

# SECURITY CONTENTS

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## SECURITY

### KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

Enemy-initiated attacks from October–December 2019 were at the highest level for the fourth quarter of any year since data collection began in 2010.

Afghan special forces conducted fewer ground operations in the fourth quarter, lower than any other quarter in 2019, and only 31% of their operations were conducted without U.S. or Coalition assistance.

DOD reports that ANDSF casualties during May–October 2019 slightly increased compared to the same period in 2018.

Despite heightened enemy attacks, the number of civilian casualties this quarter decreased by 20% compared to the same period in 2018.

The Afghan war is still in “a state of strategic stalemate” that can be solved only through a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper said this quarter.<sup>91</sup> After a cessation of direct peace talks in September, President Donald J. Trump announced that he restarted the dialogue between the United States and the Taliban in late November.<sup>92</sup>

A January 22 White House statement said that President Trump’s goal is for the Taliban to demonstrate “a significant and lasting reduction in violence . . . that would facilitate meaningful negotiations on Afghanistan’s future.”<sup>93</sup> However, the Afghan government appeared to reject the concept of a reduction in violence, saying it does not have an accurate meaning in legal and military terms, and is not practical. Afghan officials are currently demanding a cease-fire, like the one that took place in June 2018, before beginning peace negotiations with the Taliban.<sup>94</sup> As this report went to press, no cease-fire or agreement about a reduction in violence had been announced.<sup>95</sup> Meanwhile, Taliban attacks continued at a high tempo. According to data provided by the NATO Resolute Support (RS) mission, enemy-initiated attacks during the fourth quarter of 2019 were at

“If the Taliban do not agree to a cease-fire, which is the demand of the Afghan people, we cannot put an end to war in Afghanistan.”

—*Sediq Sediqqi, spokesperson for President Ashraf Ghani*

Source: Voice of America, “Afghan Government Demands Full Cease-Fire, Taliban Commit to Reduction in Violence,” 1/22/2020.

FIGURE 3.30



Note: Fatalities are estimates and only include the number of the opposing party (or civilians when indicated) killed.

Source: ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 10/19/2019–1/11/2020, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com/>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 1/2020; New York Times, “At Least 23 Soldiers Killed in Insider Attack in Afghanistan,” 12/14/2019.

“We are committed to peace talks, but we as Afghanistan’s armed forces will not allow any deal to sacrifice our two-decade achievements.”

—*Asadullah Khalid,*  
Acting Afghan Minister of Defense

Source: ToloNews, “Khalid: We Want Peace, Not Compromise,” 1/13/2019.

the highest level for a fourth quarter of any year since recording began in 2010.<sup>96</sup> Conversely, the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), the primary offensive force against the insurgency, conducted fewer ground operations this quarter than during the rest of 2019.<sup>97</sup>

Enemy attacks included a Taliban car bomb at the U.S. military base at Bagram on December 11 that killed two civilians and injured more than 73 people. The Taliban also claimed an attack in Kunduz Province on December 23 that killed a U.S. Special Forces soldier, the 23rd American death in Afghanistan in 2019. More American servicemembers died in Afghanistan in 2019 than in any year since the beginning of the RS mission in January 2015.<sup>98</sup> Two more U.S. soldiers were killed January 11 by a roadside bomb in Kandahar Province.<sup>99</sup> Figure 3.30 lists other major security incidents this quarter.

The Taliban continued to seek the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, a process National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said could begin “with a deal or without a deal” with the insurgents. While President Trump has not yet ordered a force reduction, Secretary Esper said the United States could reduce troop levels to as low as 8,600 and still be able to execute its unilateral counterterrorism mission and its role in the multi-national RS mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).<sup>100</sup>

The U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported that ANDSF strength numbers increased after more than a year of consistent decreases, as Coalition and Afghan counterparts worked to more accurately determine the actual size of the force. As of October 31, 2019, there were 272,807 ANDSF personnel biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). This is an increase of 7% (18,957 personnel) since last quarter, which CSTC-A attributed to continued enrollment and personnel cleansing actions in APPS. CSTC-A said fluctuations will continue “until the backlog of personnel actions level off and APPS reaches 100% enrollment of the ANDSF.”<sup>101</sup> CSTC-A provided the caveat that “As a result of ongoing efforts to add, verify, correct, and cleanse ANDSF personnel data in APPS, quarter-to-quarter changes in ANDSF assigned strength do not solely reflect changes to the number of personnel actually serving in the ANDSF.”<sup>102</sup>

## ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

USFOR-A continued to classify or otherwise restrict from public release the following types of data, due to Afghan government classification guidelines or other restrictions (mostly since October 2017):<sup>103</sup>

- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- unit-level Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) authorized and assigned strength
- ANDSF performance assessments

- some Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- information about the misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI)

The classified annex for this report includes the information USFOR-A classified or restricted from public release.

## U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security


As of December 31, 2019, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$86.4 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 63% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly \$3.9 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2019, nearly \$2.3 billion had been obligated and nearly \$2 billion disbursed, as of December 31, 2019. As of December 20, 2019, Congress appropriated roughly \$4.2 billion for the ASFF for FY 2020. Seen in Figure 3.31, ASFF appropriations have fluctuated between \$3.5 billion and \$4.7 billion since the beginning of the RS mission.<sup>104</sup>

Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. A significant portion of ASFF money is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI, but is not included in the authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan fund the ALP. The rest of ASFF is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 on pages 50–51.<sup>105</sup>

ASFF monies are obligated by either CSTC-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds that CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget) are provided directly to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers those funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.<sup>106</sup> In contrast to the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme's multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). The United States had been, but is no longer, the largest contributor to LOTFA.<sup>107</sup> A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) expenditures of ASFF and conditions associated with U.S. financial assistance to the ANDSF is found on pages 105–108.

FIGURE 3.31

**ASFF APPROPRIATIONS FY 2015–FY 2020**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



Source: See Appendix B.

### The ASFF FY 2019 budget reduction had three major components:

- The ANA, AAF, and ASSF Personnel budgets (salaries, incentives, etc.) were reduced by \$241.68 million.
- AAF Aircraft Contracted Support (aircraft maintenance) was reduced by \$202.52 million.
- AAF UH-60 helicopter procurement was eliminated through a \$396.00 million rescission.



## Security-Incident Data

Every quarter, SIGAR tracks and analyzes security-incident data to provide insight into the security situation in Afghanistan and activity between the parties to the conflict. The data show trends including where security-related activity is concentrated in the country and its levels over certain periods of time.

RS-reported enemy-initiated attack data is the only remaining unclassified data from an official source used to track security trends in Afghanistan. It is unclassified only at the provincial level and does not include U.S. and Coalition-initiated attacks on the enemy.


**Enemy-initiated attacks:** are “all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, IED, and mine explosions, etc.) initiated by insurgents that the ANDSF and RS consider to be [significant activities] (SIGACTs).”

**Effective enemy-initiated attacks:** are enemy-initiated attacks that result in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties.

Source: CSTC-A: response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2019.

FIGURE 3.32

## FOURTH-QUARTER ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS SINCE 2010



Note: EIA = Enemy-Initiated Attacks, EEIA = Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call 1/7/2020; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2020.

## Enemy Attacks in Late 2019 Reach Record-High Levels


Enemy attacks in Afghanistan increased considerably in late 2019, according to data from RS. September 2019, the month of the Afghan presidential election, saw the highest number of **enemy-initiated attacks** in any month since June 2012 and the highest number of **effective enemy-initiated attacks** since recording began in January 2010. This level of violence continued after the presidential election. October 2019 had the second highest number of enemy-initiated attacks in any month since July 2013.<sup>108</sup> Figure 3.32 shows that both overall enemy-initiated attacks and effective enemy-initiated attacks during the fourth quarter of 2019 exceeded same-period levels in every year since recording began in 2010. However, the figure also shows that while the number of overall and effective attacks increased this quarter, the proportion of overall attacks that were effective was similar to the same period in 2018.<sup>109</sup>

When looking at 2019 as a whole, enemy attacks appeared to decline early in the year while peace talks were ongoing. But a turbulent last six months resulted in increases in overall enemy attacks (6%) and effective attacks (4%) in 2019 compared to the already high levels reported in 2018.<sup>110</sup>

The geographic distribution of enemy activity remained largely consistent from 2018 to 2019. Figure 3.33 shows that in 2019 heavy fighting continued in southern and western Afghanistan. However, enemy activity increased and spread into larger areas of the north and east.<sup>111</sup>

FIGURE 3.33

## ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS IN 2019 VERSUS 2018



Note: The total number of enemy-initiated attacks in 2019 was 29,083; the total for 2018 was 27,417.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2020; SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2020.

### Islamic State Fighters Successfully Driven from Nangarhar Stronghold

SIGAR asked USFOR-A about news reports that hundreds of fighters from Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, surrendered to the ANDSF and Coalition forces in November 2019. USFOR-A confirmed about 300 IS-K fighters and 1,000 of their family members surrendered this quarter.


USFOR-A said due to sustained pressure from U.S. air strikes, ANDSF operations across Nangarhar Province, and continued fighting between IS-K and Taliban forces, IS-K's stronghold in Nangarhar has been "dismantled." The fighters and family members who did not surrender have fled toward Kunar Province or Pakistan, attempting to consolidate and reinforce positions in more advantageous terrain.

USFOR-A's latest assessment is that there are between 2,000 and 2,500 IS-K fighters active in Afghanistan, a decrease from the 2,000-5,000 reported in September 2019.

Source: Stars and Stripes, "Islamic State's 'Backbone was Broken' in Afghanistan as Hundreds Surrender," 11/19/2019; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2020; DOD OIG, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Lead Inspector General's Report to the United States Congress, 11/15/2019, pp. 18-19; USFOR-A, correspondence with SIGAR, 1/25/2020.

FIGURE 3.34

## RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY QUARTER



Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call 1/7/2020; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2020.

### RS Collection Methodology

According to DOD, the RS Civilian Casualty Management Team relies primarily upon operational reporting from RS's Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data. DOD says that RS's civilian-casualty data collection differs from UNAMA's in that RS "has access to a wider range of forensic data than such civilian organizations, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery ... and other sources."

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2017, p. 27 and 6/2019, p. 27.

## Civilian Casualties Decline in Late 2019


RS reported a 20% decrease in the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan this quarter (October 1–December 31, 2019) compared to the same period in 2018, despite increased levels of enemy-initiated violence over the same period. Seen in Figure 3.34, after spiking last quarter, the total number of civilian casualties in 2019 (9,189) was about the same as in 2018 (9,214).<sup>112</sup> However, Figure 3.35 shows that civilian casualties rose in most provinces (19 of 34) in 2019 compared to 2018, and the provinces where they occurred shifted. In both years, Kabul and Nangarhar Provinces continued to experience the highest number of civilian casualties.<sup>113</sup>

RS attributed 91% of this quarter's civilian casualties to antigovernment forces, including the Taliban (29%), IS-K (11%), Haqqani Network (4%), and unknown insurgents (47%). Another 4% were attributed to progovernment forces (3% to ANDSF and 1% to Coalition forces), and 5% to other or unknown forces. These percentages were similar to the RS attributions for casualties earlier in 2019. The main causes of civilian casualties continued to be improvised-explosive devices (43%), followed by direct fire (25%), and indirect fire (5%), as was also the case earlier in the year.<sup>114</sup>

SIGAR typically analyzes Afghan civilian-casualty data from RS and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), but UNAMA did not issue a report within this reporting period. For the latest available UNAMA data and analysis (as of September 30, 2019), see pages 73–74 of SIGAR's October 2019 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

FIGURE 3.35

## RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN 2019 VERSUS 2018



Note: Casualties include deaths and injuries. There were 9,189 civilian casualties in 2019 and 9,214 in 2018.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2020; SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2020.

### Human Rights Abuses Alleged Against U.S.-Backed Afghan Paramilitary Units

This quarter, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a special report alleging 14 cases of “laws-of-war violations” against Afghan civilians by U.S.-backed Afghan special paramilitary units from late-2017 to mid-2019. HRW said these violations included “extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances, indiscriminate airstrikes, [and] attacks on medical facilities.”

According to HRW, Afghan paramilitary forces operate with relative impunity in the country: they nominally belong to the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan’s primary intelligence agency. However, these forces do not fall under any ordinary chain of command under the NDS or the Afghan or U.S. military. HRW says the units are largely recruited, trained, equipped, and overseen by the CIA, and often U.S. Special Forces personnel (seconded to the CIA) are deployed alongside them during kill-or-capture operations.

After 2017, in a departure from previous policy, the Afghan paramilitary units were authorized to call in air strikes without U.S. forces present to identify the targets, resulting in increased destruction to residential

buildings, HRW said. A decreased U.S. ground presence and a reliance on local Afghan intelligence sources meant there was less information available about the possible presence of civilians during the strikes. The cases that HRW investigated involved Afghan paramilitary forces seemingly targeting civilians because of mistaken identity, poor intelligence, or political rivalries.

HRW made recommendations to both the Afghan and U.S. governments to address this issue. The primary recommendation for the Afghan government was to “immediately disband and disarm all pro-government armed groups . . . including [NDS] strike force units, the Khost Protection Force, and other counterinsurgency forces that are not under the [ANDSF] chain of command.” HRW recommended that the U.S. government “clarify command responsibility for operations” by Afghan paramilitary forces, and “in all circumstances, comply with international humanitarian law standards to protect civilians from the dangers arising from military operations.”

Source: Human Rights Watch, “‘They’ve Shot Many Like This’ Abusive Night Raids by CIA-Backed Afghan Strike Forces,” 10/31/2019.

“A small number [of U.S. troops ] is required [in Afghanistan] in order to deal with the threat of terrorism and to support us because it’s an advise, assist, and training mission—not a fighting mission.”

—President Ashraf Ghani

Source: Washington Post, “Afghanistan’s President on Holding ‘the Most Difficult Job on Earth,’” 1/23/2020.

## UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

### U.S. Force Level Slowly Declines

According to DOD, as of December 7, 2019, there are between 12,000 and 13,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, a decrease from the 14,000 personnel reported in-country earlier this year. Over the last year, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Commander General Austin Scott Miller said he began adjusting the number of personnel in Afghanistan as part an effort to “optimize” the size of the force based on their objectives and capabilities, and risks to the force and to the mission.<sup>115</sup>

Secretary of Defense Esper said on December 16 that the United States could reduce its troop level to as low as 8,600 personnel “with or without” a peace settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban because General Miller believes it would be an adequate force to undertake both the unilateral counterterrorism mission and the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF.<sup>116</sup> Of the total U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan, 8,475 were assigned to the RS mission, as of November 2019, while the rest were serving in support roles, training the Afghan special forces, or conducting air and counterterror operations.<sup>117</sup>

### U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks Increase

This quarter (October 17, 2019–January 17, 2020), there were five American military deaths in Afghanistan (two hostile and three non-hostile deaths), and 73 servicemembers were injured. American military casualties in 2019 (23 deaths and 192 injuries) were the highest they have been since the RS mission began in January 2015.<sup>118</sup> The hostile deaths this quarter were two American soldiers killed January 11 by a roadside bomb in Kandahar Province.<sup>119</sup> These casualties bring the total number of military deaths since October 2001 to 2,433 (1,907 hostile and 526 non-hostile), and injuries to 20,711.<sup>120</sup>

According to RS, there were four insider attacks, in which ANDSF personnel attack U.S. and Coalition personnel, this reporting period (September 1–December 31, 2019). One of the attacks resulted in four injuries. These insider attacks bring the total for 2019 to seven that have resulted in eight casualties. This represents more attacks, but fewer casualties, than in 2018 and 2017.<sup>121</sup>


## AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

### Reported ANDSF Force Strength Increased This Quarter

Reported ANDSF personnel strength increased by 7% since last quarter, after over a year of consistent decreases as Coalition and Afghan

FIGURE 3.36

## REPORTED ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FROM APPS



Note: This quarter's data is as of October 31, 2019. The "as of" date of the data is between the 25th and 31st of the indicated month. APPS = Afghan Personnel and Pay System; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. No civilians are included in the strength numbers.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019 and 9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2020.

counterparts worked to more accurately determine the actual size of the force. As of October 31, 2019, CSTC-A reported 272,807 ANDSF personnel (176,019 MOD and 96,788 MOD) biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in APPS, the new Afghan personnel and payroll management system. This does not include civilians or roughly 19,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). Figure 3.36 shows this is an increase of 18,957 personnel since last quarter's APPS-reported strength (July 2019), mainly driven by 13,604 more personnel reported in the MOD elements (Afghan National Army, Afghan Air Force, and MOD special forces).<sup>122</sup>

According to CSTC-A, this quarter's strength numbers increased due to ongoing enrollment and personnel cleansing actions in APPS. CSTC-A said fluctuations will continue "until the backlog of personnel actions level off and APPS reaches 100% enrollment of the ANDSF."<sup>123</sup> CSTC-A provided the caveat that "As a result of ongoing efforts to add, verify, correct, and cleanse ANDSF personnel data in APPS, quarter-to-quarter changes in ANDSF assigned strength do not solely reflect changes to the number of personnel actually serving in the ANDSF."<sup>124</sup> CSTC-A continues to say "the number of personnel reported in APPS is the most accurate it has ever been."<sup>125</sup>



## SIGAR Visits CSTC-A to Discuss Impact of Reported ANDSF Strength Changes

A team from SIGAR's Research and Analysis Directorate (RAD) traveled to Kabul from December 1 to 12, 2019, to learn more about the funding and operational implications of the fact that under the new Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS), the ANDSF is reporting considerably fewer personnel than were reported using the previous manual reporting system, and even fewer personnel compared to the forces' 352,000 authorized strength.

In meetings, CSTC-A said basing salary and incentive payments on the lower APPS-reported strength numbers will result in \$79 million in future cost avoidance due to the removal of about 50,000 inactive personnel records in APPS that the ANDSF previously reported as active. CSTC-A believes it is "impossible to predict" cost savings as a result of APPS implementation. As the ANDSF's use of APPS improves, force numbers continue to fluctuate in the system due to gains and losses. However, they said as the data levels out, historical data will be more reliable for planning and comparison purposes. CSTC-A did acknowledge that inflated personnel numbers in the past may have led to waste, but argued that the total impact through the years would be difficult to quantify.

SIGAR also asked CSTC-A whether the lower APPS-reported personnel strength had allowed DOD to avoid costs for ANDSF equipment. CSTC-A said APPS would not lead to large savings on equipment and materiel because purchases of equipment, systems, and supplies for the ANDSF are based off of equipment authorizations rather than assigned end-strength numbers.

CSTC-A explained that APPS has been a contributing factor in helping to determine whether certain ANDSF leaders and personnel are "reliable partners" based on who implements and uses the system to deter fraud and improve accountability. CSTC-A said verifying personnel numbers in APPS as the system matures will be a "vital tool for force planning, recruitment, and retirement and promotion planning" and can help inform operational planning.

SIGAR will continue to work with CSTC-A to understand how these issues have affected and will affect the expenditure of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

Source: SIGAR, record of meetings with CSTC-A, 12/9/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2020.



**Members of SIGAR's** Research and Analysis Directorate during their December 2019 trip to Kabul.

According to DOD, "APPS is a major shift in the ministries' traditional way of managing pay and personnel, and challenges are expected. APPS will take time to mature, but the current assigned-strength reporting from APPS represents another step towards improved accountability of personnel and is a reflection of continued efforts by the MOD and MOI to implement APPS."<sup>126</sup> More information about APPS and this quarter's data-cleansing efforts is available in the following section.

The ANDSF's total authorized strength continues to be roughly 352,000. The MOI's authorized force level includes an additional 30,000 ALP, which is funded only by the United States and the Afghan government. This quarter's ANDSF assigned strength stands at 77.5% (roughly 79,000 personnel short) of its authorized strength.<sup>127</sup>

## ANDSF Force Strength Lower Year-on-Year


Seen in Figure 3.37, ANDSF personnel strength numbers sourced from APPS remain lower than the Afghan self-reported strength data provided previously. This is significant because assigned-strength numbers help inform CSTC-A's decision-making on how much money to provide for ANDSF salary and incentive payments, as well as for certain equipment.<sup>128</sup>

This quarter's reported strength in APPS is 12% lower (roughly 36,000 personnel) than the Afghan self-reported strength provided during the same period in 2018.<sup>129</sup> Despite this decrease, pages 80 and 87 explain that the funds CSTC-A provided for MOD and MOI salary and incentive payments



FIGURE 3.37

## COMPARING ANDSF SELF-REPORTED AND APPS-REPORTED STRENGTH



Note: This quarter's data is as of October 31, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. No civilians are included in strength numbers. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdees, and student personnel. ANP strength numbers do not include "standby" personnel, generally reservists, or personnel not in service while completing training. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from MOI to MOD in early 2018, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF. The change in strength numbers from 2018 to 2019 is due to the transition of strength reporting from ANDSF-reported figures to reporting from the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact: CSTC-A and SIGAR have long noted many data-consistency issues with ANDSF strength numbers.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2016, 1/30/2017, 1/30/2018, 1/30/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2020.

thus far in Afghan fiscal year 1398 (December 22, 2018, to November 1, 2019) stayed about the same compared to roughly the same period in the previous Afghan fiscal year.<sup>130</sup>

## MOI and MOD Make Some Progress Accounting for Personnel

MOI, MOD, and CSTC-A continue to undertake three efforts to improve the accuracy of ANDSF personnel data in APPS: (1) "slotting" or matching ANDSF personnel to authorized positions in the system, (2) "data cleansing" or correcting and completing key personnel data, and (3) physically accounting for personnel through site visits called personnel asset inventories (PAI) and personnel asset audits (PAA).<sup>131</sup>

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the MOI made some progress in correcting and cleansing existing, and inputting new personnel records at its APPS *shura*, or conference. The primary purposes of the *shura* were to: (1) make sure active personnel did not drop off the rolls due to not being slotted into positions in the system based on the new force-authorization document

(*tashkil*), and (2) establish validated MOI APPS-data baselines for strength that can assist future force planning.<sup>132</sup> The shura began on July 27, and as of November 23, CSTC-A reported that MOI had processed 6,518 retirements; removed 138 records of personnel confirmed as killed-in-action, and completed 6,379 promotion processes. These are only preliminary results. The MOI was given an extension to complete its shura by December 15, which it did, but there are still personnel actions pending.<sup>133</sup> As a point of comparison, MOD's shura this summer resulted in a net decrease of over 18,000 reported personnel, due mainly to the removal of personnel from APPS who were no longer active due to attrition, whether killed in action (KIA), absent without leave (AWOL), dropped from rolls (DFR), or separation status or because they could not be confirmed to exist.<sup>134</sup> CSTC-A also reported that no efforts to physically account for personnel at duty locations (PAIs or PAAs) could be conducted this quarter.<sup>135</sup>

For the second quarter, MOD generated its payroll data using APPS. CSTC-A said that on September 22, the Minister of Defense issued guidance ordering the ANA to conduct all administrative functions using the system. CSTC-A reported that MOD has greatly improved its utilization of APPS and its understanding of how to integrate APPS into its payroll process. Enough MOD personnel are now enrolled in APPS that MOD can shift priorities from personnel enrollment to using APPS to process payroll. However, as with any automated system or new process, CSTC-A says challenges remain, such as the ability to process payroll in every ANA corps in a timely manner, but CSTC-A continues to train and advise on these processes.<sup>136</sup> At this time, the MOI still does not use APPS for payroll (it still uses the UN-managed Web-Enabled Pay System), but CSTC-A continues to work with MOI and the UN to transition the MOI to using APPS for this purpose.<sup>137</sup>

## ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most ANDSF attrition information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it.<sup>138</sup> SIGAR's questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANDSF force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A provided some information about MOD and MOI's efforts to combat ANDSF attrition. CSTC-A said MOD's recruiting objectives are focused on aggressively reducing attrition numbers and meeting force-authorization requirements. The ANA Chief of General Staff provided guidance to all ANA commanders to reduce attrition DFR by 45–50%, and increase by 75% the recontracting of those separated from service. Reducing attrition and increasing recontracting will decrease the strain on recruiting and maintain combat readiness. It will also allow recruitment efforts to focus on enlisting better-qualified candidates into the ANA. The

ANA's recruiting command also increased efforts to reinforce the drug-testing requirement during in-processing of new recruits, which more efficiently filtered out drug users.<sup>139</sup>

The MOI's recruiting objectives are focused on entry-level patrolmen and entry-level officers graduating from the Afghan National Police Academy. Other ANP vacancies are being filled by appointments. Recruiting efforts are primarily driven by force authorization requirements. As in any organization, one of the key challenges facing ANP recruiting is the ability to project attrition due to, for example, casualties and AWOL. As attrition trends are developed using new data in APPS, the ANP and ANDSF as a whole will be able to better project both losses. CSTC-A said this will allow them to adjust recruiting objectives as needed to ensure the force is more effective, affordable, and sustainable.<sup>140</sup>

### **ANDSF Casualties**

USFOR-A classified most ANDSF casualty information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it.<sup>141</sup> SIGAR's questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of ANDSF casualties is provided in the classified annex of this report.

DOD provided a general assessment of ANDSF casualties, saying that the number of ANDSF casualties increased slightly from May through October 2019 compared to the same period in 2018. The number of ANDSF casualties while conducting local patrols, checkpoint operations, and offensive operations did not change significantly during this period in 2019 compared to the same period in 2018. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to result from direct-fire attacks at checkpoints, and RS has long cited checkpoint reduction as one its top priorities for the ANDSF. IED attacks and mine strikes constitute a relatively small portion of casualties.<sup>142</sup>

### **ANDSF Insider Attacks Increase in 2019**

According to RS, there were 33 insider attacks on the ANDSF this reporting period (September 1–December 31, 2019) that resulted in 90 casualties, continuing the high levels seen last quarter. This brings the 2019 total to 82 attacks that caused 257 casualties (172 deaths and 85 injuries), a higher number of attacks and casualties than in recent years.<sup>143</sup>

### **ANDSF Performance – Most Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify most assessments of ANDSF performance because the Afghan government classifies them.<sup>144</sup> SIGAR's questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.



**An ASSF soldier** stands watch as his fellow soldiers raid Taliban compounds in Logar Province. (NSOCC-A photo by Spc. Casey Dinnison)

## **CSTC-A's Five Priorities and Objectives for the ANDSF**

1. Generating ANA combat power
2. Generating ANP policing power
3. Future force development
4. Logistics reform
5. Stewardship and accountability

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2020.

## **New ANDSF Assessment Tool: CSTC-A's Five Priorities and Objectives**

CSTC-A is building a new assessment tool for the ANDSF that will replace both the current advisor-engagement tool and the milestone tracker previously used. The new tool will break down CSTC-A's five priorities and objectives for the ANDSF into qualitative and quantitative measures that enable advisors to assess their train, advise, and assist (TAA) efforts.


CSTC-A says this new assessment framework will provide the ability to capture data, make measured assessments of partner progress, and develop trends that inform resource allocation and TAA efforts. In addition, the tool will allow for adjustments for the changing political, social, and military environment while maintaining historical records of key measurements. The tool has been approved and will be deployed this year.<sup>145</sup>

## **Afghan Special Security Forces**

This quarter, SIGAR has expanded its analysis of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) ground operations after compiling data provided by NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). SIGAR began tracking the data earlier this year when DOD cited the increased number of independent ASSF operations as an important success indicator for the ANDSF. Because ASSF serves as the primary offensive force in the ANDSF, DOD said the ASSF's growing size and capabilities are important not only for the ANDSF's performance, but also for the United States to

FIGURE 3.38

## COALITION-SUPPORTED VERSUS INDEPENDENT ASSF OPERATIONS



Note: Enabled = U.S. or Coalition forces' enablers (air support, etc.) are used during ASSF operation; Partnered = U.S. and Coalition forces partner with ASSF during operation; Independent = ASSF conducts operation with U.S. or Coalition support.

Source: NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2020 and 1/18/2020; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2020.

increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its small-footprint military campaign in Afghanistan.<sup>146</sup>

ASSF ground operations data from the last two years show that U.S. and Coalition forces are increasingly partnering with, or assisting the ASSF with, their operations. Figure 3.38 shows the ASSF conducted fewer ground operations (534) this quarter (October–December 2019) than they did during the rest of 2019, and only 31% of those operations were conducted independently, without U.S. and Coalition support. While the higher operational tempo of the ASSF in early 2019 entailed 30% more total operations in 2019 than in 2018, the number of independent operations was about the same. Consequently, only 43% of all ASSF operations in 2019 were independently conducted, compared to 55% in 2018.<sup>147</sup>

## Women in the ANDSF

According to CSTC-A, there were 4,524 female personnel, including civilians, enrolled in APPS as of October 31, 2019. The majority of ANDSF women continue to serve in MOI (3,062 personnel), with the other 1,462 in the MOD. CSTC-A also reported that in addition to the number of females reported in APPS, there are currently 142 female cadets enrolled at Afghan military training institutions. This reported strength figure is considerably lower than figures provided to SIGAR over the last several quarters due to the transition of personnel reporting from previous Afghan self-reporting to APPS. CSTC-A said that as with other strength reporting, assigned-strength numbers sourced from APPS will continue to fluctuate due to ongoing enrollment and personnel-cleansing actions in the system.<sup>148</sup>

## SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR inspected a \$3.1 million training compound in Herat Province designed for female ANP students. During January 2019 site visits, SIGAR found construction deficiencies and no electricity, and the compound has never been occupied. For more information, see Section 2.

## Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI performance because the Afghan government classifies it.<sup>149</sup> SIGAR's questions about the ministries' performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex of this report.

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly \$47.7 billion and disbursed more than \$47.5 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation. For more information about FY 2019 ASFF expenditures and authorizations for the ANA see pages 48–51.<sup>150</sup>

## ANA Sustainment Funding

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated \$23.7 billion and disbursed \$23.5 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment.<sup>151</sup> These costs include salary and incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment maintenance costs, including aircraft, and other expenses. For more details and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 50–51 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported providing approximately \$557.9 million of ASFF to the Afghan government for MOD elements' sustainment requirements thus far in Afghan FY 1398 (December 22, 2018–November 1, 2019). The U.S. contribution to the MOD sustainment was almost entirely for salaries and incentive pay (\$516.5 million). Roughly, \$41.4 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements (like fuel and generators) for the ANA.<sup>152</sup> CSTC-A's funding for MOD's salary and incentive payments decreased by only about \$5 million compared to about the same period in FY 1397 even though there was a roughly 8% decrease in reported MOD personnel (-14,734) over about the same time period.<sup>153</sup>

## ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$13.7 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.<sup>154</sup>

Seen in Table 3.6, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA, AAF, and ANASOC this quarter (September 1 through November 15, 2019) included five MD-530 helicopters (\$23.5 million), 36 HMMWVs (\$8.6 million), and several types of ammunition. This

TABLE 3.6

**MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE ANA,  
SEPTEMBER 1–NOVEMBER 15, 2019**

| Equipment Type | Equipment Description            | Units Issued in Quarter | Unit Cost   | Total Cost          |
|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Aircraft       | MD-530 Helicopter                | 5                       | \$4,709,284 | \$23,546,420        |
| Vehicle        | M1151A1WB1 HMMWV (Utility Truck) | 36                      | 238,500     | 8,586,000           |
| Ammunition     | .50 Caliber Ball Cartridge       | 2,678,400               | 3.20        | 8,570,880           |
| Ammunition     | M768 Mortar Cartridge (60 mm)    | 22,480                  | 313         | 7,036,240           |
| Ammunition     | High-Explosive Rocket (57 mm)    | 15,000                  | 400.62      | 6,009,300           |
| Ammunition     | High-Explosive Rocket (2.75")    | 4,320                   | 890         | 3,844,800           |
| Aircraft       | UH-60 Helicopter                 | 2                       | 1,323,000   | 2,646,000           |
| Weapon         | M42 Sniper Rifle (7.62 mm)       | 324                     | 7,049       | 2,283,876           |
| OCIE           | Field Pack Frame                 | 13,807                  | 147         | 2,034,323           |
| Ammunition     | .50 Caliber MK211-1 Cartridge    | 496,200                 | 4           | 1,736,700           |
| <b>Total</b>   |                                  |                         |             | <b>\$66,294,539</b> |

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter. The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases. OCIE = Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019.

quarter’s data shows a decrease in the amount of high-cost equipment provisions compared to previous quarters.<sup>155</sup>

CSTC-A told SIGAR this quarter that because most equipment procurements for the ANDSF require a lengthy process, equipment provisions reported here often reflect procurement requests that were made and funded one or two years ago. CSTC-A said that over the last year or so, it has shifted away from requesting bulk procurements of “major” items, such as weapons systems, HMMWVs, and other costly procurements. Instead, they are more focused on training the ANDSF to repair the equipment they currently have to extend its usable life rather than replacing it on a fixed schedule. CSTC-A will continue to provide replacements for items once they have exceeded their life cycle or are unrepairable, and to replenish less costly items like ammunition and individual equipment at operationally determined intervals.<sup>156</sup>

### ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readiness because the Afghan government classifies it.<sup>157</sup> SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.



## ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed \$6 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2019.<sup>158</sup>

As of December 8, 2019, the United States completed a total of 478 ANA, AAF, and ANASOC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan at a total cost of roughly \$5.4 billion. The number of completed, ongoing, and awarded projects this quarter were in line with trends reported over the last year. CSTC-A reported that four projects were completed this quarter, costing roughly \$11.6 million. Another 33 projects were ongoing (\$246.8 million total cost) and four projects were awarded (valued at \$18.5 million). A project to build a facility for the Special Operations Brigade-North at Camp Pratt in Mazar-e Sharif was terminated this quarter because the NATO command working with the Afghan special forces determined that existing facilities could support the force's requirement. CSTC-A said the project's construction had started, but there were no complete components at the time of termination. Unspent project funds will be returned to the CSTC-A comptroller for possible use on other ASFF requirements.<sup>159</sup>

The highest-cost ongoing projects include a joint NATO-ANA Trust Fund (NATF)-ASFF funded operations and life-support area for the AAF at the Mazar-e Sharif (\$40.8 million), a joint NATF-ASFF funded electrical grid connection for the ANA's Camp Shaheen (\$30.5 million), and an ASFF-funded renovations and additions to the ANA Parwan Prison (\$26.8 million).<sup>160</sup>

### SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR issued a special project this quarter reviewing DOD's efforts to implement recommendations from a 2016 SIGAR audit on the Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP) contract. The review found that while DOD did implement SIGAR's recommendations, it is still unknown whether their actions resulted in overall reduced spare-parts cost for the ANDSF. SIGAR made one further recommendation, that DOD modify the new NMS-GVS contract to allow the contractor to use the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to purchase spare parts when DLA's prices are the least expensive source. DOD agreed with the recommendation. See Section 2 for more information about this report.


## ANA Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$4.3 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.<sup>161</sup>

This quarter, the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DOD OIG) released an audit determining whether DOD developed training, mentoring, and contractor-logistics-support requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) contract met the ANDSF's needs for maintaining and sustaining its vehicles. The main finding was that the \$2.2 billion in contracts DOD awarded for contractor support to train and perform vehicle maintenance and repairs for the ANDSF since 2010 have made no significant progress in the ANDSF's ability to independently perform maintenance. DOD OIG said that based on the results of the latest contract, the NMS-GVS, "the ANDSF will face challenges in becoming self-sufficient unless CSTC-A develops training and mentoring requirements that measure the ANDSF progression levels, establishes a reasonable work split requirement, and provides required software systems." In addition, if the ANDSF is not able to become self-sufficient by August 2022, when the NMS-GVS ends, DOD may have to continue paying contractor support.<sup>162</sup>

FIGURE 3.39

## ANA-TERRITORIAL FORCE DISPOSITION



Note: ANA-TF = Afghan National Army-Territorial Force; Operational and Provisional = Companies are split between operational and provisional statuses; Operational and Training = Companies are split between operational and training statuses. This data in this map is as of November 29, 2019.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/1/2020 and 1/18/2020.

## ANA Territorial Force

The Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA-TF) is the newest ANDSF force element. Designed to be a lightly armed local security force that is more accountable to the ANDSF chain of command than local forces like the ALP, the ANA-TF is responsible for holding terrain in permissive security environments. DOD says that some of the ANA-TF companies may replace conventional ANA companies, where authorizations exist, in areas where conditions are appropriate for the units to thrive. Following a potential peace deal, DOD assesses that the ANA-TF or similar construct may serve as a potential vehicle for reintegration of insurgent fighters as one part of a whole-of-government approach.<sup>163</sup>

The ANDSF is currently nearing the end of its second phase of expanding the ANA-TF. According to RS, there were 70 operational ANA-TF companies across Afghanistan, as of November 29, 2019, with 14 more

companies in training, six more being stood up provisionally, and 15 more in the planning and recruiting phase.<sup>164</sup> The ANA-TF's expansion has been rapid: in July 2019, the ANA had only employed 26 operational companies across Afghanistan.<sup>165</sup>

The ANA-TF is currently authorized for 105 companies (expected to be fully operational by March 1, 2020), and the Afghan government has initial plans to grow the ANA-TF to 121 companies during a potential third phase of ANA-TF expansion. Seen in Figure 3.39 on the previous page, the locations of the ANA-TF's operational and planned companies serve the purpose of denying the Taliban freedom of maneuver, and keeping the Taliban away from urban areas and key lines of communication and transportation.<sup>166</sup>

## AFGHAN AIR FORCE

### U.S. Funding

As of November 23, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately \$8.4 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) from FY 2010 to FY 2020. After authorizing \$1.5 billion to pay for the AAF's aircraft, sustainment, training, and infrastructure in 2019, Congress authorized some \$1.3 billion in FY 2020 funding for the AAF, bringing authorized funding back to the lower levels of 2017 and 2018. The AAF has been authorized more funding than any other element of the ANDSF in 2020.<sup>167</sup>

Table 3.7 shows that in FY 2020 funding priorities for the force shifted from equipment and aircraft outlays to training for the first time since FY 2016, although sustainment remains the most resourced funding category.<sup>168</sup> AAF sustainment costs primarily include contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF's in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, and Mi-17 helicopters; A-29, C-208, and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft; and C-130 transport aircraft.<sup>169</sup>

TABLE 3.7

| U.S. ASFF FUNDING AUTHORIZED AND/OR REQUESTED FOR THE AAF, FY 2015–2020 (\$ THOUSANDS) |                  |                  |                    |                    |                    |                    |
|--|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Funding Category   | FY 2015          | FY 2016          | FY 2017            | FY 2018            | FY 2019            | FY 2020            |
| Equipment and Aircraft   | \$142,931        | \$27,263         | \$837,358          | \$395,480          | \$545,764          | \$103,650          |
| Training   | 104,220          | 92,617           | 156,045            | 266,406            | 244,853            | 340,261            |
| Sustainment  | 329,032          | 416,408          | 278,032            | 554,603            | 679,558            | 837,776            |
| Infrastructure   | —                | —                | 8,386              | 22,257             | 24,850             | 8,611              |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>\$576,183</b> | <b>\$536,288</b> | <b>\$1,279,821</b> | <b>\$1,238,746</b> | <b>\$1,495,025</b> | <b>\$1,290,298</b> |

Note: Data is as of November 23, 2019. This table does not reflect the effects of the December 2019 enacted rescission of FY 2019 funds or two forthcoming budget revision proposals for FY 2019 and FY 2020.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019.

Nearly \$5.9 billion had been obligated for the AAF and SMW from FY 2010 through FY 2019, as of November 23. About \$1.2 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018, and \$927.1 million has been obligated thus far in FY 2019.<sup>170</sup> A substantial portion of these funds (\$2.8 billion) has been obligated for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 48% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft (\$1.9 billion) at 32%. The amount of funds obligated thus far in FY 2019 differ from recent fiscal years in that the amount obligated for equipment and aircraft (\$76.2 million) decreased by 79% compared to FY 2018 and by 81% to 2017.<sup>171</sup> CSTC-A said this is because aircraft procurement has slowed down from previous years and CSTC-A is transitioning to sustaining and maintaining the current fleet.<sup>172</sup>

### Aircraft Inventory and Status

TAAC-Air reported an increase of nine operational aircraft this quarter. TAAC-Air reported that the AAF received five additional UH-60s and five MD-530s this quarter. Seen in Table 3.8, the AAF's current in-country inventory as of December 29, 2019, includes 167 operational aircraft. The table also shows TAAC Air's anticipated end state for the AAF by the end of FY 2021. Of note, they are planning to phase out the Mi-17s and add 10 more A-29s, seven more UH-60s, and six more MD-530s to the AAF's inventory.<sup>173</sup>

### AAF Operations and Readiness

The AAF decreased its flight hours by 9%, and the readiness of four of seven of its airframes declined this quarter (October–December 2019), compared to last quarter (July–September 2019).<sup>174</sup> However, all airframes except the C-208, a single-engine cargo or personnel transport plane, met their readiness benchmarks, an improvement from last quarter, when three airframes failed to meet their readiness benchmarks. According to TAAC-Air, the C-208 did not meet its benchmark because its maintenance contractors were often prevented from coming to work due to security conditions. Also, some C-208s are awaiting parts that take time to procure and some C-208s require complex repairs. Only the Mi-17 continued to fly over its recommended flight hours this quarter, the same as last quarter. TAAC-Air said this was because in November, the Mi-17s were forced to fly less while recovering due to their maintenance backlog from overflying in September and October.<sup>175</sup>

TAAC-Air also reported this quarter that it reduced its total number of AAF advisors from 183 to 150 “to better meet the needs of the [AAF].” They said they are still able to focus on advising on issues that are most critical to the AAF's continued growth, and that TAAC-Air's current capabilities and resources continue to meet all the AAF's training needs.<sup>176</sup> TAAC-Air said its advising model is focused on long-term and expeditionary advising. TAAC-Air is working to encourage AAF growth and independence in

TABLE 3.8

#### AAF AVIATION SUMMARY AS OF DECEMBER 2019

| AIRCRAFT           | Usable     | Total      | End State<br>/ Goal<br>2021 |
|--------------------|------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Fixed Wing</b>  |            |            |                             |
| A-29               | 15         | 25         | 25                          |
| C-130              | 3          | 4          | 4                           |
| C-208              | 23         | 24         | 23                          |
| AC-208             | 10         | 10         | 10                          |
| <b>Rotary Wing</b> |            |            |                             |
| Mi-17              | 22         | 27         | 0                           |
| UH-60              | 45         | 45         | 52                          |
| MD-530             | 49         | 49         | 55                          |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>167</b> | <b>184</b> | <b>151</b>                  |

Note: These figures do not include the aircraft for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2020; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 1/2020.



**A police advisor** teaches ANP officers about civil rights during an interview and reporting course. (RS photo by Staff Sgt. Neysa Canfield)

areas where they demonstrate the ability to sustain progress, establish enduring advisors in areas most critical to the AAF's continued success, and create expeditionary advisors at specific points of need to accelerate AAF independence.<sup>177</sup>

## AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly \$21.7 billion and disbursed more than \$21.4 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and some ASSF. These force elements comprised the ANP budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation. For more information about FY 2019 ASFF expenditures and authorizations for the ANP see pages 48–50.<sup>178</sup>

### ANP Sustainment Funding

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated approximately \$9.7 billion and disbursed approximately \$9.6 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF sustainment.<sup>179</sup> For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 50–51 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget MOI elements' sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398 (December 22, 2018–November 1, 2019) was roughly \$140.7 million. Some \$100.9 million of these funds went toward nonpayroll-related MOI sustainment expenses such as contracts for operations and maintenance

of equipment and buildings, drilling wells, security improvements, and other minor projects. CSTC-A said nonpayroll expenditures are increasing because MOI is doing a better job of executing its sustainment contracts.<sup>180</sup>

The remaining \$39.8 million of CSTC-A's contributions to MOI sustainment expenses was spent on ALP salaries. CSTC-A provided roughly the same amount of funds to the Afghan government for ALP salary and incentive payments as in the same period in Afghan FY 1397, despite the ALP's decreased personnel strength in APPS compared to its self-reported strength from the same period a year prior.<sup>181</sup> Unlike with the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) are paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme's multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).<sup>182</sup>

## ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$4.8 billion and disbursed approximately \$4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP equipment and transportation costs.<sup>183</sup>

CSTC-A informed SIGAR that they decided to move away from procuring "major," high-cost equipment, like HMMWVs or entire communications systems, a change from prior quarters. Instead, they are more focused on training the ANDSF to repair the equipment they currently have to extend its usable life rather than replacing it on a fixed schedule. CSTC-A will continue to provide replacements for items once they have exceeded their life cycle or are unrepairable, and to replenish less costly items like ammunition and individual equipment at regular, operationally determined intervals.<sup>184</sup>

Seen in Table 3.9 on the following page, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (September 1 through November 15, 2019) were less costly than they were previously and included several types of ammunition and tires for ANP trucks (\$1.3 million).<sup>185</sup>

## ANP Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$3.2 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANP and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2019.<sup>186</sup>

This quarter, CSTC-A reported a \$10 million decrease in the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements. These costs will now be \$68.8 million per year, with \$42.4 million provided directly to the Afghan government and \$26.4 million spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government. CSTC-A said this decrease reflects the difference between the planned facilities-sustainment costs and the actual amounts executed by the MOI.



TABLE 3.9

## MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE ANP, SEPTEMBER 1–NOVEMBER 15, 2019

| Equipment Type                 | Equipment Description                   | Units Issued<br>in Quarter | Unit Cost | Total Cost         |
|--------------------------------|---|----------------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Ammunition                     | 5.56 mm 10 & 12 Clip Band Cartridge     | 7,096,320                  | \$0.35    | \$2,483,712        |
| Parts - Vehicles               | Goodyear Tire for Ford Ranger           | 4,276                      | 360.50    | 1,310,594          |
| Ammunition                     | 7.62 mm x 54 mm Cartridge*              | 1,679,000                  | 0.71      | 1,922,090          |
| Communication                  | Exportable Multiband Networking Radio   | 82                         | 10,507    | 861,574            |
| Weapon                         | Club, Self-Protection                   | 5,500                      | 113.64    | 625,020            |
| Ammunition                     | 12.7 mm x 108 mm Ball Cartridge*        | 144,000                    | 3.82      | 550,080            |
| Ammunition                     | High-Explosive Grenade (40 mm)          | 5,508                      | 69.89     | 384,954            |
| Parts - Weapons                | MK93 Machine Gun/Grenade Launcher Mount | 199                        | 1,775     | 353,225            |
| OCIE                           | Combat Boots                            | 3,489                      | 95.85     | 334,421            |
| Parts -<br>Communications      | Power Converter                         | 100                        | 2,643     | 264,300            |
| <b>Total Cost of Equipment</b> |   |                            |           | <b>\$9,089,970</b> |

\* = non-NATO-standard equipment.

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment items provided to the ANP this quarter. The "unit costs" listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases. OCIE = Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/19/2019.

Both ministries have experienced difficulties in executing their facilities-sustainment programs.<sup>187</sup>

As of December 8, 2019, the United States had completed 782 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly \$3 billion. CSTC-A reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing \$4.3 million. Another seven projects (valued at \$82.5 million) were ongoing and no projects were awarded. The number of completed, ongoing, and awarded projects this quarter declined compared to reporting over the last year.<sup>188</sup> CSTC-A said this was because the ANP's facilities needs have mostly been met, or are currently under construction, so the construction program will continue to slow, with fewer new projects reported each quarter.<sup>189</sup>

The highest-cost ongoing ANP infrastructure projects include a joint NATF- and ASSF-funded CCTV surveillance system in Kabul (\$33 million), and ASFF-funded GCPSU facilities in Kabul (\$2.1 million) and Kandahar (\$1.7 million).<sup>190</sup>

## ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2019, the United States had obligated \$4.1 billion and disbursed \$3.9 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANP and some ASSF training and operations.<sup>191</sup> See page 82 for an update on ANP vehicle-maintenance training.





**An Afghan policeman** removes a roadside IED in Helmand Province. (Afghan government photo)

## REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Afghanistan is riddled with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs, according to the United Nations.<sup>192</sup> Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001, most casualties today are caused by the mines and other ERW following the arrival of international forces.<sup>193</sup> In recent years, casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces and UNAMA has documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in areas following heavy fighting.<sup>194</sup>

State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has allocated \$400 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional \$11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the current U.S. reconstruction effort). As of September 30, 2019, PM/WRA has allocated \$20 million in FY 2018 funds.<sup>195</sup>

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one Afghan government organization to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and by conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds), which insurgents can use to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).<sup>196</sup>

From 1997 through September 30, 2019, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 275.1 million square meters of land (106 square miles or less than twice the area of the District of Columbia) and

# SECURITY

TABLE 3.10

| DEMINEING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019 |                                      |                 |                  |                  |                   |  |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|--|
| Fiscal Year   | Minefields Cleared (m <sup>2</sup> ) | AT/AP Destroyed | UXO Destroyed    | SAA Destroyed    | Fragments Cleared | Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>a</sup> |
| 2010  | 39,337,557                           | 13,879          | 663,162          | 1,602,267        | 4,339,235         | 650,662,000  |
| 2011  | 31,644,360                           | 10,504          | 345,029          | 2,393,725        | 21,966,347        | 602,000,000  |
| 2012  | 46,783,527                           | 11,830          | 344,363          | 1,058,760        | 22,912,702        | 550,000,000  |
| 2013  | 25,059,918                           | 6,431           | 203,024          | 275,697          | 10,148,683        | 521,000,000  |
| 2014  | 22,071,212                           | 12,397          | 287,331          | 346,484          | 9,415,712         | 511,600,000  |
| 2015  | 12,101,386                           | 2,134           | 33,078           | 88,798           | 4,062,478         | 570,800,000  |
| 2016  | 27,856,346                           | 6,493           | 6,289            | 91,563           | 9,616,485         | 607,600,000  |
| 2017  | 31,897,313                           | 6,646           | 37,632           | 88,261           | 1,158,886         | 547,000,000  |
| 2018  | 25,233,844                           | 5,299           | 30,924           | 158,850          | N/A               | 558,700,000  |
| 2019  | 13,104,094                           | 3,102           | 26,791           | 162,727          | N/A               | 657,693,033  |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>275,089,557</b>                   | <b>78,715</b>   | <b>1,977,623</b> | <b>6,267,132</b> | <b>83,620,528</b> |  |

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.

Fragments are reported because clearing them requires the same care as other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre.

<sup>a</sup> Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/18/2019.

removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.10 shows conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.<sup>197</sup>

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. At the beginning of the calendar year, there were 619.3 square kilometers (239.1 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of September 30, the total known contaminated area was 657.7 square kilometers (253.9 square miles) in 3,995 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.<sup>198</sup>

In 2012, the Afghan government was granted an extension until 2023 to fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status. Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the country is not expected to achieve this objective.<sup>199</sup>

According to State, the drawdown of Coalition forces in 2014 coincided with a reduction in international donor funds to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). From a peak of \$113 million in 2010, MAPA's budget decreased to \$51 million in 2018. The Afghan government is expected to request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations. However, according to the State Department, the extension request cannot be initiated or acknowledged sooner than 18 months before April 2023—the end date of the current extension.<sup>200</sup>

## CONFLICT MITIGATION ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIANS

USAID's Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a \$40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018. It supports Afghan civilians and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:<sup>201</sup>


- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnance, suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance includes referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury.<sup>202</sup> During FY 2019, COMAC launched an online incident case-management system to coordinate the distribution of assistance packages. The incident-management system uses biometric registration to identify beneficiaries. During FY 2019, COMAC responded to 3,797 incidents in all 34 provinces, distributing 7,734 assistance packages to 5,326 eligible families for a total program expense of \$1.8 million. As seen in Figure 3.40, the provinces receiving the most assistance included Nangarhar (\$208,700), Kabul (\$186,400), and Ghazni (\$172,800) while the provinces receiving the least assistance included Bamyan (\$456), Panjshir (\$548) and Nimroz (\$1,160).<sup>203</sup>

As of September 30, 2019, USAID has disbursed \$11.28 million for this program.<sup>204</sup>

FIGURE 3.40

USAID'S CONFLICT-MITIGATION ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIANS BY PROVINCE, FY 2019



Note: Total assistance rounded to the nearest U.S. dollar. "Total Assistance" includes immediate assistance, tailored assistance, and medical assistance.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 12/18/2019.