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SECURITY

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

Fighting between the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Taliban has increased in recent months as the parties to the conflict engaged in a series of peace talks, according to the Department of Defense (DOD) and Resolute Support (RS), the U.S.-led NATO mission in Afghanistan. DOD reported that, with U.S. and Coalition support, the ANDSF “increasingly targeted the Taliban with military pressure throughout the winter and into the spring to convince the Taliban that they cannot achieve their objectives by prolonging the conflict, and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement.” The increase in offensive operations was primarily driven by Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) missions focused on disrupting the Taliban’s freedom of movement and defending “key terrain,” such as major population centers, critical infrastructure, entry points into Afghanistan, and communication lines between population centers.

The Taliban also increased the number of its overall as well as “effective” (casualty-producing) attacks against the ANDSF and Coalition this quarter. According to RS, from March 1–May 31, 2019, enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) increased by 9% and effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA) increased by 17% compared to the preceding three months. However, this period’s EIA and EEIA fell somewhat compared to the same reporting period last year (March 1–May 31, 2018). DOD said that while “Taliban fighting capacity also suffered [from December 2018 to May 2019], the Taliban retain safe havens and recruiting pools in areas not targetable by ANDSF.”

DOD continued to note that the primary goal of the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan is to support ongoing peace talks occurring between the parties to the conflict, and that violence typically spikes around these talks when the parties seek to increase their negotiating leverage. U.S. officials met in early May and late June/early July in Doha, Qatar, for a series of talks with the Taliban. At the July intra-Afghan talks that followed, Afghan government officials in an unofficial capacity met with Taliban representatives along with other Afghans.

Two of the most deadly security incidents this quarter occurred while these talks were under way. The first was a series of Afghan and NATO airstrikes on May 6 in Farah Province that reportedly killed 150 Taliban militants, wounded 40, and destroyed 68 narcotics labs; the second was a July 1 1

“Our policy is to fight and talk. We’re fighting the Taliban, to pressure them into reduction of violence... I think we’re making progress.”

- Patrick Shanahan, Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense

Taliban car bomb targeting an Afghan government facility in Kabul City that killed at least 40 people and wounded 116 others (including 51 children). Figure 3.30 details the most violent incidents over the quarter.

U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad called the latest round of talks between the U.S. and Taliban representatives “the most productive session to date.” He said the intra-Afghan dialogue that took place subsequently was “a critical milestone in the Afghan peace process,” but that “there [was] still important work left to be done before we have an agreement.” For a full account of recent peace talks between the parties to the conflict, see pages 102–104 of the Governance section.

The human toll of the conflict continues to concern the international community as well as the Afghan government. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued statements this quarter listing several incidents in which dozens of civilians were killed during the month of Ramadan and afterwards, and urged the parties to the conflict to do more to protect Afghan civilians. Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib also said on June 18 that at least 50 people per day die “in the fight against terrorism” in the country. Though effective attacks against the ANDSF may have declined since the same period last year, RS reports that “casualty rates for the ANDSF are the same this quarter as they were in the same quarter one year ago.”

ANDSF personnel strength figures reported this quarter declined considerably compared to last quarter. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) said this was due to the ANDSF switching their reporting of personnel strength to the number of personnel enrolled in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) rather than the number reported on-hand by ANDSF components. This means that only those ANDSF personnel who have been biometrically validated in APPS are included in strength figures. The change was part of an effort by the United States and its partners to reduce opportunities for corrupt ANDSF officials to report “ghost” (nonexistent) soldiers and police on personnel rolls in order to pocket the salaries. CSTC-A said there are 180,869 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 91,596 Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel enrolled and accounted for in APPS as of May 25, 2019. This is roughly 10,000 ANA fewer and 25,000 ANP fewer than the numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter. This quarter’s strength of 272,465 puts the ANDSF at 77.4%, and 79,535 personnel short, of its goal strength of 352,000.

When asked about the gulf between last quarter’s Afghan-reported strength numbers and this quarter’s APPS validated ones, CSTC-A said that it “does not expect that the APPS reported data will ever equal the amount that was self-reported [by the Afghans]” and that it “cannot categorize the excess individuals as ‘ghost’ personnel, because it is not known why the Afghan reported numbers are higher.” SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate

FIGURE 3.30

Select High-Profile Security Incidents

PROGOVERNMENT FORCES

May 3: Coalition forces conduct two air strikes against Islamic State fighters in Nangarhar province
May 6: Afghan and Coalition kill Taliban militants in Farah Province
Jun 10: AAF air strike kills Taliban militants in Nangarhar Province
Jun 30: U.S. air strike targets Taliban leaders in Balkh Province
July 4: AAF and Coalition air strikes target Taliban militants in Logar Province

ANTIGOVERNMENT FORCES

Apr 14: Taliban kill Afghan soldiers during battle in Badghis Province
Jun 29: Taliban militants attack policemen and election officials in Kandahar Province
Jun 29: Taliban attack Afghan Public Protection Forces at checkpoint in Paktia Province
Jul 1: Taliban car-bomb attack targets Afghan Ministry of Defense building in Kabul City
Jul 15: Taliban kill Afghan commandos during battle in Badghis Province

Note: Fatalities are estimates and only include the number of the opposing party killed.
Source: ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 4/12/2019–7/16/2019, available online at
is investigating the matter, and is contributing to efforts by SIGAR’s Audits Directorate, CSTC-A, and the Afghan Attorney General’s office to identify and address measures to reduce and/or eliminate payments for nonexistent police officers.84

**ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable**

This quarter, USFOR-A classified the following data:

- some newly requested operational information about the 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade (2SFAB)

USFOR-A continued to classify or restrict from public release, in accordance with classification guidelines or other restrictions placed by the Afghan government, the following data (mostly since October 2017):

- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- unit-level ANA and ANP authorized and assigned strength
- performance assessments for the ANDSF
- information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment
- Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of SMW pilots, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- reporting on anticorruption efforts by the Ministry of Interior (unclassified but not publicly releasable)
- some information about the misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior

The classified annex for this report includes the classified and nonreleasable data.

**U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security**

As of June 30, 2019, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly $82.67 billion to support security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 62% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly $4.32 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2019 (net of the $604 million reprogramming action described on page 49), nearly $1.43 billion had been obligated and more than $0.97 billion disbursed as of June 30, 2019.84

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The rest is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility, and equipment maintenance, and various
communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Table 3.4 and 3.5 on pages 58–59.85

ASFF funds are obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget funds) are then provided to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted requests. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI although it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan provide funding for the ALP.86

Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been (but is not currently) the largest contributor.87

A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on page 113.

**Security-Incident Data**

SIGAR tracks and analyzes different types of security-incident data to provide a robust account of the security situation in Afghanistan and activity between the parties to the conflict.

Each type of incident data has advantages and limitations: RS-reported enemy-initiated attack (EIA) data comes from an official source, but is only available unclassified at the provincial level and does not include Afghan and Coalition-initiated attacks on the enemy. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) event data can be disaggregated to the district level, to a variety of security incident types, and to all the parties to the conflict, but depends entirely on media reporting of political and security-related incidents.

**Enemy-Initiated Attacks**

According to RS, “enemy-initiated attacks are defined as all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, IED, and mine explosions, etc.) initiated by insurgents that are reported as [significant activities] (SIGACTs).”88

This quarter’s EIA data shows that enemy attacks have increased over the last few months, following a violent winter, though this spring appears to be slightly less violent compared to spring 2018. RS reported 6,445 enemy-initiated attacks this quarter (March 1–May 31, 2019). This period’s figures reflect a 9% increase compared to the preceding three months (December 1, 2018–February 28, 2019), but a 10% decrease compared to the EIA reported during the same period last year (March 1–May 31, 2018).89

When looking at the geographic distribution of EIA thus far in 2019 (January–May), more than half (52%) occurred in just five of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces: Helmand, Badghis, Faryab, Herat, and Farah. Of these
provinces, the most EIA reported by far were in Helmand (2,788), followed by Badghis (808) and Faryab (657). The most common methods of EIA in 2019 have been direct fire (84%), followed by IED explosions (8%), and indirect fire (5%). Similar trends for 2018 were reported last quarter.

Of the 6,445 EIA reported this quarter (March 1–May 31, 2019), roughly 43% (2,801) were considered “effective” enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA) that resulted in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties. The number of EEIA this period reflects a 17% increase compared to the preceding three months (December 1, 2018–February 28, 2019), but a 7% decrease compared to the same period last year (March 1–May 31, 2018).

The geographic distribution of the most deadly attacks in the first five months of the year has been slightly different from EIA. As seen in Figure 3.31, Helmand Province had the most EEIA, followed by Kandahar and Badghis Provinces, which placed sixth and second (of 34 provinces) for the most EIA respectively. Table 3.6 shows that the provinces with the highest proportion of EEIA were in many cases not the provinces with the most total EEIA or EIA: in Kandahar, 68% of EIA were EEIA, followed by Khost (66%), and Zabul (65%).
Figure 3.32 shows that the most common methods of EEIA in 2019 have been direct fire (76%), followed by IED explosions (15%), and indirect fire (6%), roughly in line with the 2018 trends reported last quarter.\(^9^5\)

**ACLED-Recorded Incidents Increase**

SIGAR analyzes incident data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records district-level data of political violence and protest incidents across Afghanistan.\(^9^6\) For consistency with RS’s enemy-initiated attacks data, SIGAR presents its analysis of ACLED’s data aggregated to the provincial level and chooses the date range for the data in alignment with RS’s reporting period (March 1–May 31, 2019).

ACLED recorded 2,801 incidents in Afghanistan this quarter (March 1–May 31, 2019). This figure reflects a 66% increase in incidents compared to the same period in 2018 (1,691 incidents). Unlike RS’s EIA and EEIA data, ACLED incidents include the violent and nonviolent activity of all the parties to the conflict, though violent activity made up 98% of the recorded incidents this quarter (battles, 72%; explosions/remote violence, 23%; violence against civilians, 3%). The data show that this significant year-on-year change was mainly driven by an increase in the number of battles recorded this quarter.
(2,026) versus 962 recorded during March–May 2018. USFOR-A said this is likely due to the increase in ANDSF operational tempo this quarter.

When examining the provincial breakdown of ACLED-recorded incidents thus far in 2019, the three provinces with the most incidents shifted slightly compared to the same period in 2018. In 2019 (through May 31), Helmand Province has had the most incidents (603), followed by Kandahar (460) and Ghazni (3); the same period last year saw Nangarhar with the most incidents (490), then Helmand (248) and Ghazni (245). RS’s enemy-initiated attacks and ACLED’s incident data only slightly align in that they show Helmand and Kandahar as having the most EEIA and incidents, respectively, from January through May 2019. Seen in Figure 3.33, ACLED-recorded incidents are concentrated in a several key provinces: the incidents occurring in the top 10 most violent provinces accounted for 62% of this year’s total incidents.

Figure 3.34 shows that of all the ACLED-recorded incidents from January 1 through May 2019, battles account for the vast majority (about 74%), followed by explosions and remote violence (22%). This is a shift from the same period last year, when battles made up about 58% of recorded events, and explosions and remote violence 33%.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL  I  AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SECURITY

Increased Insecurity in Helmand Province

From January 1 through May 31, 2019, both RS's enemy-initiated attacks and ACLED's incident data continued to show that Helmand has outpaced other provinces in all types of reported violence. Additionally, news media outlets have recently reported on several high-casualty Taliban, ANDSF, and Coalition operations in the province. The conflict in Helmand has taken a significant toll on its civilian population. RS reported that through May 2019, Helmand had the third-highest number of civilian casualties (221) of Afghanistan's provinces, but Table 3.7 shows that the province ranks first when adjusting for the number of casualties proportionate to its population (0.20 casualties per thousand).

Helmand Province has long been a command-and-control center for the Taliban and an operationally difficult and dangerous place for both Afghan and Coalition forces. RS's last district-control assessment showed a high level of insurgent presence in Helmand in late October 2018: the province had the greatest number of districts (nine of 14) with insurgent activity or high levels of insurgent activity of any of Afghanistan's provinces. Additionally, of the 12 districts coded as having the highest levels of insurgent activity in Afghanistan, five (more than any other province) were in Helmand. Helmand also produces more opium than any other province in Afghanistan, making it a key source of revenue for the insurgency.

Security-related incident data trends in Helmand in late 2018 and so far in 2019 appear to indicate an increased effort by Coalition and Afghan forces to target key Taliban strongholds and leadership to compel continued Taliban participation in peace talks, as well as the Taliban's response to that effort.


RS Collection Methodology

According to DOD, the RS Civilian Casualty Management Team relies primarily upon operational reporting from RS's Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data. DOD says that RS's civilian-casualty data collection differs from UNAMA's in that RS “has access to a wider range of forensic data than such civilian organizations, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery … and other sources.”


Civilian Casualties

UNAMA: Civilian Casualties

No UNAMA civilian casualty update was available this quarter before this report went to press. For SIGAR's latest reporting on UNAMA's civilian casualty data, see SIGAR's April 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

RS Civilian Casualties Data

RS reported 2,706 civilian casualties from January 1 through May 31, 2019, (757 killed and 1,949 wounded), a 32% decrease in the number reported during the same period last year. March and May were the most violent months, which saw 631 and 722 civilian casualties respectively. Of the three provinces with the most civilian casualties during this period, about 15% of total casualties occurred in Kabul Province (402 casualties), 11% in Nangarhar (309), and 8% in Helmand (221), following 2018 trends. As seen in Table 3.7, Helmand Province was the most dangerous for civilians per capita.

RS reported that the majority of the civilian casualties in the first five months of 2019 have been caused by IEDs (43%), followed by direct fire (29%), and indirect fire (13%), also in line with 2018 trends. However, some
shifts have occurred in 2019: the percentage of total casualties caused by IEDs was down by seven percentage points thus far in 2019 compared to the IED percentage of all attacks in 2018, while casualties caused by direct fire and indirect fire were up by three points and six points, respectively. These changes are likely due to recent Coalition and Afghan efforts to limit the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan’s (IS-K) ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks with IEDs, but they could also be the result of an uptick in ground operations between the parties to the conflict.

RS attributed 87% of this year’s civilian casualties (through May) to antigovernment elements (57% to unknown insurgents, 29% to the Taliban, and 1% to IS-K). The remaining 8% were attributed to progovernment forces (5% to the ANDSF and 3% to Coalition forces) and 5% to other or unknown forces.

### UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

#### U.S. Force Manning

According to DOD, as of June 2019, approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were serving as part of the U.S. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel mission in
Afghanistan, the same number reported for over a year. An additional 10,648 U.S. citizens who serve as contractors are also in Afghanistan as of July 2019. Of the 14,000 U.S. military personnel, 8,475 are assigned to the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces, unchanged since last quarter.\textsuperscript{105} The remaining U.S. military personnel serve in support roles, train the Afghan special forces, or conduct air and counterterror operations.\textsuperscript{106}

As of June 2019, the RS mission included 8,673 military personnel from NATO allies and non-NATO partner nations, bringing the current total of RS military personnel to 17,148 (a 114-person increase since last quarter). The United States continues to contribute the most troops to the RS mission, followed by Germany (1,300 personnel) and the United Kingdom (1,100).\textsuperscript{107}

DOD reported in June that General Austin Scott Miller, Commander of RS and USFOR-A, rolled out a new operational design for the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan over the last six months. The new design reportedly streamlines U.S. operations in the country by synchronizing U.S. counterterrorism capabilities with increased ANDSF operations and focused RS Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) efforts to the “point of need.” DOD said this model has “restored the Coalition’s tactical initiative and put heavy pressure on the Taliban . . . to generate strong incentives for them to engage in meaningful negotiations with the U.S. and Afghan governments.”\textsuperscript{108} DOD also said the new operational design and current U.S. military footprint are the “most efficient use of small numbers and resources to generate combat power and battlefield effects since the opening year of the war in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{109} DOD reiterated that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is conditions-based, with commanders on the ground continually evaluating conditions and making recommendations on appropriate force levels.\textsuperscript{110}
U.S. Force Casualties
According to DOD, five U.S. military personnel were killed and 35 were wounded in action (WIA) in Afghanistan this reporting period (April 17 to July 15, 2019). As of July 15, 2019, a total of 72 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan (53 from hostilities and 19 in non-hostile circumstances) and 427 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 2,419 U.S. military personnel have died (1,898 from hostilities and 521 in non-hostile circumstances) and 20,530 have been WIA.111

Insider Attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces
USFOR-A reported that there was one confirmed insider attack on U.S. and Coalition forces this quarter (data through May 31, 2019) that wounded two military personnel. There were no reported insider attacks from roughly the same period in 2018 (January 1 to May 16, 2018), but there were two such attacks during the same period in 2017 that wounded three personnel.112

AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Force Manning
CSTC-A informed SIGAR this quarter that the ANDSF switched to reporting its assigned (actual) personnel strength as the number of personnel enrolled in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) rather than the number reported on-hand by ANDSF components. This means that only those ANDSF personnel who have been biometrically validated in APPS are included in strength figures. The ANDSF strength data reported this quarter thus reflect significant differences from previously reported strength data.113 When asked about the gulf between last quarter’s Afghan-reported strength numbers and this quarter’s APPS validated ones, CSTC-A said that it “does not expect that the APPS reported data will ever equal the amount that was self-reported [by the ANDSF]” and that it “cannot categorize the excess individuals as “ghost” personnel, because it is not known why the Afghan reported numbers are higher.”114

According to CSTC-A, as of May 25, 2019, there were 180,869 ANA and Afghan Air Force (AAF) and 91,596 ANP personnel, for a total of 272,465 ANDSF personnel enrolled and accounted for in APPS. These figures reflect 9,554 fewer ANA and 24,788 fewer ANP than the assigned strength numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter.115

For the fourth consecutive quarter, ANDSF strength is reported at the lowest level it has been since the RS mission began in January 2015. As seen in Figure 3.35, this quarter’s ANDSF strength decreased by 41,777 personnel since approximately the same period in 2018, and by 50,277 compared

ONGOING SIGAR INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT OF “GHOST” POLICE
SIGAR’s special agents have been informed that portions of the ANDSF payroll process throughout Afghanistan have been manipulated to allow some former police officers to continue being paid even if they have resigned, been terminated, or killed. These salary payments are then diverted to various bank accounts to be withdrawn and shared amongst conspirators. SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate is working closely with SIGAR’s Audits Directorate, CSTC-A, and the Afghan Attorney General’s Office to identify measures that will prevent the payment of nonexistent police officers.
Note: This quarter’s data is as of May 25, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdees, and student personnel. No civilians are included. ANP strength numbers do not include “standby” personnel, generally reservists, personnel not in service while completing training, or civilians. 4+5 in the date means the ANA data is as of April and the ANP data is as of May. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from MOI to MOD, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF. The change in strength numbers from 2018 to 2019 is due to the transition of strength reporting from ANDSF-reported figures to reporting from the Afghan Personnel and Pay System. For more information, see page 80. The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact: CSTC-A and SIGAR have long noted many data-consistency issues with ANDSF strength numbers, and CSTC-A always provides the caveat that it cannot validate ANDSF strength data for accuracy.


### Table 3.8: ANDSF Assigned and Authorized Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
<th>% of Target Authorization</th>
<th>Difference Between Assigned and Authorized</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>227,374</td>
<td>180,869</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
<td>(46,505)</td>
<td>(20.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>124,626</td>
<td>91,596</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>(33,030)</td>
<td>(26.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF Total without Civilians</strong></td>
<td><strong>352,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>272,465</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(79,535)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(22.6%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data is as of May 25, 2019. ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. CSTC-A always provides the caveat that it cannot validate ANDSF strength data for accuracy.

to about the same period in 2017. CSTC-A continues to offer the caveat that they are unable to validate ANDSF strength data for accuracy.\textsuperscript{116}

According to DOD, the ANDSF’s total authorized (goal) strength in June 2019 remained 352,000 personnel, including 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP personnel, the number the international community has agreed to fund. Separately, the 30,000 Afghan Local Police, under the command of MOI, are authorized, but only DOD and the Afghan government fund them. Table 3.8 shows this quarter’s ANDSF assigned strength at 77.4\% (79,535 personnel short) of its authorized strength, a nearly 10 percentage-point decline from last quarter.\textsuperscript{117}

**ANDSF Casualties – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify most ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed information about ANDSF casualties is reported in the classified annex of this report. SIGAR also reports USFOR-A’s estimates of insurgent casualties in the classified annex.

RS provided a general, unclassified assessment of ANDSF casualties this quarter. Though RS reported that effective (casualty producing) enemy-initiated attacks declined by about 7\% this reporting period compared to the same period last year, RS also said that ANDSF casualties “are the same this quarter [March through May 2019] as they were in the same quarter one year ago.”\textsuperscript{118}

DOD also reported in June on ANDSF casualty trends from December 2018 through May 2019. According to DOD, the majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct-fire attacks, with IED attacks and mine strikes contributing to overall casualties at a much lower level. While the number of ANDSF casualties incurred from conducting local patrols was at the same level as the same period last year, those suffered while conducting checkpoint operations were 7\% higher than the same reporting period last year, and casualties incurred during offensive operations has increased by 17\% over the same period.\textsuperscript{119}

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**Reducing Checkpoints**

According to DOD, ANDSF checkpoints may play a part in enabling security forces to provide security when properly placed and managed. However, excessive and ineffective checkpoints change the ANDSF’s operational posture from offensive to defensive, and by tying down personnel to fixed locations, create a gap in the ANDSF’s ability to generate sufficient combat or policing power to preempt or counter Taliban operations. Coalition personnel have consistently advised ANDSF counterparts to reduce the number of checkpoints they maintain. Nevertheless, DOD reported in June 2019 that the ANDSF continues to operate an excessive number of checkpoints, which is negatively impacting their efforts to expand security. This also continues to provide the Taliban opportunities to inflict a high number of casualties on the ANDSF. DOD reports that the overwhelming majority of successful Taliban attacks against ANDSF forces and over half of the ANDSF casualties from December 2018 through May 2019 occurred at poorly manned, static checkpoints.

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 34.
This quarter, SIGAR asked USFOR-A about structural changes within the ANDSF after it was reported earlier this year that the ANP’s regional, eight-zone command structure had been dissolved into 34 provincial police headquarters and that the ANA was adding a new corps to its six regional corps.

**ANP Zone Dissolution**

According to CSTC-A, dissolving the police zones was a recent political decision made by President Ghani. CSTC-A said that doing away with police zones has generally changed ANP leadership and accountability structures by reducing the “power distance” across the MOI hierarchy, meaning the 34 Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOPs), rather than eight regional zone commanders, now routinely interact directly with multiple MOI deputy ministers to gain access to important resources and meet policy requirements.120

The benefits of the new PCOP system primarily appear to be long-needed changes to ANP leadership. The PCOPs now report directly to the MOI’s new Deputy Minister of Security, Brigadier General Khoshal Sadat, who is said to frequently check in with them. General Sadat, a former Afghan commando who was mentored by former U.S. commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal, recently replaced 27 of 34 PCOPs (all but five of the replacements were young officers from special operations

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units). General Miller, current U.S. and NATO forces commander in Afghanistan, has hailed the 35-year old General Sadat as “represent[ing] a new generation of Afghan leadership.” The brisk pace of these personnel changes brings an influx of young officers (partly through Inherent Law retirements) that is reinvigorating the aging ANDSF leadership ranks. But some have suggested that some of the younger officers may lack the military management and operational experience they need to be effective leaders.121 See Table 3.9 for progress on Inherent Law retirements, as of June 2019.

Some disadvantages to the new PCOP system have also been identified. USFOR-A said the change has primarily affected the division of labor between the various ANDSF elements at a local level. Zone commanders previously directed and coordinated between the elements providing security and law enforcement in population centers. City security and law enforcement is primarily the responsibility of PCOPs, but at times the Afghan National Civil Order Force and Afghan Border Force and other elements are also involved. Now the PCOPs themselves must divide security responsibilities in their area of responsibility. USFOR-A reported that PCOPs have begun making some adjustments to deconflict their duties with other forces elements and hopes this will create a greater unity of effort across the ANDSF.122

In addition, MOI’s logistics and supply system has always struggled to function well, and USFOR-A has noted that MOI is now overwhelmed with requests from 34 different PCOPs rather than eight zone commanders. The dissolution of the zones has also led to a lack of coordination between the provincial police headquarters in some regions of the country. Issues that would previously be coordinated and solved by the zone commanders must now be brought to Kabul for deconfliction.123

The change appears to have made U.S. advising more difficult. CSTC-A’s advisors, responsible for training, advising, and assisting (TAA) the MOD, MOI, and some of the ANDSF’s combat elements, said their ability to impact the ANP in support of campaign objectives has been limited. DOD said in June that RS advisors are providing TAA only to “select” provincial police headquarters. This is not entirely due to the shift from zone commanders to police chiefs. U.S. and Coalition advisors have in recent years placed less advisory attention on the MOI and ANP than the MOD and ANA. But CSTC-A reports the zone-dissolution change further constrains their ability to track Afghan policing effectiveness from the policy (strategic) level down to the tactical (output) level. Another complicating factor is the lack of zone headquarters, which previously provided a central TAA location for advisors to meet with the four or five PCOPs in each zone. Without the zone headquarters, advisors no longer have safe or easy access to TAA district and provincial police chiefs in some areas of the country.124

Only Train Advise Assist Command (TAAC)-South reported that the dissolution of police zones has been useful. USFOR-A said previous efforts to TAA the zone commander there were often ineffectual because that commander had limited influence over the police chiefs below him. Now, USFOR-A says they can TAA more commanders at a lower level and have a greater advisory impact by eliminating an extra layer of bureaucracy and working directly with commanders functioning on a tactical level.125
ANA 217th Corps

According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF also reestablished the ANA’s 20th Division as the new 217th Corps in April 2019. Seen in Figure 3.36, the new corps was given responsibility for the eastern half of the 209th Corps’ former area of responsibility (AOR), which previously covered all nine of Afghanistan’s northernmost provinces. The 209th Corps previously had the largest AOR and incurred more enemy-initiated attacks than any other AOR in 2018. The 20th Division was previously under the 209th Corps’ AOR, where it covered an area similar to the one it is responsible for as a corps (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar Provinces). The population of the four provinces is majority Tajik, and USFOR-A said the impetus for the decision was most likely political, in part due to ethnic power struggles across Afghanistan and the mineral reserves in the 217th Corps AOR, but the true driver for the change is not clear. USFOR-A also said that some believe a large portion of the ANA come from the 217th Corps area, so standing up this corps was a way to show appreciation to the area and solidify its support for the ANA.126

The 217th Corps is now operational, but still “working through logistical, personnel, and equipment changes,” according to USFOR-A. The corps headquarters is in Kunduz Province, which has experienced increased enemy-initiated violence thus far in 2019 compared to 2018. When asked how the change would impact U.S. and Coalition TAA in TAAC-North, USFOR-A said the TAAC has adjusted the new corps’ advisory team to meet its TAA requirements. TAAC-North has also made use of 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade personnel in its AOR to advise the 217th Corps at the brigade level.127
Insider Attacks on the ANDSF
According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF experienced 17 insider attacks this quarter (from February 20 through May 31, 2019) that resulted in 58 ANDSF casualties (33 personnel killed, 25 wounded). That brings the total for this year to 23 attacks, in which there were 90 casualties, 49 killed in action (KIA) and 41 wounded in action (WIA), a decrease of eight attacks and five KIA, but 10 more WIA compared to the same period last year.128

ANDSF Personnel Accountability
The MOD and MOI, with RS assistance, are implementing and streamlining personnel systems to accurately manage, pay, and track ANDSF personnel—an effort DOD expects will improve protection of U.S. funds. The United States pays ANDSF personnel costs through the unilaterally funded ASFF, except for ANP base salaries, which are funded by the multilateral LOTFA (managed by the UN Development Programme), to which the United States no longer contributes funds.129

The Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) integrates personnel data with compensation and payroll data to process authorizations, record unit-level time and attendance data, and calculate payroll amounts.130 APPS data is also used to provide background information on ANDSF personnel to assist with assignment, promotions and other personnel actions.131

CSTC-A previously described three ongoing efforts aimed at ensuring accurate personnel data exist in APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching ANDSF personnel to authorized positions in the system; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) the personnel asset inventory (PAI) for biometrically enrolling personnel. All three efforts are intended to result in the continuous process of physically counting personnel and correcting the employment status of personnel retired, separated, or killed in action.132 Standing up APPS is part of an effort by the United States and its partners to reduce opportunities for corrupt ANDSF officials to report nonexistent personnel on their unit’s rolls in order to pocket the salaries.

CSTC-A reported some changes to APPS processes this quarter. To ensure APPS personnel data is valid and up to date, enrollment into the ANDSF can be conducted at two locations, MOD’s Afghan National Army Recruiting Command (ANAREC) and MOI’s General Recruiting Command (GRC), the only two organizations which have the ability to create new records in APPS. Both of these organizations can also deploy mobile enrollment teams for regions where commands have been granted authority by the Afghan ministers of defense or interior to conduct local recruiting. The mobile enrollment teams collect all required APPS data (biometrics, bank cards, etc.) and bring the packets back to ANAREC or GRC for entry into the APPS system. The ID cards issued to ANDSF personnel expire every
In addition, CSTC-A is overseeing ANA and ANP efforts to conduct spot-check PAIs on small populations within the ANA corps and provincial police headquarters. CSTC-A’s APPS program management office (PMO) will continue to perform data validation on any personnel records transitioned from older ANDSF personnel systems to APPS. The APPS PMO will also conduct several physical spot checks (personnel accountability audits) at the ANA corps and ANP provincial headquarters level to verify all soldiers and officers are entered into APPS. According to USFOR-A, the APPS PMO will conduct these audits at the 203rd, 201st, and 205th Corps in July 2019, which will be used as a pilot to help further refine the personnel accountability audits process. An APPS roster of names is used to complete each audit, and an ANAREC mobile enrollment team is to be present to enroll any individuals not yet in APPS.

CSTC-A reported that the minimum data-entry requirements in APPS for personnel to be paid have changed, and decreased this quarter. The list to the left shows a comparison between the old and new APPS data-entry requirements. According to USFOR-A, CSTC-A’s decision to reduce the requirements from 20 to seven or eight does not make APPS more vulnerable to fraud or abuse because the seven or eight fields “are the most significant.” Starting on June 1, 2019, all records in the system that do not have the seven (MOI) or eight (MOD) data-entry requirements populated in APPS will be marked as inactive. As of June 30, 2019, CSTC-A has already marked 600 ANDSF personnel files inactive; data cleansing based on this new rule continues.

In another change, CSTC-A began relying on APPS for ANDSF strength reporting as of May 25, 2019, though they said last quarter they expected the transition to take until at least June 2019 for the ANA and the end of 2019 for the ANP. CSTC-A reported in February 28, 2019, that 91% of ANA and 69% of ANP personnel were slotted into APPS and met the minimum data-input requirements to be paid. These percentages were calculated by dividing the number of personnel slotted in APPS by the number of personnel the Afghans report to be on hand in each force (their assigned-strength figures). It is possible that transitioning to APPS early before the ANA and especially the ANP had a chance to slot more personnel could have contributed to ANDSF strength numbers being much lower this quarter than previous strength figures based on unit-reported on-hand personnel. Current APPS-based strength figures (180,869 for the ANA and 91,596 for the ANP), show that the ANA’s APPS enrollment is at 79.5% of its authorized strength and the ANP is at 73.6%.

APPs Data-Input Requirements for ANDSF Payroll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID card number</td>
<td>In order for personnel to be paid, they must have a valid ID card number in their APPS record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>The date of birth is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment date</td>
<td>The date of enrollment is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>The gender of personnel is required for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometric verification number</td>
<td>Personnel must provide a biometric verification number to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel type</td>
<td>The personnel type is required for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education</td>
<td>Personnel must have completed military education to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood type</td>
<td>The blood type of personnel is required for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First/full name</td>
<td>The first or full name is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashkil rank</td>
<td>The tashkil rank of personnel is required for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account number</td>
<td>Personnel must have a bank account number to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract expiration date</td>
<td>The date of the contract expiration is required for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s name</td>
<td>The father’s name is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of rank</td>
<td>The date of rank is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS ID</td>
<td>Personnel must have an AHRIMS ID to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph number</td>
<td>The paragraph number is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather’s name</td>
<td>The grandfather’s name is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit identification code</td>
<td>The unit identification code is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian education</td>
<td>Personnel must have completed civilian education to be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line number</td>
<td>The line number is required for personnel to be paid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AHRIMS (the Afghan Human Resource Information System) was the Afghan personnel accountability system prior to APPS. Where possible, records were migrated for personnel enrolled in AHRIMS to APPS.


ANP Personnel Audit Initiated

Given persistent concerns related to the existence of “ghost” personnel on the ANDSF rolls, SIGAR is currently developing an audit to examine the processes and procedures, and identify risks, associated with the use of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System.
ANDSF Performance—Most Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify most assessments of ANDSF performance at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.

According to DOD, RS focused on the following 10 priorities for the MOD and MOI forces and headquarters from December 2018 through May 2019:

- leader development
- reducing the number of vulnerable checkpoints
- countering corruption
- improving logistics
- improving accountability of personnel and equipment
- reducing attrition through better care of soldiers and police
- standardization of training
- better MOD and MOI budget execution
- improving processes for paying soldier and police salaries
- improving ANDSF facilities

Women in the ANDSF
As of April 2019, the ANDSF had 5,462 female personnel, an increase of about 500 women since last quarter and about 900 women compared to roughly the same period a year ago. The increase since last quarter comes from the addition of 171 women in the ANA and 307 in the ANP. As in the past, the ANP has the vast majority of ANDSF female personnel (3,650), while 1,812 are in the ANA. RS reported that 86 females are serving in the AAF, the same as last quarter. The total female presence represents about 2% of the ANDSF’s assigned strength, a proportion that has barely fluctuated in the last five years.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) continued to account for the greatest number of females in the ANDSF (2,185), followed by soldiers and police (1,682), and commissioned officers (1,489). RS was unable to provide an updated breakdown of the women serving in the Afghan Special Security Forces (the latest data is from December 2018). For a historical record of ANDSF female strength since 2015, see Figure 3.37 on the following page.

The RS Gender Advisory Office said MOD and MOI recruitment of female personnel is no longer on hold after several quarters in which they have continue to work with each ministry to realign or create positions that allow for female personnel to have career progression. While the ANA has resumed recruiting women, MOD’s current Manpower Management Plan no longer includes specific target numbers for female recruitment.

The generally agreed upon ANA recruiting goal remains 200 women per quarter, but RS says the goal is “not truly actionable until improved force development and [authorized position] reassignment identifies and creates
meaningful, operationally enhancing roles for women.” For example, there are very few lieutenant positions open at this time to either men or women, leaving no vacancies in which to assign newly trained recruits.143

The ANA’s goal is to recruit women that have at least a third-grade literacy level; however, finding soldier-level recruits who are literate remains challenging. The ANA is working toward developing a proportion of officers and NCOs among women to reflect the ANA’s overall requirements. Ideally, those proportions would be about 30–40% officers and 60–70% NCOs for women.144

The ANP is still actively recruiting women to attend the Police Training Academy in Sivas, Turkey; 167 women recently graduated from Sivas and recruiting is under way for 250 more women to attend the next course. The General Command Police Special Unit (GCPSU) currently has 26 women undertaking initial training. As a special forces unit, GCPSU provides opportunities for women to serve in critical operational posts.145

Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. All ANA numbers include AAF women. ANA and ANP numbers for 2018 and 2019 also include Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) women serving under both forces. The 2016 and 2017 ANP numbers include 213 and 142 ASSF women, respectively. Some of these women were likely serving in the ANA, but that information was not provided.

Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI performance at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about the ministries’ performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex of this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly $47.3 billion and disbursed $47.1 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.

ANA Force Manning
ANA Strength – Some Data Classified
This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANA personnel strength data in accordance with Afghan government classification guidelines. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength figures will appear in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANA strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

As noted earlier, only those ANDSF personnel who have been biometrically validated in APPS are included in strength figures. ANDSF strength data reported this quarter thus reflects significant differences from previously reported strength data. According to CSTC-A, there were 180,869 ANA personnel (including the AAF and ANA Special Operations Corps) as of May 25, 2019. Due to the transition to APPS-based strength reporting, USFOR-A was unable to provide the breakdown of officers, NCOs, and soldiers serving in the ANA this quarter. These figures reflect 9,554 fewer ANA personnel than the assigned-strength numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter and 15,421 personnel fewer compared to roughly the same period last year. CSTC-A continues to offer the caveat that they are unable to validate ANDSF strength data for accuracy.

According to DOD, the ANA’s total authorized (goal) strength as of June 2019 remained 227,374. This quarter’s assigned strength puts the ANA at 79.5%, or 46,505 personnel short, of its goal strength, decrease more than four percentage-point decline since last quarter.
ANA Attrition – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A provided limited unclassified ANA attrition data this quarter. Detailed ANA attrition information continued to be classified at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANA attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANA force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANA monthly attrition rates averaged approximately 2.6% over the quarter, a slight increase from the 2.2% recorded over the previous quarter and from the “below 2%” reported during the same period in 2018. This percentage accounts for pure attrition alone—unadjusted for new recruits or returnees—and not the total decrease in force strength listed on the previous page. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANA attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOD and that CSTC-A cannot independently verify its accuracy.¹⁵¹

ANA Sustainment

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated $23.3 billion and disbursed $23.1 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment.¹⁵²

For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 48–49 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for on-budget MOD elements’ sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398 (December 2018–December 2019) was $281.9 million through May 31, 2019. This amount includes $274.2 million for ANA sustainment, $2.6 million for AAF sustainment, and $5.1 million for ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) sustainment. The U.S. contribution to the AAF and ANASOC is almost entirely for salaries and incentive pay (except for about $38,000 for AAF “asset” sustainment, which often includes facility-construction costs). The total amount reported for MOD elements’ sustainment this quarter represents a $64.5 million increase compared to the same period in 2018.¹⁵³

The vast majority of this year’s funds have been spent on ANA salaries and incentive pay ($246 million, of which roughly $96.1 million was for incentive pay). Roughly $28.4 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements for the ANA, the costliest of which were domestic travel ($6.4 million), office equipment and computers ($6 million), and energy-generating equipment ($5.6 million).¹⁵⁴

CSTC-A said this quarter the total estimated funding required for ANA, AAF, and ANASOC base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is $534.8 million, a $257.4 million decrease from the funds expended for this purpose in FY 1397. CSTC-A said the FY 1398 decrease is

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*Sustainment:* Sustainment is defined in Joint Publication 3-0 as “The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.” ASFF funds several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay; food; the Afghan Personnel and Pay System; “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CoreMS inventory management system, and transportation services; “combat sustainment,” including organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts; and “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

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due primarily to two factors: first, the afghani has depreciated significantly against the U.S. dollar over the past year and is projected to continue depreciating throughout the rest of FY 1398, which will affect the dollars spent on future disbursements; second, both CSTC-A and MOD have significantly improved their process for accurately calculating MOD’s monthly salary requirements through improvements made to APPS, significantly decreasing the amount of CSTC-A funding paid to MOD for soldiers who did not qualify for pay.155 CSTC-A has previously noted that the U.S. contribution to ANA personnel sustainment over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.156

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $13.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.157

Seen in Table 3.10, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA, AAF, and ANASOC this quarter (March 1 to May 31, 2019) included 536 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) (two variants) valued at a total of $109.7 million, seven AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft ($92.8 million), and eight MD-530 helicopters ($52.1 million).158

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TABLE 3.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$13,263,236</td>
<td>$92,842,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1151 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>201,584</td>
<td>84,060,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>MD-530 Helicopter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6,514,670</td>
<td>52,117,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1152 HMMWV (Humvee)</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>215,333</td>
<td>25,624,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>157,848</td>
<td>19,573,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,743,750</td>
<td>23,487,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>57mm High-Explosive S-5 Aviation Rocket</td>
<td>26,704</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>10,698,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Refueller</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>236,455</td>
<td>2,601,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle Fuel Tanker</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>241,606</td>
<td>1,932,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M4 Carbine (Rifle)</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1,263,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$314,201,637</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter. The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases; “total costs” were the actual amount spent for each item which may differ slightly from simply totaling average unit costs. The 119 HMMWVs listed include 27 that will be used as ambulances.

AN A Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated $6.0 billion and disbursed more than $5.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of June 30, 2019.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical-generator requirements for FY 2019 will be $110.8 million. According to CSTC-A, of

### TABLE 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest-Cost ANA Infrastructure Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awarded Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Aviation Enhancement, Mazar-e Sharif Airfield Operations and Life Support Area*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Aviation Enhancement, Kandahar Airfield Life Support Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP MOD Women’s Training Center**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Electrical Interconnect, Camp Shaheen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Brigade North, Camp Pratt Forward Operating Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Electrical Interconnect, Kunduz / Asqalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Women’s Facilities, Marshal Fahim National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Waste Water System Upgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Women’s Facilities, North Hamid Karzai International Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth, Kandahar Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth, Kabul Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Aviation Enhancement, Kandahar Airfield Operations (Phase Two)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data is as of May 15, 2019. WPP = Projects are part of the Women’s Participation Program.
*Partially funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not all U.S. ASFF funds).
** Fully funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund.
the $110.8 million, $74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A on behalf of the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{161}

As of May 15, 2019, the United States completed 470 ANA, AAF, and ANASOC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at a total cost of $5.4 billion. CSTC-A reported that 13 projects were completed this quarter, costing roughly $16.6 million. Another 32 projects (valued at $200.4 million) were ongoing, four projects were awarded (valued at $31.2 million), and 42 projects (valued at $599.2 million) were being planned.\textsuperscript{162} See Table 3.11 for descriptions and information about the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned infrastructure projects.

The projects described above include ANA Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $9.6 million, one awarded project ($2.6 million), and two completed projects ($7 million). See Table 3.11 for a description of these projects.

### ANA Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $4.3 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.
SECURITY

TABLE 3.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Usable</th>
<th>Quarter Change</th>
<th>Command Pilots</th>
<th>Co-Pilots</th>
<th>Other Aircrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in this table. “Pilots” include command pilots and instructor pilots. “Other Aircrew” includes loadmasters, flight engineers, and sensor management officers and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. “Quarter Change” refers to the change in usable aircraft.


AFGHAN AIR FORCE

U.S. Funding

As of May 28, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately $8.2 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the Special Mission Wing) from FY 2010 to FY 2019. Roughly $1.66 billion of those funds were appropriated in FY 2019, after the reprogramming action described on page 49.163 The AAF was appropriated more U.S. funds in FY 2019 (as adjusted) than any other ANDSF force element; its allocation was $295.37 million more than the funds for ANA ground forces.164

As in previous years, a large portion of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds has been designated for AAF sustainment costs ($842.13 million). These funds are primarily used to pay for contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF’s in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, Mi-17, A-29, C-208, AC-208, and C-130.165 DOD allocated $531.46 million of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds for equipment and transportation costs.166

Nearly $5.5 billion has been obligated for the AAF and SMW from FY 2010 through May 28 of FY 2019. About $1.2 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018, and $469.6 million has been obligated thus far in FY 2019. A substantial portion of these funds ($2.6 billion) has been obligated for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 47% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft at 33%.167

Aircraft Inventory and Status

As seen in Table 3.12, the AAF’s current in-country inventory, as of June 2019, includes 179 aircraft (153 of which are operational).168
TAAC-Air reported that the AAF received three more MD-530s, four UH-60s, and five AC-208s in Afghanistan this quarter. Several aircraft were deemed unusable this quarter: two MD-530s need heavy repair due to hard landings on March 31 and May 9. TAAC-Air said the aircraft manufacturer is providing the U.S. government a repair cost estimate, after which CSTC-A can determine whether the two MD-530s will be returned to service. Additionally, six Mi-17s are currently being overhauled in depot; two are not usable pending service-life extensions. TAAC-Air said the United States has purchased and is preparing to field five MD-530s, eight UH-60s, and three A-29s for the AAF over the next few months.

AAF Operations and Task Availability
The AAF increased its flight hours this quarter and readiness decreased for four of its six airframes for which readiness metrics are tracked. According to TAAC-Air, the AAF’s average monthly flight hours this quarter (March through May 2019) increased by 14% compared to the last reporting period (December 2018 through March 2019). The AAF flew 9,874 hours from April 1 through June 30, 2019, an average of roughly 3,292 hours per month. USFOR-A said the AAF’s flight-hours data include all hours flown by all aircraft, whether for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.

The Mi-17 flew the most hours, averaging around 770 hours per month, followed closely by the UH-60 (765 hours), and the MD-530 (724 hours). The AAF has a history of overusing its oldest and most familiar aircraft, the Russian-made Mi-17. Of the six AAF airframes for which operational data is tracked, only the Mi-17 continued to exceed its recommended flight hours this quarter. The Mi-17’s average of 770 hours per month was over its recommended flying time of 650 hours per month.

ANDSF Absence Without Leave in the United States
ANDSF personnel going absent without leave (AWOL) in the United States while in training has been an issue U.S. advisors have identified over the last several quarters. This quarter, DOD provided SIGAR with the following information about which ANDSF personnel went AWOL during their U.S.-based training.

January–December 2018:
- 34 AAF
- 5 ANA

January–July 1, 2019:
- 5 AAF
- 1 ANA
- 1 ANP
- 2 MOI civilian personnel

Most of the ANDSF personnel reported to have gone AWOL since January 2018 have been AAF personnel. SIGAR reported TAAC-Air’s decision last quarter to discontinue most of the pilot training courses taking place in the United States after over 40% of the AAF students enrolled in the U.S.-based AC-208/C-208 training went AWOL. Those courses were pulled back to Afghanistan so the AAF trainees that did not go AWOL could complete their training.

This quarter, of the AAF’s six airframes for which readiness metrics are tracked, four (the Mi-17, MD-530, C-130, and A-29) saw decreases in their readiness, which TAAC-Air tracks using task-availability rates. Despite these decreases in task availability rates, only one of six AAF airframe types failed to meet its task-availability benchmark this quarter, an improvement over last quarter. According to TAAC-Air, for the second consecutive reporting period, the MD-530 failed to meet its task-availability benchmark: the airframe has a 75% benchmark and its average task availability this quarter fell to 63.2%. As mentioned, two MD-530s were taken out of service this quarter due to hard landings, which affects the task availability for the airframe because fewer aircraft were available and ready for tasking.

AAF Manning

TAAC-Air continued to provide information on the number of fully mission-qualified or certified mission-ready (CMR) aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, as shown in Table 3.12 on page 88. As of June 2019, the AAF had 27 more pilots and instructor pilots and four fewer copilots than last quarter (February 2019). TAAC-Air also reported 72 fewer qualified maintenance personnel than last quarter. Table 3.13 shows the current number of authorized and assigned AAF maintenance personnel by airframe and other maintenance functions.

DOD reported in June that the AAF continues to struggle to recruit and train qualified maintenance personnel for U.S.-provided aircraft due to lack of English-language and technical competence. Previously the AAF did not

**TABLE 3.13**

AAF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL STRENGTH, AS OF JUNE 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance Positions</th>
<th>2019 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</th>
<th>2019 ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208 / C208</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Operations</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions and Weapons</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Staff</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All personnel listed above are reported as trained and fully mission-capable. Locations refer to AAF airbases. Kabul = Kandahar, MeS = Mazar-e Sharif, and Shind = Shindand. Maintenance Operations = conducts non-mechanical functions like quality assurance, analysis, plans, scheduling, documentation, training, and logistics; Munitions and Weapons = stores, maintains, inspects, assembles, and issues aircraft munitions; Maintenance Staff = handles command, support, and finance.

formally track the training status of its maintainers, leading TAAC-Air to
develop an AAF master training plan to standardize and define skill-level
descriptions for maintainers across the AAF’s air platforms. According to
DOD, it takes between six and seven years to fully train high-level main-
tainers across most of the AAF’s platforms. Initial training to achieve a
routine-level maintenance competence takes 12 to 18 months and includes
general English-language training. Achieving the highest level of training
takes an additional four to five years and includes advanced, technical
English-language training.176

Table 3.14 shows that as of June 2019, the AAF continues to rely heav-
ily on contractor-provided maintenance to maintain six of its seven air
platforms (C-130, AC-208, C-208, A-29, MD-530, and UH-60). In contrast, the
AAF is able to perform most of the routine maintenance required for its
Russian-made Mi-17s (85%, with contractors completing the rest).177

The Special Mission Wing – Some Data Classified
This quarter, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
(NSOCC-A) continued to provide a general update on the Special Mission
Wing (SMW). NSOCC-A also continued to classify detailed performance and
other data on the SMW. SIGAR’s questions about the SMW can be found in
Appendix E of this report; information about the SMW is reported in the
classified annex for this report.

SMW Funding
The United States has obligated a total of over $2.5 billion for the SMW
from FY 2012 through FY 2019 (through May 15, 2019) from the ASFF and
the DOD-Counternarcotics Fund (DOD (CN)). U.S. spending on the SMW is
on track to increase substantially in FY 2019: about $186.5 million of ASSF
and DOD (CN) funds have already been obligated in FY 2019, $4.4 mil-
lion more than the total amount obligated during the entirety of FY 2018
($182.1 million).178 A substantial portion of the funding obligated since
FY 2012 ($2.5 billion) was obligated for SMW sustainment ($1.3 billion),
which accounts for 50.5% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and
aircraft ($996 million) at 39.7%.179

SMW Operations and Manning
The SMW is an AAF component whose mission is to support the ASSF in
operations. About 90% of SMW missions are focused on counterterrorism
(up from 85% last quarter). However, the SMW has recently been tasked
by the ANA and ANP to support conventional ground forces, a potential
misuse of the force. This quarter, as in last quarter, NSOCC-A reported that
the MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) continue to
demand support from the SMW, though NSOCC-A says instances of misuse
have decreased compared to last quarter. NSOCC-A’s leadership continues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>% AAF</th>
<th>% CLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AAF = Afghan Air Force; CLS = contractor logistics support. The Mi-17 data does not include heavy repair or
overhauls because the AAF does not have the organic
capability required.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to DOD OIG data call, 7/4/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019,
p. 64.
to address this with the MOD by recommending CSTC-A levy financial penalties to curb the misuse.180

NSOCC-A reported this quarter that the SMW is expecting deliveries of 18 UH-60s starting in January 2020, with the full complement of aircraft delivered by the end of 2021. To keep pace with the anticipated delivery of new aircraft, the SMW has been growing its pilot and maintainer force to be able to train and qualify enough personnel to fly and maintain the aircraft once they are fielded. Currently, the SMW has 40 personnel (20 pilots and 20 crew chiefs) that met selection criteria to train for fielding the first 10 UH-60s, which are expected to arrive in early- to mid-2020.

The SMW is short of maintainers. NSOCC-A reported that as of May 2019, 200 of 244 personnel required are assigned to SMW maintenance positions. This is six maintenance personnel fewer than the number reported last quarter. NSOCC-A says that the SMW will need to expand its cadre of maintainers to meet future aircraft-maintenance requirements as the fleet expands.181

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly $21.4 billion and disbursed nearly $21.2 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and some ASSF. The force elements comprised the ANP budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation.182

ANP Force Manning

ANP Personnel Strength – Some Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify unit-level ANP personnel strength data in accordance with Afghan government classification guidelines. Detailed assigned- and authorized-strength figures will appear in the classified annex for this report. SIGAR’s questions about ANP strength can be found in Appendix E of this report.

As reported earlier, only those ANSF personnel who have been biometrically validated in APPS are included in strength figures. ANDSF strength data reported this quarter thus reflects significant differences from previously reported strength data.183 According to CSTC-A, there were 91,596 ANP personnel as of May 25, 2019. Due to the transition to APPS-based strength reporting, USFOR-A was unable to provide the breakdown of officers, NCOs, and patrolmen serving in the ANP this quarter. These figures reflect 24,788 ANP fewer than the assigned-strength numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter and 26,356 personnel fewer compared to roughly the same period last year.184 CSTC-A continues to offer the caveat that they are unable to validate ANDSF strength data for accuracy.185
According to DOD, the ANP’s total authorized (goal) strength as of June 2019 remained 124,626. This quarter’s assigned strength puts the ANP at 73.5%, or 33,030 personnel short, of its goal strength, a decrease nearly 20 percentage-point decrease since last quarter.186

When asked about the gulf between last quarter’s Afghan-reported strength numbers and this quarter’s APPS validated ones, CSTC-A said that it “does not expect that the APPS reported data will ever equal the amount that was self-reported [by the Afghans]” and that it “cannot categorize the excess individuals as “ghost” personnel, because it is not known why the Afghan reported numbers are higher.”187 SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate is investigating the matter, and is contributing to efforts by SIGAR’s Audits Directorate, CSTC-A, and the Afghan Attorney General’s office to identify and address measures to reduce and/or eliminate payments for nonexistent police officers.188

**ANP Attrition – Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANP attrition information this quarter at the request of the Afghan government, but provide limited attrition information unclassified. SIGAR’s questions about ANP attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANP force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANP monthly attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 2.4%, a slight increase from the 2.2% recorded over the previous quarter. This percentage accounts for pure attrition alone—unadjusted for new recruits or returnees—and not the total decrease in force strength listed on the previous page. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANP attrition rates over the last three months. CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOI.189

**ANP Sustainment**

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $9.4 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF sustainment.190

For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 48–49 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget MOI elements’ sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398 (December 2018–December, 2019) was $116.6 million through May 31, 2019. The vast majority of these funds was the $94.9 million U.S. contribution for ANP sustainment ($92.7 million of which was for ANP goods and services and $2.2 million for ANP pay incentives). Most of the other $21.7 million was for Afghan Local Police (ALP) and GCPSU salaries.191

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**Sustainment:** Sustainment is defined in Joint Publication 3-0 as “The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.” ASFF funds several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay; food; the Afghan Personnel and Pay System; “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CoreIMS inventory management system, and transportation services; “combat sustainment,” including organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts; and “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

The total amount reported for MOI elements’ sustainment this quarter represents an $87.1 million increase compared to the same period in 2018. A large portion of this increase is $38.6 million of “contract carryover,” which CSTC-A says are contracts that were awarded during FY 1397 but for which CSTC-A had not yet reimbursed MOI. These contracts are for a range of requirements such as operations and maintenance of equipment and buildings, drilling wells, security improvements, and other minor projects.192

Of the roughly $92.7 million spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements for the ANP thus far in FY 1398, the costliest were contract carryovers from the previous fiscal year ($38.6 million), domestic fuel ($14.5 million), and repair and maintenance of ANA facilities, to include generators, water supply, and canal equipment ($8.8 million).193

CSTC-A said this quarter that the total estimated funding required for MOD elements’ base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is $56.3 million, which includes ALP salaries only.194 CTSC-A has previously noted that the U.S. contribution to ANP personnel sustainment over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.195

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated $4.8 billion and disbursed $4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF equipment and transportation.

Seen in Table 3.15, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter included 167 HMMWVs.
valued at $40.2 million and several types of artillery and rifle ammunition ($22.8 million).196

ANP Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified
This quarter USFOR-A continued to classify the data concerning the ANP’s equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government.197 The questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANP equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

ANP Infrastructure
The United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $3.2 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of June 30, 2019.198

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements for FY 2019 will be $78.8 million, the same amount reported last quarter. According to CSTC-A, of the $78.8 million, $45.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $33.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.199

As of May 15, 2019, the United States completed 775 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly $3 billion. CSTC-A reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $5.8 million. Another 15 projects (valued at $126.2 million) were ongoing and 14 projects (valued at $78.8 million) were being planned.200 See Table 3.16 on the following page for descriptions and information about the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANP infrastructure projects.

Included in these projects are 11 ANP Women’s Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of about $136.4 million, comprising eight ongoing projects ($67.1 million), two awarded projects ($66 million), and one recently completed project ($3.3 million). Most of these projects are or were funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund.201

ANP Training and Operations
As of June 30, 2019, the United States had obligated $4.0 billion and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP, some ASSF, and MOI training and operations.202

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await completion of GAO’s forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.
Afghan Local Police

Afghan Local Police (ALP) members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP’s personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, only DOD and the Afghan government fund the ALP, including its personnel and other costs. DOD’s funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, it is not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.203 NSOCC-A reported the estimated amount of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2019 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel) is about $60 million, the same amount reported last quarter.204

This quarter, NSOCC-A reported on the ALP’s continuing efforts to enroll personnel in APPS and to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer process. According to NSOCC-A, as of May 5, 2019, 73% of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Project Location</th>
<th>Agency / Contractor</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Kabul Surveillance System Camera and Security Upgrade and Expansion</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Xator Corporation</td>
<td>$32,992,327</td>
<td>5/1/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase II*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>32,831,000</td>
<td>5/23/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase I*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>23,646,225</td>
<td>11/21/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completed Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP ANP New Women’s Compound</td>
<td>Gardez Province</td>
<td>USACE/SWC Construction</td>
<td>3,333,518</td>
<td>3/16/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI Headquarters Entry Control Points, Parking, and Lighting</td>
<td>Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Assist Consultants Inc.</td>
<td>2,440,345</td>
<td>3/9/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase III*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td>6/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP Police Town, Phase IV*</td>
<td>Kabul, Kabul Province</td>
<td>USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC</td>
<td>31,000,000</td>
<td>8/30/2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data are as of May 15, 2019. WPP = Projects are part of the Women’s Participation Program.
*Funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not U.S. ASFF funds).

ALP personnel reported to be on-hand have been slotted into APPS, with 65% meeting the minimum data-entry requirements in APPS to be paid. Both figures represent slight improvements from last quarter. In addition, 85% of ALP personnel (the same as last quarter) have banking, ATM, or mobile money resources available to them and are encouraged to utilize these services instead of the previous system of turning over salaries to a “trusted agent.”

NSOCC-A reported last quarter that ALP reform has been a challenge due to the uncertainty regarding the ALP’s future. Both RS and NSOCC-A, in coordination with the Afghan government, are planning a possible transfer of the ALP to other ANDSF force elements. This quarter, USFOR-A confirmed this is still the case. They added that the FY 2020 ASFF budget request does not include funding for the ALP and that it is possible the ALP may be reorganized within the ASSF. USFOR-A will report on changes to the ALP force structure if and when the MOI orders them to occur.

This quarter, NSOCC-A provided SIGAR with the latest ALP powerbroker-influence report that lists ALP personnel determined to be under the influence of local powerbrokers such as village elders, parliamentarians, and other individuals outside the proper chain of command. As of March 2019, 147 ALP personnel were under the influence of powerbrokers across five provinces, an increase of 31 personnel but a decrease of six provinces since last quarter’s report (as of December 2018). This quarter’s figures still reflect a decrease from the 219 ALP personnel across 12 provinces reported under the influence of powerbrokers in July 2018. The provinces with the most ALP personnel under the influence of powerbrokers shifted since December 2018, with the most in March in Takhar Province (46 ALP) and Baghlan Province (41 ALP). In December, it was Nangarhar with 36 ALP under powerbroker influence and Uruzgan (40 ALP).

The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional

**ALP powerbroker-influence reports:**

According to USFOR-A, the ALP powerbroker-influence reports are generated by the ALP Staff Directorate’s (SD) Analysis and Assessments section in order to identify ALP personnel under the influence of powerbrokers (such as parliamentarians, local elders, officials outside of their chain of command, etc.) that take them away from completing their assigned duties.

The ALP SD section sources its information on powerbroker influence from both Afghan intelligence reports and reports that flow up through ANP chain of command (district chiefs of police to provincial chiefs of police to the SD). The reports are not distributed outside of the SD through Afghan chains, except to U.S. advisors to the ALP.

The SD claims to investigate all of the powerbroker influence cases, but USFOR-A says that much of this investigating gets decentralized back to the district and provincial chiefs of police due to manpower limitations on the SD’s assessment teams. Generally speaking, the SD’s goal is to remove the identified ALP personnel from powerbroker influence, and return them to their assigned duties, not to fire them. USFOR-A said that optimally, powerbrokers themselves would be held accountable, but that is often beyond the reach of the SD. If some culpability is found on the part of the influenced ALP, they can be fired, usually under the auspices of not performing their duties for an extended period of time or going absent without leave.


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**REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

According to the United Nations (UN), Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs. Although contamination originates from legacy mines laid before 2001, the cause of most casualties are the mines and other ERW dating from after the arrival of international forces. From 2012’s low of 36 per month, casualties increased to 191 per month in 2017. The National Disability Survey of Afghanistan, conducted in 2005, estimated at least 2.7% of the population were severely disabled, including 60,000 landmine and ERW survivors. The UN assumes the number is appreciably higher today.

The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional
Since FY 2002, State has provided $381.9 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort). PM/WRA so far obligated $1.85 million in FY 2018 funds.211

The Afghan government was granted an extension in 2012 until 2023 to fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status. Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the country will not reach this objective in time.212 According to State, the drawdown of coalition forces in 2014 was concurrent with a drawdown of international donor funds to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). From a 2010 peak of $113 million, MAPA's budget decreased to $51 million in 2018. The Afghan government will request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations. However, according to the State Department, the extension request cannot be initiated or acknowledged sooner than 18 months before April 2023—the end date of the current extension.213

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and by conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).214 From 1997 through March 31, 2019, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 270.2 million square meters of land (104 square miles, or 1.7 times the land area of Washington, DC) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.17 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.215

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. At the beginning of the calendar year, there were 636.9 square kilometers (245.9 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of March 31, the total known contaminated area was 619.3 square kilometers (239.1 square miles) in 3,715 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.216

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018 and supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:217

- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups

SECURITY

TABLE 3.17

DEMINING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Fragments Cleared</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,337,557</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>663,162</td>
<td>1,602,267</td>
<td>4,339,235</td>
<td>650,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>21,966,347</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>22,912,702</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,897</td>
<td>10,148,683</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>346,484</td>
<td>9,415,712</td>
<td>511,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12,101,386</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>33,078</td>
<td>88,798</td>
<td>9,616,485</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27,856,346</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>6,289</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>607,600,000</td>
<td>547,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31,897,313</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>88,261</td>
<td>1,158,886</td>
<td>547,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25,233,844</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>30,924</td>
<td>158,850</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>558,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019²</td>
<td>8,239,924</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>17,135</td>
<td>93,518</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>619,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>270,225,387</td>
<td>77,090</td>
<td>1,967,967</td>
<td>6,197,923</td>
<td>83,620,528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance, UXO = unexploded ordnance, SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.

Fragments are reported because clearing them requires the same care as other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

¹ Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

² Partial fiscal year results (10/1/2018–3/31/2019)

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.

- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances, suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance such as referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and assistance with economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury is also provided.²¹⁸ During January–March 2019, COMAC launched its online incident case-management system (IMS) through which assistance packages are distributed. The incident-management system includes biometric registration capabilities to identify beneficiaries.²¹⁹ COMAC provided immediate assistance to 3,124 families and delivered 29 capacity-building activities to Afghan government staff.

Only one meeting occurred during this period between the government and agencies and organizations providing assistance to victims, but COMAC intends to meet the program’s FY 2019 target of 19 coordination meetings. The minimal progress stems partly from the lack of an established framework enabling government entities such as the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) to support victims’ assistance packages.²²⁰ As of March 31, 2019, USAID has disbursed $6.76 million for this program.²²¹