SECURITY CONTENTS

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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

The United States’ primary goal in Afghanistan remains continued progress in the ongoing talks between the United States and the Taliban with the intent that U.S. efforts will lead to peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. U.S. officials maintain that U.S. military support in Afghanistan will remain necessary until a final peace agreement and nationwide ceasefire is reached and the United States is confident that terrorists cannot use Afghanistan to threaten the United States or its interests.122

This quarter, the outgoing Commander of United States Central Command, General Joseph Votel, told the House Armed Services Committee in a hearing on March 7 that, “In Afghanistan, the president’s South Asia strategy is working. The efforts of our [Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation] Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad show there is a path to progress. But there is much left to do to achieve our end-state of reconciliation between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.”123 General Votel added that U.S. military efforts must continue to be “focused on supporting the Afghan security forces and providing Ambassador Khalilzad the maximum military pressure and leverage to support his diplomatic efforts.”124

Ambassador Khalilzad participated in two rounds of talks with Taliban delegations in Qatar during this reporting period: six days of talks in late January and roughly two weeks of talks from late February through mid-March.125 According to Ambassador Khalilzad, during the first round of talks, Taliban and the U.S. representatives “agreed in principle” to four major issues deemed essential to any final political settlement: counterterrorism assurances from the Taliban, U.S. troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a complete ceasefire between the parties to the conflict.126 Ambassador Khalilzad said on March 12, after the second round of talks with a more senior Taliban delegation, that both sides have now “agreed in draft” on the first two of these issues. He added that once the first two issues have been finalized, “the Taliban and [the Afghan government] will begin intra-Afghan negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire.”127

Though U.S. officials are optimistic about the recent progress made during the last few months of talks, there are several indications that the Taliban, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and international forces will continue to fight to gain greater leverage at the
Select High-Profile Security Incidents

**PROGOVERNMENT FORCES**

- **Feb 8**: ANDSF operations against Taliban and/or Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Kundahar Province
- **Feb 9**: Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) conduct raid in Helmand Province
- **Feb 27**: ANDSF operation in Takhar Province
- **Mar 6**: ASSF kill Taliban and/or IS-K militants and destroy seven IEDs in Nangarhar Province
- **Mar 13**: ANDSF air strikes on an al-Qaeda military base in Ghazni Province
- **Mar 17**: ANDSF air and artillery strikes against the Taliban during an operation in Badghis Province
- **Mar 18**: ANDSF operation in Kunduz Province kills Taliban militants and destroys weapons cache
- **Mar 20**: Afghan air strike targeting a Taliban-run prison in Helmand Province
- **Mar 26**: ASSF operation against IS-K fighters in Nangarhar Province
- **Apr 6**: ANDSF operation against IS-K fighters in Nangarhar Province

**ANTIGOVERNMENT FORCES**

- **Feb 5**: Taliban clash with ANDSF in Kunduz City
- **Feb 15**: Taliban militants detonate car bomb targeting ANDSF in Kundahar Province
- **Mar 1**: Taliban clash with ANDSF in Faryab Province
- **Mar 1**: Taliban attack Afghan Army's 215th Corps' military compound in Helmand Province
- **Mar 7**: IS-K attack a Shi'a gathering in Kandahar Province
- **Mar 9-16**: Taliban clash with ANDSF in Badghis Province
- **Mar 16**: Taliban operation against ANDSF in Faryab Province
- **Mar 22**: The Taliban conduct an operation against several ANDSF checkpoints in Helmand Province
- **Apr 4**: Taliban operation against Afghan Police in Badghis Province
- **Apr 8**: Taliban attack Afghan Border Police in Kandahar Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location &amp; Event Data Project (ACLED)</th>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban attack Afghan Army’s 215th Corps’ military compound in Helmand Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mar 1</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban clash with ANDSF in Badghis Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mar 9-16</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban conduct an operation against several ANDSF checkpoints in Helmand Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mar 22</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Police in Badghis Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Apr 4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban attack Afghan Border Police in Kandahar Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Apr 8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fatalities are estimates and are the number of the opposing party killed. The March 7 IS-K attack’s fatalities were civilians.


negotiating table. Figure 3.29 lists some of the key battles between the parties to the conflict this quarter, many of which occurred during or following each of the U.S.-Taliban talks. On April 12, the Taliban announced the beginning of its 2019 spring offensive just ahead of another round of talks scheduled between American, Taliban, and Afghan representatives for late April. The announcement reportedly followed President Ashraf Ghani’s approval of an Afghan security plan in early April. Ambassador Khalilzad expressed particular discontent with the Taliban’s decision, saying “It is irresponsible to suggest that an increase in violence is warranted because the [Afghan] government announced a security plan.” On April 18, the scheduled talks were postponed due to unresolved disagreements over participation and representation between the parties involved.128

This quarter, NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) train-advice-assist mission in Afghanistan formally notified SIGAR that it has discontinued producing one of its most widely cited Afghan security metrics: district, population, and territorial control data. The command said they no longer saw decision-making value in these data.129 The latest data from the few remaining publicly available measures of the security situation in Afghanistan—enemy-initiated attacks, general ANDSF casualty trends, and security incidents—show that Afghanistan experienced heightened insecurity over the winter months.

According to Resolute Support (RS), enemy-initiated attacks rose considerably: the monthly average attacks from November 2018 through January 2019 was up 19% compared to the monthly average over the last reporting period (August 16 to October 31, 2018).130 USFOR-A said that from December 1, 2018, through February 28, 2019, “the number of ANDSF casualties were approximately 31% higher during this three-month period when compared to the same period one year prior.”131 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reported 2,234 security-related incidents in Afghanistan from December 1, 2018–February 28, 2019, a 39% increase compared to same period the year before.132 These trends are notable considering that violence has typically waned during the winter months in Afghanistan over the last several years.133

These data align with the U.S. intelligence community’s most recent public assessment that “Afghan forces generally have secured cities and other government strongholds, but the Taliban has increased large-scale attacks, and Afghan security suffers from a large number of forces being tied down in offensive missions, mobility shortfalls, and a lack of reliable forces to hold recaptured territory.”134 Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats projected in late January that in 2019 “neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban will be able to gain a strategic advantage in the Afghan war in the coming year, even if Coalition support remains at current levels.”135 General Votel echoed this statement in March. When pressed whether current conditions in Afghanistan merit a withdrawal of U.S. forces, General Votel said “The political conditions . . . right now don’t merit that.”136
ANDSF Data Discontinued
USFOR-A discontinued the following data this quarter:

- District-stability assessments (district, population, and territorial control data)

ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable
USFOR-A newly classified the following data this quarter:

- A narrative assessment about Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) misuse by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI)

USFOR-A continued to classify or restrict from public release, in accordance with classification guidelines or other restrictions placed by the Afghan government, the following data (mostly since October 2017):

- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- Corps- and zone-level Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) authorized and assigned strength by component
- Performance assessments for the ANA, ANP, MOD, and MOI
- Information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment
- Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- Reporting on anticorruption efforts by the MOI (unclassified but not publicly releasable)
- Reporting on the status of the ANDSF's progress on security-related benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact (unclassified but not publicly releasable)

The classified annex for this report covers the classified and nonreleasable data.

Population, District, and Territorial Control
This quarter, RS formally notified SIGAR that it is no longer producing its district-level stability assessment of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence, expressed in a count of the districts, the total estimated population of the district, and the total estimated area of the districts. According to RS, they determined the district-stability assessments were “of limited decision-making value to the [RS] Commander.” RS added that there is currently no other product or forum through which district-level control data is communicated within the command. For RS's full statements on the discontinuation of its district-stability assessment, see Appendix D. The last district stability data RS produced was for its October 22, 2018, assessment; SIGAR reported on that assessment in its January 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.
In mid-January, DOD told SIGAR that the assessments “are not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy or of progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, particularly in the wake of the appointment of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad.” They reiterated that there is some “uncertainty in the models that produce [the district-stability data] and the assessments that underlie them are to a degree subjective.” DOD said that it is “more important to instead focus on the principal goal of the strategy of concluding the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States.”

SIGAR recognized and reported the limitations of the district-stability assessment, including its increasing level of subjectivity. However, senior RS officials had previously cited its importance in public statements. For example, in November 2017, the then RS commander said that improving population control in Afghanistan (to 80% by the end of 2019) was one of his strategic priorities. Additionally, RS told SIGAR in May 2017 that the district-control assessments were being “methodologically improved” by making them more subjective, basing them on RS regional commanders’ informed opinions about the control status of districts within their area of responsibility. Despite its limitations, the control data was the only unclassified metric provided by RS that consistently tracked changes to the security situation on the ground. While the data did not on its own indicate the success or failure of the South Asia strategy, it did contribute to an overall understanding of the situation in the country.

As SIGAR has reported, RS’s control data from May 2017 to October 2018 showed a stagnant security environment in Afghanistan. Addressing the stagnation, RS said in late January that “one necessary condition [for a political resolution] is the perception by both sides that the conflict is in a military stalemate . . . little variation in district stability data support multiple years of assessments that the conflict is in a stalemate.”

Security-Incident Data
SIGAR tracks and analyzes several types of security-incident data to provide a robust account of the security situation in Afghanistan. With the recent discontinuation of official data on government and insurgent control of Afghanistan’s districts, population, and territory, the data presented in this section is an effort to show security activity between the parties to the conflict.

Each type of incident data presented here has advantages and limitations: RS-reported enemy-initiated attack data comes from an official source, but is only available unclassified at the provincial level and does not include U.S. and ANDSF-initiated attacks on the enemy; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) events data can be disaggregated to the district level, to a variety of security incident types, and to all the parties to the conflict, but depends entirely on media reporting of security-related events.
RS reported 22,669 enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) in Afghanistan in 2018, with 4,374 (19%) of them occurring in the last two months of the year (November 1 to December 31, 2018). RS reported 6,245 EIA this quarter (November 1, 2018–January 31, 2019). This reporting period’s figures reflect an average of 2,082 EIA per month, a 19% increase in EIA compared to the average monthly EIA last reporting period (August 16 to October 31, 2018).145

As seen in Figure 3.30, most of the attacks in 2018, (13,828, or 61%), occurred in eight of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces: Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Herat. Of these provinces, Helmand and Badghis experienced the greatest increase in EIA since October 31 (96% and 30%, respectively). The most violent province in terms of EIA shifted toward the end of the year, with the most EIA reported by far in Helmand (2,861), followed by Farah (1,801), and Badghis (1,798).

**Enemy-Initiated Attacks**
According to RS, “enemy-initiated attacks are defined as all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, IED and mine explosions, etc.) initiated by insurgents that are reported as [significant activities] (SIGACTs).” RS reported 22,669 enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) in Afghanistan in 2018, with 4,374 (19%) of them occurring in the last two months of the year (November 1 to December 31, 2018). RS reported 6,245 EIA this quarter (November 1, 2018–January 31, 2019). This reporting period’s figures reflect an average of 2,082 EIA per month, a 19% increase in EIA compared to the average monthly EIA last reporting period (August 16 to October 31, 2018).145

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Provinces. Last quarter’s data showed Farah with the most reported EIA, followed by Helmand and Faryab Provinces.

Figure 3.31 shows that the most common methods of attack for the EIA in 2018 were direct fire (82% of EIA), followed by IED explosions (12%), and indirect fire (5%). SIGAR will continue to monitor EIA to track trends over time.

For the first time this quarter, SIGAR requested effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA) data from RS. Of the 22,669 EIA reported in 2018, RS said there were 10,990 EEIA, meaning about 48% of total EIA resulted in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties. RS recorded 2,384 EEIA this reporting period (November 1, 2018–January 31, 2019), about 38% of total EIA for the same period. DOD has previously offered the caveat that ANDSF units do not always report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties. As such, the number of EIA could be higher than what RS has reported, which would also impact the percentage of EEIA to EIA.

Security-Related Events
SIGAR also analyzes security incident data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records district-level data of political violence and protest incidents across Afghanistan. For consistency with RS’s enemy-initiated attacks data, SIGAR is presenting ACLED data at the provincial level this quarter (see Figure 3.32) and chose a date range for the data in alignment with RS’s reporting period (January 1–December 31, 2018).

ACLED recorded 7,399 security-related events in Afghanistan in 2018, roughly the same as the 7,345 recorded in 2017. The three provinces with the most events were unchanged from 2017 to 2018: Nangarhar, Ghazni, and Helmand. The events occurring in these three provinces accounted for 35% of 2018’s total events. Eight of the top 10 provinces with the most ACLED-recorded security-related events in 2018 were also within the top 10 provinces where RS recorded the most enemy-initiated attacks in 2018 (Helmand, Farah, Faryab, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Herat, Ghazni, and Nangarhar).

ACLED recorded 2,234 security-related events over the winter months (December 1, 2018–February 28, 2019), a roughly 39% increase compared to the 1,610 events reported during the same period one year prior. The three provinces with the most security-related events were Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. Much of the increase in events this reporting period compared to the same period the year before was due to increases in events reported in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.
Civilian Casualties

UNAMA: Record-High Civilian Deaths in 2018

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 10,993 civilian casualties from January 1 through December 31, 2018, an overall increase of 5% compared to 2017. The casualties included 3,804 deaths (a nearly 11% increase since 2017) and 7,189 injuries (a 2% increase), a record high number of civilian deaths since UNAMA began recording civilian-casualty data in 2009. Men made up the majority of civilian casualties (62%), followed by children (28%), and women (10%).

Seen in Figure 3.33 on the following page, UNAMA attributed the majority of civilian casualties in 2018 (6,980, 63%) to antigovernment groups, which included the Taliban (37%), IS-K (20%), and unspecified antigovernment groups (6%). Casualties attributed to antigovernment elements rose by 3% compared to 2017. Civilian casualties from attacks deliberately targeting civilians by IS-K more than doubled from 843 in 2017 to 1,871.
in 2018, mainly from suicide and other attacks, including deliberate sectarian-motivated attacks against the minority Shi’a Muslim population.156

An additional 2,612 civilian casualties (24%) were attributed to progovernment groups, which included casualties caused by the ANDSF (14%), international military forces (6%), progovernment groups (2%), and undetermined or multiple progovernment groups (2%). Casualties attributed to progovernment elements rose by 24% compared to 2017, mainly due to the increase in AAF and Coalition air operations.157

UNAMA attributed most of the 5% overall increase in civilian casualties to improvised-explosive devices (IEDs). UNAMA said Afghan antigovernment elements’ use of IEDs in both suicide and nonsuicide attacks was the leading cause of civilian casualties in 2018, comprising 42% of the total. Civilian casualties from all IED incidents increased by 11% compared to 2017, which was primarily driven by the 22% increase in suicide IED incidents, a record high in 2018. Although IEDs caused the most civilian casualties in 2018, other leading causes included ground engagements between pro- and antigovernment elements (31%), aerial operations (9%), and targeted killings (8%), as shown in Figure 3.34.156

Civilians living in Kabul, Nangarhar, Helmand, Ghazni, and Faryab Provinces suffered the highest number of casualties in 2018. Of these five provinces, four experienced an increase in civilian casualties compared to 2017, including Kabul (2% increase), Nangarhar (111%), Ghazni (84%), and
Faryab (1%), with Helmand seeing an 11% decrease. Two provinces had the most civilian casualties in 2018 by far: Kabul with 1,866 casualties (596 deaths) and Nangarhar with 1,815 (681 deaths).\(^{159}\)

**UNAMA: Civilian Casualties in Early 2019 Decline Sharply**

In a stark change from the final months of 2018, UNAMA documented 1,773 civilian casualties from January 1 through March 31, 2019, a 23% decrease in casualties compared to the same period in 2018 and the lowest number of civilian casualties in the first three months of the year since 2013. The casualties included 581 deaths and 1,192 injuries.\(^{160}\)

UNAMA noted that the significant decrease in civilian casualties so far this year was primarily driven by a 76% decrease in casualties caused by suicide IED attacks. Last year’s figures were higher due to many more suicide attacks in early 2018, including the January 27, 2018, attack in Kabul, which was the deadliest incident UNAMA had ever recorded. UNAMA also said the particularly harsh winter conditions during the first three months of this year may have contributed to the decline in civilian casualties, and that it is unclear whether the trend was influenced by any measures undertaken by parties to the conflict to better protect civilians, or by the ongoing talks between some of the parties. UNAMA expressed continued concern about the increase in civilian casualties from the use of nonsuicide IEDs by antigovernment elements (up 21% compared to last year).\(^{161}\)

UNAMA reported that progovernment elements caused more civilian deaths than antigovernment elements thus far in 2019 (608 casualties, 305 deaths and 303 injuries). This was attributed to substantial increases in civilian casualties caused by progovernment aerial (41%) and search operations (85%) compared to last year. UNAMA attributed 17% of all civilian casualties to the ANDSF, 13% to international military forces, 2% to progovernment armed groups, and 2% to multiple progovernment forces. As in previous years, antigovernment elements were responsible for the majority of overall civilian casualties during the first quarter of 2019 (963 casualties, 227 deaths and 736 injuries).\(^{162}\)

The decrease UNAMA reported for the first three months of 2019 is offset by the high number of civilian casualties seen from October through December 2018 (2,943). Civilian casualties from October 2018–March 2019 were at roughly the same level they were from October 2017–March 2018.\(^{163}\)

**RS Civilian Casualties Data**

RS reported 9,214 civilian casualties in 2018 (2,845 killed and 6,369 wounded). As reported last quarter, September and October were the deadliest months, with 950 and 1,274 civilian casualties respectively. RS’s and UNAMA’s data aligned in that Kabul, Nangarhar, and Helmand Provinces experienced the most civilian casualties in 2018. According to RS, about 21% of 2018’s civilian casualties occurred in Kabul Province (1,976 casualties),
As aerial operations of progovernment forces (international military forces and the AAF) have increased, so have UN-recorded incidents of civilian casualties resulting from them. UNAMA’s records indicate that air operations in 2018 caused 1,015 civilian casualties (536 deaths and 479 injuries). Of these, it attributed 632 civilian casualties (393 deaths and 239 injuries) to international military forces, 304 (118 deaths and 186 injuries) to the Afghan Air Force, and the remaining 79 civilian casualties to undetermined or multiple progovernment forces.165

Civilian Casualties and Aerial Operations

As aerial operations of progovernment forces (international military forces and the AAF) have increased, so have UN-recorded incidents of civilian casualties resulting from them. UNAMA’s records indicate that air operations in 2018 caused 1,015 civilian casualties (536 deaths and 479 injuries). Of these, it attributed 632 civilian casualties (393 deaths and 239 injuries) to international military forces, 304 (118 deaths and 186 injuries) to the Afghan Air Force, and the remaining 79 civilian casualties to undetermined or multiple progovernment forces.165

Figure 3.38 shows that the number of UNAMA-recorded civilian casualties caused by aerial operations in 2018 increased by 61% compared to 2017 and was the highest number of civilian casualties from air strikes in a single year since UNAMA began tracking them in 2009. Figures 3.36 and
show the contrast between UNAMA and RS figures. RS provided a much lower figure for civilian casualties caused by Coalition and Afghan air strikes, and a different breakdown of responsibility for the strikes. According to RS there were 183 such casualties in 2018 (71 deaths and 112 injuries), with U.S. air strikes causing 101 of the casualties, and AAF air strikes causing 82.

UNAMAs most recent report on civilian casualties in the first three months of 2019 shows that 2018 trends are continuing: UNAMA documented the highest number of civilian casualties from aerial operations recorded during the first quarter of 2019 compared to the same period of any year since UNAMA began systematic documentation. Additionally, UNAMA determined that aerial operations were the leading cause of civilian deaths from January 1–March 31, 2019. All progovernment forces’ aerial operations caused 228 civilian casualties (145 deaths, 83 injuries), and international military forces were responsible for the vast majority of these casualties (140 deaths, 79 injuries).

The UN recorded a 42% increase in U.S. and AAF air strikes from 2017 to 2018. The U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) reported a 69% increase in weapons released during U.S. air operations in 2018 compared to 2017. AFCENT’s data show that weapons released thus far in 2019 are about on par with 2018, but this only accounts for the first two months of the year. For AFCENT’s data on U.S. weapons released in Afghanistan from the beginning of the RS mission in January 2015 through February 2019, see Table 3.6.

### UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

#### Personnel Strength

According to DOD, as of March 2019, approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were serving as part of the United States’ Operation Freedom’s Sentinel mission in Afghanistan, the same number reported since November
“I have the authorities and the capabilities that I need from the U.S. and the Coalition standpoint to work with our Afghan partners. At the same time, as a commander, I'm always trying to bring the footprint down, bring our force structure down.”

–General Austin “Scott” Miller, RS and USFOR-A Commander

2017. There are also an additional 861 DOD civilian personnel and 10,698 U.S. citizens who serve as contractors are also in Afghanistan. Of the 14,000 U.S. military personnel, 8,475 are assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces, unchanged since last quarter. The remaining U.S. military personnel serve in support roles or in conducting air operations, training the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterror operations.

As of March 2019, the RS mission included roughly 8,559 military personnel from NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing the current total of RS military personnel to 17,034 (a 115-person increase since last quarter). The United States contributes the most troops to the RS mission, followed by Germany (1,300 personnel) and the United Kingdom (1,100).

U.S. Force Casualties

According to DOD, six U.S. military personnel were killed in action and 23 were wounded in action (WIA) in Afghanistan this reporting period (January 16–April 16, 2019). As of April 16, 2019, a total of 67 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan (50 from hostile deaths and 17 in non-hostile circumstances) and 392 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 2,414 U.S. military personnel have died (1,894 from hostile deaths and 520 in non-hostile circumstances) and 20,488 were WIA.

Insider Attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces

USFOR-A reported that there were no insider attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces this quarter. There were five insider attacks in 2018, four on U.S. personnel, and one on Coalition personnel. Four RS soldiers were killed and eight were wounded during those attacks. In 2017, there were six confirmed insider attacks that killed three personnel and wounded 11.

AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security

As of March 31, 2019, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $83.3 billion to support security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 63% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the $4.7 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2018, $4 billion had been obligated and $3.7 billion disbursed as of March 31, 2019.

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF is
used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The rest is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility, and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Table 3.4 and 3.5 on pages 58–59.177

ASFF funds are obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget funds) are then provided to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted requests. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan provide funding for the ALP.178

Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been (but is not currently) the largest contributor.179

A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on page 117.

ANDSF Strength
USFOR-A reported that the assigned (actual) personnel strength of the ANDSF (not including civilians) was 306,807, including 190,423 personnel in the ANA and AAF and 116,384 in the ANP. The ANA strength figure is as of January 31, 2019, and the ANP’s figure is as of December 21, 2018 (the latest available data).180 For the third consecutive quarter, ANDSF strength is the lowest it has been since the RS mission began in January 2015.181 ANDSF strength decreased by 1,886 personnel since last quarter and by 6,921 compared to approximately the same period in 2017. CSTC-A always offers the caveat that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-reported and that RS cannot validate them for accuracy.182 See Figure 3.39 on the following page for a historical record of first-quarter ANDSF strength since 2015.

According to DOD, the ANDSF’s total authorized (goal) end strength in December remained 352,000 personnel, including 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP personnel. This number does not include 30,000 Afghan Local Police, who are under MOI’s command.183 Table 3.7 on the following page shows this quarter’s ANDSF assigned strength at 87.2% (45,193 personnel short) of its authorized strength.184

ANDSF Casualties Increase
USFOR-A provided a general, unclassified assessment of ANDSF casualties this quarter. USFOR-A said that December 1, 2018, through February 28, 2019, “the number of ANDSF casualties were approximately 31% higher during this three-month period when compared to the same period one
FIGURE 3.39
FIRST-QUARTER ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH SINCE 2015

TABLE 3.7
ANDSF ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
<th>% of Target Authorization</th>
<th>Difference Assigned and Authorized</th>
<th>Difference Between Assigned and Authorized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>227,374</td>
<td>190,423</td>
<td>83.7%</td>
<td>(36,951)</td>
<td>(16.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>124,626</td>
<td>116,384</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
<td>(8,242)</td>
<td>(6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF Total without Civilians</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>306,807</td>
<td>87.2%</td>
<td>(45,193)</td>
<td>(12.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ANP data is as of December 21, 2018, and ANA data is as of January 31, 2019; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. CSTC-A always caveats that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-reported and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.
year prior. The number of casualties incurred from defensive operations has increased by 45% while ANDSF casualties from offensive operations have increased by 21%.” USFOR-A also added that almost half of the ANDSF casualties this reporting period occurred during checkpoint security operations.  

USFOR-A continued to classify most ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil. ANDSF casualties are reported in the classified annex of this report.

Insurgent Casualties
For the first time, SIGAR reported this quarter USFOR-A’s estimates of insurgent casualties, which can also be found in the classified annex.

Insider Attacks on the ANDSF Increase
“Green-on-green” insider attacks, in which ANDSF personnel are attacked from within their own ranks, sometimes by an insurgent infiltrator, remain a significant problem for the ANDSF. According to USFOR-A, there were seven reported green-on-green insider attacks against ANDSF personnel from October 31 to December 31, 2018, bringing the 2018 total to 81 insider attacks resulting in 183 casualties (133 killed, 50 wounded). Compared to 2017, this represents 13 more attacks but 56 fewer casualties.

From January 1 through February 20, 2019, there have been six recorded insider attacks that inflicted 32 casualties (16 dead, 16 wounded), a decrease of two attacks but an increase of six casualties compared to roughly the same period in 2018.

ANDSF Personnel Accountability
The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining several systems to accurately manage, pay, and track their personnel—an effort DOD expects will improve protection of U.S. funds. The United States pays the ANA and ALP personnel costs through the unilateral ASFF and the ANP by contributing (until 2018) to the multilateral LOTFA managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is currently being fielded and, when fully implemented, will integrate personnel data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts. The APPS data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF personnel to assist with assignment, promotions and other personnel actions.

As USFOR-A has reported previously, three ongoing efforts aim to ensure that accurate personnel data exist in APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching a person to an authorized position; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) the personnel asset inventory

ONGOING SIGAR INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT OF “GHOST” POLICE
SIGAR’s special agents have been informed that portions of the ANDSF payroll process throughout Afghanistan have been manipulated to allow some former police officers to still be paid even though they have either resigned, been terminated, or been killed. These salary payments are then diverted to various bank accounts and are subsequently withdrawn and shared amongst conspirators. SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate is working closely with SIGAR’s Audits Directorate and CSTC-A to identify measures that will reduce and/or eliminate the payment of nonexistent police officers.
APPs Data-Input Requirements for ANDSF Payroll

There are 20 data points that all ANDSF personnel must have in their APPs record in order to be paid. These include:

- ID card number
- Date of birth
- Enrollment date
- Gender
- Biometric verification number
- Actual rank
- Military education
- Blood type
- First/full name
- Tashkil rank
- Bank account number
- Contract expiration date
- Father’s name
- Date of rank
- AHRIMS ID
- Paragraph number
- Grandfather’s name
- Unit identification code
- Civilian education
- Line number

Note: AHRIMS (the Afghan Human Resource Information System) was the Afghan personnel accountability system prior to APPs. Where possible, records were migrated for personnel enrolled in AHRIMS to APPs.


(PAI) for biometrically enrolling personnel. All three efforts result in the continuous process of physically counting personnel and correcting the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.193

As of November 30, 2018, CSTC-A reported that both the MOD and MOI became “fully operationally capable” in APPs, meaning that the APPS system has been delivered and both ministries have the ability to fully employ the system and maintain it to meet their operational needs. However, CSTC-A expects that the transition to APPS for force-strength reporting will take until June 2019 for the ANA and the end of 2019 for the ANP.194

This quarter, CSTC-A reported improvements in the percentage of ANA and ANP personnel enrolled in APPS. As of February 28, 2019, 91% of ANA personnel were slotted into the system and met the minimum data-input requirements to be paid, an improvement from the 85% reported in December 2018. For the ANP, only 69% of the force is slotted into APPS and eligible to be paid, up from 60% reported in December 2018. CSTC-A calculates these percentages by dividing the number of personnel slotted in APPS by the number of personnel the Afghans report to be on hand in each force (their assigned-strength figures).195

CSTC-A confirmed that it continues to only pay APPS-enrolled, biometrically validated ANDSF personnel. CSTC-A said they are encouraging UNDP to transition from its current ANP payroll system, the Web Enabled Pay System (WEPS) to APPS, and to provide salaries only to APPS-validated personnel. To assist with this process, CSTC-A said this quarter that it is synchronizing with UNDP to reconcile APPS personnel data with the data UNDP has in WEPS.196

ANDSF Combat Element Performance – Most Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most assessments of ANDSF performance. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil. Detailed ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.

This quarter, USFOR-A provided a general overview on ANDSF performance. According to USFOR-A, senior ANDSF leaders are continuing to demonstrate progress in organizational management, decision-making, and operational planning and execution. The Afghan government has been striving to employ quality leaders and continues to successfully identify and replace ANDSF leaders found guilty of corruption.197

USFOR-A continued to report that ANA corps receive the preponderance of Coalition train, advise, and assist (TAA) support, and that as a result, their capabilities continue to advance more rapidly than the ANP’s. USFOR-A said the ANA’s improvements are evident in their ability to synchronize combat enablers (e.g., air and artillery support) and to conduct coordinated operational planning with adjacent corps.198

USFOR-A also reported this quarter that the Afghan government has dissolved the ANP’s zone system, which has challenged Coalition advisors,
who must now provide TAA support to multiple provincial police headquarters (PHQs) rather than to a single zone. Now instead of eight regional ANP zones, the 34 PHQs serve as the command structure for ANP throughout the country.200

Operational Readiness Cycles
This quarter, SIGAR requested a status update on the implementation of operational readiness cycles (ORCs) for the ANA and ANP. The data discussed below shows an uneven execution of the ORC concept across the country. ANDSF personnel operating in the RS Task Force (TF) Southeast, Train, Advise, Assist Command (TAAC) East, and TAAC-West areas of responsibility (AORs) are implementing ORCs better than their counterparts in TAAC-Capital, TAAC-North, and TAAC-South.201 ANDSF personnel in the latter two AORs have not been able to successfully use the ORC to prepare for the spring fighting season. TAAC-North is the largest AOR (nine provinces) and had the second highest number of enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) in 2018 (4,346, or 19.2% of total attacks) of all RS AORs. Despite only having four provinces in its AOR, TAAC-South ranked third of seven RS AORs in the number of EIAs experienced in 2018 (3,953, or 17.4% of total attacks).202 USFOR-A provided updated ORC information for each AOR (see Figure 3.40 for the geographic locations of these areas):203

Operational Readiness Cycle: a process that allows certain combat units to rotate out of operational duty to train, refit, and rest to increase readiness and effectiveness upon return to the battlefield. The ANDSF typically implement ORCs in the winter months when operational tempo is historically slower.

• **TF Southeast (SE):** The ANA 203rd Corps’ Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) has been continuously conducting training for its soldiers from November 2018 until the most recent graduation of soldiers on February 19, 2019. Sometimes it is difficult for 203rd Corps personnel to get their brigade commanders to release them from operations in order to execute the re-training and refitting portion of the ORC. For the ANP, despite many of the provinces in the TF-SE AOR being under constant insurgent attack or threat of attack, the Gardez Regional Training Center (RTC) commander is reported to have successfully trained policemen assigned to the area. The RTC itself is well maintained and staffed and continues to train over 90% of assigned policemen in the AOR, which has better prepared the TF-SE provinces for the spring fighting season.

• **TAAC East:** The ANA’s 201st Corps took it upon themselves to add an additional week of marksmanship training to its ORC process to maximize their combat effectiveness. The ANP in this AOR have used the RTC in Nangarhar for their training requirements. However, MOI has not developed an ORC program similar to MOD’s.

• **TAAC West:** All three ANA 207th Corps brigades and two Afghan Border Force brigades entered into the ORC this quarter. The 207th Corps is gradually implementing the ORC until all platoons are phased into the cycle. There was no information available on ANP’s ORC process in this area of responsibility.

• **TAAC North:** The ANA’s 209th Corps has an established ORC process, but it is being implemented minimally due to frequent operations, manning of checkpoints, and critical manning shortfalls facing many of the units. Of eight kandaks in the 209th Corps, only one has been trained and through the ORC. The other kandaks have not been trained or reset and are not ready for the spring fighting season. There was no update for other ANP forces in this AOR.

• **TAAC Capital:** The ANA 111th Capital Division’s ORC began in January 2019. The ORC lasts four weeks and was designed to accommodate one company at a time. As companies and kandaks rotate to different posts around the province, they plan to have a short retraining period at the Combat Training Center before they take their new posts.

• **TAAC South:** The 205th Corps has not successfully implemented an ORC due to heavy operational tempo in its AOR. There are not enough soldiers in the corps to man checkpoints, conduct operations, and return for training. ANP units in the TAAC-South AOR do not currently have a functioning ORC process, also due to their high operational tempo.
Women in the ANDSF
As of January 2019, the ANDSF had 4,984 female personnel, 1.6% of the ANDSF’s total force strength. The number of women in the ANDSF increased by about 250 since last quarter and by about 650 personnel compared to the same period a year ago. The increase since last quarter comes from the addition of 124 women in the ANA and 125 in the ANP. As in the past, the ANP has the vast majority of ANDSF female personnel (3,343), while 1,641 are in the ANA.203
Included in the ANA and ANP numbers are 138 women serving in the Afghan Special Security Forces (the same as last quarter) and 86 in the AAF (one more than last quarter). Noncommissioned officers account for the greatest number of females in the ANDSF (1,823), followed by soldiers and police (1,595), and commissioned officers (1,445).204 For a full breakdown of ANDSF female strength, see Table 3.8.

The RS Gender Advisory Office said MOD and MOI recruitment of female personnel continues to be generally on hold as each ministry works to realign or create positions that allow for female personnel to have career progression.205

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $47.4 billion and disbursed $47.1 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).206

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF FEMALE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force (AAF)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> ASSF personnel numbers are as of December 2018. All other data is as of January 2019.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Source:** RS Gender Integration Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
ANA Force Manning

ANA Strength – Some Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANA personnel strength data in accordance with Afghan government classification guidelines. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength figures will appear in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANA strength can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil.

According to DOD, the ANA’s total authorized (goal) end strength as of December 2018 was 227,374.207 USFOR-A reported that the assigned (actual) strength of the ANA and AAF as of January 31, 2019, (not including civilians) was 190,423 personnel, a decrease of 330 personnel since last quarter. This quarter’s ANA strength represents a 5,851-person increase from the same period in 2017, but this figure is skewed due to the transfer of 18,950 personnel from the Afghan Border Police (formerly under MOI) to MOD. When adjusting for that transfer, the ANA actually lost 13,099 personnel compared to the same period in 2017.208 CSTC-A always offers the caveat that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-reported and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.209

The ANA’s 190,423 personnel consisted of 83,702 soldiers, 72,027 noncommissioned officers, and 34,694 officers. The ANA’s noncommissioned officer and officer ranks experienced attrition since last quarter (losing 429 and 69 personnel, respectively), but the number of soldiers increased by 168.210 This quarter’s assigned strength puts the ANA at 83.7%, or 36,951 personnel short, of its goal strength, a slight decrease since last quarter.211

ANA Attrition – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANA attrition information this quarter. SIGAR’s questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix F. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANA force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANA monthly attrition rates averaged approximately 2.2% over the quarter, a slight improvement from the 2.5% recorded over the previous quarter. This percentage accounts for attrition alone, not the total decrease in force strength listed on the previous page, as that percentage change includes any gains made from recruitment occurring over the quarter. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANA attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOD and that CSTC-A cannot independently verify its accuracy.212
ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $23.5 billion and disbursed $23.2 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment.213

For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019, see page 59 of this report.

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed $13.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.214

Seen in Table 3.9, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (December 1, 2018, through February 18, 2019) included 13 MD-530 helicopters (valued at a total of $84.7 million), six UH-60 helicopters ($70 million), and two variants of HMMWVs (valued at a total of about $32.7 million).215

Table 3.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>MD-530 Helicopter</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$6,518,000</td>
<td>$84,734,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>UH-60 Helicopter</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11,670,000</td>
<td>70,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1152 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>230,868</td>
<td>18,469,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1151 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>232,775</td>
<td>14,199,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>162,079</td>
<td>14,100,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Refueller</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>236,455</td>
<td>6,857,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M240B Machine Gun</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>7,927</td>
<td>3,472,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Water Tanker</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>247,372</td>
<td>2,473,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>12,685</td>
<td>2,435,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Wrecker</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>350,152</td>
<td>1,750,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost of Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$218,512,809</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These items were the major items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter, not the only items. Vehicles issued this quarter were procured under varying foreign military sales cases, which may cause their unit cost to vary from the cost reported last quarter.


Sustainment: Sustainment generally refers to operations and maintenance efforts. There are several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay, food, the Afghan Personnel Pay System, “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CorelMS inventory management system, and transportation services, “combat sustainment” to include organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts, and other “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

The United States had obligated and disbursed $5.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of March 31, 2019.216 This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical generator requirements for FY 2019 will be $110.8 million, the same as last quarter. This is a roughly $43 million increase from the costs incurred in FY 2018. According to CSTC-A, of the $110.8 million, $74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A on behalf of the Afghan government. CSTC-A said the increase is due to the number of new construction projects slated for completion in 2019.217

As of February 28, 2019, the United States completed 457 ANA infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at a total cost of $5.4 billion. CSTC-A reported that one project was completed this quarter, costing roughly $704,000. Another 47 projects (valued at $193.3 million)

### Table 3.10

#### Highest-Cost ANA Infrastructure Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Project Location</th>
<th>Agency / Contractor</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awarded Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Kabul City Gates Improvements, Phase I</td>
<td>Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Assist Consultants Inc.</td>
<td>$2,637,500</td>
<td>9/14/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar Airfield Improvements, Phase I, Construction Materials</td>
<td>Kandahar Province</td>
<td>RCC-A</td>
<td>1,024,445</td>
<td>3/1/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar Airfield Improvements, Phase I, Heavy Equipment Lease</td>
<td>Kandahar Province</td>
<td>RCC-A</td>
<td>166,250</td>
<td>4/2/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Electrical Interconnect at Camp Shaheen</td>
<td>Marmal, Balkh Province</td>
<td>USACE/Venco-Intiiz Construction Company</td>
<td>27,692,414</td>
<td>10/21/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Brigade North, Camp Pratt Forward Operating Center</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province</td>
<td>USACE/Builtek Construction</td>
<td>25,353,848</td>
<td>2/26/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Electrical Interconnect at Kunduz / Asqalan</td>
<td>Kunduz, Kunduz Province</td>
<td>USACE/Assist Consultants Inc.</td>
<td>10,488,724</td>
<td>7/15/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completed Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul National Military Hospital, Entry Control Points</td>
<td>Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Arab Shah Construction Company</td>
<td>703,962</td>
<td>12/17/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Aviation Enhancement, Mazar-e Sharif Airfield*</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>47,000,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Kandahar Airfield Life Support Area</td>
<td>Kandahar, Kandahar Province</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21,000,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth at Kandahar Airfield</td>
<td>Kandahar, Kandahar Province</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15,900,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth at Kabul Airfield</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13,600,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data is as of February 28, 2019. *Partially funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not all U.S. ASFF funds).

were ongoing, three projects were awarded (valued at $3.8 million), and 33 projects (valued at $450 million) were being planned.218 Table 3.10 describes the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANA infrastructure projects.

Included in the projects described above are four ongoing ANA Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $16.7 million and three ANA WPP projects in the planning phase valued at $4.4 million.219 See Table 3.11 for a description of these projects.

### ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed $4.3 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.220

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts.221 For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

### Afghan Air Force

#### U.S. Funding

As of February 12, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately $8.4 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) from

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**Table 3.11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest-Cost ANA WPP Infrastructure Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing Projects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pediatrics and Obstetrics/Gynecology Clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Facilities at Marshal Fahim National Defense University*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Facilities at North Hamid Karzai International Airport AAF Airbase*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Barracks at South Hamid Karzai International Airport/AFghan Air University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awarded/Planned Projects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Training Center in Kabul*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daycare and Kitchen at Camp Zafar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Tactical Platoon Facility at Camp Scorpion*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data is as of February 28, 2019. *Partially funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not all U.S. ASFF funds).

SECURITY

SIGAR RELEASES UH-60 AUDIT

Last quarter, SIGAR released an audit on the status of the AAF’s UH-60 program. Among the key findings of the audit:

• The Army met CSTC-A’s request for an initial operational capability date of June 1, 2018, by beginning training early, sending training version helicopters in October 2017, and using contractors to provide refurbishment, logistic support, and training. (The first operational UH-60 mission was flown in May 2018.)
• Pilot production has already begun to fall behind the aircraft delivery schedule and is likely to persist.
• DOD has not established benchmarks for when aircraft deliveries should slow or stop based on pilot production, an advantage cited by DOD when selecting the refurbished UH-60 platform for the Afghans.
• No organic ANDSF maintenance training course for the UH-60 has begun, creating a necessity for contractor-provided maintenance that increases the cost to the United States of supporting the UH-60 program.
• Lack of trained ANDSF maintainers also limits the effective area that UH-60s can operate in due to Coalition security restrictions on where Western maintainers can work.

As seen in Table 3.12, the AAF’s current in-country inventory, as of February 2019, includes 170 aircraft (143 of which are operational).²²⁸

Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) reported this quarter that the AAF received six more MD-530s and 10 UH-60s in Afghanistan. Additionally, the AAF received its first five AC-208 light attack aircraft this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Usable</th>
<th>Quarter Change</th>
<th>Command Pilots</th>
<th>Co-Pilots</th>
<th>Other Aircrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in this table, except for AC-208 personnel (who will be fully qualified in May 2019). “Other Aircrew” includes loadmasters, flight engineers, and special mission operators and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. “Quarter Change” refers to the change in usable aircraft only. All AC-208s are in this category because the air platform is new this quarter to the AAF’s inventory.


FY 2010 to FY 2019. Roughly $1.7 billion of those funds were appropriated in FY 2019, a $65.4 million increase in funds appropriated compared to FY 2018.²²² The AAF was allocated more funds in FY 2019 than any other ANDSF force element, $88.3 million more than the funds allocated for the ANA.²²³

As in previous years, a large portion of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds ($893.2 million, or 52%) has been designated for AAF sustainment costs, a $58.6 million decrease from $951.8 million in FY 2018.²²⁴ These funds are primarily used to pay for contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and the procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF’s in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, Mi-17, A-29, C-208, AC-208, and C-130.²²⁵

DOD allocated $537.6 million (31%) of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds for equipment and transportation costs, roughly $419.6 million of which is designated for the procurement of additional U.S.-manufactured UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters intended to replace the AAF’s aging Russian-manufactured Mi-17 helicopters.²²⁶

Also, as of February 12, nearly $5.3 billion had been obligated for the AAF and SMW, a roughly $4 million increase since last quarter. About $1.6 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018. A substantial portion of these funds ($2.6 billion) was obligated for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 48.6% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 34.2%.²²⁷

Aircraft Inventory and Status

As seen in Table 3.12, the AAF’s current in-country inventory, as of February 2019, includes 170 aircraft (143 of which are operational).²²⁸

Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) reported this quarter that the AAF received six more MD-530s and 10 UH-60s in Afghanistan. Additionally, the AAF received its first five AC-208 light attack aircraft this
quarter. Five more AC-208s are scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by late May 2019, and two MD-530s, six UH-60s, and three A-29s are scheduled to arrive by September. Two MD-530s were lost this quarter: one was hit by surface-to-air fire near Ghazni City on February 7 and destroyed in place; another experienced engine failure after a hard landing in Zabul Province on February 10. The latter aircraft is expected to be recovered, but TAAC-South has so far had higher-priority missions.

AAF Operations and Task Availability

TAAC-Air reported that the AAF flew 14,398 sorties from December 1, 2018, through March 31, 2019. A sortie is defined as one takeoff and one landing. There were an average of 3,600 sorties per month this quarter, with the most sorties (4,027) flown in March 2019. This is a 10% increase from the 3,264 average sorties per month reported last quarter (August 1–November 30, 2018). As in previous quarters, the Mi-17 flew the greatest number of sorties (6,182), followed by the UH-60 (3,270).

According to TAAC-Air, two of six AAF airframes failed to meet their task availability benchmarks this quarter, the same airframes as last quarter. The MD-530’s average task availability this reporting period was 74.3% against a goal of 75%, and the C-208’s was an average of 68.3% against a goal of 75%.

According to TAAC-Air, the AAF flew an average of roughly 2,875 hours this quarter, a 2% decrease in the average number of hours flown last quarter. Both the UH-60 and the MD-530 overtook the Mi-17 and flew the most hours, averaging 699.4 and 671.4 hours per month respectively. USFOR-A said the AAF’s flight-hours data include all hours flown by all aircraft, whether the hours flown were for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.

Of the six AAF airframes, only the Mi-17 continued to exceed its recommended flight hours. The Mi-17’s average of 599.7 hours per month was 104.3% of its recommended flying time of 575 hours per month, an improvement from 123% of its recommended hours per month recorded over the previous reporting period. With the increased usage of other airframes, the Mi-17’s overutilization is declining: the airframe flew 20.9% of the total hours flown by the AAF this quarter, a nearly 6.5 percentage-point decrease from the 27.3% of the AAF’s total hours the Mi-17 flew last quarter. The Mi-17’s average task availability over the reporting period also met its task availability benchmark.

AAF Training and Manning

Training

Critical for the success of the AAF modernization and expansion is the timely training of pilots, aircrew, and maintainers to ensure those personnel are capable of operating and maintaining the new aircraft procured for the AAF. Last quarter, TAAC-Air reported that the training of UH-60 and
security

MD-530 pilots, aircrew, and maintainers had begun to lag behind schedule to produce the required number of aircrew for the fielded aircraft and for planned fleet expansions. This quarter, TAAC-Air provided several updates that show it has begun to address these issues. For example, regarding the training of aircraft maintainers, TAAC-Air said standing up the AAF Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC) and its personnel pipeline by June 2019 is expected to rapidly accelerate the development of mission-qualified maintainers. The AMDC will utilize a third-country and an Afghanistan location to train the maintainers. TAAC-Air anticipates that the AMDC pipeline will produce the required number of entry-level maintainers for all the AAF’s platforms within the next two years.237

TAAC-Air provided the following updates on the training effort for each AAF platform:

• **UH-60:** The UH-60 program is currently making a new effort to maximize the recruitment and training of pilots and aircrew utilizing a third-country location. The new effort will push all aircraft-qualification training through a third-country and mission-qualification training (which includes combat skills training) will take place in Kandahar. This adjusted, parallel effort will allow for qualified aircrew to keep pace with aircraft deliveries in Afghanistan. TAAC-Air is also using smaller class sizes in more frequent intervals to minimize the delay time for students between training programs. Some Mi-17 aircrew will be converted to UH-60 aircrew as the Mi-17 mission draws to a close for the AAF. There remains a continued emphasis on night-vision goggle training and employment for the UH-60 platform.

• **AC-208 and C-208:** The AC-208 pilot training classes that were underway in the United States were disbanded due to the number of trainees who were going absent without leave (AWOL). Those students that did not go AWOL were pulled back to Afghanistan to complete their training: as a result, only one class graduated from the U.S.-based program. The second and third classes will continue and finish their training in Afghanistan. TAAC-Air has a plan to continue the student training and is developing a contract solution to support the effort to train the initial group of AC-208 aircrew. TAAC-Air said the C-208 trainees continue to progress to a self-sustaining level of proficiency.

• **A-29:** The A-29 program is still building its pilot force at Moody Air Force Base in the United States. The U.S.-based program will end in late 2020 and the A-29 training efforts will transition to Afghanistan in order to develop the remaining A-29 force. After the required force is built, A-29 pilot training in Afghanistan will still be needed to create new pilots as older pilots leave due to promotions and retirements. The Afghanistan portion of the program will begin with a very small footprint in mid-2019 and is expected to be located in Mazar-e Sharif. TAAC-Air is exploring options to streamline the training timeline for
pilots from entry level pilot training to mission qualified training. Night training also continues to be a training priority for this platform.

- **MD-530**: TAAC-Air said it continues to find efficient solutions for the MD-530 training pipeline to ensure that students delivered to the squadron are trained to the best standard possible. Following issues raised last quarter, they are currently exploring options to expand the pilot training pipeline, including options to give contractors that provide training support more flexibility to train students. This would reduce the strain on the already limited Afghan trainer force. As with the UH-60 platform, TAAC-Air is also considering a third-country option to expand and streamline the pilot and aircrew training pipeline for the MD-530.

**Manning**

TAAC-Air continued to provide information on the number of fully mission-qualified, or certified mission-ready aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, as shown in Table 3.12 on page 94. TAAC-Air also provided the number of qualified maintenance personnel on hand for each AAF platform. Table 3.13 shows the current number of
authorized and assigned AAF maintenance personnel by airframe and other maintenance function.

The Special Mission Wing – Some Data Classified
This quarter, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provided an expanded unclassified update on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). NSOCC-A continued to classify other data on the SMW. SIGAR’s questions on this data can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil; information about the SMW is reported in the classified annex for this report.

Funding
As of January 31, 2019, the United States had obligated a total of nearly $2.3 billion for the SMW since FY 2012 from ASFF and the DOD-Counternarcotics Fund, a roughly $94.4 million decrease since last quarter. About $182.1 million of those funds were obligated in FY 2018. A substantial portion of the funding obligated since FY 2012 ($2.3 billion) was obligated for SMW sustainment, which accounts for 48.9% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 42.7%. NSOCC-A said that the figures for SMW obligated funds decreased this quarter because NSOCC-A found several items in CSTC-A-reported obligations data were inflated. This issue is now resolved. NSOCC-A also said that FY 2019 funds will begin to be disbursed in May or June 2019.

SMW Operations and Performance
The SMW is an AAF component whose mission is to support the ASSF in operations. About 85% of SMW missions are focused on counterterrorism. However, the SMW has recently been tasked by the ANA and ANP to support conventional ground forces. This quarter, NSOCC-A again reported that the MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) continue to demand support from the SMW, though these instances of misuse have decreased compared to last quarter after the appointment of a new minister of defense in early 2019. However, the issue still negatively affects aircraft maintenance and the SMW’s implementation of operational readiness cycles, and has at times resulted in higher-priority missions being dropped or pushed back. NSOCC-A’s leadership continues to address this with the MOD by recommending CSTC-A levy financial penalties to curb SMW misuse.

Between November 13, 2018, and February 18, 2019, NSOCC-A reported three aircraft mishaps, with two resulting in total aircraft losses (two more than last quarter). All three incidents occurred within days of each other in December 2018; they caused no AAF casualties. Both aircraft lost were Mi-17s; one loss occurred in Faryab Province, the other in Kandahar Province.
According to NSOCC-A, the SMW continues to develop its capabilities, achieving success training with partner units on the Mi-17 Fast Rope Insertion and Exfiltration System (FRIES) for quickly delivering and retrieving troopers by rope from helicopters. As a complementary effort, SMW has also worked with Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222 to develop an Aerial Suppression Platform (ASP) capability, in which snipers can conduct precision fires in urban areas during FRIES operations. These capabilities are vital to operations to defend against high-profile attacks within Kabul.244

Manning
NSOCC-A reported that the SMW’s leadership continues to emphasize quality recruiting, partly by developing its junior-officer and noncommissioned-officer leaders through mentorship and language training. The SMW is currently authorized to select 40 personnel (20 pilots and 20 crew chiefs) for training to field the first 10 of 20 UH-60 aircraft expected to arrive in the second quarter of FY 2020 and have already accepted 16 applicants this quarter. The SMW is expected to grow to an authorization of 1,086 personnel in 2019. NSOCC-A expressed some concern about the challenges with inducting enough qualified candidates with sufficient education capable of successfully completing the rigors of aircrew training.245

Additionally, SMW expansion is expected to include requisite maintenance personnel, to build up an organic SMW UH-60 maintenance workforce, but the force will remain reliant on contractor-provided maintenance. There are currently 206 of 228 authorized maintenance personnel assigned to the SMW. The SMW’s maintainer squadron needs to grow from 228 to 960 personnel to fulfill the forecasted growth of the force and its aircraft.246

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $21.4 billion and disbursed $21.1 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and some ASSF.247

ANP Force Manning

ANP Personnel Strength – Some Data Classified
This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANP personnel strength data in accordance with Afghan government classification guidelines. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength figures will appear in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil.
According to DOD, the ANP’s total authorized (goal) end strength in December 2018 was 124,626. The assigned (actual) strength of the ANP, as of December 21, 2018, was 116,384 personnel. This figure represents a decrease of 1,556 personnel since last quarter, and a 12,772-person decrease compared to the same period in 2018. The latter decrease was mostly due to the transfer of 18,950 Afghan Border Police (formerly MOI) personnel to MOD. When adjusting for that transfer, the ANP actually gained 6,178 personnel compared to last year. CSTC-A always offers the caveat that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-reported and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy. This quarter’s strength puts the ANP at 93.4% (or 8,242 personnel below) of its authorized strength.

ANP Attrition – Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANP attrition information this quarter but declassified limited attrition information. SIGAR’s questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANP force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANP attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 2.2%, the same average reported last quarter. This percentage accounts for attrition alone, not the total decrease in force strength above that percentage change would include any gains made from recruitment occurring over the quarter. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANP attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOI.

ANP Sustainment
As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $9.4 billion and disbursed $9.3 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF sustainment.

For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see page 59 of this report.

ANP Equipment and Transportation
As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $4.8 billion and disbursed $4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF equipment and transportation.

Seen in Table 3.14, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter included 181 HMMWVs (Humvees) valued at a total of $43.1 million and 38 water tankers valued at about $9.4 million.
TABLE 3.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1152 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>$239,818</td>
<td>$23,262,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1151 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>235,693</td>
<td>19,798,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Water Tanker</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>247,372</td>
<td>9,400,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>160,594</td>
<td>8,323,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1152 Ambulance</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>131,372</td>
<td>7,619,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Fuel Tanker</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>235,776</td>
<td>3,065,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48,475</td>
<td>921,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>40mm RPG-7s (Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers)</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>777,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M9 Pistols</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>131,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>DSHKA (Heavy Machine Gun)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>112,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost of Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$73,920,169</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These items were the major items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter, not the only items. Vehicles issued this quarter were procured under varying foreign military sales cases, which may cause their unit cost to vary from the cost reported last quarter.


**Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified**

This quarter USFOR-A continued to classify the data concerning the ANP’s equipment readiness. The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix F, available at www.sigar.mil. ANP equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

**ANP Infrastructure**

The United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of March 31, 2019.256

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and electrical generator requirements for FY 2019 will be $78.8 million, the same amount reported last quarter. According to CSTC-A, of the $78.8 million, $45.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $33.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.256

As of February 28, 2018, the United States completed 773 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly $3 billion. CSTC-A reported that five projects were completed this quarter, costing $3.4 million. Another 14 projects (valued at $98.5 million) were ongoing, one project was awarded (valued at about $33 million), and six projects (valued at $77.9 million) were being planned.257 Table 3.15 on the following page
The highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANP infrastructure projects. Included in these projects are 14 ANP Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of about $143.1 million, comprising nine ongoing projects ($70.4 million), two projects in the planning phase ($70 million), and three recently completed projects ($2.7 million). The vast majority of these ANP WPP projects are being funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund.

### ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2019, the United States had obligated $4 billion and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP, some ASSF, and MOI training and operations. At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of GAO’s forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.
Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP’s personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD funds the ALP, including its personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength. NSOCC-A reported the estimated amount of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2019 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel) is about $60 million, the same amount reported last quarter.

NSOCC-A reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP had roughly 28,000 guardians on hand as of January 31, 2019, roughly 21,500 of whom were fully trained. The ALP’s strength declined by roughly 150 personnel since last quarter, and by about 1,100 since the same period in 2018. The number of trained personnel also dropped this quarter by about 1,300 personnel since last quarter, causing the percentage of the force that is untrained or in training to increase to 23%, up four percentage points since last quarter. NSOCC-A has previously said that even if ALP training centers are full for the year, the number of ALP personnel losses and new and untrained recruits is so high that there probably will not be an appreciable increase in the number or percentage of trained ALP personnel.

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported on the ALP’s continuing efforts to enroll personnel in APPS and to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer process. According to NSOCC-A, as of February 10, 2019, 70% of ALP personnel have been slotted into APPS. As of February 15, 2019, 85% of ALP personnel have banking/ATM/mobile money capabilities available to them and are encouraged to utilize these services instead of the previous system of turning over salaries to a trusted agent.

For the first time, NSOCC-A reported this quarter that ALP reform has been a challenge due to the uncertainty regarding the future of the ALP. Both RS and NSOCC-A, in coordination with the Afghan government, are planning a possible transfer of the ALP to other ANDSF force elements. As this report went to press, no decisions have been made on timing of this change to the ALP’s status, nor is it clear to which ANDSF force the ALP would be transferred.

This quarter, NSOCC-A provided SIGAR with the latest ALP power-broker-influence report that lists ALP personnel determined to be under the influence of local powerbrokers, such as village elders, parliamentarians, and other individuals outside the proper chain of command. As of December 12, 2018, 116 ALP personnel were under the influence of powerbrokers across 11 provinces, an increase of 46 personnel and two provinces since last quarter. This is still a decrease from the 219 ALP personnel across
12 provinces reported under the influence of powerbrokers in July 2018. Most provinces have only a couple of ALP personnel under powerbroker influence, but the personnel in two provinces—Nangarhar (36 personnel) and Uruzgan (40 personnel) account for about 66% of the total number under powerbroker influence.

**REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

According to the United Nations (UN), Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs. The UN said the country is averaging 180 civilian casualties per month from ERW and improvised landmines by antigovernment forces. The National Disability Survey of Afghanistan estimates at least 2.7% of the population are severely disabled, including 60,000 landmine and ERW survivors.

The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $381.9 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. (An additional $11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort.) PM/WRA so far obligated $1.85 million in FY 2018 funds.

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

From 1997 through December 31, 2018, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 267.8 million square meters of land (101 square miles, or 1.7 times the land area of Washington, DC) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.16 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. At the beginning of October 2018, there were 558.7 square kilometers (215.7 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of December 31, the total known contaminated area was 636.9 square kilometers (245.9 square miles) in 3,754 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018 and
supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:

- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances, suicide attacks
- public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance such as referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and assistance with economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury is also covered. During the first quarter of FY 2019, COMAC provided immediate assistance to 3,102 families, including 317 households that received counseling, 80 beneficiaries that received medical assistance, and 735 households that received income-generation packages. COMAC is developing an incident-management system to be deployed in the coming months with biometric registration and identification of beneficiaries. As of March 31, 2019, USAID has disbursed $6.76 million for this program.

### TABLE 3.16

DEMINING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Fragments Cleared</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,337,557</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>663,162</td>
<td>1,602,267</td>
<td>4,339,235</td>
<td>650,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>21,966,347</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>22,912,702</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,697</td>
<td>10,148,683</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>346,484</td>
<td>9,415,712</td>
<td>511,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12,101,386</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>33,078</td>
<td>88,798</td>
<td>4,062,478</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27,856,346</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>4,062,478</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31,897,313</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>4,062,478</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25,233,844</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>30,924</td>
<td>158,850</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>558,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019¹</td>
<td>5,829,893</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>19,337</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>636,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>267,815,356</td>
<td>76,671</td>
<td>1,952,788</td>
<td>6,123,742</td>
<td>83,620,528</td>
<td>636,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.

1. Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
2. Partial fiscal year results (10/1/2018–12/31/2018)