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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
This quarter, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, again described the security situation in Afghanistan as a stalemate, saying the Taliban “are not losing right now” and “we used the term stalemate a year ago and, relatively speaking, it has not changed much.”88

NATO Resolute Support’s (RS) district-stability data confirms Chairman Dunford’s assessment. That data shows that as of October 22, 2018, control of Afghanistan’s districts, population, and territory became somewhat more contested, Afghan government control or influence continued to decline, and insurgent control or influence increased slightly since July 2018. The percentage of the population in districts under Afghan government control or influence—largely stagnant from May 2017 through July 2018 at around 65%—decreased in October to 63.5%. The Afghan government’s control or influence of its districts decreased by nearly two percentage points since July to 53.8%. This quarter, DOD and RS emphasized that RS’s district-stability data is “not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy,” and reiterated that there is some “uncertainty in models that produce [the data]” and subjectivity in the assessments that underlie it. For their full statements and more information about RS’s district-stability data, see page 68.89

RS also reported that from August 16–October 31, 2018, an average of 1,742 enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) occurred per month, a 6% decrease compared to the average of 1,859 EIA per month reported from January 1–August 15. Separately, Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) personnel strength in October 2018 (308,693) fell to the lowest level it has been since the beginning of the RS mission in January 2015. On January 24, 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that about 45,000 Afghan security personnel have been killed since Ghani became president in September 2014. That number indicates that in those roughly 53 months, around 849 Afghan security personnel have been killed per month on average.90

For the first time, on December 20, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, publicly discussed details of his team’s talks with the Taliban, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. According to Ambassador Khalilzad, the United States’s main goal in the talks continues to be an intra-Afghan peace agreement that would ensure that international terrorist organizations...
“If I do get [troop drawdown] orders, I think it’s important for [Afghan officials] to know that we are still with the security forces. . . . Even if I have to get a little bit smaller, we’ll be okay. We’ve thought about this before, and we will be able to do the things that [the Afghans] require in terms of support.”

—General Austin Scott Miller, RS and USFOR-A Commander

can never use Afghan territory against the United States and the international community. Khalilzad said at this juncture he doubted the Taliban’s seriousness about peace due to the group’s insistence on the removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan as well as their continued refusal to engage directly with the Afghan government’s negotiation team.91 The latter sentiment was echoed by Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah at a recent cabinet meeting. As this report went to press, there has been no reporting that the Taliban have agreed to meet with Afghan government representatives.92

Also in late December, U.S. and international media outlets published a number of contradictory reports about whether President Donald J. Trump was considering drawing down 5,000 to 7,000 U.S. forces from Afghanistan. General Dunford and the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Austin Scott Miller, said subsequently that they had received no orders to begin a drawdown.93 DOD told SIGAR on January 11 that they have “nothing to report” about whether the White House ordered the Pentagon to begin planning a troop drawdown in Afghanistan.94

Afghan government officials responding to the press reports of a possible U.S. drawdown generally maintained that the departure of a few thousand American troops would not negatively impact Afghanistan’s security, and noted that the ANDSF have been in the security lead since January 2015. Afghan media reported that the Taliban’s reaction was to issue a statement saying if the Afghan government is actually interested in peace talks with the Taliban, the government should discard its security pact with the United States, the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement (more commonly known as the Bilateral Security Agreement), and order all U.S. troops to leave the country immediately.95

President Ashraf Ghani replaced his ministers of defense and interior in December with two strongly anti-Taliban former defense officials. Asadullah Khalid, selected to lead the Ministry of Defense, ran the Afghan intelligence service in 2012. According to a January Human Rights Watch report, Khalid has been credibly accused of human-rights abuses and war crimes while serving as governor of Ghazni and Kandahar.96 Ghani chose Amrullah Saleh, also a former intelligence chief from 2004 to 2010, to be interior minister but later announced Saleh would run alongside him as his first vice president for the upcoming presidential elections in July 2019. As this report went to press, Ghani had not yet named a new minister of interior.97

ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

There were no major changes this quarter to the types of ANDSF data classified or restricted from public release.

USFOR-A declassified the following information this quarter:

- Exact strength of female ANDSF personnel
- General attrition information for the ANA and ANP

Taliban Fighter Strength Estimate

In a December Senate hearing, the nominee for commander of U.S. Central Command, Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie Jr., estimated active Taliban fighter strength at 60,000. Estimates of Taliban strength vary. DOD OIG estimated in its most recent report (September 2018) that the Taliban had a maximum of 40,000 fighters, 5,000 of whom were part of the Taliban-allied Haqqani Network.

• The percentage of Special Mission Wing (SMW) missions categorized as counternarcotics vs. counterterrorism

USFOR-A continued to classify or restrict from public release, in accordance with classification guidelines or other restrictions placed by the Afghan government, the following data (mostly since October 2017):
• ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
• Corps- and zone-level ANA and ANP authorized and assigned strength
• Performance assessments for the ANA, ANP, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI)
• Information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment
• SMW information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
• The detailed methodology DOD uses to calculate revenue denied to the insurgency as a result of counter-threat finance air strikes
• Reporting on anticorruption efforts by the MOI (unclassified but not publicly releasable)
• Reporting on the status of the ANDSF’s progress on security-related benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact (unclassified but not publicly releasable)

The classified annex for this report covers the classified and nonreleasable data.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY
As of December 31, 2018, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $83.1 billion to support security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 63% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the $4.7 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2018, $3.8 billion had been obligated and $3.7 billion disbursed as of December 31, 2018.

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Nearly half of ASFF is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft sustainment and for Afghan National Army (ANA), AAF, Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries that are paid via accounts at Afghanistan’s central bank. The rest is used for purposes described on page 53. ASFF funds are obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The Ministry of Finance then transfers funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted requests. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI although
it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan provide funding for the ALP.100

Unlike the ANA, a significant share of Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multi-donor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been (but was not in FY 2018) the largest contributor.101

A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on page 120–122.

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**DOD and RS on Control Data**

**DOD:** In response to SIGAR’s analysis of RS’s control data this quarter, DOD said “Measures of population control are not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy or of progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, particularly in the wake of the appointment of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) Zalmay Khalilzad. According to DOD, the [population control] percentages have varied little since the implementation of the South Asia strategy, which over the last 18 months has slowed Taliban gains made during U.S. drawdowns between 2011 and 2016. Moreover, typical quarter to quarter variations in these metrics may be due to, among other things, uncertainty in the models that produce them and the assessments that underlie them are to a degree subjective. DOD considers it more important to instead focus on the principal goal of the strategy of concluding the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. More aggressive combat operations by Afghan forces, increased authorities for U.S. forces to conduct supporting strikes, international calls for peace, and the new SRAR’s engagements appear to be driving the Taliban to substantive negotiations. Taliban participation in these talks suggests that the Taliban recognize that they cannot advance their interests militarily.”

**RS:** RS also commented that “The [South Asia] strategy aims to set conditions for a political resolution to the conflict. One necessary condition is the perception by both sides that the conflict is in a military stalemate. Alternatively, they cannot believe they will attain their goals with continued fighting. Multiple years with little variation in district stability data support multiple years of assessments that the conflict is in a stalemate. Taliban participation in various talks (Russia, U.S. [SRAR], etc.) suggests they have a similar assessment. There is no explanation for Taliban behavior if they are advancing their interest militarily.”

Source: OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.

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**POPULATION, DISTRICT, AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL**

Resolute Support (RS)-reported district-stability data show that as of October 22, 2018, control of Afghanistan’s districts, population, and territory became somewhat more contested, Afghan government control or influence continued to decline, and insurgent control or influence increased slightly since July 2018. The percentage of the population in districts under Afghan
government control or influence—largely stagnant from May 2017 through July 2018 at around 65%—decreased in October to 63.5%. The Afghan government’s control or influence of its districts in October decreased by nearly two percentage points since July to 53.8%. As shown in the box on the left, this quarter, DOD and RS said RS’s district-stability data is “not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy,” and reiterated that there is some “uncertainty in models that produce [the data]” and subjectivity in the assessments that underlie it. For more information on how RS assesses government and insurgent control and influence, please see SIGAR’s April 2016 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

Population Control
The Afghan government’s control or influence over the population declined this quarter. According to RS, as of October 22, 2018, 63.5% of the population (21.2 million of an estimated 33.3 million total) lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence, down roughly 500,000 people (and 1.7 percentage points) since the previous quarter. However, this quarter’s figure represents a slightly smaller decline (0.6 percentage points) in population under government control or influence compared to the same period in 2017.

The insurgency slightly increased its control or influence over areas where 10.8% of the population (3.6 million people) lived, a 0.3 percentage-point increase since last quarter but a decrease from the 12% reported in October 2017. The population living in contested areas increased to 8.5 million people (25.6% of the population), a nearly two percentage-point increase compared to the same period in 2017.

See Figure 3.31 on the next page, for a historical record of population-control data since SIGAR began receiving it in August 2016.

District Control
According to RS, as of October 22, 2018, there were 219 districts under Afghan government control (74) or influence (145), 53.8% of the total number of districts. This represents a decrease of seven government-controlled or influenced districts compared to last quarter and eight since the same period in 2017.

Insurgent control or influence of Afghanistan’s districts increased marginally: there were 50 districts under insurgent control (12) or influence (38) this quarter. This is an increase of one district since last quarter, but a decrease of eight compared to the same period in 2017. Therefore, 12.3% of Afghanistan’s districts are now reportedly under insurgent control or influence. The number of contested districts—controlled or influenced by neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency—increased by six since last quarter to 138 districts, meaning that 33.9% of Afghanistan’s districts are now contested.
FIGURE 3.31
HISTORICAL POPULATION CONTROL OR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Afghan government and insurgent figures include control and influence.

FIGURE 3.31
HISTORICAL DISTRICT CONTROL OR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Afghan government and insurgent figures include control and influence.
Since SIGAR began receiving district-control data in November 2015, Afghan government control and influence over its districts has declined by more than 18 percentage points; contested districts have increased by about 13 points; and insurgent control or influence has risen by about five points. A historical record of district control is shown in Figure 3.31.

RS identified the provinces with the most insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Kunduz (five of seven districts), and Uruzgan (four of six districts), and Helmand (nine of 14 districts). DOD reported in December that the provincial centers of all of Afghanistan’s provinces are under Afghan government control or influence. See Figure 3.32, for an RS-provided map showing Afghan government and insurgent control or influence by district.

**Territorial Control**

As seen in Table 3.3 on the next page, RS reported that the Afghan government controlled or influenced 360,000 square kilometers (56.1%) of
Afghanistan's total land area of roughly 644,000 square kilometers, down less than half a percentage point since last quarter. The insurgency controlled or influenced 111,000 square kilometers (17.3%) of the total land area, also down by roughly half a percentage point since last quarter. The remaining 171,000 square kilometers (26.6%) was contested by the government and insurgents, a one percentage-point increase since last quarter.114

Violent Events and District Stability
SIGAR analyzes violent-event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records district-level data of violent incidents across Afghanistan, to track security-related events. SIGAR overlays its ACLED analysis with the RS-provided district-stability data (which is a snapshot reflecting district stability as of October 22, 2018) and has chosen the date range of August 1, 2018, through October 31, 2018, to align with RS’s reporting period. The results are presented in map form in Figure 3.33.

SIGAR found that there were 1,658 violent events in Afghanistan from August 1 to October 31, 2018, a roughly 7% decrease since last quarter (1,792 events from May 16, 2018, to July 31, 2018). The breakdown of this quarter’s violent events by district-stability level is little changed since last quarter: about 7.1% of ACLED-recorded incident-days from August through October were in districts RS assessed as Afghan government-controlled (as of October 22), 27.6% were in districts assessed as Afghan government-influenced, 46.2% were in districts assessed as contested, 16.5% were in districts assessed as having insurgent activity, and 2.5% were in districts assessed as having high levels of insurgent activity.115

| GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT CONTROL WITHIN AFGHANISTAN AS OF OCTOBER 2018 |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Control                    | Influence       | CONTESTED       | INSURGENT       |
| **GOVERNMENT**             |                 |                 |                 |
| Number                     | %               | In Millions     | %               | Sq Km           | %               |
| Control                    | 74              | 18%             | 11.3            | 34%             | 104,000         | 16%             |
| Influence                  | 145             | 36%             | 9.9             | 30%             | 258,000         | 40%             |
| CONTESTED                  | 138             | 34%             | 8.5             | 26%             | 171,000         | 27%             |
| Control                    | 12              | 3%              | 0.6             | 2%              | 40,000          | 6%              |
| Influence                  | 38              | 9%              | 3.0             | 9%              | 71,000          | 11%             |
| **Total**                  | 407             | 100%            | 33.3            | 100%            | 644,000         | 100%            |

Note: Sq Km = square kilometers. Component numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. Territory figures have been rounded by RS.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.

What is ACLED?
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is “a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis-mapping project” funded by the State Department. The project collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all political violence and protest events across Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East reported in open, secondary sources.

ACLED codes the event data it collects as “violent events” or “nonviolent events.” It defines a violent event as “a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups toward a political end, although some nonviolent instances—including protests and strategic developments—are included in the dataset to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict.”

The types of violent events ACLED codes include: (1) Battle–No Change in Territory, (2) Battle–Non-State Actor Overtakes Territory, (3) Battle–Government Regains Territory, (4) Violence against Civilians, and (5) Remote Violence (such as bombings, IED attacks, mortar and missile attacks, etc.).

Enemy-Initiated Attacks

According to RS, there were 18,295 enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) in Afghanistan from January 1–October 31, 2018, with 4,355 (roughly 24%) of them occurring this reporting period (August 16–October 31, 2018). This reporting period's figures reflect an average of 1,742 EIA per month, which is 6% lower than the average of 1,859 EIA per month from January 1–August 15, 2018.116

As seen in Figure 3.34, most of the attacks that occurred in 2018, (10,698, or 58.5%), occurred in eight of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Herat. Of these provinces, Herat and Badghis experienced the greatest increase in EIA since August 15 (43% and 37%, respectively). The most violent province in terms of EIA shifted this reporting period, with the most EIA reported

IS-K Attacks Continue to Decrease

The number of IS-K-claimed attacks decreased this quarter. According to ACLED, the group claimed three attacks in Afghanistan this quarter (October 2, 2018, to January 15, 2019) that killed 20 people, compared to 14 claimed attacks last quarter (July 16 to October 1, 2018) that killed 96 people. However, there were 74 attacks this quarter conducted by unidentified armed groups—some of which could have been IS-K—that killed 220 people. These unclaimed attacks included the major attack on a gathering of Sunni clerics in Kabul on November 20 that killed 55 people and wounded 94.

Security incidents: reported security-related incidents by all parties to the conflict that include armed clashes, air strikes, IED attacks, targeted killings, abductions, suicide attacks, criminal acts, and intimidation.


Security incidents decline slightly since 2017

According to the United Nations Secretary-General, overall security incidents reported in Afghanistan from August 16 to November 15, 2018, decreased compared to roughly the same period in 2017. The UN reported 5,854 security incidents between August 16, 2018, and November 15, 2018, a 1% increase from last quarter, but a 2% decrease from the same period in

FIGURE 3.34

ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY PROVINCE, JANUARY-OCTOBER 2018


FIGURE 3.35

ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY ATTACK TYPE, JANUARY 1–OCTOBER 2018

Source: RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/22/2019 and 1/15/2019.

in Farah (1,546), followed by Helmand (1,460), and Faryab (1,448) Provinces. Last quarter, Faryab had the most EIA, followed by Farah and Uruzgan Provinces.¹¹⁷

Figure 3.35 shows that the most common methods of attack for the EIA in 2018 were direct fire (81% of EIA), followed by IED explosions (13%), and indirect fire (5%).¹¹⁸ For RS’s full data of EIA by province, see Appendix F. SIGAR will continue to monitor EIA to track trends over time.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY REPORTING

Security Incidents Decline Slightly Since 2017

According to the United Nations Secretary-General, overall security incidents reported in Afghanistan from August 16 to November 15, 2018, decreased compared to roughly the same period in 2017. The UN reported 5,854 security incidents between August 16, 2018, and November 15, 2018, a 1% increase from last quarter, but a 2% decrease from the same period in
2017. The UN also noted that this quarter saw very low levels of violence around the Eid al-Adha holiday period (August 20–24), but very high levels on the first day of parliamentary elections on October 20.  

As reflected in Figure 3.36, the reporting period saw an average of 63.6 incidents per day, a slight decrease in average incidents per day compared to roughly the same period in 2017 (64.4). This quarter’s average daily incidents is the highest of any quarter in 2018, but it remains slightly lower than the daily average over roughly the last three years (64.2). According to the UN, armed clashes continued to cause the most security incidents (63%). The UN also said that suicide attacks this quarter decreased by 37% compared to the same period 2017, which they said possibly reflects successful interdiction efforts in Kabul and Jalalabad. However, the UN reported that AAF and U.S. air strikes increased by 25% compared with the same period in 2017. U.S. Air Force figures show an even higher increase in air strikes this year compared to previous years.

**U.S. Air Strikes**

According to U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), U.S. air assets in Afghanistan dropped 6,823 munitions in the first 11 months of 2018. This year’s figure was already 56% higher than the total number of munitions released in 2017 (4,361), and is more than five times the total released in 2016. AFCENT reported the greatest number of munitions released in November (841), September (831), and October (769) of this year.

Note: UN reporting periods occasionally vary, leading to some gaps in data.

As in previous quarters, the UN said the eastern, southern, and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan experienced the most security incidents during the reporting period. 121

**UNAMA: No Update on Civilian Casualties**
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) did not issue a civilian casualty update this reporting period. For the latest available UNAMA data and analysis (as of September 30, 2018), see pages 77–79 of SIGAR’s October 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. 122

**RS Civilian Casualty Data**
From January 1 through November 16, 2018, RS recorded 8,260 civilian casualties in Afghanistan, with the highest number of casualties occurring in October (1,268), September (946), and January (875). 123 As seen in Table 3.4, RS reported that the provinces with the highest number of civilian casualties by far were Kabul (1,703) and Nangarhar (1,517), which together accounted for 39% of total casualties nationwide. 124

### TABLE 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Casualties</th>
<th>Casualties Per Thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>1,165,960</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>607,825</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>1,120,511</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>1,633,048</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>549,243</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daykundi</td>
<td>561,651</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>620,552</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyab</td>
<td>1,226,475</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>1,507,262</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghur</td>
<td>845,018</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>1,112,152</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>2,326,261</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jowzjan</td>
<td>656,187</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>5,452,652</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>1,512,293</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>540,051</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>704,149</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>551,469</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Casualties include killed and wounded.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2019.

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2017, p. 27.
From January 1 through November 16, RS recorded a total of 122 civilian casualties due to U.S. (47 casualties, 27 killed and 20 wounded) and AAF (75 casualties, 10 killed and 65 wounded) air strikes. Last quarter SIGAR reported that RS said there had been no civilian casualties due to U.S. or Afghan air strikes during May or August 2018, when both forces conducted heavy air operations to counter the Taliban’s assault on Farah in May and on Ghazni in August. However, this quarter their figures are updated to show two civilian casualties in May (one death, one injury, both by U.S. strikes), five civilian deaths from U.S. strikes in August, and one civilian wounded by an AAF strike in August. When asked about the updated civilian casualties, RS said that USFOR-A operations in Farah or Ghazni during May and August did not cause those casualties, but RS could not confirm anything about the AAF air strike casualty in August.

While RS’s overall civilian-casualty data is difficult to compare accurately with UNAMA’s due to their different reporting periods and methodologies, one difference is easily discernible. When examining both data set’s casualty figures by incident type, particularly air strikes, it is clear that RS’s data reflects far fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA’s. As of September 30, UNAMA reported that it verified 210 civilian casualties (69 deaths and 141 injuries) occurring in Ghazni City between August 10–15, the majority of which they attributed to ground fighting between Taliban and pro-government forces, but also from pro-government aerial operations. For the breakdown of RS’s civilian-casualty data by incident type, see Figure 3.37.

**U.S. AND COALITION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN**

According to DOD, as of December 2018, approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were serving as part of the United States’ Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) mission in Afghanistan, the same number reported for the last year. An additional 861 DOD civilian personnel and 10,688 U.S. citizens who serve as contractors are also in Afghanistan. Of the 14,000 U.S. military personnel, 8,475 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces, unchanged since last quarter. The remaining U.S. military personnel serve the OFS mission in support roles or in conducting air operations, training the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterror operations.

As of December 2018, the RS mission included roughly 8,444 military personnel from NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing the current total of RS military personnel to 16,919 (a 690-person increase since last quarter). The United States contributes the most troops to the RS mission, followed by Germany (1,300 personnel) and the United Kingdom (1,100).
U.S. Forces Casualties
According to DOD, seven U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 39 were wounded in action (WIA) in Afghanistan from October 16, 2018, through January 15, 2019. As of January 15, 2019, a total of 61 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan (44 KIA and 17 in non-hostile circumstances) and 369 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom's Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 2,409 U.S. military personnel have died (1,888 KIA and 520 in non-hostile circumstances) and 20,461 were WIA.132

Insider Attacks on U.S. Forces
USFOR-A reported that from August 27 to November 3, 2018, ANDSF personnel turned on U.S. personnel in four confirmed “green-on-blue” insider attacks, bringing the 2018 total through November 3 to five insider attacks. Three U.S. soldiers were killed and six were wounded during this quarter’s attacks, bringing the 2018 total to four soldiers killed and eight wounded. The same period in 2017 saw six confirmed green-on-blue insider attacks that killed three U.S. military personnel and wounded 11.133

For more information about USFOR-A’s green-on-blue attack mitigation policies, see SIGAR’s January 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.134
AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Personnel Strength
USFOR-A reported that the assigned (actual) personnel strength of the ANDSF as of October 31, 2018, (not including civilians) was 308,693 personnel, which includes 190,753 personnel in the ANA and AAF and 117,940 in the ANP. ANDSF strength this quarter is the lowest it has been since the RS mission began in January 2015. ANDSF strength decreased by 3,635 since last quarter and by 3,983 since the same period in 2017. CSTC-A always cautions that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-owned and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy. See Figure 3.38 for a historical record of fourth-quarter ANDSF strength since 2015.

According to DOD, the ANDSF’s total authorized (goal) end strength in December remained 352,000 personnel, which includes 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP personnel, but excludes 30,000 Afghan Local Police, who are under MOI’s command. Seen in Table 3.5 on the next page, this quarter's assigned strength puts the ANDSF at 87.7% (43,307 personnel short) of its authorized strength, down from 88.8% during the same period in 2017.

Figure 3.38

FOURTH QUARTER ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH SINCE 2015

Authorized Strength Total: 352,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10/2015</th>
<th>11/2016</th>
<th>11/2017</th>
<th>10/2018</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>315,744</td>
<td>315,962</td>
<td>312,682</td>
<td>308,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146,026</td>
<td>147,835</td>
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<tr>
<td>169,718</td>
<td>168,277</td>
<td>166,344</td>
<td>190,753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdovers, and student personnel. No civilians are included. ANP strength numbers do not include “standby” personnel, generally reservists, personnel not in service while completing training, or civilians. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from the MOI to MOD, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF. The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact: CSTC-A and SIGAR have long noted many data consistency issues with ANDSF strength numbers, and CSTC-A always cautions that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-owned and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.

ANDSF Casualties – Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR's questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANDSF casualties are reported in the classified annex for this report.

Nevertheless, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, speaking at the World Economic Forum on January 24, said that about 45,000 Afghan security personnel have “paid the ultimate sacrifice” since Ghani became president in September 2014. That number indicates that in those roughly 53 months, around 849 Afghan security personnel have been killed per month on average. He previously said on November 12 that from 2015 to November 2018, 28,529 Afghan security personnel had been killed. That figure reflects an average of at least 620 Afghan security personnel killed per month over those 46 months. These figures are higher than some previous years’ data reported to SIGAR. RS stopped providing unclassified data on ANDSF casualties in July 2017, and the most recent, unclassified figures they reported were 2,531 ANDSF killed in action in roughly the first five months of 2017. This figure represents a much lower monthly KIA average of 506 personnel than President Ghani indicated. ANDSF reported to SIGAR casualties in 2015 averaged 525 KIA per month but were higher in 2016, at an average of 667 KIA per month.

Insider Attacks on the ANDSF Increase
“Green-on-green” insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel are attacked from within their own ranks, sometimes by an insurgent infiltrator, remain a significant problem for the ANDSF. According to USFOR-A, there were 18 reported green-on-green insider attacks against ANDSF personnel from August 27, 2018, to October 31, 2018, bringing this year’s total to 74 insider attacks.
attacks. This is an increase of 22 insider attacks compared to roughly the same period in 2017.\textsuperscript{142}

The ANDSF incurred 60 casualties (34 killed and 26 wounded) as a result of this quarter’s insider attacks, and a total of 181 ANDSF casualties (119 killed and 62 wounded) from January 1 to October 31, 2018. This year’s increase in attacks also corresponded to an increase in ANDSF casualties compared to the same period in 2017, when 102 ANDSF were killed and 53 were wounded in 52 insider attacks.\textsuperscript{143}

**ANDSF Force Element Performance – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify ANDSF performance assessments. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.

**Ministry Performance Assessments – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify MOD and MOI performance assessments. SIGAR’s questions about the ministries’ performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex for this report.

**AHRIMS and APPS**

The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort DOD expects will greatly improve protection of U.S. funds. The United States pays the ANA and ALP personnel costs through the unilateral ASFF and the ANP by contributing to the multilateral LOTFA.\textsuperscript{144}

The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is currently being fielded and when fully implemented, will integrate personnel data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.\textsuperscript{145} The APPS data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF personnel to assist with assignment, promotions and other personnel actions.\textsuperscript{146}

As USFOR-A has reported previously, three ongoing efforts aim to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) the personnel asset inventory (PAI), biometrically enrolling personnel. All three efforts result in the continuous process of physically counting personnel and correcting the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.\textsuperscript{147}

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that both the MOD and MOI are now “fully operationally capable” in APPS as of November 30, 2018, meaning that the APPS system has been delivered and both ministries have the ability to fully employ the system and maintain it to meet their operational
needs. However, neither the ANA nor the ANP have slotted 100% of their personnel into APPS. As of December 2018, only 83.6% of ANA personnel (including civilians) were slotted into the system and met the minimum data-input requirements to be paid. For the ANP, only 60.9% of the force is slotted into APPS and meet the requirements to be paid. Both forces’ enrollment rates increased when compared to last quarter: the ANA slotted nearly 11% more of its personnel, and the ANP about 4% more. CSTC-A said they calculate the percentage of ANDSF personnel slotted into APPS as the number of personnel slotted in APPS divided by the number of personnel the Afghans report to be on hand in each force (their assigned strength figures). CSTC-A also said the full transition to APPS for strength reporting is dependent upon the Afghans’ progress; however, CSTC-A’s estimate is that it will take six more months for the ANA and another year for the ANP.148

On the effort to continue to physically account for and enroll MOD and MOI personnel into APPS (the continuous PAI process), CSTC-A said that the MOD reported 82% completion of the latest PAI, which took place from October 2016 through May 2018 at all corps, brigades, and battalions. MOD is now staffed with permanent biometric teams to conduct PAI throughout the ANA. MOI reported 54% completion of its current PAI (up from 44.9% last quarter).149

A senior U.S. military official expressed concern to SIGAR in October 2018 about whether the APPS was succeeding in rooting out all “ghost,” or non-existent soldiers, especially from the rolls of the MOI. SIGAR is planning to audit ANP personnel and payroll systems.150

Afghanistan Compact – Not Publicly Releasable

This quarter, RS continued to designate unclassified but not publicly releasable much of the detailed security-related data about Afghanistan Compact progress. SIGAR’s security-related questions about the Compact can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the security milestones in the Compact are a bilateral U.S.-Afghan effort designed to commit senior MOD and MOI leadership to maintain pressure on their respective ministries to track progress toward and achieve reform goals. The Afghan National Security Council is responsible for monitoring and reporting ministerial progress to President Ghani, and the Afghan President’s “personal oversight of the Compact provides his [national security advisor] and ministers with incentive to achieve positive progress.”151

CSTC-A reported this quarter that the purpose of the tracker that assesses progress on the Compact’s security milestones will not change, but that a review is under way of the corresponding RS train, advise, and assist (TAI) work tracker (which monitors Coalition TAI efforts with the security ministries). The Compact’s milestone change process will also be

APPs Data-Input Requirements for ANDSF Payroll

There are 20 data points that all ANDSF personnel must have in their APPS record in order to be paid. These include:

- ID card number
- Date of birth
- Enrollment date
- Gender
- Biometric verification number
- Actual rank
- Military education
- Blood type
- First/full name
- Tashkil rank
- Bank account number
- Contract expiration date
- Father’s name
- Date of rank
- AHRIMS ID
- Paragraph number
- Grandfather’s name
- Unit identification code
- Civilian education
- Line number

Note: AHRIMS (the Afghan Human Resource Information System) was the Afghan personnel accountability system prior to APPS. Where possible, records were migrated for personnel enrolled in AHRIMS to APPS.

reevaluated to eliminate milestones that describe broad, strategic-level policy goals, rather than tangible and measurable outcomes.\textsuperscript{152}

**Counterthreat-Finance: Disrupting Insurgent Revenue Streams**

According to DOD, air operations targeting narcotics operations have denied an estimated $200 million to those involved in the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan, and more than $42 million to the Taliban specifically.\textsuperscript{153} DOD uses estimated amounts because, as DOD officials have stated in multiple press briefings, no ground verification takes place to weigh and assess the amounts of the precursors or products actually destroyed by an air strike. According to DOD, the numbers represent a sufficient and consistent measure of performance (not effect, which is measured in intelligence reports).\textsuperscript{154} DOD does not consider its counterthreat finance (CTF) campaign part of the counternarcotics mission in the country. Prior quarterly reports have raised concerns about DOD’s methodology regarding the campaign’s financial impact on drug-trafficking organizations, resources and the potential risk to civilian populations.\textsuperscript{155}

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $47.4 billion and disbursed $46.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.\textsuperscript{156}

**ANA Personnel Strength – Some Data Classified**

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANA authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength information will appear in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANA strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANA’s total authorized (goal) end strength as of December 2018 was 227,374.\textsuperscript{157} USFOR-A reported that the assigned (actual) strength of the ANA and AAF as of October 31, 2018, (not including civilians) was 190,753 personnel, a decrease of 3,264 personnel since last quarter. This quarter’s ANA strength represents a 24,415-person increase from the same period in 2017, but this figure is skewed due to the transfer of 30,689 personnel from two MOI force elements (ANCOP and ABP) to MOD.\textsuperscript{158} When adjusting for that transfer, the ANA lost 6,274 personnel compared to the same period in 2017. CSTC-A always caveats that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-owned and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.\textsuperscript{159}

The ANA’s 190,753 personnel consisted of 83,534 soldiers, 72,456 noncommissioned officers, and 34,763 officers. The ANA’s soldier ranks experienced the vast majority of attrition since last quarter (1,827 soldiers), followed by noncommissioned officers (908), and officers (529).
This quarter’s assigned strength puts the ANA at 83.9%, or 36,621 personnel short, of its goal strength. This is a 1.4 percentage-point drop from the 85.3% reported last quarter and in 2017.160

ANA Attrition – Some Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANA attrition information this quarter but declassified limited attrition information. SIGAR’s questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E. A full analysis of attrition by ANA force element is provided in the classified annex for this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANA attrition rates averaged approximately 2.5% over the quarter. This percentage accounts for attrition alone, not the total decrease in force strength listed on the previous page as that percentage change includes any gains made from recruitment occurring over the quarter. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANA attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOD.161

ANA Sustainment
As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $23.5 billion and disbursed $23 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.162

CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget ANA sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (December 2017–December 2018) was $685.1 million through November 13, 2018. The vast
The United States contribution for ANA salary and incentive pay has increased substantially over the last two years: this year’s spending reflects a $73.3 million increase compared to the same period in 2017, and a $122.1 million increase compared to 2016. CSTC-A noted that while it does not conduct year-on-year salary and incentive-pay comparisons, the major contributor to this year’s increase in ANA salaries and incentives was the growth of the ANA due to the transfer of two MOI force elements (ANCOP and ABP) to MOD.

Roughly $102.4 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements, the costliest of which were energy-generating equipment ($25.4 million), the construction of building and non-building structures ($17.7 million), and office equipment and computers ($17.6 million). This amount reflects a $41.1 million increase in nonpayroll expenses compared to the same period in 2017. Previously, fuel was a large, on-budget nonpayroll sustainment expense, but CSTC-A reported that fuel for ANDSF vehicles is now part of the off-budget funds that CSTC-A manages for the Afghans.

CSTC-A said this quarter that the estimated funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for FY 2019 is estimated at $743 million, but noted that the U.S. contribution to ANA personnel sustainment over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.

**ANA Equipment and Transportation**

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed $13.7 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.

Seen in Table 3.6 on the next page, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (September 1 through November 20, 2018) included 443 HMMWVs (Humvees) valued at a total of about $97 million, five MD-530 helicopters (valued at a total of $32.6 million), two UH-60 helicopters ($23.3 million), and other equipment (valued at a total of about $14.8 million).

**ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified**

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readiness. SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex for this report.

**ANA Infrastructure**

The United States had obligated and disbursed $5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2018.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported an increase in the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical
generator requirements. CSTC-A said that for FY 2019, these costs will reach $110.8 million, a roughly $43 million increase from the $68 million reported last quarter for FY 2018. According to CSTC-A, of the $110.8 million, $74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government. CSTC-A said the increase in the annual facility-sustainment costs projected for the ANA in 2019 is due to the number of new construction projects slated for completion in 2019.\footnote{As of November 15, 2018, the United States completed 456 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at a total cost of $5.4 billion.\footnote{CSTC-A reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $1.7 million. Another 36 projects (valued at $182.5 million) were ongoing, 11 projects were awarded (valued at $28.5 million), and 30 projects (valued at $406 million) were being planned. See Table 3.7 for a description of the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANA infrastructure projects. Included in the projects described above are eight ANA Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $21.9 million, comprising one completed project (\$984,873), four ongoing projects (\$16.5 million), and three projects in the planning phase (\$4.4 million). See Table 3.8 on page 88 for a description of these projects.}}

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As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.3 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.\footnote{As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.3 billion of ASFF for ANA, AAF, and MOD training and operations.}
At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts.\textsuperscript{177} For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

**ANA Territorial Force**

Last year, President Ghani issued an order establishing the ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF), a locally recruited, nationally trained, and nationally led force that was created to play a key role in holding terrain that ASSF and conventional forces have cleared of enemy combatants. According to DOD, ANA-TF soldiers provide some short-term cost savings because they receive only 75\% of the salary conventional ANA soldiers receive and occupy existing bases and facilities.\textsuperscript{178}
One key aim of the ANA-TF model is to refocus the ANA and ASSF on conducting more offensive operations and allow the ANA to eventually transition to a smaller, more affordable force. The ANA-TF has been described as a force similar to the ALP, except that it is recruited, trained, and operated by the MOD and not the MOI. ANA-TF units are not equipped or intended to deploy away from their home district to conduct offensive operations.\textsuperscript{179}

The pilot phase of the ANA-TF implementation plan began in summer 2018, and the first three companies completed training in September and began serving in their home districts under ANA leadership. DOD OIG reported that as of September the ANDSF was able to recruit enough soldiers for six of its eight planned companies in five provinces: Paktika, Laghman, Kapisa, Kandahar, and Herat. It also established three “emergency” ANA-TF companies in Nangarhar Province to improve the volatile security situation there.\textsuperscript{180}

According to DOD, RS ordered a pause in ANA-TF recruiting in September to evaluate the pilot ANA-TF companies and incorporate lessons learned into the program before moving forward. DOD said, “specific emphasis is being placed on determining the conditions that must be established in a community before an ANA-TF [unit] will be allowed to thrive.”\textsuperscript{181} As with the conventional forces, one of the greatest challenges the ANDSF is currently facing in standing up the ANA-TF is the chronic inefficiency of the Kabul Military Training Center, (where MOD recruits are centrally trained) which struggles with infrastructure, Manning, and organizational problems.\textsuperscript{182}

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### TABLE 3.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Project Location</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Awarded Projects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Training Center in Kabul*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>$2,605,200</td>
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<td>Daycare and Kitchen at Camp Zafar</td>
<td>Herat, Herat Province</td>
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<td>Female Tactical Platoon Facility at Camp Scorpion*</td>
<td>Kandahar, Kandahar Province</td>
<td>805,200</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing Projects</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Facilities at Marshal Fahim National Defense University*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
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<td>Women’s Facilities at North Hamid Karzai International Airport Afghan Air Force Airbase*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>1,537,747</td>
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<td>Women’s Barracks at South Hamid Karzai International Airport / Afghan Air University</td>
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<td>Pediatrics and Obstetrics/Gynecology Clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>3/15/2019</td>
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<td><strong>Completed Projects</strong></td>
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<td>MOD WPP Daycare Expansion</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>984,873</td>
<td>11/10/2018</td>
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Note: * Projects are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund. All data is as of November 15, 2018.

It is unclear what schedule and conditions will permit the future recruiting and deployment of more ANA-TF forces. According to USFOR-A, the Afghan government intends to expand the ANA-TF program after the assessment of the ANA-TF’s pilot phase. The expansion would occur over two more phases, with the goal of training 21,000 ANA-TF soldiers by 2020. It was reported in Afghan media in mid-January that the ANDSF deployed 300 new ANA-TF personnel to serve under the ANAs 207th Corps in Herat after they had completed their training. There may be many more ANA-TF personnel already in the pipeline for deployment. DOD said in December that more than 20 companies were in the process of completing their training.

Afghan Air Force

Funding
As of November 23, 2018, the United States had appropriated approximately $6.7 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) since FY 2010. Roughly $1.7 billion of those funds were appropriated in FY 2018, a $326.5 million increase from the appropriated funds reported last quarter. A large portion of FY 2018 funds ($882.1 million) is earmarked for AAF sustainment costs, which is primarily used to maintain an in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, Mi-17, PC-12, A-29, C-208, and C-130. According to DOD’s FY 2018 budget-justification document, the appropriated funds for FY 2018 include $709.8 million for the second year of the ANDSF Aviation Modernization (AAM) plan, a major part of which is the transition from Russian-manufactured Mi-17 helicopters to U.S.-manufactured UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

Also as of November 23, nearly $5.1 billion had been obligated for the AAF and SMW in FYs 2010–2018, a roughly $1.3 billion increase since last quarter. About $1.4 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018. The majority of the funding obligated since FY 2010 continues to be for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 46.8% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 35.5%.

Aircraft Inventory and Status
As seen in Table 3.9 on page 94, the AAF’s current inventory of aircraft, as of December 13, 2018, includes:

- 47 Mi-17 helicopters (21 unavailable, four fewer unavailable than last quarter)
- 35 MD-530 helicopters (all available, one more than last quarter)
- 24 C-208 utility airplanes (one unavailable, same as last quarter)
- 4 C-130 transport airplanes (all available, one more than last quarter)
- 12 A-29 light attack airplanes (one unavailable, one more than last quarter, nine more in the United States for training)
- 26 UH-60 utility helicopters (one unavailable, one more than last quarter)
Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) reported this quarter that the AAF received five more MD-530s and seven UH-60s in Afghanistan, and one more A-29 in the United States (a total of nine A-29s are in the United States and 12 are in Afghanistan) for U.S.-based AAF training that will eventually transfer to Afghanistan. One UH-60 was irreparably damaged this quarter when a HMMWV crashed into it. TAAC-Air said there is currently no plan to replace it. One A-29 was severely damaged during battle but was deemed reparable.189 Four of the AAF’s Mi-17s, one MD-530, and one C-130 were returned to service this quarter.190

Several aircraft have been purchased for the AAF but not yet fielded, including four A-29s, 10 AC-208s, 20 MD-530s, and 27 UH-60s.191 According to DOD, the current near-term schedule for aircraft delivery to Afghanistan is two UH-60s per month, five MD-530s per quarter, and seven AC-208s by spring 2019, with three AC-208s remaining in the United States for AAF training. Further deliveries are currently being planned. The final four A-29s to be delivered to the AAF are scheduled to arrive at Moody Air Force Base for AAF training by March 2019. DOD noted that the delivery schedules could vary depending on factors such as availability of trained air crews and maintainers to conduct operations and changes in requirements for numbers of aircraft needed to support training activities.192

**AAF Operations and Task Availability**

TAAC-Air reported that the AAF flew 13,056 sorties from August 1, 2018, through November 30, 2018. A sortie is defined as one takeoff and one landing. There were an average of 3,264 sorties per month this quarter, with the most sorties (3,665) flown in October 2018. This is a 13% decrease from the 3,733 average sorties per month reported last quarter but a 5% increase in average sorties per month compared to the same period in 2017.193 As in previous quarters, the Mi-17 flew the greatest number of sorties (5,346) followed by the C-208 (2,854).194

According to TAAC-Air, two of six AAF airframes failed to meet their task availability benchmarks this quarter, one more than last quarter. The MD-530’s average task availability from August through November was 72.2% against a goal of 75%, and the C-208’s was an average of 73.8% against a goal of 80%.195

According to TAAC-Air, the AAF flew an average of roughly 2,936 hours this quarter (August 1 through November 30, 2018), a 7% decrease in the average number of hours flown last quarter but a 3% increase compared to the same period in 2017. The Mi-17 continued to fly the most hours of any airframe, an average of 800 hours per month this reporting period, followed by the MD-530 at 695.5 average hours per month. This was a decrease compared to the Mi-17’s 965.7 hour-per-month average and the MD-530’s 805.7 hour-per-month average flown during the preceding reporting period (May through July 2018).196 USFOR-A said the AAF’s flight-hours data include all

**AAF Task Availability:** The task availability rate is defined as the number of aircraft serviceable and ready to be tasked, for combat or training, compared to the number of aircraft in the operational fleet (excluding those in depot). For example, if a 12-aircraft fleet has five serviceable aircraft, two aircraft in the maintenance depot, and five in other status, this calculation yields a 50% task availability (i.e., five of the 10 airframes not undergoing maintenance) for that aircraft type. Task availability is a capabilities-based measurement for senior leadership mission planning, rather than a measurement of how contractors are performing in maintaining AAF aircraft.

hours flown by all aircraft, whether the hours flown were for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation. 197

Of the six AAF airframes, only one (the Mi-17) exceeded its recommended flight hours, one fewer than last quarter. The Mi-17’s average of 800 hours per month was 123% over its recommended flying time of 650 hours per month, an improvement from 176% over its recommended hours per month recorded over the previous reporting period. 198 However, the Mi-17’s overutilization is improving: the airframe flew 27.3% of the total hours flown by the AAF from August through November, an 8.5 percentage-point decrease from the 35.7% of the AAF’s total hours the Mi-17 flew six months prior. The Mi-17’s average task availability over the reporting period also met its task availability benchmark. 199

Training and Manning
Critical for the success of the AAM plan is the timely training of pilots, aircrew, and maintainers to ensure those personnel are capable of operating and maintaining the new aircraft procured for the AAF as it arrives in country. According to TAAC-Air this quarter, the AAF’s training of UH-60 and MD-530 pilots, aircrew, and maintainers began to lag behind schedule to produce the required number of aircrew for the fielded aircraft and for planned fleet expansions. However, DOD says that steps have already been taken to increase training capacity for these platforms. TAAC-Air reported that the U.S.-based training for the AC-208 and the A-29 platforms is progressing well. 200

TAAC-Air provided the following updates on the training effort for each AAF platform:
• **UH-60**: The UH-60 training program is designed to accommodate 16 pilots and special mission operators from each course. Since the first class (February 2018), there has been difficulty filling all the seats due to the time required for matriculating students to complete initial rotary-wing training outside of the country. Currently, due to attrition and available qualified pilots, only one of four classes had a maximum capacity of students. A large portion of the early UH-60 graduates were Mi-17 transfers, which allowed for the start of UH-60 operational missions ahead of schedule and eliminated the time constraint of out-of-country training. However, the current mission demands on Mi-17 crews have reduced the crossflow of capable pilots to the UH-60 platform. There are currently no technical-school-trained maintainers for the UH-60 fleet because of the short period the UH-60 has been in the AAF inventory (just over a year); it takes several years to fully train expert maintainers. Technical training is set to begin in 2019. Additionally, since fall 2018 there has been an accelerated demand for Night Vision Goggle (NVG) capable crews. Initially, NVG training was anticipated for late 2019, but UH-60 advisors have since redirected their TAA efforts.
and flight training to accommodate the increased demand for NVG training for the UH-60 crews. It is now expected that the UH-60 will have a limited NVG capability by the end of 2018 (almost 10 months ahead of earliest anticipated date). The current plan and projection for aircrew development is on track to create 32 UH-60 crews by the end of 2019, with 29 of these crews NVG-qualified and three day-only qualified.201

- **AC-208**: The Kabul Air Wing is expected to receive its first seven AC-208s in the second quarter of 2019. The Kabul Air Wing is also expected to have all the crew needed to man its full fleet of 10 aircraft by April 2019, provided all remaining trainees arrive back in Kabul from Fort Worth. The Kandahar Air Wing is not scheduled to receive its first AC-208 until the first quarter of 2020. The current AC-208 training is progressing well, with two AC-208 courses currently underway in the United States. The unit is fully capable of receiving, planning and executing mobility, casualty evacuation, and human-remains missions. They are growing their instructor pilot force—fully qualified Afghan pilots who can go on to train fellow Afghan pilots and trainees—and the unit is projected to have four instructor pilots for a squadron of 17 personnel by February 2019. The unit is beginning to undertake its own mission-qualification training with advisors conducting quality checks at various points of the syllabus. Advisors’ focus has now shifted to more advanced capabilities, such as NVG and airdropping, and Afghan instructor pilots have taken more ownership in current and

Source: SIGAR, 19-18-AR, Afghan Air Force: DOD Met the Initial Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters, but Program Is at Risk of Not Having Enough Trained Pilots or the Capability to Maintain Future UH-60s, 1/30/2019.
basic qualification sorties. Advisors believe the AC-208 squadron will be able to complete and manage all training requirements with advisor oversight and input as long as it is no longer poached for manpower to source other platforms (A-29 and C-130).202

- **A-29:** All the A-29 initial qualification and mission-qualification training is currently completed in the United States at Moody Air Force Base. TAAC-Air projects the first shared Afghanistan-based mission qualification training program to start in November 2019, and a fully operational training program will start in country in January 2021. Local area “spin-up,” or familiarization with Afghanistan’s environmental hazards that are not duplicable in U.S. training environments (like terrain, air quality, etc.), and qualification training is conducted at Kabul Airfield, and includes basic surface-attack and close-air-attack training. TAAC-Air said 2.5 night-employment qualified crews that have completed their training have recently been employed in night combat missions. The program forecast is to have 11.5 night-employment crews qualified by the end of 2019. Future night training is likely to be conducted at Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif airfields (once the latter has the lighting capability). Under current plans, Mazar-e Sharif will be the center focus for training and Kandahar and Kabul Airfields will be utilized for combat missions. The projected, full A-29 fleet will require 38 pilots (there are currently 15), and TAAC-Air expects there will be 34 qualified pilots by the end of 2020. The A-29 program is not projected to have the required number of qualified maintainers until the end of 2024.203

- **MD-530:** Currently, the MD-530 fleet is facing some training and manning issues. At this time, TAAC-Air reports that the Air Academy and initial entry rotary-wing training course are producing the required number of pilot-training candidates to fill the required number of pilot positions for the MD-530 fleet, but the mission-qualification portion of the MD-530 program has become a choke point stalling the qualification of MD-530 pilots. The plan is to have 103 of 104 required pilots created by the end of 2020 (there are currently 50 pilots). TAAC-Air also reported that there are pilots who have no previous experience coming from undergraduate training that are supposed to be basic commercial instrument-rated pilots, but do not meet that level of experience, knowledge, and training. Therefore, the time required to train these individuals exceeds what is currently programmed. If the number of pilots received from undergraduate training does not increase, TAAC-Air said it will be unable to keep pace with projected MD-530 expansion rates at the current aircraft-delivery schedule. There is also limited maintenance training for this platform in Kandahar, and most of the maintainers and their training are in Kabul. In Kandahar, there are four or five trained maintainers, not enough for 15 aircraft.204
• **C-130:** TAAC-Air reported that the number of qualified pilots and aircrew is currently lagging behind the C-130 program’s requirements for a fleet of four aircraft. There are currently 11 pilots of a required 16 to support the four aircraft. TAAC-Air is programming to create more pilots and aircrew to meet the requirement. The plan is to have at least 14 pilots fully mission-qualified by the end of 2020. Personnel are still being recruited to fill maintenance positions: a fully qualified maintenance force for the C-130 is projected for 2024.205

• **Mi-17:** According to TAAC-Air, the Mi-17 program would need minimal additions to future force numbers, including maintainers, depending on the number of Mi-17s added to the AAF’s inventory. However, the main thrust of the AAM plan is to move the AAF away from Mi-17s and replace them with UH-60s.206

TAAC-Air provided the following information on how many fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready (CMR) aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, which can be seen in Table 3.9. For more information about the specific training involved for crew members attaining CMR status, please see SIGAR’s April 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.207

TABLE 3.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Usable</th>
<th>Command Pilots</th>
<th>Co-Pilots</th>
<th>Other Aircrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in this table. “Other Aircrew” includes loadmasters, flight engineers, and special mission operators and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified.


TAAC-Air also provided information about the number of qualified maintenance personnel on hand for each AAF platform. For more information about the qualifications training involved for AAF maintainers, see SIGAR’s October 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Table 3.10 shows the current number of authorized and assigned AAF maintenance personnel by airframe and other maintenance function, as well as the projected authorizations for AAF maintenance personnel for 2023.208
The Special Mission Wing – Some Data Classified

NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) continued to classify much of the data on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR's questions on this data can be found in Appendix E of this report and information about the SMW is reported in the classified annex for this report.

A component of the AAF, the SMW’s mission is to support the ASSF in operations, though recently the SMW has been more frequently tasked by the ANA and ANP to support conventional ground forces.209 This quarter, NSOCC-A provided an unclassified narrative assessment of the challenges the SMW currently faces. They reported that demand for the SMW remains high across the MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) despite its primary mission to support the ASSF. This has led to aircrew fatigue, and in the worst case, a total-loss aircraft accident this year on September 29, 2018. NSOCC-A said that there were no AAF casualties during this incident. NSOCC-A previously expressed concern that the SMW needed to get approval for more personnel to help meet its operational requirements. As of January 2019, the SMW amended force-authorization document (the tashkil) was approved for 144 additional positions, for a total of roughly 1,100 personnel. This is expected to aid in the SMW’s transition to the UH-60 in the first quarter of 2020.210

### TABLE 3.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</th>
<th>2018 ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>2023 PROJECTED AUTHORIZATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Positions</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kand</td>
<td>MeS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-60 FFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Operations</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Munitions Squadron</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All personnel listed above are trained and fully mission-capable. The locations on the table refer to AAF airbases. Kand = Kandahar, MeS = Mazar-e Sharif, and Shind = Shindand. Maintenance Operations = non-mechanical functions like quality assurance, analysis, plans, scheduling, documentation, training, and logistics; Munitions Squadron = a squadron that stores, maintains, inspects, assembles, and issues aircraft munitions; Maintenance Staff = staff that handle command, support, and finance; FFF= Fixed Forward Firing.

Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) Misuse and Overuse

Both DOD and CSTC-A reported increasing concerns in December about the misuse and overuse of the ASSF, which includes the SMW, whose main mission is to conduct high-risk offensive missions to pressure the Taliban. CSTC-A said that the ASSF continue to be tasked by MOD’s chief of general staff to conduct missions meant for conventional ANDSF units, such as replacing conventional infantry units to hold or regain ground.

DOD characterized ASSF misuse as having “increased to unsustainable levels” over the last six months. They said that in many cases, ASSF units, especially ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) commandos, were deployed for extended periods of time after ANA Corps commanders refused to relieve them with conventional forces. This has caused many ASSF units to be overused and unable to rest, train, or reequip, lowering the overall readiness of the force. It has also reduced the number of offensive operations executed by the ASSF over the summer, which is a key part of this year’s military strategy. DOD said that continued misuse of ASSF to provide security at static checkpoints or district centers, or as holding forces, will pose a challenge to future ASSF operations against the Taliban.

To address these issues, NSOCC-A, MOD, and MOI, in coordination with RS, authored “concept of employment” documents to outline roles, coordination, and responsibilities for employing ASSF. The concepts have been signed and are currently being implemented, and associated financial penalty letters based on the type and frequency of ASSF misuse have been issued through CSTC-A to MOD and MOI. From August through December 2018, seven penalty letters were executed. The financial penalty for ANASOC misuse is $1 million per week and for SMW misuse is $150,000 per flight hour for the Mi-17 and $60,000 per flight hour for the PC-12. DOD said these fines have been effective in dropping ASSF misuse levels since September, with CSTC-A withholding about $3.6 million from MOD and MOI for ANASOC misuse and $582,306 for SMW misuse.


AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $21.3 billion and disbursed $21 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.

ANP Personnel Strength – Some Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANP authorized-strength figures. Detailed assigned and authorized-strength information appears in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

According to DOD, the ANP’s total authorized (goal) end strength in December 2018 was unchanged at 124,626. The assigned (actual) strength of the ANP, as of October 31, 2018, was 117,940 personnel. This figure represents a decrease of 371 personnel since last quarter, and a 28,398-person decrease since October 2017, most of which was due to the transfer of
30,689 ANCOP and ABP personnel to MOD. When adjusting for that transfer, the ANP actually gained 2,291 personnel since 2017. CSTC-A always caveats that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-owned and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.213

This quarter’s strength puts the ANP at 94.6% (or 6,686 personnel below) of its authorized strength up about one percentage point since October 2017.214

**ANP Attrition – Some Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANP attrition information this quarter but declassified limited attrition information. SIGAR’s questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix E. A full analysis of attrition by ANP force element is provided in the classified annex for this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANP attrition rates averaged approximately 2.2% over the quarter. This percentage accounts for attrition alone, not the total decrease in force strength listed on the previous page as that percentage change would include any gains made from recruitment occurring over the quarter. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANP attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOI.215

**ANP Sustainment**

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $9.4 billion and disbursed $9.2 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.216

According to CSTC-A, the total estimated annual ANP salary and incentive costs for FY 2019 will be the same as last year at $140.1 million. These funds will primarily be paid to the ANP via LOTFA, a multilateral fund to which the United States has recently contributed relatively little funds (only about $1 million from December 21, 2017, through November 13, 2018). The United States will pay an estimated $42.2 million through ASFF for ALP salaries and incentives in FY 2019.217

CSTC-A reported this quarter that the total on-budget ASFF funds expended for ANP sustainment requirements for Afghan FY 1397 (December 2017–December 2018) through November 13, 2018, was $101.1 million. The United States contribution for ANP sustainment has decreased by $61.4 million since the same period in 2017, which comes from a decrease in funding given for ALP salaries and ANP services (about $40 million) and the U.S. contribution to LOTFA for ANP salaries (about $20 million).218

The majority of the $101.7 million of ANP sustainment funds spent this year was spent on non-payroll-related services and assets such as electricity, fuel, security services, and repairing and maintaining energy-generating equipment ($47.1 million) as well as ALP salaries and incentives ($44.5 million; $28.9 million of which was for incentives). The rest of the funds went to subsidies and grants ($9.5 million).219
ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.7 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.\(^2\)

Seen in Table 3.11, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter included 454 HMMWVs (Humvees) valued at a total of $96.2 million, 830 PKM machine guns valued at $3.3 million, and other equipment valued at about $5.5 million.\(^2\)

**Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified**

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify the data concerning the ANP's equipment readiness. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANP equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex for this report.

**ANP Infrastructure**

The United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2018.\(^2\)

This quarter, CSTC-A reported a slight increase in the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and electrical generator requirements. CSTC-A said that for FY 2019, these costs will be $78.8 million, a roughly $7 million increase from the $71.7 million reported last quarter for FY 2018. According to CSTC-A, of the $78.8 million, $45.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $33.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.\(^2\)

As of November 15, 2018, the United States completed 768 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at $3 billion.\(^2\) CSTC-A reported
that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $1.7 million. Another 21 projects (valued at $78.2 million) were ongoing, eight projects were awarded (valued at $821,388), and six projects (valued at $113 million) were being planned.\footnote{See Table 3.12 for a description of the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANP infrastructure projects.}

Included in the projects described above are 14 ANP Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $144.4 million, comprising 12 ongoing projects ($74.4 million), and two projects in the planning phase ($70 million). The vast majority of these ANP WPP projects are being funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund.\footnote{All data are as of November 15, 2018. All WPP Police Town projects listed above are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund. The estimated cost of the two WPP Police Town projects in the planning phase are rough estimates based upon recent contract awards.}

### ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $4 billion and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.\footnote{At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of GAO’s forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Project Location</th>
<th>Agency/Contractor</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awarded Projects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Regional ANP Center Water Purification Unit</td>
<td>Kandahar, Kandahar Province</td>
<td>RCC-A</td>
<td>$40,751</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) Fence at Gambieri</td>
<td>Laghman Province</td>
<td>USACE/Herat.Ayer Construction</td>
<td>153,243</td>
<td>1/12/2019</td>
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<td>Special Police Advanced Training Wing Ammunition Holding Area</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province</td>
<td>RCC-A</td>
<td>67,053</td>
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<td><strong>Ongoing Projects</strong></td>
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<td>WPP Police Town, Phase II</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>32,831,000</td>
<td>3/31/2021</td>
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<td>WPP Police Town, Phase I</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>23,646,225</td>
<td>11/23/2018</td>
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<td>WPP Women’s Facilities at Kabul Police Academy</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
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<td><strong>Completed Projects</strong></td>
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<td>Joint Regional ANP Center Low-Water Crossing</td>
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<td>USACE/Assist Consultants Inc.</td>
<td>896,720</td>
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<td>GCPSU Special Police Advanced Training Wing</td>
<td>Nangarhar, Jalalabad Province</td>
<td>USACE/Assist Consultants Inc.</td>
<td>798,922</td>
<td>9/30/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase III</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>6/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase IV</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>8/30/2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data are as of November 15, 2018. All WPP Police Town projects listed above are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund. The estimated cost of the two WPP Police Town projects in the planning phase are rough estimates based upon recent contract awards.

Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP’s personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD funds the ALP, including its personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government.\(^{229}\) Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.\(^{230}\)

NSOCC-A reported the estimated amount of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2019 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel) is about $60 million. This is a substantial decrease from the $90 million allocated for FY 2018. NSOCC-A said the reason for the decrease was that the ALP left more than $60 million unspent last year, leading CSTC-A to amend the force’s budget.\(^{231}\) NSOCC-A reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP had roughly 28,000 guardians on hand as of November 11, 2018, roughly 23,000 of whom were fully trained. The ALP’s strength declined by roughly 400 personnel since last quarter, and by about 800 since the same period in 2017. The number of trained personnel also dropped this quarter by about 700 personnel, causing the percentage of the force that is untrained or in training to increase to 19%, up two percentage points since last quarter.\(^{232}\) NSOCC-A said last quarter that even if training centers are full for the year, the number of ALP personnel losses and new (untrained) recruits is so high that there probably will not be an appreciable increase in the number or percentage of ALP personnel trained.\(^{233}\)

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported on the ALP’s continuing efforts to enroll personnel in APPS, to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer (EFT) process, and to inventory materiel. According to NSOCC-A, as of November 11, 2018, roughly 85.7% have been slotted into APPS, an increase from the 70% reported last quarter.\(^{234}\)

NSOCC-A said that ALP reform efforts are progressing slowly but consistently. After multiple delays driven by external forces, ALP enrollment in APPS is once again progressing and the ALP Staff Directorate has put every asset at its disposal to accelerate the enrollment process. Additionally, the staff directorate’s analysis and assessments branch continues to travel the country as much as their limited personnel allows to investigate power-broker influence over ALP guardians and UNAMA reports and accusations of criminal behavior by ALP personnel, prosecuting and removing them as required. According to NSOCC-A, the new ALP staff director has been “extremely effective” since he assumed the role in September. He is initiating an effort to optimize ALP locations and the tashkil to take better advantage of areas in which the ALP are performing well and to remove ALP billets from areas with chronic recruitment, defection, and ghost-soldier issues.\(^{235}\)
This quarter, NSOCC-A provided SIGAR with ALP powerbroker-influence reports that list ALP personnel determined to be under the influence of local powerbrokers, such as village elders, parliamentarians, and other individuals outside the proper chain of command. The latest report as of September 10, 2018, lists 70 ALP personnel under the influence of powerbrokers across nine provinces. This a significant decrease in the number of ALP personnel under the influence of powerbrokers (down from 219 personnel in July 2018 across 12 provinces). Most provinces have only a couple of ALP under powerbroker influence, but three provinces—Nangarhar (15 personnel), Takhar (15) and Kunar (14) have 63% of those personnel.

**WOMEN IN THE ANDSF**

RS declassified the exact strength data for female personnel in the ANDSF this quarter. As of November 2018, the ANDSF had 4,735 female personnel or less than 2% of current assigned strength. The number of women in the ANDSF increased by about 200 since last quarter and 101 personnel since the same period in 2017. As in the past, the ANP has the vast majority of ANDSF female personnel (3,218), with 1,517 in the ANA. Included in the ANA and ANP numbers are 138 women serving in the Afghan Special Security Forces and 85 in the AAF. Noncommissioned officers account for the greatest number of females in the ANDSF (1,739), followed by soldiers and police (1,455), and commissioned officers (1,406). For a full breakdown of ANDSF female strength, see Table 3.13.

The RS Gender Advisory Office provided an update on the status of women in the ANDSF this quarter. They reported that the women serving in the ANDSF continue to be challenged by cultural resistance. RS said that

| ANDSF FEMALE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH, AS OF OCTOBER 2018 |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                        | Officers | Noncommissioned Officers | Soldiers/ Patrolmen | Cadets | Total |
| ANP                    | 742      | 1,198                      | 1,278               | 0       | 3,218 |
| ANA                    | 664      | 541                       | 177                  | 135     | 1,517 |
| Total                  |          |                           |                      |         | 4,735 |
| Afghan Air Force (AAF) |          |                           |                      |         | 85    |
| AAF                    | 45       | 26                        | 9                    | 5       | 85    |
| Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) |      |                           |                      |         |
| ANP                    | 18       | 81                        | 9                    | 0       | 108   |
| ANA                    | 12       | 12                        | 6                    | 0       | 30    |

Note: The AAF strength is included in the ANA’s total strength number. The ASSF numbers are included in the ANP and ANA numbers, respectively.

Source: RS Gender Integration Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
there is no change this quarter to the generally on-hold status of MOD and MOI recruitment of female personnel as each ministry works to realign or create positions that allow for female personnel to have career progression. RS continued to stress that recruitment is not the only factor defining success of ANDSF women, and that recruitment as a metric to reflect increased female integration into the ANDSF is meaningless without a formalized strategy to recruit and employ women into meaningful roles and safe working environments. As such, current RS advisory efforts focus on training and recruiting women to be effectively utilized in positions with a clear career progression and ensuring they have the necessary skills for those positions, and are afforded opportunities for career development and promotion. RS pointed out that recruiting women ad hoc could lead to possible marginalization and even harassment.\textsuperscript{238}

Recent successes for women in the ANDSF include the appointment of the first female deputy minister within the MOI, Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy Hussna Jahil. Another woman who is the director of the Family Response Units (FRU) was recently appointed to command and control over 205 FRU offices in all 34 of Afghanistan provinces. MOI also nominated and sent the first two ANP women to the leadership development capstone course, and 23 ANP women were accepted into the four-year bachelor’s program at the ANP Academy. The first female ANA officer was sent to train at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where all officers in the British Army are trained.\textsuperscript{239}
ANDSF MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE

As of December 12, 2018, the total cost of CSTC-A-procured medical items for the ANDSF since the beginning of the FY 1397 (December 2017) was $29.5 million, the same amount reported last quarter.240 There were 881 physicians and 2,469 other medical staff (the same as last quarter) in the ANDSF health care system, as of November 20, 2018. Of the non-physician staff, 714 were nurses and 379 were medics. The remaining medical staff include dental, medical administration, bioenvironmental and preventive medicine, laboratory, and radiology staff. A number of medical positions in the ANDSF remained unfilled, including 92 physician positions (9.5% of those required) and 699 other medical positions (22.1%), no change since last quarter.241

CSTC-A provided a short update on the status of training ANDSF personnel to prevent combat deaths and injuries. CSTC-A reported that there has been increased effort to ensure combat medics receive the necessary training, but this has varied by location and with unit operational tempo. The most remote and isolated areas receive the least training and the ANP is impacted more than ANA. Medical personal assigned within medical facilities received training on disease and non-battle injuries. There were also multiple campaigns over the reporting period to promote the wearing of personal protection equipment and the use of individual first-aid kits in conjunction with continued self-aid and buddy-care training for conventional ANDSF forces. There was also an increase in coordinated mass-casualty training prior to the elections.242

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

According to the United Nations (UN), Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs.243 The UN said the country is averaging 180 casualties per month from ERW and improvised landmines by anti-government forces. The National Disability Survey of Afghanistan estimates at least 2.7% of the population are severely disabled, including 60,000 landmine and ERW survivors.244

The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $380 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. (An additional $11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort.) PM/WRA has two-year funding and has so far obligated $20 million in FY 2017 funds. Additional funding will be captured in subsequent SIGAR reports.245
State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution that help with clearing areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From 1997 through September 30, 2018, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 262 million square meters of land (101 square miles, or 1.7 times the land area of Washington, DC) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.14 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2018.246

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of July 2018, there were 538 square kilometers (207 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of September 30, the total known contaminated area was 558.7 square kilometers (215.7 square miles) in 3,729 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.247

In August, more than 1,000 insurgents mounted a siege on Ghazni City in Ghazni Province, killing 100 to 150 Afghan police officers and army forces, as well as up to 150 civilians, according to various media reports.248 The UN deployed teams after the Ghazni assault to remove 106 explosive remnants
of war that threatened community safety and security, and helped educate more than 8,000 people on the risks. From January to September 2018, the teams visited 188 communities, removing 1,611 ERW, surveying hazardous areas, and providing risk education.249

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018 and supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:250

• military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
• landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances, suicide attacks
• public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
• cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

Victim-assistance activities began in mid-April 2018. By the end of September, over 1,250 families had received assistance such as psychosocial counseling, medical assistance, and income-generation packages.251 As of January 12, 2019, USAID has disbursed $5.45 million for this program.252