SECURITY CONTENTS

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KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
This quarter saw heavy fighting among all parties to the Afghan conflict, as President Donald J. Trump called off peace negotiations with the Taliban after the insurgents claimed an attack that killed a U.S. soldier on September 5, and as the Afghan government carried out its late-September presidential election.80

United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) told SIGAR this quarter that Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) efforts to secure the Afghan presidential election on September 28 resulted “in less violence than expected” and emphasized that the ANDSF’s provision of security enabled the election to go forward. However, Taliban efforts to violently subvert the election resulted in low voter turnout, and over 1,000 polling places were reportedly closed due to security concerns.81 The Taliban targeted election facilities and candidates’ political rallies in several fatal attacks.82 The insurgents also attacked key transportation, telecommunications, and power infrastructure to impede election preparations and civilian participation.83

This quarter’s security activity caused civilian casualties to spike. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a record high number of civilian casualties from July through September (4,313), representing a 42% increase compared to the same period in 2018. Resolute Support (RS) also reported a 39% increase in civilian casualties from June–September 2019, compared to the same period in 2018. Both UNAMA and RS said the increase in civilian casualties was due to a high number of terrorist and insurgent attacks prior to the presidential elections that included the use of improvised explosive devices.84

Operations by all the parties to the conflict this quarter also led to high combat casualties. According to RS, the NATO command in Afghanistan, from June 1 through August 31, 2019, ANDSF total casualties increased by approximately 5% when compared to the same period last year.85 Additionally, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), seven American service members were killed in action (KIA) in Afghanistan from July 16 to October 16, bringing the 2019 total to 17 KIA and 124 wounded in action, the highest annual number of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan in the last five years.86
For a list of this quarter’s major high-casualty incidents, see Figure 3.30.

Insurgent casualties have also reportedly been high. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that U.S. and Afghan operations inflicted 1,000 insurgent casualties from August 28 to September 8, and President Ashraf Ghani reported 2,000 from September 6 to 13.87 However, SIGAR cannot verify these figures nor provide a reliable number for insurgent casualties inflicted over the quarter. USFOR-A said an increase in Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) ground operations and U.S. air strikes heightened insurgent casualties this quarter.88

According to NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the 2,531 ground operations conducted by ASSF from January–September 2019 have already outpaced the total for all of 2018 (2,365).89 Additionally, U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) reported that September 2019 saw more munitions released (948) during U.S. and Coalition air missions than in any month since October 2010. The numbers of munitions released January through September 2019 (5,431) increased by 4% compared to the same period last year.90

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continued to report on changes to ANDSF personnel strength as it supports the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) transition to using the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) to better manage, generate payroll for, and account for ANDSF personnel. According to CSTC-A, as of July 28, 2019, there were 162,415 personnel in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 91,435 in the Afghan National Police (ANP), for a total 253,850 ANDSF personnel in APPS. These figures reflect 18,454 fewer ANA and 161 fewer ANP than the assigned strength numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter.91 CSTC-A said this decrease in strength reflects the number ANDSF personnel biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in APPS and that “changes in personnel eligible for pay from one quarter to another do not directly translate to a change in actual … strength of the ANDSF.” The APPS-based reporting of ANDSF strength will continue to change as the MOD, MOI, and CSTC-A work to correct and complete key personnel data in APPS.92 For more information about ANDSF strength and APPS changes this quarter, see pages 77–82.

### ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable
USFOR-A continued to classify or otherwise restrict from public release the following types of data, due to Afghan government classification guidelines or other restrictions (mostly since October 2017):93
- most ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- unit-level ANA and ANP authorized and assigned strength
- performance assessments for the ANDSF
- information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-Casualty Security Incidents</th>
<th>Number of Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROGOVERNMENT FORCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 Sep 7: AAF air strikes kill Taliban insurgents in Farah Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109 Sep 7: ANDSF regain district under Taliban control for five years in Badakhshan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 Sep 15: AAF air strikes kill suspected Taliban militants in Paktika Province</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>83 Sep 29: AAF air strikes kill suspected Taliban militants in Ghor Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 Oct 5: ANDSF conduct operations against Taliban in Takhar Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTIGOVERNMENT FORCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>395 Jul 31: Busload of civilians and journalists killed when it hit Taliban-planted IED in Farah Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 Aug 17: IS-K-claimed suicide bomber attacks Shiite wedding party, killing civilians in Kabul City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Aug 24: Taliban fighters kill ANDSF during night raid on base in Zabul Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Sep 19: Taliban-claimed suicide bomber attacks hospital, killing civilians in Zabul Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 Oct 18: IS-K-claimed suicide bomber attacks mosque, killing civilians in Nangarhar Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fatalities are estimates and only include the number of the opposing party (or civilians when indicated) killed.

• some Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes

• some information about the misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior

The classified annex for this report includes the information USFOR-A classified or restricted from public release.

**U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security**

As of September 30, 2019, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly $82.55 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 62% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly $4.32 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2019 (net of the $604 million reprogramming action described on page 52), nearly $2.01 billion had been obligated and nearly $1.65 billion disbursed as of September 30, 2019.94

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. A significant portion of ASFF is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI, but is not included in the authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan fund the ALP. The rest is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 on pages 52–53.95

ASFF funds are obligated by either CSTC-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds that CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget) are provided directly to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers those funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.96

Unlike with the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs is paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been, but is no longer, the largest contributor.97 A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on pages 115–117.

**Security-Incident Data**

Every quarter, SIGAR tracks and analyzes security-incident data from different sources to provide a robust account of the security situation
in Afghanistan and activity between the parties to the conflict. This data shows trends including where security-related activity is concentrated in the country and at what levels it is occurring over certain periods of time.

Each type of incident data has advantages and limitations: RS-reported enemy-initiated attack data is the only remaining unclassified data from an official source tracking security trends in Afghanistan. It is unclassified only at the provincial level and does not include U.S. and Coalition-initiated attacks on the enemy. Open-source Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) event data can be disaggregated to the district level, to a variety of security-incident types, and to all parties to the conflict, but depends almost entirely on media reporting of political and security-related incidents. For consistency with RS’s enemy-initiated attacks data, SIGAR presents its analysis of ACLED’s data at the provincial level and during RS’s reporting period.

**Enemy-Initiated Attacks**

This quarter’s enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) data show that enemy violence in Afghanistan increased this summer compared to last summer.
RS reported 7,183 EIA this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019), with most attacks occurring in the south, west, and northwest of the country. Seen in Figure 3.31, this period's figures reflect a 19% increase compared to the same period in 2018, and an 11% increase from the preceding three months (March 1–May 31, 2019).98

Roughly half of the 3,495 EIA this quarter (49% from June 1–August 31) were considered “effective” enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA) that resulted in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties. Enemy attacks have been more effective this quarter than they were during the preceding months of this year (42% effective from January–May 2019). EEIAs this quarter increased by 10% compared to the same period in 2018 and by 24% compared to last quarter (March 1–May 31, 2019).99

The geographic distribution so far this year shows that most EEIA occurred in the south as well as the north and west. As seen in Figure 3.32, Helmand Province had the most EEIA (1,056), followed by Kandahar (533), Farah (449), Balkh (401), and Herat (395) Provinces.100 The most common methods of EEIA in 2019 have been direct fire (76%), followed by IED explosions (17%), and indirect fire (5%), and mine strikes (2%). This is in
line with trends reported last quarter and last year. RS provided the caveat that a small proportion of EIA and EEIA are not included in the reported totals due to a lag in Afghan operational reporting.101

ACLED-Recorded Incidents
ACLED-recorded 4,005 political-violence and protest incidents this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019), a 61% increase compared to the same period last year, with incidents concentrated in southern and eastern Afghanistan.102 The data show that this significant year-on-year change was mainly driven by an increase in the number of battles recorded this quarter: 2,530 versus 1,579 recorded during June–August 2018. ACLED defines a battle as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location,” such as armed clashes or the government or non-state actors taking territory. Battles can occur between armed and organized state, non-state, and external groups, or in any such combination.103

Unlike RS’s EIA and EEIA data, ACLED incidents include the violent and nonviolent activity of all the parties to the conflict, though violent activity made up 98% of the recorded incidents this quarter (battles, 63%; explosions/remote violence, 32%; violence against civilians, 3%). Comparatively, violent activity made up 93% of the recorded incidents during the same period last year.104

The geographical distribution of ACLED-recorded incidents thus far in 2019 shows the provinces with the most incidents shifted slightly compared to the same period in 2018. As shown in Figure 3.33, in 2019 (through August 31), Helmand Province has had the most incidents (935), followed by Kandahar (773), Ghazni (770), Nangarhar (465), and Zabul (434); the same period last year saw Nangarhar with the most incidents (853), then Ghazni (536), Helmand (447), Uruzgan (329), and Faryab (275). RS’s enemy-initiated attacks and ACLED’s incident data align in that they show Helmand and Kandahar as having the most EEIA and incidents, respectively, from January through August 2019.105

Civilian Casualties
SIGAR analyzes Afghan civilian-casualty data from two different sources, UNAMA and RS. These organizations use different methodologies to collect civilian-casualty data, with the result that RS consistently reports fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA. However, comparing both sources, including the overall increase or decrease of civilian casualties, the breakdown of casualties by type, and the breakdown of casualties by party attribution, can provide helpful insights into civilian-casualty trends over similar reporting periods.
UNAMA: Civilian Casualties
UNAMA documented a higher number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan from July 1 through September 30, 2019, than in any quarter since documentation began in 2009. In July, UNAMA documented the highest number of civilian casualties that the Mission has ever recorded in a single month. The 4,313 civilian casualties that UNAMA reported during this period represent a 42% increase compared to the same period in 2018. The casualties included 1,174 deaths and 3,139 injuries.106

UNAMA's civilian-casualty data this quarter reflects the high level of violence surrounding the September 28 presidential election, particularly from Taliban attacks targeting election-related sites and activities. However, the higher level of overall civilian casualties this year was not solely due to election-related violence. UNAMA found that civilian casualties were “significantly lower” during this year's election compared to the 2018 parliamentary elections, but higher than on the polling days for the first and second round of the presidential election in 2014.107

Election-related violence this year caused 458 civilian casualties (85 deaths and 373 injuries), including 277 civilian casualties (28 deaths

UNAMA Collection Methodology
According to UNAMA, data on civilian casualties are collected through "direct site visits, physical examination of items and evidence gathered at the scene of incidents, visits to hospital and medical facilities, still and video images," reports by UN entities, and primary, secondary, and third-party accounts. Information is obtained directly from primary accounts where possible. Civilians whose noncombatant status is under "significant doubt," based on international humanitarian law, are not included in the figures. Ground-engagement casualties that cannot be definitively attributed to either side, such as those incurred during crossfire, are jointly attributed to both parties. UNAMA includes an “other” category to distinguish between these jointly-attributed casualties and those caused by other events, such as unexploded ordnance or cross-border shelling by Pakistani forces. UNAMA's methodology has remained largely unchanged since 2008.
UNAMA reported its particular concern that over one-third of all civilian casualties on polling day in 2019 were children. They attributed to the Taliban more than 80% of total civilian casualties of election-related violence in 2019, and 95% of civilian casualties from violence on polling day.¹⁰⁸

UNAMA attributed the majority of this year’s overall civilian casualties from January 1 through September 30 to antigovernment elements (62%, or 5,117 casualties). There was a notable increase in casualties attributed to the Taliban as opposed to other groups. UNAMA attributed 3,823 civilian casualties (46% of the total) to the Taliban in the first nine months of 2019, an increase of 31% from the same period in 2018. However, comparing just this reporting period (July, August, and September) to the same period in 2018, civilian casualties attributed to the Taliban more than tripled.¹⁰⁹

The significant increase in civilian casualties this quarter was attributed to suicide and non-suicide IED attacks by antigovernment elements, primarily the Taliban. During the months of July, August, and September, UNAMA documented an alarming 72% increase in civilian casualties caused by IEDs compared to the same period in 2018.¹¹⁰

The significant increase in civilian casualties this quarter was attributed to suicide and non-suicide IED attacks by antigovernment elements, primarily the Taliban. During the months of July, August, and September, UNAMA documented an alarming 72% increase in civilian casualties caused by IEDs compared to the same period in 2018.¹¹⁰

RS Civilian Casualties Data
RS said Afghanistan experienced 4,554 civilian casualties, a 39% increase in the number of civilian casualties from June 1 through September 30, 2019, compared to the same period last year, reversing the decline reported earlier this year.¹¹¹ Like UNAMA, RS said the increase in civilian casualties was due to a high number of terrorist and insurgent attacks prior to the presidential elections that included the use of improvised-explosive-devices (IEDs).¹¹²

RS reported that the majority of the civilian casualties from June through September have been caused by IEDs (60%), followed by direct fire (21%), and indirect fire (9%), compared to trends for the preceding months of 2019 that showed the causes as IEDs (43%), direct fire (25%), and indirect fire (13%).¹¹³

This quarter’s figures bring RS-reported civilian casualties in 2019 (January 1–September 30) to 7,260. This reflects a 6% increase compared to civilian casualties incurred during the same period in 2018.¹¹⁴ According to RS, July and September were the most violent months so far this year, which saw 1,437 and 1,292 civilian casualties, respectively.¹¹⁵ This quarter’s figures shifted the provinces with the highest civilian casualties this year when adjusted for population. Table 3.6 shows that Zabul, Logar, and Nangarhar have been the most dangerous for civilians thus far in 2019 (last quarter it was Helmand, Nuristan, and Nangarhar).¹¹⁶

RS attributed about 91% of the casualties from January 1 through September 30 to antigovernment elements (48% to unknown insurgents, 35.5% to the Taliban, and 7% to IS-K). Only 5% were attributed to
progovernment forces (2% to Coalition forces and 3% to the ANDSF) and 4% to other or unknown forces. As seen in Figure 3.34, while both UNAMA and RS attribute the majority of this year’s civilian casualties to antigovernment elements, they disagree on the proportion of casualties attributed to progovernment elements.117

USFOR-A commented this quarter: “Preventing civilian casualties remains a top priority for U.S. forces. USFOR-A takes extraordinary measures to reduce and mitigate civilian casualties. USFOR-A recognizes and respects its moral, ethical, and professional imperative to reduce and mitigate these casualties, consistent with the law of war. USFOR-A uses reports of civilian casualties to determine if and how such losses of life could have been averted and to evaluate and improve upon its ability to protect civilians in the future.”118

**TABLE 3.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Casualties</th>
<th>Casualties Per Thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>374,440</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>481,271</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1,864,582</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>552,694</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>551,469</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>620,552</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>540,051</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktya</td>
<td>677,465</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>1,112,152</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>1,512,293</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>704,149</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>5,452,652</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghami</td>
<td>1,507,262</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>1,120,511</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>1,237,001</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>173,222</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>1,226,475</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>429,415</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>845,018</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panwan</td>
<td>817,955</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>2,326,261</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wadak</td>
<td>729,983</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>607,825</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sar-e Pul</td>
<td>690,566</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakhika</td>
<td>532,953</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>1,208,745</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>1,633,048</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>202,488</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>475,655</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>656,187</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daykundi</td>
<td>561,651</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>1,165,960</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>187,856</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>549,243</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,329,050</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,260</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average 0.22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Casualties include killed and wounded. Population data is from LandScan 2016 data provided by RS in its last district-stability assessment (October 22, 2018).


**RS Collection Methodology**

According to DOD, the RS Civilian Casualty Management Team relies primarily upon operational reporting from RS’s Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data. DOD says that RS’s civilian-casualty data collection differs from UNAMA’s in that RS “has access to a wider range of forensic data than such civilian organizations, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery ... and other sources.”

U.S. Force Manning
According to DOD, as of October 23, 2019, there are approximately 13,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan “supporting complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO Resolute Support Mission and to conduct counterterrorism operations.” DOD said that around 8,500 of those personnel serve under the RS mission. The 13,000 assigned-strength number reflects a 1,000-person decrease from the 14,000 number cited for over a year. This change was reported after RS commander General Austin Scott Miller stated on October 21 that “unbeknownst to the public, as part of our [force] optimization over the last year ... we’ve reduced our authorized strength by 2,000 here.” The exact authorized strength of U.S. forces in Afghanistan remains classified. DOD said “While the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan fluctuates regularly due to troop rotations and conditions on the ground, there have been no changes to DOD’s mission or to our commitment to our security partnership with the Government of Afghanistan.”

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said on October 19 that any larger troop withdrawal would be “conditions based” and that he is “confident that we can go down to 8,600 [troops] without affecting our [counterterrorism] operations.” When asked whether DOD would draw troop levels down to 8,600 with or without a peace deal, Secretary Esper said, “I don’t want to get ahead of the diplomats on that front. I’m just saying I know what we can go down to and feel confident based on reports I’ve gotten from the commander on the ground.”

U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks
According to DOD, seven U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 64 were wounded in action (WIA), and one service member died in non-hostile circumstances in Afghanistan this reporting period (July 16, 2019–October 16, 2019). As of October 16, 2019, a total of 80 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan (60 were KIA and 20 died in non-hostile circumstances) and 491 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 2,429 U.S. military personnel have died (1,906 were KIA and 523 died in non-hostile circumstances) and 20,638 have been WIA.

USFOR-A reported two confirmed insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel attacked U.S. and Coalition forces this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019) that resulted in two military casualties. That brings this year’s total to three attacks that have resulted in four casualties. This is two more attacks and one more casualty compared to January 1–August 26, 2018. This year’s attacks and casualties are still fewer than the six insider attacks
that occurred during roughly the same period in 2017, in which there were 13 casualties.124

AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Force Manning

ANDSF Personnel Strength

According to CSTC-A, as of July 28, 2019, there were 162,415 MOD and 91,435 MOI personnel, for a total ANDSF assigned strength of 253,850 personnel reported in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). This does not include roughly 18,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). This quarter’s figures reflect a decrease of 18,615 reported personnel (18,454 fewer MOD and 161 fewer MOI) than the 272,465 APPS-derived ANDSF assigned strength reported for May 28, 2019 (also not including the ALP).125

Because this quarter’s strength reflects the number of ANDSF personnel biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay, CSTC-A said the quarter-to-quarter decrease “do[es] not directly translate to a change in actual … strength of the ANDSF.”126

The decrease this quarter specifically was due to an MOD shura (conference) that involved a data-cleansing effort to improve the accuracy of MOD personnel (ANA, AAF, and ANA special forces) data in APPS. The shura

Assigned vs. Authorized Strength

Assigned strength is the reported number of personnel serving in a force, whereas authorized strength indicates the number of personnel authorized to serve in a force. MOD strength figures mainly include the ANA, Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan Border Force (ABF), Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), and ANA special forces. MOI strength figures include the ANP and ANP special forces.

APPS is the computerized personnel and payroll system from which CSTC-A now draws ANDSF assigned-strength numbers. It is designed to more accurately manage, generate payroll information, and account for ANDSF personnel. Since December 2018, DOD has reported APPS-based strength numbers to Congress in its semiannual report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan. CSTC-A informed SIGAR last quarter that they switched to reporting the ANDSF’s assigned strength as the number of personnel biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay rather than the number of personnel reported on-hand by ANDSF components, as it had done previously.

Since June 2019, only those ANDSF personnel who have the following requirements are counted toward the ANDSF assigned-strength figure:

- biometric enrollment (fingerprints, iris, and face scans stored separate from APPS in the Afghan biometric system)
- assignment to an authorized position in APPS
- other identifying data in their APPS records (biometric number, name, father’s name, grandfather’s name, ID card number, date of birth, and actual rank).

As CSTC-A, MOD, and MOI work to improve the accuracy of the ANDSF personnel records in APPS to ensure all active personnel have complete APPS records and all inactive and nonexistent personnel records are removed from APPS, assigned-strength numbers will not reflect the actual size of the force.

led to processing a backlog 25,000 personnel actions such as removing personnel killed or wounded in action, personnel absent without leave, or retirements. CSTC-A reports that the process of updating and validating the records in APPS will continue, and that an APPS shura to improve the accuracy of MOI personnel is ongoing. As a result of the recent data-cleansing efforts, CSTC-A says they are confident that “the number of personnel reported in APPS is the most accurate it has ever been.” More information about APPS and this quarter's shuras are available in the following section.

According to CSTC-A, the ANDSF's total authorized strength is 351,729, a slight change from the long-reported 352,000 (due to the implementation of a new MOD tashkil on July 1, 2019). The Ministry of Interior Affair’s authorized force level includes an additional 30,000 ALP funded only by the United States and the Afghan government. Table 3.7 shows this quarter's ANDSF assigned strength at 72% (roughly 98,000 personnel short) of its authorized strength.

Seen in Figure 3.35, ANDSF personnel strength numbers sourced from APPS are lower than the Afghan-provided strength data previously reported, which is significant because assigned-strength numbers help inform CSTC-A's decision-making on how much money to provide to the Afghan government for ANDSF salary and incentive payments. CSTC-A said last quarter it “does not expect that the APPS-reported data will ever equal the amount that was self-reported [by the Afghans]” and that it “cannot categorize the excess individuals as ‘ghost’ (non-existent) personnel, because it is not known why the Afghan reported numbers are higher” than those reported from APPS. This quarter's APPS-sourced assigned strength (not including the ALP) reflects 58,478 fewer personnel than what was reported using the old reporting method during the same period in 2018, and roughly 70,000 fewer compared to the same period in 2017. CSTC-A has been gradually transitioning to using APPS-based strength numbers to inform funding decisions on salary and incentive payments.

DOD said in December 2018 that “it will likely take several more months to complete enrollment into the APPS system, and the true overall size of the ANDSF is likely to fall between the Afghan-reported numbers and the numbers accounted for in APPS.” DOD said this quarter that “APPS is a major shift in the ministries’ traditional way of managing pay and personnel, and challenges are expected. APPS will take time to mature, but the current assigned-strength reporting from APPS represents another step towards improved accountability of personnel and is a reflection of continued efforts by the MOD and MOI to implement APPS.”

In light of SIGAR's longstanding concern over this issue, we look forward to working with CSTC-A over the coming months to fully understand the ramifications of the new force-strength numbers for past and future expenditures.
Note: Quarterly reports of assigned-strength data usually reflect a three-month reporting lag. This quarter’s data is as of July 28, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdees, and student personnel. No civilians are included. ANP strength numbers do not include “standby” personnel, generally reservists, personnel not in service while completing training, or civilians. 2017 figures were rounded because exact figures for ANDSF strength were classified for that period. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from MOI to MOD in early 2018, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF. The change in strength numbers from 2018 to 2019 is due to the transition of strength reporting from the number reported on-hand by the ANDSF to reporting from the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact.


TABLE 3.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDSF Component</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
<th>% of Target Authorization</th>
<th>Difference Between Assigned and Authorized</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA including AAF</td>
<td>227,103</td>
<td>162,415</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>(64,688)</td>
<td>(28.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>124,626</td>
<td>91,435</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>(33,191)</td>
<td>(26.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF Total without Civilians</td>
<td>351,729</td>
<td>253,850</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>(97,879)</td>
<td>(27.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data is as of July 28, 2019. ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. CSTC-A notes that the 253,850 assigned personnel number provided represents those individuals who are biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay. There are additional personnel who are biometrically enrolled in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), however, they are not yet assigned to an authorized position and are therefore not included in the assigned strength number. Therefore, the ANDSF is closer to their authorized strength than is reflected by the current assigned strength number: As the ANDSF continue to assign all personnel against authorized positions, the difference between assigned strength and authorized strength will decrease.

CSTC-A had planned for APPS to be fully implemented by MOD in July 2018 and MOI in November 2018. However, this quarter the Department of Defense’s Office of the Inspector General (DOD OIG) completed an audit which found that neither ministry was using APPS as intended to generate payroll data (as of April 2019), and CSTC-A had paid $26.2 million for a system that “does not accomplish [its] stated objective of reducing the risk of inaccurate personnel records or fraudulent payments through the use of automated controls.” DOD OIG said APPS failed to reduce the risk of inaccurate records and fraudulent payments because there is no link between the two systems to validate the authenticity of the biometric number recorded in APPS. Therefore the system still relies on manual input of the biometric identification numbers and the same manually intensive human-resource and payroll processes that the system was designed to streamline. This ultimately means that DOD cannot have definitive assurance that each APPS personnel record reflects an actual ANDSF employee and is still at risk of funding payroll based on fraudulent personnel records.\(^{136}\)

CSTC-A told SIGAR this quarter that it has begun addressing the concerns presented in the DOD OIG audit, and in partnership with the MOD and MOI have “made monumental progress towards deploying APPS for use in areas such as generating payroll data, providing personnel reporting, and ensuring personnel actions such as promotions, assignments, and retirements can be better managed” by the responsible MOD and MOI offices. CSTC-A also reported that as of July 2019, MOD began generating payroll data using APPS. There were a number of issues identified in this first attempt and MOD has been given three months to address them. CSTC-A
said this quarter that MOI does not currently use APPS for payroll, and it continues to work with MOI and UNDP to transition MOI to using APPS for payroll.\footnote{137}

As of September 1 2019, MOD, MOI, and CSTC-A continue to undertake three efforts to ensure accurate ANDSF personnel data exist in APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching ANDSF personnel to authorized positions in the system; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) physically accounting for personnel through personnel asset inventories (PAI) and personnel asset audits (PAA).\footnote{138}

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that MOD and MOI were conducting two extended APPS shuras (conferences) aimed at cleansing existing and slotting records in APPS rather than conducting PAIs to physically account for personnel. CSTC-A said the primary purpose of the shuras was to establish validated MOD and MOI APPS data baselines that could assist future force planning.\footnote{139}

The MOD shura (June 10–July 3, 2019) resulted in 2,919 Inherent Law retirements, 25,214 records unslotted due to attrition (KIA, AWOL, DFR, or separation status), and 805 individuals assigned out of the active reserves. CSTC-A stressed that “while there is still progress to be made in updating and validating the ANA records in APPS, the current ANA APPS baseline is the most accurate it has ever been.”\footnote{140}

The MOI shura began July 27 and is expected to end on October 31, 2019. It is being conducted in four groups due to the large number of provincial police headquarters (PHQs). As of September 1, the shura has resulted in 310 Inherent Law retirements, 1,281 scheduled reassignments, and 1,301 completed promotion processes in APPS. The new MOI tashkil will take effect on or about October 31, so a key objective of the shura is to ensure that individuals not assigned against an authorized position in the new tashkil are scheduled for reassignment prior to this date. As with the MOD, CSTC-A says that the MOI APPS shura will provide ANP leadership with the most accurate APPS baseline that they have had to date in order to provide a foundation on which the ANP can schedule promotions, assignments, and retirements that can all be validated.\footnote{141}

With regard to physically accounting for ANDSF personnel, CSTC-A reiterated that the continued issuance of ID cards to ANDSF personnel will remain the primary way of physically accounting for personnel. The cards have chips that link to biometric record numbers. The biometric data itself (iris, face, and fingerprint scans) are kept separate from APPS in the Afghan biometric system. The cards are valid for three years, at which point they can be reissued in-person.\footnote{142} In addition, CSTC-A's APPS Program Management Office has recently conducted several physical spot checks and personnel-accountability audits (PAAs) to verify whether all soldiers and officers entered into APPS were present at each location. CSTC-A reported that this quarter’s PAAs occurred at units within the ANA’s 201st,
The results show that the ANP PAAs resulted in the enrollment of 771 previously unenrolled ANP personnel into APPS, but the ANA PAA results showed that at best 10%, and at worst 60%, of the personnel reported to exist in those ANA units were not present for duty at the time of the audit. CSTC-A noted that “not present” can mean a number of things, including absent without leave, dropped from rolls, killed in action, wounded, transferred, separated from the force, retired, out on mission, assigned temporary duty elsewhere, or on leave. CSTC-A said continuing to conduct PAAs will be “determined on a case-by-case basis depending on internal staffing levels and force-protection statuses.” CSTC-A also said it will look at alternative methods to assess the validity of APPS enrollments instead of performing high-security-risk PAAs.

**ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify all but limited ANDSF attrition information this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANDSF force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANA monthly attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 2.8%, a slight increase from, but largely in line with the 2.6% recorded over the previous quarter. ANP monthly attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 3%, a slight increase from the 2.4% recorded over the previous quarter. These percentages account for pure attrition alone—unadjusted for new recruits or returnees—and not the net decrease in force strength. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANA and ANP attrition rates over the last three months.

**Attrition:** unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel dropped from the rolls, killed in action, separated from the force, and other losses (disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (e.g., absence without leave, permanent medical issue, or transferred to another part of the force) losses.

WHY ANDSF NUMBERS MATTER: SIGAR’S WORK ON STRENGTH AND SALARY PAYMENTS

SIGAR has for years raised concerns regarding the processes for collecting and verifying the accuracy of ANDSF personnel and payroll data. As Inspector General John F. Sopko testified in 2015, this data informs DOD’s decision-making on funding for hundreds of millions of dollars of salary and incentive payments for the ANDSF. Those concerns also extend to the Afghan government’s capacity to manage and account for these funds, which are provided through direct assistance and multi-donor trust funds. After SIGAR’s Research and Analysis Directorate (RAD) raised questions regarding the accuracy of ANDSF strength numbers, SIGAR issued its first audit report on ANDSF personnel and payroll systems in 2011, followed by two more audits in 2015. These reports found that despite many years and several billion dollars spent on salary assistance, there was still no assurance that the ANDSF data informing funding levels was accurate.

After those and other oversight agencies’ reports determined that Afghan personnel and payroll systems in place created opportunities for corruption—including the creation of and payment to ghost soldiers—in early 2016, CSTC-A began to develop APPS to address these deficiencies. RAD has in the intervening years tracked ANDSF strength numbers and CSTC-A’s gradual implementation of APPS. Recent SIGAR work continues to find issues with the system that signal it may still be vulnerable to the fraud and corruption APPS was intended to prevent.

As of October 2019, SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate found:

- Government officials within the MOD and MOI, and at various provincial police headquarters throughout Afghanistan, fraudulently created payroll records to receive payments to nonexistent ANDSF personnel.
- Several hundred personnel records in WEPS (the UN’s system for paying ANP), and potentially in APPS, may have been tampered with and require further investigation for being linked to ghost personnel.
- Some MOD and MOI personnel records created in APPS before November 2018 relied on data entry through the previous human resource system—the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS)—and WEPS. SIGAR found that these prior records may still reflect fraudulent police and soldier data.
- According to SIGAR sources, Afghan government auditors responsible for oversight of MOI funding and documentation have been negligent in their assigned duties and have resisted when follow-up audits were attempted.

SIGAR is coordinating with CSTC-A to continue to analyze APPS and WEPS (though a transition to APPS for MOI payroll is possible) to identify vulnerabilities in the systems and management practices that puts U.S. funds at risk of waste, fraud, or abuse. Part of the focus will be to build on DOD OIG’s 2019 audit finding that the lack of system interfaces between APPS and the Afghan biometric and financial systems may allow for fraud in APPS personnel records.

SIGAR Investigators are identifying Afghan-led auditing entities and mechanisms for increasing oversight and are expanding SIGAR’s criminal intelligence-collection efforts by strengthening partnerships with Afghanistan’s regulatory entities and with Afghan and U.S. law-enforcement agencies. SIGAR’s investigative efforts and support to Afghan anticorruption institutions have also enabled Afghan prosecutors to identify and arrest several individuals receiving fraudulent salary payments for departed or nonexistent ANDSF personnel. SIGAR will continue to collaborate with the Afghan government to remove corrupt actors or enablers within the ANDSF while they are being investigated.

ANDSF Casualties
USFOR-A continued to classify most ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed information about ANDSF casualties is reported in the classified annex of this report.

RS provided a general, unclassified assessment of ANDSF casualties this quarter. From June 1 through August 31, 2019, there was an approximately 5% increase in ANDSF total casualties when compared to the same period last year. RS also said that about 60% of ANDSF casualties during this period occurred in defensive operations and 40% in offensive operations.

ANDSF Insider Attacks
According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF experienced 30 insider attacks from June 1 through August 31, 2019—nearly double the number reported last quarter (from February 20 through May 31, 2019)—that resulted in 87 ANDSF casualties. That brings the total for this year to 49 attacks, resulting in 167 casualties. While there have been three fewer attacks this year compared to the same period last year, there were 56 more ANDSF casualties. There have been five more attacks and 30 more casualties than roughly the same period in 2017.

ANDSF Performance – Most Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify most assessments of ANDSF performance at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.

Women in the ANDSF
According to the RS Gender Advisor Office, this quarter the ANDSF had 6,395 female personnel, an increase of 933 women since last quarter and about 1,900 women compared to roughly the same period in 2018. The increase since last quarter includes 721 women in the ANP and 212 in the ANA. The vast majority of ANDSF female personnel (4,371) are in the ANP, including 165 women in the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). There are 2,024 female personnel in the ANA, including 110 in the AAF and 20 in the ASSF.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) continued to account for the greatest number of females in the ANDSF (2,032), followed by soldiers and police (1,726), commissioned officers (1,485), and civilians (999). Currently 153 female cadets are serving at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (74), the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (32), and the Kabul
Military Training Center (47). For a historical record of ANDSF female strength since 2015, see Figure 3.36.

This quarter, the RS Gender Advisor Office told SIGAR that MOD is currently in the process of executing its Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevent Policy (SHAPP) Implementation Plan that was signed in March 2019. The SHAPP outlines a harassment and assault complaint-reporting process and has specific language about creating an inclusive environment for women in the ANA. As part of the plan, the MOD will conduct a training workshop for victim advocates, commanders, and supervisors by the end of 2019. Attendees will then be required to provide the training they received to ANDSF personnel throughout the various levels of the organization.

Additionally, under a new MOI Gender Policy signed in April 2019, a recently appointed MOI director of human rights, women’s affairs, and children has begun planning for a nationwide awareness training program (similar to MOD’s) on guidance and procedures for handling sexual harassment and sexual assault. MOI’s gender policy is broad, and the initial implementation will focus on the training program and the development of a more specific sexual harassment-prevention policy. MOI also issued
guidelines about use of ANDSF facilities designated for women this quarter. They require female ANDSF personnel to have access to safe, secure, and private facilities, and prohibit the misuse of female facilities by male ANDSF personnel.\textsuperscript{156}

RS gender advisors commented that restrictive “cultural norms” surrounding women’s participation in the workplace (particularly in non-traditional roles such as the security forces), and the tacit acceptance of sexual harassment of women in some areas of the country, mean it will take time to implement the new ANDSF policies. In the meantime, advisors continue to train and advise both Afghan security ministries on the importance of addressing sexual harassment and assault of ANDSF women. They added that “every success along the way, no matter how small, is a step in the right direction.”\textsuperscript{157}

**ANDSF Medical Personnel and Health Care**

Consistent shortages of staff, reassignment to non-medical fields, retention difficulties, and lack of required training are enduring challenges for ANDSF medical professionals. As of July 31, 2019, there were 891 physicians and 2,840 other medical staff (nurses, medics, dental, radiology, laboratory technicians, etc.) serving in the ANDSF. Medical staff vacancies remain an issue for the ANDSF, with 16\% of required doctors (174 positions) and 26\% of other medical staff (972 positions) remaining unfilled. However, the number of medical personnel has increased since January, with 10 more doctors and an additional 371 other medical personnel reported this quarter.\textsuperscript{158}

Additionally, CSTC-A reported medical-supply delivery delays and other complications in its medical logistics arrangements with the NATO Supply Procurement Authority (NSPA). The Afghan government’s inability to supplement NATO’s medical-procurement activities further exacerbates this challenge. CSTC-A said delays in the delivery of medical supplies continue to adversely affect the ANDSF medical system.\textsuperscript{159} The total cost of CSTC-A-procured medical items for the ANDSF from January 1 through July 31, 2019, was $35.6 million, an increase from $29.5 million SIGAR last reported in January 2019. These funds were used to purchase medic bags, first-aid kits, and a variety of basic medications, among other items.\textsuperscript{160}

CSTC-A also reported some improvements over the last several months, particularly in the management of preventive medicine, casualty evacuation, and point-of-injury care. Routine casualty-evacuation times have dropped significantly, from 1–1.5 days to 8–12 hours. ANDSF response-time standards are now meeting Coalition standards. The ANA is revising its national curriculum for point-of-injury care with the help of advisors with the aim of updating its national training manual by the end of 2019. The new training manual is also being designed for seamless integration into the ANP system.\textsuperscript{161}
Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI performance at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about the ministries’ performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex of this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly $47.7 billion and disbursed more than $47.4 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.

ANA Sustainment
As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated $23.7 billion and disbursed $23.4 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 51–52 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for on-budget MOD elements’ sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398.
(December 2018–August 2019) was about $438.7 million. This includes $427 million for ANA sustainment, $3.7 million for AAF sustainment, and $7.9 million for ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) sustainment. The U.S. contribution to the MOD sustainment is almost entirely for salaries and incentive pay ($398 million, of which $147 million is incentive pay).165

Roughly $40.7 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements for the ANA, the costliest of which were office equipment and computers ($6 million), energy-generating equipment ($5.6 million), and domestic travel ($4.4 million).166

CSTC-A said this quarter the total estimated funding required for ANA, AAF, and ANASOC base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is $534.8 million, the same amount reported last quarter.167

ANA Equipment and Transportation
As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $13.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.168

Seen in Table 3.8, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA, AAF, and ANASOC this quarter (June 1 through August 31, 2019) included six UH-60 helicopters ($61.8 million), 205 HMMWVs (two variants) valued at a total of $48.6 million, and seven MD-530 helicopters ($44.1 million).169
DOD said that several hundred HMMWVs provided to the ANDSF this quarter represent “the tail end of a roughly three-year surge of HMMWV buys (totaling about 6,000) that were made to implement the 2016 vehicle strategy.” DOD said about one-fourth of the HMMWVs provided were refurbished U.S. Army vehicles; the rest were new purchases. See Table 3.9 for the total number of HMMWVs provided to the ANDSF in 2019.\textsuperscript{170}

### ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{171} SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

### ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed $6.0 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of September 30, 2019.\textsuperscript{172}

This quarter, CSTC-A continued to report that the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical-generator requirements for FY 2019 will be $110.8 million. According to CSTC-A, of the $110.8 million, $74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A on behalf of the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{173}

As of August 12, 2019, the United States completed 474 ANA, AAF, and ANASOC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan at a total cost of $5.4 billion. CSTC-A reported that four projects were completed this quarter, costing roughly $15 million. Another 31 projects ($234.8 million total cost) were ongoing, three projects were awarded ($49.5 million), and 39 projects ($491.7 million) were being planned.\textsuperscript{174}

The projects above include one ongoing $2.6 million project, a women’s training center at MOD headquarters in Kabul (funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund), and a completed women’s and pediatric health clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital ($8.5 million).\textsuperscript{175}

### Table 3.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>ANA</th>
<th>ANP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>463</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>425</td>
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<td>April</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>1,974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: August numbers are only through August 15, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; ANP = Afghan National Police.

See Table 3.10 on the following page for descriptions and information about the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned infrastructure projects this quarter.

**ANA Training and Operations**

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $4.3 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.\(^{176}\)

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.
As of August 31, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately $7.9 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) from FY 2010 to FY 2019. This amount decreased by $328.4 million compared to what SIGAR reported last quarter due to DOD’s recent decision that fitting and funding the AAF’s future force will require less than originally submitted for DOD’s FY 2019 funding justification to Congress. Nearly $1.7 billion of the $7.9 billion were funds appropriated for FY 2019, a $71.9 million decrease compared to what SIGAR reported last quarter. The AAF appropriation of U.S. funds in FY 2019 (adjusted for DOD’s change to funds authorized) was more than any other ANDSF force element; its allocation was $295.4 million more than the funds for ANA ground forces.

As in previous years, a large portion of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds has been designated for AAF sustainment costs ($842.1 million, or 51%). These funds are primarily used to pay for contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF’s in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, and Mi-17 helicopters; A-29, C-208, and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft; and C-130 transport aircraft. DOD allocated $531.5 million (32%) of the AAF’s FY 2019 funds for equipment and transportation costs.
Nearly $5.5 billion had been obligated for the AAF and SMW from FY 2010 through August 31 of FY 2019. About $1 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018, and $661.8 million has been obligated thus far in FY 2019. A substantial portion of these funds ($2.5 billion) has been obligated for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 46% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft ($1.8 billion) at 31%.

Aircraft Inventory and Status
The AAF’s current in-country inventory, as of October 1, 2019, includes 183 aircraft (158 of which are operational). TAAC-Air reported that the AAF received three A-29 aircraft this quarter that were transferred from Moody Air Force Base, where they were being used for training. Two UH-60s and seven MD-530 were also delivered to Afghanistan this quarter. Several aircraft were deemed unusable this quarter: three Mi-17s (out of service until overhauled) and one C-208 (taken out of service for maintenance training). TAAC-Air said the United States has purchased and is preparing to field five more MD-530s and five UH-60s before the end of 2019. SIGAR asked TAAC-Air about the anticipated end-state for the AAF’s air fleet this quarter, which is also reported in Table 3.1. When asked about the continued decrease in the number of Mi-17s in the AAF’s inventory, TAAC-Air clarified this quarter that the plan is to continue maintaining the AAF’s aging Mi-17 fleet through 2021. As the aircraft need to go into overhaul maintenance, they will be transferred to the SMW and taken off the AAF’s aircraft inventory.

AAF Operations and Readiness
The AAF increased flight hours for four of its six airframes (not yet including the AC-208); it is also noted that readiness decreased for all of its airframes this quarter compared to last quarter. TAAC-Air said this was due to increased advisor security concerns this quarter and RS restricting AAF advising efforts. The consequent reduction in the presence of contractors who provide aircraft maintenance and repair broken aircraft lead to longer aircraft down time. According to TAAC-Air, the AAF’s average monthly flight hours this quarter (July 1 through September 30, 2019) increased by about 19% compared to the last reporting period (April 1 through June 30, 2019). The AAF flew 11,737 hours from July 1 through September 30, 2019, an average of roughly 3,912 hours per month.

This quarter for the first time, the AAF flew more hours on its MD-530 helicopters than any other airframe in its inventory, surpassing the Mi-17. The AAF has a history of overusing its oldest and most familiar aircraft, the Russian-made Mi-17. The MD-530 is one of the aircraft in its inventory intended to help transition away from the Mi-17s. The MD-530 flew an average of 1,049 hours per month, followed by the Mi-17 (953 hours), and the C-208 (760 hours). Of all the AAF’s airframes, only the Mi-17 continued...
Security

A-29
mi-17
uh-60
md-530
C-130
C-208
ac-208

Total

Assigned
Pilots
10
69
46
41
11
23
10
12

Assigned
Other
Aircrew
16
0
24
28
9
39
10
4

Authorized
Pilots
17
74
84
44
14
30
16
16

Authorized
Other
Aircrew
16
0
24
28
9
39
16
4

Note: Only fully mission-qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in the assigned pilots and aircrew categories of this table. Some personnel assigned but unable to fly at this time, mainly due to medical reasons, are also included in the assigned pilots and aircrew figures. “Pilots” now include command pilots, copilots, navigators, and instructor pilots. “Other Aircrew” include loadmasters, aerial gunners, air technology coordinators, equipment technicians, and others, and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. One C-208 in the total is listed because it is used for maintenance training purposes, but it is not tasked for operations.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to DOD OIG data call, 10/5/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air provided data, 10/2019.

Mission-capable (MC) rates: Mission-capable rates reflect the readiness of each airframe. MC rates are calculated by taking the number of fully mission capable (available for tasking) aircraft divided by the total aircraft for that airframe (both fully mission capable and non-mission capable).

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.

AAF Manning

TAAC-Air continued to provide information on the number of fully mission-qualified aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, as shown in Table 3.11. As of October 1, 2019, the AAF had 212 pilots, instructor pilots, and copilots, 76% of its authorized strength of 279. TAAC-Air also

to exceed its recommended flight hours this quarter. The Mi-17’s average of 953 hours per month far surpassed its recommended flying time of 575 hours per month.\textsuperscript{187} As in the past, the AAF’s flight-hours data include all hours flown by all aircraft, whether for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.\textsuperscript{188}

All of the AAF’s airframes saw decreases in their readiness since last quarter, which TAAC-Air tracks using mission-capable (MC) rates. Three of six airframes failed to meet their MC benchmarks this quarter (the MD-530, C-208, and A-29), two more than last quarter. This is the third consecutive quarter the MD-530 has failed to meet its readiness benchmark: the airframe has a 75% MC benchmark and its average MC rate this quarter fell to 61.3%. The C-208 had an average MC rate of 71.4% against a 75% benchmark, and the A-29 a 69% average against a 75% benchmark. The other three airframes (Mi-17, C-130, and UH-60) exceeded their MC benchmarks.\textsuperscript{189}

As of September 2019, the AAF continues to rely heavily on contractor-provided maintenance to maintain six of its seven air platforms (C-130, AC-208, C-208, A-29, MD-530, and UH-60), the same as last quarter. By contrast, the AAF is able to perform most of the routine maintenance required for its Mi-17s (85%, with contractors completing the rest).\textsuperscript{190}
SECURITY

reported that it currently has 120 “other aircrew,” including loadmasters, aerial gunners, and other personnel, 100% of its authorized strength for other aircrew.191

The Special Mission Wing – Some Data Classified
This quarter, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) continued to provide a general update on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). NSOCC-A also continued to classify detailed performance and other data on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR’s questions about the SMW can be found in Appendix E of this report; information about the SMW is reported in the classified annex for this report.

SMW Funding
The United States has obligated a total of roughly $2.4 billion for the SMW from FY 2012 through FY 2019 (through August 31, 2019) from the ASFF and the DOD-Counternarcotics Fund (DOD-CN). The total obligated funds ($2.4 billion) includes $182.1 million spent on the SMW in FY 2018 and $69.5 million thus far in FY 2019. Last quarter, SIGAR reported that U.S. spending on the SMW was somewhat higher ($2.5 billion) and was on track to increase substantially in FY 2019; however this was due to an error in NSOCC-A’s reporting on SMW funding. NSOCC-A now expects expenditures in FY 2019 to be similar to FY 2018.192 A substantial portion of the funding obligated since FY 2012 was for SMW sustainment ($1.2 billion), which accounts for 49.4% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft ($991.1 million) at 41.4%.193

SMW Operations
The SMW is an AAF component whose mission is to support the ASSF with counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. About 90% of SMW operations are focused on counterterrorism (the same as last quarter), with only one operation this quarter in support of a “counternexus” (counterterrorism and counternarcotics) mission, none solely supporting counternarcotics missions, and about 9% of operations characterized as “general support” or “misuse.”194

In recent quarters, NSOCC-A said the SMW continues to be tasked by the ANA and ANP to support conventional ground forces, a possible misuse of the special-purpose force. Non-core-mission tasking had declined, but NSOCC-A reported this quarter that as a result of political pressure ahead of the September 28 presidential election, the formal tasking process had been frequently circumvented by high-level MOD officials. NSOCC-A said the amount of SMW misuse and general-support missions have directly undermined its ability to conduct counternarcotics missions. Because SMW conducts decisive support operations that require precision, increased skill, and unique capabilities not found in the regular Afghan Air Force
(AAF), demand for SMW support remains high across the ANDSF. The SMW receives many mission taskings that are better tailored for the AAF, but fall to the Special Mission Wing due to Afghan leadership’s confidence in the unit.195

NSOCC-A said this quarter that assessing financial penalties against MOD for SMW misuse has had a limited effect in discouraging inappropriate SMW missions. Therefore, NSOCC-A’s leadership continues to advise MOD on appropriate use of the SMW.196

Despite the recent resurgence of SMW misuse, the SMW continues to successfully support ASSF and develop a number of capabilities. For example, during a July 1 high-profile attack in Kabul, SMW aircraft unilaterally utilized their fast-rope insertion and exfiltration system to deploy police commandos onto a rooftop near the attack location. Additionally, the SMW has been conducting more medical evacuations using their Mi-17 aircraft. The SMW medical section has trained with Critical Response Unit (CRU) 222 medics to initiate a collaborative medical evacuation process. Medical trauma treatment begins on the ground with CRU 222 medics, then is handed off to SMW flight medics, who continue treatment aboard the aircraft. SMW flight medics have also been teaching other SMW personnel first aid to improve casualty treatment.197

**AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE**

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly $21.7 billion and disbursed more than $21.4 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and some ASSF. These force elements comprised the ANP budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation.198

**ANP Sustainment**

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated approximately $9.7 billion and disbursed approximately $9.5 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF sustainment.199 For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 52–53 of this report.

Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) are paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).200 This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget MOI elements’ sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398 (December 2018–August 31, 2019) was $135.8 million. The vast majority of these funds was the $102.7 million U.S. contribution for ANP sustainment ($99.5 million for ANP goods and services, $2.2 million for

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**Sustainment:** Sustainment is defined in Joint Publication 3-0 as “The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.” ASFF funds several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay; food; the Afghan Personnel and Pay System; “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CoreIMS inventory management system, and transportation services; “combat sustainment,” including organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts; and “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

salaries and incentives, and about $1 million for assets such as facilities). Most of the other $33 million was for Afghan Local Police (ALP) and GCPSU salaries.\textsuperscript{201}

The total amount reported for MOI elements' sustainment this quarter represents a $70.3 million increase compared to the same period in 2018. A large portion of this increase is $38.6 million of "contract carryover," which CSTC-A says are contracts that were awarded during FY 1397 for which CSTC-A had not yet reimbursed MOI. These contracts are for a range of requirements such as operations and maintenance of equipment and buildings, drilling wells, security improvements, and other minor projects.\textsuperscript{202}

The $102.5 million spent on goods and services sustainment for MOI elements thus far in FY 1398 reflects an increase of about $86 million compared to roughly the same period in Afghan FY 1397 (through August 17, 2018). CSTC-A increased the funds it provided to the ANP to spend on goods and services sustainment this year because they said the ANP improved the execution of its procurement process due to targeted CSTC-A advising efforts. The ANP has improved their ability to award on-budget contracts and process payments to vendors in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{203} The costliest goods and services contributing to this increase are contract carryovers from the previous fiscal year ($38.6 million), domestic fuel ($14.5 million), and the Delegated Authority Fund ($14.4 million).\textsuperscript{204} CSTC-A said the Delegated Authority Fund is a small allotment of funding made available the ANP for emergency or emerging requirements without going through the longer approval process.\textsuperscript{205}

CSTC-A said this quarter that the total estimated funding required for MOI elements' base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is $56.3 million (which includes ALP salaries only), the same as last quarter.\textsuperscript{206} For more information about what these costs generally include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see page 53 of this report.

### ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $4.8 billion and disbursed approximately $4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP equipment and transportation costs.\textsuperscript{207}

Seen in Table 3.12, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (June 1 through August 31, 2019) included 350 HMMWVs (two variants) valued at a total of about $83 million, radio systems ($3.5 million), and about 64,000 grenades ($2.2 million).\textsuperscript{208}

### ANP Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter USFOR-A continued to classify the data concerning the ANP’s equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{209} The
The ANP’s Non-NATO-Standard Weapons

Over the last few quarters, CSTC-A reported it was providing the ANP with some non-NATO weapons and ammunition. There have been reports of complications due to the ANP having a mix of NATO and non-NATO-standard weapons, including problems with the lack of interchangeability of weapons and ammunition during joint ANA-ANP operations.

This quarter, CSTC-A said the ANP still possesses a large stock of non-NATO weapons. While CSTC-A had initially planned to gradually transition the ANP to NATO-standard weapons, the MOI and ANP expressed reservations and preferred to retain their current weapon systems. According to CSTC-A, a transition to NATO weapons would take until FY 2022 and would “incur an initial capital expense” of about $95 million to purchase 78,000 M4 rifles.

CTSC-A reported the following advantages for transitioning to NATO weapons:

- fewer types of ammunition to manage or procure
- weapons interchangeability with ANA
- fewer repair parts for weapons in the supply system
- ability to purchase all repair parts through NATO-approved vendors

CSTC-A continues to advise MOI to transition to NATO standard weapon sets, but said the decision ultimately rests with the Afghan government.

in the table, the highest-cost projects are being funded by international donors to the NATO ANA Trust Fund.\textsuperscript{213}

### ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated $4.1 billion and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF training and operations.\textsuperscript{214}

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await completion of GAO’s forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

### Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP’s personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, DOD funds the ALP, including its personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP’s personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, its personnel are not counted toward the ANDSF’s authorized end strength.\textsuperscript{215} NSOCC-A reported the estimated amount of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2019 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel) is about $60 million.\textsuperscript{216}
NSOCC-A reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP had roughly 28,000 guardians on hand as of July 17, 2019, roughly 23,500 of whom were fully trained, the same as last quarter. The ALP continues its efforts to enroll personnel into APPS and to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer process. According to NSOCC-A, as of August 4, 2019, about 74% of ALP personnel reported to be on-hand have been slotted into APPS, with 67% meeting the minimum data-entry requirements in APPS to be paid. Both figures reflect slight improvements from last quarter.

SIGAR inquired this quarter about ALP attrition trends. NSOCC-A continued to note that it is unable to maintain consistent situational awareness of ALP operations outside of the capital region, making it difficult to determine ALP attrition for reasons other than casualties. The ALP Staff Directorate reported to NSOCC-A that from October 1, 2018, through July 16, 2019, approximately 21 ALP personnel were killed in action per week on average.

**REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

According to the United Nations, Afghanistan is riddled with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs. Although contamination originates from legacy mines laid before 2001, the cause of most casualties today are mines and other ERW dating from after the arrival of international forces.

In recent years, increased casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces. From a low of 36 per month in 2012, casualties from mines and ERW increased to 191 per month in 2017. The National Disability Survey of Afghanistan, conducted in 2005, estimated at least 2.7% of the population were severely disabled, including 60,000 landmine and ERW survivors. The UN assumes the number is appreciably higher today.

The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided $391.1 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort). As of June 30, 2019, PM/WRA has obligated $11.1 million in FY 2018 funds.

The Afghan government was granted an extension in 2012 until 2023 to fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status. Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the country will not reach this objective in time. According to State, the drawdown of Coalition forces in 2014 was concurrent with a drawdown of international donor funds to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan.
From a 2010 peak of $113 million, MAPA’s budget decreased to $51 million in 2018. The Afghan government will request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations.226

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and by conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).227 From 1997 through June 30, 2019, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 271.5 million square meters of land (104 square miles, or 1.7 times the land area of the District of Columbia) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.14 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.228

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. At the beginning of the calendar year, there were 619.3 square kilometers (239.1 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of June 30, the total known contaminated area was 662.7 square kilometers (255.9 square miles) in 3,847 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.229

### TABLE 3.14

DEMINING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Fragments Cleared</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,337,557</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>663,162</td>
<td>1,602,267</td>
<td>4,339,235</td>
<td>650,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>21,966,347</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>22,912,702</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,697</td>
<td>10,148,883</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>9,415,712</td>
<td>511,600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12,101,386</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>33,078</td>
<td>88,798</td>
<td>4,062,478</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27,856,346</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>6,289</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>607,600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31,897,313</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>88,261</td>
<td>547,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25,233,844</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>30,924</td>
<td>158,850</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>558,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019b</td>
<td>9,476,017</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>25,147</td>
<td>161,218</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>662,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>271,461,480</td>
<td>77,540</td>
<td>1,975,979</td>
<td>6,265,623</td>
<td>83,620,528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance, UXO = unexploded ordnance, SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.

Fragments are reported because clearing them requires the same care as other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Partial fiscal year results (10/1/2018–6/30/2019).

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018. It supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:

- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances, suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance includes referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury. During the second fiscal quarter, COMAC launched its online incident case-management system through which assistance packages are distributed. The incident-management system includes biometric registration capabilities to identify beneficiaries. Between April and June 2019, COMAC distributed over 1,700 assistance packages to eligible families.