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NATO’s Resolute Support Mission significantly reduced its presence in Afghanistan as U.S. and international forces withdrew.


Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan’s mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan forces ended and transitioned to providing “over-the-horizon” security assistance as the new Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan.

The Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, overrunning numerous district centers and several border crossings, but avoided attacking U.S. and Coalition forces.

Formal Withdrawal of U.S. Forces to be Complete by the End of August

In accordance with President Joseph R. Biden’s April 14 announcement that U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) formally began its military drawdown from Afghanistan on May 1, 2021, in what officials described as “a safe and orderly way.” The drawdown includes redeploying U.S. troops, turning facilities over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), retrograding equipment, and either giving excess equipment to the ANDSF or turning it over to DOD’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

General Austin Scott Miller, NATO Resolute Support Mission and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander, transferred responsibility of USFOR-A to CENTCOM commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie in a small ceremony on July 12, 2021, in Kabul. All U.S. troops except those assigned to duty at the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul will leave Afghanistan by the end of August.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III established U.S. Forces Afghanistan Forward to be led by Navy Rear Admiral Peter Vasely, who

**Retrograde:** The movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset (replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements.

will remain in Kabul. Supporting U.S. Forces Afghanistan Forward from Qatar will be the new Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), led by Army Brigadier General Curtis Buzzard. DSCMO-A will be responsible for providing security assistance to the ANDSF, including over-the-horizon (OTH) aircraft-maintenance support to sustain ANDSF combat operations against the Taliban.48

Coalition Forces Withdraw from Afghanistan Along with U.S. Forces
NATO Resolute Support (RS) informed SIGAR this quarter that Coalition forces have been reducing their footprint in Afghanistan in concert with U.S. forces.49 As of June 12, 2021, some U.S. capabilities shifted to an “over-the-horizon location.”50 Other Coalition forces also withdrew, with Germany and Italy ending their Afghanistan missions in the last week of June, the United Kingdom announcing the end of their mission July 8, and Australia announcing on July 11 that their last personnel had left Afghanistan “in recent weeks.” At least 16 smaller contingents reportedly withdrew earlier in June or May.51

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Ends, Transitions to Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A)
CSTC-A, the command that executed much of the mission to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the Afghan forces, officially ended on July 12, 2021, when General Miller transferred responsibility to General McKenzie.52 CSTC-A transitioned to the Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), based in Qatar.53 In early May, RS ended its TAA missions with Afghan forces at the corps and provincial chief of police levels and CSTC-A significantly reduced TAA staffing at the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This included the dissolution of the regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) at the corps and provincial chief of police levels the first week of May and closure of both the Ministerial Advisory Group-Defense (MAG-D) and Ministerial Advisory Group-Interior (MAG-I) the last week of May.54 Before its dissolution, CSTC-A’s main focus this quarter was the safe withdrawal of personnel from Afghanistan.55 Accordingly, Resolute Support advised SIGAR that, with reduced staffing and a focus on the withdrawal process, they had limited capacity to respond to several of SIGAR’s questions for this report.56 For more information on what reconstruction data is no longer available, see page 61.
The Taliban Overrun Numerous District Capitals, but Avoid Attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces

After U.S. and Coalition forces officially began drawing down in May, the Taliban launched an offensive, overrunning numerous ANDSF checkpoints, bases, and district centers. For more on the deteriorating security situation and district control, see pages 54–55.

In some districts ANDSF forces put up some level of resistance and conducted a tactical (fighting) retreat, while in others they surrendered or fled in disorder. According to news reports, about 1,600 ANDSF personnel fled into neighboring Tajikistan in July to avoid Taliban advances in Badakhshan Province. In other instances, local elders reportedly mediated truces that allowed the ANDSF defenders to leave, abandoning their U.S.-supplied equipment, which the Taliban then displayed on social media as propaganda to tout its victories. The Taliban have not yet taken any of Afghanistan's 34 provincial capitals, but several were reportedly surrounded.

Particularly concerning was the speed and ease with which the Taliban seemingly wrested control of districts in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, once a bastion of anti-Taliban sentiment. The deteriorating situation caused the commander of the NATO Resolute Support Mission, General Miller, to tell reporters on June 29 that “a civil war path is visualizable.” Miller added in a later interview, “We should be concerned. The loss of terrain and the rapidity of that loss of terrain has to be concerning.”

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs David F. Helvey testified on May 5, 2021, before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that since the U.S.-Taliban agreement was signed on February 29, 2020, the Taliban “did comply with their agreement not to conduct attacks against the U.S. or Coalition forces … with some very minor exceptions.”

More detailed information on the security situation in Afghanistan can be found in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this report.

Senior U.S. Officials Explain the New Defense Relationship with Afghan Security Forces

Testifying before the SASC on May 5, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey said, “We will continue funding key capabilities such as the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing, we will continue paying salaries for Afghan security forces, and we will continue delivering certain military supplies, and we are developing the mechanisms to provide appropriate oversight for the use of these funds most of which will continue to be executed through DOD contracts.”

On June 17, Secretary of Defense Austin testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee, “We will now transition to a new bilateral relationship with our Afghan partners … but one that will not require a U.S. footprint larger than what’s necessary to protect our diplomats.”
SECURITY

“The plan right now would be to make a seamless transition from what we have currently in Afghanistan to other locations that would be able to meet our overarching objectives of ensuring that Afghanistan doesn’t become a safe haven for terrorists that would attack the U.S. or our allies.”

— Brig. Gen. Matthew G. Trollinger

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley added, “It’s the president’s intent to keep an embassy open, to keep our security forces around the embassy and to continue to work with the Afghan government to continue to fund the Afghan security forces and to keep that situation from devolving into the worst case and that’s what we’re planning on and that’s what we’re working toward. There are not guarantees in any of this.”

How the ANDSF, Especially the Afghan Air Force, Will Function Without U.S. Soldier and Contractor Support Remains Unclear

U.S. military contractors are also being withdrawn from Afghanistan, as stipulated in the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement. These contractors provide an array of functions, including logistics, maintenance, and training support for ANDSF ground vehicles and aircraft; security; base support; and transportation services. Their loss could significantly impact ANDSF sustainability, in particular their ability to maintain aircraft and vehicles. Secretary Austin said in a June 23, 2021, House Armed Services Committee hearing that “Some of the [aircraft] maintenance is taking place in … one of the Gulf countries, one of our partners … and we may be able to contract other types of capabilities going forward. That’s still a work in progress.” For more information on contractors in Afghanistan, see page 61.

Turkey Tentatively Agrees to Continue Securing Hamid Karzai International Airport After U.S. Forces Depart

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan announced on July 9, 2021, that Turkey and the United States had agreed on the scope of how to secure Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) after U.S. forces withdraw, though details remain to be finalized. Turkey currently provides security at HKIA, an essential transport facility for the diplomatic missions that will remain in Afghanistan. A Taliban spokesman said that “If foreign forces want to retain a military presence here in the name of airport security, Afghans will not allow it and will view them as invaders, be it Turkey or any other country.”

More information on the challenge of transferring control of Afghanistan’s airports can be found on pages 117–121 and in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this quarterly report.

Ministers of Defense and Interior Replaced

On June 19, 2021, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced that he was replacing his ministers of defense and of interior. Ghani named General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi as his new defense minister, replacing Asadullah Khalid. Khalid had been in the position since 2018, but required ongoing treatment for injuries suffered in a 2012 suicide bombing. Mohammadi is no stranger to the position, having previously served...
as Minister of Defense as well as Minister of the Interior and Army chief of staff. Ghani named General Abdul Sattar Mirzakwal as the new interior minister. Both men will serve in an acting role until the Afghan parliament approves their appointments.

**U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security**

As of June 30, 2021, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly $88.61 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly $3.1 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2020, over $2.4 billion had been obligated and more than $2.1 billion disbursed, as of June 30, 2021. About $675.6 million of FY 2021 ASFF has been obligated and $247.4 million disbursed, as of June 30, 2021.

Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF money is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) salaries. The rest of ASFF is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Table 2.4 on page 33.

Going forward, ASFF monies will be obligated by either the DSCMO-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (ASFF obligations remain the same for DSCMO-A as for CSTC-A). Funds that DSCMO-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget) now go directly to the Ministry of Finance, which then transfers them to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests. While the United States funds most ANA salaries, a significant share of Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel costs is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). The United States has significantly reduced its support to LOTFA since 2018, with annual contributions ranging between $0.95 million and $8.84 million. A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on page 90.

**The Taliban Overrun Dozens of District Centers and Seize Multiple Border Crossings**

This quarter, a Taliban offensive that began slowly in May accelerated in June and early July. On June 22, 2021, Deborah Lyons, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, reported that “more than 50” districts had fallen to the Taliban “since the beginning of May.” A day later, General Milley testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that “There’s 81 district centers … underneath
SIGAR tracked Afghan government population, district, and territorial control from November 2015 until October 2018, using unclassified data provided by Resolute Support. In March, 2019, Resolute Support notified SIGAR that it no longer produced its district-level stability assessment of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence, claiming they were “of limited decision-making value to the [RS] Commander.” The last time SIGAR published district control assessments was for its January 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. RS reported then that as of October 2018, of Afghanistan’s then-407 districts, 50 were under insurgent control or influence (12 controlled, 38 influenced).

In the conference report for the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Congress required DOD to include a section in their semiannual Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan report providing a district-level stability assessment displaying insurgent control versus Afghan government control and influence of districts to include district, population, and territorial control data. The next DOD report, covering the previous six months ending June 30, had not yet been issued as this report went to press.

Whether the Afghan government or the insurgents had “control” of a district was a subjective determination based on a number of factors, such as degree of effective Afghan government local governance, security, infrastructure, economic control, and communications, that RS took into consideration (for more detail on metrics Resolute Support used to determine district, population and territorial control see the April 30, 2016, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, p. 96).

Regardless of how Resolute Support once measured district control, that level of detailed, subjective analysis from on-the-ground U.S. or Coalition soldiers no longer exists. The ongoing withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces has left open sources such as the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), the Long War Journal (LWJ), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Gandhara (Radio Free Afghanistan) to fill the void on what is happening in Afghanistan’s districts, especially those furthest from Kabul. These organizations define and determine “district control” in various ways, including press reports, government agency statements, their own reporters and contacts, and the Taliban, often through social media.

The latest CENTCOM assessments of district control are available in the classified supplement to this report.

THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS IN AFGHANISTAN
Different organizations use different figures for the number of Afghanistan districts, which have changed over time. For example, Deborah Lyons, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, reported 370, General Milley used 419 in his June 22 HASC testimony, the Wall Street Journal recently used 387, the Long War Journal uses 407, and other open sources use vaguer terms such as “roughly” 400. SIGAR has in the past used 407 districts (the number provided by Resolute Support), as well as 399, the number in USAID’s third-party dataset.

In 2018, Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organization (now called the National Statistic and Information Authority) and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance compiled a joint, consolidated list of 387 districts (plus 34 provincial capitals) that it used to prepare for upcoming elections.

Who Controls Afghanistan's Districts?

Long War Journal, as of July 13, 2021

Gandhara (Radio Free Afghanistan), as of July 15, 2021

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), as of July 12, 2021

Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), as of July 15, 2021

Note: SIGAR provides these maps for information only and takes no position on the accuracy, methodologies, or analysis used by their creators. These maps were recreated by SIGAR for simple map-to-map comparisons, otherwise they are reproduced from the source. Each source may have used a different number of districts so there may not be an exact district-to-district comparison between maps. For more on the methodologies used to create these maps, please see the sources.
Taliban control.”81 On July 2, the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) claimed that the Taliban had captured 127 district centers, about 25% of the total, “adding to those they already controlled.”82

In a July 21 press conference, General Milley updated his previous estimate of Taliban control to “about half of the 419 that are out there.” He also noted that the Taliban is putting pressure on 17 of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals and the ANDSF was consolidating their forces to protect those population centers and Kabul. General Milley further added that while “strategic momentum appears to be sort of with the Taliban … I don’t think the end game is yet written.”83

The online Long War Journal (LWJ) painted an even bleaker picture of the extent and swiftness of Afghan government district losses, claiming that the Taliban controlled 157 districts on June 29, then 204 on July 9, and 221 by July 15.84 According to LWJ, this was more than three times the number of districts the Taliban controlled on April 14, from 73 to 221, or more than half the number of total districts in Afghanistan (see page 55).85 The numbers fluctuate as government forces have retaken some districts.86

In addition to capturing districts, the Taliban have taken at least six international border crossings and hold long stretches of highways throughout the country, according to the AAN. This not only denies the Afghan government significant revenue from taxes on international trade, but also provides far more opportunities for the Taliban to raise their own revenue by taxing traders and extorting travelers at checkpoints.87 For more information on the potential revenue impact from the loss of border crossings, see page 131 and the classified supplement to this report.

The Afghan government still holds Kabul and all 34 provincial capitals, though many appear threatened.88

Both the Taliban and the ANDSF report inflicting significant casualties on each other.89 In one incident, 23 Afghan special forces soldiers were surrounded and killed in northern Faryab Province on June 16. Among the dead was Colonel Sohrab Azimi, a renowned field commander who was mourned across Afghanistan.90 On June 29, the Afghan government claimed they had killed over 6,000 Taliban fighters and wounded another 3,485 in the past month.91

**Violence Trends**

**Some Violence Trend Data Unavailable as Resolute Support Mission Withdraws**

SIGAR analyzes different types of data to obtain a better understanding of the violence trends in Afghanistan. These data sources, when available, include RS-provided data on enemy-initiated attacks against the ANDSF, RS, and UNAMA-provided data on civilian casualties, and USFOR-A data on ANDSF casualties and insider attacks.
This quarter, RS informed SIGAR that due to the drawdown, especially the end of the train, advise, and assist missions, several key elements of violence trend data were incomplete and will no longer be available. In addition, unclassified information about ANDSF casualty trends may not be available. For details on what information may no longer be available, see the callout box on page 61.

**Enemy Attacks Increased Significantly Since the U.S.-Taliban Agreement of February 2020**

Despite continued calls from U.S. officials for the Taliban to reduce its levels of violence in line with their commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, USFOR-A’s enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) data the past three months (March–May 2021) show that the Taliban have not done so. Figure 2.28 shows that each three-month period since the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement has had significantly more EIAs than their corresponding quarters the previous year. Figure 2.29 on the following page shows the dramatic increase in enemy-initiated attacks last quarter (January–March 2021), especially when compared to previous first quarters. USFOR-A believed that ANDSF reporting of EIAs and effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA) decreased this quarter due to the train, advise, and assist missions ending; the data ended altogether on May 31, 2021.

**Enemy-initiated attacks (EIA):** All attacks (direct fire, surface to air fire, IED, and mine explosions, etc.) initiated by insurgents that the ANDSF and RC consider to be [significant activities] (SIGACTs).

**Effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA):** A subset of enemy-initiated attacks that result in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties.

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**Note:** EIA = Enemy-Initiated Attacks. EEIA = Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks, referring to a subset of enemy-initiated attacks that produced casualties.

Civilian Casualties Intensify

RS Reports Increasing Civilian Casualties in 2021

Civilian casualties continued to rise this quarter, including deadly urban attacks. In one of the worst incidents, on May 8, 2021, a car-bomb exploded along with two other blasts, killing 85 and wounding 275 students at Sayed-ul-Shuhada High School, a predominantly Shia girls school in Kabul. While no group claimed responsibility—the Taliban disavowed any involvement—U.S. officials believe that IS-K carried out the attack.96

RS reported 2,035 civilian casualties in April and May 2021, which included 705 deaths and 1,330 injuries. This total is nearly as high as the three months from January through March 2021 (2,149).98 RS attributed about 93% of this quarter’s civilian casualties to antigovernment forces (40% to the Taliban, 38% to unknown insurgents, 14% to IS-K, and less than 1% to the Haqqani Network), as seen in Figure 2.30. About 2% were attributed to progovernment forces (2% to ANDSF), and about 5% to other or unknown forces. These percentages are roughly similar to long-term trends reported by RS.100
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

Oversight and Advising Capabilities and Limitations During the Drawdown

At the end of the drawdown an estimated 650 U.S. troops will remain to assist with security at U.S. Embassy Kabul. This is down from 2,500 last quarter. Figure 2.32 on the following page shows the American troop levels in Afghanistan from 2002–2021.

Retrograde Process Mostly Complete by Early July

CENTCOM estimated it had completed more than half of the retrograde process by June 14, and more than 90% by July 5. This process included 984 C-17 transport aircraft loads out of Afghanistan, more than 17,000 pieces of equipment turned over to DLA for disposition, and 10 facilities, including Bagram Airfield, handed over to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense.

Included in the retrograde are thousands of vehicles and other equipment, including over 400 pieces of rolling stock and more than 6,600 pieces of non-rolling stock. The two most expensive retrograded items were 14 air-defense artillery pieces valued at more than $144 million, and five “Enhanced Sentinel FMTVs (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles)” valued at more than $16 million.
“Over-The-Horizon” Support to ANDSF Similar to COVID-19-Restricted Support

Security assistance to Afghanistan is now conducted “over-the-horizon” from Qatar by the Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A). Resolute Support cautioned that “OTH does not equal over-the-shoulder” oversight, and acknowledged that the reduced presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will constrain DSCMO-A’s capacity to monitor ANDSF use of ASFF funds and procured materials. DSCMO-A now provides security assistance through videoconference meetings at both the senior-leader level and at the directorate and branch levels “to ensure sustained pay, maintenance, logistics, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support,” much as they did the past year under COVID-19 restrictions. In addition, DSCMO-A said they will mitigate misuse of ASFF funds through end-use monitoring (EUM) of critical equipment, using local national contractors as the “on-ground eyes and ears for the U.S. government,” and remote monitoring of pay and logistics databases. DSCMO-A explained that the local national contractors “send pictures and write-ups as deliverables to enable the projects to stay on schedule.” This was also standard procedure before the retrograde.

Over-the-horizon DSCMO-A support has some advantages despite the elimination of face-to-face contact with their Afghan counterparts, according to Resolute Support. RS claimed that in some cases they provide “the
exact same level of support to the ANDSF from over-the-horizon that was provided while in Afghanistan.”

For example, DSCMO-A Human Resources Management continues with the same scheduled meetings over the same communications platforms they used in Afghanistan, and still maintains system configuration control, management, and oversight of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). RS claimed that some advantages of over-the-horizon support include a longer personnel transition time (seven to 10 days, as opposed to two to three days) between incumbent and replacement due to the elimination of transit time into Afghanistan, better connectivity with contacts in the continental United States, and potentially more personnel continuity due to longer tours of duty.

DOD Contractor Personnel
As of early June 2021, there were 7,795 DOD contractor personnel supporting agency operations in Afghanistan. This includes 2,656 U.S. citizens, 2,491 third-country nationals, and 2,648 Afghan nationals. The contractor count last quarter was 16,832 (6,147 U.S., 6,399 third-country nationals, and 4,286 Afghans). This represents a decrease of 9,037 total contractors (about 54%), including 3,491 U.S. contractors (about 57%) from the previous quarter. However, DOD noted that since the numbers were taken from a census in early June, they “have since decreased due to ongoing redeployment and related drawdown activities in accordance with the President’s direction.”
U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks

There were no additional U.S. or Coalition casualties this quarter. From October 7, 2001, through July 19, 2021, 1,897 U.S. military personnel were killed in action in Afghanistan. Another 415 died as a result of non-hostile causes. A total of 20,666 military personnel have been wounded in action.113

From April 1, 2021, through June 30, 2021, there were no insider attacks against U.S. and Coalition military personnel.114

A NEW SIGAR LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT EXPLORES THE CORE CHALLENGE OF PROPERLY ASSESSING RECONSTRUCTION’S EFFECTIVENESS

This quarter, SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program issued a report on the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of contracting. The report’s most important finding is that, as implemented, M&E created the risk of “doing the wrong thing perfectly”: Programs could be deemed “successful” regardless of whether they had achieved or contributed to broader, more important goals—including, most prominently, a stable Afghanistan.

With the ANDSF struggling to check the Taliban’s ongoing offensive, the current situation in Afghanistan makes this lessons-learned report especially relevant. A central theme of the report is the tendency for M&E to be overoptimistic—that is, to favor good news over data suggesting a lack of progress. For years, U.S. taxpayers were told that, although circumstances were difficult, success was achievable.

Optimistic assertions of progress have not been limited to the overall campaign. A similar pattern is evident in assessments of ANDSF effectiveness. In 2011, General David Petraeus stated, “Investments in leader development, literacy, marksmanship and institutions have yielded significant dividends. In fact, in the hard fighting west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised some 60% of the overall force and they fought with skill and courage.” In 2015, General John Campbell said that the ANDSF had “proven themselves to be increasingly capable,” that they had “grown and matured in less than a decade into a modern, professional force,” and, further, that they had “proven that they can and will take the tactical fight from here.” Similarly, in 2017, General John Nicholson stated that Afghan security forces had “prevailed in combat against an externally enabled enemy,” and that the ANDSF’s “ability to face simultaneity and complexity on the battlefield signals growth in capability.” More recently, on July 11, 2021, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said that the ANDSF “have much more capacity than they’ve ever had before, much more capability,” and asserted, “they know how to defend their country.”

Over the years, however, other data points (or the lack thereof) recommended greater skepticism. SIGAR has expressed serious concerns about the corrosive effects of corruption within the ANDSF (including the existence of ghost soldiers and police); the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of the force; the inability of assessment methodologies to account for the influence on combat readiness of intangible factors such as the will to fight; the shaky sustainability of the ANDSF given its dependencies on advanced equipment and the initial lack of focus on ministerial-level capabilities; and the discontinuation of critical data, such as assessments of district control, that could be used to help measure the ANDSF’s performance in recent years.

More than $88 billion has been appropriated to support Afghanistan’s security sector. The question of whether that money was well spent will ultimately be answered by the outcome of the fighting on the ground, perhaps the purest M&E exercise.

AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Strength
As of April 29, 2021, CSTC-A reported 300,699 ANDSF personnel (182,071 MOD and 118,628 MOI) biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). There are an additional 7,066 civilians (3,015 MOD and 4,051 MOI). Figure 2.33 shows that ANDSF total strength decreased slightly (2.3%) this quarter compared to last quarter, but included some 12,281 personnel (4.3%) more than a year ago.

These ANDSF strength figures include 6,312 female personnel enrolled in APPS as of May 29, 2021. This reflects an increase of 270 female personnel since February 25, 2021. The majority of ANDSF women continue to serve in the Afghan National Police (ANP, 4,253 personnel), with the other 1,913 in the Afghan National Army (ANA), and 146 in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). These numbers include 419 civilians as well as 29 female cadets at the Afghan National Military Academy and 42 female cadets at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy.

Note: This quarter’s data is as of April 29, 2021. The “as of” date of the data each quarter is between the 25th and 31st of the indicated month. APPS = Afghan Personnel and Pay System; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. No civilians are included in the strength numbers.

ANDSF personnel strength reported for this quarter does not reflect the loss of personnel to casualties, surrender, capture, or fleeing to other countries that occurred during the Taliban offensive from May through July.

**Popular Uprising and People’s Mobilization Forces**
As the security situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces deteriorated, some district leaders began mobilizing their own local forces to evict the Taliban. Despite government promises to provide training and include them in Afghan army organizations, there were fears that local power brokers and warlords would form their own militias loyal to them, as occurred in Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s.117

**Afghan Personnel and Pay System**
CSTC-A developed the computerized personnel and payroll system, APPS, to reduce opportunities for corruption and fraud—such as fake personnel records that corrupt actors used to pocket salaries for “ghost” police—and to create better accountability, transparency, and auditability in ANDSF payroll processes. The United States initially spent $35.8 million on the development contract for APPS in 2016. An additional $29 million has been spent since 2019, when a sustainment contract for the system began. This brings the total amount spent on APPS to $64.8 million as of June 1, 2021.118

DSCMO-A continues its efforts to transition to the Afghan government some of the roles and responsibilities for management of APPS. CSTC-A told SIGAR that Afghan government “ownership of APPS” means the ANDSF are responsible for operating APPS, including program management and funding the contract. The ANDSF can have “full ownership” of APPS even if the U.S. continues to fund the program from ASFF and/or LOTFA (APPS sustainment is expected to cost roughly $9.6 million per year).119

After the U.S. troop withdrawal is complete, CSTC-A said DSCMO-A will remain in regular contact with the MOD and MOI program offices. DSCMO-A will also continue to maintain “configuration control” of APPS, meaning that all requests from ANA or ANP units will pass through the DSCMO-A Human Resources Management Program Manager for quality checks before flowing to the MOD or MOI APPS program management offices.120

While retrograding, CSTC-A could no longer monitor many details about the phased transfer of APPS management to the Afghan MOD and MOI, but CSTC-A told SIGAR that the ANDSF took several significant steps this quarter in their long march toward this goal. These included:

- On May 12, 2021, APPS began connecting to the Afghan Automated Biometric Information System (AABIS), a separate database that holds ANDSF biometric information, as a requirement for pay. CSTC-A believes that this will be a significant step in the effort to
reduce fraud and corruption in the ANDSF personnel system, such as “ghost” police.\textsuperscript{121}

- An additional measure to reduce fraud and corruption, connecting APPS to the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS)—the country’s government-wide accounting system—remains on track to be completed for the MOD in September 2021.\textsuperscript{122}

- As of June 23, 2021, the MOD has 15 military and three civilian personnel hired and actively employed to manage APPS. The MOI has its APPS program manager and a small team of subject matter experts onboard while it waits approval for the remaining 25 civilian personnel.\textsuperscript{123}

- As of May 29, 2021, 97% of MOD personnel were biometrically enrolled and validated, up slightly from 96% last quarter.\textsuperscript{124}

- The MOI made significant progress biometrically enrolling its personnel. As of June 12, 2021, 116,755 MOI personnel have been biometrically verified, an increase of more than 8,400 in the first two weeks of June and 97.8% of total MOI personnel, up from 90% last quarter.\textsuperscript{125}

For more details on the APPS transition including the biometric and validation process, see SIGAR’s April 30, 2021, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

**ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified**

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANDSF attrition information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it.\textsuperscript{126} SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that overall ANA monthly attrition averaged about 3% in February–April 2021, and that ANP’s attrition increased from 2.5% to 3.5%.\textsuperscript{127}

**ANDSF Casualties**

SIGAR asked USFOR-A to provide an unclassified description of the data’s trends. USFOR-A said “ANA KIAs reported in APPS have shown an upward trend, especially during the month of June. ANP KIAs [have] also trended upward, but not as notably as the ANA.”\textsuperscript{128}

Detailed information on ANDSF casualties can be found in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this quarterly report.

**ANDSF Insider Attacks**

USFOR-A reported at least 26 insider attacks against the ANDSF from April 1, 2021, through June 30, 2021. These attacks resulted in at least 81 ANDSF personnel killed and 37 wounded. USFOR-A added, however, that “due to ongoing retrograde operations,” the number of insider attacks that their analysts were tracking against the ANDSF was incomplete.\textsuperscript{129}
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

U.S. Funding
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $2.5 billion and disbursed nearly $2.27 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA. Also, as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $47.5 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group for reporting purposes through the 2018 appropriation.130

ANA Sustainment
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $2.3 billion and disbursed roughly $2.15 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA sustainment. Also, as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating $23.6 billion and nearly finished disbursing roughly $23.5 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. These costs include salary and incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment-maintenance costs, including aircraft, and other expenses.131

For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1400 (December 2020–December 2021), DSCMO-A plans to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up to $841.6 million to support the MOD. Of this amount, approximately $653.0 million (78%) is for salaries.132 As of June 12, CSTC-A provided the Afghan government the equivalent of $289.4 million to support the MOD for FY 1400 (December 2020–December 2021). The majority of these funds (87%) paid for salaries.133

ANA Equipment and Transportation
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly $34 million and disbursed more than $20 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA equipment and transportation costs. Also as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $13.6 billion of FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.134 Table 2.8, lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (April 1, 2021, to June 30, 2021), which included six A-29 light attack aircraft, valued at more than $133 million; 174 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs, commonly known as “Humvees”) valued at about $41.5 million; and 9,696 2.75 inch high-explosive rockets valued at roughly $18.4 million.135

Table 2.8, lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (April 1, 2021, to June 30, 2021), which included six A-29 light attack aircraft, valued at more than $133 million; 174 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs, commonly known as “Humvees”) valued at about $41.5 million; and 9,696 2.75 inch high-explosive rockets valued at roughly $18.4 million.135
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $48 million and disbursed about $15 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA infrastructure projects. Also as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASFF infrastructure projects.136

This quarter U.S. Forces-Afghanistan transferred a total of 4,836 unique real property items from 10 locations in Afghanistan valued at roughly $805 million to the Afghan MOD. These items included:

- Contingency Location New Antonik was turned over to MOD on May 4, 2021: 42 unique real-property items valued at $3,246,526
- New Camp Brown/Kandahar Airfield was turned over to the MOD on May 11, 2021: 2,832 unique real-property items valued at $130,188,595
- Camp Morehead was turned over to MOD on May 12, 2021: 132 unique real-property items valued at $1,318,756
- New Kabul Complex was turned over to MOD on May 28, 2021: 75 unique real-property items valued at $52,463,004
- Blockhouse was turned over to MOD on May 28, 2021: 25 unique real-property items valued at $1,750,012
- Camp Stevenson was turned over to the MOD on June 1, 2021: 34 unique real-property items valued at $9,784,497
- Camp Dwyer was turned over to the MOD on June 15, 2021: 120 unique real-property items valued at $38,588,407

### TABLE 2.8

**MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Units Issued in Quarter</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>A-29 light attack aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$22,252,120.00</td>
<td>$133,512,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>M1151 HMMW</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>$238,500.00</td>
<td>$41,499,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>2.75 inch rockets</td>
<td>99,696</td>
<td>$1,906.00</td>
<td>$18,480,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>40mm high-explosive rounds</td>
<td>60,840</td>
<td>$75.00</td>
<td>$4,563,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Shirts, various sizes</td>
<td>88,709</td>
<td>$41.00</td>
<td>$3,597,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>.50 caliber cartridges</td>
<td>884,880</td>
<td>$3.20</td>
<td>$2,703,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Hydraulic vehicle transmissions</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>$7,697.00</td>
<td>$2,339,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Diesel engines</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>$37,443.00</td>
<td>$3,145,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>7.62 mm cartridges</td>
<td>2,015,600</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1,511,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>5.56 blank training cartridges</td>
<td>4,723,248</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1,039,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$212,391,597</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (April 30–June 30, 2021). The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases.


### ANA Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $48 million and disbursed about $15 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA infrastructure projects. Also as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASFF infrastructure projects.136

This quarter U.S. Forces-Afghanistan transferred a total of 4,836 unique real property items from 10 locations in Afghanistan valued at roughly $805 million to the Afghan MOD. These items included:

- Contingency Location New Antonik was turned over to MOD on May 4, 2021: 42 unique real-property items valued at $3,246,526
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- Camp Dwyer was turned over to the MOD on June 15, 2021: 120 unique real-property items valued at $38,588,407

**Real property items:** Includes one or more of the following: a building, structure, utility system, pavement, and/or underlying land.

• Camp Lincoln (Camp Marmal) was turned over to the MOD on June 29, 2021: 10 unique real-property items valued at $1,698,087
• Camp Arena was turned over to the MOD on 28 June, 2021: Six unique real-property items valued at $322,341
• Bagram Airfield was turned over to the MOD on July 1, 2021: 1,558 unique real-property items valued at $565,840,912

In addition, Resolute Support headquarters (RSHQ) was handed over to the Afghan government on June 6, 2021. It was then handed over to U.S. Embassy Kabul on the same day. RSHQ was valued at $4.2 million.138

As of June 12, 2021, CSTC-A was managing five ongoing, DOD-funded ANA infrastructure projects costing roughly $22.7 million in total. In addition, CSTC-A completed two projects totaling $3.3 million and was planning two projects costing an estimated $5.7 million. No DOD-funded ANA infrastructure projects were descoped or terminated this quarter.139

The two projects completed this quarter were a roughly $1.8 million Special Mission Wing (SMW) “Ramp6S Supporting Structures” and a $1.5 million ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) building renovation and construction in Kabul.140

Of the ongoing and planned projects, the costliest include an ongoing electrical-grid connection project for the ANA in Baghlan Province (about $9.5 million), one phase of an ongoing SMW facilities-expansion plan for its airbase at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul ($5.6 million), and a planned electrical-grid connection project for the ANA in Parwan Province (costing roughly $8.5 million, of which the U.S. ASFF contribution is $5.2 million with the rest pledged by another donor nation).141

Four of the five ongoing infrastructure projects for MOD elements are slated for completion after September 2021, when U.S. forces plan to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan.142 As for continued oversight of construction projects after the U.S. withdrawal, DSCMO-A confirmed the same plan that CSTC-A said in January:

We are keenly aware of the need to provide proper oversight of projects and protect taxpayer dollars. Therefore, in order to meet our fiscal oversight responsibilities CSTC-A and USACE have established construction verification and quality assurance contracts with local national engineers. These contractors conduct regular and reoccurring site visits and provide detailed photographic and written reports back to us. This allows CSTC-A and USACE to effectively oversee construction completion regardless of U.S. or Coalition troop levels.143

CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANA facility-sustainment requirements remain $108.8 million, as in the previous two quarters. Of this, $74.7 million is provided directly to the Afghan government and $34.1 million is spent by DSCMO-A for the Afghan government.144
ANA Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated over $104 million and disbursed nearly $84 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA training and operations. Also as of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing about $4.3 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.\(^{145}\)

According to CSTC-A, ASFF funds currently pay for a number of high-cost, mission-critical training programs for MOD force elements. The costliest is a roughly $110 million training program for the ASSF, supporting NSOCC-A-partnered units as they further develop critical operational and institutionalized special operations training and build sufficient capacity. This is followed by a nearly $80 million contract to train entry-level AAF and SMW aircraft maintainers, and another roughly $80 million entry-level rotary and fixed-wing pilot training contract for the AAF and SMW.\(^ {146}\)

Shown in Table 2.9, just the 10 most costly U.S.-funded contracts to train ANA, AAF, and ANASOC personnel could total roughly $517 million by the time the current contracts’ terms end. Seven of the 10 are scheduled to run into the late summer or early fall of 2021; the other three end in 2022.\(^ {147}\)

### Table 2.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Base/Current Period of Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSF Training Program</td>
<td>Base: 10/1/2019–9/1/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY1: 9/1/2020–9/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Entry Rotary Wing and Initial Entry Fixed Wing</td>
<td>Current Base: 4/1/2020–10/31/2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Continental United States AAF Pilot Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Aviation Maintenance Development Center</td>
<td>Base: 4/15/2019–4/14/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY1: 4/15/2020–9/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(No-cost extension due to COVID-19 delays)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSF Training Support Services</td>
<td>Base: 4/15/2019–4/14/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY1: 4/15/2020–9/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY3: 9/1/2020–8/31/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Support Squadron Advisors</td>
<td>Base: 7/1/2019–4/30/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY2: 10/1/2020–9/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29 Pilot and Maintenance Training (AAF)</td>
<td>Base: 10/1/2019–9/30/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY1: 10/1/2020–9/30/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208 Contractor Logistics Support and Maintenance Training (AAF)</td>
<td>Base: 5/20/2017–1/31/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY3: 2/1/2020–1/31/2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29 Lead-In High Power Turbo Propeller Pilot Training (AAF)</td>
<td>Current Base: 8/15/2020–8/14/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF English Language Training</td>
<td>Base: 7/1/2019–6/30/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current OY1: 8/15/2020–8/14/2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value training contracts supporting MOD force elements. The case/contract value dollar amounts were not approved for public release this quarter. ASSF = Afghan Special Security Forces, AAF = Afghan Air Force, ANA = Afghan National Army.

DOD noted that many contracts are already executed outside Afghanistan, so contract oversight will continue as it was before the U.S. withdrawal began. For those contracts executed in Afghanistan, a small DSCMO-A element will remain co-located with U.S. Embassy Kabul and monitor the contracts through interactions with the MOD and MOL.148

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

U.S. Funding
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly $2.13 billion and disbursed about $1.78 billion of ASFP appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the AAF. The authorized ASFF funds for the AAF from FY 2019 through FY 2021 total approximately $2.8 billion.149

As in most previous years, sustainment remains the costliest funding category for the AAF (59% of FY 2020, and 69% of FY 2019 obligated funds), followed by training (35% and 24% respectively), equipment and transportation (7% and 5%), and infrastructure (1% of both fiscal years’ funds). AAF sustainment and equipment costs primarily include contractor-provided maintenance; major and minor repairs and aircraft upgrades; and procurement of parts, supplies, and training equipment for the AAF’s in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, and Mi-17 helicopters; A-29, C-130, C-208, and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft.150

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
<th>Usable / In-Country</th>
<th>Authorized Aircrews</th>
<th>Assigned Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The AAF is phasing out its Russian-made Mi-17s. FY 2022 is the last year DOD will seek sustainment funding for the Mi-17s. Some will remain in the fleet to provide operational capability until the UH-60 capability matures and the transition to CH-47s is completed. TAAC-Air did not provide data for Mi-17 aircrews because it does not provide train, advise, and assist support for the AAF’s Mi-17s.

**Security**

**AAF Inventory and Aircrew**

**Inventory and Status**

As of June 30, 2021, the AAF had 167 available aircraft among the 211 aircraft in its total inventory. As Table 2.10 shows, three of seven of the AAF’s airframes had fully usable aircraft inventories this quarter (A-29, AC-208, and C-208). In addition to the AAF’s current fleet in Afghanistan, 37 UH-60s previously purchased for the AAF are currently held in strategic reserve in the United States. Secretary Austin told Afghan President Ghani that DOD will begin to provide these aircraft to the AAF. He added that three UH-60’s would be delivered by July 23, 2021, but no further details are publicly available. Four MD-530s have been purchased to replace battle damaged aircraft. The timeline for their delivery to the AAF has yet to be determined.

**Afghan Air Force Still Lacking Qualified Aircrew**

DSCMO-A reported no changes this quarter to the number of authorized AAF aircrews, but several changes to assigned aircrews from last quarter. These changes included three fewer A-29 crews (from 21 to 18), two more AC-208 crews (13 to 15), and 16 less C-208 crews (from 31 to 15), and two more C-130 crews (from three to five).

As TAAC-Air did last quarter, this quarter DSCMO-A provided data on qualified and trained aircrew by position and airframe (instructor pilots, copilots, mission system operators, etc.). As seen in Table 2.11, only 15 of 42 total positions were filled with qualified personnel, as of June 30, 2021, a decrease of three from last quarter. Only the C-130 had more than half of its aircrew positions filled (four of seven) with the required number of qualified personnel. The C-208 and MD-530 fared worst, with only one of five positions filled with the required number of qualified personnel.

OUSD-P explained why so many aircrew positions lacked qualified personnel:

> After the initial break in training caused by COVID, training was further slowed by COVID-related delays in obtaining student visas and quarantine requirements at the training locations. Students who returned to Afghanistan after completing initial training and aircraft qualification training were not able to fly with contracted or T10 instructors due to COVID restrictions, which caused a “bubble” of aircraft-qualified pilots who are still waiting to complete mission qualification training.

DSCMO-A plans to shift contracted pilot and maintainer training that was previously provided in Afghanistan to third-country locations and will supplement other pilot and maintenance training that is already provided in third countries. Training challenges include finding suitable live-fire...
locations for some Afghan aircraft and ensuring that training at these various locations is accomplished to standard.\textsuperscript{156}

Another worrisome development concerning AAF aircrew was a media report that the Taliban is deliberately targeting Afghan pilots. According to Reuters, at least seven Afghan pilots have been assassinated off-base in recent months.\textsuperscript{157}

**AAF Operations and Readiness**

**Afghan Air Force Readiness Dips in June**

Five of the seven airframes experienced decreases in readiness the last month of the quarter (June). This coincided with the Taliban offensive and the withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces, including aircraft-maintenance contractors. The combined effect of the two appeared to reduce aircraft readiness rates. The AC-208 fleet, for example, had maintained a 93% readiness rate in April and May, but dropped to 63% in June; the UH-60 fleet was at 77% in April and May, but dropped to 39% in June.\textsuperscript{158}

The AAF’s flight hours this quarter (April–June) were slightly higher than seasonal norms, but almost identical to last quarter’s flight hours and lower than the third and fourth quarters of 2020, as shown in Figure 2.34.\textsuperscript{159}

Two of seven AAF airframes flew more than their recommended flight hours this quarter (one fewer than last quarter). Three of seven airframes met their readiness benchmarks this quarter compared to four last quarter (January–March 2021). The four airframes that failed to meet readiness benchmarks were the A-29, C-208, MD-530, and UH-60.\textsuperscript{160}

**FIGURE 2.34**

**AAF Flight Hours by Quarter Since 2019**

Note: Flight hours have been rounded to the nearest hour.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call 7/15/2021; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 7/2021
**Aircraft Overtaxed and Crews Overtasked**

According to Training Advisory Assistance Command-Air (TAAC-Air) all aircraft platforms are overtaxed due to increased requests for close air support, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance missions, and aerial resupply now that the ANDSF largely lacks U.S. air support. All airframes are flying at least 25% over their recommended scheduled-maintenance intervals. This is exacerbating supply-chain issues and delaying scheduled maintenance and battle-damage repair. Meanwhile “crews remain over-tasked due to the security situation in Afghanistan and the OPSTEMPO has only increased,” according to TAAC-Air. The Afghan government claimed on June 29, 2021, that the AAF carried out 491 attacks on Taliban positions in the past month.

The UH-60 fleet of helicopters provided by the United States is meeting the operational needs of the AAF. However, accidents, battle damage, the withdrawal of U.S. and contractor logistics support (CLS) personnel, and the resultant consolidation of CLS in Kabul as the main maintenance hub for almost all aircraft repair is damaging the health of the UH-60 fleet. With reduced personnel due to the withdrawal of contractors as well as the increased operational tempo, UH-60 CLS has temporarily shifted from training and mentoring the AAF to aircraft maintenance in an attempt to improve aircraft availability.

In one positive development, after the contractors began withdrawing and those that remained focused on mentorship versus maintenance, the AAF signed for equipment and supplies, accepted responsibility of the various equipment accounts, and increased work and class attendance. This resulted in “a delay in [reaching] the dire predicted aircraft availability rates,” according to TAAC-Air.

TAAC-Air will transition to the Aviation Division (AD) within DSCMO-A. The AD will be the requirements owner for all aviation-related equipment, supplies, maintenance, and training in support of both the AAF and Special Missions Wing, including aviation CLS and contract training programs.

**Qualified Afghan Maintainers Even More Critical with the Loss of U.S. Maintenance Contractors**

As SIGAR highlighted in its 2021 *High-Risk List* and as IG Sopko testified to Congress on March 16, 2021, building a qualified maintainer cadre is critical for the AAF’s ability to independently maintain its own aircraft and work toward eventually no longer requiring costly U.S.-funded contractor logistic support for aircraft maintenance. TAAC-Air assessed in January 2021 that without continued contractor support, none of the AAF’s airframes can be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months, depending on the stock of equipment parts in-country, the maintenance capability on each airframe, and the timing of contractor support withdrawal.
According to AAF data provided by DSCMO-A, three of seven AAF airframes (C-208, AC-208, and Mi-17s) have enough qualified maintainers at all three levels of certification (Level 3, basic maintenance duties, through Level 1, the most advanced maintenance duties) required to maintain their aircraft, as seen in Table 2.12. Some of the progress the AAF made filling its ranks with qualified mechanics appeared to slip this quarter, with the A-29 losing required mechanics at all three levels of certification.167

Afghan mechanics will be forced to perform with far fewer maintenance contractors, who not only provided training and mentorship, but also could repair aircraft in emergencies. As Table 2.12 shows, the number of contracted mechanics dropped dramatically this quarter. Not including Mi-17 maintenance contractors, the number of aircraft maintenance contractors went from 409 in April 2021 to 101 in June 2021.168

In addition to virtual training and maintenance meetings, DSCMO-A DA is also establishing a third-country supply depot to control parts flow and fly aircraft parts to Afghanistan as required. Afghan aircraft requiring depot-level and battle damage repairs are transported to maintenance facilities outside Afghanistan. On June 29, Afghan media reported that 25 helicopters are out of country for repair.169

**TABLE 2.12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Maintainer Level 3</th>
<th>Maintainer Level 2</th>
<th>Maintainer Level 1</th>
<th>Contracted Maintainers April 2021</th>
<th>Contracted Maintainers June 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>233%</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>125%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>190%</td>
<td>151%</td>
<td>286%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>781%</td>
<td>372%</td>
<td>579%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>101*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total does not include 66 Mi-17 contractors to allow an accurate quarter-to-quarter comparison.

Note: Data is as of June 2021. Percentages are the percent of positions filled with the required number of qualified maintainers at each level of maintenance qualification. Maintainer levels with percentages over 100% have an excess number of qualified maintainers versus the number required.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2021.
AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES
The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are the ANDSF’s primary offensive forces. The ASSF include a number of elements, such as the ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR tracks ASSF operations data because DOD has said the ASSF’s growing size and capabilities are important both for the ANDSF’s overall performance and for the United States to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its over-the-horizon counterterrorism efforts.170

U.S. Funding
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated roughly $1.15 billion and disbursed nearly $885 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ASSF.171

ASSF Operations
Like the rest of Resolute Support, NATO’s Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) also retrograded and closed their bases; NSOCC-A transitioned to over-the-horizon support at the end of June 2021.172 Additionally, NSOCC-A claimed they “repositioned forces for over-the-horizon operations in anticipation of orders to monitor and disrupt al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan operations originating from Afghanistan.”173

According to NSOCC-A, most ANA corps refuse to execute missions without ANASOC support. When ANASOC forces arrive, they are misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance, checkpoint security, and quick-reaction force. NSOCC-A reported that misuse of the SMW also increased significantly this quarter compared to both last quarter and a year ago. NSOCC-A cautioned, however, that “it is difficult to assess [ASSF] ‘misuse’ in an environment where the [Afghan government] is fighting for its existence.”174

Despite the increasing misuse of the ASSF, NSOCC-A added that the “ASSF quickly became largely independent as a result of our retrograde.” For example, the integration of Afghan Air Force and ground force planning for the ASSF continues to improve. Areas needing improvement include the repetitive use of flight routes and helicopter landing zones and the need to improve communication between ground units and the SMW.175

In a press conference on June 29, an Afghan special operations corps commander claimed his unit’s activity had increased 30% following the start of the withdrawal two months ago.176

“It is difficult to assess [ASSF] ‘misuse’ in an environment where the [Afghan government] is fighting for its existence.”

Special Mission Wing Integrates UH-60 “Black Hawk” Helicopters into Operations
NSOCC-A told SIGAR this quarter that the Special Mission Wing (SMW), which conducts special-operations aviation missions and provides capabilities not found in the AAF, has begun integrating UH-60 aircraft into their operations, now that their first UH-60-rated crew and Level-3 mechanics (basic maintenance duties) have been certified. Integration of the UH-60s reduces the need to overwork the older Mi-17 aircraft still in the AAF inventory. However, the SMW can field no more than one UH-60 per night for helicopter missions.177

Also, because of the withdrawal, “the SMW has begun to transition from contract logistics support maintenance at each squadron location to a centralized hub-and-spoke maintenance posture” centered in Kabul.178 NSOCC-A explained that from now on aircraft from around the country will be flown or transported to HKIA for maintenance. Should an aircraft be unable to move, an Afghan team of mechanics will go to the location and repair the aircraft for a one-time flight to HKIA for further repair. Contractor logistic support provides both on-site maintenance support and over-the-horizon maintenance support to the SMW. In addition, DSCMO-A claimed to be standing up out-of-country locations to conduct major maintenance and overhauls.179

More information on the ASSF, including updates about ASSF components and their performance this quarter, the number of operational aircraft and the number of authorized and assigned aircraft maintainers in the Special Mission Wing, is available in the SIGAR's classified supplement to this quarterly report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
U.S. Funding
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly $900 million and disbursed more than $794 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.180 As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated $21.7 billion and disbursed nearly $21.5 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build, train, equip, and sustain ANP elements, including police special forces. These force elements constituted the ANP budget activity group for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.181

ANP Sustainment
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $756.3 million and disbursed more than $671.4 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP sustainment. As of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about $9.6 billion from
FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations to sustain ANP elements, including police special forces. ¹⁸² Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). ¹⁸³ To support the MOI, CSTC-A planned to provide up to $174.4 million in FY 1400. Of these funds, approximately $6.9 million (4%) was for salaries, with the remaining funds for purchase of goods, services, or assets. ¹⁸⁴ As of June 12, DOD had disbursed $9.5 million directly to the Afghan government to support MOI for FY 1400. ¹⁸⁵

ANP Equipment and Transportation
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $3.7 million and disbursed about $3.5 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP equipment and transportation costs. As of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about $4.8 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements, including police special forces, equipment and transportation costs. ¹⁸⁶ Although CSTC-A has moved away from new procurements of major equipment and systems, items already procured are still being delivered to the ANP. ¹⁸⁷ Table 2.13 lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (March 1, 2021, through May 31, 2021). Of these items, the costliest was the delivery of over 11 million 7.62 mm cartridges ($8.5 million total). Additionally, the costliest defense article transferred from USFOR-A equipment to the ANP via foreign military sales from stock were 374 pistols ($97,079). ¹⁸⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO ANP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost of Equipment</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (March 1–May 31, 2021). The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases.

SECURITY

ANP Infrastructure

As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $4.1 million and disbursed about $2.3 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP infrastructure projects. As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated and disbursed about $3.2 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for infrastructure projects for ANP elements, including police special forces.189

As of June 12, 2021, CSTC-A was managing one ongoing, DOD-funded ANP infrastructure project—the joint NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF)- and ASFF-funded closed-circuit television surveillance system in Kabul ($19 million of this funded by ASFF).190 CSTC-A reported that no projects were completed, cancelled, or terminated this quarter.191 Ongoing projects will continue and progress will be monitored as long as the security environment permits.192

CSTC-A continued to report this quarter that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements is $68.8 million. Of this, $42.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $26.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.193

ANP Training and Operations

As of June 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than $135.6 million and disbursed about $117.2 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP training and operations. As of June 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating about $4 billion and disbursing roughly $3.9 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements, including police special forces, training and operations.194

Police checkpoint in Tang-e-Farkhar, Taloqan. (UNAMA photo)
This quarter, DOD provided SIGAR an update on the two current U.S.-funded ANP training contracts. One is a $14 million contract to train the ANP to maintain its ground vehicles as part of the 2018 National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support contract; the current contract extends through August 31, 2021, although another year can be supported. The other is a contract to support training MOI and MOD women in occupational skills as part of the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development Program; the roughly $1 million contract runs until April 30, 2022.

Operations and training efforts include reducing the numbers of the most vulnerable checkpoints and reevaluating the training pipeline and training curriculum for police personnel. Specifically, MOI revised the curriculum of initial-entry police training to better align with a civil law-enforcement mission. But MOI lacks institutional training that reinforces civil law enforcement. Furthermore, beyond early training, the ANP also lacks an institutionalized leadership-development program at the district and local levels.

SIGAR released the 2021 High-Risk List in March to alert legislators and policymakers of major areas of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan at risk of waste, fraud, abuse, mismanagement, or mission failure. The 2021 High-Risk List focuses on program areas and elements of the reconstruction effort that are: (1) essential to success; (2) at risk of significant and large-scale failure due to waste, fraud, or abuse; and (3) subject to the control or influence of the U.S. government.

One risk area is developing Afghan police. SIGAR found that after two decades of international support, Afghanistan currently has a small number of highly trained specialized police forces that have emerged under the tutelage of international advisors. At the same time, the Afghan government still lacks a police force that can legitimately enforce the rule of law on a day-to-day basis. The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), responsible for this civilian policing mission, are largely illiterate and poorly trained. Further, many AUP are considered abusive, predatory, and corrupt.

Additionally, SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program (LLP) has begun briefing some of its preliminary findings from its ongoing Police in Conflict report. Most recently, in response to current political discussions on the future of U.S. and international donor assistance to the Afghan National Police, LLP staff briefed Resolute Support, U.S. Embassy Kabul, UK Embassy Kabul, and the Netherlands Embassy Kabul on SIGAR’s ongoing study identifying lessons from U.S. and international police assistance from 2001 to 2021.
DEADLY ATTACK HINDERS MINE CLEARING EFFORTS

On June 8, 2021, at least 10 people were killed and 16 others wounded in an attack on the British-American HALO Trust demining charity. Islamic State-Khorasan claimed responsibility for the assault on the camp in northeastern Baghlan Province. The HALO Trust began working in Afghanistan in 1988, shortly before the Soviet withdrawal, and employs more than 2,600 local staff members.198

Afghanistan is riddled with land mines and “explosive remnants of war” (ERW) such as live shells and bombs, according to the United Nations (UN).199 Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001, most casualties today are caused by mines and other ERW that have accumulated since 2002.200 In recent years, casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also has documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in areas following heavy fighting.201

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has allocated $427 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction effort). As of May 31, 2021, PM/WRA had released $7 million in FY 2020 funds.202

State directly funds six Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), four international NGOs, and one Afghan government organization to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds), which insurgents can use to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).203 From 1997 through May 31, 2021, State-funded implementing partners have cleared approximately 317.2 square kilometers of land (117 square miles) and removed or destroyed nearly 8.5 million land mines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 2.14 shows conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2011–2021.204

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. As of May 31, 2021, the total known contaminated area was 809.4 square kilometers (312.5 square miles) in 4,152 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a battlefield can include land mines and other improvised explosives; and an initial hazardous area will include an indeterminate amount and type of explosive hazards.205
### TABLE 2.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31,644,360</td>
<td>10,504</td>
<td>345,029</td>
<td>2,393,725</td>
<td>602,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46,783,527</td>
<td>11,830</td>
<td>344,363</td>
<td>1,058,760</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,059,918</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>203,024</td>
<td>275,697</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22,071,212</td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>287,331</td>
<td>346,484</td>
<td>511,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12,101,386</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>33,078</td>
<td>88,798</td>
<td>570,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27,856,346</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>6,289</td>
<td>91,563</td>
<td>607,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31,897,313</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>88,261</td>
<td>547,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25,233,844</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>30,924</td>
<td>158,850</td>
<td>558,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>13,104,094</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>26,791</td>
<td>162,727</td>
<td>657,693,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>23,966,967</td>
<td>2,879</td>
<td>7,197</td>
<td>85,250</td>
<td>843,517,435</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>18,155,152</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>4,051</td>
<td>31,644</td>
<td>809,437,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>277,874,119</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,779</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,325,709</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,781,759</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition.

There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. FY 2021 data covers October 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/16/2021.