of roughly 5,000 ANA personnel from January 2017 to January 2018, CTSC-A responded that there are three main reasons for the losses: (1) personnel being dropped from the rolls, (2) separated from the service, or (3) killed in action by a hostile actor.¹⁹¹

ANA Sustainment

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$22 billion and disbursed \$21.6 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.¹⁹²

CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all ANA sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (beginning December 21, 2017) was \$217.4 million through May 20, 2018, the vast majority of which was expended on ANA salaries and incentive pay; of that \$214.7 million amount, roughly \$86 million was for incentive pay. This is an increase of about \$78.1 million in salaries and incentive payments compared to the same period last year. According to CSTC-A, the increase since last fiscal year

was due to the increased force authorization for MOD (from 195,000 to 227,374) and a 5 percent salary increase for MOD personnel.¹⁹³

Roughly \$2.7 million was spent on non-payroll sustainment requirements, the costliest of which were domestic transportation (\$2.3 million, not including fuel costs) and telecommunications contracts (about \$271,000).¹⁹⁴

CSTC-A said there has been no change in the estimated funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for this fiscal year, estimated at \$651.6 million, but noted that the U.S. contribution to ANA personnel sustainment over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.¹⁹⁵ DOD said forecasted salary and incentives figures are for planning purposes only and are not definitive indicators of future DOD support, which will depend on Afghan progress toward reconciliation, reducing corruption, security conditions, and other factors.¹⁹⁶

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$13.8 billion and disbursed \$13.7 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.¹⁹⁷

This quarter CSTC-A reported on the major items of equipment purchased for and provided to the ANA over the last quarter. As seen in Table 3.6, between March 1, 2018, and May 30, 2018, these included: UH-60 (“Black Hawk”) helicopters, A-29 light-attack aircraft, and several types of armored personnel and utility vehicles. The equipment provided this past quarter is valued at \$71.3 million, significantly less than last quarter’s \$169.4 million. The greatest expenditure was procurement of two A-29s (\$54 million), followed by two refurbished UH-60s (\$12 million). CSTC-A noted that the UH-60s delivered this quarter are a “hybrid configuration aircraft in order to meet an accelerated schedule demand.” They said that these are the same as the aircraft as those delivered to the Afghans last quarter and that the full “Afghanistan Configuration UH-60A” aircraft are

TABLE 3.6

| MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANA, MARCH–MAY 2018 | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Equipment Type | Equipment Description | Units Issued in Quarter | Unit Cost | Total Cost* |
| Aircraft | A-29 Light Attack Aircraft | 2 | \$27,000,000 | \$54,000,000 |
| Aircraft | UH-60 Helicopter | 2 | 6,000,000 | 12,000,000 |
| Vehicle | M1151 HMMWV (Humvee) | 12 | 237,000 | 2,844,000 |
| Vehicle | Medium Tactical Vehicle International | 10 | 149,000 | 1,500,000 |
| Vehicle | M1082 Trailer (Cargo trailer) | 16 | 35,000 | 560,000 |
| Vehicle | Fuel Tanker 1200 Gallon | 1 | 201,000 | 201,000 |
| Vehicle | Water Tanker 1200 Gallon | 1 | 181,000 | 181,000 |
| Total | | | | \$71,286,000 |

Note: *Figures were rounded by CSTC-A.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018 and 7/18/2018.

expected to begin being delivered in March 2019. According to USFOR-A, the latter configuration primarily differs from the hybrid configuration in that it provides features such as: improved flight controls and gearbox, a ballistic-protection system, and a Afghan National Tracking System, all of which make the aircraft safer to fly but will not increase the pilot's learning curve for operation.¹⁹⁸

ANA Equipment Operational Readiness

This quarter USFOR-A classified data on ANA equipment readiness. SIGAR's questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANA equipment readiness in its classified annex.

ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed \$5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure projects as of June 30, 2018.¹⁹⁹ As of May 31, 2018, CSTC-A reported that facilities-sustainment costs for FY 2018, covering all ANA facility and generator requirements, will be roughly \$68 million—a \$18.7 million decrease from last quarter's revised amount (\$86.7 million). According to CSTC-A, as of May 31, 2018, the United States completed 452 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at \$5.4 billion.²⁰⁰

CSTC-A reported 35 ongoing projects from February 1 through May 31, 2018, valued at roughly \$190.8 million. CSTC-A also reported that six projects were completed this quarter, valued at a total cost of about \$7.4 million, including a \$3.3 million facility for the ANA's Special Operations Brigade North in Mazar-e Sharif. During the reporting period, five projects (valued at roughly \$14.2 million) were awarded, the largest two to build water and wastewater systems upgrades at Kandahar Airfield.²⁰¹

The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were the same as last quarter: two Northern Electrical Interconnect (NEI) substation projects, one in Balkh Province (\$27.7 million) slated for completion in October 2019, and one in Kunduz (\$9.5 million), due to be completed in February 2019. Additionally, the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), a multi-year, \$73.5 million project, set for completion in December 2017, is pending because the necessary replacement of fire doors has not yet been resolved.²⁰²

According to CSTC-A, there were 27 ANA projects in the planning phase, valued at a total of \$337.1 million. These included: four AAF projects at \$65.7 million, six ANA projects at \$35.7 million, five ANASOC projects at \$59.9 million, three Kabul National Military Hospital projects at \$62.2 million, two MFNDU projects at \$12.7 million, five Parwan Detention Facility projects at \$97.53 million, and two **Women's Participation Program (WPP)** projects at \$3.4 million.²⁰³

Women's Participation Program: An initiative that seeks to advance and promote women's participation in Afghan security institutions. The program promotes safe and secure facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities for women to increase their membership in the ANDSF.

Source: OSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 4/15/2016.

TABLE 3.7

| ACTIVE ANA TRAINING CONTRACTS AS OF MARCH 2018 | | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Case ID | Contract Description | Contractor | Contract Dates | Contract Value |
| W5-B-UAC | ANA and MOD Advisors and Mentors | DynCorp International | 12/1/2017-5/31/2018 | \$81,160,849 |
| W5-B-UAW | Afghan Special Security Forces Training | Raytheon | 9/30/2017-N/A | 80,025,453 |
| W5-B-UBE | In-Country UH-60 Aircraft Pilot Training Course for the AAF | ARMA | 10/1/2017-9/30/2018 | 43,761,086 |
| W5-D-TAA | Afghan Air Force Training in the United States (Texas) | Northrup Grumman | 1/1/2018-1/31/2019 | 28,967,928 |
| W5-B-UCR | Initial Entry Rotary Wing (AAF Pilot) Training in Czech Republic | Raytheon | 11/1/2017-6/30/2019 | 19,095,939 |
| W5-B-UCI | Initial Entry Rotary Wing (AAF Pilot) Training in United Arab Emirates | Raytheon | 9/1/2017-1/1/2019 | 18,396,258 |
| W5-B-UDC | Initial Entry Fixed Wing (AAF Pilot) Training in United Arab Emirates | Raytheon | 1/1/2018-6/30/2019 | 17,874,236 |
| C5-B-UFC | English-Language Training | Raytheon | 3/29/2017-N/A | 15,584,145 |
| 7H-B-UAC | Mentor Trainers in Support of the AAF | Raytheon | 12/31/2017-9/28/2018 | 13,618,976 |
| W5-B-UCD | English-Language Training for the AAF | Raytheon | 8/1/2017-7/31/2018 | 11,591,856 |
| Total Cost of Highest-Value Training Contracts | | | | \$330,076,726 |

Note: This table includes only the 10 highest value training contracts (the other 16 active projects were between \$99,000 and \$11,584,570 in value).

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/22/2018 and 6/22/2018; OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/24/2018 and 7/27/2018.

CSTC-A reported that there were seven ongoing WPP projects valued at roughly \$19 million. The largest of these projects were an \$8.5 million women’s and pediatric wellness clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital to be finished by mid-January 2019, and a \$5.3 million conference center, gym, and daycare center at MFNDU planned for completion in late November 2018.²⁰⁴

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.2 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.²⁰⁵

According to CSTC-A, there are no new ASFF-funded training programs to report this quarter.²⁰⁶ The latest ANA training contracts are listed in Table 3.7.

Afghan Air Force

This quarter, DOD reported that the FY 2018 authorized force strength for the AAF and SMW is 8,739 (not including civilians), an increase of 113 personnel authorized than in FY 2017.²⁰⁷ This quarter, CTSC-A provided rounded AAF assigned strength in an unclassified format. As of April 30, 2018, there were roughly 9,000 uniformed personnel serving in the AAF and Special Mission Wing, plus 200 AAF civilians.²⁰⁸ As of May 22, 2018, the United States has appropriated approximately \$6.6 billion to support and develop the AAF from FY 2010 to FY 2018, with roughly \$1.6 billion appropriated in FY 2018. A large portion (\$715.1 million) is earmarked for AAF sustainment costs. According to DOD’s FY 2018 budget-justification document, the \$1.4 billion includes \$709.8 million for the second year of

the ANDSF Aviation Modernization (AAM) plan to continue the transition from Russian-manufactured helicopters to U.S.-manufactured UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.²⁰⁹

Also as of May 22, nearly \$3.9 billion has been obligated for the AAF in FYs 2010–2018, with roughly \$107 million of those funds obligated in FY 2018. The majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 continues to be for sustainment items, which account for 42.8 percent of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 38.5 percent.²¹⁰

The AAF's current inventory of aircraft, as of May 8, 2018, includes:²¹¹

- 4 Mi-35 helicopters (all four unavailable; DOD does not fund or support any of these aircraft)
- 48 Mi-17 helicopters (22 unavailable, 2 fewer than last quarter)
- 25 MD-530 helicopters (one unavailable, four fewer than last quarter)
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes (one unavailable)
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes (two unavailable)
- 20 A-29 light attack airplanes (one unavailable, one fewer than last quarter)
- 16 UH-60 utility helicopters (eight more than last quarter)

The Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters are Russian-made. The United States procured 33 Mi-17s from Russia for the AAF with ASFF funds (the others were procured for the Afghans from other sources) and 30 for the Special Mission Wing from 2011–2014. The A-29 aircraft are Brazilian-designed and manufactured in the United States. The rest of the AAF inventory is composed of U.S.-made aircraft.²¹² DOD reported this quarter that of the 16 UH-60s in the Afghan inventory, ten are used for pilot and aircrew training and qualification, and six for AAF operational missions. The next two UH-60s set for delivery to Afghanistan are currently undergoing preparation for qualification testing in the United States before being transferred.²¹³

For the AAF modernization program, DOD is procuring: 40 UH-60s, 30 MD-530s, six A-29s, and 10 AC-208s. According to DOD, most of the UH-60s are undergoing or have yet to undergo modification and upgrade; most of the MD-530s have not been built, with deliveries of the first five scheduled for July 2018; two of the additional A-29s have been delivered, with the rest scheduled to be delivered by April 2019; and the first three AC-208s are scheduled to be delivered to their training location in the United States by the end of August.²¹⁴

USFOR-A also reported that the AAF flew their first operational mission in the UH-60s on May 8, 2018, one day after graduating the first four qualified airframe commanders. The AAF is currently operating three flights per week from both Kandahar Airfield and Forward Operating Base Shorab in Helmand Province. UH-60 pilot and crewmember training is ongoing at Kandahar Airfield, with the most recent class graduating 15 pilots and



The AAF's new UH-60s take off from Kandahar Air Field during their first Afghan-led operational mission on May 8. (USAF photo by 1st Lieutenant Erin Recanzone)

the current class including 12 pilots who graduate in early August. TAAC-Air expects, if the recently graduated class is a good indicator, that the current training class could produce three aircraft commanders from the 12 graduates.²¹⁵

AAF Task Availability

The task availability rate is defined as the number of aircraft serviceable and ready to be tasked, for combat or training, compared to the number of aircraft in the operational fleet (excluding those in depot). For example, if a 12-aircraft fleet has five serviceable aircraft, two aircraft in the maintenance depot, and five in other status, this calculation yields a 50 percent task availability (i.e., five of the 10 aircraft not undergoing maintenance) for that airframe. Task availability is a capabilities-based measurement for senior leadership mission planning, rather than a measurement of how contractors are performing in maintaining AAF aircraft.²¹⁶

AAF task availability over the reporting period slightly improved from last quarter's assessment. Only one of five airframes for which the AAF tracks task availability fell short of its mission-readiness benchmark (the C-208), one airframe fewer than last quarter. The AAF has begun tracking UH-60 flight hours, sorties, and task-availability rates, but since the airframe is a newer addition to the inventory, TAAC-Air says there is not yet enough data to determine a task-availability benchmark. Therefore, UH-60 data is not yet incorporated into the task-availability analysis.²¹⁷

However, TAAC-Air did report that the recommended number of flight hours for the UH-60s is 35 hours per month. This means that of the six airframes tracked for flight hours (now including the UH-60), only two

Task Availability Versus Operational Readiness

According to USFOR-A, task availability is a metric separate from but related to "mission capability" or "operational readiness." AAF aircraft that are "available for tasking" are on hand (in Afghanistan) and able to be flown for combat or training purposes. Other metrics, like "mission capable rate" and "operational readiness," are prone to being conflated. AAF maintenance contracts were written with different metrics (often by the same name but with different methods of calculation). TAAC-Air is working to rectify that problem, so that all maintenance contracts supporting the AAF use the same metric for measuring contract performance. However, USFOR-A said outside observers were conflating availability metrics with contract performance and drawing inaccurate conclusions about both contract performance and AAF combat capability. The "available for tasking" metric conveys the combat capacity for the AAF's fleet and is most commonly expressed as a simple ratio reflecting a snapshot in time: aircraft available for tasking versus total aircraft. The task availability metric has a minimum granularity of one day, meaning that it cannot capture the possibility that an aircraft was in several states within a 24-hour period (e.g., it flies a mission in the morning but lands with a maintenance problem). However, USFOR-A notes that those transitions average out.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2018.

airframes (C-130 and Mi-17) significantly exceeded their recommended flight hours, the same as last quarter.²¹⁸

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that the AAF flew 8,752 sorties from February 1, 2018, through April 30, 2018. A sortie is defined as one takeoff and one landing. This is an increase of 637 sorties since last quarter. There were an average of 2,917 per month this quarter, with the most sorties (3,252) flown in March 2018.²¹⁹

As in previous quarters, the Mi-17 flew the greatest number of sorties (4,706) followed by the C-208 (1,515).²²⁰ The Mi-17 continued to fly the most hours of any airframe, an average of 815.5 hours per month this reporting period, followed by the MD-530 at 598 average hours per month. This was a decrease compared to the Mi-17's 829-hour average and the MD-530's 676-hour average reported last quarter.²²¹ USFOR-A said its flight-hours data include all hours flown by the airframes, whether they are for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.²²²

Personnel Capability

USFOR-A provided the following information on how many fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready (CMR) crew members the AAF has for each of its airframes. For more information about the specific training involved for crew members attaining CMR status, please see SIGAR's April 2017 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.²²³ According to USFOR-A, as of May 8, 2018:²²⁴

- **C-130:** 12 total pilots, including eight aircraft commanders and four copilots. Of the aircraft commanders, there are four instructor pilots, three are evaluator pilots; 19 total aircrew, including eight flight engineers and 11 loadmasters.
- **C-208:** 44 total pilots, including 17 aircraft commanders, 26 copilots, and one pilot not yet qualified. Of the 17 aircraft commanders, nine are instructor pilots and two are evaluator pilots; there are also two loadmasters and two pilots qualified as loadmasters.
- **A-29:** 18 total pilots, including 15 flight leads, five of whom are instructor pilots, and three wingmen.
- **MD-530:** 60 total pilots, including 20 aircraft commanders, 29 copilots, 10 instructor pilots, and one pilot not yet qualified.
- **Mi-17:** 76 total pilots, including 41 aircraft commanders and 35 copilots. Of the 41 aircraft commanders, 13 are instructor pilots; for aircrew there are 10 instructor flight engineers, 21 mission flight engineers, and 79 gunners.
- **Mi-35:** 13 pilots, according to the AAF (CSTC-A does not track Mi-35 pilot qualifications).
- **UH-60:** 15 pilots, four of whom are aircraft commanders, and 12 pilots in training.²²⁵

The Special Mission Wing

This quarter, USFOR-A classified most of the data on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR's questions on this data can be found in Appendix E of this report and information about the SMW will be reported in the classified annex.

Afghan National Army Territorial Force

The Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANATF) is a new force element intended to function as a local force, like the ALP, but under the command of regular ANA kandaks and brigades.²²⁶

As of late March, USFOR-A noted that the exact locations of the ANATF and the timeline for its creation is evolving due to the dynamic nature of the security environment in Afghanistan, as well as changes occurring at the ministerial level. Planning considerations will take into account hostile threats, local dynamics, national politics, and the overall progress of Afghanistan's security institutions.²²⁷

Likewise, the projected costs to stand up and maintain the ANATF have yet to be determined. USFOR-A said that a company of the ANATF is expected to save 45 percent in overall annual operations costs, "yield[ing] significant cost savings" compared to the regular ANA. USFOR-A provided a breakdown of these estimated savings, which include: the conversion in the personnel force structure and pay rate (an estimated 6 percent savings); the reduction of equipment (vehicles, weapons, communication systems, etc.) allocated to the ANATF units (a 66 percent savings); and the commensurate reduction in fuel consumption (15 percent savings), ammunition (77 percent savings), and maintenance and parts (56 percent savings).²²⁸

USFOR-A reported that the recruitment of the ANATF has already begun. President Ghani ordered that by 2024, the ANATF will add 36,652 personnel to the ANA. During the pilot phase, 648 ANATF soldiers have been recruited, 80 percent of whom had already received basic training (the same standard as the ANA) at the Kabul Military Training Center. The ANATF pilot will initially be rolled out in six districts of five provinces.²²⁹

As reported last quarter, the ANATF's primary function is to secure areas cleared by the ANA and ASSF, and the force will fall under the operational and training command of regular ANA conventional forces at the platoon level and higher. According to USFOR-A, once in place, the ANATF will alert the ANA of insurgent activity by serving as a communications bridge between the local populace and the Afghan security forces. This is intended to increase local security at the district level, secure and retain key government infrastructure, and prevent insurgent and terrorist freedom of movement. USFOR-A said that typical ANATF operations may include patrolling the district area, providing a quick-reaction force or humanitarian aid, conducting area reconnaissance, engaging with local and government

leaders, and establishing cordons, observation posts, and checkpoints as needed.²³⁰

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$21.3 billion and disbursed \$21 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.²³¹

ANP Strength

This quarter, USFOR-A classified unit-level ANP authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned-and authorized-strength information will appear only in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANP’s total authorized (goal) end strength was 124,626, a considerable decrease from the 157,000 personnel authorized in 2016 and 2017. DOD reported in June that this was due to the transfer of the majority of ABP and ANCOP personnel from MOI to MOD. DOD said that while there was a 20 percent reduction in MOI’s total force size, the MOI headquarters “did not reduce at commensurate levels.”²³² The top-line assigned, or actual, strength of the ANP, as of April 30, 2018, was 117,952 personnel, including 24,216 officers, 35,032 noncommissioned officers, and 58,704 patrolmen. This figure represents a 30,758-person decrease since April 2017, most of which was due to the transfer of 30,686 ANCOP and ABP personnel to MOD. This means the other ANP elements lost only 69 personnel compared to the same period last year.²³³

With the changes to authorization and strength this quarter, the ANP was at 94.6 percent of its authorized strength in April 2018, or 6,674 personnel short of their goal strength. This is a nearly two-point fall from the 96.3 percent one year prior.²³⁴

TABLE 3.8

| MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANP, MARCH–MAY 2018 | | | | |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Equipment Type | Equipment Description | Units Issued in Quarter | Unit Cost | Total Cost* |
| Vehicle | M1152 HMMWV (Humvee) | 40 | \$294,000 | \$11,760,000 |
| Vehicle | M1151 HMMWV (Humvee) | 40 | 237,000 | 9,480,000 |
| Weapon | PKM (Rapid Fire) Machine Gun | 300 | 4,300 | 1,200,000 |
| Weapon | M9 9MM Pistol | 325 | 682 | 221,000 |
| Weapon | 7.62 x 54R Sniper Rifle | 42 | 1,500 | 66,000 |
| Total | | | | \$22,727,000 |

Note: *Figures were rounded by CSTC-A.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018 and 7/18/2018.

ANP Attrition

USFOR-A provided limited ANP attrition information this quarter in an unclassified format. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANP force element will be provided in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR's questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix E.

As of April 30, 2018, CSTC-A reported that ANP monthly attrition averaged between 1 to 1.5 percent over the preceding three months, a slight improvement from the 2 percent average attrition reported over the previous quarter. The attrition rates were calculated from data provided by the ANP; CSTC-A said they are unable to validate the data for accuracy.²³⁵

ANP Sustainment

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$9.1 billion and disbursed \$8.9 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.²³⁶ CSTC-A reported this quarter that the total amount expended for ANP sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (beginning December 21, 2017) was \$29.5 million through May 28, 2018, the majority of which were spent on ANP salaries and incentives and non-payroll-related expenses such as electricity and fuel. CSTC-A disbursed \$17.3 million in salary and incentive pay for the ANP, \$12.2 million for services (such as electricity, security, and telecommunication), and roughly \$31,000 for assets (such as land, infrastructure improvements, communications equipment).²³⁷

According to CSTC-A, the total estimated annual ANP salary and incentive costs for FY 2018 will be \$140.1 million to be paid via LOTFA, the majority of which will come from donor nations other than the United States.²³⁸

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.7 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.²³⁹

As seen in Table 3.8, CSTC-A reported the major items of equipment provided to the ANP from March 1, 2018, through May 30, 2018. During that period, the ANP received several major items of equipment valued at a total of roughly \$22.7 million, significantly less than last quarter's \$211.3 million. Of this amount, the procurement of 40 each of the M1151 and M1152 variants of HMMWV (armored troop-transport vehicles) made up the bulk of the expense, at \$21.2 million. Following these, the costliest items were 300 rapid-fire machine guns (\$1.2 million).²⁴⁰

Equipment Operational Readiness

This quarter USFOR-A classified the data concerning the ANP's equipment readiness. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on ANP equipment readiness in the classified annex.

ANP Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$3.2 billion and disbursed \$3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.²⁴¹ According to CSTC-A, as of May 31, 2018, the United States had completed a total of 763 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly \$3.0 billion. CSTC-A reported that the estimated total sustainment costs for ANP infrastructure in FY 2018 is unchanged since last quarter at \$71.7 million.²⁴² CSTC-A reported 18 ongoing projects from February 1 through May 31, 2018, valued at roughly \$51.6 million, seven fewer projects than last quarter. CSTC-A also reported that eight projects were completed this quarter, valued at a total cost of about \$47.8 million, including the large, \$43.5 million information-technology server installation at MOI Headquarters in Kabul. During the reporting period, one project (valued at roughly \$600,000) was awarded to build a police special forces (National Mission Unit) training facility in Mazar-e Sharif.²⁴³ The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects this quarter were all Women's Participation Program projects: the first phase of the Women's Police Town in Kabul, funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund (\$23.6 million) and scheduled to be completed by late November 2018; compounds for women at the Kabul Police Academy to be completed by June 2019 (\$7.1 million); a women's training facility at the Police Central Training Command in Kabul, which will now be completed earlier, in October 2018 (\$3.9 million).²⁴⁴

CSTC-A reported this quarter that there were five ANP infrastructure projects in the planning phase, valued at approximately \$145 million. Three of these projects are the remaining three phases of the Women's Police Town, valued at roughly \$82 million total (which DOD is not funding), with the last phase estimated for completion by July 2022. The remaining two projects were a CCTV system for Kabul security (roughly \$63 million) and a water-purification system for an ANP regional training center (about \$70,000).²⁴⁵

ANP Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$4.4 billion and disbursed \$4.2 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.²⁴⁶

According to CSTC-A, there are no new ASFF-funded training programs to report this quarter.²⁴⁷ The latest ANP training contracts are listed in Table 3.9.

Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as "guardians," are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.²⁴⁸

While the ANP's personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD funds the ALP, including personnel and other costs. The United States will provide

TABLE 3.9

| ACTIVE ANP TRAINING CONTRACTS AS OF MARCH 2018 | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Case ID | Contract Description | Contractor | Contract Dates | Contract Value |
| W5-B-UAD | ANP and MOI Advisors and Mentors | DynCorp International | 12/1/2017-5/31/2019 | \$74,687,195 |
| 7H-B-UAA | ANP and MOI Advisors and Mentors | TBD | 12/1/2017-5/31/2018 | 27,990,079 |
| W5-B-UAX | Afghan Special Security Forces Training for the ANP | Raytheon | 9/30/2017-N/A | 13,889,977 |
| W5-B-UBR | Afghan Logistics Specialists for the ANP | OT Training Solutions | 7/1/2017-7/31/2018 | 3,226,010 |
| W5-B-UCZ | Gender Occupational Opportunity Development Program for the ANP | Raytheon | 12/1/2017-11/30/2018 | 1,649,790 |
| W5-B-UCX | Counter-IED Training for the ANP | Raytheon | 1/1/2018-N/A | 1,114,958 |
| Total Cost of Highest-Value Training Contracts | | | | \$122,558,009 |

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/22/2018 and 6/22/2018; OSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 7/27/2018.

an estimated \$45.6 million to fund salaries and incentives for the ALP in FY 2018. Funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government.²⁴⁹ Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.²⁵⁰

As of May 6, 2018, the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP has roughly 29,000 guardians on hand, roughly 25,000 of whom are trained, about 4,000 untrained, and about 250 in training. The ALP’s strength has been largely consistent compared to last quarter and last year, but the number of trained personnel fell by roughly 250 personnel, and the number of untrained personnel increased by roughly 300 personnel since the same period last year.²⁵¹ However, the percentage of the force that is untrained remained at around 14 percent, the same as last quarter.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported on the ALP’s continuing efforts to enroll personnel in APPS, to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process, and to inventory materiel. According to NSOCC-A, as of May 15, 2018, roughly 80 percent of ALP have been slotted into APPS, a substantial increase from the 68 percent reported last quarter. However, only about 50 percent of the force has been through the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) process.²⁵² NSOCC-A noted that the gulf between the percentages of the ALP slotted into APPS versus completing the PAI process was due to APPS slotting only requiring verification from the ALP district commander that an individual slotted is an active ALP guardian. To complete the PAI, ALP guardians must be enrolled biometrically in-person.²⁵³

NSOCC-A said that a renewed effort is taking place within the MOI to ensure the ALP PAI is prioritized. On May 1, 2018, several PAI registration teams were deployed to Balkh, Samangan, Kandahar, Parwan, Daykundi, Kunduz, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces, with each team to remain in these provinces for 30 days. The provincial police chiefs have been ordered by the ALP Director to conduct PAI registration on every ALP guardian present for duty, with the ALP chiefs of each provincial police headquarters



ANP commandos from the General Command of Police Special Units conduct clearing operations in Logar Province in late April. (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Paul Sale)

providing daily updates on the ALP PAI numbers and biometric enrollment. The Coalition's regional commands have also been sent information on this effort to increase their visibility and oversight.²⁵⁴ NSOCC-A clarified in July that salaries are not being denied to ALP personnel who have not been through the PAI.²⁵⁵

NSOCC-A reported no change to the estimated \$90 million of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2018 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel).²⁵⁶ Additionally, CSTC-A reported that between December 21, 2017, and May 20, 2018, CSTC-A spent \$6.7 million on stipends for the ALP.²⁵⁷ Consistent with last quarter, about 85 percent of the ALP have been enrolled in EFT or Mobile Money to receive their salaries electronically.²⁵⁸

NSOCC-A reported several efforts are under way to assess ALP reform, including the above-mentioned personnel reforms, addressing power-brokers' (parliamentarians, chiefs of police, etc.) sway over the ALP, and conducting district assessments. This quarter, the ALP's Coalition advisors received the latest quarterly report on the influence of powerbrokers in the ALP from the ALP staff directorate. NSOCC-A reported that the ALP continue to make progress in eliminating powerbroker influence. As of May 20, 2018, the ALP reported only 62 ALP guardians remain under the sway of powerbrokers, a 68 percent decline from the 195 personnel from November 2017. NSOCC-A says the reduction is due to "a new reporting process and the elimination of ghost personnel."²⁵⁹

NSOCC-A confirmed this quarter that ALP district assessments resumed in February 2018. Since that time, the ALP staff directorate has conducted

eight district assessments in police Zone 808 (Baghlan and Kunduz Provinces) and Zone 606 (Herat Province).²⁶⁰

WOMEN IN THE ANDSF

According to the RS Gender Advisor Office, as of April 25, 2018, there were 4,543 women serving in the ANDSF, an increase of 208 personnel since last quarter, but still only 1.4 percent of the entire ANDSF's assigned strength. Of the total female personnel in the ANDSF, 3,231 were in the ANP and 1,312 were in the ANA. Included in the ANA figure are 19 women in the ASSF and 103 in the AAF. Of the women in the ANP, ANA, ASSF, and AAF, there were 1,431 officers, 1,623 noncommissioned officers, 1,356 enlisted personnel, and 133 cadets. The number of female personnel rose across all branches, with the exception of the ASSF, which experienced a substantial decline of 53 women since March 3, 2018.²⁶¹



Two AAF female pilots celebrate their graduation from fixed-wing flight training in the Czech Republic. They are the AAF's second and third female pilots to become mission-qualified. (USAF photo by 1st Lieutenant Erin Recanzone)

RS Gender Affairs reported that there is currently no authorized strength for female ANDSF personnel due to the tashkil being revised for both the ANA and ANP to “better reflect the realities of women serving in the military and police (i.e. career fields, geographic locations, career progression, etc.)” RS said that the authorized strength for ANDSF women would therefore be “in flux” until the respective tashkils are amended and approved by the ministers of defense and interior. RS did report this quarter that the MOD has reassessed its goals for ANA female recruitment. The previously proposed target for female-only positions had been an annual increase of 1,600 for the next four years, or 400 new female recruits per quarter. The new target is 6,425 over eight years; roughly 200 per quarter. CSTC-A said this is considered a more realistic target. The target for ANP women’s recruitment still has not been finalized.²⁶²

In response to questions this quarter about the performance of female ANDSF personnel, RS responded that it is difficult to gauge overall performance, as few records of performance assessments exist for any personnel of either gender. Female ANA personnel are drawn from a wide range of educational backgrounds and skill levels.²⁶³

Based on anecdotal reporting, RS says ANDSF women have performed well in a variety of support and staff functions. However, opportunities for female personnel are limited by the number of authorized positions and, in some cases, reluctance to be assigned outside of Kabul. Further, female ANA and ANP personnel are not always given assignments appropriate to their rank or qualifications, and are often assigned menial tasks unrelated to their job description.²⁶⁴

Literacy rates among female ANA personnel are high, because the majority of women are recruited as NCOs or officers, for whom literacy is required. In the Female Tactical Platoon, 100 percent are literate. Female ANP NCOs are particularly difficult to assess because their training is conducted in Turkey, separate from their male counterparts, and because ANP female personnel perform different roles in police units.²⁶⁵



Afghan soldiers drill on casualty evacuation with a UH-60 helicopter. (USMC photo by Sergeant Luke Hoogendam)

ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE

This quarter, USFOR-A provided unclassified, assigned-strength figures for ANDSF medical personnel for the first time since they were classified in October 2017.

As of May 10, 2018, there were 924 physicians (a two-person increase compared to April 2017), and 2,694 other medical staff (a 191-person decrease) in the ANDSF healthcare system. A number of positions remained unfilled, including: 338 physician positions (26.8 percent of those required) and 544 other medical positions (16.8 percent).²⁶⁶ On April 30, 2018, the commander of ANA Medical Command and the ANP Surgeon General signed an immunization policy prescribing periodic immunization

of ANDSF personnel. The implementation of this policy is expected to reduce personnel losses from vaccine-preventable diseases.²⁶⁷

Funding for Phase Three of the Afghan National Police Hospital renovation project was secured during a June 26 review in which MOI allocated \$24 million to support the project.²⁶⁸

This quarter, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) won MOI approval for 56 additional OTSG Tashkil positions. These positions—four police and four civilians in seven ANP zones—are necessary to staff ANP zone medical supply points. CSTC-A reported that OTSG made this increase affordable by offsetting requirements for police positions by using internal bill payers and senior civilian positions. CSTC-A further reported that OTSG has achieved the personnel and structure necessary to transform from a Kabul-centric focus to a nationwide staff, and is realigning staff functions and organization for a larger, national mission.²⁶⁹

The ANA is currently implementing CoreIMS (the ANDSF's electronic inventory management system) at its Regional Military Hospitals. According to CSTC-A, implementation is currently 71 percent complete with the goal of being fully operational by August 2018. CSTC-A reports that the ANDSF's use of medics with little or no training has resulted in many preventable casualties in the ANA and ANP. RS advisors initiated in March 2018 a **Self-Aid Buddy Care Policy** in ANA and ANP in order to improve casualty survival rates. Current efforts are focused on standardizing medic training across the ANA and ANP.²⁷⁰

In another effort to address casualties, the AAF's medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) systems transported increased numbers of casualties this quarter. CSTC-A reports that all AAF UH-60s are intended to be equipped with Combat Lifesaver first-aid kits and emergency stretchers, in order to enhance their CASEVAC capability. All AAF UH-60s are to be multirole, capable of switching quickly to MEDEVAC and CASEVAC missions as necessary.²⁷¹

Self-Aid Buddy Care Policy: a policy mandating that all ANDSF soldiers and police receive damage-control first-aid training during their initial basic training course. Refresher training is required every two years. The training provides skills in establishing and maintaining a simple airway, controlling a hemorrhage by the application of a tourniquet or pressure at point of bleeding, preventing hypothermia and shock, and the fundamentals of preparing a wounded soldier for medical evacuation.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/13/2018.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

According to the UN, Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs.²⁷² The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$378.7 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. (An additional \$11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort.) PM/WRA has two-year funding and has so far obligated \$18.7 million of its FY 2017 funds. Additional funding will be noted in subsequent SIGAR reports.²⁷³

SECURITY

TABLE 3.10

| CONVENTIONAL-WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2018 | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| Fiscal Year | Minefields Cleared (m ²) | AT/AP Destroyed | UXO Destroyed | SAA Destroyed | Fragments Cleared ^a | Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²) ^a |
| 2010 | 39,337,557 | 13,879 | 663,162 | 1,602,267 | 4,339,235 | 650,662,000 |
| 2011 | 31,644,360 | 10,504 | 345,029 | 2,393,725 | 21,966,347 | 602,000,000 |
| 2012 | 46,783,527 | 11,830 | 344,363 | 1,058,760 | 22,912,702 | 550,000,000 |
| 2013 | 25,059,918 | 6,431 | 203,024 | 275,697 | 10,148,683 | 521,000,000 |
| 2014 | 22,071,212 | 12,397 | 287,331 | 346,484 | 9,415,712 | 511,600,000 |
| 2015 | 12,101,386 | 2,134 | 33,078 | 88,798 | 4,062,478 | 570,800,000 |
| 2016 | 27,856,346 | 6,493 | 6,289 | 91,563 | 9,616,485 | 607,600,000 |
| 2017 | 31,897,313 | 6,646 | 37,632 | 88,261 | 1,158,886 | 547,000,000 |
| 2018 ^b | 9,365,904 | 1,623 | 17,241 | 41,179 | (No data) | 591,700,000 |
| Total | 246,117,523 | 71,937 | 1,937,149 | 5,986,734 | 83,620,528 | 591,700,000 |

Note: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small arms ammunition.

Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

^a Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

^b Partial fiscal year (10/1/2017–3/31/2018) results only.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018.

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution. These funds enable clearing areas contaminated by ERW and support clearing conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From 2002 through March 31, 2018, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 246.1 million square meters of land (95 square miles, or nearly 1.5 times the land area of Washington, DC) and removed or destroyed approximately eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.10 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2018.²⁷⁴

For the first time in Afghanistan, a group of women in Bamyan Province received demining training and learned techniques for defusing mines and explosive ammunition.²⁷⁵

According to the UN, the security situation remains volatile with 5,675 security incidents reported between mid-February and mid-May 2018. IEDs accounted for 15 percent of all incidents.²⁷⁶ Between January 1 and March 31, 2018, IEDs, including complex, suicide and non-suicide attacks resulted in over 1,000 casualties.²⁷⁷ There were 274 civilian casualties due to landmines and ERW during the first quarter of 2018, a 54 percent decrease compared with the same period in 2017. In the first quarter of 2018, 89 percent of ERW victims were children—an 8 percent increase year-on-year.²⁷⁸

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 575 square kilometers (222 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. Following this quarter, the total known contaminated area was 592 square kilometers (229 square miles) in 3,842 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.²⁷⁹

USAID, in partnership with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, most recently through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) III. This \$19.6 million nationwide program ran from April 2015 to February 2018, and provided immediate and short-term assistance to over 149,000 civilian victims of conflict, including ERW victims.²⁸⁰ USAID's final evaluation found that assistance activities were relevant and effective based on beneficiaries' comments, and the project's approach to building awareness of assistance programs was highly effective. Yet, the evaluation concluded that the project did not meet broad governance goals, one being to strengthen Afghan government capabilities to identify and respond to the needs of its citizens.²⁸¹

USAID is in the process of awarding Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) to take over ACAP III's activities. COMAC is a five-year program with an estimated cost of \$39 million. The program, which began March 2018, is based in Kabul with regional offices in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e Sharif that aim to support delivery of victims' assistance to at least 50,000 Afghan families. It will also focus on developing the Afghan government's capacity to deliver victims' assistance.²⁸²

Afghanistan is a signatory of the UN Ottawa Treaty on antipersonnel mines, which requires it to be mine-free by 2023. According to UNMAS, Afghan government compliance is lagging, with funding dropping to 41 percent of 2011 levels. To help meet its international commitments, Afghanistan requested \$85.1 million for clearance activities this year.²⁸³

SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS

SIGAR is conducting two financial audits on Janus Global Operations LLC contracts with the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center:

- audit of contract W912DY-10-D-0016 for costs incurred during the period January 1, 2016, through May 1, 2017, totaling \$20 million under the program Afghanistan-wide Mine, Battle Area, and Range Clearance-Phase II, Effort I
- audit of contract W912DY-10-D-0016 for costs incurred during the period December 1, 2015, through December 1, 2017, totaling \$144.2 million under the program Afghanistan-wide Mine, Battle Area, and Range Clearance-Phase II, Effort II