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The implementation of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, contested presidential election results, regional political tensions between the United States and Iran, prisoner-release discussions, war, and the COVID-19 global health crisis have made this quarter “perhaps the most complex and challenging period in the last two decades” for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), according to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) told SIGAR in late July that RS and USFOR-A Commander General Austin Scott Miller “sees that political risk has surged and creates additional security risk” and that the risk “is focused on the ANDSF.”

In May, USFOR-A’s spokesman called on the Taliban to reduce the level of violence in the country, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the importance of fostering a permissive environment for intra-Afghan negotiations. Instead, RS said, “[Enemy] violence levels stayed well above historic norms for the majority of the reporting period with reduced violence occurring during the three-day Eid cease fire (May 24–26, 2020) … There were no Taliban attacks against Coalition forces, though there were several attacks against ANDSF sites in provincial capitals.”

Afghanistan’s National Security Council (NSC) said Taliban attacks increased June 14–21, with 422 attacks in 32 provinces killing 291 ANDSF personnel and wounding 550 others, making it the “deadliest [week] of the past 19 years.”

According to NATO Resolute Support (RS), enemy violence levels stayed well above historic norms for most of this quarter. The Taliban conducted no attacks against Coalition forces, but attacked Afghan government forces at several sites in provincial capitals.

Data provided by RS shows civilian casualties in Afghanistan increased by nearly 60% this quarter (April 1–June 30, 2020) compared to last quarter (January 1–March 31, 2020), and by 18% compared to the same period last year.

The United States met its first troop-withdrawal target of 8,600 troops in country, as stipulated in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, before its mid-July deadline. Five former American bases were also handed over to the Afghan government.
In late June, the Afghan NSC spokesman said, “The Taliban’s commitment to reduce violence is meaningless, and their actions inconsistent with their rhetoric on peace,” while the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Stefano Pontecorvo, called the level of Taliban violence “totally unacceptable.” Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s acting ministers of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the director of intelligence were summoned to parliament on June 22 for questioning on the rise of security incidents and crime.

With regard to whether continued Taliban attacks on the ANDSF violate their commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, DOD said “The assessment of Taliban compliance with the agreement is still under interagency review.” On July 15, General Kenneth McKenzie, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), told Voice of America, “I would not say that [the Taliban] have yet [kept up their commitments] … we expected to see a reduction in violence. And … the violence against the Afghans is higher than it’s been in quite a while. It’s one of the highest, most violent periods of the war that we see to date. Average lethality is down just a little bit. But the number of enemy-initiated attacks is, in fact, very worrisome.”

CSTC-A nonetheless reported that the ANDSF continued to be effective this quarter, although COVID-19 has and will impact the ministries’ command and control, planning, recruiting, and execution capabilities. CSTC-A said that the ANDSF and the MOD and MOI managed to “remain structurally stable and hold a defensive posture.” Though there was reporting that the ANDSF was ordered to move to an offensive posture in response to several high-profile attacks in May, USFOR-A and DOD said on July 19 that the current orders issued to the ANDSF are to maintain an “active defense posture”—allowing them to preemptively strike to prevent an enemy attack—and the majority of ANDSF forces remain in defensive positions.

On June 18, General McKenzie said the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has been reduced to “the mid-8,000 range,” the first troop-withdrawal target the United States committed to in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. A DOD report confirmed in early July that the first phase of the troop withdrawal to 8,600 troops is complete. The full withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan is “conditions-based” on the Taliban meeting their commitments in the agreement.

In other major news impacting U.S. troops this quarter, the New York Times, citing unnamed sources, reported in January 2020 that U.S. intelligence officers and Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan had alerted their superiors to a suspected Russian scheme to pay bounties to the Taliban to kill American forces in Afghanistan. These unnamed officers were quoted as saying at least one U.S. soldier may have been killed as part of the arrangement. Several high-ranking U.S. officials, including President Trump, said at that time they had not been briefed on this intelligence assessment. USFOR-A said that there is still disagreement within the
intelligence community specifically regarding the direct tie to bounties and killing of U.S. personnel. Additionally, DOD stated, “The Department of Defense continues to evaluate intelligence that Russian [intelligence] operatives were engaged in malign activity against United States and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. To date, DOD has no corroborating evidence to validate the recent allegations found in open-source reports.”

**ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable**

USFOR-A continued to classify or otherwise restrict from public release the following types of data due to Afghan government classification guidelines or other restrictions (mostly since October 2017):

- enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) and effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA)
- ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- unit-level Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) authorized and assigned strength
- detailed ANDSF performance assessments
- some Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number of pilots and aircrew, aircraft inventory, the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes, and the cost of the SMW’s aircraft maintenance being paid by the United States or other countries

Because public-health measures imposed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic inhibit the use of secure facilities necessary for accessing classified information, SIGAR will not issue a classified annex to this quarterly report.

**U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security**

As of June 30, 2020, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $86.30 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 63% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly $4.20 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2020, nearly $543.70 million had been obligated and nearly $357.99 million disbursed, as of June 30, 2020.

Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. A significant portion of ASFF money is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI, but is not included in the authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan fund the ALP. U.S. funding for the ALP will expire at the end of FY 2020. The rest of ASFF is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various
Despite Setbacks, IS-K Continues to Threaten Security
According to DOD, capabilities of the terrorist group Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) have been degraded from sustained pressure by the ANDSF, Coalition forces, and the Taliban that has killed their fighters, induced surrenders, and forced IS-K to relinquish territorial control in southern Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces. However, as recent events show, IS-K maintains the ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks. DOD says that since the group was dislodged from the territory it controlled, IS-K may be moving to smaller groups in urban areas that make them more difficult to locate and identify.


Active defense posture: According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF have been ordered by their national command authority to maintain an “active defense posture” across Afghanistan. In the support of a reduction in violence in Afghanistan, the ANDSF operating guidance is defensive in nature and limits actions to impairing a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming for, assembling for, or executing an attack on Afghan government elements. DOD’s definition for active defense is “The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”

A particularly heinous attack occurred on May 12, when gunmen targeting a maternity ward in Kabul run by Doctors Without Borders killed 24 people, including newborns, mothers, and health-care workers. Although the Taliban denied responsibility and condemned the attack, President

communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in tables on pages 48 and 49.123

ASFF monies are obligated by either CSTC-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds that CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget) are provided directly to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers those funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.124 While the United States funds most ANA salaries, most ANP personnel costs are paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). The United States is no longer the largest contributor to LOTFA for the last several years, having given just $0.95 million in 2019 and no funds in 2020 through June 30, 2020.125 A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on pages 104–110.

Violence Levels “Totally Unacceptable” after U.S.-Taliban Deal
This quarter began with the USFOR-A spokesman calling on the Taliban on May 2 to reduce the level of violence in Afghanistan, not only to help foster a permissive environment for intra-Afghan negotiations, but also to counter the COVID-19 pandemic.126 While the State Department told SIGAR last quarter that the U.S.-Taliban agreement does not prohibit all Taliban attacks against Afghan security forces, a DOD report this quarter states clearly that the agreement “included commitments to seek to continue reducing violence.”127

However, violence continued at what the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Stefano Pontecorvo, called “totally unacceptable” levels.128 Though RS continued to restrict from public release enemy-initiated and effective enemy-initiated attack data this quarter, it provided this unclassified characterization of enemy violence over the reporting period:

The security situation in Afghanistan remains unchanged from the trend observed at the end of last quarter. [Enemy] violence levels stayed well above historic norms for the majority of the reporting period with reduced violence occurring during the three-day Eid cease fire (May 24–26, 2020). During the holiday, violence was at a similar level of the February [reduction in violence] once again demonstrating the Taliban’s ability to exert command and control of their fighters. There were no Taliban attacks against Coalition forces, though there were several attacks against ANDSF sites in provincial capitals.129

Ghani said the Taliban had ignored calls to reduce violence and agree to a cease fire; he reportedly ordered the ANDSF to go on the offensive that same day. However, USFOR-A and DOD said on July 19 that the ANDSF are in an “active defense posture,” which allows them to preemptively strike to prevent an enemy attack, and the majority of ANDSF forces remain in defensive positions.

U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad said on May 15 that the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K)—the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan—carried out the attack as “an enemy of the peace process [that] wants the peace process to fail.” Ambassador Khalilzad also expressed concern with the level of Taliban-initiated violence, saying that the number of attacks against the ANDSF violated “the spirit if not the letter” of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. See Figure 3.30 for descriptions of this quarter’s major violent incidents and high-profile attacks.

A brief de-escalation of violence occurred in late May, as both the Taliban and Afghan government announced cease-fires in observance of the May 24–26 Eid holiday. However, on June 5, USFOR-A announced it had conducted two air strikes (its first since the Eid cease-fire) to defend against Taliban attacks on ANDSF checkpoints. Later in the month, Afghanistan’s NSC said Taliban attacks June 14–21 had increased to 422 attacks in 32 provinces, killing 291 ANDSF personnel and wounding 550 others, making it the “deadliest [week] of the past 19 years.”

DOD’s latest unclassified assessment of the violence level since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement (February 29) through June 1 said, “The Taliban is calibrating its use of violence to harass and undermine the ANDSF and [the Afghan government], but remain at a level it perceives is within the bounds of the agreement, probably to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal and set favorable conditions for a post-withdrawal Afghanistan.” DOD reported that the U.S. government continues to closely monitor violence levels in Afghanistan, to assess whether the Taliban “is sufficiently complying with its commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement,” and to assert that the withdrawal of U.S. troops below the 8,600 level is contingent on Taliban compliance with the agreement. On July 15, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie said “I would not say that [the Taliban] have yet [kept up their commitments],” due to their high level of violence, not yet beginning inter-Afghan negotiations, and not yet adequately assuring the United States of severing ties with terrorist groups. He added, “They still may yet do it. Time is not out ... we’re coming up on a pretty important time with this process.”

### Civilian Casualties

SIGAR analyzes Afghan civilian-casualty data from two different sources, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and RS.
These organizations use different definitions for which individuals can be considered civilians versus combatants, and different methodologies to collect and assess civilian-casualty data, with RS consistently reporting fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA.¹³⁹

**UNAMA vs. RS Collection Methodology and Definition of Civilians**
UNAMA and RS civilian casualty data diverge due to different collection methodologies and definitions for civilians versus combatants. UNAMA’s collection method uses “direct site visits, physical examination of items and evidence gathered at the scene of incidents, visits to hospital and medical facilities, still and video images,” reports by UN entities, and primary, secondary, and third-party accounts. Information is obtained directly from primary accounts where possible. Civilians whose noncombatant status is in “significant doubt,” based on international humanitarian law, are not included in the figures. UNAMA’s methodology has remained largely unchanged since 2008.

RS Civilian Casualty Management Team collects civilian casualty data by relying primarily upon operational reporting from RS’s Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data. DOD says that RS’s civilian-casualty data collection differs from UNAMA’s in that it has “access to … full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, and digital and other imagery, which are generally not available to external entities.” Also considered in its assessments are open-source media, social media, and other sources that can be a basis for assertions made by external entities.

DOD reports that U.S. forces and some entities like UNAMA use different interpretations about who receives protections as civilians under the law of war (to include the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law). When assessing reports of civilian casualties, USFOR-A considers whether any members of the civilian population were wounded or killed as a direct result of U.S. military operations. For the purposes of such assessments, USFOR-A does not include persons who have forfeited the protections of civilian status by engaging in hostilities, including by being part of a non-state armed group like the Taliban or ISIS.

UNAMA’s interpretation of these laws is that individuals affiliated with groups like the Taliban or ISIS, but without a “continuous combat function” should be immune from attack except for when they participate directly in hostilities. It is DOD’s opinion that this position supports “revolving door” protections for members of the Taliban and ISIS that are contrary to longstanding U.S. interpretations of the law of war.


**RS Reports Increase in Civilian Casualties This Quarter**
In line with the continued increase in violence following the U.S.-Taliban agreement, RS reported 59% more civilian casualties in Afghanistan this quarter (April 1–June 30, 2020) compared to last quarter (January 1–March 31, 2020) and an 18% increase compared to last year (April 1–June 30, 2019).
Figure 3.31 shows that the 2,085 civilian casualties this quarter were 776 more than last quarter and 321 more than the same period last year. RS attributed 84% of this quarter’s civilian casualties to antigovernment forces, which include unknown insurgents (39%), the Taliban (36%), IS-K (9%), and the Haqqani Network (9%). Another 4% were attributed to progovernment forces (4% to ANDSF and no incidents attributed to Coalition forces), and 12% to other or unknown forces. These RS-provided percentages were similar to last quarter. However, in contrast to last quarter when direct fire caused the most civilian casualties, this quarter it was improvised-explosive devices (41%), followed by direct fire (30%), and indirect fire (9%).

Figure 3.32 on the following page shows that civilian casualties increased or remained the same in most provinces (25 of 34) compared to last quarter. Last quarter, Kabul, Kunduz, and Helmand Provinces experienced the highest number of civilian casualties (an average of 126 each). Of these provinces, only Kunduz experienced a decline (22%) in civilian casualties this quarter. Nangarhar, Kabul, and Ghazni Provinces experienced the highest number of civilian casualties this quarter (average of 204 each). Nangarhar Province suffered the most civilian casualties (259), and had one of the most substantial increases (236%) over last quarter.
UNAMA: Attacks on Health Care Facilities During the COVID-19 Pandemic

This quarter, UNAMA released a special report detailing combatants’ attacks on health-care services in Afghanistan during the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, UNAMA documented 12 incidents from March 11 (start of Afghanistan’s pandemic) through May 23 (the start of the Eid-al Fitr ceasefire) in which combatants carried out deliberate violence or other interference with health care workers or facilities, and disturbing critical health care provision during the COVID-19 pandemic.\(^{143}\) UNAMA attributed eight incidents to the Taliban (abducting health workers and attacking a pharmacy) and three incidents to the ANDSF (an air strike on a health care facility, intimidation of health workers, and looting medical supplies).\(^{144}\)

Most striking of these incidents was the May 12 attack on the Kabul hospital maternity ward. Moving systematically from room to room, gunmen killed 24 people, including 19 women and three children. The attackers injured an additional 23 people. According to UNAMA, this “most horrendous attack” highlights how parties to the conflict have interfered with necessary health care services during the particularly difficult conditions caused by the pandemic.\(^{145}\)
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

United States Reaches First Troop-Withdrawal Target Ahead of Schedule

On June 18, CENTCOM Commander, General McKenzie, said the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has been reduced to “the mid-8,000 range,” one of the United States’ commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed February 29, 2020. Under the agreement, the United States committed to drawing down the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 8,600 within 135 days of the agreement’s signing (by mid-July) and withdraw all troops within 14 months, if the Taliban meet the conditions outlined in the agreement. A DOD report confirmed in early July that the first phase of the troop withdrawal to 8,600 troops is complete.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper said in March that once U.S. troops have reached the 8,600 level, “we’re going to stop, and we’ll assess the situation, not just tactically on the ground but also are all the parties living up to their obligations, their commitments? Are they acting in good faith and showing good effort?” DOD told SIGAR this quarter, “The assessment of Taliban compliance with the [U.S.-Taliban] agreement is still under interagency review.”

On July 15, General McKenzie said, before there could be a greatly reduced U.S. presence in Afghanistan, inter-Afghan negotiations needed to begin and the United States would need to be confident that the Taliban would not host terrorist groups, potentially allowing them to carry out attacks on the United States and allies. He assessed that “Right now, it is simply unclear to me that the Taliban has taken any positive steps in … those areas.”

NATO also reported a reduction in the number of Coalition troops in Afghanistan this quarter. NATO’s latest figure for the Coalition-support RS train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission is 15,937 Coalition military personnel as of June 2020, a 614-person decrease from the figure reported in February 2020. The decrease was entirely made up of non-U.S. personnel. The current force level includes 8,000 U.S. personnel (unchanged from February) and 7,937 military personnel from NATO and non-NATO partner nations. The remaining U.S. troops in Afghanistan serve Operation Freedom’s Sentinel mission in supporting roles, training Afghan special forces, or conducting air and counterterror operations.

The reduction of the Coalition-nation forces was expected, but has yet to reach the level NATO announced earlier this year. In early April, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said “to support the peace efforts, we are reducing our presence to around 12,000 by the summer,” but “no decision for a further reduction has been taken and all of our steps will be conditions-based.”

U.S. Forces Capabilities at Current Force Level

According to Resolute Support commander General Austin S. Miller, at the current force level, U.S. forces can continue to:

1. provide support to other NATO countries
2. train, advise, and assist the ANDSF, with COVID mitigation, at echelon and when required at the tactical points of need
3. protect the force

USFOR-A explained that this is a fighting formation, meaning it retains necessary authorities, mobility, fires, logistics, and medical capability, and continues to administer security assistance with the appropriate oversight.

SECURITY

U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks
According to DOD, from October 2001, the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, through April 30, 2020, 1,909 U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA), and 20,719 were wounded in action (WIA). From November 1, 2019, through April 30, 2020, there were five U.S. personnel KIA and 75 WIA.154 From April 30 through July 15, DOD reported three more U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan, two non-combat related incidents and one a “vehicle rollover accident.” Each of these incidents is under investigation.155

From November 1, 2019, through April 30, 2020, DOD reported one insider attack that killed two U.S. personnel and one Afghan. DOD said U.S. forces and the Afghan government are continuing their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks), including the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF personnel and new recruits.156

U.S. and Coalition Forces’ Advising Efforts
Train, Advise, and Assist Efforts during the COVID-19 Pandemic
According to CSTC-A, this quarter COVID-19 impacted ANDSF progress in many strategic areas including logistics, oversight of construction projects, and delays in integrating the ALP into other parts of the security forces.

The ANDSF continues to test personnel for COVID-19 and implement protective measures such as practicing social distancing, wearing masks, and using hand sanitizers. CSTC-A reported that many senior leaders across Afghanistan, including the acting Minister of Interior Massoud, have contracted the virus or have seen impacts of the virus on their workforces.157 As of early July, Minister Andarabi had recovered and resumed his duties.158

On March 14, RS Commander General Scott Miller directed that, due to the danger of coronavirus infection, Coalition personnel would conduct only limited face-to-face advising with their Afghan counterparts. Advisory efforts would shift towards video-teleconferences and other forms of remote communication, such as email.159 RS reported some successful examples of remote advising during the quarter, including a meeting between RS senior leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany providing train, advise, and assist (TAA) support to their ANDSF counterparts via videoconference on June 15, and a June 18 videoconference between Polish, Portuguese, Belgian, American, and British advisors, and their MOD counterparts to discuss security and improving logistics.160 Additionally, under proper social distancing protocols, advisors and key members of the ministries were conducting mission-essential meetings this quarter.161

To provide prompt assistance to the ANDSF in fighting the pandemic, CSTC-A used funding lines for medical supplies already notified to Congress via the Justification Book and Financial Activity Plans (FAPs) to provide COVID-19 support to the ANDSF. This included $2.12 million of ASFF
that was provided directly to the MOD and MOI to fund unit-level procurements and about $13.7 million for procurement using DOD contracts of medical supplies for ANDSF personnel (such as masks, gloves, and sanitation equipment).  

**AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES**

**Reported ANDSF Force Strength Highest in a Year**

This quarter, the ANDSF saw its highest reported strength since began using the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) in July 2019, which leverages biometric enrollment and Afghan self-reporting for more accurate accounting, from the previous system that relied only on self-reporting.

As of April 30, 2020, CSTC-A reported 288,418 ANDSF personnel (182,747 MOD and 105,671 MOI) biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in APPS. There are an additional 7,604 civilians (3,328 MOD and 4,276 MOI) and 18,382 Afghan Local Police (ALP). Figure 3.33 shows this is an increase of 6,870 personnel (2%) since last quarter’s APPS-reported strength from January 2020, mainly driven by 6,296 more personnel reported in the MOI

**Figure 3.33**

**REPORTED ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FROM APPS**

Note: This quarter’s data is as of April 30, 2020. The “as of” date of the data each quarter is between the 25th and 31st of the indicated month. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. No civilians are included in the strength numbers.

elements. CSTC-A attributes the increase to overseeing MOI improvements in reconciling personnel-record disparities and inputting and reviewing new APPS personnel data entries for accuracy.

Figure 3.34 shows that while reported ANDSF strength has rebounded over the last year, it remains lower than in previous years, when strength figures were self-reported using a paper-based system. As discussed in Section 1 of this report, SIGAR is continuing to examine the implications of the difference between the newer and older reported strength numbers on U.S. taxpayer expenditures for salary and incentive payments, as well as some types of equipment for the ANDSF.

Advisors Make Progress Transitioning Personnel Accountability System to ANDSF

Despite the significant challenges facing the ANDSF this quarter, CSTC-A reported that it made progress in its phased effort to transition APPS to MOD and MOI. According to CSTC-A, the ministries have now taken full
ownership of the APPS ID card management and distribution process. The ID cards are a way of physically accounting for personnel because they are issued after biometric enrollment (iris, face, and fingerprint scans) and have chips that link to biometric record numbers. The cards are valid for three years, at which point they can be reissued in-person. In addition, each ministry has taken control of its “Tier One Help Desk,” which is the frontline support resource for ANDSF APPS users across Afghanistan. CSTC-A said these are “significant steps” in their effort to transition control of the APPS system to the Afghan government. CSTC-A is encouraged by MOD and MOI’s willingness to transition to the APPS system and that with CSTC-A’s policy, programmatic, and technical advisors, the ministries “continue to demonstrate significant progress in adopting APPS as a system of record.”

The three ongoing efforts to improve the accuracy of the personnel data in APPS used by MOI, MOD, and CSTC-A include: (1) “slotting” or matching ANDSF personnel to authorized positions in the system, (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data or deactivating entries for inactive personnel, and (3) physically accounting for personnel through site visits called personnel asset inventories (PAIs) and personnel asset audits (PAAs).

CSTC-A reported that MOD processed more personnel actions in APPS than last quarter. From January 27, 2020, to April 30, 2020, MOD elements, including the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), processed 48,214 personnel actions in APPS (1,304 promotions, 28,172 reassignments, 8,954 initial assignments, and 9,784 separations), an increase of 16,451 compared to last quarter (November 1, 2019, to January 26, 2020). Separately, the ANP and ALP processed 8,144 personnel actions this quarter (1,007 promotions, 6,860 reassignments, 3,039 initial assignments, and 61 separations) a decrease of 2,823 compared to last quarter. CSTC-A said MOD’s personnel actions likely increased this quarter due to greater use of APPS by MOD with the implementation of a new tashkil (force authorization document) and the necessary reassignments of personnel to positions in the new tashkil in APPS. For MOI, the decrease was likely due to COVID-19 preventive measures, part of which involved reduced working hours at the ministry.

These personnel actions resulted in net increases in personnel for both MOD and MOI force elements (see previous section). However, CSTC-A reported again this quarter that COVID-19-related operational limitations did not allow them or the ANDSF to conduct PAIs or PAAs to physically verify the accuracy of the ANDSF personnel data. CSTC-A said no decisions had been made yet on a resumption date. PAI and PAA verification is a particularly important issue in light of a joint MOI-NDS assessment of police in Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan Provinces this quarter, which found that 50–70% of police positions in those provinces were not active, valid personnel, but ghost soldiers. CSTC-A and DOD commented

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**CSTC-A’s APPS Payroll Review**

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that one of its teams is leading a “payroll review” to analyze the ANDSF payroll process end-to-end to ensure every soldier gets their entitled pay on time, every time, and to ensure CSTC-A hands over to the ANDSF a process that is simple and sustainable. This team has been analyzing the payroll process for over 300,000 soldiers and police and creating a roadmap to ensure multiple donor nations have confidence in the process. The team has thus far provided recommendations and proposals to overhaul MOD pay incentives and to reform and recalculate the payroll structure for an institutionally viable system capable of being transitioned to the Afghan government in the fall. These recommendations and proposals are currently tentative, and SIGAR will follow up on the results of the review next quarter.

that this was a draft MOI-NDS report that cannot be corroborated. CSTC-A said it was most likely those records existed prior to APPS, but that they continue to cleanse data in APPS, including previous data, to remove potentially fabricated personnel records.\footnote{175}

SIGAR continued to ask CSTC-A if there are any remaining exceptions to CSTC-A’s policy of paying only ANDSF personnel who are enrolled and meet the criteria to be eligible for pay in APPS. They responded that as of April 20, 2020, CSTC-A funded salaries and incentive payments for 6,416 MOD trainees and cadets outside of the APPS-generated payroll numbers. As reported last quarter, there is still a technical issue in APPS that has prevented these trainees and students from being slotted. While CSTC-A initially said this would be resolved by late June, CSTC-A now expects it to be resolved by the end of September.\footnote{176}

CSTC-A said it has deactivated 70,580 MOD and 9,678 MOI personnel records in APPS from July 1, 2018, through April 30, 2020. These are the ANDSF personnel who have been moved to inactive status in APPS for not meeting the criteria to be active and slotted in APPS.\footnote{177} There are several reasons why ANDSF personnel records are retained in APPS after an individual is deactivated. First, it is very common for soldiers and police to return after long breaks in service, so retaining all personnel records within APPS makes it easier to reintegrate returning personnel. Second, if an individual is released for misconduct and tries to rejoin or to join another service, the system can flag it. Third, as in the U.S. and other militaries around the world, retaining personnel records in the system allows future verification of an individual’s service if needed.\footnote{178}

**ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANDSF attrition information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it.\footnote{179} SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E. Due to public-health measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, SIGAR will not issue a classified annex to this report. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANDSF force element will be provided in a future classified annex once these public-health measures are lifted.

According to DOD, attrition remains problematic within the ANA and ANP with the most significant cause continuing to be the number of personnel dropped from rolls (DFR) for being absent without leave (AWOL) for more than 30 days. According to DOD, DFRs accounted for 66% and 73% of ANA and ANP attrition respectively, from November 1, 2019, through April 30, 2020.\footnote{180}

CSTC-A reported that the MOD no longer provides monthly manually reported strength numbers from which attrition had been previously derived. As a consequence, CSTC-A moved to using APPS-reported end
strength and present-for-duty rates as a measure of force stability, which they define as “a stable force is one that is able to retain its structure across time.” According to CSTC-A, from the period of February through April 2020, the ANA “maintained consistent levels of end strength and present-for-duty.”

CSTC-A said APPS has provided a better understanding of ANDSF personnel movements, particularly in showing a significant number of returnees from AWOL and DFR that keeps the force at a relatively constant level of manning. While this causes a great deal of personnel churn in the force, the structure remains relatively static in terms of assigned strength and number of personnel present for duty. About 150,000 personnel are present for duty on an average day and about 6,500 are not present, CSTC-A said, indicating “a stable force but one that is not as combat ready as a more professional force that is able to maintain consistent manning levels with personnel on duty as planned.”

**ANDSF Casualties**

USFOR-A classified all ANDSF casualty information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E. SIGAR will provide a detailed analysis of ANDSF casualties in a future classified annex once public-health measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic are lifted.

DOD included a brief unclassified statement about ANDSF casualty trends from November 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020, in its latest report:

> The number of ANDSF casualties, including those that occurred on local patrols, checkpoint operations, and offensive operations, decreased significantly during this reporting period compared to the same period in 2019, but still remained high, largely due to Taliban attacks at static ANDSF checkpoints. Direct fire attacks at checkpoints continue to cause the majority of casualties, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes.

**ANDSF Insider Attacks**

According to DOD, there were 40 ANDSF insider attacks from November 1, 2019, through April 30, 2020. DOD said this reflects an increase in insider attacks against the ANDSF compared to the same period last year, but a decrease compared to the previous reporting period. This reporting period saw higher total deaths caused by insider attacks, but fewer total wounded compared to both the same period last year and the previous reporting period. KIA rates from insider attacks have risen from about two personnel killed per attack last year and last reporting period to about three personnel killed per attack during this reporting period.
Afghan Special Security Forces

The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are the ANDSF’s primary offensive forces. The ASSF include a number of elements, such as the ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR tracks ASSF operations data because DOD has said the ASSF’s growing size and capabilities are important both for the ANDSF’s overall performance and for the United States to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its small-footprint military campaign in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{186} DOD reported in June 2020 that ASSF elements have nearly doubled in size since 2017, when it was laid out as a reform goal in President Ashraf Ghani’s four-year ANDSF Road Map for developing the force.\textsuperscript{187}

ASSF Operations

NSOCC-A reported that the overall number of ground operations conducted by the ASSF, the ANDSF’s primary offensive forces, this quarter continued to be lower than seasonal norms. NSOCC-A attributed this to the decline in U.S. and Coalition-partnered and -enabled ASSF operations due to COVID-19 and U.S. commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement to conduct only defensive air strikes against the Taliban.\textsuperscript{188} The 597 ASSF ground operations conducted this quarter (April 1–June 30, 2020) were only about half as many the ASSF conducted during the same period last year (1,168), but are a 14% increase compared to last quarter (January 1–March 31, 2020). June saw the lowest number of operations (148) during the quarter compared to April (229) and May (220).\textsuperscript{189}

However, as shown in Figure 3.35, the number of operations the ASSF conducted independently were similar to the same period last year (537 this quarter compared to 594 last year). NSOCC-A said ASSF did not have a larger increase in independent operations this quarter due more to the “active defense” posture the Afghan government ordered for most of this quarter, than due to misuse of the force.\textsuperscript{190} Though the ASSF are in an active defense posture with respect to the Taliban, they are still conducting normal operations against other insurgents within Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{191}

ASSF Misuse Persists with Some Improvements

NSOCC-A, the Coalition element that advises the ANASOC, reported this quarter that misuse of ASSF elements continues “despite attempts to address the issue,” and is the main impediment to the ASSF’s ability to successfully carry out their missions. It occurs when MOD or MOI orders ASSF to conduct operations that are more appropriate for the conventional forces or assigns them other tasks that are not within their mission set as outlined in each force’s concept of employment document. Examples include using special forces to man checkpoints, hold terrain, or provide personal security for politicians or ANDSF leaders.\textsuperscript{192}
NSOCC-A said this quarter the most common misuse issue—employing ANASOC forces on long-duration, usually static, missions (such as manning checkpoints)—has resulted in forces’ enduring austere conditions for which their sustainment systems (food, fuel, vehicle maintenance, etc.) are not designed.  

NSOCC-A, told SIGAR this quarter that there are nearly 1,900 (10%) of roughly 19,000 ANASOC commandos currently manning checkpoints or assigned to other inappropriate missions. This misuse impacts ANASOC readiness because it can delay force-generation cycles. USFOR-A said that “at times, MOD and MOI choose to use ANASOC units because they are better trained and more proficient at the regional task. Even though this is the primary impediment, NSOCC-A emphasized that USFOR-A and NSOCC-A are “aggressively advising and mentoring MOD and MOI from the ministerial level to the tactical level on the proper use of ASSF.” NSOCC-A said they have seen improvements as the leadership understands the issue and tries to use the ASSF appropriately.

Similarly, NSOCC-A continues to report problems with the misuse of the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the special-operations aviation unit that supports counterterror and counternarcotics ASSF missions. The SMW is designed and trained with more specialized skills than the AAF. Frequently Afghan leaders assign the SMW with general support missions that would be more appropriately conducted by the AAF. The extent of the problem is apparent in the breakdown of mission sorties provided by NSOCC-A this quarter. From April 1 through May 27, 2020, the SMW conducted 165 sorties,
nearly a third of which (54 sorties) were general support missions for ASSF and non-ASSF units outside the SMW’s mission set. This is an improvement, though, from last quarter’s 48% of missions being general support/misuse missions.196

NSOCC-A said the GCPSU experienced the biggest improvement related to misuse. Currently, 10 of the 33 units are reporting misuse of its sub-units, a decrease from the 46% of units reporting misuse last quarter. The remaining instances of misuse are more common in Afghanistan’s remote provinces. NSOCC-A said these cases are also being addressed through advising at the ministerial and tactical level.197

Women in the ANDSF
According to CSTC-A, 5,251 female personnel, including 434 civilians, were enrolled in APPS as of April 30, 2020. This reported strength figure is roughly the same as last quarter. The majority of ANDSF women continue to serve in the MOI (3,619 personnel), with the other 1,632 in the MOD. CSTC-A also reported that in addition to the number of females reported in APPS, there are currently 30 female cadets enrolled at the National Military Academy and 16 students at Kabul Medical University.198

CSTC-A said the Gender Internship Program, which hires female employees to work at MOD and MOI, is succeeding this quarter. There are currently 52 female interns—18 at MOI and 34 at MOD—with another 10 interns in the hiring process.199

Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified
USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI performance because it is classified by the Afghan government.200 SIGAR’s questions about the ministries’ performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in a future classified annex once public health measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic have been lifted.

This quarter, CSTC-A said the ministries faced unprecedented complexities in their operating environment due to major events during the reporting period such as the implementation of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, contested presidential election results, regional political tensions between the United States and Iran, prisoner release discussions, war, and a global health crisis. CSTC-A said this created “perhaps the most complex and challenging period in the last two decades for Afghanistan,” yet MOD and MOI managed to “remain structurally stable and hold a defensive posture.”201

CSTC-A said that COVID-19 will continue to impact the ministries’ command and control, planning, and execution capabilities, but that throughout, leadership remained central to all efforts to sustain an institutionally viable and effective ANDSF.202 CSTC-A reported that the Afghan government removed over 100 individuals from MOI and MOD this quarter for
corruption, ranging from fraud involving CSTC-A-provided funds, to check-
point bribes, to large-scale commodity and contract fraud. CSTC-A said this
represents a positive trend for creating reliable leaders within ministries.203

Despite restricted movements caused by COVID-19, CSTC-A, in coordina-
tion with MOD and MOI leaders, transferred 3,214 pallets of supplies to the
ANA (1,672) and ANP (1,542).204 However, the pandemic stalled recruiting
and initial training at both ministries. Overall, CSTC-A said both ministries
increased their level of independent policy development and operations,
such as the recent creation of Public Service Centers and improvements to
promotion and appointment procedures in APPS, but they continue to rely
heavily on the Coalition for identifying key issues that need planning and
coordination, such as transitioning the Afghan Local Police to other parts of
the ANDSF and further developing the ANP’s structure to meet the needs of
Afghanistan’s citizens.205

CSTC-A reported some highlights of MOI performance this quarter. While
touring Baghlan, Samangan, and Balkh Provinces in early May, the MOI’s
deputy minister of security said the ANP had “shocking[ly] high morale and
were in good spirits whilst [the] majority of the checkpoints were under
high threat from the enemy.” Additionally, due to recent progress made by
MOI’s deputy minister for support on food contracts, the deputy security
minister was “happy to see in the last few weeks, food issues have been rec-
tified as all the checkpoints were receiving their proper allocation of meat,
fresh eggs, and fruits and vegetables.”206

Separately, Acting Minister of Interior Massoud Andarabi rolled out the
installation of CSTC-A-funded Afghan National Tracking Systems (ANTS)
devices in MOI vehicles, a program that began in 2018, which document
actual mileage driven to provide CSTC-A a more accurate accounting of fuel
consumption. CSTC-A said this MOI initiative enabled CSTC-A to reduce
MOI’s fuel allocation by over 15 million liters, saving the U.S. government
over $8.5 million in cumulative savings from November 2019 to June 2020.207
Nonetheless, CSTC-A’s anticorruption team expressed concerns this quarter
with ongoing corruption associated with CSTC-A-funded commodities. For
more information about this, see page 117–119.

CSTC-A said its MOI advisors are “constantly reviewing fuel consump-
tion reports, fuel calculators, tank capacity and sites, and cross checking
the MOI’s National Police Coordination Centre’s mission reporting, to
validate fuel orders.” Advisors are working in partnership with the MOI
Deputy Minster to move from an allocation expectation to a requirements
determination, where MOI plans and reports the fuel needed based on mis-
sion requirements. CSTC-A expects to see additional cost savings from
these efforts.208

For MOD, CSTC-A worked with MOD senior leaders to coordinate a
first-time aerial delivery of fuel by an Afghan contractor through a part-
nership with KamAir, to areas where ground fuel resupply was virtually

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Public Service Centers: These centers to provide Afghans a way to address
their needs and/or complaints with MOI as well as gain access to MOI services
(such as obtaining passports and vehicle registrations). The intent behind creating
the centers is to increase transparency, efficiency, and accountability of services,
thereby increasing trust between citizens, the ANP, and the Afghan government.

impossible due to Taliban activity. The delivery destinations included Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, with five missions and 42,864 liters of fuel flown in, and Farah City, Farah Province, with one mission (8,333 liters). CSTC-A attributed these successful missions to the coordination of all parties—CSTC-A advising oversight, AAF, and contractors. Increased operations in Uruzgan had raised ANA daily fuel consumption six-fold, making resupply critical. Mission details were quickly planned and executed, allowing the ANA to perform their duties and preventing the Taliban from expanding their footprint.209

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated more than $47.61 billion and disbursed more than $47.56 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.210

ANA Sustainment Funding

As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated $23.66 billion and disbursed $23.55 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. These costs include salary and incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment maintenance costs, including aircraft, and other expenses.211 For more details and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019 and FY 2020, see pages 48–49 of this report.

For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1399 (December 2019–December 2020), CSTC-A plans to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up to $725.3 million to support the MOD. Of this amount, approximately $636.7 million (88%) is for salaries.212

As of May 19, CSTC-A had provided the Afghan government the equivalent of $278 million to support the MOD for FY 1399. Almost all of these funds (92%) paid for salaries.213

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $13.68 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.214

Although CSTC-A has moved away from procuring major equipment and systems (such as HMMWVs), items procured in the past are still being delivered to the ANA.215 Table 3.7, lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (February 1 through April 30, 2020),
which included 161 HMMWVs (valued at $38.4 million) and four refurbished UH-60A+ helicopters (valued at $18.5 million). CSTC-A reported that these items were purchased in 2017 and 2018, respectively, and more deliveries are pending.216

Considering CSTC-A’s continued provision of large amounts of ammunition to the ANDSF, SIGAR asked CSTC-A if they track whether ANDSF replenishment requests are consistent with the observed or reported tempo and duration of ANA training and operations. CSTC-A said it “manages ammunition holistically” in that it tracks all aspects of inventory levels, projections and consumption, and tracking for in-transit and lead times for replenishing stock levels. CSTC-A uses the information in the ANDSF’s electronic equipment inventory system of record, CoreIMS, as well as information from its regional advising commands to monitor consumption rates used to request replenishment of ANA and ANP ammunition stocks. CSTC-A then uses the average consumption rate for each ministry and records of previous issues from national stocks to gauge ANA and ANP projections for accuracy and to procure the amount of ammunition to keep the ANDSF supplied.217

**ANA Infrastructure**
The United States had obligated and disbursed $6 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of June 30, 2020.218

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**TABLE 3.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1151A1 HMMWV (Utility Truck)</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>$238,500</td>
<td>$38,398,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>UH-60A Helicopter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,635,000</td>
<td>18,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare Parts</td>
<td>5.56 MM Ball M855 Clip Band Cartridge</td>
<td>8,064,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,822,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare Parts</td>
<td>Semi-Fluid Lubricating Oil</td>
<td>9,299</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,067,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Man’s Shirt</td>
<td>24,408</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>989,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M240H Machine Gun</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8,593</td>
<td>859,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>7.62 MM Ball M80 Linked Cartridge</td>
<td>1,348,000</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>849,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>M4 Rifle</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>746,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare Parts</td>
<td>Field Pack Frame</td>
<td>3,680</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>542,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>.50 Caliber 4-Ball Tracer Linked Cartridge</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>486,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $65,302,051

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (February 1–April 30, 2020). The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases. Unit costs over a dollar are rounded to the nearest dollar.


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**ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT**

From FY 2002 through FY 2017—the most recent year for which there is publicly available data—the U.S. government provided more than $28 billion in defense articles (such as HMMWs, aircraft, and other types of equipment) to Afghanistan. An ongoing SIGAR audit is focused on the extent to which DOD, since the beginning of FY 2017, (1) conducted required routine and enhanced post-delivery end-use monitoring of defense articles provided to the ANDSF, and (2) reported and investigated potential end-use violations in Afghanistan and took steps to ensure corrective actions occurred, when applicable.
SECURITY

CSTC-A reported that it canceled 20 planned ANA infrastructure projects and terminated four active infrastructure contracts this quarter, mostly for “execution change,” which it described as “adjust[ing] to focus on maintaining existing infrastructure and … on projects with tangible benefits,” not on new construction.\textsuperscript{219} Seven of these projects were among the 10 projects with the highest estimated contract or construction cost and included several projects for Parwan Prison.\textsuperscript{220} CSTC-A said the construction projects at Parwan Prison were terminated when President Ghani issued a decree changing the Parwan Prison from an MOD entity to one controlled by the Bureau of Prisons, thereby rendering those projects no longer eligible for ASFF support.\textsuperscript{221}

As of April 30, 2020, the United States completed a total of 484 ANA, AAF, and ANASOC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, costing roughly $5.5 billion.\textsuperscript{222} There were fewer awarded, active, and completed projects this quarter compared to previous quarters over last year, which CSTC-A attributes to COVID-19-related limitations as well as the recent execution change.\textsuperscript{223} CSTC-A completed one project this quarter, a $3.8 million support-structure project at Kandahar Airfield.\textsuperscript{224}

The highest-cost ongoing projects include a joint NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF)-ASFF funded operations and life-support area for the AAF in Mazar-e Sharif ($28.5 million), a NATF-funded rehabilitation center at the ANAs Kabul National Military Hospital.

SIGAR RELEASES INSPECTION OF ANA AND TAAC-AIR HANGAR COMPLEX

The inspection found that ANA and TAAC-Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex construction and renovation generally met contract requirements and applicable standards. However, Assist Consultants Inc. finished the project 430 days (about 14 months) later than initially scheduled, and SIGAR noted six deficiencies resulting from ACI’s noncompliance with the contract that raise concerns about the quality of the work at the complex. For more information, see Section 2 of this report.

ANA commandos stand in formation before meeting Acting Minister of Defense Khalid and RS Commander General Miller on April 28. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)
SECURITY

($14.1 million), and an electrical grid connection for the ANA and ANP in Kunduz ($12 million). CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANA facility sustainment requirements continues to be $108.8 million. Of this, $74.7 million is provided directly to the Afghan government and $34.1 million is spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.

ANA Training and Operations
As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $4.3 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.

Conditions at the Kabul Military Training Center Improve
Last quarter, CSTC-A and DOD reported that conditions were deteriorating at the Kabul National Military Training Center (KMTC), the main ANA training center, due to corruption by MOD senior leaders in command there. This quarter, CSTC-A said conditions at KMTC, now known as the Combined Arms Training Center (CAT-C), have improved since the last reporting period as MOD has removed the leadership from key positions and pursued investigations into corruption. CSTC-A believes the newly installed CAT-C leadership is performing well: they have executed a training regimen resulting in 5,000 recruits in training or having completed training since January 2020. Beginning in March, the effects of COVID-19 slowed the output of the training courses, as expected. CSTC-A’s TAA efforts are focused on how the new CAT-C leadership can best care for their soldiers and prepare them for the battlefield.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

U.S. Funding
As of May 25, 2020, the United States had appropriated approximately $8.5 billion of ASFF to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) from FY 2010 to FY 2020, unchanged since last quarter. The amount of money authorized for the AAF for FY 2020 (roughly $1.3 billion) also remains unchanged since last quarter. The FY 2020 amount brings the funding authorization level for the AAF back to the level of 2017 and 2018.

As in most previous years, sustainment remains the most costly funding category for the AAF (65% of FY 2020 authorized funds). AAF sustainment costs primarily include contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF’s in-country operations.

ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT
The United States has spent billions of dollars to train and equip the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW). Given the significant investment, SIGAR is conducting an audit to assess the extent to which (1) the AAF and SMW developed and implemented vetting policies and procedures that help identify corruption and potentially corrupt individuals, and (2) DOD has taken steps to ensure that the AAF and SMW recruit, train, and retain qualified personnel intended to contribute to professional and sustainable Afghan air forces.
Aircraft Inventory and Status

Seen in Table 3.8, as of June 30, 2020, the AAF currently has 150 available aircraft and 174 aircraft in its inventory, four fewer available aircraft and three fewer total aircraft than reported last quarter. TAAC-Air said the change in total aircraft this quarter was due to AAF aircraft being transferred to SMW. The table also shows the number of each aircraft type currently authorized for the AAF as well as the number of authorized and assigned pilots and other aircrew.234

AAF Operations and Readiness

This quarter, the AAF's flight hours increased by about 20% compared to last quarter, in line with seasonal norms. Only three of seven AAF airframes increased their readiness this quarter (April–June 2020) compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
<th>Usable / In-Country</th>
<th>Authorized Pilots</th>
<th>Assigned Pilots</th>
<th>Authorized Other Aircrew</th>
<th>Assigned Other Aircrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures do not include the aircraft for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. Ten A-29s remain at Moody Air Force Base in the United States for AAF A-29 training. The AAF is phasing out its Russian-made Mi-17s. FY 2022 is the last year DOD will seek sustainment funding for the Mi-17s. Some will remain in the fleet to provide operational capability until the UH-60 capability matures and the transition to CH-47s is completed.

to last quarter (January–March 2020). However, all but one of the AAF’s airframes (C-208) met their readiness benchmarks this quarter, an improvement from last quarter, when two airframes (C-208 and MD-530) failed to meet readiness benchmarks. TAAC-Air said that COVID-19 conditions, including personnel travel restrictions and quarantine requirements, continued to slow parts resupply and scheduled maintenance for the C-208s.

In addition, according to the latest data from TAAC-Air, the AAF is beginning to show improvements in its ability to conduct more of its own aircraft maintenance, one of the long-term goals of the United States for the AAF. Table 3.9 shows that while the AAF is still wholly reliant on U.S.-funded contractor logistics support (CLS) to maintain its UH-60s and C-130s, over the last year the AAF has made progress in performing independent maintenance on a few of its airframes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated nearly $21.7 billion and disbursed nearly $21.5 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and the GCPSU. These force elements constituted the ANP budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation. For more information about what these costs include and the amount of U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 48–49 of this report.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANP Sustainment Funding**

Unlike the ANA, most ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) are paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

To support the MOI, CSTC-A plans to provide up to $146.6 million in FY 1399. Of these funds, approximately $54.0 million (37%) is for salaries, with the remaining funds for purchase of goods, services, or assets. As of June 12, CSTC-A has provided no funds to support MOI sustainment because the MOI is using available funds previously disbursed to their Ministry of Finance account for prior-year requirements that were not fully executed. Once these funds have been exhausted, CSTC-A will begin distributing FY 1399 funding to MOI.

**ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated approximately $4.8 billion and disbursed approximately $4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP equipment and transportation costs.
Although CSTC-A has moved away from new procurements of major equipment and systems, items procured in the past are still being delivered to the ANP.\textsuperscript{244} Table 3.10 lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (February 1, 2020, through April 30, 2020). Of these items, the costliest was the delivery of 5,980 vehicle tires ($2.7 million).\textsuperscript{245}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Tire, Pneumatic, Vehicular</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>$453</td>
<td>$2,709,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Wheel, Pneumatic Tire</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>2,196,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>Machine Gun, .50 Caliber</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12,886</td>
<td>1,649,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Shirt, Cold Weather, Medium</td>
<td>29,276</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,154,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>Cartridge, .50 Caliber, 4 Ball-1 Tracer, Linked</td>
<td>347,200</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,111,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Coat, Cold Weather</td>
<td>7,753</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>987,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Control Assembly, Train</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>743,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Brake Shoe Set</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>579,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Battery, Storage</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>508,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Caliper Disc Brake</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>448,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Cost of Equipment** $12,087,320

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANP this quarter. The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases.


**ANP Infrastructure**

The United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $3.2 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANP and some GCPSU infrastructure projects as of June 30, 2020.\textsuperscript{246}

As of June 12, 2020, the United States had completed 785 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly $3 billion. CSTC-A reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $257,522. Another four projects (valued at $84 million) were ongoing and no projects were awarded. Additionally, eight projects were cancelled or terminated (valued at $74 million).\textsuperscript{247}

The four ongoing ANP infrastructure projects include a joint NATF- and ASSF-funded CCTV surveillance system in Kabul ($33 million), two NATF-funded housing projects for ANP families in Kabul ($27.4 and $21.1 million), and an ASSF-funded GCPSU project at the Kabul Garrison Command ($2.5 million).\textsuperscript{248}

CSTC-A continued to report this quarter that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements will be $68.8 million. Of this, $42.4 million
will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $26.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{249}

**ANP Training and Operations**

As of June 30, 2020, the United States had obligated $4.1 billion and disbursed $3.9 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANP and some GCPSU training and operations.\textsuperscript{250}

According to DOD, the MOI continued to focus on the future role of the ANP in a stabilized security environment. This includes an evidence-based assessment intended to understand how the ANP should be structured and equipped in a stable environment. This is part of a continuing plan to transition the ANP away from its current organization as a paramilitary security force and toward a more traditional police force focusing on “community policing” and the rule of law. Efforts in this direction include reducing the numbers of the most dangerous checkpoints and re-evaluating the training pipeline and training curriculum for police personnel. Specifically, MOI reviewed the curriculum of initial entry police training for better alignment with a civil law-enforcement mission. Nonetheless, MOI continues to lack institutional training that reinforces civil law enforcement. Furthermore, beyond early training, the ANP also lacks an institutionalized leadership-development program at the district and local-level.\textsuperscript{251}

**REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

Afghanistan is riddled with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs, according to the United Nations (UN).\textsuperscript{252} Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001, most casualties today are caused by mines and other ERW following the arrival of international forces.\textsuperscript{253} In recent years, casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces. UNAMA also has documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in areas following heavy fighting.\textsuperscript{254} According to UN reporting from March 2020, approximately 2.5 million Afghans live within one kilometer of areas contaminated with explosive hazards that are in need of immediate clearance.\textsuperscript{255}

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has allocated $408.4 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction effort). As of March 31, 2019, PM/WRA has allocated $8.4 million in FY 2019 funds.\textsuperscript{256}

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one Afghan government organization to help

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**SIGAR RELEASES INSPECTION OF SECURITY UPGRADES AT MOI HEADQUARTERS**

SIGAR inspectors visited the MOI headquarters complex six times in February and May 2020, and found that contractor ACF generally constructed the security upgrades according to the contract requirements. SIGAR inspectors also found three potential safety hazards due to insufficient electrical power and inadequate maintenance. For more information, see Section 2 of this report.
clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds), which insurgents can use to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

From 1997 through March 31, 2020, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 286.8 million square meters of land (111 square miles) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.11 shows conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. On March 31, 2019, there were 619.3 square kilometers (239.1 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of March 31, 2020, the total known contaminated area was 665.6 square kilometers (257 square miles) in 3,991 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.

In 2012, the Afghan government was granted an extension until 2023 to fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status. Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the country is not expected to achieve this objective. According to State, the drawdown of Coalition forces in 2014 coincided with a reduction in international donor funds to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA).

### Table 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,337,557</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>663,162</td>
<td>1,602,267</td>
<td>650,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,697</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>346,484</td>
<td>511,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12,101,386</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>33,078</td>
<td>88,798</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27,856,346</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>6,289</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>607,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31,897,313</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>88,261</td>
<td>547,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25,233,844</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>30,924</td>
<td>158,850</td>
<td>558,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>13,104,094</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>26,791</td>
<td>162,727</td>
<td>657,693,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>11,692,039</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>6,719</td>
<td>37,816</td>
<td>665,612,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>286,781,596</strong></td>
<td><strong>80,047</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,984,342</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,304,948</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes
- AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.
- There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.
- Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. FY 2020 data covers October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2020.

From a peak of $113 million in 2010, MAPA’s budget decreased to $51 million in 2018. The Afghan government is expected to request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations. However, according to the State Department, the extension request cannot be initiated or acknowledged sooner than 18 months before April 2023—the end date of the current extension.\textsuperscript{261}

CONFLICT MITIGATION ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIANS

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018. It supports Afghan civilians and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:\textsuperscript{262}

- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnance, suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance includes referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury.\textsuperscript{263} From January 1 through March 31, 2020, COMAC provided 2,741 immediate assistance packages, 203 tailored assistance packages, and 163 medical assistance packages, for a total program expense of $530,701. As seen in Figure 3.36, the provinces receiving the most assistance included Nangarhar ($53,432), Faryab ($50,843), and Kunduz ($40,984) while the provinces receiving the least assistance included Badghis ($3,802), Badakhshan ($1,703) and Samangan ($753).\textsuperscript{264}

As of March 31, 2020, USAID has disbursed $12.4 million for this program.\textsuperscript{265}

\textbf{USAID’S CONFLICT-MITIGATION ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIANS BY PROVINCE, JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2020}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daykundi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sar-e Pul</td>
<td>3,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktiya</td>
<td>6,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>6,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>7,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>7,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>8,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>11,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>11,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>12,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jowzjan</td>
<td>12,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>12,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>13,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>15,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>17,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>17,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>20,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>21,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>21,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>25,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>25,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>29,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>33,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urugzan</td>
<td>35,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>40,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>50,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>53,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total dollars vary slightly since some packages were still pending payment at the time the financial report was generated. Total assistance rounded to the nearest dollar. “Total Assistance” includes immediate assistance, tailored assistance, and medical assistance.