GOVERNANCE CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events 101
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Governance 102
Reconciliation and Reintegration 102
Preparations for the Presidential Elections Continue 105
Who’s Who of Presidential Candidates 107
Mutual Accountability 108
U.S. Assistance to the Afghan Government Budget 109
National Governance 116
Subnational Governance 118
Quarterly Highlight: Service Delivery in Taliban-Controlled or Influenced Areas 122
Rule of Law and Anticorruption 125
Refugees and Internal Displacement 131
Gender 133
GOVERNANCE

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

This quarter, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad held two rounds of talks with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, that he described as “the most productive” to date, with “substantial progress” on all four principal topics: counterterrorism assurances, foreign troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue and intra-Afghan negotiations, and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. Ambassador Khalilzad’s office confirmed to SIGAR that the latest round of talks ended on July 9 with both sides agreeing to set a date for another meeting after completing internal consultations.222

On July 6, the U.S. and Taliban negotiators paused negotiations for two days to accommodate a parallel intra-Afghan dialogue event sponsored by Qatar and Germany.223 (Ambassador Khalilzad met again with Taliban representatives on the morning of July 9, but then departed for China and the United States for consultations.224) Some 44 delegates (including 10 women) from Afghanistan met with 17 Taliban representatives to share their ideas for peace. Afghan government officials expressed their hope that the dialogue could lead to direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.225 Participants called for the continuation of foreign assistance following a peace agreement.226

Following the dialogue, the Taliban’s senior negotiator, Sher Mohammad Abas Stanekzai, said the Taliban would enter into direct negotiations “with the Afghan government side for internal matters” only after a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops is finalized.227

Political opponents of President Ashraf Ghani—including a group of 11 presidential candidates—claimed this quarter that May 22, 2019, marked the end of President Ghani’s constitutional term of office. On April 21, the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of extending President Ghani’s term until the election of a new president, saying this followed the 2009 precedent. The president’s opponents criticized the Supreme Court’s decision and warned of potential civil disobedience if its proposals for an interim government were not considered. According to the United Nations, there were no observed demonstrations against Ghani’s presidency on May 23.228

President Ghani further upset his political opponents when he appointed several senior security officials, including two deputy ministers for defense,
provincial chiefs of police in 17 provinces, and three new deputies in the Office of the National Security Council. While President Ghani said these appointments were part of his reform agenda, the UN reported that opposition figures claimed these appointments created the perception that he was politicizing the security sector ahead of the presidential elections.229

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR GOVERNANCE
As of June 30, 2019, the United States had provided nearly $34.5 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of this funding, more than $20.5 billion, was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).230

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION
U.S.-led Peace Talks with the Taliban
On June 29, the United States began the latest round of peace talks with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar.231 During a visit to Kabul days before the talks, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo expressed his hope for a peace deal by September 1.232

Ambassador Khalilzad described the most recent talks as “the most productive” to date having made “substantial progress” on all four principal topics agreed upon between the United States and the Taliban in January 2019: counterterrorism assurances, foreign troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue and intra-Afghan negotiations, and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. Ambassador Khalilzad’s office confirmed to SIGAR that the latest round of talks ended on July 9 with both sides agreeing to set a date for another meeting after completing internal consultations.233

In a previous round of talks between May 1 and 9, U.S. and Taliban negotiators focused their discussions on the withdrawal of international troops and guarantees that Afghanistan would not become a base for transnational terrorism.234

On July 11, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice G. Wells said that no future Afghan government can expect international assistance if it “restricts, represses or relegates Afghan women to second-class status.”235

A more comprehensive discussion of State’s perspectives on the peace talks is presented in the classified addendum of this report.
Parallel Peace Efforts in Moscow and Doha

Although Afghan politicians and the Taliban negotiators failed to reach a ceasefire agreement during talks in Moscow in May, the Afghan delegates and Taliban representatives at a July intra-Afghan dialogue event in Doha, Qatar, committed to a goal of reducing “civilian casualties to zero.”

Afghan politicians, particularly those opposed to President Ghani, pushed for a ceasefire with a Taliban delegation led by the group’s co-founder, Abdul Ghani Baradar, but the Taliban rejected this request. Russia’s foreign minister opened the meeting with a call for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

A more detailed account of the Moscow meeting is presented in the classified addendum of this report.

Also in May, Germany’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Markus Potzel, twice met with Taliban representatives in Doha. On June 30, a representative for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Germany agreed to facilitate imminent direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Potzel clarified that those attending the upcoming event would “participate only in their personal capacity and on an equal footing.” Ambassador Khalilzad described these talks as “an essential element of the four-part peace framework.”

On July 7 and 8, 44 Afghan delegates (including 10 women) and 17 Taliban representatives gathered for the German- and Qatar-sponsored “Intra-Afghan Peace Conference.” According to State, the Afghan delegates included Afghan government officials, civil-society representatives, political opposition representatives, and members of parliament. In a joint declaration issued at the conclusion of the conference, participants said a dignified and thoughtful peace was only possible through inclusive Afghan negotiations. The participants further called for the parties to the Afghanistan conflict to consider a number of measures, including:

- immediate release of all elderly, disabled, and sick inmates
- ensuring the security of public buildings, such as schools and madrassas, hospitals, markets, and water dams
- respecting educational institutions
- reducing civilian casualties to zero

Ambassador Khalilzad’s office told SIGAR that the Doha dialogue included “serious” discussions (despite all participants’ serving only in their personal capacities), was a “strategic success,” and represented the highest profile gathering of Afghans (including the Taliban) since 2001.

Participants called for assuring women’s political, social, economic, and cultural rights “within the Islamic framework of Islamic Values.” One female delegate said she asked the Taliban representatives for their definition of a hijab (a head covering that some believe is required for women by Islam) “because, during the Taliban time, women were beaten for not...”

“In the end only the Afghans themselves, including the Taliban, can decide upon the future of their country.”

—Markus Potzel, Germany’s Special Representative of the Federal Government for Afghanistan and Pakistan
wearing a burqa” [a one-piece veil that covers the face and body, often leaving just a mesh screen to see through]. According to the delegate, a Taliban representative responded that, from their interpretation of Islam, a less concealing headscarf is as appropriate as a burqa.246

On June 6, 77 members of Congress sent a bipartisan letter to Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo urging him to ensure that women are included in Afghan peace negotiations and that any agreement protects Afghan women’s rights.247

**Afghanistan Holds a Consultative Loya Jirga on Peace**

Over five days starting on April 29, more than 3,000 delegates met in Kabul to discuss their views and thoughts on peace and stability in Afghanistan. Hosted by the Afghan government, the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga, or grand gathering, sought to develop the parameters for talks with the Taliban.248 The delegates called on the Afghan government and Taliban to declare an immediate and permanent ceasefire to coincide with the start of Ramadan in May.249 (The Taliban rejected demands for a ceasefire on the final day of the Jirga and again on June 1, 2019, in the group’s annual message for the Eid al-Fitr holiday.250)

Further, the delegates said any amendments to the Afghan constitution should occur after a peace agreement, recommended that Taliban establish a political office in Afghanistan, and requested that the Afghan government and international community develop a timeline for a responsible withdrawal of foreign military forces.251 Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, as well as opposition presidential candidates, boycotted the event, claiming it was part of President Ghani’s reelection campaign.252

**U.S. Support to Peace and Reconciliation**

State provided $3.9 million to the United Nations Development Programme in September 2017 to support reconciliation, including the activities of the High Peace Council (HPC).253 State provided an additional $6 million in September 2018 for a project extension to July 31, 2019. State has allocated, but not obligated, another $2.5 million to support Afghanistan’s peace strategy.254 The United States, United Kingdom, and South Korea are developing a follow-on to the present interim reconciliation activity.255

State’s funding supports the HPC as it prepares the Afghan public for negotiations with the Taliban, including initiatives to develop a social consensus for peace and reconciliation. According to State, the HPC, with funding from the European Union, will conduct a series of peace dialogues over the next six months. Residents of Paktiya, Bamyan, Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, and Kunduz Provinces will discuss their potential peacebuilding roles to address the causes of the conflict.256

The HPC is not effective enough to implement a peace agreement, State says. The Afghan government still needs to develop and implement
guidelines for province and district government officials to de-escalate local conflicts and reintegrate local Taliban fighters and commanders. According to State, local Afghan civil and military officials regularly engage with Taliban commanders to de-escalate the conflict. These same officials have requested financial support from the Afghan government, but no national program exists. In the event of a broader peace agreement, State said the contacts generated through these local efforts could help in implementing the larger peace plan.257

PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CONTINUE
This quarter, the Afghan election management bodies—the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)—continued their preparations for the upcoming presidential elections. On May 29, the IEC announced that only the presidential elections would occur on September 28, 2019. This reversed the IEC’s previous decision to hold provincial council elections and the delayed parliamentary elections for Ghazni Province on the same day as the presidential voting. The IEC did not announce a new date for these other elections.258

The United States and the other principal international election donors welcomed the IEC’s decision to concentrate solely on the presidential election, writing this was “essential given the very tight timeline and the practical challenges.”259

The IEC launched a 22-day voter registration “top-up” on June 8. Five categories of voters can register, including those:260

- who will be 18 years old by election day
- who recently returned to Afghanistan
- who have not registered before
- whose name was previously registered incorrectly or who have lost or damaged national identification cards
- who changed their electoral constituency

The IEC will also run a full voter-registration exercise during the 22-day voter registration period in Ghazni Province, which could not complete voter registration in 2018 due to insecurity and political disputes.261

The IEC said it would post the existing voter lists at all polling centers during the registration period to allow already registered voters to make corrections.262 The October 2018 parliamentary elections featured the first use of polling-center-based voter lists (which require voters to cast their ballots at the polling center at which they register).263 According to the UN, Afghan civil-society organizations observed polling centers having inaccurate voter lists and difficulties in identifying registered voters during the October 2018 parliamentary election.264
After initially deciding on April 25, 2019, that it would register all voters biometrically, the IEC reversed itself on May 13 when it said the voter registration top-up would use paper-based registration methods. According to the UN Secretary-General, international donors facilitated an assessment by a senior technology expert, who advised the IEC that it would need 18 to 24 months to properly implement a biometric voter registration process.

A more comprehensive discussion of State’s perspectives on the elections is presented in the classified addendum of this report.

Why No Elections in Ghazni Province?

Out of all Afghan provinces, only Ghazni failed to hold parliamentary elections in October 2018. This quarter, the IEC again delayed parliamentary elections in Ghazni to an unknown future date. Earlier, in 2010, parliamentary elections in Ghazni were also controversial. As shown in Figure 3.38, Ghazni is a linguistically and ethnically mixed province with predominately Dari-speaking Hazara- and Pashto-speaking, Pashtun-dominated districts. Whereas the 2005 parliamentary elections produced five Hazara and six Pashtun victors, in 2010 Hazara candidates won all 11 parliamentary seats. According to the National Democratic Institute, insurgent violence and intimidation depressed Pashtun turnout that year. Pashtun candidates protested and claimed they had been disenfranchised following the announcement of the preliminary results.

Against this backdrop of controversy, the IEC announced in June 2018 that it would split Ghazni Province into three electoral constituencies. This would have made Ghazni unique among the other 33 provinces that are unitary, multi-seat constituencies (multiple parliamentarians representing a single province). Protests in support of and opposed to the split seriously hindered election preparations in the province. A few days before the October 2018 elections were to be held, the IEC announced it was delaying the Ghazni vote due to insecurity and difficulties in registering voters. While the IEC expressed hope that the elections would be held in four months as required by law, the parliamentary elections remain unscheduled.
GOVERNANCE

WHO’S WHO OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
The IEC has approved 18 candidates to run in the September 2019 presidential election. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, the election will move to a second round on November 23, 2019. Each candidate has a randomly assigned position on the ballot and a candidate-selected symbol and photograph to help illiterate voters. According to Afghanistan’s election law, each candidate had to gather support of 100,000 voters in at least 20 provinces to register. The ECC vetted and cleared all 18 candidates, reporting that there were no complaints made against any them.

CANDIDATES FOR THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Rahmatullah Nabil
Arminiat wa Adalat (Security and Justice)
Former chief, National Directorate of Security

Sayed Noorullah Jallili
Taktir wa Tawse’a (Prudence and Development)
Head of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Faramarz Tamana
Musharekat wa Taghir (Participation and Change)
Former Ambassador to India

Shaista Mohammad Abdali
Subat wa Hangmgar (Stability and Integration)
Current Chief Executive of Afghanistan

Ahmad Wall Masood
Wefa-e Melli (National Accord)
Former Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Noor Rahman Lewal
Masuliat wa Adalat (Responsibility and Justice)
Founder and owner of a software company

Mohammad Shahnah Hakimi
Solh, Qamuriat wa Refah (Peace, Lawfulness and Welfare)
Director of the Mine Detection Centre

Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
Dawlat-i-sa’i (State-builders)
Incumbent President of Afghanistan

Dr. Abdullah Abdali
Subat wa Hangmgar (Stability and Integration)
Current Chief Executive of Afghanistan

Amal mekenem, shi’ar na mevedem (We act, we do not chant slogans)
Former intelligence official during the communist government

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Solh wa Adalat-e Islami (Peace and Islamic Justice)
Former leader of Hezb-e Islami insurgent group; reconciled with the Afghan government in 2016

Abdul Latif Pedram
Azadi wa Adalat (Freedom and Justice)
Leader of a political party

Noorulhaq Uloomi
Mardomsalar, Erkeshaf wa Tawazun (Democracy, People’s Power, Development and Balance)
Former minister of interior

Haji Mohammad Atmar
Subat wa Hangmgar (Stability and Integration)
Leader of a political coalition

Prof. Dr. Ghulam Farooq Najibi
Leader of a political party

Enayatullah Hafiz
Khadem-e Melli (Servants of the Nation)
Unsuccessful candidate for province council and lower house of parliament

Mohammad Hanif Atmar
Solh wa Etdal (Peace and Moderation)
Former national security advisor and government minister

Dr. Zalmay Rasool
Wahdat, Shafaqat wa Etdal (Unity, Transparency and Moderation)
Former national transparency advisor and government minister

U.S. Funding Support to Elections

The U.S. government has provided financial support to the Afghan elections in 2018 and planned elections in 2019 through a grant of up to nearly $79 million to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Through this grant, UNDP provides support to Afghanistan’s electoral management bodies, the IEC and the ECC.274

As shown in Table 3.18, USAID had three active elections-related programs this quarter, the largest of which is support to the UNDP.275

On August 8, 2018, USAID signed a three-year, $14 million cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)—representing the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute—to support domestic Afghan election observation of the 2018 parliamentary elections, the 2019 presidential elections, and to promote longer-term electoral reforms.276

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID ELECTION-RELATED PROGRAMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Support Activity (ESA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Activity (SCEEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Elections and Political Transitions Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Afghanistan Compact

In August 2017, the U.S. and Afghan governments announced the launch of the “Afghanistan Compact.”277 The Afghanistan Compact is an Afghan-led initiative designed to demonstrate the government’s commitment to reforms. The Afghan government appears to face no direct financial consequences if it fails to meet the Afghanistan Compact reform commitments. Instead, the principal motivation for the Afghan government officials tasked with achieving the Compact benchmarks appears to be avoiding embarrassment, State said.278

According to State, this quarter, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) met several Compact benchmarks, including successfully prosecuting former Herat governor and head of the IEC Ahmad Yusuf Nooristani (for further details of this case, see page 128).279 Further, the AGO indicted for fraud all 12 election commissioners who oversaw the October 2018 parliamentary election.280 The AGO also continued its investigation of the individuals
GOVERNANCE

named in the October 2015 Farooqi Report on fuel-related corruption that uncovered collusion, price fixing, and bribery related to bids for fuel contracts totaling nearly $1 billion. However, this case remains stalled because, according to State, it lacks support from President Ghani’s office.281

The AGO made progress on a Compact benchmark when it investigated sexual-abuse allegations against the former president of the Afghan Football Federation (AFF), Keramuudin Karim, and his associates. The AGO issued an arrest warrant against Karim a day after the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) imposed a lifetime ban and a $1 million fine on Karim following its investigation into physical and sexual abuse of women players.282

State reported some progress with the Supreme Court obtaining equipment to record trials at its specialized judicial centers. However, the Supreme Court has not started using this equipment. The Supreme Court also committed to publish all judicial opinions and hired consultants to share the work of the judiciary with the media.283

After several high-level meetings, the Afghan government resolved an issue that saw international humanitarian assistance caught in Afghan customs. It also committed more than $10 million to assist displaced persons and returnees.284

According to State, the Afghan government self-reports its progress in meeting the Compact benchmarks. When possible, the U.S. Embassy may try to follow up and verify these reports.285

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET

Summary of Assistance Agreements

At the Brussels Conference in October 2016, the United States and other international participants confirmed their intention to provide $15.2 billion between 2017 and 2020 in support of Afghanistan’s development priorities.286 At the November 2018 Geneva Conference on Afghanistan, international donors reaffirmed their intention to provide $15.2 billion for Afghanistan’s development priorities up to 2020 and to direct continuing but gradually declining financial support to Afghanistan’s social and economic development up to 2024.287

According to the World Bank, the planned 2020 expiration of major donor pledges means that the future trajectory of foreign grant assistance is highly uncertain.288 However, the World Bank believes that if a growing proportion of donor funds are delivered on-budget, the current donor commitments should be sufficient to fund the existing levels of service delivery as well as some additional infrastructure investments.289

In several conferences after the 2010 Kabul Conference, the United States and other international donors supported an increase to 50% in the

On-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are aligned with Afghan government plans, included in Afghan government budget documents, and included in the budget approved by the parliament and managed by the Afghan treasury system. On-budget assistance is primarily delivered either bilaterally from a donor to Afghan government entities, or through multidonor trust funds. (DOD prefers the term “direct contributions” when referring to Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) monies executed via Afghan government contracts or Afghan spending on personnel.)

Off-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are excluded from the Afghan national budget and not managed through Afghan government systems.

SIGAR’s Concern with On-Budget Assistance

As the United States reduces its military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, U.S. agencies will likely provide a greater proportion of their foreign aid as on-budget assistance. If more U.S. reconstruction funds are provided directly to the Afghan government on-budget, SIGAR believes strong accountability measures and internal controls must be in place, as well as oversight of those measures and controls. Likewise, if more U.S. and other donor on-budget assistance is provided through international trust funds such as the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the UN Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and Asian Development Bank’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund, enhanced accountability measures and internal controls by the Afghan government must be in place, as well as oversight of those measures and controls by the international organizations and the donor community. As Inspector General John F. Sopko has said, “If those conditions and that will to protect that money are lacking, and assistance is provided anyway, we at SIGAR believe you may as well take all of that cash and set it ablaze in Massoud Circle for all the help it will do to the Afghans or to us.”

SIGAR has found that the World Bank and UN have had serious problems monitoring the on-budget funds they disburse. Further, U.S. agencies have shown very little inclination to monitor what the funds’ financial agents are doing. For example, a 2017 SIGAR investigation uncovered corruption with Afghan-based contractors and the award process of the on-budget, USAID-funded, Ghazi–Kandahar Five Substations Project run by the Afghan national power utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), worth nearly $135 million. As a result, in 2018, USAID deobligated all on-budget support to DABS for future and planned energy projects not yet awarded, worth nearly $400 million.

Additionally, SIGAR found that despite steps taken to improve monitoring and accounting of ARTF funds since 2011, continuing limitations on and lack of transparency into the World Bank and Afghan government’s monitoring and accounting of ARTF funds put billions of dollars at risk. In 2013, SIGAR found that despite 13 years and after more than $1 billion in U.S. assistance, the multilateral LOTFA, which pays Afghan National Police (ANP) salaries and helps build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior, could provide no assurance that personnel and payroll data were accurate.

To protect U.S. taxpayer funds and eliminate payments for nonexistent “ghost” soldiers and police, United States Forces-Afghanistan has since implemented the Afghan Personnel and Pay System to better integrate personnel data with compensation and payroll data, and to calculate payroll amounts. Still, as of June 2019, only about 73.6% of ANP personnel have been matched to an authorized position and met the requirements to be paid.

If U.S. agencies choose to provide more on-budget assistance, this aid should be conditioned on an independent and context-specific finding that adequate monitoring mechanisms and internal controls are in place for the Afghan ministry or multilateral trust fund in question. SIGAR has found that Afghanistan’s programming environment presents unique challenges that strain the normal processes of foreign assistance. SIGAR urges Congress to consider these unique challenges for monitoring and managing foreign assistance in Afghanistan, particularly if these funds are provided on-budget.

proportion of civilian development aid delivered on-budget through the Afghan government or multidonor trust funds to improve governance, cut costs, and align development efforts with Afghan priorities.\textsuperscript{290} According to USAID, by the time of the November 2018 Geneva Conference, the whole donor community’s thinking on on-budget commitments and specific targets had “matured.” As a result, USAID and other donors committed at the conference to “review options to continue channeling on-budget development assistance as appropriate.”\textsuperscript{291} (During the conference, however, the Afghan government unsuccessfully proposed that donors commitment to delivering 60% of aid on-budget.\textsuperscript{292}) USAID told SIGAR in December 2018, and again in March 2019, that it does not commit to a target of a specific percentage of funds to be used for on-budget programming.\textsuperscript{293}

As shown in Table 3.19, USAID’s active, direct bilateral-assistance programs have a total estimated cost of $75 million. USAID also expects to contribute $2.7 billion to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) from 2012 through 2020 in addition to $1.37 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreement between USAID and the World Bank (2002–2011). USAID has disbursed $154 million to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).\textsuperscript{294}

On July 11, 2018, participants in the NATO Brussels Summit committed to extend “financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024.” The public declaration did not specify an amount of money or targets for the on-budget share of assistance.\textsuperscript{295}

### TABLE 3.19

**USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project/Trust Fund Title</th>
<th>Afghan Government On-Budget Partner</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 7/9/2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral Government-to-Government Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Textbook Printing and Distribution</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>9/15/2017</td>
<td>12/31/2019</td>
<td>$75,000,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<td><strong>Multi-Donor Trust Funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (current award)*</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>3/31/2012</td>
<td>7/31/2019</td>
<td>1,900,000,000</td>
<td>2,155,686,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *USAID had a previous award to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled $1,371,991,195 in disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently $3,527,677,528.

Civilian On-Budget Assistance

According to the World Bank, Afghan government domestic revenues finance only 46% of its civilian expenditures.296

USAID has provided on-budget civilian assistance in two ways: bilaterally to Afghan government entities, and through contributions to two multidonor trust funds, the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Asian Development Bank-administered Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).297 According to USAID, all bilateral-assistance funds are deposited in separate bank accounts established by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for each program.298

The ARTF provides funds to the Afghan government’s operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy reforms, and national-priority programs.299 The AITF coordinates donor assistance for infrastructure projects.300

As of March 2019, the United States remains the largest cumulative donor to the ARTF (30.8% of actual, as distinct from pledged, contributions paid in); the next-largest donor is the United Kingdom (16.8% of actual contributions).301

The ARTF recurrent-cost window supports operating costs, such as Afghan government non-security salaries. As of March 2019, the ARTF recurrent-cost window has cumulatively provided the Afghan government approximately $2.6 billion for wages, $600 million for operations and maintenance costs, $1.1 billion in incentive program funds, and $762 million in ad hoc payments since 2002.302

ARTF Incentive Reforms for 2019 Finalized

In 2018, the Afghan government, World Bank, and ARTF donors agreed to restructure the recurrent-cost window to make provision of funds contingent upon policy reforms and fiscal stability-related results. Within the recurrent-cost window, there were two instruments: (1) the Incentive Program Development Policy Grant (IP DPG), a policy-based budget support program; and (2) the Fiscal Stability Facility (FSF), a results-based, recurrent-cost financing program. However, in March 2019, ARTF donors agreed to merge these two programs for 2019.303

The World Bank reports that the United States is the only ARTF donor explicitly preferring that a portion of its funds should be spent for the IP DPG, having provided $210 million as of March 2019.304 (While other donors may not express a similar preference for their funds to be spend on the IP DPG, USAID says they still help fund the IP DPG as the contributions of all ARTF donors can be used to support the recurrent-cost window.305) USAID started using the IP DPG after its own mechanism for providing reform-based financial incentives, the New Development Partnership (NDP) program, ended. Through NDP, USAID agreed to provide $20 million through the ARTF recurrent-cost window for each development result the
Afghan government achieved. Between 2015 and 2017, USAID disbursed $380 million before formally ending NDP in July 2018. The 2019 IP DPG consists of 11 reform-based tranches. The first tranche of $100 million comes from non-ARTF World Bank monies. The remaining 10 tranches are each worth $30 million in ARTF funds tied to Afghan government achievement of specific conditions. The Afghan government receives these funds if the conditions are met before November 15, 2019. Tranches are penalized 10% per month if conditions are not met by the deadline.

Table 3.20 on the following pages lists the 2019 reforms and a summary of the World Bank’s justification for each reform.

**On-Budget Assistance to the ANDSF**

Approximately 70% of total U.S. on-budget assistance goes toward the requirements of the Afghan security forces. According to a recent World Bank estimate, Afghan government security expenditures—including off-budget security costs—were equal to 29% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018. The average low-income country spends 3% of GDP on security-related costs, according to the Bank.

DOD provides on-budget assistance to the Afghan government through direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to the Afghan government to fund a portion of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) requirements, and through ASFF contributions to the multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

According to DOD, most of the ASFF appropriation is not on-budget because it is spent on equipment, supplies, and services for the Afghan security forces using DOD contracts. UNDP administers LOTFA primarily to fund Afghan National Police salaries and incentives. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provides direct-contribution funding to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which allots it incrementally to the MOD and MOI.

For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1398 (December 2018–December 2019), CSTC-A plans to provide the Afghan government up to the equivalent of $707.5 million to support the MOD and $137.3 million to support the MOI. As of May 25, CSTC-A had provided the Afghan government the equivalent of $267.2 million to support the MOD for FY 1398. Almost all of these funds (90%) paid for ministry salaries. Additionally, as of May 25, CSTC-A had provided the equivalent of $110.6 million to support the MOI. Of these funds, none were delivered via the LOTFA.

**CSTC-A has Not Assessed MOD or MOI Compliance with Commitment Letters**

For the past two quarters, CSTC-A reported to SIGAR that it did not assess the MOD or MOI in meeting the conditions outlined in the 1397/1398 commitment...
## WORLD BANK’S 2019 ARTF INCENTIVE PROGRAM REFORMS, INDICATORS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (as of 2018)</th>
<th>Target (end of 2019)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop a regulatory framework for e-money and digital payments</td>
<td>Proportion of customs duties (as a share of total payments by volume throughout the fiscal year) transferred to Da Afghanistan Bank (central bank) via electronic payment from commercial banks</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average monthly number of transactions through the Afghanistan Payment System (APS)</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support implementation of the Civil Servants Law</td>
<td>Proportion of total civil servant appointments (2018-2020) made in compliance with the new competitive recruitment processes</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of female civil servants in total and at Senior Management Group level (Director General (Grade 1) and Director (Grade 2) positions)</td>
<td>22% (all grades) 6% (grades 1 and 2)</td>
<td>26% (all grades) 9% (grades 1 and 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support private-sector development through improved access to credit</td>
<td>Credit-registry coverage as a proportion of adult population (15–64)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of women included on the credit register</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the cost and time requirements to access electricity</td>
<td>Time taken to acquire an electricity connection for commercial customers</td>
<td>114 days</td>
<td>80 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of acquiring an electricity connection for commercial customers</td>
<td>2,448% of income per capita</td>
<td>1,500% of income per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of international power-purchase agreements reviewed by dedicated multi-disciplinary team in the national electric utility (DABS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve land administration</td>
<td>Number of municipal districts in which an administrative land system is operating</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve management of water resources</td>
<td>Responsibility for the design, construction, and management of irrigation canals for agriculture from the source to the farm is allocated to Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve public investment management</td>
<td>Proportion of new projects of over $7.5 million approved for implementation in the discretionary development budget that have undergone economic and gender analysis</td>
<td>0% (2019 budget)</td>
<td>50% (2020 budget)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve tax administration</td>
<td>Proportion of active Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) filing firms utilizing fast-track filing</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of cases submitted for ruling by the Tax Dispute Resolution Board</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve tax policy</td>
<td>Approve Value-Added Tax (VAT) business processes and release communications materials based on regulations, including procedures for exemptions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the quality of public expenditure</td>
<td>The budget is developed through application of the new Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) norms for four pilot ministries (as reflected in budget working papers)</td>
<td>No (2019 budget)</td>
<td>Yes (2020 budget)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen transparency and improve accountability and quality of cash management</td>
<td>Number of downloads of new-revenue performance reports</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of treasury salary payments made within 10 days of submission of monthly claims by line ministries</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The World Bank has linked provision of up to $400 million of support to the Afghan government’s budget to achievement of these targets.

*Unless otherwise noted, these are the justifications offered by the World Bank in its proposal to ARTF donors.
Background and Justification*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Background and Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to electricity</td>
<td>Time taken to acquire an electricity connection for commercial customers</td>
<td>The high cost of accessing electricity is a key constraint to economic growth and investment. Electricity is extremely unreliable and the fee schedule is not transparent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of acquiring an electricity connection for commercial customers</td>
<td>DABS, the national electric utility, relies heavily on imported electricity under international supply contracts that have not been subject to thorough economic assessment or regular review, and often contain unfavorable terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support private-sector development</td>
<td>Proportion of total civil servant appointments (2018–2020) made in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)</td>
<td>There is low formal land registration in Afghanistan, with only 30% of urban properties and 10% of rural properties formally registered. It takes 250 days to register a property in Afghanistan, well above the South Asian average of 114 days. (In 2017, SIGAR reported that USAID had spent $96.7 million from 2004 through 2014 to reform Afghanistan’s land administration system.) Afghanistan is currently developing a centralized administrative system including a land registration database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of women included on the credit register</td>
<td>The existing Water Law does not provide clarity on the roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) and MAIL. This lack of clarity has undermined the expansion of the irrigation network, impacting agricultural production and productivity. The Afghan cabinet has approved and submitted to parliament a revised Water Law that clarifies the roles of MEW and MAIL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of female civil servants in total and at Senior Management Group level (Director General (Grade 1) and Director (Grade 2) and Maintenance (O&amp;M) norms for four pilot ministries (as reflected in budget working papers)</td>
<td>There is low formal land registration in Afghanistan, with only 30% of urban properties and 10% of rural properties formally registered. It takes 250 days to register a property in Afghanistan, well above the South Asian average of 114 days. (In 2017, SIGAR reported that USAID had spent $96.7 million from 2004 through 2014 to reform Afghanistan’s land administration system.) Afghanistan is currently developing a centralized administrative system including a land registration database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of cases submitted for ruling by the Tax Dispute Resolution Board</td>
<td>Project selection under existing budget systems is inadequate. The Afghan government-managed discretionary development budget (approximately $700 million in 2018) lacks robust alignment with policy priorities and adequate project appraisals. Political concerns have historically driven discretionary project selection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of downloads of new-revenue performance reports</td>
<td>Taxpayers in Afghanistan have limited options when attempting to resolve tax disputes. Many in the business community perceive the revenue department as biased, while cases are also often subject to delay and petty corruption. The 2015 Tax Administration Law called for the establishment of a tax dispute resolution board. This board will exist outside of the revenue department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan is currently heavily reliant on customs revenues, which account for around 19% of total revenues. Customs revenues are expected to decline following Afghanistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2016. Afghanistan also currently levies a business tax which is a significant constraint to private sector development. To replace both the business tax and revenues lost from declines in tariff rates, the Afghan government plans to implement a 10% VAT by the end of 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan faces major challenges in ensuring adequate and efficient O&amp;M expenditures. Pressure on available resources for O&amp;M has dramatically increased. In late 2018, the Afghan government approved a new O&amp;M policy that includes costs schedules for budgeting, a national asset registry, and detailed codes for budgeting and monitoring O&amp;M expenditures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections in Afghanistan, scheduled for 2019, have historically been associated with deteriorations in revenue performance and governance, posing important fiscal and macroeconomic risks. The Afghan government is now seeking to ensure full transparency in revenue performance and expenditure management decision-making. This is expected to both improve accountability on policymakers to citizens and the international community. It should also ensure that development partners have full and up-to-date information on short-term developments impacting the revenue and cash position in order to inform any international donor response to fiscal disruptions. Data on revenue performance is not currently published throughout the year. (Every quarter since July 2017, SIGAR has reported Afghan government revenue figures after the Afghan government stopped its monthly public reporting.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

letters. CSTC-A is able to issue fines and penalties if CSTC-A determines that the MOD or MOI have not complied with the terms of these commitment letters. However, CSTC-A did not issue financial penalties this quarter.\textsuperscript{317}

CSTC-A says it is reviewing over 1,300 “tasks” it previously used to monitor the progress of the Afghan security forces. Once CSTC-A completes this review, it plans to deploy a new assessment instrument that will inform its conditionality approach.\textsuperscript{318}

CSTC-A reported no instances of withholding funds for noncompliance with the commitment letters. The command issued, but did not ultimately implement, the threat to withhold over $90 million from the MOI’s future budget disbursements after the MOI failed to meet deadlines for retiring personnel under Afghanistan’s Inherent Law that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums, and time-in-grade limits. CSTC-A and the MOI agreed to delay imposing these penalties; CSTC-A reported that all the delayed retirements have now occurred.\textsuperscript{319}

**NATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

President Ghani inaugurated the first new parliament since 2011 (minus representatives from Kabul and Ghazni Provinces) on April 26, 2019.\textsuperscript{320} The elections took place in October 2018, but the Afghan election-management bodies did not finalize the results for Kabul Province until May 14, more than six months later. The parliamentarians from Kabul Province were sworn in on May 15.\textsuperscript{321}

State reports that a dispute over the selection of the new speaker of the lower house and other administrative positions has prevented parliament from passing any legislation since it reconvened.\textsuperscript{322}

Parliament’s recent internal dysfunction may coincide with a broader marginalization of the institution vis-à-vis the executive branch. For example, in 2018, President Ghani issued 34 legislative acts by decree under emergency powers, while both houses of parliament only passed 14 laws.\textsuperscript{323} In another example of the legislative branch’s weakness, the UN reported also this quarter that the Afghan government, effective October 2018, suspended the salaries of parliamentarians who failed to declare their assets per the terms of the anticorruption law that President Ghani enacted by presidential legislative decree.\textsuperscript{324} (According to the UN, the salary suspension was followed by a “remarkable” increase in asset declarations by parliamentarians, showing the importance of political will for anticorruption reforms.\textsuperscript{325}) For 2018, at least, the executive branch appears to have taken the lead in developing the laws it then executes.
Civil Society and Media

As shown in Table 3.21, USAID funds programs to support broader human and institutional capacity building of civil-society organizations and the media.

TABLE 3.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasana (Media)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Afghan Civic Engagement Program’s (ACEP) goal is to promote civil-society and media engagement that enables Afghan citizens to influence policy, monitor government accountability, and serve as advocates for political reform. Starting in June 2018, ACEP’s goals included expanding civic and voter education and engagement for the scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections.326 In its first five years, ACEP awarded $9.2 million in grants to local institutions and civil-society organizations (CSO). Its current portfolio includes an additional $2.1 million in grants.327

Much of ACEP’s work is in the form of trainings to civil society members. Below are illustrative examples of two recent ACEP-sponsored trainings:

- ACEP provided women-focused training to 90 people on political participation in elections. The training covered identity issues,
gender division of labor, equality and equity concepts, and gender mainstreaming. One participant was quoted describing how it was the first time he learned of the differing needs, challenges, and aspirations of men, women, boys, girls, transgender, minorities, differently abled, and marginalized sections of the societies. According to ACEP, participants developed action plans to integrate these lessons into their public outreach activities.

- In Kunar Province, an ACEP-supported CSO provided women’s rights awareness training to 140 individuals. One female participant was quoted saying that the training would help her and others to raise their voices for their rights. A male participant said he appreciated that young men and women sat together for the training and “now we can easily create awareness among our families and communities.”

On May 8, the Taliban attacked the Kabul office of the ACEP implementing partner, Counterpart International. The Taliban killed four Afghan Public Protection Force guards, but all Counterpart staff were safe. According to Counterpart, this was the first attack of its kind against the organization in its 14 years working in Afghanistan. Reuters said the Taliban’s spokesperson accused Counterpart of promoting “Western culture,” including gender mixing.

USAID’s $9 million Rasana program provides support to women journalists and women-run or women-owned media organizations. The program has four program areas: (1) support and training for women journalists, (2) investigative journalism initiatives, (3) advocacy and training for the protection of journalists, and (4) expanding the outreach of media through small grants for content production in underserved areas.

Rasana supports women-run and women-owned media organizations to produce three to five minute-long women-focused radio programs. Between January and March 2019, Rasana-supported outlets produced 188 such radio packages. This quarter, Rasana attributed Kunduz municipality’s promise to open a women-only market to one Rasana-supported radio broadcast.

**SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

This quarter, the Afghan news organization TOLOnews conducted an investigation on the presence of Afghan government institutions at the district level. In June, TOLOnews interviewed local officials, members of parliament and provincial councils, and, in some cases, visited selected districts. TOLOnews found that in 64 out of 364 official and 11 unofficial districts, the Afghan government’s civil offices either were working outside the district (for example, a district administrator worked out of a location such as the province capital) or were no longer functional. Figure 3.39 shows the districts TOLOnews reported with no Afghan government civil offices.
According to TOLOnews, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) confirmed that in approximately 20 of these districts, the Afghan government had no government presence (civil and security) at all. SIGAR has not independently verified this information but the latter findings do conform to other information provided to SIGAR.

**Provincial and Municipal Programs**

USAID has two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and municipalities: the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA) and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) programs. Table 3.22 on the following page summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.
GOVERNANCE

TABLE 3.22

USAID SUBNATIONAL (PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL) PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 7/9/2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR)</td>
<td>11/30/2014</td>
<td>11/29/2019</td>
<td>$72,000,000</td>
<td>$54,489,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA)</td>
<td>2/1/2015</td>
<td>1/31/2020</td>
<td>48,000,000</td>
<td>37,167,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP)*</td>
<td>3/31/2012</td>
<td>7/31/2019</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>34,314,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *This includes USAID contributions to ARTF with an expressed preference for the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project.


Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations

The $48 million ISLA program is meant to enable the Afghan government to improve provincial governance in the areas of fiscal and development planning, representation of citizens, and enhanced delivery of public services. ISLA aims to strengthen subnational systems of planning, operations, communication, representation, and citizen engagement, leading to services that more closely respond to all citizens’ needs in health, education, security, justice, and urban services.335

This quarter, ISLA assisted the IDLG in establishing a Regional Development Authority (RDA) and developing strategic guidelines. At the request of IDLG, ISLA examined regional bodies in the United States, Pakistan, Colombia, and the Philippines as comparative models. The Afghan government specifically cited these countries in a May 2018 subnational governance policy that placed responsibility for the design, planning, implementation, and monitoring of development projects at a new regional level between the national and province levels.336 In April 2019, ISLA drafted an outline for the IDLG’s regional strategic development planning guideline.337

According to USAID, ISLA saw improvement in a core problem: the poor integration of provincial priorities into Afghanistan’s national budget plans.338 For the Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1398 (December 2018–December 2019), ISLA found that 14.2% of community-proposed provincial development-plan (PDP) projects from 16 ISLA-supported provinces found their way into the national budget plan. This was an increase from the previous budget, when the Afghan government adopted only 11% of PDP projects.339 However, it is unclear whether such a minor increase will change the reported perceptions that Afghan ministry programming often bears little resemblance to the PDPs developed the previous year after extensive planning and budgeting work. According to a USAID-commissioned assessment of the state of subnational governance before the latest Afghan budget, PDPs have had a limited impact on sectoral programming and budgeting by central ministries.340
GOVERNANCE

Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience

The objective of the $72 million SHAHAR program is to create well-governed, fiscally sustainable Afghan municipalities capable of meeting the needs of a growing urban population. SHAHAR partners with municipalities to, among other things, deliver capacity-building for outreach and citizen consultation, improved revenue forecasting and generation, and budget formulation and execution.341

Four SHAHAR-supported municipalities (Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat) reported a 61% reduction in fixed-revenue collection for the first quarter of this year (compared to the first quarter of the prior year). According to SHAHAR, the Ministry of Finance began collecting a fee that was a significant source of municipal revenues.342 USAID said it had no additional information regarding this fee or the MOF’s motives in collecting it themselves.343 Despite this loss of fixed revenues, however, municipalities registered increased overall year-on-year revenues for the first quarter with a 25% increase for northern municipalities, 160% increase for eastern municipalities, 35% increase for southern municipalities, and 43% increase for western municipalities.344

Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project

In October 2018, USAID began explicitly contributing a portion of its ARTF funds to the Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP) for the first time since the program began in 2016. In October, USAID requested that $34 million of its $300 million contribution to the World Bank’s ARTF be spent on CCAP.345

According to the Afghan government, CCAP is the centerpiece of the government’s national inclusive development strategy for rural and urban areas. As of November 1, 2018, the Afghan government reported that CCAP had been rolled out in 10,000 communities (700 urban and 9,300 rural) in all 34 provinces. CCAP works through Community Development Councils (CDC) to implement community projects. CCAP defines a suite of minimum basic services for each community covering health, education, and a choice of infrastructure investments (such as road access, electricity, or small-scale irrigation for rural communities).346
SERVICE DELIVERY IN TALIBAN-CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED AREAS

The Taliban have not ruled Afghanistan since 2001, but they still exert a heavy influence on the Afghan government’s delivery of public services in many parts of the country. The Taliban seldom provide services themselves, but they reportedly can co-opt, modify, or choose to facilitate or hinder Afghan government services.

These observations—troubling given the Afghan government’s need to improve perceptions of its legitimacy and effectiveness—emerge from studies conducted in the past two years by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and the World Bank. Although SIGAR has not independently verified these studies, they highlight a rarely acknowledged aspect of service delivery in Afghanistan: bargains with insurgents are often a necessary compromise when operating in areas they control or influence.

The ODI study described the situation in 2018:

Aid agencies, the [Afghan] government and the international community seem worryingly unaware of [the growing Taliban efforts to control and influence service delivery], deeply unprepared and reluctant to engage with the Taliban, despite their growing influence on the ground, including over aid and government programmes.

These studies have largely sought to describe the Taliban’s role in service delivery rather than examine its political consequences. However, some analysts argue that the Taliban’s approach is part of a larger governing strategy. According to the scholar Antonio Giustozzi, some Taliban leaders seem to believe involvement in service delivery can be a source of political legitimacy for them. Since the group has few resources to dedicate to providing services themselves, it is more efficient, according to Giustozzi, for the movement to “hijack” Afghan government-provided services.

Since December 2018, AAN and USIP have issued a series of case studies on life in Taliban-controlled or influenced districts. This research relied on semi-structured interviews with key informants from districts under varying levels of insurgent influence. As shown in Table 3.23, there was a pattern to the Taliban’s activities across districts. The Taliban were reported to monitor schools, prohibit some school subjects such as science, promote others such as Islamic studies, restrict polio campaigns from going door-to-door but instead to operate from the village mosque, and run commissions that would register nongovernmental service providers.

As one USIP author summarized, service delivery in Taliban-controlled and -influenced areas is a “hybrid of state- and nongovernmental organization-provided services, operating according to Taliban rules.” The Taliban have been both disrupters and advocates or facilitators of services. For example, the Taliban regularly threaten cell phone providers to stop service
at night. Conversely, the Taliban have threatened to attack Afghan government electrical infrastructure to force the government to provide electricity to villages under their control.351

In multiple districts, the Taliban reportedly co-opted government services, taxing service providers, monitoring services, and presenting candidates for government jobs. These actions by the Taliban's “shadow state” are parallel to, but in many ways parasitically dependent on, the formal Afghan government. In some cases, the Taliban appeared to advance community interests. For example, respondents in Andar District in Ghazni Province reported that the Taliban removed nonexistent or “ghost” teachers from the Afghan government's roster.352 In other cases, the Taliban reportedly benefited from corruption. In Nad Ali District, Helmand Province, respondents said the Taliban collected ghost-teacher salaries.353

The UK's ODI and the World Bank published research in 2017 and 2018, respectively, showing that development programming can continue (in

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**TABLE 3.23**

| Role                                      | Andar District, Ghazni Province | Helmand’s Nad Ali District, Helmand Province | Ghazni District, Herat Province | Dasht-e Archi District, Kunduz Province | Achin District, Nangarhar Province *
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervise/monitor schools</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censor school books/subjects</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in selecting teachers/monitoring teacher performance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health facilities agree to treat Taliban fighters</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor health centers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post guards at health facilities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict or influence vaccinations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax businesses/population</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax service providers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict cell phone services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict television and/or radio (though often ignored)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate Taliban courts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint resident shadow governor</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-related shadow directors or registration of service providers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize locals for small projects</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) is presently the principal antigovernment armed group in this district and the Afghan government mostly controls the district. This graphic summarizes the Taliban's approach to service delivery during their time of control between 2009 and 2015 rather than IS-K’s uniformly opposed approach to state service delivery. For example, IS-K is reported to have run its own health clinic during but were opposed to state-funded health services.

some cases, rather successfully) in Taliban-controlled or -influenced areas through bargains with insurgents. ODI, relying on interviews with 162 individuals, reported that the Taliban co-opted government- and aid agency-provided goods and services in areas under their control. The report says that Afghan government service delivery ministries have struck deals with local Taliban and that most provincial or district-level government health and education officials interviewed for the report said they were in direct contact with their Taliban counterparts.354

Similarly, an Afghan government official interviewed for the recent AAN/USIP study of Dasht-e Archi District, Kunduz Province described how the responsibilities for school monitoring were divided between the government and the Taliban, depending on which group controlled the areas in which the school resided.355

The World Bank wrote that where the Taliban was relatively reliant upon local support, agreements with local elites emerged to support delivery of government-funded health and education services. The World Bank found that after launching attacks on schools in 2006–2008, the group has since changed to attempting to influence state schools through local-level negotiations with Ministry of Education officials. Some Taliban were thus bargaining about co-opting rather than closing schools.356

While the AAN/USIP, ODI, and World Bank studies offered similar descriptions of Taliban involvement in service delivery, only the ODI study drew strong conclusions on the consequences for Taliban governance. The World Bank demurred on a critical question, writing that their study did not address “the question of whether or how service delivery may contribute to, or undermine, state-building, peace-building, or conditions of fragility,” as they saw improving the delivery of services as a worthy goal in its own right.357 However, ODI argued that the bargains around service delivery were indicative of a coherent Taliban governing strategy. According to ODI, the Taliban’s involvement in service delivery allows the group to exert influence beyond the areas under its direct control in furtherance of its goal to impose its rule.358
RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

According to the UN, Afghan courts are functioning in 232 out of 378 districts with 24 district primary courts operating in neighboring districts and 116 primary courts operating in the provincial capitals. No courts are operating in 146 districts. The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) is present in 283 districts and the Ministry of Justice’s legal services department is present in 336 districts.

Summary of Rule of Law and Anticorruption Programs

As shown in Table 3.24, the United States has a number of active rule-of-law and anticorruption programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 7/9/2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT)</td>
<td>8/23/2017</td>
<td>8/22/2022</td>
<td>31,986,588</td>
<td>4,371,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections System Support Program (OASIS CSSP) Option Year I*</td>
<td>6/1/2018</td>
<td>5/31/2020</td>
<td>12,131,642</td>
<td>9,556,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Professional Development Support (CPDS)*</td>
<td>2/6/2018</td>
<td>4/6/2020</td>
<td>7,938,401</td>
<td>7,938,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegated Cooperation Agreement (DCAR) with the Department for International Development (DFID) for Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)</td>
<td>5/19/2015</td>
<td>8/31/2020</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Disbursements as of 6/20/2019.


In April 2016, USAID launched the $68 million Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) program. ADALAT aims to (1) increase the effectiveness and reach of the formal justice sector, (2) strengthen the linkages between the formal and traditional justice sectors, and (3) increase citizen demand for quality legal services. ADALAT collaborates with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Department of the Huquq (“rights”). Huquq offices provide citizens the opportunity to settle civil cases within the formal system before beginning a court case. According to ADALAT, the Afghan government is replacing half of the Huquq professional staff (approximately 400 persons) since they did not have the required academic degrees. This quarter, the UN Secretary-General said the MOJ failed to finalize its required anticorruption-related reforms of the Huquq and the Department of Government Cases (Qaza-e-Dawlat), and failed to develop a law codifying relationship between the formal and the informal justice sectors.
In August 2017, USAID awarded the Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT) contract to support the Afghan government’s efforts to reduce and prevent corruption in government public services. According to USAID, AMANAT supports select Afghan government institutions with technical assistance to plan for and implement recommended procedural reforms. This quarter, USAID declared the AMANAT’s implementing-partner performance reporting to be sensitive but unclassified and, therefore, not usable as a source for this public report. USAID did not offer a justification for this restriction or offer any alternative source to report on AMANAT’s efforts during the quarter.

USAID has a cooperation arrangement with the UK’s Department for International Development to fund the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). USAID funds the MEC’s monitoring, analysis, and reporting activities, including its vulnerability-to-corruption assessments.

State’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) is the largest rule-of-law program in Afghanistan. JSSP was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building support to the Afghan justice system through training, mentoring, and advisory services. The current JSSP contract began in August 2017 and has an estimated cost of $23 million. The previous JSSP contract, which began in 2010, cost $280 million. JSSP provides technical assistance to Afghan justice-sector institutions through (1) building the capacity of justice institutions to be professional, transparent, and accountable; (2) assisting the development of statutes that are clearly drafted, constitutional, and the product of effective, consultative drafting processes; and (3) supporting the case-management system so that Afghan justice institutions work in a harmonized and interlinked manner and resolve cases in a transparent and legally sufficient manner.

JSSP advises various Afghan government offices on the Case Management System (CMS). CMS is an online database that tracks the status of criminal cases in Afghanistan, across all criminal justice institutions, from the moment a case is initiated to the end of confinement. As of May 31, 2019, the CMS had recorded 467,527 criminal cases and 87,604 civil cases.

In February 2018, State launched the $8 million Continuing Professional Development Support (CPDS) program. According to State, CPDS will respond to an urgent need by the Afghan government to train legal professionals on the newly revised penal code and build the organizational capacity of the nascent professional training departments of Afghan legal institutions.

Anticorruption

In May, the UN reported that while the Afghan government has created new anticorruption institutions and adopted laws and strategies, the results have
GOVERNANCE

not materialized quickly enough.\textsuperscript{373} The UN cited the October 2018 parliamentary elections as an example of legal and process reforms failing to prevent severe levels of corruption in practice.\textsuperscript{374}

According to the UN, one of the major reforms contained in the September 2018 anticorruption law was the intention to create an independent anticorruption commission. However, seven months after the law was enacted by a presidential legislative decree, no such commission exists.\textsuperscript{375}

In cases involving prominent figures, the UN says the Afghan criminal-justice system "looks like a system promoting impunity." According to the UN, there are numerous incidents when the police failed to make arrests and the AGO failed to issue charges. Further, suspects have been released prior to trial and orders to not leave the country were not enforced. Despite there being legal and procedural grounds for these choices, the UN says the cumulative effects are limited execution of Anti-Corruption Justice Center arrests, limited enforcement of sentences in high-level cases, and fewer indictments against high-ranking officials.\textsuperscript{376}

\textbf{Anti-Corruption Justice Center}

In May 2016, President Ghani announced the establishment of a specialized anticorruption court, the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC). At the ACJC, elements of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) investigators, AGO prosecutors, and judges work to combat serious corruption. The ACJC's jurisdiction covers major corruption cases committed in any province involving senior officials (up to the deputy minister), generals, and colonels, or cases involving substantial monetary losses. Substantial losses are

\textbf{The Department of Justice provided no assessment of corruption in Afghanistan.}

SIGAR regularly conveys the Department of Justice's (DOJ) views on the corruption situation in Afghanistan. This quarter, however, SIGAR cannot report those views because DOJ, for the first time, marked the primary data source as "sensitive but unclassified." Further, DOJ provided no responses to SIGAR's direct questions for its assessment of the Afghan government's anticorruption institutions. Previously, DOJ reported that it observed increased vigor on the part of Afghan government anticorruption bodies following SIGAR's publishing of DOJ's critiques. SIGAR will pursue this issue with DOJ.

\textbf{SIGAR AUDIT}

As directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, SIGAR will submit an updated assessment of the Afghan government's implementation of its national anticorruption strategy to Congress this year that includes an examination of whether the Afghan government is making progress toward achieving its anticorruption objectives. The Afghan government has recently provided information concerning their activities to implement this strategy that SIGAR staff is translating and reviewing as part of this assessment.
defined as a minimum of five million afghani—approximately $73,000—in cases of bribes, money laundering, selling of historical or cultural relics, illegal mining, and appropriation of Afghan government property; or a minimum of 10 million afghani—approximately $146,000—in cases of embezzlement.377

This quarter, the ACJC convicted two high-profile defendants in absentia. The primary court convicted Ahmad Yusuf Nooristani—a member of the upper house of parliament and a former governor of Herat Province—of illegal ownership of money. According to DOD, the illegal ownership of money is a crime akin to embezzlement and is committed when a “public official takes the ownership of state money, securities, financial documents, goods, or other government properties or damages or destroys the said items.” When Nooristani was Governor of Herat Province, he unlawfully demanded approximately $13,000 from the chairman of Herat’s Mili Bus Enterprise. While Nooristani claimed he later lawfully distributed the money, he did not. He is the first parliamentarian prosecuted at the ACJC. The primary court sentenced Nooristani to one year and one month imprisonment and fined him the approximate equivalent of $13,000.378

In the second case, the primary court convicted for abuse of authority Major General Ahmad Zia Yaftali and nine others who had mismanaged the Dawood Military Hospital between 2005 and 2010, when $150 million worth of medical supplies were pilfered.379 The ACJC sentenced each defendant to six months’ confinement and collectively fined them the approximate equivalent of $220,800. According to DOJ, the corruption at the military hospital caused “horrendously inhumane conditions that were described as ‘Auschwitz-like.’”380

Following up on a corruption case that State highlighted in a previous quarterly report, the ACJC appeals court this quarter acquitted the former Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Abdul Razaq Wahidi. According to DOJ, Wahidi was suspended from his post on January 2, 2017, based on allegations of nepotism, overpayments, illegally contracted workers, embezzlement, and misappropriation of tax revenue. He had been found guilty in absentia by the ACJC primary court and imprisoned in April 2019 for a three-year prison sentence.381

Personnel attached to the ACJC continue to face threats. This quarter, two AGO prosecutors attached to the ACJC were attacked on the way to work. One of the prosecutors was killed in the attack.382

Afghan Government Recovers Less than 1% Of ACJC-issued Financial Penalties and Struggles to Execute Warrants and Summonses

As shown in Table 3.25 below, less than 1% of the financial penalties the ACJC primary court has imposed on convicted criminals has been deposited in the AGO bank account.383
To date, the ACJC’s primary court has convicted 10 deputy ministers (two from security ministries and eight from civilian ministries), 16 general officers (one lieutenant general, seven major generals, and eight brigadier generals), one governor, four members of province councils (including two chairs), and two mayors.384

According to the UN, the ACJC significantly increased its output in the first half of 2019 compared to the decline recorded in the latter half of 2018. By May 20, the ACJC primary court had issued judgments in 57 cases involving 223 defendants, the appeals court had decided 52 cases involving 173 defendants, and the Supreme Court had issued 36 judgments involving 117 accused in appeals against the decisions of the ACJC primary and appeals courts.

Despite the increased judicial output, the UN said Afghan law enforcement agencies have been unable to execute ACJC arrest warrants and summons. As shown in Table 3.26 on the following page, most warrants were resolved when suspects voluntarily surrendered.385

Per the International Monetary Fund’s extended credit facility arrangement, the Afghan government is required to publish ACJC-related data on prosecutions and convictions. According to the UN, the AGO has published statistics and a chart on ACJC decisions with names of defendants and the sanctions on the AGO’s website, demonstrating its attempt to meet this benchmark. However, the ACJC did not establish a consistently functioning website, and its judges argued the publication of full decisions was not possible under Afghan law.386

### TABLE 3.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACJC-issued financial penalties</th>
<th>Approximate value of financial penalties</th>
<th>Amount fully recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,321,626,267 afghani</td>
<td>$30,150,990</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153,140,821 USD</td>
<td>153,140,821</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299,500 Pakistani rupees</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,090,000,000 Iranian rials</td>
<td>73,392</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,701,000 Saudi riyals</td>
<td>1,786,933</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 United Arab Emirates dirhams</td>
<td>27,229</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 euros</td>
<td>16,855</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$185,198,267</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 Includes orders for cash fines, restitution, compensation, and confiscation.  
2 Conversions of currencies to approximate U.S. dollar values based on the average of the average monthly exchange rates for April, May, and June 2019.  
3 This is the amount of the penalties that have been enforced, recovered, and deposited into the Attorney General Office’s bank account.

GOVERNANCE

Afghanistan Security Forces

According to CSTC-A, powerbrokers vying for political power and profit help drive corruption in the Afghan security forces. The Afghan government has weak oversight of units and their commanders in peripheral areas. CSTC-A predicts corruption will remain a problem at least through the presidential election season. CSTC-A believes that partnering with the new ministers of interior and defense has been helpful in driving increased countercorruption efforts. CSTC-A said the insistence and assistance of CSTC-A leaders and countercorruption advisors led to an MOI investigation of the commander of the regional logistics center in Nangarhar Province and an MOD investigation into fuel corruption in northern Afghanistan.

Among the MOD and MOI elements tasked with reducing corruption, CSTC-A singled out the MOI Criminal Investigative Directorate (MOI CID) for critique this quarter. According to CSTC-A, the MOI CID has undertaken no investigations or other actions to counter corruption. CSTC-A believes that MOI CID leadership participates in, rather than disrupts, corruption.

CSTC-A’s critique is particularly noteworthy since MOI CID recently received additional personnel when the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) was transferred from the MOI Inspector General (MOI IG) to the MOI CID. Last quarter, CSTC-A said this transfer caused the MOI IG to lose critical anticorruption capabilities to prepare and conduct the monthly meetings, collect asset declarations, and administer the ministerial internal-control program. This quarter, however, CSTC-A said that the loss of 33 of its personnel has not significantly altered MOI IG’s work.

CSTC-A reported that the MOD has empowered its criminal-investigative directorate (MOD CID) by nearly doubling its personnel strength and removing the layers of leadership between it and the defense minister. According CSTC-A, under the previous arrangement, corrupt actors could intervene to stop investigations. Now, the MOD CID, as well as the MOD Inspector General, reports directly to the minister. Additional reforms include nominating new MOD judges and reviving the former practice of nonjudicial punishments for minor military infractions.

TABLE 3.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number pending (as of April 2019)</th>
<th>Executed (as of June 14, 2019)</th>
<th>Suspect voluntarily surrendered</th>
<th>Executed by force</th>
<th>Persons tried and serving their sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrest Warrants</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summons</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GOVERNANCE

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is an MOI unit chartered to investigate corruption by senior government officials and organized criminal networks, and high-profile kidnappings committed throughout Afghanistan. According to CSTC-A, the majority of MCTF personnel appear to be passionate about investigations and the organization has reasonable latitude in its operations. CSTC-A says that the expectation by other Afghan organizations that the MCTF serve arrest warrants negatively affects the MCTF. According to DOD, the MCTF director has said that other Afghan government agencies (particularly the police) should be able to assist with warrant execution. In the past, the MCTF has executed warrants related to their own cases with their own investigators. The MCTF only has 291 personnel and is not staffed or equipped to be assigned multiple warrants from other agencies, DOD says.

REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

According to the World Bank, the more than two million migrants who have returned since 2015 and the 1.7 million internally displaced persons represent both a risk and an opportunity to the Afghan economy. Returnees are generally better educated and could provide a boost to productivity and growth if successfully integrated, the Bank says. However, the concentration of refugee returnees and the displaced persons in urban areas risks overwhelming public services and generating large humanitarian needs.

State, however, disagrees with the idea that returnees are better educated, calling it a common misconception. State, citing United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, said that only 19% of Pakistan-based returnee children attended school there. Despite this, State agreed...
Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection. According to the UNHCR, refugees have the right to safe asylum and should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident.

Migrants are persons who change their country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status. According to the UN, there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant.


TABLE 3.27

USAID GENDER PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements, as of 7/9/2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote: Rolling Baseline and End-line Survey</td>
<td>2/21/2017</td>
<td>10/20/2020</td>
<td>7,577,638</td>
<td>4,746,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Human Trafficking in Afghanistan</td>
<td>1/11/2016</td>
<td>8/31/2019</td>
<td>7,098,717</td>
<td>6,526,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Based Violence (GBV)</td>
<td>7/9/2015</td>
<td>7/8/2020</td>
<td>6,667,272</td>
<td>6,667,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) II - Empowerment and Advocacy to Prevent Trafficking</td>
<td>1/10/2018</td>
<td>1/9/2020</td>
<td>1,483,950</td>
<td>929,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


that it would be beneficial to use returnees’ talents and productivity and integrate them into the economy.396

Afghan Refugees
As of June 29, 2019, the UNHCR reported that 2,969 refugees have voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in 2019.400 The majority (2,165) of these refugee returns were from Iran. Far fewer refugees have returned to Afghanistan this year than the high in October 2016.401

Undocumented Afghan Migrant Returnees
As of June 22, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) reported that 214,217 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran and 10,720 undocumented Afghan migrants returned from Pakistan in 2019. So far, 224,937 undocumented Afghans have returned in 2019. For 2019, IOM is projecting over 570,000 returnees from Iran (due to Iran’s ongoing economic challenges) and a minimum of 50,000 returns from Pakistan. Additionally, IOM says more than 1,000,000 Afghans may face deportation from Pakistan in 2019.402

Conflict-induced Internal Displacement
There has been less conflict-induced internal displacement this year than in 2018. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of June 16, conflicts in 2019 had induced 150,888 people to flee their homes. The office recorded 172,387 displaced persons in the same period last year.403
GENDER

In July 2013, then-USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah described the Promote partnership in a public speech as “the largest investment USAID has ever made to advance women in development.” According to USAID, Promote aims to strengthen women’s participation in civil society, boost female participation in the economy, increase the number of women in decision-making positions within the Afghan government, and help women gain business and management skills.

USAID has committed $280 million to Promote. Table 3.27 show the current Promote programs.

As of June 20, 2019, USAID said that of the 65,216 total Promote beneficiaries, 19,244 Promote beneficiaries have been hired. Of these, 1,455 have been employed by the Afghan government and 9,447 have secured permanent employment in the private sector. There are also 8,342 Promote beneficiaries holding private sector internships.

Recently, four Promote-supported activists participated in a roundtable discussion with U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad on peace. USAID cited this meeting as an example of Promote’s strategic effect.

As of March 31, USAID’s third-party monitor for the Promote programs has interviewed 49,161 beneficiaries to establish a baseline for establishing program effects. Table 3.28 shows the demographic profile of the Promote beneficiaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Percent married</th>
<th>Average monthly household income</th>
<th>Percent employed</th>
<th>Number of persons interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote: Women in the Economy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>$239</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote: Women’s Leadership Development</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote: Women in Government</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote: Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison group</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>