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## SECURITY

## KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

This quarter, Defense Secretary James Mattis described the security situation in Afghanistan as a “tough fight,” as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) faced pressure from the Taliban along multiple fronts.<sup>86</sup> Regarding the progress toward the goal of reconciliation between the Taliban and Afghan government, Secretary Mattis said in September, “We’re getting two different messages from [the Taliban]. They’ve increased their violence in some parts of the country, not in all parts of course. But they’ve also shown an increased interest in reconciliation. We’ll have to see which way it goes.”<sup>87</sup> While still commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), General John Nicholson said “the Taliban are fighting in order to increase their leverage in the [reconciliation] negotiation and to maintain their cohesion.”<sup>88</sup>

The last few months saw several discouraging developments. After accepting a three-day ceasefire in June, the Taliban rejected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s August 19, 2018, offer of a second ceasefire.<sup>89</sup> The Taliban instead continued conducting offensive operations, including a high-profile attack on October 18 targeting an election-security meeting between General Miller, Kandahar Province police chief General Abdul Raziq, and provincial intelligence chief General Abdul Momin, at the provincial governor’s compound in Kandahar. General Miller escaped the attack unharmed, but General Raziq and General Momin were killed. As of the publication of this report, provincial governor General Zalmay Wesa, 404th Police Zone commander General Nabi Elham, and three U.S. citizens were reportedly wounded and receiving medical treatment. The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack and said that General Miller and General Raziq were their main targets. Former Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh called the incident a “pan-Afghan loss,” adding that General Raziq had been “an architect of stability” who had established “deep political networks” for the government in a province surrounded by insurgent threats.<sup>90</sup>

On August 10, the Taliban conducted their second major assault on a provincial capital this year on Ghazni City in Ghazni Province. Like last quarter’s siege of Farah City, the fighting in Ghazni lasted five days until the insurgents were finally expelled from the city by Afghan commandos



**U.S. Army General Austin Scott Miller** succeeded General Nicholson as commander of USFOR-A and NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) mission on September 2, 2018. (Screenshot from DOD video)

“These attacks in cities bring great hardship on the Afghan people. The Taliban repeatedly claim not to cause civilian casualties, but their actions show otherwise.”

—General John Nicholson

Source: DOD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via Teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan,” 8/22/2018.

supported by American air power. International media outlets reported that at least 100 ANDSF and 150 civilians were killed. However, official reporting on the offensive was initially sparse: much of the communications infrastructure in Ghazni was destroyed by the Taliban, leaving the question of who controlled the city uncertain for days.<sup>91</sup> Afghan defense officials released their account of the events in Ghazni, along with initial casualty figures, in a press conference in Kabul on August 13, and Resolute Support (RS) issued its press statement on August 17.<sup>92</sup> While American officials did not confirm the casualty figures reported in the media, they said that the Taliban ultimately lost more fighters than the ANDSF and that they failed to achieve their major objectives.<sup>93</sup>

In addition to Ghazni, the Taliban maintained pressure on the ANDSF this quarter by overrunning smaller Afghan military bases in Faryab, Baghlan, and elsewhere.<sup>94</sup> By late September, media reports that ANDSF casualties had increased in recent months spurred questions for Department of Defense (DOD) officials, with Secretary Mattis responding that he could not confirm reported numbers of 30–40 ANDSF personnel killed per day but that “they sound about right.” In early October, General Joseph Votel, Commander of U.S. Central Command, confirmed that ANDSF casualties this year had increased compared to last year.<sup>95</sup> When SIGAR asked RS to comment on the issue, they responded, “From the period of May 1 to the most current data as of October 1, 2018, the average number of casualties the ANDSF suffered is the greatest it has ever been during like periods. May was the most active month, accounting for 26% of all casualties during this five month period. The preponderance of casualties during this time period came as a result of either checkpoint operations (52%) or patrolling (35%). Trends indicate that the number of checkpoint casualties is increasing while the number of patrol casualties is decreasing.”<sup>96</sup> SIGAR has reported ANDSF casualty figures in the classified annex of its quarterly reports since RS classified them in September 2017 at the request of the Afghan government.

Other unclassified data show the ANDSF made minimal or no progress in pressuring the Taliban over the quarter. RS-provided data showed that the ANDSF failed to gain greater control or influence over districts, population, and territory this quarter. While the districts, territory, and population under insurgent control or influence also decreased slightly, the districts, territory, and population “contested”—meaning under neither Afghan government nor insurgent control or influence—increased. Notably, Afghan government control or influence of its districts reached the lowest level (55.5%) since SIGAR began tracking district control in November 2015. The Afghan government controls or influences districts in which about 65% of the population lives, unchanged since October 2017.<sup>97</sup>

The ANDSF also struggled to maintain its personnel strength this quarter. The ANDSF’s July 2018 strength of 312,328 personnel—comprising 194,017

in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 118,311 in the Afghan National Police (ANP)—was the lowest strength reported for comparable periods since 2012. ANDSF strength decreased by 1,914 personnel since last quarter and by 8,827 personnel since the same period last year.<sup>98</sup> This puts the ANDSF at roughly 40,000 personnel, or 11%, below their target strength of 352,000.<sup>99</sup> According to DOD, ANDSF attrition is due to a number of factors, including personnel being killed in action, going absent without leave, or declining to reenlist.<sup>100</sup>

However, counterterrorism efforts against Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) scored some successes this quarter. In early August, 250 IS-K militants surrendered to Afghan security forces in Jowzjan Province, a development that General Nicholson described as “eliminat[ing] one of the three pockets of ISIS in Afghanistan.”<sup>101</sup> Then on August 25, U.S. forces conducted an air strike against IS-K in Nangarhar Province that killed their leader, Abu Saad Orakzai, to further disrupt IS-K’s command-and-control and attack-planning capabilities.<sup>102</sup>

American forces in Afghanistan also suffered losses this quarter. Three U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and one U.S. soldier was killed in non-hostile circumstances in Afghanistan from July 18, 2018, through October 15, 2018.<sup>103</sup> For more information on U.S. military casualties in Afghanistan this quarter, see page 81.

“The Afghan army has taken severe casualties over the last year and a half. They’ve stayed in the field fighting.”

—Secretary James Mattis

Source: DOD, “Secretary Mattis Media Availability at the Pentagon,” 9/24/2018.

## ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

USFOR-A newly classified or marked unreleaseable the following data:

- Exact ANDSF female personnel assigned and authorized strength (rounded figures are unclassified)
- All information about ANA and ANP attrition

USFOR-A continued to classify or restrict from public release in accordance with classification guidelines or based on other restrictions placed by the Afghan government:

- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- Corps- and zone-level ANA and ANP authorized and assigned strength
- All performance assessments for the ANA, ANP, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI)
- Information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment
- Information about the Special Mission Wing (SMW), including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, the percent-breakdown of counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions flown, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- The detailed methodology DOD uses to calculate revenue denied to the insurgency as a result of counter-threat finance air strikes

- Reporting on anticorruption efforts by the MOI (unclassified but not publicly releasable)
- Reporting on the status of the ANDSF's progress on security-related benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact (unclassified but not publicly releasable)

SIGAR continues to urge transparency in data relating to the security aspects of Afghanistan reconstruction. A classified annex to this report will cover the classified and nonreleasable data.

## U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY

As of September 30, 2018, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$83.14 billion to support the ANDSF, including amounts appropriated for FY 2019. This accounts for 63% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002.<sup>104</sup> Of the \$4.67 billion appropriated for the ASFF for FY 2018, \$3.24 billion had been obligated and \$2.42 billion disbursed as of September 30, 2018.<sup>105</sup>

In 2005, Congress established the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. Additionally, ASFF supports the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund. Most U.S.-provided funds supporting the ANDSF are channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.<sup>106</sup>

On August 13, President Donald J. Trump signed the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law.<sup>107</sup> The FY 2019 NDAA includes a different authorized ASFF funding breakdown than in previous years: rather than separating the funds by authorization for the Afghan MOD and MOI, the fund is separated into four categories, the ANA, ANP, Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).<sup>108</sup>

Key changes in NDAA authorizations for the ASFF from FY 2018 to FY 2019 include:<sup>109</sup>

- \$1.9 billion less in total ANA funds, though most of this is accounted for in the \$1.8 billion in funds now designated for the AAF (previously ANA and AAF were combined into an MOD category)
- \$116.7 million more funding for ANA infrastructure
- \$428 million less funding for ANP sustainment (which includes salaries, incentive pay, and non-payroll-related expenses such as electricity)
- \$61.4 million less for ANP equipment funds
- \$87.3 million more funding for ANP training
- \$702 million in funds designated for the ASSF (previously these funds would have been designated for MOD and MOI)

On September 28, President Trump signed the FY 2019 Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act and Continuing Appropriations Act.<sup>110</sup> The act appropriated \$4.9 billion for the ASFF in FY 2019, about \$280 million less than the \$5.2 billion authorized by the NDAA, yet a 5% or \$250 million increase over FY 2018 levels.<sup>111</sup>

According to DOD, the majority of ASFF funds are executed using DOD contracts to equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF. Another major use of ASFF is for ANA and ALP salaries, which are paid via accounts at Afghanistan's central bank. The Ministry of Finance then transfers funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted requests.<sup>112</sup> However, unlike the ANA, the ANP's personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development Programme's multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been the largest contributor.<sup>113</sup>

## DISTRICT, POPULATION, AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL

This quarter, Afghan government control or influence of its districts reached the lowest level (55.5%) since SIGAR began tracking district control in November 2015, while control or influence over the population has remained the same since October 2017 (65.2%).<sup>114</sup> The control of Afghanistan's districts, population, and territory overall became more contested this quarter, with both the Afghan government and the insurgency losing districts and land area under their control or influence.<sup>115</sup> For more information on how RS assesses government and insurgent control and influence, please see SIGAR's April 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>116</sup>

### District Control


According to RS, using Afghanistan's 407 districts as the unit of assessment, as of July 31, 2018, there were 226 districts under Afghan government control (75) or influence (151), 55.5% of the total number of districts. This represents a slight decline since last quarter (0.7 percentage points) and the same period last year (1.2 points). Insurgent control or influence of Afghanistan's districts also decreased: there were 49 districts under insurgent control (10) or influence (39). This is a decrease of seven districts since last quarter (1.7 percentage points) and five from same period last year (1.2). Therefore, 12% of Afghanistan's districts are now reportedly under insurgent control or influence.<sup>117</sup> The number of contested districts—controlled or influenced by neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency—increased by 10 since last quarter to 132 districts, meaning that 32.4% of Afghanistan's districts are now contested.<sup>118</sup>

Since SIGAR began receiving district-control data in November 2015, Afghan government control and influence over its districts has declined by

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FIGURE 3.26

## HISTORICAL DISTRICT CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN



Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 11/27/2015, 1/29/2016, 5/28/2016, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, 6/22/2018, and 9/19/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.


about 16 percentage points; contested districts have increased by about 11 points; and insurgent control or influence has risen by 5.5 points.<sup>119</sup> A limited historical record of district control is shown in Figure 3.26.

RS identified the provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with four of its six districts and 53% of the population under insurgent control or influence; Kunduz Province (five of seven districts, 62% of the population); and Helmand Province (nine of 14 districts, 56% of the population). The numbers of districts in each of these provinces that are under insurgent control or influence are all unchanged for the last three quarters. RS noted that the provincial centers of all of Afghanistan’s provinces are under Afghan government control or influence.<sup>120</sup>

As seen in Figure 3.27, RS provided a map showing Afghan government and insurgent control or influence by district. While the assessment categories in the RS narrative assessment (“insurgent control” or “insurgent influence”) are slightly different than those in the map (“insurgent activity” and “high insurgent activity”) RS explained that the change was not due to adopting new methodology for district-control assessments, but was adopted only for the map to make it unclassified and publicly releasable. For the other district-control data, as included above, RS used the original terms.<sup>121</sup>

FIGURE 3.27

## CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN'S 407 DISTRICTS AS OF JULY 31, 2018



Note: A district is assigned its district-stability level based on the overall trend of land-area/population control of each district as a whole. The district stability levels listed in the key of this map do not correspond exactly to the categories used in RS's September 2018 narrative response for district control (i.e. High Insurgent Activity vs. Insurgent Control).  
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

## Population Control

As with district measures, the Afghan government's control or influence over the population showed no improvement since last quarter but showed a slight improvement since last year (one percentage point). According to RS, as of July 31, 2018, about 65% of the population (21.7 million of an estimated 33.3 million total) lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence, the same percentage as the last two quarters. However, this figure represents a 1.5 percentage-point increase in population under government control or influence compared to the same period last year. The insurgency controlled or influenced areas where 10.5% of the population (3.5 million people) lived, a 1.2 percentage-point decrease since last quarter. The population living in contested areas increased to 8.1 million people, a 1.2 percentage-point increase since last quarter.<sup>122</sup> The goal of the Afghan government is to control or influence territory in which 80% of the population (26.6 million people) live by the end of 2019.<sup>123</sup>

“There has not been a significant change one way or the other with respect to population control.”

—General John Nicholson


Source: DOD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via Teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan,” 8/22/2018.

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As seen in Figure 3.28, since SIGAR began receiving population-control data in August 2016, the overall trend has shown a decrease in the Afghan population living in areas under government control or influence (by about four percentage points), a fluctuation of the population living in contested areas from roughly 23% to 29%, and an increase in people living in areas under insurgent control or influence (by about two points).<sup>124</sup>

FIGURE 3.28

## HISTORICAL POPULATION CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN



Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, 6/22/2018, and 9/19/2018. RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.

TABLE 3.7

GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT CONTROL WITHIN AFGHANISTAN AS OF JULY 31, 2018						
Control Status	Districts		Population		Territory	
	Number	%	In Millions	%	Sq Km	%
<b>GOVERNMENT</b>						
Control	75	18%	11.4	34%	106,000	16%
Influence	151	37%	10.3	31%	258,000	40%
<b>CONTESTED</b>						
	132	32%	8.1	24%	165,000	26%
<b>INSURGENT</b>						
Control	10	2%	0.5	2%	37,000	6%
Influence	39	10%	3.0	9%	78,000	12%
<b>Total</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>644,000</b>	<b>100%</b>

Note: Sq Km = square kilometers. Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. Territory figures have been rounded by RS.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 9/2018.

## Territorial Control

Shown in Table 3.7, RS reported that the Afghan government controlled or influenced 364,000 square kilometers (56%) of Afghanistan's total land area of roughly 644,000 square kilometers, down about two percentage points since last quarter. The insurgency controlled or influenced 115,000 square kilometers (18%) of the total land area, also down 1.5 points since last quarter. The remaining 165,000 square kilometers (26%) was contested by the government and insurgents, a 3.5 percentage-point increase since last quarter.<sup>125</sup>

## Violent Events and District Stability

SIGAR conducted an analysis of violent-event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records district-level data of violent incidents across Afghanistan. SIGAR overlays its ACLED analysis with the RS-provided district-stability data (which is a snapshot reflecting district stability as of July 31, 2018) and has chosen the date range of May 16, 2018, to July 31, 2018, accordingly. The results are presented in map form in Figure 3.29 on the following page.

SIGAR's analysis found that there were 1,792 violent events in Afghanistan from May 16, 2018, to July 31, 2018. About 8.3% of ACLED-recorded incident-days were in districts assessed as Afghan government-controlled (as of July 31), 26.9% were in districts assessed as Afghan government-influenced, 47.4% were in districts assessed as contested, 16.6% were in districts assessed as having insurgent activity, and 0.8% were in districts assessed as having high levels of insurgent activity.<sup>126</sup>

### What is ACLED?

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is “a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis-mapping project” funded by the State Department. The project collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all political violence and protest events across Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East reported in open, secondary sources.

ACLED codes the event data it collects as “violent events” or “nonviolent events.” It defines a violent event as “a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups toward a political end, although some nonviolent instances—including protests and strategic developments—are included in the dataset to capture the potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict.”


The types of violent events ACLED codes include: (1) Battle—No Change in Territory, (2) Battle—Non-State Actor Overtakes Territory, (3) Battle—Government Regains Territory, (4) Violence against Civilians, and (5) Remote Violence (such as bombings, IED attacks, mortar and missile attacks, etc.).

Source: ACLED, “About ACLED: What is ACLED?,” “ACLED Methodology,” and “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8 (2017),” pp. 6–8, accessed online on 7/10/2018, available at <https://www.acleddata.com/>.

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FIGURE 3.29

POLITICAL CONFLICT AND DISTRICT CONTROL, MAY 16–JULY 31, 2018



Note: The district map was adapted from the 2012 Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office (AGCHO) shapefile that included 399 districts. Adjustments, some approximate, were made to data for districts that were whole in AGCHO's 399-district set but that were split in RS's 407-district set. See R.L. Helms, District Lookup Tool, <https://arcg.is/1b0JGv> accessed 10/14/2018, for differences amongst district sets. This 407-district set was used to aggregate RS-provided district control data and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) incident data. SIGAR used ArcGIS Pro 2.2 for this analysis and all layers were projected to UTM 42N. ACLED data showing political conflict and protest data between 5/16/2018 and 7/31/2018 was used in order to match RS's district-control reporting period. ACLED data was sorted to the district-level by using a geo-precision code of 1 or 2 and incidents were summed. This left 1,792 district-level incidents for analysis. To create the map, incidents were categorized into three classes using the quantile method. The quantile method produces an equal number of observations per class to facilitate comparative analysis, but the interval of the class must therefore be variable.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; ACLED, South Asia 2016-Present dataset, 5/16/2018–7/31/2018, accessed online on 10/14/2018, available at <https://www.acleddata.com/>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED and RS-provided data, 10/2018.


As the zoomed-in areas of Figure 3.29 show, when looking only at districts coded as under Afghan government control or influence, Nangarhar Province had the highest number of violent events occur within those districts (129 events in 7 districts), followed by Ghazni Province (101 events in 4 districts), and Kabul Province (46 events in one district). Ghazni District experienced 48 security incidents during the period, all of which occurred before the Taliban's offensive on its capital city between August 10–15.<sup>127</sup>

## Enemy-Initiated Attacks

For the first time, SIGAR this quarter requested data from RS on enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) in Afghanistan. According to RS, from January 1 to August 15, 2018, there were 13,940 enemy-initiated attacks throughout Afghanistan, with 8,435 of them occurring last quarter from April 15 to August 15, 2018.<sup>128</sup>

FIGURE 3.30

**ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY PROVINCE, JANUARY 1–AUGUST 15, 2018**



Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2018.


Figure 3.30 shows that most of the attacks that have occurred since January 1, 2018, (7,473, or 54%), occurred in seven of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan. The most violent province in terms of EIA was Faryab, with 1,176 EIA, followed closely by Farah (1,145) and Uruzgan (1,096) Provinces.<sup>129</sup>

Figure 3.31 shows that the most common method of attack in the EIA this year was small-arms fire (75% of EIA), followed by unknown causes of EIA (10%), heavy machine-gun fire (6%), and indirect fire (4%).<sup>130</sup>

For RS’s full data of EIA by province, see Appendix G at [www.sigar.mil](http://www.sigar.mil). SIGAR will continue to monitor EIA to track trends over time.

FIGURE 3.31

**ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY ATTACK TYPE, JANUARY 1–AUGUST 15, 2018**



Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2018.

## UNITED NATIONS SECURITY REPORTING


### Security Incidents Decline; Suicide Attacks and Air Strikes Rise

According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, security incidents across the country decreased since last year, but suicide attacks

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FIGURE 3.32

AVERAGE DAILY SECURITY INCIDENTS BY UN REPORTING PERIOD SINCE 2015



Note: UN reporting periods are occasionally inconsistent, leading to some gaps in data.

Source: UN, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, reports of the Secretary-General, 6/10/2015, p. 4; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 12/10/2015, p. 5; 3/7/2016, p. 6; 6/10/2016, p. 4; 9/7/2016, p. 5; 12/13/2016, p. 4; 3/3/2017, p. 4; 6/15/2017, p. 4; 9/15/2017, p. 4; 12/15/2017, p. 5; 2/27/2018, p. 5; 6/6/2018, p. 5; 9/10/2018, p. 5; SIGAR, analysis of UN-provided data, 9/2018.

**Security incidents:** reported incidents that include armed clashes, improvised explosive devices, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of the Report of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, 12/9/2014.

and AAF and Coalition air strikes increased notably. The UN reported 5,800 security incidents between May 15, 2018, and August 15, 2018, a 10% decrease from the same period in 2017. The decline in security incidents during this period may be partially attributed to the Afghan government and the Taliban’s Eid-al Fitr ceasefires that occurred in June. During the week that included the holiday, the UN recorded a total of 285 incidents, the lowest number recorded since the 2014 transition of security authority to the Afghan government.<sup>131</sup>

As reflected in Figure 3.32, the reporting period saw an average of 62.4 incidents per day, a more than eight incident-per-day decrease compared to roughly the same period in 2017 (70.9). For the third consecutive quarter, the daily average number of security incidents over the reporting period remained lower than the daily average of 64.4 incidents over roughly the last three years. According to the UN, armed clashes continued to cause the most security incidents (61%). However, the UN continued to report significant increases in suicide attacks and air strikes, up 38% and 46% respectively since the same period in 2017.<sup>132</sup>

As in previous quarters, the UN said the eastern, southern, and southeastern regions of Afghanistan experienced the most security incidents during the reporting period. This quarter, incidents occurring in these three regions accounted for 67% of the national total, compared to 82% of the total last quarter. However, the UN noted concerns about the “deteriorating

security conditions in the north” of the country due to an observed increase in ground engagements in Balkh, Faryab, and Jowzjan Provinces. During the reporting period, the Taliban succeeded in capturing three district centers in Faryab Province. Additionally, the surrender of more than 250 IS-K fighters to government forces in Jowzjan Province allowed the Taliban to further consolidate its position in that province. The UN said they recorded 17% more security incidents in northern Afghanistan in the first half of 2018 than the same period in 2017.<sup>133</sup>

## UNAMA: Civilian Deaths at Record High for Second Consecutive Quarter

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued its quarterly update on civilians in armed conflict, which reported 8,050 civilian casualties (2,798 deaths and 5,252 injuries) from January 1 through September 30, 2018.<sup>134</sup>

As seen in Figure 3.33, UNAMA documented more civilian deaths in the first nine months of 2018 than they had during the same nine-month reporting period since 2014. While the number of civilian deaths from January 1–September 30, 2018, increased by 5% compared to the same period in 2017, the number of injuries decreased by 3%, which kept the overall number of civilian casualties roughly on par with the high level of casualties over the same period in 2017.<sup>135</sup>

Similar to the last two quarters, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (suicide, complex, and non-suicide IED attacks) by antigovernment elements continued to be the primary cause of civilian casualties. UNAMA said that the combined use of suicide and non-suicide IEDs caused 45% of all civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2018. Ground engagements


### UNAMA Collection Methodology

According to UNAMA, data on civilian casualties are collected through “direct site visits, physical examination of items and evidence gathered at the scene of incidents, visits to hospital and medical facilities, still and video images,” reports by UN entities, and primary, secondary, and third-party accounts. Information is obtained directly from primary accounts where possible. Civilians whose noncombatant status is under “significant doubt,” based on international humanitarian law, are not included in the figures. Ground engagement casualties which cannot be definitively attributed to either side, such as those incurred during crossfire, are jointly attributed to both parties. UNAMA includes an “other” category to distinguish between these jointly attributed casualties and those caused by other events, such as unexploded ordnance or cross-border shelling by Pakistani forces. UNAMA’s methodology has remained largely unchanged since 2008.

Source: UNAMA, *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 3/6/2018, i-ii; 1/2010, p. 35; 2/11/2009, pp. 4–5; and 8/2015, p. 4.

FIGURE 3.33

### UNAMA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 2009–2018




Note: This chart also appears in UNAMA’s report.

Source: UNAMA, *Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018*, 10/10/2018, p. 1.

FIGURE 3.34


UNAMA: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY INCIDENT TYPE



Total: 8,050

- Suicide and Complex Attacks - 2,343
- Non-Suicide IEDs - 1,291
- Ground Engagements - 2,311
- Targeted/Deliberate Killings - 668
- Aerial Operations - 649
- Explosive Remnants of War - 337
- Other - 451

UNAMA: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT



Total: 8,050

- Antigovernment Elements - 5,243
- Progovernment Forces - 1,753
- Jointly Attributed - 833
- Other - 221

Note: The reporting period for this data is January 1–September 30, 2018. These charts also appear in UNAMA’s report.

Source: UNAMA, *Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018*, 10/10/2018, pp. 2, 3.

were the second leading cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 29% of the total. UNAMA reported that the increase in civilian casualties caused by suicide and complex attacks by antigovernment elements offset decreases in civilian casualties from other incident types, such as the 18% reduction in casualties caused during ground engagements and the 32% decrease from targeted and deliberate killings.<sup>136</sup>

UNAMA attributed 65% of this year’s casualties through September to antigovernment elements, 22% to progovernment forces, 10% to both pro- and antigovernment forces, and 3% to other actors. Notably, UNAMA recorded 649 civilian casualties (313 deaths and 336 injuries) due to aerial operations by progovernment forces from January 1 to September 30, 2018, a 39% increase in civilian casualties from aerial operations since the same period in 2017. This year’s figures reflect a record number of civilian casualties caused by this incident type since UNAMA began recording civilian-casualty data in 2009. UNAMA said that air-strike casualties, together with “a significant increase in civilian casualties from search operations” offset the 17% decrease in civilian casualties from ground fighting by

### U.S. Air Strikes

According to U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), the United States conducted 4,429 air strikes in Afghanistan in the first eight months of 2018. The number of strikes this year already surpasses the total number carried out during 2017 (4,361) and is more than three times the total carried out during 2016. AFCENT reported the greatest number of air strikes in July (746) and August (715) of this year.

Source: AFCENT, “AFCENT Airpower Summary,” 8/31/2018, p. 3.

## Election-Related Violence

UNAMA recorded 366 civilian casualties (126 deaths and 240 injuries) from election-related violence between January 1 and September 30, 2018. Most of these casualties (more than 250) came from two IED attacks on April 22 and May 6 in Kabul and Khost Provinces. Antigovernment elements perpetrated election-related violence during the voter registration period through the use of IEDs, suicide attacks, and targeted killings. They mainly targeted national ID distribution centers, voter registration sites, and election personnel, including elections workers and ANP officers providing security to election-related sites.

UNAMA noted that many of the planned polling centers for the parliamentary elections scheduled in October 2018 and presidential elections in April 2019 are located in schools, health clinics, and mosques. Attacks on such facilities can lead to more civilian deaths and injuries and have a negative impact on access to education, health, and on the freedom of religion. UNAMA said it is also concerned with the increased targeting of electoral candidates. In one recent example, a parliamentary candidate in Kandahar, well-known in his community as a civil-society activist and outspoken critic of corrupt politicians, was shot and killed by Taliban militants on September 25. As of October 18, ten election candidates have been killed while campaigning for office over the last two months.

Source: UNAMA, *Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018*, 10/10/2018, p. 8; *Washington Post*, "U.S. commander in Afghanistan survives deadly attack at governor's compound that kills top Afghan police general," 10/18/2018.

progovernment forces. For UNAMA's full breakdown of civilian casualties by incident type and parties to the conflict, see Figure 3.34.<sup>137</sup>

## IS-K Continues to Inflict Heavy Casualties

UNAMA continued to report a record-high number of civilian casualties caused by suicide and complex attacks by antigovernment elements, more than half of which they attributed to IS-K. As it did last quarter, UNAMA expressed "extreme concern" over the doubling of civilian casualties in Nangarhar Province, where IS-K continues to operate.<sup>138</sup>

IS-K continues to deliberately and indiscriminately target civilians and has claimed responsibility for several high-profile attacks this quarter. According to ACLED, the group claimed 14 attacks targeting Afghan security forces or civilians from July 16 to October 1, 2018, inflicting an estimated 96 fatalities, a decrease of 10 attacks and 46 fatalities compared to the previous period (May 1–July 15, 2018).<sup>139</sup> Two things likely contributed to the decrease in IS-K attacks this quarter: first, in early August, 250 IS-K militants surrendered to Afghan security forces in Jowzjan Province; second, on August 25, U.S. forces killed IS-K's leader Abu Saad Orakzai in an air strike in Nangarhar Province. He was the third IS-K commander killed in just over two years.<sup>140</sup>

## RS Civilian Casualty Data

For the first time, SIGAR this quarter requested detailed civilian-casualty data from RS. From January 1 through August 15, 2018, RS recorded 5,588


### RS Collection Methodology

According to DOD, the RS Civilian Casualty Management Team relies primarily upon operational reporting from RS's Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data.

Source: DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2017, p. 27.

FIGURE 3.35

## RS: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY INCIDENT TYPE



Note: The reporting period for this data is January 1–August 15, 2018. Casualties include dead and wounded.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

civilian casualties in Afghanistan, with the highest number of casualties occurring in January (875), April (801), and June (777).<sup>141</sup> As seen in Table 3.8, RS reported that the provinces with the highest number of civilian casualties by far were Kabul (1,225) and Nangarhar Provinces (935), which together accounted for 38.7% of total casualties nationwide.<sup>142</sup>

While RS's overall civilian-casualty data is difficult to compare accurately with UNAMA's due to their different reporting periods and methodologies, one key difference, is easily discernable. When examining both data sets' casualty figures by incident type, particularly air strikes, it is clear that RS's data reflects far fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA's. As seen in Figure 3.35, from January 1 through August 15, RS recorded a total of 102 civilian casualties due to U.S. (29 casualties) and AAF (73) air strikes, less than a sixth of the 649 reported by UNAMA through September 30, 2018.<sup>143</sup>

RS recorded no civilian casualties due to U.S. or Afghan air strikes during their operations to counter the Taliban's assault on Ghazni in August, and only two U.S. air-strike casualties during the Taliban assault on Farah in May. In both of these incidents, RS reported that U.S. and Afghan forces conducted many air strikes: in Ghazni alone, RS said U.S. forces conducted 32 air strikes from August 10–13 (which killed over 220 Taliban fighters).<sup>144</sup> Conversely, as of October 7, UNAMA reported that it verified 210 civilian casualties (69 deaths and 141 injured) occurring in Ghazni City between August 10 and 15, the majority of which they attributed to ground fighting between Taliban and progovernment forces, but also from progovernment aerial operations.<sup>145</sup>

## U.S. AND COALITION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, as of June 2018, approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), the same number reported for the last three quarters. This number does not include an additional 816 DOD civilian personnel and 10,457 U.S. citizens who serve as contractors in Afghanistan.<sup>146</sup> Of the 14,000 U.S. military personnel, 8,475 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces, unchanged since last quarter.<sup>147</sup> The remaining U.S. military personnel support the OFS mission through air operations, training the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterrorism operations.<sup>148</sup>

As of September 2018, the RS mission included roughly 7,754 military personnel from NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing the current total of RS military personnel to 16,229 (the same as last quarter). The United States contributes the most troops to the RS mission, followed by Germany (1,300 personnel) and Italy (895).<sup>149</sup>

### CSTC-A Change of Command

In addition to the change in the RS and USFOR-A command, CSTC-A also changed commands this quarter. On October 12, U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Rainey succeeded Major General Robin Fontes as CSTC-A commander.

Source: Stars and Stripes, "Rainey Takes the Lead of Key Coalition Command in Afghanistan," 10/12/2018.

TABLE 3.8

RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: JANUARY–AUGUST 15, 2018							
Province	Population	Total Casualties	Casualties Per Thousand	Province	Population	Total Casualties	Casualties Per Thousand
Nangarhar	1,864,582	935	0.50	Ghazni	1,507,262	176	0.12
Kunar	551,469	214	0.39	Badghis	607,825	63	0.10
Paktiya	677,465	259	0.38	Nuristan	173,222	18	0.10
Logar	481,271	137	0.28	Herat	2,326,261	219	0.09
Helmand	1,112,152	290	0.26	Nimroz	202,488	17	0.08
Laghman	552,694	143	0.26	Balkh	1,633,048	111	0.07
Uruzgan	429,415	109	0.25	Ghor	845,018	48	0.06
Khost	704,149	169	0.24	Parwan	817,955	53	0.06
Farah	620,552	135	0.22	Jowzjan	656,187	36	0.05
Kabul	5,452,652	1,225	0.22	Samangan	475,655	26	0.05
Faryab	1,226,475	247	0.20	Takhar	1,208,745	55	0.05
Kapisa	540,051	92	0.17	Badakhshan	1,165,960	30	0.03
Zabul	374,440	57	0.15	Sar-e Pul	690,566	23	0.03
Kandahar	1,512,293	206	0.14	Panjshayr	187,856	4	0.02
Kunduz	1,237,001	169	0.14	Daykundi	561,651	6	0.01
Paktika	532,953	73	0.14	Bamyan	549,243	0	0.00
Baghlan	1,120,511	151	0.13	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>33,329,050</b>	<b>5,588</b>	
Wardak	729,983	92	0.13				

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

## U.S. Forces Casualties

According to DOD, three U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and one U.S. soldier was killed in non-hostile circumstances in Afghanistan from July 18, 2018, through October 15, 2018. On October 4, U.S. Army Specialist James Slape was killed in Helmand Province as a result of wounds sustained from an IED. On September 4, Army Staff Sergeant Diobanjo Sanagustin died from a non-combat related injury at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. On September 3, Command Sergeant Major Timothy Bolyard, of 3rd Squadron, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), was killed and another U.S. soldier was wounded in eastern Afghanistan as a result of an apparent insider attack. The attack illustrates the significant risks SFAB advisors take in working closely with their forward-operating Afghan counterparts. Army Staff Sergeant Reymund Transfiguracion died on August 12 of wounds sustained when an IED detonated near him while he was conducting combat patrol operations in Helmand Province. DOD is currently investigating these incidents.<sup>150</sup>

As of October 15, 2018, a total of 37 U.S. military personnel were KIA (17 in non-hostile circumstances) and 328 military personnel were wounded in action (WIA) since the start of Operation Freedom's Sentinel

on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of the Afghan war in October 2001, 2,401 U.S. military personnel have died (1,881 KIA and 520 of non-hostile deaths) and 20,422 were WIA.<sup>151</sup>

## Insider Attacks on U.S. Forces

USFOR-A reported that from January 1 to August 26, 2018, ANDSF personnel turned on Coalition personnel in one confirmed “green-on-blue” insider attack (which does not include the above-mentioned apparent insider attack on September 3). One U.S. soldier was killed and two were wounded during the confirmed attack. All three were assigned to the 1st SFAB, which is assigned to advise and assist ANDSF personnel below the corps level. The same period last year saw six confirmed green-on-blue insider attacks that killed three U.S. military personnel and wounded 10.<sup>152</sup>

USFOR-A emphasized last quarter that as the SFAB mission began, USFOR-A shifted personnel and resources to support screening of all SFAB partner brigades within the ANA and ANP. This new requirement was implemented while the screening requirements and processes for Coalition conventional bases throughout Afghanistan remained in place. For more information on USFOR-A’s green-on-blue mitigation policies, see SIGAR’s January 2018 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>153</sup>

## Updates on Developing Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Highlights for each RS functional area reported to SIGAR this quarter include:

- **Rule of Law (ROL):** According to ROL, the MOD identified and reported six cases believed to be gross violations of human rights (GVHR) after using the legal criteria ROL had provided. While no DOD determination has yet been made regarding the credibility of the allegations, MOD legal officials believed there were sufficient grounds to formally investigate all six cases. These cases included two allegations of rape or sexual assault (both alleged victims were female ANA personnel), two cases of assault and battery or cruel treatment, one case involving cruel treatment and extrajudicial killing, and one case involving **bacha bazi**. RS Legal Affairs noted that “while [they] appreciate [MOD] reporting on crimes that [MOD] believe meet the criteria, not all allegations rise to the level of a GVHR for DOD **Leahy Law** vetting purposes.”<sup>154</sup>

As of August 22, 2018, MOD investigations of three cases have been completed. One of the cases was dismissed without further action, and the remaining two cases were referred for adjudication by court-martial. One of these two cases has been adjudicated, resulting in a conviction and a one-year sentence. ROL said that if insufficient

**Bacha bazi:** When men, including some government officials and security forces, use young boys for social and sexual entertainment. There are reports that some law-enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges accept bribes from or use their relationships with perpetrators of bacha bazi to allow them to escape punishment.

**Leahy Laws:** The Leahy laws prohibit U.S. funding of units of foreign forces that commit gross violations of human rights.

Source: State, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, 6/30/2016, p. 66; SIGAR, Evaluation Report 17-47-IP: *Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan*, p. 2.

progress is made on open GVHR cases in the coming months, financial penalties will be applied to both ministries. MOD reported to ROL that as of late August, 24% of ANA personnel have received unit-level human rights training.<sup>155</sup>

- **MAG-I STRATCOM:** MAG-I reported a number of strategic-communications successes for MOI this quarter. MOI created a weekly Strategic Communication Working Group chaired by the MOI's chief of staff and attended by senior representatives from many of the major MOI directorates (Religious and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, Gender and Human Resources, and the office of the Deputy Minister for Security). The working group also developed structural and process changes required to institutionalize sustainable strategic communication within the MOI.

In addition, Minister of Interior Wais Barmak had two major engagements with the media that MAG-I STRATCOM felt were successful in informing and building trust with the Afghan public. The first was a media roundtable in early August to discuss the ANP's efforts to provide security to voter-registration sites across Afghanistan and its plans to provide security for polling sites during the October elections. The second was his participation at a joint press conference, with Minister of Defense Tariq Shah Bahrami, on the status of the battle for Ghazni in mid-August.

MAG-I STRATCOM identified the following challenges for MOI strategic and tactical communications: (1) vertical coordination and synchronization of communications from tactical (ANP) to strategic (MOI headquarters) levels; (2) access to accurate operational reporting due to insurgents destroying communication infrastructure; (3) message coordination between MOI and USFOR-A/RS advisors, particularly in fast-paced, crisis situations; and (4) poor leadership, with concerns about the efficacy and professionalism of the MOI spokesman.<sup>156</sup>

- **MAG-D STRATCOM:** MAG-D STRATCOM reported no MOD strategic-communications challenges this quarter, but highlighted a few areas of progress. The MOD appointed a new civilian official as director of strategic communications. They also developed a marketing-communications recruiting plan (radio, TV, and billboard advertisements), specifically for the new ANA Territorial Force.<sup>157</sup>
- **Force Development (FD-AIAT):** FD-AIAT reported "notable accomplishments" with the Afghan Training and Education Enterprise in three broad areas: enhancement of systems approach to ANA training, refining existing doctrine, and providing Afghan command and institutional staff the means to develop training and doctrine programs in MOD academies and branch schools. FD-AIAT identified three key challenges to these efforts: (1) resources and efforts went to field units rather than professional military-education institutions; (2) human

## New NATO Command Center Planned

NATO is planning to replace temporary structures at its headquarters in Kabul with hardened, permanent structures. According to RS officials, a contract to build a large, concrete command-and-control center on the compound is out for bidding. The planned three-story, 120,000-square-foot concrete building would require hundreds of personnel living and working at the current headquarters to relocate to other nearby bases while construction is under way. According to a NATO procurement document, the complex is expected to have more than 800 workspaces, but further details are unavailable until the bidding and design phase of the project are completed.

Source: *Stars and Stripes*, "NATO Base in Kabul is Building More amid Open-Ended US Commitment," 9/17/2018.

resource and career-path management continued to perform poorly; and (3) poor leadership was responsible for the poor sustainment of trainees, a lack of an operational readiness cycle, ineffective collective training, and corruption.<sup>158</sup>

- **Force Development (FD-PIAT):** FD-PIAT reported that 62 female ANP personnel graduated from the first large-scale training course for female police at Balkh Regional Training Center, demonstrating that the ANP can successfully train female police in Afghanistan.<sup>159</sup>
- **Resource Management (RM):** RM reported that it reviewed and analyzed MOD's internal processes to streamline emergency and urgent procurements, which are awaiting approval from the National Procurement Commission. Emergency and urgent procurements are defined as goods, works, or services that exceed roughly \$28,000 per event limit where there is an imminent threat to health, welfare, safety, or damage to property. Final approval for these items and services lies with the Minister of Defense with concurrence from CSTC-A.<sup>160</sup>
- **Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO):** TAO reported that MOD IG has begun the process for coordinating next year's annual inspection plan, developed a plan to create one central complaint center, and restructured its Training and Education branch to include five permanent instructors and course developers. MOI IG submitted its first budget request for years 2019–2021, hired subject-matter experts in quality control, and initiated a plan to reorganize for better efficiency and independence. TAO also reported that the permanent MOD and ANA general staff inspectors general have not yet been appointed, posing a critical barrier to the decision making process of both organizations.<sup>161</sup>
- **Operational Sustainment (OS):** OS-Logistics reported that the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support Contract, which began full operation on December 29, 2017, has delivered substantial maintenance support to the ANDSF. The contractor completed maintenance on 2,224 ANA vehicles and 9,203 ANP vehicles during the period, and oversaw maintenance conducted by the ANDSF on 1,046 vehicles by the ANA (32% of total ANA vehicle fleet) and 249 vehicles by the ANP (2.6% of total ANP vehicle fleet). The ANA's central workshop is also reported to have established inventories for their weapons- and communications-repair divisions, reducing repair wait times for equipment. OS-Medical reported that it has recruited 60 nurses, 30 physicians, and 17 specialty physicians to fill the ANP Hospital's open billets. Additionally, 20,000 tons of scrap metal from ANDSF sites have been disposed of through an MOD-established contract generating revenue for the Afghan government, and the MOI has demilitarized 518 vehicles this year.<sup>162</sup>
- **CJ3/5/7:** MOD produced its Strategic Planning Guidance and MOI produced the annual Strategic Planning Directive during this period,

improving their ability to develop strategic documents and planning initiatives. Pursuant to MOI's first strategic goal to strengthen public order and ensure security, a total of 13,000 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) personnel have been transferred to MOD and redesignated as the Afghan National Civil Order Forces (ANCOF), while the remaining 2,200 ANCOP personnel in MOI have been redesignated as Anti-Riot Police Forces. The transfer was designed to improve command and control and unity of effort, and resulted in redefined tasks and the loss of police powers for ANCOF.<sup>163</sup>

- **Intelligence TAA:** Six of eight planned ScanEagle systems, which are unmanned aerial vehicles that perform reconnaissance, have been fielded to MOD. These six systems are fully operational: the ScanEagle schoolhouse (training center) was recently relocated to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and has one system, and the other five systems are located with the ANA Corps. The two remaining ScanEagle systems are scheduled for fielding to the 207th and 209th Corps in November 2018 and April 2019, respectively. To support enemy targeting, Intelligence TAA has also shared the current CENTCOM list of over 40,000 no-strike entities with MOD in order to reduce collateral damage from kinetic strikes. MOD Intelligence TAA also reported that the National Military Intelligence Center has created a new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) module showing the location, maintenance status, and operational tracking for all ANA ISR assets. The ANA is currently training personnel to operate Wolfhounds, which are backpacked, low-level voice-intercept radios, to listen to and locate insurgent hand-held radios. The training and certification of Wolfhound operators within the ANA increased from 20% capacity last quarter to 40% capacity in September 2018. Intelligence TAA anticipates readiness will increase through further personnel training in October and November.<sup>164</sup>
- **Gender Integration Advisory Office:** This quarter RS Gender Integration Advisory Office reported that the MOI issued an updated human resource manual and a revised gender policy to address sexual harassment but they did not take into consideration recommended policy changes provided by the MOI Human Rights, Women's Affairs and Children Directorate. RS said that MOI's Human Resource Manual and Gender Policy lack the necessary roles, responsibilities, processes, and confidentiality requirements to be effectively implemented throughout the ministry. In addition, the MOD approved its sexual-harassment policy in April 2018, but the policy was subsequently reviewed by RS Rule of Law advisors who recommended changes. A working group recently convened to finalize a substantive policy, which is slated to be approved and signed by the Minister of Defense in October.<sup>165</sup>

## Counterthreat-Finance: Disrupting Insurgent Revenue Streams

USFOR-A have carried out interdiction missions against drug trade-related targets as part of a broader military effort targeting insurgents' revenue generation.<sup>166</sup> According to U.S. government officials, as of early August, air strikes have hit approximately 200 counter-revenue targets, of which 129 were drug-related. The strikes represent a small percentage of the targets hit in the intensified air campaign launched last November under President Trump's South Asia strategy.<sup>167</sup>

The counterthreat-finance strikes are not explicitly intended to curtail the opium trade but to disrupt financing for particular insurgent leaders to make reconciliation more attractive.<sup>168</sup> Between March and July 31, 2018, the Afghan Air Force destroyed four narcotics production facilities, independently from the U.S. counterthreat-finance (CTF) campaign.<sup>169</sup> Coalition forces struck 34 CTF targets between July 1 and September 30, 2018—all targets were narcotics-production facilities. According to USFOR-A, the campaign remains effective at destroying the enemy's resources and causing it to make tactical changes to avoid strikes.<sup>170</sup>

According to DOD, the air campaign has denied the Taliban about \$46 million in revenue so far, although USFOR-A told SIGAR that exact quantities and values for narcotics labs and storage facilities destroyed during air strikes cannot be assessed.<sup>171</sup> DOD admitted that their estimates of revenue denied to the enemy are imperfect because, as they have stated in multiple press briefings, no ground verification takes place to weigh and assess the amounts of the precursors or products actually destroyed by a strike. According to DOD, the numbers represent a sufficient and consistent measure of performance (not effect, which is measured in intelligence reports).<sup>172</sup>

SIGAR has raised concerns in previous reports about DOD estimates of revenue denied from destroyed narcotics and the potential for civilian casualties associated with the campaign. DOD's methodology assigns values to the narcotics-production facilities and a uniform 20% tax rate applied to the total value to determine the potential revenue to the Taliban. It does not account for the various production stages along the opium value chain, nor for the variations in regional tax rates because, according to DOD, these measures would unnecessarily complicate and introduce inconsistencies in the measure of performance.<sup>173</sup> According to David Mansfield, an expert on Afghanistan's opium industry, heroin profits and taxes are not as large as U.S. forces estimate and bombing drug labs will have a negligible effect on Taliban revenues.<sup>174</sup> According to DOD, however, Mr. Mansfield's views are contradicted by CIA classified assessments based on intelligence reviews and the costly changes observed in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of drug-trafficking organizations. USFOR-A reports that no confirmed civilian casualties have resulted from the counter-revenue campaign strikes while 29 civilian casualties were reported by DOD from other coalition air

strikes and 73 from Afghan Air Force air strikes between January 1 and August 15.<sup>175</sup>

## AFGHAN SECURITY MINISTRIES AND THE ANDSF


### ANDSF Strength Declines

USFOR-A reported that the actual, assigned strength of the ANDSF as of July 31, 2018, (not including civilians) was 312,328 personnel, which includes 194,017 personnel in the ANA and AAF and 118,311 in the ANP.<sup>176</sup> As shown in Figure 3.36, ANDSF strength this quarter is the lowest it has been in the third quarter of the year since 2012. The ANDSF strength decreased by 1,914 personnel since last quarter and by 8,827 personnel since the same period last year.<sup>177</sup>

According to DOD, the ANDSF's total authorized (goal) end strength in July was 352,000 personnel, including 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP personnel, but excluding 30,000 Afghan Local Police, who fall under MOI oversight.<sup>178</sup> Seen in Table 3.9 on the next page, this puts the ANDSF at only

FIGURE 3.36

THIRD QUARTER ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH SINCE 2012



Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. These figures do not include civilian personnel. ANP and Total ANDSF figures do not include "standby" personnel, generally reservists, or personnel not in service while completing training. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from the MOI to MOD. However, this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 9/6/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/1/2013, 10/6/2014, 9/11/2015, 8/30/2016, and 9/19/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2016, 10/11/2016, and 10/11/2018; OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 10/2018.

TABLE 3.9

<b>ANDSF ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, AS OF JULY 31, 2018</b>					
<b>ANDSF Component</b>	<b>Authorized Strength</b>	<b>Assigned Strength</b>	<b>% of Target Authorization</b>	<b>Difference Between Assigned and Authorized</b>	
				<b>Assigned and Authorized</b>	<b>Difference</b>
ANA including AAF	227,374	194,017	85.3%	(33,357)	(14.7%)
ANP	124,626	118,311	94.9%	(6,315)	(5.1%)
<b>ANDSF Total without Civilians</b>	<b>352,000</b>	<b>312,328</b>	<b>88.7%</b>	<b>(39,672)</b>	<b>(11.3%)</b>

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police.

Source: DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 6/2018, p. 40; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; SIGAR, analysis of USAFOR-A-provided data, 9/2018.

88.7% of its authorized strength, down from 91.2% during the same period in 2017.<sup>179</sup>

## ANDSF Casualties – Data Classified

USFOR-A continues to classify ANDSF casualty data at the request of the Afghan government.<sup>180</sup> SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANDSF casualties are reported in the classified annex.

## Insider Attacks on the ANDSF Increase

Since responsibility for security began transitioning to the Afghan government in 2014, “green-on-green” insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel are attacked from within their own ranks, sometimes by an insurgent infiltrator, have consistently been a severe problem.<sup>181</sup> According to USFOR-A, there were 23 reported green-on-green insider attacks against ANDSF personnel from May 17 to August 26, 2018, bringing this year’s total to 56 insider attacks. This is an increase of eight attacks compared to roughly the same period in 2017.<sup>182</sup>

The ANDSF incurred 42 casualties (28 killed and 14 wounded) as a result of this quarter’s insider attacks, and a total of 121 ANDSF casualties (85 killed and 36 wounded) from January 1 to August 26, 2018. Though there have been more attacks so far in 2018 compared to the same period in 2017, last year’s attacks were more lethal (97 ANDSF were killed and 50 were wounded).<sup>183</sup>

## ANDSF Force Element Performance – Data Classified

USFOR-A continues to classify ANDSF performance assessments. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex.

This quarter, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released an audit (GAO-19-116) on ANDSF capabilities. The key findings of the report include: the ANDSF have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and Coalition support to fill several important capability gaps; DOD has initiatives to address some of these ANDSF capability gaps, such as country-wide vehicle maintenance and training efforts, yet other capabilities (such as logistics) may take several more years to develop to a self-sustaining level; while DOD has firsthand information on the AAF and the Afghan Special Security Forces' abilities to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units, with DOD relying on the latter's self assessments; and DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations-and-maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan.<sup>184</sup> For more information about this and other U.S. government oversight agency reports on Afghanistan, see Section 4.

### **Ministry Performance Assessments – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continues to classify MOD and MOI performance assessments. SIGAR's questions about the ministries' performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. MOI and MOD performance assessments are reported in the classified annex.

### **AHRIMS and APPS**

The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort DOD expects will greatly improve protection of U.S. funds. The United States pays the ANA and ALP personnel costs through unilateral ASFF funds but it pays ANP personnel costs by contributing to the multilateral LOTFA.<sup>185</sup>

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) contains data that includes the name, rank, education level, identification-card number, and approved positions to align with each ANDSF service member. AHRIMS contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI with each position linked to a unit, location, and duty title. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is currently being fielded and when fully implemented, will integrate AHRIMS data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.<sup>186</sup> The AHRIMS (and in future, APPS) data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF personnel to assist with assignment, promotions and other personnel actions.<sup>187</sup>

As USFOR-A has reported previously, three ongoing efforts aim to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in AHRIMS to support the migration

to APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) the personnel asset inventory, which is a continuous process of physically counting personnel and correcting the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.<sup>188</sup>

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the MOD became “fully mission capable” in APPS on July 30, 2018, meaning that the APPS system has been delivered, and the MOD has the ability to fully employ the system and maintain it to meet their operational needs. However, as of August 22, 2018, only 75.1% of ANA personnel (including civilians) met minimum data-input requirements to be paid via APPS. The total force slotted in APPS as of the same date was 78.3%. According to CTSC-A, the ANA continues to biometrically enroll and slot personnel into the APPS system to increase these figures.<sup>189</sup>

CSTC-A also reported that the MOI are expected to become fully mission capable in APPS by November 30, 2018. As of August 22, 44.9% of ANP personnel (including ALP members and civilian employees) met minimum data-input requirements to be paid via APPS, and 74.5% of the force was slotted in APPS. The ANP completed APPS training for all ANP Zone and Provincial Headquarters personnel and continues to biometrically enroll and slot personnel.<sup>190</sup>

## **Afghanistan Compact – Not Publicly Releasable**

Much of the detailed data about Afghanistan Compact progress is unclassified but not releasable to the public. SIGAR’s questions about the Compact can be found in Appendix E of this report and information about the Compact is reported in the classified annex.

## **AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$46.7 billion and disbursed \$46.0 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>191</sup>

## **ANA Strength – Some Data Classified**

USFOR-A continues to classify unit-level ANA authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength information appear in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANA strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANA’s total authorized (goal) end strength was 227,374.<sup>192</sup> USFOR-A reported that the actual, assigned strength of the ANA and AAF as of July 31, 2018, (not including civilians) was 194,017 personnel, a decrease of 2,273 personnel since last quarter. This quarter’s ANA strength represents a 24,041-person increase from the same period last year, but this

figure is skewed due to the transfer of 30,689 personnel from two MOI force elements (ANCOP and ABP) to MOD.<sup>193</sup> When adjusting for that transfer, the ANA lost 6,648 personnel compared to the same period last year.<sup>194</sup>

The ANA's 194,017 personnel consisted of 85,361 soldiers, 73,364 non-commissioned officers, and 35,292 officers. This put the ANA at 85.3% of its authorized strength in July 2018, or 33,357 personnel short of their goal strength. This is a one percentage point drop since last quarter, and about a two-point fall from the 87.2% one year prior.<sup>195</sup>

### ANA Attrition – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A classified all ANA attrition information; last quarter it provided limited attrition information. SIGAR's questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANA force element is provided in the classified annex to this report.

### ANA Sustainment

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$22.8 billion and disbursed \$22.2 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.<sup>196</sup>

CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget ANA sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (beginning December 21, 2017) was \$495.5 million through August 17, 2018, the vast majority of which was expended on ANA salaries and incentive pay (\$395.2 million, of which roughly \$158.9 million was for incentive pay). This is an increase of about \$29.1 million in salaries and incentive payments compared to the same period last year.<sup>197</sup>

Roughly \$100.3 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements, the costliest of which were energy-generating equipment (\$23.4 million), office equipment and computers (\$17.6 million), and construction of non-building structures (\$10.5 million). This amount reflects a \$66.1 million increase in non-payroll expenses compared to the same period last year.<sup>198</sup>

CSTC-A said this quarter that the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for FY 2019 is estimated at \$735.9 million (an increase from last quarter's estimate of \$651.6 million), but noted that the U.S. contribution to ANA personnel sustainment over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.<sup>199</sup>

### ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$13.7 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.<sup>200</sup>

Seen in Table 3.10 on the following page, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter included 10 aircraft (valued at a total of \$35.5 million), 16 HMMWVs (humvees) valued at a total of \$3.6 million, and other equipment (valued at a total of about \$1.4 million).<sup>201</sup> As shown in Table 3.11 on the following page, several

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**Cargo trucks** (left) awaiting transfer to the ANDSF at the Gear Lot. (Gear International photo)

TABLE 3.10

<b>MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANA, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2018</b>				
<b>Equipment Type</b>	<b>Equipment Description</b>	<b>Units Issued in Quarter</b>	<b>Unit Cost*</b>	<b>Total Cost*</b>
Aircraft	UH-60A Helicopter	5	\$4,000,000	\$20,000,000
Aircraft	MD-530 Helicopter	5	3,100,000	15,500,000
Vehicle	M115A2 HMMWV (Humvee)	8	256,000	2,048,000
Vehicle	M115A1 HMMWV (Humvee)	8	192,000	1,536,000
Weapon	M2 Machine Gun	100	12,500	1,250,000
Other	5 KW Generator	10	18,800	188,000
<b>Total Cost of Equipment</b>				<b>\$40,522,000</b>

Note: \*Figures were rounded by CSTC-A.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/5/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/16/2018.

TABLE 3.11

<b>VEHICLES ISSUED TO THE ANDSF, AUGUST 1–OCTOBER 3, 2018</b>				
<b>Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Received Afghanistan</b>	<b>Issued to Afghan Army</b>	<b>Issued to Afghan Police</b>	<b>Vehicles Not Yet Issued (as of Oct 3, 2018)*</b>
M1151 HMMWV	66	8	87	214
M1152 HMMWV	0	8	106	293
Cargo Truck (MTV International)	48	0	62	605
1200 Gallon Water Tanker	15	0	1	78
1200 Gallon Fuel Tanker	11	0	0	40
Flatbed Wrecker Truck	0	0	13	0
Wrecker Truck	0	0	5	13
Forklift Truck	3	0	0	3
40 Foot Trailer	11	0	0	11

Note: \* This is not an exhaustive accounting of vehicles not yet issued to the ANDSF. This figure includes vehicles ready for issue, vehicles waiting for repair, and vehicles waiting for inspection.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of Gear International, "Gear International Daily Overview Report 03-OCT-2018," 10/3/2018.

hundred ASFF-funded vehicles were received in Afghanistan, issued to the ANA or ANP, or have yet to be issued to the ANA or ANP this quarter. SIGAR will continue tracking the status of these vehicles in future reports.

## **ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continues to classify data on ANA equipment readiness. SIGAR's questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex.

## **ANA Infrastructure**

The United States had obligated and disbursed \$5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure projects as of September 30, 2018.<sup>202</sup>

TABLE 3.12

MAJOR ANA INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS				
Project Description	Project Location	Agency / Contractor	Estimated Cost	Estimated Completion Date
<b>Awarded Projects</b>				
Special Operations Brigade North Forward Operating Center, Camp Pratt	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	USACE / Bultek Construction	\$25,353,848	2/26/2021
Afghan National Army Special Operations Corps, Corps Headquarters	Pul-e Charkhi, Kabul Province	USACE / Bultek Construction	4,993,449	11/1/2020
Forward Operating Center, Camp Julien	Darulaman, Kabul Province	MAKRO Mechanics	2,298,703	2/28/2019
<b>Ongoing Projects</b>				
Marshal Fahim National Defense University, Phase II	Kabul, Kabul Province	Macro Vantage Levant JLT	72,462,207	12/31/2017
Northern Electrical Interconnect at Camp Shaheen	Marmal, Balkh Province	USACE / Venco-Imtiaz Construction Company	27,692,414	10/21/2019
Special Operations Brigade North Forward Operating Command, Camp Pratt	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	USACE / Bultek Construction	25,353,848	2/26/2021
<b>Completed Projects</b>				
ANA Electrical System Repair at North Hamid Karzai International Airport AAF Airbase	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE / Road & Roof Construction Company	1,173,048	7/11/2018
Third Well Construction for the Special Mission Wing at Kandahar Airfield	Kandahar, Kandahar Province	USACE / Assist Consultants Inc.	679,998	8/14/2018
<b>Planned Projects</b>				
Afghan Air Force Aviation Enhancement, Mazar-e Sharif Airfield	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	TBD	37,904,173	N/A
Afghan Air Force Aviation Enhancement, Kandahar Airfield	Kandahar, Kandahar Province	TBD	27,000,000	N/A
New 8th Special Operations Kandak at Forward Operating Base Shank	Logar Province	TBD	9,742,320	N/A

Note: All data is as of August 25, 2018. Marshal Fahim National Defense University's Phase II is pending completion because the necessary replacement of fire doors has not yet been resolved.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.

CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical generator requirements will be roughly \$68 million—the same as last quarter. According to CSTC-A, as of August 25, 2018, the United States completed 454 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at a total cost of \$5.4 billion.<sup>203</sup>

CSTC-A reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing \$1.9 million. Another 37 projects (valued at \$221.6 million) were ongoing, four projects were awarded (valued at \$32.9 million), and 24 projects (valued at \$307.9 million) were being planned.<sup>204</sup> See Table 3.12 for a description of the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANA infrastructure projects.

Included in the projects described above are eight **Women's Participation Program** (WPP) projects valued at a total of \$13.9 million, three projects in the planning phase (\$4.4 million), and five ongoing projects (\$9.5 million).<sup>205</sup> See Table 3.13 on the next page for a description of these projects.

**Women's Participation Program:** An initiative that seeks to advance and promote women's participation in Afghan security institutions. The program promotes safe and secure facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities for women to increase their membership in the ANDSF.

Source: OSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 4/15/2016.

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TABLE 3.13

<b>MAJOR ANA WPP INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS</b>			
<b>Project Description</b>	<b>Project Location</b>	<b>Estimated Cost</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
<b>Awarded Projects</b>			
Women's Training Center in Kabul*	Kabul, Kabul Province	\$2,605,200	11/1/2019
Daycare and Kitchen at Camp Zafar	Herat, Herat Province	1,014,000	TBD
Female Tactical Platoon Facility at Camp Scorpion*	Kandahar, Kandahar Province	805,200	TBD
<b>Ongoing Projects</b>			
Women's Facilities at Marshal Fahim National Defense University*	Kabul, Kabul Province	5,278,818	11/30/2018
Women's Facilities at North Hamid Karzai International Airport Afghan Air Force Airbase*	Kabul, Kabul Province	1,537,747	12/8/2018
Women's Barracks at South Hamid Karzai International Airport / Afghan Air University	Kabul, Kabul Province	1,143,739	1/1/2019

Note: \* Projects are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund, not through unilateral U.S. ASFF funds. All data is as of August 25, 2018.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

## ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$4.3 billion and disbursed \$4.2 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.<sup>206</sup>

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts.<sup>207</sup> For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

## Afghan Air Force

As of August 31, 2018, the United States has appropriated approximately \$6.4 billion to support and develop the AAF from FY 2010 to FY 2018, with roughly \$1.4 billion appropriated in FY 2018, no change since last quarter.<sup>208</sup> A large portion of these funds (\$715.1 million) is earmarked for AAF sustainment costs. According to DOD's FY 2018 budget-justification document, the \$1.4 billion includes \$709.8 million for the second year of the ANDSF Aviation Modernization (AAM) plan which includes the transition from Russian-manufactured helicopters to U.S.-manufactured UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.<sup>209</sup>

Also as of August 31, nearly \$3.9 billion has been obligated for the AAF in FYs 2010–2018, with roughly \$107 million of those funds obligated in FY 2018, unchanged since last quarter. The majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 continues to be for sustainment items, which account for 42.8% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 38.5%.<sup>210</sup>

As seen in Table 3.14 on page 97, the AAF's current inventory of aircraft, as of September 3, 2018, includes:<sup>211</sup>

- 47 Mi-17 helicopters (25 unavailable, three more than last quarter)
- 29 MD-530 helicopters (one unavailable, same as last quarter)
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes (one unavailable, same as last quarter)
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes (one unavailable)
- 20 A-29 light attack airplanes (all available, one more than last quarter)
- 19 UH-60 utility helicopters (all available, three more than last quarter)

TAAC-Air reported this quarter that the AAF received five MD-530s and three UH-60s, and also successfully returned three of its Mi-17s to service from overhaul or heavy repair.<sup>212</sup> Several aircraft have been purchased for the AAF but not yet fielded, including nine A-29s, 10 AC-208s, and 41 UH-60s.<sup>213</sup> According to DOD, the current near-term schedule for aircraft delivery to Afghanistan is two UH-60s per month, five MD-530s per quarter, and seven AC-208s by spring 2019, with three AC-208s remaining in the United States for AAF training. Further deliveries are currently being planned. The final four A-29s to be delivered to the AAF are scheduled to arrive at Moody Air Force Base for AAF training by March 2019. DOD noted that the delivery schedules could vary depending on factors such as availability of trained air crews and maintainers to conduct operations and changes in requirements for numbers of aircraft needed to support training activities.<sup>214</sup>

According to TAAC-Air, the AAF's training for the A-29, C-208, and MD-530 platforms is on track to produce the required number of aircrew. The aircrew for the C-208 and MD-530 become qualified directly out of the initial pilot-training courses that take place outside of Afghanistan. Currently, A-29 training is in the United States, but this is programmed to change by the end of 2020, with DOD and the MOD considering options for a long-term plan for A-29 training beyond 2020. TAAC-Air said the current UH-60 training program is taxing the aircraft-utilization limits to train, season, and upgrade aircrew to create full crews.<sup>215</sup>

Five aircraft-qualification classes to train pilots on how to operate the UH-60 and two mission-qualification classes to train pilots and crews on employing the UH-60 for its specific missions have been completed, progressing on track with the UH-60 growth plan. Training is projected to remain on track if aircraft and crews continue to arrive as anticipated. UH-60 aircrew training will be on pace with aircraft delivery for one year, but is capped at up to 64 pilots and special-mission operators. Training of aircraft commanders (pilot in command) will determine how many full crews are established. According to TAAC-Air, a complete UH-60 crew is a pilot in command, a co-pilot, and two special mission operators (four personnel total). The current projection is to have 17 UH-60 aircrews trained within the next year, in line with the schedule for FY 2019 UH-60 aircraft

delivery. The training for new AC-208 aircrew is just beginning, and TAAC-Air said that it is too early to assess that effort.<sup>216</sup>

## **AAF Task Availability and Operations**

The task availability rate is defined as the number of aircraft serviceable and ready to be tasked, for combat or training, compared to the number of aircraft in the operational fleet (excluding those in depot). For example, if a 12-aircraft fleet has five serviceable aircraft, two aircraft in the maintenance depot, and five in other status, this calculation yields a 50% task availability (i.e., five of the 10 airframes not undergoing maintenance) for that aircraft type. Task availability is a capabilities-based measurement for senior leadership mission planning, rather than a measurement of how contractors are performing in maintaining AAF aircraft.<sup>217</sup> TAAC-Air has gathered enough data on UH-60 flight hours, sorties, and performance to determine a task-availability benchmark this quarter, which they determined is 75%, the same benchmark as for the A-29 and C-208 airframes.<sup>218</sup> According to TAAC-Air, as of July 31, 2018, only one AAF airframe (the C-208) failed to meet its task availability benchmark with an average task availability of 64.2% from May through July 2018.<sup>219</sup>

According to TAAC-Air, the AAF flew an average of roughly 3,165 hours per month this quarter (May 1 to July 31, 2018), a 39% increase in the average amount of hours flown per month last quarter and a 12% increase compared to the same period last year. The Mi-17 continued to fly the most hours of any airframe, an average of 966 hours per month this reporting period, followed by the MD-530 at 806 average hours per month. This was an increase compared to the Mi-17's 816-hour average and the MD-530's 598-hour average reported last quarter.<sup>220</sup> USFOR-A said its flight-hours data include all hours flown by the airframes, whether for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.<sup>221</sup>

Of the six AAF airframes, only two airframes (the Mi-17 and C-130) significantly exceeded their recommended flight hours, the same as last quarter. The Mi-17 flew an average of 966 hours this reporting period versus a recommended 550 hours (176% of recommended) and the C-130 flew an average of 116 hours versus a recommended 75 hours (155% of).<sup>222</sup> The Mi-17 flew 30.5% of the total hours flown by any AAF aircraft from May through July, a roughly five percentage-point decrease from the 35.7% of the AAF's total hours the Mi-17 flew last quarter.<sup>223</sup>

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that the AAF flew 11,199 sorties from May 1, 2018, through July 31, 2018, the most sorties the AAF has reported flying since SIGAR began tracking this data in March 2017. A sortie is defined as one takeoff and one landing. There were an average of 3,733 sorties per month this quarter, with the most sorties (3,990) flown in July 2018. This is a 28% increase from the 2,917 average sorties per month reported last quarter and a 34% increase in average sorties per month reported last

year.<sup>224</sup> As in previous quarters, the Mi-17 flew the greatest number of sorties (5,564) followed by the C-208 (2,184).<sup>225</sup>

## Personnel Capability

TAAC-Air provided the following information on how many fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready (CMR) aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, which can be seen in Table 3.14. For more information about the specific training involved for crew members attaining CMR status, please see SIGAR's April 2017 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.<sup>226</sup>

TABLE 3.14

AFGHAN AVIATION SUMMARY, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2018					
AIRCRAFT	Usable	Total	Command Pilot	Co-Pilots	Other Aircrew
A-29	12	12	15	N/A	0
Mi-17	22	47	25	33	7
UH-60	19	19	9	15	24
MD-530	29	30	34	25	0
C-130	3	4	8	4	14
C-208	23	24	19	11	3

Note: Only qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in this table. "Other Aircrew" includes loadmasters, flight engineers, and special mission operators and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/3/2018; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2018.

TAAC-Air also provided for the first time information on AAF maintenance personnel and their training requirements. They said fully mission-capable AAF maintainers must undergo two to three years of training, which includes 36 weeks of English-language training, two to three months of academics, and six to 12 months of on-the-job training, with some gaps between training. Table 3.15 on the following page for the current number of authorized and assigned AAF maintenance personnel by airframe and other maintenance function, as well as the projected authorizations for AAF maintenance personnel for 2023. As of September 3, 2018, the AAF's 1,246 assigned maintenance personnel were at 73.9% of their authorized strength of 1,686. Kabul Airbase has the most maintenance personnel by far (703), followed by Kandahar (316). Kabul had the highest percentage of maintenance personnel against its authorization (85.9%) and Mazar-e Sharif had the lowest (48.2%). In terms of maintenance positions, the AC-208 and the Maintenance Operations teams had the most personnel against their authorization, at 90.6% and 90.4% respectively. The C-130 (13.3%) and Maintenance Staff (20.2%) teams had the least staff against their authorizations.<sup>227</sup> SIGAR will continue to track AAF maintenance personnel for future quarterly reports.

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TABLE 3.15

AAF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL STRENGTH, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2018															
Maintenance Positions	2018 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH					2018 ASSIGNED STRENGTH					2023 PROJECTED AUTHORIZATIONS				
	Kabul	Kand	MeS	Shind	Total	Kabul	Kand	MeS	Shind	Total	Kabul	Kand	MeS	Shind	Total
A-29	59	64	0	0	123	56	30	0	0	86	59	67	83	0	209
AC-208	57	7	0	0	64	54	4	0	0	58	72	81	62	0	215
C-208	50	50	0	44	144	49	36	0	38	123	48	55	37	36	176
C-130	15	0	0	0	15	2	0	0	0	2	15	0	0	0	15
MD-530	85	102	0	0	187	85	52	0	0	137	76	163	117	0	356
Mi-17	0	50	0	4	54	0	35	0	3	38	0	0	0	0	0
UH-60	75	79	0	42	196	0	22	0	37	59	105	143	67	42	357
UH-60 FFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	78	75	68	0	221
Maintenance Operations	416	154	50	123	743	415	120	25	112	672	305	224	176	107	812
Munitions Squadron	33	31	0	12	76	28	16	0	10	54	45	44	36	12	137
Maintenance Staff	28	30	6	20	84	14	1	2	0	17	24	31	21	17	93
<b>Total</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>1,686</b>	<b>703</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>1,246</b>	<b>827</b>	<b>883</b>	<b>667</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>2,591</b>

Note: All personnel listed above are trained and fully mission-capable. The locations on the table refer to AAF airbases. Kand = Kandahar, MeS = Mazare Sharif, and Shind = Shindand. Maintenance Operations = non-mechanical functions like quality assurance, analysis, plans, scheduling, documentation, training, and logistics; Munitions Squadron = a squadron that stores, maintains, inspects, assembles, and issues aircraft munitions; Maintenance Staff = staff that handle command, support, and finance; FFF= Fixed Forward Firing.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/5/2018, 10/11/2018, and 10/22/2018.

TAAC-Air said this quarter that despite beginning to assign some maintainers to the UH-60, UH-60 maintenance operations are currently conducted by contract and the AAF has no organic UH-60 maintenance capability at this time. The qualification of MD-530 maintainers lags behind delivery of those aircraft, while A-29 maintainer qualification is meeting or exceeding delivery, and AC-208 maintainer-training methodology and qualification-output goals are still being determined.<sup>228</sup>

## The Special Mission Wing – Data Classified

NSOCC-A continued to classify most of the data on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR’s questions on this data can be found in Appendix E of this report and information about the SMW is reported in the classified annex.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$21.6 billion and disbursed \$21.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.<sup>229</sup>

## ANP Strength – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANP authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned-and authorized-strength information appears in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANP’s total authorized (goal) end strength was 124,626, a considerable decrease from the 157,000 personnel authorized in 2016 and 2017. DOD reported in June that this was due to the transfer of the majority of ABP and ANCOP personnel from MOI to MOD. DOD said that while there was a 20% reduction in MOI’s total force size, the MOI headquarters “did not reduce at commensurate levels.”<sup>230</sup>

The assigned, or actual, strength of the ANP, as of July 31, 2018, was 118,311 personnel, including 24,229 officers, 35,424 noncommissioned officers, and 58,658 patrolmen. This figure represents an increase of 359 personnel since last quarter, but a 32,868-person decrease since July 2017, most of which was due to the transfer of 30,689 ANCOP and ABP personnel to MOD. After adjusting for that transfer, the ANP lost 2,179 personnel compared to the same period last year.<sup>231</sup>

The ANP was at 94.9% (or 6,315 personnel below) its authorized strength in July 2018, down from 96.3% of its authorized strength one year prior.<sup>232</sup>

## ANP Attrition – Data Classified

USFOR-A classified all ANP attrition information this quarter, unlike last quarter when limited attrition information was provided. SIGAR’s questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANP force element is provided in the classified annex to this report.

## ANP Sustainment

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$9.4 billion and disbursed \$9.2 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.<sup>233</sup>

According to CSTC-A, the total estimated annual ANP salary and incentive costs for FY 2018 will be \$140.1 million to be paid via LOTFA, a multilateral fund to which the United States has only contributed \$1 million so far this year. Separately, the United States will pay an estimated \$42.1 million to fund salaries and incentives for the ALP, a roughly \$4.5 million decrease from last quarter’s estimate.<sup>234</sup>

CSTC-A reported this quarter that the total on-budget amount expended for ANP sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (beginning December 21, 2017) was \$65.4 million through August 17, 2018, the majority of which were spent on ANP salaries and incentives and non-payroll-related expenses such as electricity and fuel. CSTC-A disbursed \$33.6 million of these funds in salary and incentive pay (mostly for the ALP), \$27.8 million for services (such as electricity, fuel, and natural gas), and roughly



**Afghan Special Police** recruits practice close quarters battle drills during training at the Special Police Training Center, near Kabul, Afghanistan, July 18. (NATO photo by LaShawn Sykes)

\$4 million for assets (such as land, infrastructure improvements, and communications equipment).<sup>235</sup>

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.7 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.<sup>236</sup>

Seen in Table 3.16, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter included nearly 300 vehicles (valued at a total of \$55.1 million) and weapons and other equipment (valued at a total of about \$3.1 million).<sup>237</sup>

TABLE 3.16

MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANP, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2018				
Equipment Type	Equipment Description	Units Issued in Quarter	Unit Cost*	Total Cost*
Vehicle	M115A1 HMMWV (Humvee)	109	\$192,000	\$20,928,000
Vehicle	M115A2 HMMWV (Humvee)	89	256,000	22,784,000
Vehicle	Medium Tactical Vehicle	81	140,000	11,340,000
Weapon	PKM Machine Gun	600	4,200	2,520,000
Weapon	Night Vision Device	299	2,100	627,900
Other	Winch	10	3,700	37,000
<b>Total Cost of Equipment</b>				<b>\$58,236,900</b>

Note: \* Figures were rounded by CSTC-A.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/5/2018, and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/16/2018.

### Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data concerning the ANP's equipment readiness. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANP equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex.

### ANP Infrastructure

The United States has obligated \$3.2 billion and disbursed \$3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure projects as of September 30, 2018.<sup>238</sup>

CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and generator requirements will be roughly \$71.7 million—the same as last quarter. According to CSTC-A, as of August 25, 2018, the United States completed 766 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan costing \$3.0 billion.<sup>239</sup>

CSTC-A reported that three projects were completed this quarter, costing \$3.1 million; 16 projects were ongoing (valued at \$81.3 million); one project was awarded (valued at \$32.8 million); and four projects were being planned (valued at \$144.1 million).<sup>240</sup> Table 3.17 on the following page lists the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANP infrastructure projects.

Included in the projects described above are 17 Women's Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at \$147.5 million. Two projects were being planned (roughly \$70 million), 12 are ongoing projects (\$74.4 million), and three have been completed (\$3.1 million).<sup>241</sup>

### ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2018, the United States had obligated \$4.4 billion and disbursed \$4.2 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.<sup>242</sup>

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of GAO's forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts.<sup>243</sup> For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

### Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP's personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD funds the ALP, including both personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP's personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government.<sup>244</sup> Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF's authorized end strength.<sup>245</sup>

As of July 21, 2018, the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate,

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.17

MAJOR ANP INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS				
Project Description	Project Location	Agency / Contractor	Estimated Cost	Estimated Completion Date
<b>Awarded Projects</b>				
Women's Participation Program (WPP) Police Town, Phase II	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE / Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	\$32,831,000	3/31/2021
<b>Ongoing Projects</b>				
WPP Police Town, Phase I	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE / Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	23,646,225	11/23/2018
WPP Police Town, Phase II	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE / Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	32,831,000	3/31/2021
WPP Women's Facilities at Kabul Police Academy	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE / Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	7,072,803	6/23/2019
<b>Completed Projects</b>				
Daycare for the Afghan Border Police Regional Training Center, Zone 301 Headquarters	Nangarhar, Jalalabad Province	USACE / Assist Consultants Inc.	837,006	5/28/2018
Daycare for the ANP Regional Training Center, Zone 301 Headquarters	Nangarhar, Jalalabad Province	USACE / State Women Corporation	1,232,874	7/31/2018
Daycare and Barracks for the Afghan Uniform Police Provincial Headquarters in Panjshir	Panjshir, Panjshir Province	USACE / Assist Consultants Inc.	1,016,006	7/15/2018
<b>Planned Projects</b>				
WPP Police Town, Phase III	Kabul, Kabul Province	TBD	30,000,000	6/30/2021
WPP Police Town, Phase IV	Kabul, Kabul Province	TBD	40,000,000	8/30/2021

Note: All data are as of August 25, 2018. All WPP Police Town projects listed above are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund, not through unilateral U.S. ASFF funds. The estimated cost of the two WPP Police Town projects in the planning phase are rough estimates based upon recent contract awards. CSTC-A did not report the Afghan Border Police daycare to SIGAR last quarter due to an unexpectedly early completion of the project.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

the ALP has roughly 28,000 guardians on hand, roughly 24,000 of whom are trained, about 5,000 untrained, and about 100 in training. The ALP's strength declined by roughly 1,000 personnel since last quarter, as did the number of trained personnel, with the number of untrained personnel increasing by about 1,000. However, the percentage of the force that is untrained increased this quarter to 17%, up three percentage points since last quarter.<sup>246</sup>

When asked about the large number of untrained personnel, NSOCC-A said the ALP receive a four-week training course covering basic weapons use, human rights, and logistics and supplies, which is taught at the ANP's Regional Training Centers. NSOCC-A said the ALP has the most personnel killed in action of any unit in Afghanistan because they fight in locations without significant backup. For example, ALP will lose (killed in action, absent, contract ended) approximately 3,000 trained personnel over a three-month period. During the same time period, they will hire approximately 5,000 new personnel, all of whom require training. NSOCC-A said even if the training centers are full for the year, there probably will not be an appreciable increase in the number or percentage of ALP personnel trained, due to the number of losses and new recruits.<sup>247</sup>

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported on the ALP's continuing efforts to enroll personnel in APPS, to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process, and to inventory materiel. According to NSOCC-A, as of August 9, 2018, roughly 70% of ALP have been slotted into APPS, a substantial decrease from the 80% reported last quarter.<sup>248</sup>

NSOCC-A reported no change to the estimated \$90 million of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2018 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel).<sup>249</sup>

## WOMEN IN THE ANDSF – SOME DATA CLASSIFIED

RS classified the exact strength data for female personnel in the ANDSF this quarter. A detailed analysis of female ANDSF personnel strength is provided in the classified annex to this report. SIGAR's questions about women in the ANDSF can be found in Appendix E. For rounded strength figures, see Table 3.18.

RS's Gender Integration Advisory Office reported efforts to recruit women for the ANA are currently on hold. MOD is not actively recruiting women for the ANA while the ministry is working to create a dedicated force-development plan that will allow the ANDSF to conduct targeted recruiting of qualified women in the future. There are no lieutenant positions open at this time to either men or women, leaving no vacancies for newly trained recruits. Therefore, if women are recruited with no vacant positions, they go straight into the inactive reserve. Personnel assigned to the inactive reserve are no longer paid now that APPS is officially online. RS said the ANA recruiting goal will be 200 women per quarter once recruiting resumes. It is anticipated that the ratio for female recruits will be somewhere near 30–40% officers to 70–60% NCOs.<sup>250</sup>

TABLE 3.18

<b>ANDSF FEMALE PERSONNEL, ROUNDED ASSIGNED STRENGTH, AS OF JULY 2018</b>					
	<b>Officers</b>	<b>Non-commissioned Officers</b>	<b>Soldiers/ Patrolmen</b>	<b>Cadets</b>	<b>Total</b>
ANP	800	1,200	1,200	0	<b>3,200</b>
ANA	600	400	200	100	<b>1,300</b>
<b>Total</b>					<b>4,500</b>
<b>Afghan Air Force (AAF)</b>					
AAF	60	20	10	10	<b>100</b>
<b>Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)</b>					
ANP	10	80	10	0	<b>100</b>
ANA	10	10	10	0	<b>30</b>

Note: The AAF strength is included in the ANA's total strength number. The ASSF numbers are included in the ANP and ANA numbers, respectively.

Source: RS Gender Integration Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018.

The ANP is also minimally recruiting women as the MOI works to realign targets for female recruitment by rank due to pending tashkil changes to allow for career progression. RS said that current ANP recruitment efforts are focused, for the time being, on recruiting women to attend the Sivas Police Training Academy course in Turkey in October 2018.<sup>251</sup> RS commented generally that focusing on recruiting numbers alone fails to capture the challenge of identifying valid personnel requirements, training needs, and career progression opportunities before placing an emphasis on recruitment.<sup>252</sup>

Separately, the Gender Integration Advisory Office reported that as of August 29, 2018, there are 76 female cadets in training at the Afghan National Military Academy (ANMA). There are also 42 ANDSF women currently attending the Afghan Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences (Afghan Army Medical School), who are receiving broad exposure and hands-on training in combat casualty, ethics, leadership, operational medicine, intensive care/critical care medicine, general medicine, surgery, pediatric, obstetrics, geriatrics, and anesthesia.<sup>253</sup>

When asked this quarter how RS uses the funds authorized by Congress in the NDAA for women in the ANDSF, they responded that funds are primarily used for: the construction of facilities to recruit and retain women and to ensure their safety, incentive pay for female ANDSF personnel, public awareness campaigns to recruit women to work in the ANDSF, and the procurement of training and education classes (both domestic and international) for the professional development of ANDSF female personnel.<sup>254</sup>

## ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE

As of August 28, 2018, the total cost of CSTC-A-procured medical items for the ANDSF since the beginning of the Afghan fiscal year (December 21, 2017) was \$29.5 million. The highest-cost items included, the intravenous (IV) solutions Ringer's Lactate Solution (475,000 units costing \$1.4 million) and sodium chloride (465,000 units costing \$301,000); IV pumps (machines used to administer and monitor the IV fluids being given to a patient, 275 units costing \$617,000), and amoxicillin (4 million units costing \$406,000) and ceftriaxone (1 million units costing \$908,000), both antibiotics used to treat bacterial infections.<sup>255</sup>

As of August 17, 2018, there were 881 physicians (a 43-person decrease since May 2018), and 2,469 other medical staff (a 225-person decrease) in the ANDSF health care system. Of the non-physician staff, 714 were nurses and 379 were medics. The remaining medical staff include dental, medical administration, bio-environmental and preventive medicine, laboratory, and radiology staff. A number of medical positions in the ANDSF remained unfilled, including 92 physician positions (9.5% of those required) and 699 other medical positions (22.1%).<sup>256</sup>

CSTC-A reported this quarter that in response to an increase in tashkil positions, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) ordered the “aggressive” recruitment of qualified medical personnel from the civilian sector for the ANDSF. The Surgeon General took pride in the quality of his recruits and said most of the nurses were Kabul Medical University graduates. The OTSG had also recruited physicians from some of the best hospitals in Kabul, such as the French Medical Institute for Children. OTSG anticipates the full complement of new recruits will be available by March 2019. The delay is primarily due to a backlog of available seats in the Officer Basic Course.<sup>257</sup> According to CSTC-A, the new hires will be reflected in the ANDSF medical personnel strength once the recruits finish their training.<sup>258</sup>