

# 3 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE



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**Photo on previous page**

U.S. troops secure the perimeter at Kabul airport as the U.S. evacuation proceeds, August 2021. (DVIDS photo)



# RECONSTRUCTION IN BRIEF

Section 3 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of the reporting period as well as the programs and projects concerning Afghanistan reconstruction across four areas: Funding, Security, Governance, and Economic and Social Development

## TALIBAN TAKEOVER

- The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) disintegrated, the Afghan government collapsed, and the Taliban regained power this quarter.
- U.S. and Coalition forces conducted a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation that evacuated more than 124,000 people, including 6,000 Americans, diplomats, foreign nationals from allied and partner countries, and at-risk Afghans.
- All remaining U.S. and Coalition Forces withdrew.
- The Taliban captured a windfall of ANDSF military equipment when it regained control of the country; DOD is analyzing the materiel losses.

## 'CARETAKER' GOVERNMENT

- On August 15, 2021, President Ashraf Ghani abandoned Kabul; Taliban forces entered the capital.
- The Taliban announced a “caretaker” government that contains no non-Taliban members, no past government officials, and no leaders from minority groups.
- Several Taliban cabinet officials have terror ties and are on sanction lists, including the prime minister.
- The United States and other members of the international community suspended access to billions of dollars in Afghan government assets and donor funds.

## FUTURE OF AFGHAN WOMEN UNCERTAIN

- The UN noted reports that the Taliban prohibited women from appearing in public places without male chaperones and prevented women from working.
- The Taliban have limited girls' access to education, with many secondary schools reopening in September for male students and teachers only.

## HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

- All USAID-funded development assistance activities in Afghanistan are suspended.
- Afghanistan's formal economy stalled and public services were on the verge of collapse as the country lost foreign development assistance; a UN agency warned the country faced “near universal poverty.”
- The combination of economic problems, drought conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and insecurity has driven a worsening humanitarian crisis.
- At the September 2021 donors' conference in Geneva, over \$1.1 billion was pledged in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, including \$64 million in new aid from the U.S. government.

## U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING

- Cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002 rose to \$145.96 billion in the quarter.
- Of \$110.26 billion (76% of total) appropriated to the six reconstruction funds examined this quarter, about \$3.59 billion remained for possible disbursement.
- DOD's latest *Cost of War Report*, dated June 30, 2021, said its cumulative obligations for Afghanistan, including U.S. warfighting and reconstruction, had reached \$839.8 billion. Cumulative reconstruction and related obligations reported by State, USAID, and other civilian agencies reached \$49.7 billion.
- The Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute estimated Afghanistan war costs at \$2.26 trillion. That total includes DOD and civilian agency costs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a portion of DOD costs since 2001, veterans' medical and disability costs, and interest costs on war-related borrowing.

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# STATUS OF FUNDS

## STATUS OF FUNDS

In accord with SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2021, the United States government had appropriated or otherwise made available approximately \$145.96 billion in funds for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Total Afghanistan reconstruction funding has been allocated as follows:


- \$89.38 billion for security (including \$4.60 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$36.23 billion for governance and development (including \$4.38 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$4.43 billion for humanitarian aid
- \$15.92 billion for agency operations

- ASFF:** Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- CERP:** Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
- ESF:** Economic Support Fund
- IDA:** International Disaster Assistance
- INCLE:** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- MRA:** Migration and Refugee Assistance
- NADR:** Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

Figure F.1 shows the seven largest active U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts. SIGAR previously reported on the eight largest active funds, but one of these funds, the Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities account, did not provide funding for counternarcotics activities in FY 2021, so has been removed from this section of SIGAR’s reporting.

FIGURE F.1


U.S. APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. \*As of June 30, 2021, the latest figures provided to SIGAR.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

# STATUS OF FUNDS



## U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

As of September 30, 2021, cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan totaled approximately \$145.96 billion, as shown in Figure F.2. This total comprises four major categories of reconstruction and related funding: security, governance and development, humanitarian, and agency operations. Approximately \$8.98 billion of these funds supported counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the categories of security (\$4.60 billion) and governance and development (\$4.38 billion). For complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.


President Donald J. Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA 2021) into law on December 27, 2020, providing appropriations for all agencies active in Afghanistan, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. Agency for Global Media; the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; and SIGAR. Three appropriations were specifically targeted for Afghanistan, consisting of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), and the SIGAR appropriation, together totaling \$3.10 billion; other funds were made available for Afghanistan reconstruction under various authorities and requirements. Total funds made available for Afghanistan reconstruction for FY 2021 were \$4.37 billion, as shown in Figure F.3.

In the quarter ending September 30, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden signed the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (ESSAA), 2021, on July 30, 2021, making funds available to the Department of Defense (DOD) under its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)

**INCLE account data was not provided this quarter. The amount provided to the six largest remaining funds represents more than 75.5% (nearly \$110.26 billion) of total reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of this amount, nearly 93.0% (nearly \$102.53 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 90.7% (nearly \$99.99 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated \$6.68 billion of the amount appropriated for these funds has expired and will therefore not be disbursed.**

FIGURE F.2

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2021 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

provision, and to the Department of State (State) for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) and the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account, in connection with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup>

Also during the quarter, DOD took steps to reprogram nearly \$1.46 billion from its ASFF FY 2020 and FY 2021 accounts to OHDACA and its Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF), and State took steps to address the fact that its \$200.00 million allocation to Afghanistan for the FY 2020 Economic Support Fund (ESF) was unobligated and set to expire after the collapse of the Afghan government in August.<sup>2</sup> These steps consisted of rescinding \$73.07 million as part of a larger State rescission requirement and extending the period of availability of obligation for the remaining \$126.93 million, both under special provisions found in the CAA 2021.<sup>3</sup>

Since 2002, the United States has provided more than \$17.32 billion in on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan. This includes nearly \$11.36 billion provided to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and nearly \$5.97 billion to three multilateral trust funds—the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development Programme-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the Asian Development Bank-managed Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Table F.1 shows U.S. on-budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan government and multilateral trust funds, and Table F.6 on page 47 shows the increasing share of U.S. civilian sector assistance being provided to multilateral institutions.

TABLE F.1


U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2002 (\$ MILLIONS)	
	Disbursements
<b>Total On-Budget Assistance</b>	<b>\$17,323.01</b>
<b>Government-to-Government</b>	<b>11,355.23</b>
DOD	10,493.25
USAID	776.79
State	85.19
<b>Multilateral Trust Funds</b>	<b>5,967.77</b>
ARTF	4,127.68
LOTFA	1,686.42
AITF	153.67

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2018; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/21/2021; World Bank, ARTF Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021 (end of 8th month of FY 1400), accessed 10/11/2021; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 (Combined Bilateral and MPTF), updated 9/30/2021, in response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2021.

FIGURE F.3

## ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

## U.S. COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN


DOD's latest *Cost of War Report*, dated June 30, 2021, said its cumulative obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom's Sentinel in Afghanistan, including U.S. warfighting and reconstruction, had reached \$839.8 billion.<sup>4</sup> DOD and SIGAR jointly provide oversight for security-related reconstruction funding accounting for \$84.5 billion of this amount. State, USAID, and other civilian agencies report cumulative obligations of \$49.7 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction, which when added to the DOD amount results in \$134.2 billion obligated for Afghanistan reconstruction through that date, as shown in Figure F.4. This cost of reconstruction equals 15% of the \$889.5 billion obligated by all U.S. government agencies for Afghanistan.

### Some DOD Costs of Reconstruction Not Provided to SIGAR

Because DOD has not provided information to SIGAR pursuant to requests made under statutory requirement, SIGAR has been unable to report on

FIGURE F.4

AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2021 Q3 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Cumulative obligations reported by DOD for the Cost of War through June 30, 2021, differ markedly from cumulative appropriations through September 30, 2021, as presented elsewhere in the Status of Funds section, because the former figures do not include unobligated appropriations and DOD Cost of War reporting lags by one quarter.

Source: DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Total War-related Obligations by Year Incurred, data as of June 30, 2021. Obligation data shown against year funds obligated. SIGAR analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts as presented in SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2021. Obligation data shown against year funds appropriated.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

some Afghan reconstruction costs, principally those relating to the DOD's Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission under Operation Freedom's Sentinel that are not paid for by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF pays only for contractors and not the DOD military and civilian employees that train, advise, and support the ANDSF.

Therefore, SIGAR reporting does not include costs of: (1) training and advising programs such as the Train Advise Assist Commands (TAACs), the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program, the Afghanistan Hands Program (AHP), and the DOD Expeditionary Civilian (DOD-EC) program; (2) support provided to members of the NATO Resolute Support Mission; and (3) certain advisory and support costs of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and its successor, the Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A).

SIGAR has also been unable to report on the operating expenses of CSTC-A and its successor DSCMO-A, and program offices that support ASFF procurement.

SIGAR is mandated by federal statute to report on amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Reconstruction is defined by statute to include funding for efforts "to establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan" such as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The mandate also requires reporting on "operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan."<sup>5</sup>

SIGAR has made repeated requests to DOD since 2018 for an accounting or estimates of these costs, but none has been provided.<sup>6</sup> DOD representatives have replied that its accounting and reporting systems do not generate the information in the format requested by SIGAR—information that SIGAR's authorizing statute requires it to report—and that it generally does not provide estimates that are inconsistent with its official reporting. For example, DOD's *Cost of War Report* does not include costs of the base pay and certain benefits of military personnel deployed to Afghanistan, since these costs are generally reported by units based outside of Afghanistan. This fact complicates the reporting of the cost of military organizations in Afghanistan, particularly those with a mix of DOD military, DOD civilians, and DOD-paid contractors.

## Costs of War Project Sees Higher Costs than DOD

A nongovernmental estimate of U.S. costs for the 20-year war in Afghanistan is more than double DOD's calculation. The Costs of War Project sponsored by the Watson Institute at Brown University recently issued *U.S. Costs to Date for the War in Afghanistan, 2001–2021*, putting total costs at \$2.26 trillion.<sup>7</sup>

The Watson Institute's independently produced report builds on DOD's \$933 billion Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets and State's \$59 billion OCO budgets for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unlike the DOD *Cost of War Report*, the Watson report adds what it considers to be Afghanistan-related

### Funding After the Collapse

U.S. disbursements intended for direct (on-budget) aid to the elected Afghan government paused or ended with the fall of that government on August 15, 2021. The United States does not recognize the successor Taliban regime.

DOD said no further on-budget assistance was provided to the Afghan ministries of defense and interior after the government's collapse. The State Department told SIGAR, "The United States is not providing any assistance to the Taliban or any part of the government of Afghanistan." USAID said it asked its implementing partners not to carry out any work in Afghanistan, while it continued disbursing some funds so its partners could retain staff and preserve operational capacity.

Some U.S. funding for humanitarian purposes continues to flow through UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations into Afghanistan, but is not under the control of the Taliban regime.

Source: DOD, State, and USAID communications to SIGAR, 10/2021.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

costs of \$433 billion above DOD baseline costs, \$296 billion in medical and disability costs for veterans, and \$530 billion in interest costs on related Treasury borrowing.


SIGAR takes no position on the reasonableness of the Watson report's assumptions or the accuracy of its calculations.

## AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated more than \$145.96 billion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan, of which nearly \$110.26 billion was appropriated to six of the seven largest active reconstruction accounts. Appropriations to the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account is excluded this quarter because the data was not provided by the Department of State. (INCLE reported cumulative appropriations of \$5.50 billion and \$0.57 billion in funds remaining for possible disbursement at June 30, 2021.) As of September 30, 2021, approximately \$3.59 billion of the amount appropriated to these six reconstruction accounts remained for possible disbursement, as shown in Table F.2 and Figure F.5.

FIGURE F.5

**STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS, SIX OF SEVEN LARGEST ACTIVE ACCOUNTS, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2021** (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: INCLE reported cumulative appropriations of \$5.50 billion and \$0.57 billion in funds remaining for possible disbursement at June 30, 2021.

TABLE F.2

<b>CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, DISBURSED, AND REMAINING FY 2002 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2021</b> (\$ BILLIONS)				
	<b>Appropriated</b>	<b>Obligated</b>	<b>Disbursed</b>	<b>Remaining</b>
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	\$81.44	\$76.39	\$75.72	\$1.56
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	21.16	20.09	18.45	1.80
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	Account balances were not provided by State			
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP)	3.71	2.29	2.29	0.00
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1.73	1.72	1.63	0.08
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	1.28	1.25	1.11	0.14
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR)	0.93	0.79	0.79	0.00
<b>Six of Seven Largest Active Accounts (INCLE Excluded), Total</b>	<b>110.26</b>	<b>102.53</b>	<b>99.99</b>	<b>3.59</b>
Other Reconstruction Funds	19.78			
Agency Operations	15.92			
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$145.96</b>			

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven largest active reconstruction accounts, excluding INCLE this quarter because their balances were not provided to SIGAR, after deducting approximately \$6.68 billion that has expired. Expired funds equal the amount appropriated but not obligated after the period of availability for obligation has ended and thereafter includes amounts deobligated and canceled. The amount remaining for potential disbursement for Other Reconstruction Funds is less than \$50 million; for Agency Operations the amount can not be determined from the data provided by the agencies but is most often less than the most recent annual appropriation. The agencies do not report the full set of annual allocation, obligation, and disbursement data for some accounts, and in these cases, SIGAR assumes that annual allocations or obligations equal disbursements.

Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriation laws and obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID, 10/20/2021.


# STATUS OF FUNDS

## AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding for salaries, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction. The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF was the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which was succeeded by CENTCOM command and the Qatar-based Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A).

President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, into law on December 27, 2020, which provided an appropriation of \$3.05 billion for ASFF FY 2021 and a **rescission** of \$1.10 billion for ASFF FY 2020, reducing the original appropriation from \$4.20 billion to an adjusted appropriation of \$3.10 billion. This quarter, DOD took steps to reprogram nearly \$1.46 billion from its ASFF FY 2020 and FY 2021 accounts to its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) accounts, providing funds for evacuation from Afghanistan, and reducing ASFF FY 2020 and ASFF FY 2021 balances to more than \$2.95 billion and nearly \$1.74 billion, respectively, as shown in Figure F.6.<sup>8</sup>

As of September 30, 2021, cumulative appropriations for ASFF stood at more than \$81.44 billion, with nearly \$76.39 billion having been obligated, and nearly \$75.72 billion disbursed, as shown in Figure F.7. DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by \$193.06 million during



### ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

**Rescission:** Legislation enacted by Congress that cancels the availability of budget authority previously enacted before the authority would otherwise expire.

**Reprogramming:** Shifting funds within an appropriation or fund to use them for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation.

FIGURE F.6

ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR (\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE F.7

ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Source: GAO, Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, 9/2005.

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, \$1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, \$1.78 million from FY 2013 ASFF, \$604 million from FY 2019 ASFF, \$146 million from ASFF FY 2020, and \$1.31 billion from ASFF FY 2021 to fund other DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed \$230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. ASFF data reflect the following rescissions: \$1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, \$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, \$400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113, \$150 million from FY 2016 in Pub. L. No. 115-31, \$396 million from FY 2019 in Pub. L. No. 116-93, and \$1.10 billion from FY 2020 in Pub. L. No. 116-260.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2021," 10/16/2021; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021," 7/16/2021; and DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

the quarter ending September 30, 2021, and that cumulative disbursements increased by more than \$514.60 million.<sup>9</sup>

**Budget Activity Groups:** Categories within each appropriation or fund account that identify the purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund.

**Subactivity Groups:** Accounting groups that break down the command's disbursements into functional areas.

Source: DOD, Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual, accessed 9/28/2009; Department of the Navy, Medical Facility Manager Handbook, p. 5, accessed 10/2/2009.

## ASFF Budget Categories

DOD budgeted and reported on ASFF by three **Budget Activity Groups** (BAGs) through the FY 2018 appropriation. These BAGs consisted of Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, ANA), Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP), and Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations).

DOD revised its budgeting and reporting framework for ASFF beginning with its ASFF budget request for FY 2019, submitted to Congress in February 2018, and with its reporting beginning on October 1, 2018. The new framework restructures the ANA and ANP BAGs to better reflect the ANDSF force structure and new budget priorities. In FY 2018 and previous years, all costs associated with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) fell under the ANA BAG and costs for the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) were split between the ANA and ANP BAGs. Beginning with the ASFF FY 2019 appropriation, the ANDSF consists of the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF BAGs. As shown in Figure F.8, ASFF disbursements for the new AAF and ASSF BAGs, amounting to \$2.12 billion and \$1.06 billion, respectively, over the FY 2019 to FY 2021 period, together account for \$3.18 billion or 49% of total disbursements of \$6.43 billion over this period.

Funds for each BAG are further allocated to four **subactivity groups** (SAGs): Sustainment, Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, and Training and Operations. As shown in Figure F.9, ASFF disbursements of \$38.27 billion for ANDSF Sustainment constituted 51% of total cumulative ASFF expenditures of \$75.32 billion through September 30, 2021.

FIGURE F.8

**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY GROUP, OLD (FY 2005 TO FY 2018) AND NEW (FY 2019 TO FY 2021) (\$ BILLIONS)**





FIGURE F.9

**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP FY 2005 TO FY 2021 (\$ BILLIONS)**



Note: Numbers have been rounded. ASFF Disbursements by Budget Activity Group and Subactivity Group both exclude disbursements for Related Activities and undistributed disbursements, amounting to \$0.40 billion, that are included in total ASFF disbursements of \$75.72 billion as presented in Figure F.7.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2021," 10/16/2021.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

## ASFF Budgeting Requirements

The annual DOD appropriation act sets forth a number of ASFF budgeting requirements. Prior to the obligation of newly appropriated funds for ASFF, a **Financial and Activity Plan (FAP)** with details of proposed obligations must be approved by the DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC), concurred in by the Department of State, and notified to the Congressional defense committees. Thereafter, the AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of \$50 million annually and for any nonstandard equipment requirement in excess of \$100 million. In addition, DOD is required to notify Congress prior to obligating funds for any new projects or transfer of funds between budget subactivity groups in excess of \$20 million.<sup>10</sup>

DOD notified Congress of its initial budget for the ASFF FY 2021 appropriation with FAP 21-1 in January 2021, and notified Congress of its proposed plans to modify the budget for the ASFF FY 2020 appropriation with FAP 20-3 in March 2021. These budgets were modified with the reprogramming actions taken in FY21Q4, as presented on the next page in Table F.4. The DOD's execution of its spending plans for the ASFF FY 2020 and ASFF FY 2021 appropriations is presented below in Table F.3.

**Financial and Activity Plan:** DOD notification to Congress of its plan for obligating the ASFF appropriation, as well as updates to that plan involving any proposed new projects or transfer of funds between budget subactivity groups in excess of \$20 million, as required by the annual DOD appropriation act.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/23/2020.

TABLE F.3

ASFF FY 2020 AND ASFF FY 2021 BUDGET EXECUTION THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2021 (\$ MILLIONS)						
Budget Activity Groups	ASFF FY 2020			ASFF FY 2021		
	Avail. for Obligation	Obligations	Disbursements	Avail. for Obligation	Obligations	Disbursements
Afghan National Army	\$1,130.99	\$970.99	\$876.15	\$374.79	\$188.64	\$148.03
Afghan National Police	419.25	321.93	279.69	227.38	54.62	32.57
Afghan Air Force	988.83	975.17	882.60	626.72	367.13	353.66
Afghan Spec. Sec. Forces	414.73	304.41	243.89	509.39	233.96	210.96
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,953.79</b>	<b>\$2,572.50</b>	<b>\$2,282.32</b>	<b>\$1,738.28</b>	<b>\$844.35</b>	<b>\$745.22</b>

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The ASFF FY 2020 budget reflects \$1.10 billion rescinded from the account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, enacted on December 27, 2020, and reprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4 that reduced available balances by \$146.19 million. The ASFF FY 2021 budget reflects reprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4 that reduced available balances by \$1.31 billion. Totals exclude undistributed obligations and disbursements.

Source: DOD, AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2021, 10/16/2021; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2020, 20-3, March 2021; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2021, 21-1, January 2021, 4/8/2021; and response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021.

## NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) has contributed nearly \$1.70 billion to ASFF for specific projects funded by donor nations through September 30, 2021; ASFF has returned nearly \$456.94 million of these funds following the cancellation or completion of these projects. DOD has disbursed nearly \$1.20 billion of NATF-contributed funds through ASFF through September 30, 2021.<sup>11</sup> These amounts are not reflected in the U.S. government-funded ASFF obligation and disbursement numbers presented in Figures F.6 and F.7.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

TABLE F.4

<b>ASFF FY 2020 AND ASFF FY 2021 REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS AND REVISED BUDGETS, SEPTEMBER 30, 2021</b> (\$ MILLIONS)						
Budget Activity Groups	ASFF FY 2020			ASFF FY 2021		
	Previous Budget (FAP 20-3, March 2021)	Reprogramming Actions (to OHDACA and TWFC)	Revised Budget Available for Obligation	Previous Budget (FAP 21-1, January 2021)	Reprogramming Actions (to OHDACA and TWFC)	Revised Budget Available for Obligation
<b>Afghan National Army</b>						
Sustainment	\$1,132.53	(\$126.19)	\$1,006.34	\$963.57	(\$616.16)	\$347.41
Infrastructure	37.91		37.91	0.22		0.22
Equipment & Transport.	52.88		52.88	4.70	(3.20)	1.50
Training & Operations	33.86		33.86	25.66		25.66
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,257.18</b>	<b>(126.19)</b>	<b>1,130.99</b>	<b>994.15</b>	<b>(619.36)</b>	<b>374.79</b>
<b>Afghan National Police</b>						
Sustainment	384.40	(20.00)	364.40	392.98	(195.00)	197.98
Infrastructure	6.13		6.14	0.45		0.45
Equipment & Transport.	13.44		13.44	28.03	(26.00)	2.03
Training & Operations	35.27		35.28	26.92		26.92
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>439.25</b>	<b>(20.00)</b>	<b>419.25</b>	<b>448.38</b>	<b>(221.00)</b>	<b>227.38</b>
<b>Afghan Air Force</b>						
Sustainment	555.86		591.43	537.76	(44.33)	493.44
Infrastructure	3.44		3.44	0.00		0.00
Equipment & Transport.	56.28		51.86	45.98		45.98
Training & Operations	373.25		342.10	234.30	(147.00)	87.30
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>988.83</b>		<b>988.83</b>	<b>818.05</b>	<b>(191.33)</b>	<b>626.72</b>
<b>Afghan Special Security Forces</b>						
Sustainment	305.68		305.68	597.90	(142.64)	455.26
Infrastructure	9.91		9.91	1.53		1.53
Equipment & Transport.	71.98		71.98	18.69	(4.00)	14.69
Training & Operations	27.15		27.15	168.91	(131.00)	37.91
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>414.73</b>		<b>414.73</b>	<b>787.03</b>	<b>(277.64)</b>	<b>509.39</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$3,099.98</b>	<b>(\$146.19)</b>	<b>\$2,953.79</b>	<b>\$3,047.61</b>	<b>(\$1,309.33)</b>	<b>\$1,738.28</b>

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Funds have been reprogrammed from ASFF to the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation made available to the DOD in the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021, enacted on July 30, 2021, and the DOD Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). The ASFF FY 2020 budget reflects \$1.10 billion rescinded from the account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, enacted on December 27, 2020, and reprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4 that reduced available balances by \$146.19 million. The ASFF FY 2021 budget reflects reprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4 that reduced available balances by \$1.31 billion. Totals exclude undistributed obligations and disbursements.

Source: DOD, AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2021, 10/16/2021; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2020, 20-3, March 2021; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2021, 21-1, January 2021, 4/8/2021; and response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021.

## COMMANDERS' EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

The Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) enabled U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is restricted to small projects whose cost may not exceed \$500,000.<sup>12</sup>

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, decreased the annual appropriation for CERP from \$5.0 million in FY 2020 to \$2.0 million in FY 2021, bringing total cumulative funding to more than \$3.71 billion. House Report 116-453 accompanying the Appropriations Act stated that “the Committee believes that after nearly two decades the time has come to wind down this program [CERP]. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to transition activities to the Afghanistan Security Forces and other agencies of the United States government, as appropriate, and to phase out this program during fiscal year 2021.”<sup>13</sup>

Notably, CERP annual appropriations had equaled or exceeded \$400.00 million per year during the FY 2008–FY 2012 period, as shown in Figure F.10, and nearly \$1.12 billion in appropriations from this period were realigned to other Operation and Maintenance, Army account requirements, or expired without being disbursed. DOD reported that CERP cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements stood at approximately \$3.71 billion, \$2.29 billion, and \$2.29 billion, respectively, at September 30, 2021, as shown in Figure F.11.<sup>14</sup>



### CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

FIGURE F.10

**CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)




FIGURE F.11

**CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. Analysis includes data from a draft DOD financial report because the final version had not been completed when this report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021 and 7/19/2021; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2013; Pub. L. Nos. 115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, and 112-10.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

## Authorities for Transferring DOD Property

- FERP:** Foreign Excess Real Property
- FEPP:** Foreign Excess Personal Property
- EDA:** Excess Defense Articles

## Largest Base Transfers to the ANDSF Based on Depreciated Transfer Value

**Bagram Airfield, Parwan Province**  
\$565.84 million, July 2021

**Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar Province**  
\$130.19 million, May 2021

**Shindand Airfield, Herat Province**  
\$297.73 million, November 2014

**Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province**  
\$236.00 million, October 2014

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2021 and 6/22/2021; SIGAR, Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property, SIGAR 16-23-SP, 3/2016.

## MILITARY BASE AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS TO ANDSF

The Department of Defense manages the transfer of military bases and equipment principally through procedures designed for three types of assets, Foreign Excess Real Property (FERP), Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) defines FERP as any U.S.-owned real property located outside the United States and its territories that is under the control of a Federal agency, but which the head of the agency deemed it unnecessary to meet the agency's needs or responsibilities. Before disposing of FERP in Afghanistan, the donor agency must declare the property excess and ensure that another department or agency of the U.S. government does not require it to fulfill U.S. government objectives. The DOD Base Closure and Transfer Policy Standard Operating Procedures guide sets forth the conditions of transfer.<sup>15</sup> The FEPP and EDA programs have similar transfer frameworks.

USFOR-A has reported FERP and FEPP transfers at depreciated transfer value of nearly \$1.77 billion and \$462.26 million, respectively, over the FY 2012 to FY 2021 period. The peak transfer years of FY 2015 and FY 2021 had transfers valued at \$568.64 million and more than \$1.29 billion, as shown in Figure F.12. Cumulative FERP and FEPP transfers are valued at nearly \$2.23 billion, as shown in Figure F.13.<sup>16</sup> The four largest USFOR-A base transfers to the ANDSF based on depreciated transfer value, as shown to the right, is headed by the transfer of Bagram Airfield on July 1, 2021.<sup>17</sup>

FIGURE F.12

**FERP, FEPP & EDA BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(TRANSFERS, DEPRECIATED VALUES, \$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE F.13

**FERP, FEPP, & EDA, CUMULATIVE**  
(DEPRECIATED VALUES, \$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/14/2021; SIGAR, Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property, SIGAR 16-23-SP, 3/2016.


# STATUS OF FUNDS

## ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs are intended to advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF programs support counterterrorism; bolster national economies; and assist in the development of effective, accessible, and independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.<sup>18</sup>

The ESF was allocated \$136.45 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded between State and the U.S. Congress in the quarter ending June 30, 2021. This followed a \$200.00 million allocation of ESF funds to Afghanistan for FY 2020 that had remained unobligated at June 30, 2021. In the quarter ending September 30, 2021, \$73.07 million of the FY 2020 ESF allocation was rescinded as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021-mandated ESF rescission, and \$126.92 million of the FY 2020 ESF allocation had its period of availability for obligation extended by relying on the 7014(b) extraordinary authority found in the Act.<sup>19</sup>

Cumulative appropriations for the ESF now stand at more than \$21.16 billion, of which more than \$20.09 billion had been obligated and nearly \$18.45 billion had been disbursed as of September 30, 2021, as shown in Figure F.15 below.<sup>20</sup>



### ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

- Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments
- Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies
- Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

FIGURE F.14

**ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE F.15


**ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to the ESF: \$101 million for FY 2011, \$179.5 million for FY 2013, and \$55 million for FY 2014. FY 2016 ESF for Afghanistan was reduced by \$179 million and put toward the U.S. commitment to the Green Climate Fund, and FY 2020 ESF was reduced by \$73.07 million as part of rescission mandated by Section 7014(b) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021 and 7/14/2021; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021, 7/2/2021, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, 10/5/2018, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.

# STATUS OF FUNDS



## IDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

## INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), created through the combination of its Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP) in June 2020, administers International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds. BHA is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. government response to disasters overseas, and obligates funding for emergency food-assistance projects when there is an identified need and local authorities lack the capacity to respond. BHA works closely with international partners such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) to deliver goods and services to assist conflict- and disaster-affected populations in Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup>

USAID reported more than \$1.28 billion in IDA funds had been allocated to Afghanistan from 2002 through September 30, 2021, with obligations of nearly \$1.25 billion and disbursements of nearly \$1.11 billion reported as of that date. USAID obligated \$130.80 million in IDA funds in FY 2021, down from the record \$177.83 million it obligated in FY 2020, but still at a high rate of spending compared to previous periods.<sup>22</sup> Figure F.16 presents annual appropriations of IDA funds to Afghanistan. Figure F.17 presents cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements.

FIGURE F.16

**IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE F.17

**IDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.  
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021 and 7/14/2021.

## INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which funds projects and programs for advancing the rule of law and combating narcotics production and trafficking. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police, counternarcotics, and rule of law and justice.<sup>23</sup>

The INCLE account was allocated \$82.20 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded between State and the U.S. Congress in the quarter ending June 30, 2021. This allocation represented a decrease of 7% from the \$88.00 million that was allocated to the INCLE account for FY 2020, as shown in Figure F.18 below.<sup>24</sup> Cumulative funding for INCLE stood at more than \$5.50 billion, of which more than \$5.16 billion had been obligated and more than \$4.69 billion had been disbursed at June 30, 2021, as shown in Figure F.19.<sup>25</sup>

State INL wrote to SIGAR this quarter, "Unfortunately, we are unable to provide information requested for one fund covering INL programs, INCLE. We continue to divert our resources to the on-going situation in Afghanistan, prioritizing the safety of our partners. Although we are not able to provide FY21Q4 data right now, INL will be able to submit updated financial data at the end of FY22Q1."<sup>26</sup>



### INCLE FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

FIGURE F.18

INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR  
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE F.19


INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2021 and 7/2/2021.

# STATUS OF FUNDS



## MRA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended

## MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) administers the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account that funds programs to protect and assist refugees, conflict victims, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants. Through MRA, PRM supports the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other international organizations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan to support Afghan refugees throughout the region and upon their return to Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup>

The MRA allocation for Afghan refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees has been at historically high levels for the past two fiscal years, although it did fall from its record level of \$150.41 million in FY 2020 to \$126.69 million in FY 2021, as shown in Figure F.20. The FY 2021 allocation includes \$25.69 million in funds obligated from the American Rescue Plan Act, 2021, appropriated to supplement MRA funds. PRM reported that it has not obligated funds from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) made available through the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2021, for use in Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup> Cumulative appropriations since FY 2002 have totaled nearly \$1.73 billion through September 30, 2021, with cumulative obligations and disbursements reaching more than \$1.72 billion and more than \$1.63 billion, respectively, on that date, as shown in Figure F.21.<sup>29</sup>

FIGURE F.20

**MRA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE F.21

**MRA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. MRA balances include funds provided from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) of \$25.00 million in FY 2002 and \$0.20 million in FY 2009 (obligated and disbursed), and funds from the American Rescue Plan Act, 2021, appropriated to supplement MRA funds, of \$25.69 million obligated and \$17.55 million disbursed through September 30, 2021. All other MRA balances shown have been allocated from the annual Migration and Refugee Assistance appropriation.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2021, 7/13/2021, and 7/9/2021.

## NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, DEMINING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

The Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account played a critical role in improving the Afghan government’s capacity to address terrorist threats, protect its borders, and remove dangerous explosive remnants of war.<sup>30</sup> The majority of NADR funding for Afghanistan was funneled through two subaccounts, Antiterrorist Assistance (ATA) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD), with additional funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and Counterterrorism Financing (CTF). The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources made allocated funding available to relevant bureaus and offices that obligate and disburse these funds.<sup>31</sup>

The NADR account was allocated \$45.80 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded among State and the U.S. Congress in the quarter ending June 30, 2021. This allocation represents an increase of 19% from the \$38.50 million that was allocated through the Section 653(a) process for FY 2020, which itself was relatively flat from the \$38.30 million that was allocated in FY 2019, as shown in Figure F.22. Figure F.23 shows that the cumulative total of NADR funds appropriated and transferred stands at \$927.14 million at September 30, 2021.<sup>32</sup>



### NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

**Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments

**Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies

**Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended


FIGURE F.22

**NADR APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



FIGURE F.23

**NADR FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

<sup>a</sup> State and Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance accounts, including NADR, through the Section 653(a) process. The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus at State that obligate and disburse these funds.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2021, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, and 10/5/2018.

# STATUS OF FUNDS

## INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN


The international community has provided significant funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts through multilateral institutions. These institutions include multilateral trust funds; United Nations and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations; two multilateral development finance institutions, the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank (ADB); two special-purpose United Nations organizations, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); and the (now terminated) NATO Resolute Support Mission.

The four main multilateral trust funds have been the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the UNDP-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF), and the ADB-managed Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).

These four multilateral trust funds, as well as the humanitarian assistance organizations reported by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the NATO Resolute Support Mission, and UNAMA all report donor or member contributions for their Afghanistan programs, as shown in Figure F.24.

FIGURE F.24

CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BY 10 LARGEST DONORS AND OTHERS TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN (ARTF, UN OCHA-REPORTED PROGRAMS, LOTFA, NATO ANATF, NATO RSM, UNAMA, AND AITF) SINCE 2002 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Amounts under \$350 million are not labeled. Numbers may not add due to rounding. "NATO" consists of NATO ANA Trust Fund contributions of \$3.45 billion through May 31, 2021, and NATO member assessments for Resolute Support Mission costs of \$1.27 billion for 2015–2019 (2020–2021 remain unaudited). "Other" consists of UN member assessments for UNAMA costs of \$2.38 billion for 2007–2020, and AITF contributions of \$0.59 billion at 3/31/2021.

Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021, (end of 8th month of FY 1400) at [www.artf.af](http://www.artf.af), accessed 10/11/2021; UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2021; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021, 9/30/2021, response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2021; NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of Contributions Made as of May 31, 2021, at [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed 10/10/2021; NATO, IBAN Audits of Allied Command Operations and Cost Share Arrangements for Military Budgets, at [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed 4/28/2021 and 7/7/2021; ADB, AITF Quarterly Report January–March 2021, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2021; State, UNAMA approved budgets and notified funding plans, in response to SIGAR data calls, 2/19/2021 and 7/13/2020; UN, Country Assessments, at [www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/scale](http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/scale), accessed 10/9/2020.

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Cumulative contributions to these seven organizations since 2002 have amounted to \$38.36 billion, with the United States contributing \$10.05 billion of this amount, through recent reporting dates. The World Bank Group and the ADB are funded through general member assessments that cannot be readily identified as allocated to Afghanistan. These two institutions have collectively made financial commitments of \$12.1 billion to Afghanistan since 2002, as discussed in the sections that follow.

## Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan government's operational and development budgets has come through the ARTF. From 2002 to August 22, 2021, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had paid in more than \$13.12 billion. Figure F.24 shows the three largest donors over this period as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Figure F.25 shows that Germany, Canada, and Denmark were the largest donors to the ARTF for the first eight months of Afghan FY 1400 (through August 22, 2021), when the ARTF received contributions of \$248.41 million. This compares with receipts of \$718.63 million received during the full 12 months of the preceding Afghan FY 1399.<sup>33</sup>

Contributions to the ARTF have been divided into two funding channels, the Recurrent Cost Window (RCW) and the Investment Window. As of August 22, 2021, according to the World Bank, more than \$6.05 billion of ARTF funds had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RCW, including the Recurrent and Capital Cost Component, to assist with recurrent costs such as civil servants' salaries.<sup>34</sup> To ensure that the RCW receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not "preference" (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions.<sup>35</sup>

The Investment Window supports development programs. As of August 22, 2021, according to the World Bank, more than \$6.18 billion had been committed through the Investment Window, and nearly \$5.31 billion had been disbursed. The Bank reported 33 active projects with a combined commitment value of more than \$2.51 billion, of which more than \$1.63 billion had been disbursed.<sup>36</sup>


## Contributions to UN OCHA-Coordinated Humanitarian Assistance Programs

The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) leads emergency appeals and annual or multiyear humanitarian-response plans for Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistance provided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs. Donors have contributed more than \$11.16 billion to humanitarian-assistance organizations from 2002 through September 30, 2021, as reported by OCHA. OCHA-led annual humanitarian-response plans and emergency appeals for Afghanistan accounted for nearly \$7.49 billion, or 67.1% of these contributions.

The United States, Japan, and the European Union have been the largest contributors to humanitarian assistance organizations in Afghanistan since

FIGURE F.25

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, AFGHAN FY 1400 TO AUG. 22 (8 MONTHS) (PERCENT)




Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. "Others" includes eight national government donors.

Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021 (end of 8th month of FY 1400) at [www.artf.af](http://www.artf.af), accessed 10/11/2021.

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FIGURE F.26

## UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, JAN. 1–SEP. 30, 2021 (PERCENT)



Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. "Others" includes 22 national governments and 7 other entities. UN CERP refers to the the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund.

Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2021.

2002, as shown in Figure F.24; while the United States, European Union, and Germany have been the largest contributors for the nine months ending September 30, 2021, as shown in Figure F.26. Contributions for the first nine months of 2021 of \$834.65 million have exceeded 2020 contributions of \$731.45 million. The UN World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have been the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, as shown in Table F.5.<sup>37</sup>

TABLE F.5

### LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA) CUMULATIVE RECEIPTS, 2002 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2021 (\$ MILLIONS)

Largest Recipients	Receipts
<b>United Nations Organizations</b>	
World Food Programme (WFP)	\$3,340.40
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	1,332.73
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	594.20
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)	337.22
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	298.84
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	258.23
World Health Organization (WHO)	173.94
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)	148.44
<b>Nongovernmental Organizations</b>	
International Committee of the Red Cross	811.23
Norwegian Refugee Council	205.57
HALO Trust	123.84
Save the Children	120.54
ACTED (formerly Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development)	107.47
<b>All Other and Unallocated</b>	<b>3,308.29</b>
<b>Total Humanitarian Assistance Reported by OCHA</b>	<b>\$11,160.95</b>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2021.

## Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

The UNDP had historically administered the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).<sup>38</sup> Beginning in 2015, UNDP divided LOTFA support between two projects: Support to Payroll Management (SPM) and MOI and Police Development (MPD).

The SPM project has aimed to develop the capacity of the Afghan government to independently manage all nonfiduciary aspects of its payroll

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function for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) staff. Almost 99% of SPM project funding goes toward ANP and CPD staff remuneration.

The MPD project focused on institutional development of the MOI and police professionalization of the ANP. The project concluded on June 30, 2018.

The LOTFA Steering Committee, composed of Afghan ministries, international donors, and the UNDP, approved restructuring the fund and changing its scope of operations on November 25, 2018. The organization expanded its mission beyond the management of the SPM project to include the entire justice chain (police, courts, and corrections), and thereby cover all security and justice institutions, with an increased focus on anticorruption. A new multi-lateral trust fund, the LOTFA Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), was launched that year to fund this expanded mission alongside the original LOTFA.<sup>39</sup>

Donors have paid in more than \$6.38 billion to the two LOTFA funds from 2002 through September 30, 2021. The LOTFA MPTF has raised nearly \$363.41 million, with the UK and Canada its largest donors. Figure F.24 shows the two LOTFA funds' largest donors to have been the United States and Japan on a cumulative basis. Figure F.27 shows Japan and Canada to have been the largest donors to the two LOTFA funds for the nine months ending September 30, 2021, with the United States being the fifth largest donor with a \$10.84 million contribution.<sup>40</sup>

## Contributions to the NATO Resolute Support Mission

NATO members are assessed annual contributions for the NATO Civil Budget, Military Budget, and Security Investment Program based on audited program costs and agreed annual cost-sharing formulas. The NATO Military Budget includes Allied Command Operations (ACO) whose largest cost component is the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. NATO has assessed member contributions of \$1.27 billion for costs of the Resolute Support Mission from 2015, the first year of the mission, through 2019, the most recent year for which ACO audited statements detailing RSM costs have been made publicly available. The United States share of commonly funded budgets has ranged from 22.20% to 22.14% over the 2015–2019 period, resulting in contributions of \$281.87 million. The United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom were the largest contributors to the costs of the NATO Resolute Support Mission, and these contributions are reflected in Figure F.24.<sup>41</sup> The Resolute Support mission was terminated in September 2021.<sup>42</sup>

## Contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) supported the Afghan National Army and other elements of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces through procurements by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA).<sup>43</sup> The Fund received contributions from 25 of the 30 current NATO members, including the United States, and from 12 other Coalition partners totaling nearly \$3.45 billion through May 31, 2021.<sup>44</sup> Germany, Australia,

FIGURE F.27

LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, JAN. 1–SEP. 30, 2021 (PERCENT)



Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Japan and the United States contributed through the LOTFA Bilateral Mechanism and Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom contributed through the LOTFA MPTF Mechanism.

Source: UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 (Combined Bilateral and MPTF), updated 9/30/2021, in response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2021.

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and Italy were the three largest contributors to the fund. The United States made its first contribution in FY 2018 to support two projects under an existing procurement contract.<sup>45</sup>

## World Bank Group in Afghanistan

The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) has committed over \$5.4 billion for development, emergency reconstruction projects, and budget support operations in Afghanistan from 2002 through August 15, 2021. This support consists of nearly \$5 billion in grants and \$436 million in no-interest loans known as "credits." The Bank, as of October 20, 2021, has 24 active IDA projects with a total commitment value of over \$2.1 billion from IDA.

In addition, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has invested more than \$300 million in Afghanistan, mainly in the telecom and financial sectors and its current committed portfolio stands at \$46 million. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has a modest exposure on a single project in Afghanistan.<sup>46</sup>

The United States is the World Bank Group's largest shareholder, with ownership stakes of 10–25% of shares in the IDA, IBRD, MIGA, and IFC.<sup>47</sup>

## Asian Development Bank in Afghanistan

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has committed over \$6.41 billion for 168 development projects and technical-assistance programs in Afghanistan from 2002 through June 2021. This support has consisted of \$5.43 billion in grants (of which the Asian Development Fund, or ADF, provided \$4.33 billion, and the ADB provided \$1.10 billion in co-financing), \$0.872 billion in concessional loans, and \$111.2 million in technical assistance. ADB has provided \$2.67 billion for 20 key road projects, \$2.12 billion to support energy infrastructure, and \$1.08 billion for irrigation and agricultural infrastructure projects, and \$190 million for the health and PSM sectors. The United States and Japan are the largest shareholders of the ADB, with each country holding 15.57% of total shares.<sup>48</sup>

The ADB manages the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), a multidonor platform that provides on-budget financing for technical assistance and investment, principally in the transport, energy, and water management sectors. The AITF has received contributions of \$590.54 million from the NATO ANA Trust Fund, Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and had disbursed \$333.20 million through March 31, 2021.<sup>49</sup>

## United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political UN mission established at the request of the government of Afghanistan. UNAMA maintains its headquarters in Kabul and an extensive field presence across Afghanistan, and is organized around its development and political affairs pillars. The Department of State has notified the U.S. Congress of its annual plan to fund UNAMA along with other UN political missions based on mission budgets since FY 2008. The U.S. contribution to UNAMA, based

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on its fixed 22.0% share of UN budgets and funded through the Contribution to International Organizations (CIO) account, has totaled \$523.45 million from FY 2008 through FY 2021. Other UN member governments have funded the remainder of UNAMA's budget of \$2.38 billion over this period.<sup>50</sup>

The UN Security Council voted in September 2021 to extend UNAMA's mandate through March 2022.<sup>51</sup>

## Share of U.S. Civilian Assistance Provided to Multilateral Institutions

The United States provides significant financial support to the numerous multilateral institutions that are active in the civilian sector in Afghanistan. As the international donor community, including the United States, has reduced its physical presence in Afghanistan, the relative importance of these multilateral institutions compared to donors' assistance missions in Afghanistan has increased. The share of U.S. civilian assistance provided to multilateral institutions can be seen in Table F.6 to have increased in recent years, with over 50% of its assistance disbursed in 2018 and 2020 from the principal civilian-sector assistance accounts being provided to the principal civilian-sector multilateral institutions covered in Figure F.24. Table F.7 provides additional details on the sources of U.S. funding for the multilateral assistance programs and organizations active in Afghanistan.

TABLE F.6


SHARE OF U.S. CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, 2014–2020 (\$ MILLIONS)							
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<b>U.S. Contributions to Civilian Sector Multilateral Institutions</b>							
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	\$433.47	\$275.95	\$261.03	\$185.40	\$400.00	\$240.00	\$360.00
UN OCHA-Reported Programs (UN OCHA)	171.17	168.51	149.72	113.52	190.90	212.44	240.63
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and AITF	43.17	41.79	49.35	80.98	36.12	32.72	30.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$647.81</b>	<b>\$486.25</b>	<b>\$460.10</b>	<b>\$379.90</b>	<b>\$627.02</b>	<b>\$485.16</b>	<b>\$630.91</b>
<b>Disbursements from the Principal U.S. Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts</b>							
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	\$986.37	\$1,234.07	\$1,091.06	\$878.51	\$555.49	\$1,118.59	\$631.20
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	443.89	310.15	265.28	232.94	147.07	196.76	148.27
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Title II	88.65	79.94	63.81	49.88	102.09	100.32	170.43
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	94.54	96.95	90.35	119.20	82.97	84.47	96.89
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	43.20	43.50	37.96	37.00	35.60	38.30	38.50
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)	43.17	41.79	41.35	40.31	36.12	32.72	30.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,699.82</b>	<b>\$1,806.40</b>	<b>\$1,589.81</b>	<b>\$1,357.84</b>	<b>\$959.34</b>	<b>\$1,571.16</b>	<b>\$1,115.57</b>
<b>U.S. Civilian Assistance Provided to Multilateral Institutions/ Total Disbursements from U.S. Civilian Assistance Accounts</b>	<b>38.1%</b>	<b>26.9%</b>	<b>28.9%</b>	<b>28.0%</b>	<b>65.4%</b>	<b>30.9%</b>	<b>56.6%</b>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Calendar year reporting is used for UN OCHA, UNAMA, AITF, ESF, IDA, MRA, and CIO; Afghan fiscal year reporting is used for ARTF; and U.S. fiscal year reporting is used for Title II and NADR. The Principal U.S. Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts presented above exclude DOD civilian sector accounts (CERP AIF, and TFBSO) and a group of civilian agency accounts that were active in the FY 2014 to FY 2020 period (IMET, DA, GHP CCC, USAID-Other, HRDF, ECE, DFC, USAGM, DEA, and TI) but whose combined annual disbursements only approximate \$50.00 million per year. (See Appendix B to this report for additional information.)

Source: SIGAR analysis of the SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2021, 1/30/2020, 1/30/2019, 1/30/2018, 1/30/2017, 1/30/2016, 1/30/2015, 1/30/2014, and 1/30/2013.

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TABLE F.7



## SOURCES OF U.S. FUNDING FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Multilateral Assistance Programs and Organizations	Sources of U.S. Funding
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	ESF
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)	ASFF and INCLE
Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF)	ASFF
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)	ESF
UN OCHA Coordinated Programs	
UN World Food Programme (WFP)	IDA and Title II
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	MRA
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)	GHP, IDA, MRA, and Title II
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)	ESF and NADR
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	ESF, IDA, and MRA
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	ESF and IDA
UN World Health Organization (WHO)	GHP, ESF, and IDA
UN OCHA and its Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund	IDA
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	ESF and INCLE
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) <sup>a</sup>	ESF, IDA, MRA, and NADR
NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM)	Army O&M <sup>b</sup>
The Asia Foundation (TAF)	SFOPS TAF <sup>b</sup> and INCLE
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	CIO <sup>b</sup>
World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA)	Treasury IP <sup>b</sup>
Asian Development Bank (ADB and ADF)	Treasury IP <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> State and USAID have requested that SIGAR not disclose the names of NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan, and have cited various authorities that underlie their requests. State has cited OMB Bulletin 12-01, Collection of U.S. Foreign Assistance Data (2012), which provides an exemption to federal agency foreign assistance reporting requirements "when public disclosure is likely to jeopardize the personal safety of U.S. personnel or recipients of U.S. resources." USAID has cited the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006, (PL. 109-282), which provides a waiver to federal agency contractor and grantee reporting requirements when necessary "to avoid jeopardizing the personal safety of the applicant or recipient's staff or clients." The so-called FFATA "masking waiver" is not available for Public International Organizations (PIOs). Both State and USAID provide "branding waivers" to NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan.

<sup>b</sup> The Army O&M, SFOPS TAF, CIO, and Treasury IP accounts provide funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan. All other accounts provide programmatic funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan.

Note: Army O&M refers to the Support of Other Nations subaccount in the Operation & Maintenance, Army account in the Department of Defense appropriation; SFOPS TAF refers to The Asia Foundation account in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriation; and Treasury IP refers to the International Programs account in the Department of the Treasury appropriation.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019; State, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2021, 1/13/2021, 4/17/2020, 4/9/2020 and 8/21/2019; Department of Defense, FY 2022 President's Budget, Exhibit O-1, at <https://comp-troller.defense.gov>, accessed 7/17/2021; SFOPS Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2021, at [www.state.gov/cj](http://www.state.gov/cj), accessed 1/15/2021; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 4/20/2020; UNDP response to SIGAR data call, 4/5/2020; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 1/10/2021, 4/3/2020 and 1/13/2020; and USAID, Afghanistan-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4 FY 2017 at [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov), accessed 4/9/2020.

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- 1 Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-31, 7/30/2021.
- 2 DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 10/19/2021 and 10/21/2021; and state, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021.
- 3 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020, and its Section 7014(b) Extension of Availability and Section 7071(a) Overseas Contingency Operations Rescissions.
- 4 DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, data as of June 30, 2021, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2021.
- 5 See Appendix A, Cross-Reference of Report to Statutory Requirements, at paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) and Section 1229(i)(1)(F) of Pub. L. No. 110-181, respectively.
- 6 SIGAR data call requests to DOD, including but not limited to those dated 11/21/2018, 11/20/2019, 11/18/2020, and 8/18/2021.
- 7 Costs of War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, at <https://watson.brown.edu/costofwar/figures/2021/us-costs-date-war-afghanistan-2001-2021>, accessed 4/15/2021.
- 8 Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020.
- 9 DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2021,” 10/16/2021; and “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021,” 7/16/2021.
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- 13 H. Rept. 116-453, 12/27/2020.
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- 16 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/14/2021.
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- 20 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021 and 7/14/2021; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021 and 7/2/2021.
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- 23 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.
- 24 State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2021, 7/13/2020, and 1/3/2020.
- 25 State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2021 and 7/2/2021.
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- 27 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018, pp. 44–52; and State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/17/2019.
- 28 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2021.
- 29 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2021, 7/13/2021, and 7/9/2021.
- 30 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018, p. 423.
- 31 State, response to SIGAR data call, 3/29/2013.
- 32 State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2021, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, and 10/5/2018.
- 33 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021 (end of 8th month of FY 1400) at [www.artf.af](http://www.artf.af), accessed 10/11/2021, p. 4.
- 34 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021 (end of 8th month of FY 1400) at [www.artf.af](http://www.artf.af), accessed 10/11/2021, pp. 9, 11.
- 35 The World Bank Group in Afghanistan, Country Update, 4/2020, p. 40.
- 36 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021 (end of 8th month of FY 1400) at [www.artf.af](http://www.artf.af), accessed 10/11/2021, pp. 9–10.
- 37 UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2021.
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## SECURITY

### KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces disintegrated, the Afghan government collapsed, and the Taliban regained power.

U.S. and Coalition forces conducted a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from August 14 to August 30 that evacuated more than 124,000 people, including 6,000 Americans, diplomats, foreign nationals from allied and partner countries, Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants and other at-risk Afghans.

All remaining U.S. and Coalition forces withdrew from Afghanistan.

### ANDSF FAILS TO STOP TALIBAN OFFENSIVE

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) began the quarter on the defensive. Though the Afghan government had lost more than half of the country's districts to the Taliban beginning in May, they still held all provincial capitals as late as August 5.<sup>1</sup> The Taliban advance accelerated in August, as multiple Afghan provincial capitals fell in rapid succession and the ANDSF proved unable to stop it.<sup>2</sup> The final collapse of the Afghan government occurred on August 15, when President Ghani fled the country, and what was left of the ANDSF disintegrated.<sup>3</sup> The Taliban completed their military victory when they occupied undefended Kabul that afternoon.<sup>4</sup>

For U.S. and Coalition forces, what began as an orderly withdrawal changed rapidly into a **Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)** primarily based out of Kabul's Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA).<sup>5</sup> The last flight out of HKIA left on August 30, 2021.<sup>6</sup> The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission was terminated in early September 2021.<sup>7</sup>

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO):** An operation whereby noncombatants are evacuated from a threatened area abroad, including areas facing actual or potential danger from natural or man-made disaster, civil unrest, imminent or actual terrorist activities, hostilities, and similar circumstances. NEOs are carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense.

Source: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1/2021, p. 154.

## U.S. and Coalition Forces Withdraw

As the ANDSF struggled to stop or slow the Taliban offensive that began in May, U.S. and Coalition forces were in the final phase of a military withdrawal that followed President Joseph R. Biden's April 14 announcement that all remaining U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan by September 11, 2021 (later changed to August 31).<sup>8</sup> U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) formally began the final phase of the drawdown from Afghanistan on May 1, 2021, in what officials described as "a safe and orderly way."<sup>9</sup> All U.S. troops were to leave Afghanistan by the end of August except those assigned to a residual mission of augmenting diplomatic security and a small Embassy Kabul-based presence intended to interface with the Afghan government to oversee security-assistance efforts managed primarily from outside Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup>

In mid-May, General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), ordered CENTCOM to prepare for a potential NEO, and two weeks later additional U.S. troops began prepositioning in the region.<sup>11</sup>

General Austin Scott Miller, commander of the NATO Resolute Support Mission and of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), transferred responsibility for USFOR-A to General McKenzie in a small ceremony on July 12, 2021, in Kabul.<sup>12</sup>

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III established U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward led by Navy Rear Admiral Peter Vasely, who remained in Kabul. Supporting U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward from Qatar was the new Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), led by Army Major General Curtis Buzzard. DSCMO-A was responsible for providing security assistance to the ANDSF, including **over-the-horizon (OTH)** aircraft-maintenance support to sustain ANDSF combat operations against the Taliban.<sup>13</sup>

By August 9, 2021, CENTCOM estimated that they had completed 95% of the entire **retrograde** process, including flying approximately 984 C-17 transport-aircraft loads of material out of Afghanistan, and turning over nearly 17,074 pieces of materiel to the Defense Logistics Agency for disposition.<sup>14</sup>

## Weak ANDSF response to Taliban takeover

By mid-July the Taliban controlled about half the districts in Afghanistan, at least six international border crossings with their revenue-generating customs posts, and long stretches of highways throughout the country.<sup>15</sup> The numbers fluctuated as government forces retook some districts.<sup>16</sup> At the time, the Afghan government still held Kabul and all 34 provincial capitals, while the ANDSF were reportedly consolidating to protect about half the capitals that appeared threatened.<sup>17</sup>

The Taliban shifted their military focus in late July from overrunning rural districts to capturing provincial capitals, including key population

**Over-The-Horizon (OTH):** An "over-the-horizon amphibious operation" is "an operation launched from beyond visual and radar range of the shoreline." In the Afghanistan context, DOD also uses the term to refer to U.S. capabilities located outside Afghanistan.

Source: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1/2021, p. 164; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2021.

**Retrograde:** The process for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset (replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements.

Source: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1/2021, p. 187.

centers such as Lashkar Gah, Kunduz City, Kandahar, and Herat.<sup>18</sup> Through the first week of August, the ANDSF continued to lose ground despite some U.S. air strikes launched in support of beleaguered Afghan forces.<sup>19</sup> On August 4, the Taliban attempted to assassinate acting defense minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi in Kabul, reportedly in retaliation for escalating government attacks on Taliban fighters and civilians.<sup>20</sup>

Multiple open sources reported that ANDSF performance was uneven, with Afghan special forces performing well compared to other units. Afghan police, in particular, reportedly performed poorly against the Taliban during the final collapse.<sup>21</sup>

As the situation deteriorated, and with the ANDSF spread thin, President Ghani turned to veteran warlords, whom he had once promised to hold accountable for breaking the law.<sup>22</sup> For example, he called on former Afghan vice president and recently designated Marshal of Afghanistan Abdul Rashid Dostum, former Northern Alliance leader and Balkh Province governor Atta Muhammed Noor in the north, and famous mujahedeen commander Ismail Khan in Herat, for assistance in beating back the Taliban advances.<sup>23</sup>

### **Taliban seize multiple provincial capitals in rapid succession as ANDSF disintegrates**

The Afghan government's collapse commenced on August 6 with the fall of Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province, the first provincial capital taken by the Taliban, as depicted in Figure S.1 on the following page. A parliament member from the province said the Taliban took control without a fight, as ANDSF and government officials fled into neighboring Iran.<sup>24</sup>

The next day the Taliban captured Shibirghan, the capital of Jowzjan Province and home to Marshal Dostum. As at Zaranj, ANDSF personnel reportedly fled the city rather than fight.<sup>25</sup>

The following day, August 8, three more northern Afghanistan provincial capitals fell: Kunduz City, capital of Kunduz Province; Taluqan, capital of Takhar Province; and Sar-e Pul, capital of its namesake province.<sup>26</sup> On Monday, August 9, the Taliban captured Aibak, capital of Samangan Province, and the next day took Farah City in Farah Province, Pul-e Khumri, capital of Baghlan Province, and Faizabad, capital of Badakhshan Province.<sup>27</sup>


On Wednesday, August 11, with most of the north already under Taliban control, what remained of the Afghan Army's 217th Corps outside Kunduz fled or surrendered, turning over their equipment, including weapons and Humvees, to the Taliban.<sup>28</sup>

On August 12, DOD announced the deployment of an additional 3,000 troops to join U.S. forces already in Kabul as well as an infantry brigade to stage in Kuwait as a reserve force if needed "to ensure the safety and security of U.S. and partner civilian personnel."<sup>29</sup>

# SECURITY

FIGURE S.1

## TALIBAN COMPLETES THEIR CONQUEST OF AFGHANISTAN AUGUST 6–SEPTEMBER 5, 2021



Note: The map above is based on an Al Jazeera map of the fall of Afghanistan, edited to include additional provinces and a different color scheme. Lightest-to-darkest shading of provinces indicates calendar sequence of Taliban control of capitals, oldest to newest. The dates represent the final fall of the provincial capitals provided by open sources, and may not indicate Taliban control of the entire province.

Source: Reuters, "Taliban capture first Afghan provincial capital, in Nimroz – police," 8/6/2021; Washington Post, "Taliban fighters overrun an Afghan provincial capital for the first time since withdrawal of foreign forces," 8/6/2021; Al Jazeera, "Sheberghan: Taliban captures second Afghan provincial capital," 8/7/2021; Stars and Stripes, "Taliban seize major Afghan city, one of three provincial capitals to fall Sunday," 8/8/2021; Daily Mail, "Taliban captures its SIXTH city in less than a week as military pilots quit after being targeted for assassination, leaving Afghan troops without vital air support," 8/9/2021; Long War Journal, "Former headquarters of Northern Alliance falls under Taliban control," 8/10/2021; Al Jazeera, "Taliban captures Afghan commander Ismail Khan after fall of Herat," 8/13/2021; Voice of America, "Taliban Seize Several Major Afghan Provincial Capitals," 8/13/2021; New York Times, "Afghanistan's Commercial Hub, Mazar-i-Sharif, Falls to the Insurgents," 8/14/2021; Associated Press, "Taliban capture key northern city, approach Afghan capital," 8/14/2021; Al Jazeera, "Taliban enters Kabul, awaits 'peaceful transfer' of power," 8/15/2021; Long War Journal, "Taliban completes conquest of Afghanistan after seizing Panjshir," 9/6/2021.



**U.S. troops** stand guard at the Kabul airport. (DVIDS photo)

The ANDSF's final disintegration began the evening of August 12 to August 13, when the Taliban captured the major cities Kandahar and Herat as well as provincial capitals Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province), Ghazni (Ghazni Province), Qalat (Zabul Province), Tarin Kot (Uruzgan Province), Pul-e Alam (Logar Province), Qalah-ye Now (Badghis Province), and Chaghcharan (Ghor Province). The Taliban arrested former governor and local commander Ismail Khan in Herat, while governors in Ghazni and Uruzgan reportedly made deals with the Taliban and surrendered without a fight. Guards at the central prison in Kandahar reportedly also surrendered to the Taliban, resulting in about 3,000 prisoners being freed, including members of the Taliban.<sup>30</sup>

The Taliban took Mazar-e Sharif, capital of Balkh Province, the following day without a fight, completing their conquest of northern Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup> Warlords Noor and Dostum fled to Uzbekistan.<sup>32</sup> Also on August 14, the Taliban captured Paktika, Kunar, Faryab, Daykundi and Laghman Provinces.<sup>33</sup>

The rapidly deteriorating security situation caused the United States to evacuate Embassy Kabul, relocating its personnel to U.S. and Coalition facilities at HKIA. On August 14, President Biden announced the deployment of about 5,000 additional troops to Kabul to oversee and execute the evacuation.<sup>34</sup> This followed an earlier statement by the British Defense Ministry that they were sending 600 troops back to Kabul to assist with evacuations. Other Coalition partners hurried to evacuate their embassy staff.<sup>35</sup> The number of U.S. forces securing HKIA would eventually peak at 5,784 troops.<sup>36</sup>

## **Afghan President Ghani flees as government collapses; Kabul undefended**

With the loss of Mazar-e Sharif and then Jalalabad soon after, on August 15, 2021, Kabul was isolated and vulnerable. According to media reports, the ANDSF had no viable plan for defending Kabul and panic seized the capital as the Taliban approached.<sup>37</sup> President Ghani fled in the early afternoon by helicopter to Uzbekistan, and from there to the United Arab Emirates. Ghani reportedly left without telling most of Afghanistan's senior government officials or his American contacts.<sup>38</sup>

Other senior Afghan government officials soon followed, including the speaker of parliament, the head of the Afghan intelligence service, and the defense minister, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, who also fled to the UAE.<sup>39</sup>

Ghani's unexpected and sudden departure led to chaos in the capital as police left their posts and law and order broke down. An exodus began as panicked people rushed to HKIA to flee the Taliban's imminent takeover.<sup>40</sup>

The Taliban were among those surprised by the suddenness of the collapse. On August 15, 2021, General McKenzie met with then-leader of the Taliban's political wing and future Taliban deputy prime minister Abdul Ghani Baradar in Doha to deliver a message that the U.S. mission in Kabul was now the evacuation of Americans and Coalition partners and that the United States "would not tolerate interference and that we would forcefully defend our forces and evacuees if necessary," while the Taliban stated their intent to enter and occupy Kabul. They also offered to work with Coalition forces and "promised" not to interfere with the withdrawal.<sup>41</sup> By the afternoon of August 15, 2021, Taliban fighters were in the city center, including the presidential palace.<sup>42</sup>

More detailed information on the ANDSF's disintegration and the Afghan government's collapse is available in the Classified Supplement to this report.

More information on key figures in the new Taliban government is available on pages 96–97.

## **EVACUATION OF AMERICANS, COALITION, AND AFGHAN ALLIES AS THE TALIBAN CONSOLIDATE POWER**

From the Afghan government's collapse on August 15 until the last plane departed Kabul on August 30, NATO's allies and partners focused on evacuating U.S. and allied citizens, as well as Afghans who worked for U.S. and Coalition forces or were otherwise at risk of Taliban reprisals.<sup>43</sup> On August 22, Secretary Austin ordered the activation of the **Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)**, comprising 18 aircraft: three each from American Airlines, Atlas Air, Delta Airlines, and Omni Air; two from Hawaiian Airlines; and four from United Airlines. The aircraft did not fly into HKIA, but assisted with "onward movement of passengers from temporary safe havens and interim staging bases."<sup>44</sup>

**Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF):** A National Emergency Preparedness Program designed to augment DOD's airlift capability and a core component of U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM's) ability to meet national-security interests and contingency requirements. Under CRAF, the commercial carriers retain their civil status under Federal Aviation Administration regulations while USTRANSCOM exercises mission control via its air component, Air Mobility Command.

The use of CRAF aircraft to assist the evacuation in Afghanistan is only the third activation in the program's history. The other times were for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Source: DOD, "Department of Defense Activates Civil Reserve Air Fleet to Assist With Afghanistan Efforts," 8/22/2021.

## U.S. Forces Form “Pragmatic Relationship” with Taliban at HKIA

General McKenzie described the tense “pragmatic relationship” that U.S. forces developed with the Taliban as an effort to deconflict security issues “to prevent miscalculation while our forces operated in close quarters.”<sup>45</sup> The Taliban established an outer perimeter at HKIA and promised not to interfere with the withdrawal, while the U.S., Coalition, and about 500 remaining Afghan forces secured an inner perimeter.<sup>46</sup> It was an imperfect arrangement, as there were widespread reports of the Taliban harassing people on their way to the airport to be evacuated.<sup>47</sup> At least one aircraft was shot at by an unknown gunman and on August 30, five rockets were fired into HKIA, causing the **Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM)** system to destroy those rockets deemed dangerous.<sup>48</sup> Terrorist group Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) claimed responsibility for the rocket attack.<sup>49</sup>

U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward, commanded by Rear Admiral Peter Vasely, with the Joint Task Force-Crisis Response, commanded by Brigadier General Farrell Sullivan, initially took charge of HKIA security and evacuation operations. The 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by Major General Christopher Donahue, arrived August 18 to take specific responsibility for airfield security.<sup>50</sup>

## IS-K Attack on HKIA Leaves 13 U.S. Service Members and 170 Afghans Dead

By far the worst security incident occurred on August 26, 2021, when an IS-K suicide bomber detonated explosives in the middle of a crowd gathered in front of the “Abbey Gate” entrance to HKIA. The blast was followed by small-arms fire from other IS-K terrorists and another bombing at a nearby hotel.<sup>51</sup> The attack at HKIA left 13 U.S. service members (11 Marines, one Navy corpsman, and one Army soldier) and approximately 170 Afghans dead, with at least 200 more wounded, including 18 U.S. service members.<sup>52</sup> It was the deadliest day for the U.S. military in Afghanistan since 2011 and the first U.S. military combat deaths since February 2020.<sup>53</sup>

The U.S. retaliated with a drone strike, killing two “high-profile” IS-K targets in Nangarhar Province.<sup>54</sup> Another strike at a suspected, but misidentified, vehicle-borne IED on August 29, 2021, killed 10 civilians.<sup>55</sup>

## Last Aircraft Departs HKIA on August 30, 2021

The last C-17 left HKIA on August 30 at 3:29 pm EDT. According to General McKenzie, it departed Afghanistan with Major General Donahue and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson on board. From August 14 to 30, 2021, U.S. military aircraft had evacuated more than 79,000 civilians, including 6,000 Americans, and more than 73,500 third-country nationals and Afghan civilians. According to General Milley, U.S. and Coalition aircraft combined to evacuate more than 124,000 civilians from HKIA.<sup>56</sup> The evacuation included some civilian chartered flights and three helicopter missions outside the

### Counter rocket, artillery, and mortar

**(C-RAM):** An indirect-fire protection capability weapons system developed to protect ground forces and forward operating bases from the threat of rockets, artillery, and mortars. C-RAM comprises a variety of different systems which provide command and control capability, along with the ability to sense incoming rounds, warn ground forces, and respond to and intercept incoming rounds.

Source: Interestingengineering.com, “C-RAM: An Advanced Automated Point-Defense Gatling Gun,” 1/11/2021.

“It’s important to understand that within 48 hours of the [Noncombatant Evacuation Operation] execution order, the facts on the ground had changed significantly. We had gone from cooperating on security with a longtime partner and ally to initiating a pragmatic relationship of necessity with a longtime enemy.”

—General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. (USMC), CENTCOM Commander

Source: DOD, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. Hold a Press Briefing,” 8/30/2021.

“The Taliban and al-Qaeda have a very close relationship. And I do not expect the Taliban to seriously interfere with their basing or repositioning in Afghanistan.”

—General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. (USMC), CENTCOM Commander

Source: General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. (USMC), CENTCOM Commander, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 9/29/2021.

## DOD Conducting Full Assessment of ANDSF Equipment

The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P) advised SIGAR this quarter that because of the collapse of the Afghan government and their focus on the U.S. and Coalition withdrawal from Kabul, they would be unable to supply much of the reconstruction-related data usually provided for SIGAR quarterly reports, including the status of ANDSF equipment. However, DOD said they are conducting a full assessment of and accounting for the types, numbers, and value of all military equipment the U.S. provided to Afghanistan since 2005, including an estimate of how much of that equipment may have remained in the ANDSF inventory before its disintegration, reduced by battle losses, aging out of equipment over time, and equipment that was outside Afghanistan when the Taliban took over. DOD told SIGAR that open-source equipment information is incomplete and inaccurate. DOD is currently working on a full equipment assessment as required by Congress that will be shared with SIGAR once it is completed.

Source: OUSD-P and CSTCA response to SIGAR data call, 8/26/2021, OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2021 and 10/22/2021.

airport to extract 185 Americans and 21 German citizens.<sup>57</sup> On August 30, Secretary Blinken said, “We believe there are still a small number of Americans—under 200 and likely closer to 100—who remain in Afghanistan and want to leave.”<sup>58</sup>

Prior to departing, U.S. forces rendered inoperable up to 70 MRAP tactical vehicles and 80 Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing aircraft.<sup>59</sup>

More information on the evacuation from HKIA and the implications of the Taliban takeover for al-Qaeda and IS-K appears in the Classified Supplement to this report.

## THE TALIBAN TAKE PANJSHIR PROVINCE, THE LAST SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE CENTER

After the Taliban took Kabul, only Panjshir and Parwan Provinces remained outside their control. Former Vice President and National Directorate of Security chief Amrullah Saleh joined Ahmad Massoud, son of famed former Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, to lead a resistance called the National Resistance Front, centered in the rugged Panjshir Valley, which famously withstood occupation by both the Soviets in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s. They were augmented by ANDSF remnants that refused to surrender.<sup>60</sup>

The resistance was short-lived. The Taliban launched an assault on August 30 and after seven days of heavy fighting captured Bazarak, Panjshir’s provincial capital, on September 6. The resistance group vowed to continue fighting.<sup>61</sup>

## New Opportunities for IS-K and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

In congressional hearings in September, military and civilian leaders cautioned that the threats to American interests and the homeland from IS-K and al-Qaeda were likely to grow over time. “We know for [certain] that they [ISIS] do aspire to attack us in our homeland. And we know the same for al-Qaeda,” said General McKenzie at a September 28 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Secretary Austin supported that claim at the same hearing, “A reconstituted al-Qaeda or ISIS with aspirations to attack the United States is a very real possibility. And those conditions to include activity in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 36 months.”<sup>62</sup> CIA Deputy Director David Cohen said, “We are already beginning to see some of the indications of some potential movement of al-Qaeda to Afghanistan.”<sup>63</sup> With the loss of the Afghan government and bases in Afghanistan, General Milley added, “I think it’s going to become much more difficult now in order to conduct counterterrorism operations against a reconstituted al-Qaeda or ISIS in Afghanistan. Not impossible. We have the capabilities and means to do that. But it will be more difficult.”<sup>64</sup>

## A WINDFALL OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE ANDSF FOR THE TALIBAN

The ANDSF's sudden collapse provided the Taliban with a windfall of military hardware. Multiple images on social media in July and August showed Taliban fighters with captured U.S.-supplied weapons such as M4 carbines, machine guns, night-vision devices, body armor, Toyota trucks, and Humvees.<sup>65</sup> By the time Kabul fell on August 15, the videos included entire motor pools-worth of what appeared to be operational trucks, MRAPs, and even some aircraft such as UH-60 Blackhawks, Mi-17 helicopters, and ScanEagle unmanned aerial systems.<sup>66</sup>

As detailed on pages 47–49, since 2002 the United States appropriated nearly \$89.38 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan.<sup>67</sup> Of that amount, approximately \$18.6 billion went to ANDSF equipment and transportation costs: \$13.8 billion for the Afghan National Army (ANA)—including the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and most Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)—and \$4.8 billion for the Afghan National Police (ANP).<sup>68</sup>

### Government Accountability Office Report “Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded Equipment for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces”

As DOD works on a full equipment assessment of the types, numbers, and value of all military equipment the U.S. provided to Afghanistan since 2005, some of this information has been quantified in recent years. While a full DOD accounting is forthcoming, an August 10, 2017, GAO report (GAO-17-667R) gives insight into the breadth and scope of the inventory. The GAO report quantified the amount, type, and value of equipment purchased for the ANDSF from 2002 to 2016 using data that DOD provided. The report focused on six general categories of equipment: weapons; communications equipment; vehicles; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment; aircraft; and explosive-ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment.<sup>69</sup>

GAO found that DOD provided 162,643 radios of different types, 75,898 vehicles of several models, nearly 600,000 weapons of all calibers, almost 30,000 pieces of EOD equipment such as mine detectors and robots, just over 16,000 pieces of ISR equipment (almost all being night-vision devices), and 208 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.<sup>70</sup> From 2018 to 2021, according to information provided to SIGAR for its *Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress*, DOD provided the ANDSF an additional 6,551 vehicles, 18,956 weapons, 299 night-vision devices, and 84 aircraft.<sup>71</sup>

These figures only represent equipment that was transferred to the Afghan government. They do not account for equipment that was damaged, destroyed, stolen, lost, in repair or otherwise unavailable. Nor do they account for what was operational at the time of the ANDSF's collapse or what is currently operational and in Taliban hands. DOD said those data are currently unavailable,

“It was a logistical success but a strategic failure.”

—General Mark Milley, in reference to the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul

Source: General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9/28/2021.

though the figures are probably significantly less than what the U.S. provided to the ANDSF over 20 years. Also, given the reliance of the ANDSF on DOD contractors for maintenance of vehicles and aircraft, the operational readiness of existing equipment can be expected to decline quickly.<sup>72</sup>

DOD is currently updating the data it provided to GAO in 2017 with data on all transfers of equipment to the Afghan government since then.<sup>73</sup>

## The Taliban Captured Some Aircraft Abandoned by the ANDSF, but How Many Remain Operational is Unclear

**Usable aircraft:** Aircraft in the AAF's inventory that are located in Afghanistan and are either operational and available for tasking or are in short-term maintenance.

**Total inventory:** The number of aircraft either usable or in long-term maintenance (either at a third country location or in the United States) it does not include aircraft that were destroyed and have not yet been replaced.

**Authorized:** The total number of aircraft approved for the force.

### Aircraft inventory and status

As of July 31, 2021, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) had 131 available, **usable aircraft** among the 162 aircraft in its **total inventory**, as Table S.1 shows.<sup>74</sup> In addition to the AAF fleet in Afghanistan, 37 used UH-60 helicopters purchased from the U.S. Army for the AAF in 2017–2018 but not yet refurbished and upgraded were held in strategic reserve in the United States. Secretary Austin told then-Afghan President Ghani that DOD would begin to provide these aircraft to the AAF.<sup>75</sup> He added that three UH-60s would be delivered by July 23, 2021, but no further details were made available.<sup>76</sup> In addition, at least six aircraft (three Mi-17s and UH-60s) were in a third country or the United States for maintenance.<sup>77</sup> The Afghan media reported that 25 helicopters were out of country for repair.<sup>78</sup> Also, four MD-530s were purchased to replace battle-damaged aircraft; two of the replacements were delivered in August, but DOD was able to extract them from HKIA.<sup>79</sup>

As SIGAR reported in its July 2021 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, all airframes were flying at least 25% over their recommended

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/16/2021.

TABLE S.1

AAF AVIATION SUMMARY AS OF JULY 31, 2021			
Aircraft	Authorized	Total Inventory	Usable / In-Country
<b>Fixed Wing</b>			
A-29	26	23	23
AC-208	10	10	10
C-208	24	23	23
C-130	4	4	3
<b>Rotary Wing</b>			
Mi-17	0	13	12
MD-530	60	49	42
UH-60	43	40	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>131</b>

Note: These numbers include Afghan Air Force only and do not include Special Mission Wing aircraft.

Source: OUSD-R response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2021.



**U.S. troops** direct evacuees at the Kabul airport. (DVIDS photo)

scheduled-maintenance intervals. This exacerbated supply-chain issues and delayed scheduled maintenance and battle-damage repair. Meanwhile “crews remain over-tasked due to the security situation in Afghanistan and the operational tempo has only increased,” according to Training Advisory Assistance Command-Air (TAAC-Air).<sup>80</sup> The AC-208 fleet, for example, had maintained a 93% readiness rate in April and May, but dropped to 63% in June; the UH-60 fleet was at 77% in April and May, but dropped to 39% in June.<sup>81</sup> Given the constant combat, overuse of the airframes, and even further reduction in equipment maintainers due to the U.S. military and DOD contractor withdrawals, the operational readiness of the AAF presumably continued to fall through July and into August 2021.

### **About 25% of the AAF’s total inventory reportedly flew to neighboring countries before Kabul fell**

Before the ANDSF disintegrated, AAF pilots reportedly flew about 25% of the total available aircraft inventory to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to avoid Taliban capture.<sup>82</sup> On August 18, when asked what was being done to retrieve the AAF aircraft that were flown out of Afghanistan, Secretary Austin replied, “We’re focused on the airfield and getting people out safely ... we’re going to take that issue up a later date.”<sup>83</sup>

### **Another 80 AAF and SMW aircraft rendered unusable at HKIA prior to the final U.S. departure**

OUSD-P confirmed that U.S. forces rendered **non-mission capable** all former AAF and SMW aircraft that remained at HKIA. An accounting of the number and type of aircraft destroyed at HKIA will be part of DOD’s forthcoming full ANDSF equipment assessment.<sup>84</sup>

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**Not (Non-) mission capable:** “Material condition indicating that systems and equipment are not capable of performing any of their assigned missions.”

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Source: Army Regulation 700-138, “Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability,” 4/23/2018.

Before the Afghan government collapsed and the Taliban took over the country, RS reported that due to the end of the Resolute Support mission, the Casualty Mitigation Team retrograded and the remaining military personnel in Afghanistan at the time would not be able to support the tracking and collection of civilian casualty data.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/16/2021.

The Taliban could potentially harvest parts from some aircraft to return others to mission-capable status.<sup>85</sup> However, CSTC-A assessed in January 2021 that without continued contractor support, none of the AAF's airframes could be sustained as combat-effective for more than a few months, depending on the stock of equipment parts in-country, the maintenance capability on each airframe, and the timing of contractor support withdrawal.<sup>86</sup>

The number and types of AAF aircraft that were destroyed, that flew to other countries before the Afghan government collapsed, or that fell into Taliban hands will be part of DOD's forthcoming full equipment assessment.<sup>87</sup>

More detailed information on the fate of AAF aircraft is available in the Classified Supplement to this report.

## Violence Trends

### Violence trend data unavailable as Resolute Support Mission ends

In previous quarterly reports, SIGAR analyzed different types of data to obtain a better understanding of the violence trends in Afghanistan. With the end of the RS mission, DOD said several key elements of violence-trend data were incomplete and are no longer available.

## MILITARY CASUALTIES

Approximately 60,000 to 70,000 ANDSF soldiers and police were killed in Afghanistan over the last 20 years defending the Afghan government, according to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley.<sup>88</sup>

Total U.S. military casualties in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001, to August 31, 2021, were 1,910 killed in action and 20,686 wounded in action. The number of service members killed does not include 415 non-hostile deaths (includes by accident, suicide, homicide, disease, natural, or unknown causes) or four DOD civilians killed.<sup>89</sup>


## CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

### Contractor Casualties

From April 17, 2002 until December 31, 2018, at least 1,233 contractors, including 45 Americans, were killed while working reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Another 1,427 contractors, including 38 Americans, were wounded during the same time period.<sup>90</sup>

FIGURE S.2

## U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002-2021



<sup>a</sup> Projected for 2018 based on public statements of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. According to USFOR-A, the publicly releasable U.S. troop level, as of March 1, 2018, remains 14,000.

<sup>b</sup> On January 15, 2021, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was 2,500; the number dropped to 650 by late June/early July as U.S. forces withdrew; peaked at 5,784 in late August as the U.S. deployed forces to assist with the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation; and went to zero on August 30, 2021.

Source: CRS, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, FY2002-FY2012," 7/2/2009, p. 9; DOD, "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 10/2009," p. 18; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 73; 7/30/2011, p. 71; 10/30/2012, p. 95; 10/30/2013, p. 87; 10/30/2014, p. 91; 10/30/2015, p. 92; OSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 12/27/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/27/2017 and 3/1/2018; Reuters, "Despite NATO Pledge to Increase Afghan Support, Troop Shortfall Remains: U.S.," 11/9/2017; DOD, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," 6/2019; DOD, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," 6/2020, p. 1; DOD, "Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan," 1/15/2021, p. 3; House Armed Services Committee, "House Armed Services Committee Holds a Hearing on Afghanistan," transcript, 9/30/2021; Senate Armed Services Committee, "Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan," transcript, 9/29/2021; DOD, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III On the End of the American War in Afghanistan," 8/30/2021.

## Violent Airport Attack on Eve of Departure

Violence involving civilians continued unabated as the Taliban advanced towards Kabul. Most of the incidents were attributed to the Taliban and included accusations of "massacring civilians," assassinations, and execution of surrendering soldiers.<sup>91</sup> For instance, the Taliban reportedly shot and killed the director of Afghanistan's government media center during an ambush in Kabul.<sup>92</sup> And Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission alleged that Taliban fighters massacred civilians during their capture of the southern Afghanistan border crossing at Spin Boldak in mid-July.<sup>93</sup>

The IS-K August 26 suicide attack at HKIA was the most deadly attack on civilians. It killed 120 Afghans and 13 American service members, and wounded another 200 people, including 18 U.S. service members (See page 73 for more details).

## DSCMO-A CLOSING OUT

Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A) remains headquartered in Qatar, administering the final disposition of efforts in Afghanistan, such as service contracts.<sup>94</sup> Army Major General Curtis Buzzard is director of DSCMO-A, which consists of 158 U.S. service members, DOD civilians, and U.S. contractors as of the end of this reporting period.<sup>95</sup> DSCMO-A is closing out and transitioning its activities to other DOD entities.<sup>96</sup> Figure S.2 shows U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan from 2002 through 2021.

“When your president flees literally on no notice in the middle of the day, that has a profoundly debilitating effect on everything else.”

—General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. (USMC), CENTCOM Commander

Source: General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr (USMC), CENTCOM Commander, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9/28/2021.

## HOW COULD THE ANDSF DISINTEGRATE IN 11 DAYS?

The speed with which the Taliban completed their military reconquest of Afghanistan came as a shock not only to U.S. military and civilian leaders and to Coalition partners, but also to Afghans and even the Taliban. The ANDSF disintegrated quickly and completely, despite allegedly superior force numbers, training, and equipment—including a capable air force—compared to the Taliban. “How did we miss the collapse of an army and a government that big, that fast, and [in] only 11 days?” General Milley asked during a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on September 28, 2021.<sup>97</sup>

The rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the ANDSF was the main focus at the congressional hearings. A number of contributing factors over the 20-year reconstruction effort played a role. SIGAR is conducting a more thorough examination of this question at the request of Congress, but some of the possible factors in the collapse already raised by SIGAR and other observers include:

- the effective Taliban strategy of gradually taking rural areas first and then later persuading district and provincial leaders that their victory was inevitable
- repeated shifts in U.S. and Coalition strategies, with decisions based on dates and not conditions on the ground
- multiple changes in authorities, policies, and roles of U.S. and Coalition military advisors restricting contact, advising, and oversight
- the 2003–2010 shift in U.S. focus from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq
- Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan
- U.S. and Coalition building an ANDSF too dependent on technology and too much in the image of a Western force
- problems with perceived legitimacy of the Afghan government
- poor Afghan leadership and rampant corruption both in government and the ANDSF

These issues were present prior to the February 2020 Doha agreement between the United States and the Taliban, which appeared to accelerate the Afghan government’s collapse. “I think the Afghans were very weakened by that morally and spiritually if you will,” General McKenzie said at the SASC hearing, referring to the Doha agreement that included the U.S. setting a withdrawal date.<sup>98</sup>

Once the U.S. and Coalition forces began to withdraw, the ANDSF’s weaknesses were further exposed. These included an over-reliance on foreign contractors to maintain sophisticated equipment and the inability of the AAF to replace the dramatic reduction in U.S. and Coalition close air support. In addition, the reduction of U.S. and Coalition advisors made it difficult for the U.S. to assess the capability and morale of ANDSF units.<sup>99</sup>

A milestone in the minds of ANDSF personnel may have occurred when the U.S. reduced its numbers to below 2,500 after April 14, 2021. General McKenzie testified that he believed, “If we went below that number, in fact, we would probably witness a collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan military.”<sup>100</sup> The departure from the major air base at Bagram in July may have exacerbated ANDSF fears of abandonment.<sup>101</sup>

Once the Taliban began their offensive in earnest in May 2021, the ANDSF appeared surprised and ill-prepared, and ANDSF leadership proved unable or unwilling to slow, much less reverse Taliban gains, notwithstanding some heroic resistance by the small percentage of elite Afghan forces and those ANDSF still willing to fight.<sup>102</sup>

By mid-July half of Afghanistan’s districts were under Taliban control, many having given up without resistance, and about half of the 34 provincial capitals were threatened.<sup>103</sup> After the first provincial capital fell on August 6, 2021, the others fell in rapid succession. Like several districts, many provinces gave up without resistance. “The Taliban made a concerted effort to really reach out to provincial leaders and convince them that the Taliban was going to be in charge, so they might as well sign up with them early on,” Secretary Austin testified.<sup>104</sup>

By the time President Ghani fled to the UAE there was little doubt about the final outcome, though General McKenzie believed that it was possible that the ANDSF “could have fought and held parts of Kabul had the president stayed.”<sup>105</sup>

U.S. military officials said it appeared that Afghan leaders were more corrupt than almost anyone imagined, and this had a debilitating and ultimately fatal impact on the ANDSF. “We failed to fully grasp that there was only so much for which and for whom many of the Afghan forces would fight,” Secretary Austin testified.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, former Finance Minister Khalid Payenda claimed in an interview with the Afghan Analysts Network that the actual number of available ANDSF troops was between 40,000 to 50,000, not the over 300,000 that were on the books, due to government and ANDSF officials using “ghost soldiers” to defraud the government and enrich themselves.<sup>107</sup>

“Kabul was taken with a couple hundred guys on motorcycles and there wasn’t a shot fired.”

—General Mark Milley

Source: General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9/28/2021.

## CONGRESS SEEKS AN ACCOUNTING OF WHY THE ANDSF FAILED AND WHAT EQUIPMENT WAS LOST IN AFGHANISTAN

On September 23, 2021, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022. The bill and accompanying committee report direct SIGAR to conduct an evaluation of ANDSF performance between February 2020 and August 2021.

SIGAR is required to address:

- why the ANDSF proved unable to defend Afghanistan from the Taliban following the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel
- the impact the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel had on the performance of the ANDSF
- elements of the U.S. military's efforts since 2001 to provide training, assistance, and advising to the ANDSF that impacted the ANDSF's performance following the U.S. military withdrawal
- current status of U.S.-provided equipment to the ANDSF
- current status of U.S.-trained ANDSF personnel
- any other matters SIGAR deems appropriate

For more information, see Section 1 of this report.

Source: H.R. 4350 (Excerpt), "SIGAR Performance Evaluation of the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces," p. 251, 9/23/2021; House of Representatives, "Amendment to Rules Committee Print, 117-13 Offered by Mr. Comer of Kentucky, Sec. 1214., "Additional Reports Required of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction," 9/15/2021; Senator Grassley, "Statement calling for support of HASC provision 28 Sep," 9/28/2021; SIGAR, internal summary of NDAA provisions, 9/24/2021.

### ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR is reviewing DOD's efforts to ensure the accountability for funds which were provided to Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense (MOD). This audit will determine the extent to which DOD, since the beginning of FY 2019, ensured (1) the accuracy and completeness of data used in Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), and (2) the funds it provided to the Afghan government to pay MOD salaries were disbursed to intended recipients.

### ANDSF Strength Before the Final Collapse

DSCMO-A provided ANP strength numbers as reported by the ANDSF in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) on June 24, July 29, and August 14, 2021. However, the numbers appear highly questionable given the ongoing Taliban offensive at the time. For example, on June 24, there were a reported 111,850 ANP on the books, with 96.5% present for duty; on July 29 (when roughly half the districts in Afghanistan had been lost to the Taliban), 112,431 ANP were in APPS with 94.2% present for duty; and on August 14, with most provinces lost and the day before the Afghan government collapsed, there were 112,924 ANP in APPS with 93.5% present for duty.<sup>108</sup>

Prior to the beginning of the Taliban offensive (as of April 29, 2021), CSTC-A reported 300,699 ANDSF personnel (182,071 MOD and 118,628 MOI) biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in APPS. There were an additional 7,066 civilians (3,015 MOD and 4,051 MOI).<sup>109</sup> These numbers do not include Popular Uprising, People's Mobilization Forces, or other militia forces that were reportedly formed to stem the Taliban offensive.<sup>110</sup>

These numbers do not account for potential corruption (e.g., “ghost soldiers”) nor do they reflect the loss of personnel to casualties, surrender, capture, or flight to other countries during the Taliban offensive from May through August 2021.

## **U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY**

As of September 30, 2021, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$89.38 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly \$3.1 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2020, over \$2.5 billion had been obligated and nearly \$2.2 billion disbursed, as of September 30, 2021. About \$844 million of FY 2021 ASFF has been obligated and over \$741 million disbursed, as of September 30, 2021.<sup>111</sup>

Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprised all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF money was used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) salaries. The rest of ASFF was used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Table F.4 on page 50.<sup>112</sup>

ASFF monies were obligated by either DSCMO-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.<sup>113</sup> Funds that DSCMO-A provided directly (on-budget) to the Afghan government to manage went to the Ministry of Finance, which then transferred them to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.<sup>114</sup> While the United States funded most ANA salaries, a significant share of personnel costs for the ANP was paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).<sup>115</sup> According to DOD, the United States provided about \$1 million annually in order to participate in LOTFA deliberations.<sup>116</sup>

## **Afghan National Army**

### **U.S. Funding**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated almost \$2.6 billion and disbursed more than \$2.4 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>117</sup> Also, as of September 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly \$47.5 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force

elements constituted the ANA budget activity group for reporting purposes through the 2018 appropriation.<sup>118</sup>

## **ANA Sustainment**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$2.4 billion and disbursed nearly \$2.3 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA sustainment. Also, as of September 30, 2021, the United States had nearly finished disbursing roughly \$23.5 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. These costs included salary and incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment-maintenance costs, including aircraft, and other expenses.<sup>119</sup>

## **ANA Equipment and Transportation**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had disbursed almost all of the roughly \$248 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 obligated for ANA equipment and transportation costs. Also, as of September 30, 2021, the United States had nearly finished disbursing approximately \$13.6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations obligated for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.<sup>120</sup>

## **ANA Infrastructure**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had disbursed about \$15 million of almost \$30 million of ASFF appropriations obligated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANDSF infrastructure projects. Also as of September 30, 2021, the United States had finished disbursing roughly \$6 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 obligated for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects.<sup>121</sup>

Before the Afghan government collapsed, DSCMO-A was managing six DOD-funded ANA infrastructure projects costing roughly \$14.2 million in total contract value. All of these infrastructure projects were terminated following the collapse of the Afghan government; final termination costs and amount recouped remain to be determined. In addition, DSCMO-A was planning a seventh project that was canceled before contract award.<sup>122</sup>

## **ANA Training and Operations**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated roughly \$108 million and disbursed approximately \$86 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA training and operations. Also as of September 30, 2021, the United States had nearly finished disbursing about \$4.3 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 obligated for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.<sup>123</sup>

As of September 13, 2021, the 10 costliest U.S.-funded contracts to train ANA, AAF, and ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) personnel had a contract value of over \$356 million.<sup>124</sup> All of these training contracts were terminated for convenience following the collapse of the Afghan government. The potential recoupable funds from the terminated contracts is about \$141 million, but final termination costs and disposition of training equipment and supplies have yet to be determined.<sup>125</sup>

## **Afghan Air Force**

### **U.S. Funding**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$2.2 billion and disbursed roughly \$2.1 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the AAF.

## **Afghan Special Security Forces**

The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) was the ANDSF's primary offensive component. The ASSF included a number of elements, such as the ANA ANASOC, the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW).<sup>126</sup>

### **U.S. Funding**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated over \$1.2 billion and disbursed over \$1 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ASSF.<sup>127</sup>

## **Afghan National Police**

### **U.S. Funding**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated over \$915 million and disbursed roughly \$833 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.<sup>128</sup> As of September 30, 2021, the United States had disbursed nearly all of the \$21.6 billion of ASFF obligated from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build, train, equip, and sustain ANP elements, including police special forces. These force elements constituted the ANP budget activity group for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.<sup>129</sup>

## **ANP Sustainment**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated over \$771 million and disbursed about \$710 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP sustainment. As of September 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about \$9.6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations to sustain ANP elements, including police special forces.<sup>130</sup> Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) were paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).<sup>131</sup>

## **ANP Equipment and Transportation**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had disbursed almost all of the roughly \$3.7 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 obligated for ANP equipment and transportation costs. As of September 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about \$4.8 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements, including police special forces, equipment and transportation costs.<sup>132</sup>

## **ANP Infrastructure**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$4.1 million and disbursed about \$2.5 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP infrastructure projects. As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated and disbursed about \$3.2 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for infrastructure projects for ANP elements, including police special forces.<sup>133</sup>

DSCMO-A was managing one DOD-funded ANP infrastructure project: the joint NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) and ASFF-funded closed-circuit television surveillance system in Kabul (\$19 million of this funded by ASFF). This project was terminated after the collapse of the Afghan government; final termination costs and amounts that can be recouped have yet to be determined.<sup>134</sup>

## **ANP Training and Operations**

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$136 million and disbursed about \$117 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP training and operations. Also as of September 30, 2021, the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about \$4 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements, including police special forces, training and operations.<sup>135</sup> The one remaining ANP training contract with a contract value of over \$500,000 was terminated for convenience following the collapse of the Afghan government; termination costs and amount recouped yet to be determined.<sup>136</sup>

## ASSISTANCE SUSPENDED TO FORMER GOVERNMENT'S MINE-CLEARANCE DIRECTORATE

State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) suspended assistance to the former Afghan Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on September 9, 2021. State said assistance was suspended because it provided direct support to Taliban governance and therefore ran counter to international sanctions on material support to specially designated global terrorists. Since 2006, PM/WRA had provided \$1 million in assistance to DMAC. PM/WRA will recoup the remaining funds (approximately \$650,000) from DMAC, but all other mine-action projects and implementing partners have continued on-the-ground mine and explosive-remnants of war (ERW) clearance activities. PM/WRA support to these partners continues through a U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control license.<sup>137</sup>

PM/WRA supports the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. State has directly funded six Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and four international NGOs to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds), which insurgents can use to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).<sup>138</sup>

Afghanistan is riddled with land mines and explosive remnants of war such as live shells and bombs, according to the United Nations (UN).<sup>139</sup> Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001, most casualties today are caused by mines and other ERW that have accumulated since 2002.<sup>140</sup> In recent years, casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also has documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in areas following heavy fighting.<sup>141</sup>

PM/WRA manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has allocated \$440 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional \$11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction effort). As of September 15, 2021, PM/WRA had released \$19.5 million in FY 2020 funds.<sup>142</sup>

From 1997 through July 31, 2021, State-funded implementing partners cleared approximately 323.8 square kilometers of land (125 square miles) and removed or destroyed nearly 8.5 million land mines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table S.2 on the following page shows conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2011–2021.<sup>143</sup>

The estimated total area of contaminated land continued to fluctuate: clearance activities reduced the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys found new contaminated land. As of July 31, 2021, the total known

### SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, a SIGAR audit of DOD's management and oversight of the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (NATF) since 2014 found that CSTC-A did not monitor and account for NATF funds transferred into DOD's NATF ASFF account, as required; a lack of clear guidance outlining responsibilities for funds that went from SHAPE directly to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, bypassing DOD's NATF ASFF account; CSTC-A did not meet NATF performance management and reporting requirements, and did not ensure that NATF projects addressed up-to-date ANDSF requirements; and although CSTC-A, as trust fund manager, was not required to evaluate the Afghan government's capacity to sustain NATF projects, CSTC-A initiated, but did not complete, steps to help make NATF funding more efficient, transparent, and responsive to donor needs, including considering the sustainability of future NATF investments.

SIGAR made no recommendations in the final report.

# SECURITY

TABLE S.2

<b>DEMINEING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE, FISCAL YEARS 2011–2021</b>					
<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Minefields Cleared (m<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>AT/AP Destroyed</b>	<b>UXO Destroyed</b>	<b>SAA Destroyed</b>	<b>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m<sup>2</sup>)<sup>a</sup></b>
2011	31,644,360	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	602,000,000
2012	46,783,527	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	550,000,000
2013	25,059,918	6,431	203,024	275,697	521,000,000
2014	22,071,212	12,397	287,331	346,484	511,600,000
2015	12,101,386	2,134	33,078	88,798	570,800,000
2016	27,856,346	6,493	6,289	91,563	607,600,000
2017	31,897,313	6,646	37,632	88,261	547,000,000
2018	25,233,844	5,299	30,924	158,850	558,700,000
2019	13,104,094	3,102	26,791	162,727	657,693,033
2020	23,966,967	2,879	7,197	85,250	843,517,435
2021	24,736,683	11,641	4,533	43,761	804,023,346
<b>Total</b>	<b>284,455,650</b>	<b>79,356</b>	<b>1,326,191</b>	<b>4,793,876</b>	

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition.

There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre.

<sup>a</sup> Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. FY 2021 data covers October 1, 2020, through July 31, 2021.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/16/2021.

contaminated area was 804 square kilometers (310.4 square miles) in 4,129 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a battlefield can include land mines and other improvised explosives; and an initial hazardous area will include an indeterminate amount and type of explosive hazards.<sup>144</sup>

## SECURITY ENDNOTES

- 1 Reuters, “Taliban capture first Afghan provincial capital, in Nimroz – police,” 8/6/2021.
- 2 Daily Mail, “Taliban captures its SIXTH city in less than a week as military pilots quit after being targeted for assassination, leaving Afghan troops without vital air support,” 8/9/2021; Long War Journal, “Former headquarters of Northern Alliance falls under Taliban control,” 8/10/2021.
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## GOVERNANCE

### KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

On August 15, 2021, President Ashraf Ghani fled the country; the Afghan government collapsed as Taliban forces entered Kabul.

The Taliban announced what they called a “caretaker” government cabinet on September 7, 2021.

While the United States and other members of the international community suspended access to billions of dollars in Afghan assets and donor funds, donors still pledged at least \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan this quarter.

The last minister of finance in the Ghani government claimed that at least 80% of Afghan soldiers and police were “ghosts.”

### U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR GOVERNANCE

As of September 30, 2021, the United States had provided nearly \$36.2 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of this funding, nearly \$21.2 billion, was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).<sup>1</sup>

As summarized in the tables below, as of September 22, 2021, USAID told SIGAR that it had suspended all USAID-funded assistance activities, including any contact with the Afghan government. USAID requested their implementing partners not to carry out any agreement-specified activities, but to maintain staff and operational capacity, and to incur only reasonable, allocable, and allowable recurrent costs. USAID continued to disburse funds to those partners who needed to maintain staff and sustain operational capacity.<sup>2</sup>

State, however, did not provide SIGAR with an update on the status of their programs, which had included efforts to support the rule of law



**Former President Ashraf Ghani** meeting with U.S. officials the day before he fled the country. (Afghan government photo)

and corrections. State said there were “extenuating circumstances it faced while responding to the onset of the Afghanistan crisis.”<sup>3</sup>

## **AFGHAN GOVERNMENT COLLAPSES, TALIBAN ANNOUNCE “CARETAKER” GOVERNMENT**

### **Ashraf Ghani Flees, Government Falls Following Rapid Taliban Advance**

On August 15, 2021, President Ashraf Ghani fled Afghanistan after Taliban forces entered Kabul, leading to what the UN Secretary-General described as the “de facto disintegration” of the Afghan government.<sup>4</sup> Ghani said he left the country to prevent further bloodshed. Over a 10-day span in August, the Taliban captured 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals.<sup>5</sup> The Taliban, commenting on what they called their “unexpected” victory, claimed they had entered Kabul to “ensure security of lives and property of the people.”<sup>6</sup> In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Frank McKenzie, said that on August 15, 2021, the Taliban offered to let U.S. military forces take responsibility for the security of Kabul. General McKenzie said that securing all of Kabul city was not part of the mission he was directed to execute and, even if he had been directed, he did not have the resources to secure the entire city.<sup>7</sup>

Whereas Ghani fled, the chairperson of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah; former President Hamid Karzai; and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the Hizb-i Islami political party, stayed and formed a temporary council aimed at ensuring a peaceful transfer of power to Taliban leaders.<sup>8</sup>

### **Taliban Announce Their “Caretaker” Government**

The Taliban announced their 33-person “caretaker” government cabinet on September 7, 2021. According to the *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, the all-male government “seemed almost intentionally designed to provoke” and signaled “to the outside world and other Afghans that the [Taliban] movement currently sees no reason to compromise with anyone but their own.”<sup>9</sup>

According to the UN, the “de facto” Taliban government is a disappointment for any who hoped or advocated for inclusivity. There were “no non-Taliban members, no figures from the past government, nor leaders of minority groups,” the UN said. Further, many of the new leaders had been members of leadership during the Taliban’s 1996–2001 time in power. The new Taliban regime’s prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, and the foreign minister are among those on the UN sanctions list for their association with the Taliban.<sup>10</sup> The names and backgrounds of the Taliban ministers are shown on the following page.

## KEY FIGURES IN THE TALIBAN'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT



Leader/"Commander of the Faithful"

### Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada

Took command of the Taliban in 2016, following the death of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. The Taliban released the only known photo of Sheikh Akhundzada at this time. He is estimated to be in his 60s and is generally characterized as a religious authority, rather than a military commander.

#### KEY

- Involved in Doha Talks
- Sanctioned\*
- Guantanamo Five\*\*
- Previously Incarcerated



Prime Minister

### Mohammad Hassan Akhund

A minister in the previous Taliban regime and close to Taliban founder Mullah Omar. Rarely seen in public. Thought to be a religious authority rather than a military commander.



Deputy Prime Minister

### Abdul Ghani Baradar

A founding member of the Taliban, Baradar was close to Mullah Omar and held several positions in the previous regime. Led the negotiating team in Doha. Generally considered a moderate within the movement.



Deputy Prime Minister

### Abdul Salam Hanafi

An Uzbek, Hanafi is one of very few non-Pashtuns in leadership. Also a deputy minister under the previous regime, he was allegedly involved in drug trafficking.



Political Deputy for Prime Minister

### Abdul Kabir

A member of the previous regime, allegedly involved in both terror operations and drug trafficking.



Defense Minister

### Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid

The oldest son of Mullah Omar, Mujahid is believed to be in his early 30s.



Deputy Minister of Defense

### Abdul Qayyum Zakir

A high-ranking military commander with possible connections to Iran. Zakir appears popular with field commanders and was strongly opposed to peace negotiations.



Deputy Minister of Defense

### Mohammad Fazil Mazloom

A front-line military commander through the 1990s, Mazloom is accused of human rights abuses and war crimes.



Interior Minister

### Sirajuddin Haqqani

Wanted for multiple terror attacks by the FBI, Haqqani is a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist



Director of Prisons

### Nooruddin Turabi

Infamous for his brutal Justice Ministry under the previous regime, Turabi continues to support amputations as punishment.



Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs for Security

### Mohammad Ibrahim Sadr



Acting Director of Intelligence

### Abdul Haq Wasiq



Foreign Affairs Minister

### Amir Khan Muttaqi



Minister of Justice

### Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai



UN Ambassador (unrecognized)

### Suhail Shaheen



Spokesman

### Zabihullah Mujahid

\* Individuals marked as "Sanctioned" are named in UN, U.S. and/or Interpol lists.

\*\* "Guantanamo Five" refers to the five Taliban officials released from Guantanamo Bay Prison in 2014 in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl.

Note: It remains unclear how much power individual officials hold. The Taliban continue to shuffle various cabinet positions and have named multiple people to the same roles. Nearly all officials listed here are sanctioned for alleged connections to criminal acts ranging from drug trafficking to civilian massacres.

Note 2: This graphic is not intended to communicate any official recognition of the Taliban as the rightful or legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Source: Please see endnote 11. The photos of Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada, Mohammad Hassan Akhund and Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai originated with various Taliban media and may not be accurate. The photos of Abdul Ghani Baradar and Suhail Shaheen are State Department photos. The photo of Sirajuddin Haqqani is from the FBI. The photo of Zabihullah Mujahid is a still image captured from a video of a Taliban press conference. SIGAR has not used photographs to which others hold copyright.

## SIGAR AUDITS

This quarter, a SIGAR audit on post-peace planning in Afghanistan found that State and USAID (1) did not develop strategies or plans for future reconstruction efforts following Afghan peace negotiations; (2) did not develop a plan detailing how reconstruction activities would be revised based on other possible outcomes and risks; (3) deferred decisions on reintegrating former prisoners and combatants into Afghan society, leaving that to the Afghan government and Taliban; and (4) did not develop plans for monitoring and evaluating reconstruction activities following an Afghan peace deal or outcome of the U.S. withdrawal.

While State and USAID said they had a strategy and plans for protecting the rights of Afghan women and girls, it was up to the Afghan government and the Afghan people to decide whether and to what extent the rights of women and of ethnic and religious minorities should be protected. State and USAID told SIGAR they intended to condition future reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan to ensure continued progress for Afghan women and girls. SIGAR made no recommendations in the final report.

## U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET

### International Assistance Uncertain Following Taliban Conquest

The future of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remains uncertain in the wake of the Taliban's conquest. State told SIGAR on September 29, 2021, that "the United States is not providing any assistance to the Taliban or any part of the government of Afghanistan."<sup>12</sup> On September 9, 2021, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, reported that "billions of assets and donor funds have been frozen by members of the international community."<sup>13</sup> As late as early August, Ambassador Khalilzad insisted that the Taliban "must understand that there is no military solution in Afghanistan," saying "the Taliban cannot establish by force a government that would be accepted by the majority of Afghans and the international community."<sup>14</sup> Further, Khalilzad claimed that if the Taliban did conquer the country, they would become a "pariah state" without international recognition or foreign assistance.<sup>15</sup>

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, testifying to Congress in September, appeared to suggest that development assistance to Afghanistan might continue under certain circumstances, saying the "legitimacy and support that [the Taliban government] seeks from the international community will depend entirely on its conduct." Further, he said that the U.S. government is working with the international community to "leverage our combined influence."<sup>16</sup> For example, Secretary Blinken told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "the Taliban has a big problem on its hands. And of course, it is generating very, very little revenue in order to deal with that. All of which, I might add, gives the international community very significant leverage and influence going forward."<sup>17</sup>

On the question of leverage over the Taliban, the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Frank McKenzie, told the Senate Armed Services Committee this quarter that "I do think there is opportunity [but it] will not be a long-lived opportunity, a matter of months perhaps, where we can force the Taliban down a certain path based on their desire to have international financing, international recognition, the release of sanctions and other things that are very important to them."<sup>18</sup>

When speaking on continued humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, Secretary Blinken expressed hope that it will not be diverted to the Taliban-led government.<sup>19</sup> Blinken said this humanitarian assistance will be provided through the UN, which in turn, will work through nongovernmental organizations using "long-tested methods" to ensure these funds do not go to the Taliban government.<sup>20</sup>

On September 24, 2021, the Treasury Department announced that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two general licenses to support the continued flow of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan and other activities that support basic human needs in

Afghanistan while “denying assets to the Taliban and other sanctioned entities and individuals.” One of these general licenses authorizes the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, and certain international organizations and entities (including the UN), as well as those acting on their behalf, to engage in humanitarian efforts.<sup>21</sup>

However, the question remains whether humanitarian assistance can be firewalled from the Taliban government’s influence. In comments to reporters in September, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said “it’s impossible to provide humanitarian assistance inside Afghanistan without engaging with de facto [Taliban] authorities of the country.” Further, despite donors pledging \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance following a UN-organized donor conference on September 13, 2021, Guterres questioned whether that form of assistance will be enough, saying “humanitarian aid will not solve the problem if the economy of Afghanistan collapses.”<sup>22</sup>

## Civilian On-Budget Assistance

USAID provided **on-budget** civilian assistance in two ways: bilaterally to Afghan government entities; and through contributions to two multidonor trust funds—the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Asian Development Bank-administered Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).<sup>23</sup> The ARTF provided funds to the Afghan government’s operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy reforms, and national-priority programs.<sup>24</sup> The AITF coordinated donor assistance for infrastructure projects.<sup>25</sup>

According to USAID, all bilateral-assistance funds were deposited in separate bank accounts established by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for each program.<sup>26</sup>

As shown in Table G.1 on the following page, USAID’s direct bilateral-assistance programs had a total estimated cost of \$352 million. USAID also expected to contribute \$700 million to the ARTF from 2020 through 2025, in addition to \$3.9 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreements between USAID and the World Bank (2002–2020).<sup>27</sup> According to USAID, the ARTF is “paused and in discussion with the donor community on a way forward.”<sup>28</sup>

The ARTF coordinates international aid on behalf of donors. The ARTF was the largest single source of funding for Afghanistan’s development, financing up to 30% of Afghanistan’s civilian budget, and supporting core functions of the previous government. The main funding mechanisms (also known as “windows”) that were executed by the former government were the Recurrent Cost Window (RCW) and the Investment Window (IW). The RCW provided on-budget reimbursements to the former government for a portion of eligible and non-security related operating expenditures every year. Since 2018, the World Bank says all RCW funding was incentivized to



**UN Secretary-General António Guterres** said “it’s impossible to provide humanitarian assistance inside Afghanistan without engaging with de facto [Taliban] authorities of the country.” (UN photo)

**On-budget assistance:** Encompasses donor funds that are aligned with Afghan government plans, included in Afghan government budget documents, and included in the budget approved by the parliament and managed by the Afghan treasury system. On-budget assistance is primarily delivered either bilaterally from a donor to Afghan government entities, or through multidonor trust funds. (DOD prefers the term “direct contributions” when referring to Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) monies executed via Afghan government contracts or Afghan spending on personnel.)

**Off-budget assistance:** Encompasses donor funds that are excluded from the Afghan national budget and not managed through Afghan government systems.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2014, p. 130; Ministry of Finance, “Aid Management Policy for Transition and Beyond,” 12/10/2012, p. 8; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2016; DOD, OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018.

# GOVERNANCE

TABLE G.1

USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS					
Project/Trust Fund Title	Afghan Government On-Budget Partner	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2021
<b>Bilateral Government-to-Government Projects</b>					
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC)*	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat	1/1/2013	12/31/2023	\$316,713,724	\$272,477,914
Textbook Printing and Distribution*	Ministry of Education	9/15/2017	12/31/2021	35,000,000	4,333,950
<b>Multilateral Trust Funds</b>					
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (current award)*/**	Multiple	9/29/2020	12/31/2025	\$700,000,000	\$55,686,333
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)*	Multiple	3/7/2013	3/6/2023	153,670,184	153,670,184

\*USAID told SIGAR that it had suspended all USAID-funded assistance activities, including any contact with the Afghan government. USAID requested their implementing partners not to carry out any agreement-specified activities, but to maintain staff and operational capacity, and to incur only reasonable, allocable, and allowable recurrent costs. USAID continued to disburse funds to those partners who needed to maintain staff and sustain operational capacity.

\*\*USAID had previous awards to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled \$1,371,991,195 in disbursements and in September 2020 and totaled \$2,555,686,333 in disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently \$4,127,677,528.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2021.

policy benchmarks. The IW provided on-budget funding for Afghan government national development programs in their budget.<sup>29</sup>

USAID cumulatively disbursed \$154 million to the AITF.<sup>30</sup> As of September 2020, the United States was the second-largest cumulative donor to the AITF, (26% of contributions); the largest cumulative donor is the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (34% of contributions).<sup>31</sup> The last U.S. disbursement to the AITF was in April 2017.<sup>32</sup>

## Last Finance Minister Claims at Least 80% of Afghan Soldiers and Police were “Ghosts”

Approximately 70% of total U.S. on-budget assistance went toward the requirements of the Afghan security forces.<sup>33</sup> A large portion of this was to support salaries. As of April 29, 2021, DOD reported that 300,699 Afghan military and police were eligible for pay.<sup>34</sup> For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1400 (December 2020–December 2021), as of June 12, DOD provided the Afghan government the equivalent of \$289.4 million, most of which (87%) paid for salaries.<sup>35</sup>

In an interview with the *Afghanistan Analysts Network* in late September, the last minister of finance in the Ghani government, Khalid Payenda, said that the reported 300,000 Afghan military and police personnel “was all a lie.” Instead, he estimated that there were between 40,000 and 50,000 actual soldiers and police, the remainder being “ghosts.” Payenda accused lower-level commanders of colluding with officials “all the way to the top” to inflate the number of serving soldiers and police in order to receive the full allocated funding for salaries and meals. Further, he said these commanders would collude with contractors, such as those expected to provide foodstuffs, to divide profits from payments for nonexistent personnel.<sup>36</sup>

# GOVERNANCE

Payenda claimed that it was not until the final weeks before the fall of the Afghan government that senior officials came to appreciate the extent of the problem, finding out “there were no soldiers” and concluding the Afghan army needed six months to recuperate and reconstitute itself.<sup>37</sup>

Payenda’s claims, if true, would indicate a massive fraud that went undetected for an unspecified period of time despite DOD’s efforts to reduce the opportunities for corruption and fraud around personnel. According to DOD last quarter, the computerized Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) saw the biometric enrollment of 97% of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and 97.8% of Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported personnel.<sup>38</sup> If Payenda’s estimates are accurate, it would mean between 83% and 87% of 300,000 reported military and police personnel were ghosts.<sup>39</sup>

At least one senior ANDSF official with whom SIGAR has spoken contradicted Payenda. SIGAR intends to investigate this matter.

## SIGAR ATTEMPTS TO SPEAK WITH THE LAST FINANCE MINISTER REBUFFED

In late September 2021, SIGAR special agents made several attempts to contact the last Islamic Republic finance minister, Khalid Payenda, to no avail. SIGAR special agents then visited Payenda’s residence and asked to interview him about his experiences in Afghanistan, which he declined. When offered the opportunity to schedule an appointment the following day or week, Payenda again declined, saying he might contact the agents later, but doubted it would be soon. SIGAR has subsequently reached out to Payenda without success.

## RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

### Summary of Rule-of-Law and Anticorruption Programs

As shown in Table G.2, the United States supported a number of rule-of-law and anticorruption programs in Afghanistan.

TABLE G.2

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2021
Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT)*	4/18/2016	4/17/2022	\$68,163,468	\$49,505,383
Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT)*	8/23/2017	8/22/2022	31,986,588	16,590,954
Corrections System Support Program (OASIS CSSP) Option Year 3**	6/1/2020	5/31/2021	No update	No update
Justice Sector Support Program OASIS Contract**	8/28/2017	8/27/2022	No update	No update
Transferring Professional Development Capacity (TPDC)**	8/31/2020	8/31/2023	No update	No update

\*USAID told SIGAR that it had suspended all USAID-funded assistance activities, including any contact with the Afghan government. USAID requested their implementing partners not to carry out any agreement-specified activities, but to maintain staff and operational capacity, and to incur only reasonable, allocable, and allowable recurrent costs. USAID continued to disburse funds to those partners who needed to maintain staff and sustain operational capacity.

\*\*The State Department’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services informed SIGAR this quarter that it would not provide the current status of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). According to State, it is “conducting a review of non-humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. This review is ongoing and will determine how INL approaches its programming going forward. The United States is not providing any assistance to the Taliban or any part of the government of Afghanistan.”

Source: State, email correspondence with SIGAR, 9/29/2021; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2021.

## Anticorruption

In an interview with the *Afghanistan Analysts Network* following the collapse of the government, former Ghani-appointed finance minister Khalid Payenda, described corruption in the Afghan government as “mind-boggling; almost everyone was corrupt.” Payenda, who resigned five

## SIGAR AUDITS

This quarter, SIGAR issued an audit on the conditions DOD imposed on funding to the Afghan security forces. SIGAR found that Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did not hold the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to account by enforcing the conditions it established to create a stronger, more professional, and more self-reliant ANDSF. As a result, DOD will never know if the ANDSF could have performed at a higher level in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal had DOD held the ANDSF accountable for failures rather than simply performing tasks for them and providing funding regardless of actual progress. SIGAR made no recommendations in the final report.

**Refugees:** Persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection. According to the UNHCR, refugees have the right to safe asylum and should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident.

**Migrants:** Persons who change their country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status. According to the UN, there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant.

days before the final collapse of the government, said that a few people, particularly in the security sector, tried to make money in the last days of the republic.<sup>40</sup>

Customs collection was one area Payenda said remained corrupt, describing the challenge as “a quagmire and I was drowning in it.”<sup>41</sup> (In 2015, SIGAR reported that U.S. government officials said that potentially up to half of Afghanistan’s customs revenue was lost to corruption.<sup>42</sup>) According to Payenda, one of his priorities after being named minister of finance in January 2021 was improving the collection of customs.<sup>43</sup> Payenda described how each customs house competed with each other to offer traders a lower tariff, thus attracting more traffic for their corrupt schemes while losing the Afghan government important revenues.<sup>44</sup> After Payenda confronted the director of the Nangarhar Province customs office, the director reportedly claimed that he was not a bad person, but the environment forced him to pay off the province governor, news reporters, and members of the Major Crimes Task Force.<sup>45</sup>

Payenda said that all customs directors when confronted accused their province governors of corruption, with many directors saying they also had to illegally pay police, province council representatives and members of parliament, and the Taliban.<sup>46</sup>

## REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The situation facing Afghan **refugees** and the internally displaced has changed drastically since last quarter with the Taliban taking control of the country, State said. Relief agencies report the humanitarian situation worsened in 2021, with increased conflict-related displacements inside the country; a higher rate of returns of undocumented Afghans from Iran; severe drought, which is expected to contribute to below-average crop harvests and further worsen food insecurity in the coming months; increased rates of malnutrition among children ages five years and younger; and growing gaps in health-system coverage to address health needs, including for COVID-19 prevention and response.<sup>47</sup>

### Afghan Refugees

On August 16, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a non-return advisory for Afghanistan that called for a bar on forced returns of Afghan nationals, including asylum seekers who have had their claims rejected.<sup>48</sup>

As of September 23, UNHCR reported that 1,264 refugees voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in 2021. Most of the refugees returned from Iran (800) and Pakistan (413).<sup>49</sup> UNHCR estimated that approximately 2.6 million Afghans were refugees in other countries in 2020.<sup>50</sup>

Source: United Nations, “Refugees and Migrants: Definitions,” 2019; UNHCR, “Protecting Refugees: questions and answers,” 2/2002.

## SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, SIGAR issued an updated assessment of the Afghan government's implementation, resourcing, and administration of the Afghanistan National Strategy for Combating Corruption. SIGAR found that corruption remained a serious problem and more tangible government action was required to root it out. Specifically, the Afghan government should have: (1) created and implemented benchmarks that were specific, verifiable, time bound, and achieved the desired outcome; (2) amended Article 102 of its Constitution or developed and enforced procedures for the arrest and prosecution of members of Parliament; (3) created and maintained a single, comprehensive list of warrants for individuals accused of corruption crimes; (4) provided additional resources to support the declaration and verification of assets by public officials; (5) increased formal and informal cooperation with other international law-enforcement organizations; and (6) provided resources to Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan and other relevant bodies to enable them to conduct regular inspections at *hawaladars* (informal networks for transferring money) and better monitor illicit financial flows.

## Undocumented Afghan Migrant Returnees

As of September 9, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) reported that 858,956 undocumented Afghan migrants (spontaneous returnees and deportees) returned from Iran and 7,933 undocumented from Pakistan in 2021.<sup>51</sup>

## Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement

As of October 6, 2021, conflicts had induced 665,200 Afghans to flee their homes in 2021, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.<sup>52</sup>

## WOMEN'S ADVANCEMENT

As of August 15, USAID had only one remaining Promote program, which aimed to strengthen women's participation in civil society.<sup>53</sup> Like other USAID activities, this program has been suspended.<sup>54</sup>

Table G.3 on the following page shows the Promote and women's-focused programs. Promote's Musharikat (Women's Rights Groups and Coalitions) program was focused on advancing women's participation in the peace process, political participation, and addressing gender-based violence (GBV).<sup>55</sup>

## Future of Women Uncertain

According to the UN, there are increasing reports that the Taliban have prohibited women from appearing in public places without male chaperones

# GOVERNANCE

TABLE G.3

USAID GENDER PROGRAM				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2021
Promote: Women's Rights Groups and Coalitions*	9/2/2015	12/1/2021	\$34,534,401	\$31,653,638

\*USAID told SIGAR that it had suspended all USAID-funded assistance activities, including any contact with the Afghan government. USAID requested their implementing partners not to carry out any agreement-specified activities, but to maintain staff and operational capacity, and to incur only reasonable, allocable, and allowable recurrent costs. USAID continued to disburse funds to those partners who needed to maintain staff and sustain operational capacity.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2021.



**The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan,** Deborah Lyons (left), met with prominent advocate for women and children, Mahbouba Seraj, in Kabul on October 13. (UN photo)

and prevented women from working. Further, the UN said the Taliban have limited girls' access to education in some regions and dismantled the Departments of Women's Affairs across Afghanistan, as well as targeted women's nongovernmental organizations. Shortly after the fall of the Islamic Republic, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said they would respect the rights of women "within the framework of Islam."<sup>56</sup>

As the Taliban took control of districts across Afghanistan leading up to the final collapse of the government, the UN reported allegations of lost rights and freedoms by Afghan women and girls. In particular, women have lost access to education, to health clinics, the right to work and freedom of movement, owing to the directive that women were to be accompanied by a male family chaperone when leaving the home and the reinstatement of strict dress code. In several locations, the Taliban had reportedly threatened those who violate these rules with harsh punishments. The UN said there were reports of women having been flogged and beaten in public because they had breached the prescribed rules.<sup>57</sup>

As of October 5, 2021, Human Rights Watch (HRW) summarized:<sup>58</sup>

[There has] been a steady stream of bad news for women and girls. Almost every day brings further evidence that they are implementing a massive rollback of women's rights. But Afghan women are fighting back—taking to the streets and protesting, even in the face of violence from the Taliban and attempts to ban protest.

According to HRW, there are a number of concerning reports, including: Taliban bans on women's sports, limited women's access to health care due to Taliban rules requiring women to be chaperoned by a man, suspension of international aid, Taliban dispersal of women's rights protesters with gunfire, reports of the Taliban banning women civil servants in the fallen government from returning to work, and Taliban efforts to ban female humanitarian workers.<sup>59</sup>

According to USAID, even if the Taliban allowed females to study, the space for girls and women's education continues to shrink in Afghanistan. The lack of a clear policy or strategy to guide the education sector has led to fragmentation, inconsistency, and incoherent guidance from the local

level de facto authorities based on their own interpretations and understanding of education, USAID said.<sup>60</sup>

## HUMAN RIGHTS

### Numerous Reports of Human Rights Violations, Few Means to Verify

According to Patricia Gossman, associate director for Human Rights Watch Asia, there are numerous claims of atrocities in Afghanistan, but her organization has struggled to confirm them. She said, “there is an avalanche of unverified information on social media” but “there is no other way [besides credible investigations] to establish the truth and press for accountability.”<sup>61</sup>

## COUNTERNARCOTICS

### DEA Evacuates Kabul, Aims to Permanently Close Afghan Office

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that on August 15, all its staff evacuated Kabul and it has begun administrative proceedings to permanently close its office in Afghanistan.<sup>62</sup> According to DEA, the U.S. military withdrawal and the dissolution of the Afghan government had “catastrophic impacts” on DEA’s work in Afghanistan, and it has no plans to maintain a longer-term mentoring presence there.<sup>63</sup>

DEA over the past two quarters had told SIGAR that it had a long history in Afghanistan, predating September 11, 2001, and the arrival of U.S. forces. During that time DEA said it planned to remain engaged in Afghanistan for as long as the Afghan government permitted and so long as the security situation did not significantly and permanently deteriorate.<sup>64</sup>

### Interdiction Results

DEA reported this quarter that the value of narcotics intercepted from July 1 through August 15, 2021, was over \$3.7 million.<sup>65</sup> In total, interdiction activities resulted in seizures of 200 kilograms (kg) (441 lbs.) of opium, 96 kg (212 lbs.) of heroin, and 24 kg of methamphetamines (53 lbs.). Additionally, 18 arrests were made and approximately 505 kg (1,113 lbs.) of hashish were seized by Afghan security forces during this period.<sup>66</sup> No supplemental information has been available since August 15, 2021. Table G.4 on the following page contains interdiction results provided by DOD and DEA.

DEA reported that DEA-mentored, -partnered, or -supported counter-narcotics interdiction activities by the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) from July 1 through August 15, 2021, included 12 operations.<sup>67</sup> Despite the improved capabilities of Afghan

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TABLE G.4

INTERDICTION RESULTS, 2011–2021												
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 <sup>1</sup>	2021 <sup>2</sup>	TOTAL
Number of Operations	624	669	518	333	270	196	157	198	152	184	57	<b>3,358</b>
Arrests	862	535	386	442	394	301	152	274	170	263	52	<b>3,831</b>
Hashish seized (kg)	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,785	123,063	227,327	42,842	148,604	422,658	112,439	<b>1,524,621</b>
Heroin seized (kg)	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,056	2,859	3,532	1,975	3,242	3,507	585	383	<b>36,051</b>
Morphine seized (kg)	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	13,041	106,369	10,127	11,859	2	-	<b>181,052</b>
Opium seized (kg)	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,379	27,600	10,487	24,263	23,180	13,751	325	1,086	<b>349,562</b>
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	42,314	89,878	22,863	81,182	30,849	56,075	<b>900,572</b>
Methamphetamine <sup>3</sup> (kg)	50	-	11	23	11	14	31	143	1,308	672	308	<b>2,571</b>

Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2014 seizure of 135,000 kg of precursor chemicals.

- Indicates no data reported.

<sup>1</sup> Data covers January 1–December 8, 2020

<sup>2</sup> Data covers January 1–March 13, 2021, April 1–June 14, 2021, and from July 1–August 15, 2021

<sup>3</sup> In crystal or powder form

Source: DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/16/2021.

specialized units over the years, drug seizures and arrests have had minimal impact on the country’s opium-poppy cultivation and production. For example, total opium seizures since FY 2008 were equivalent to approximately 8% of the country’s 6,400 metric tons of opium production for the *single year* of 2019, as reported by UNODC.<sup>68</sup>

## State Refuses to Disclose the Current Status of Counternarcotics Programming

The State Department’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services informed SIGAR this quarter that it would not provide the current status of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). INL had provided counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan through direct programming as well as through an inter-agency agreement with DEA. According to State, it is “conducting a review of non-humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. This review is ongoing and will determine how INL approaches its programming going forward. The United States is not providing any assistance to the Taliban or any part of the government of Afghanistan.”<sup>69</sup>

## The Taliban and Narcotics

### Could An Opium-Poppy Ban Succeed?

The Taliban has an inconsistent relationship with an Afghan narcotics industry that has grown massively over the past four decades. At its core, the Taliban's approach to narcotics appears contingent on the relative balance of economic (e.g., revenue from narcotics taxation), constituent (e.g., poppy farmers and traffickers), and international demands (e.g., foreign aid and international norms). In this light, the Taliban have both actively supported the drug trade (1996–1999 and 2002–2021) and enforced an outright nationwide ban (2000–2001). These past actions help contextualize recent Taliban pronouncements as well as orient international observers towards possible Taliban narcotics-industry practices or policies.

The Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, effectively completing their rapid takeover of Afghanistan. On August 17, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told international media that the Taliban would not allow the production of opium or other narcotics. Mujahid said, “Afghanistan will not be a country of cultivation of opium anymore.”<sup>70</sup> Some commentators have argued that the Taliban may be able to do this if opium poppy is not as significant of a financial resource for the Taliban as commonly thought, and therefore it may have the flexibility to enforce a ban.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, the political consequences of banning cultivation could destroy the Taliban's popular support among opium-poppy farmers and narcotics traffickers.<sup>72</sup>

Despite the Taliban's critical support to the narcotics industry while it was an insurgency, the group's stated intent to ban opium-poppy cultivation has precedent. In the 1990s, the Taliban expansion occurred prior to its involvement in the narcotics economy, yet its need to consolidate political power drove the Taliban to embrace the drug economy.

By 1996, early “prohibitions” had morphed into a more permissive approach that taxed farmers and traffickers and even initiated a system for providing licenses and regulation over opium producers. This boosted the Taliban's rural legitimacy and provided a crucial source of political power.<sup>73</sup> By 1997, the head of the Taliban's antidrug force in Kandahar commented that “We cannot push the people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising against the Taliban if we forced them to stop poppy cultivation.”<sup>74</sup>

Yet in 2000, under Western pressure, the Taliban implemented and enforced a ban on opium production.<sup>75</sup> In exchange for the July 2000 ban, the Taliban were to receive a \$43 million grant of U.S. counternarcotics funding.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, major traffickers appear to have been interested in a ban on poppy cultivation, which brought windfall profits after raw opium prices rose dramatically and traffickers were able to move their stockpiles.<sup>77</sup>

Regardless of the specific interests, the effective ban meant that when the United States entered Afghanistan in 2001, opium production was at its lowest point since systematic records began in 1980. Focused on counterterrorism operations and wary of large-scale reconstruction efforts, DOD, and its partners at State and USAID, were little concerned at the time with what remained of the broken opium economy.<sup>78</sup>

But by 2004, opium-poppy cultivation had rebounded, expanding to an estimated 130,614 hectares (ha; one ha is roughly 2.5 acres), an extent that surpassed the highest levels during the Taliban period (1994–2001). Further, after the Taliban reversed its ban, the poppy problem seemed to correlate with the most troublesome areas of the emerging insurgency. Increasingly, the Afghan opium trade was seen as a problem worthy of applying significant U.S. military and economic might.<sup>79</sup>

## Decades of Narcotics Industry Expansion

Afghan opium cultivation and production hit record levels after 2002 despite significant U.S. and Coalition counternarcotics efforts. Since 2002, the U.S. has spent over \$8.9 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds on counternarcotics programs and activities.<sup>80</sup> These initiatives took a whole-of-government approach, trying to tackle the problem through interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement; opium-poppy eradication; alternative development programs aimed at creating licit livelihood opportunities; and the mobilization of Afghan political and institutional support.<sup>81</sup> Yet according to DEA officials, disrupting the trade was impossible because key Afghan national and tribal figures played both sides, taking money from the drug trade while being protected as power brokers for the U.S.-led military coalition.<sup>82</sup> It was not just the Taliban enabling the trade, but corrupt government or government-aligned actors who also benefited.<sup>83</sup>

Despite the Coalition's efforts, in 2020, opium poppy was the country's most valuable cash crop, at \$863 million. It is the country's largest industry, employing over 500,000 individuals. This scale of employment outstripped even the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which [allegedly] employed approximately 290,000 Afghans at the time.<sup>84</sup>

## REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION, 2020



Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2020: Executive Summary, 5/2021, pp. 6, 9.

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Afghan opiate economy accounted for 6–11% of the country’s GDP, remaining the country’s most valuable export, exceeding official (licit) exports of goods and services.<sup>85</sup> The failure of U.S. and Afghan government counternarcotics programs means that narcotics in 2021 are much more interwoven into the political economy of Afghanistan than they were in 2000.

Further, the Taliban’s active support for narcotics trafficking over the past two decades means that the Taliban has enormously contributed to and benefited from a narcotics problem that it now, at least publicly, vows to eliminate. According to one retired DEA official active from 2005 through 2013, “Our investigations showed that the Taliban were intimately interconnected with the drug traffickers in every corner of Afghanistan. They were making tens of millions of dollars a year easily ... it was increasingly difficult to separate the Taliban from the drug traffickers.”<sup>86</sup>

Insurgent-dominated districts accounted for 48% of opium-poppy cultivation compared to 26% for government-dominated districts in 2018.<sup>87</sup> Southern Afghanistan accounts for the largest share of opium-poppy cultivation, with Helmand the leading poppy-cultivating province at 136,798 hectares in 2018. Kandahar (23,410 ha) and Uruzgan (18,662 ha) Provinces in southern Afghanistan ranked second and third, respectively. These three southern provinces accounted for 68% of the national cultivation total in 2018.<sup>88</sup> This trend continued into 2020, when Afghanistan's southwestern region (Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces) continued to dominate opium-poppy cultivation and again accounted for 68% (152,935 ha) of the national total.<sup>89</sup>

## Popular Resistance to an Opium Ban

In light of the Taliban's cooperation with the narcotics industry, Mujahid's statement to international media on August 17 might be viewed mainly as a diplomatic communique to see what the international community may offer in exchange for an opium-poppy ban. Stanford University Afghanistan expert Robert Crews has suggested as much, concluding that the ban is a Taliban attempt to inform the international community that it intends to have a responsible government adhering to international legal norms.<sup>90</sup> If true, the Taliban's interest in a ban may align with Western interests in providing humanitarian and development assistance in exchange for eliminating the Afghan narcotics industry.

Other experts are less confident that the West has that kind of financial leverage over the narcotics industry. According to Afghanistan narcotics expert David Mansfield, Western hopes to apply financial pressure through humanitarian and development funding are misplaced because the Taliban are surprisingly insulated from the decisions of international donors.<sup>91</sup>

According to Mansfield, "Trafficking in opium, hashish, methamphetamines, and other narcotics is not the biggest kind of trade that happens off the books: The real money comes from the illegal movement of ordinary goods, like fuel and consumer imports. In size and sum, the informal economy dwarfs international aid" and is making the Taliban into a major player in South Asia's regional trade.<sup>92</sup> For example, in southwestern Nimroz Province during the spring of 2021, all sides were raising \$235 million annually taxing trade, yet less than \$20 million flowed into the province from Kabul in the form of reconstruction assistance. Further, the Taliban collected only \$5.1 million in illegal drug profits at this major port of entry in narcotics country, but \$40.9 million taxing transit goods and fuel.<sup>93</sup>

Mansfield says claims that the Taliban was earning as much as \$400 million annually from narcotics are wildly exaggerated, with the Taliban almost

certainly obtaining only tens of millions per year at most.<sup>94</sup> In 2018 for example, Mansfield estimated that the Taliban earned about \$40 million from all stages of opium production.<sup>95</sup> Mansfield's estimate also aligns with DEA statements that Taliban narcotics revenue is in the tens of millions annually.<sup>96</sup> This suggests that the Taliban, from a financial perspective, may be able to cut off the narcotics industry with or without international assistance.

Yet the potentially bigger challenge is dealing with the political constituencies whose meager lifestyles depend on some level of cash-crop (i.e. opium-poppy) production. Any Taliban attempt to curb Afghanistan's drug business could undermine public support for its regime. For example, a Kandahar opium farmer reacting to Mujahid's policy statement said that farmers were unhappy, but that they must comply: "We can't oppose the Taliban's decision, they are the government. They've told us that when we ban poppies, we'll make sure you have an alternative crop." Raw opium prices have already tripled in some provinces of southern Afghanistan since Mujahid's statement. Another farmer commented that "We still hope they will let us grow poppies. Nothing can compensate for the income we get from growing poppies."<sup>97</sup>

For these reasons, analyst Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution has concluded that "implementing and maintaining any kind of poppy ban will be wickedly difficult for the Taliban."<sup>98</sup> The 2000 ban was not sustainable and by the summer of 2001, farmers started seeding poppy once again.<sup>99</sup> According to some, by the spring of 2001, Afghan farmers were flouting the ban because they could not cope otherwise. That opium ban ultimately turned into a key reason why most Afghans did not support the Taliban during the U.S. invasion at the end of 2001.<sup>100</sup>

Whatever approach the Taliban takes to the narcotics industry, it will likely be an attempt to moderate between the competing demands of financial revenue, political constituencies, and international norms.

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## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT



### KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

USAID suspended all USAID-funded development assistance activities in Afghanistan.

Following the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan's formal economy stalled and public services were on the verge of collapse as the country lost foreign development assistance and a UN agency foresaw "near universal poverty."

The combination of economic problems, drought conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and insecurity has driven a worsening humanitarian crisis within Afghanistan.

At the September 2021 donors' conference in Geneva, over \$1.1 billion was pledged in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, including \$64 million from the U.S. government.

### AFGHANISTAN'S GROWING CRISES

Following the August 15 collapse of the former Afghan government and the full withdrawal of U.S. forces on August 30, the United States suspended development activities in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> Other foreign governments and international organizations have likewise halted efforts to strengthen the country's economic growth, public health, and educational sector following the Taliban takeover, though they have continued humanitarian aid, such as food and other short-term emergency assistance, to Afghans.<sup>2</sup> Coupled with Taliban dictates that threaten progress made over the preceding two decades in areas such as education (especially for women) and public health, Afghanistan faces a worsening economic and humanitarian crisis.

In early September, a spokesperson for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs warned that basic public services in Afghanistan were on the verge of collapsing with the formal economy coming to a virtual stop.<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) said the economic impact of lost foreign assistance in the wake of the Taliban takeover has Afghanistan facing the prospect of "near universal

**Food Security:** all people within a society at all times having “physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet daily basic needs for a productive and healthy life,” without being forced to deplete household assets in order to meet minimum needs.

Source: United Nations, Press Release, “World Food Summit Concludes in Rome,” 11/19/1996.

poverty” by mid-2022 and a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by drought and the continuing COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>4</sup> As a result, millions of Afghan are threatened by **food insecurity**.<sup>5</sup> The executive director of the World Food Programme, David Beasley, warned, “Fourteen million people, one out of three, are marching to the brink of starvation. They don’t know where their next meal is.”<sup>6</sup>

## U.S. SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

As of September 22, 2021, USAID had suspended all USAID-funded development assistance activities in Afghanistan, including all contact with the new Taliban-controlled government. As such, USAID told their implementing partners not to carry out any agreement-specified activities, but to maintain staff and operational capacity, and to incur only reasonable, allocable, and allowable recurrent costs. USAID continued to disburse funds to implementing partners to maintain staff and sustain operational capacity.<sup>7</sup>

On August 15, 2021, immediately after the collapse of the Afghan government, the United States froze Afghan government monetary reserves being held in U.S. financial institutions, blocking the Taliban’s access to these funds. According to Ajmal Ahmady, the former head of Afghanistan’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), approximately \$7 billion of Afghanistan’s assets were held by the U.S. Federal Reserve as a mixture of cash, gold, bonds, and other investments. The remainder of DAB’s assets, he said, were in the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland and other international accounts, leaving at most about 0.2% of the central bank’s \$9.4 billion (about \$19 million) in total assets available to the Taliban.<sup>8</sup>

On August 30, following the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted that U.S. engagement with Afghanistan in the near term would focus, first, on evacuating Americans, other foreign nationals, and Afghan allies who wish to depart the country and ensuring that the Taliban allow them to depart and, second, on counterterrorism efforts, especially against Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).

Secretary Blinken also stressed the United States’ continued commitment to providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people by working through international organizations and NGOs, rather than by providing support to the Taliban-controlled government. He said,

The conflict has taken a terrible toll on the Afghan people. Millions are internally displaced. Millions are facing hunger, even starvation. The COVID-19 pandemic has also hit Afghanistan hard. The United States will continue to support humanitarian aid to the Afghan people. Consistent with our sanctions on the Taliban, the aid will not flow through the government, but rather through independent organizations, such as UN agencies and NGOs. And we expect that those efforts will not be impeded by the Taliban or anyone else.<sup>9</sup>

On September 13, 2021, at the donors' conference in Geneva, the United States announced nearly \$64 million in additional humanitarian assistance, including food aid, emergency health care, medical supplies, and other needed relief, to Afghans facing the “compounding effects of insecurity, conflict, recurring natural disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic.”<sup>10</sup>

On September 24, 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department issued two general licenses authorizing the U.S. government and its partners to continue to support humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

On July 23, 2021, President Biden also had authorized up to \$100 million in additional assistance to Afghan refugees and those impacted by conflict, including Special Immigrant Visa applicants.<sup>12</sup>

Regardless of the level of funding appropriated for continued humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, administering vital U.S. aid to the Afghan people will still depend upon the ability of international organizations and NGOs to operate safely under a Taliban-controlled government.

As of September 30, 2021, the U.S. government has provided approximately \$36.2 billion to support governance and economic and social development in Afghanistan since 2002. Most of these funds—approximately \$21.2 billion—were appropriated to USAID's Economic Support Fund (ESF). Of this amount, \$20.1 billion has been obligated and \$18.5 billion has been disbursed. Figure E.1 on the following page shows USAID assistance by sector.


## THE TALIBAN AND AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC CRISIS

One of the primary questions facing the Taliban now that they have seized power is whether they are able to manage the existing bureaucracy and keep the Afghan economy from collapse. As Princeton economist Atif Mian noted, “Afghanistan is experiencing the mother of all ‘sudden stops.’”<sup>13</sup>

Shortly after the U.S. government froze Afghan government assets in U.S. financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) similarly suspended Afghanistan's access to its financial resources due to “lack of clarity within the international community” regarding recognizing the Taliban-controlled government. Over \$370 million in IMF funds were scheduled to be transferred to Afghanistan on August 23 as part of loans to mitigate

FIGURE E.1

USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS, AS OF OCTOBER 8, 2021 (\$ MILLIONS)



\*Unpreferenced funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.

Note: USAID Mission-managed funds. Numbers are rounded. USAID gender programs managed by the agency's Office of Gender are presented as a separate category. Agriculture programs include Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and programs that build health and education facilities. OFM activities (e.g. audits and pre-award assessments) included under Program Support funds.

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2021; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of August 22, 2021, 10/14/2021.

## Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

**(ARTF):** A World Bank-administered multi-donor trust fund that coordinated international assistance to support the former Afghan government's operating and development costs, which financed up to 30% of its civilian budget. Out of 34 total donors since 2002, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have been the three leading contributors, with U.S. contributions comprising 50% of the \$718.6 million paid into the ARTF during 2020.

Source: ARTF, Who We Are, 2021; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2021, p. 42.


the current economic crisis.<sup>14</sup> Days later, the World Bank also suspended funding for its projects in Afghanistan, including disbursements from the **Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund**. A World Bank spokesperson cited concerns over the repercussions of the Taliban takeover on "the country's development prospects, especially for women."<sup>15</sup>

Even before the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan faced numerous economic challenges with the former Afghan government relying heavily on international assistance. The former Afghan government consistently faced insufficient domestic revenues to cover government expenditures, offsetting deficits with international grants. Figure E.2 demonstrates this trend in recent years, with sustainable domestic revenues covering on average only 43% of the former Afghan government's largely non-security related expenditures, while foreign assistance made up the rest.<sup>16</sup>

In Afghanistan, approximately 90% of the economy is informal and thus largely escapes taxation, hindering the former Afghan government's financial self-sufficiency.<sup>17</sup> For revenue derived from trade, such as customs, more than half of the total value of goods crossing the international border flows to the informal economy. This served as a substantial source of income for anti-state insurgents, other nongovernment groups, and corrupt officials, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue for the former Afghan government.<sup>18</sup> As the Taliban expanded their territorial

FIGURE E.2

## AFGHAN GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES (BILLIONS OF AFGHANIS)



Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1/10/2018, 1/12/2019, 1/6/2020, and 1/10/2021.

control over the spring and summer, one of their most crucial gains came when they seized border crossings.<sup>19</sup>

The challenge of insufficient domestic revenues only worsened in recent years as domestic revenues stagnated while government expenditures steadily increased.<sup>20</sup> Donor grants totaling at least \$8.6 billion per year financed over half of the government budget. That proportion climbed to almost 80% of Afghanistan’s \$11 billion in total public expenditures when off-budget (U.S.-managed) assistance was counted along with on-budget (Afghan-managed) aid.<sup>21</sup>

Increased government service provision, an economy fueled by donor funds, and artificially inflated demand produced by the large international presence rapidly improved many of Afghanistan’s development outcomes until the 2014 drawdown of most international troops. After the Afghan government assumed responsibility for fighting the Taliban insurgency, licit annual GDP growth of just under 10% dropped to low-single-digit rates.<sup>22</sup>

The Taliban inherited these challenges and, in many instances, exacerbated many of them after their military takeover prompted donors to suspend most support to the Afghan government. As a result, the Taliban have limited revenue to run the government’s bureaucracy and provide public services, which could lead to a huge contraction of the government and

its expenditures. It also has limited foreign currency to finance the country's large trade deficit, as Afghanistan's currency, the afghani, is not accepted for cross-border trade.<sup>23</sup> The suspension of international funds and revenue shortfalls could have a variety of economic effects on the Afghan economy. Ultimately, fear of international sanctions against the Taliban-controlled government, as well as reluctance to operate under the Taliban, may inhibit foreign investment, trade, and other economic engagement with Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban cabinet includes hardline figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani, who has a \$10 million U.S. bounty offered for information leading to his arrest.<sup>24</sup>

For internationally backed development, Western governments are taking a “wait and see” approach regarding the Taliban's actions. On September 7, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said, “There is no rush to recognition. ... It is really going to be dependent on what steps the Taliban takes. The world will be watching—the United States included—and they will be watching whether they allow for American citizens and citizens of other countries to depart, whether they allow individuals who want to leave the country to leave, whether they allow for humanitarian assistance to travel, how they treat women and girls around the country.”<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Germany has laid down various conditions before it would restart development aid and reestablish its diplomatic presence in Kabul, such as respect for human rights, including rights for women.<sup>26</sup>

## Electricity Provision for Economic Activity

To address shortfalls in domestic power production, Afghanistan relies heavily on electricity imports from neighboring countries. This has made Afghans' access to reliable electricity vulnerable to changes (seasonal domestic demands, energy output levels, etc.) in other countries. By late 2020, according to data provided by Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy, Afghanistan's total installed capacity for domestic power production is approximately 699 MW, versus the 2000 MW the Afghan Ministry of Water and Energy estimated the country needs. Domestic generating capacity consists of 280.5 MW of hydroelectric power, 353.5 MW of thermal/oil plants, and 65 MW from renewable energy.<sup>27</sup> This limited access to reliable, grid-based power has been an obstacle to economic growth.

Moreover, the expansion of Afghanistan's energy supply was tied to power-purchase agreements between independent power producers (IPPs) and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan's national power utility, which obligated DABS to purchase all IPP-produced electricity.<sup>28</sup> Given the former Afghan government's heavy reliance on international donor assistance, DABS's financial viability was tied to either continued donor support or the government's ability to generate far greater levels of domestic revenue. IPPs warned that unpaid invoices from DABS for

generated electricity in the past contributed to cash-flow problems that put power plant operations at risk.<sup>29</sup>

Not only does the Taliban-controlled government face potential technical and personnel difficulties in managing the country's power infrastructure, particularly as trained personnel leave the country, it now faces severe revenue shortages that inhibit its ability to provide both domestically and externally generated electricity to the power grid. DABS's operations will be further impacted by the rising levels of poverty that inhibit households' ability to pay their electric bills.<sup>30</sup>

In early October, it was reported that the Taliban-controlled government had not paid for electricity imports from neighboring countries or resumed bill collections from electricity consumers. Central Asian countries can suspend their electricity exports under the existing contracts due to non-payment. The current drought is adding to these problems as it inhibits hydroelectric production in Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup>

## Financial Sector Challenges

Afghanistan's largely cash-based economy also has struggled with an acute cash shortage, which has limited day-to-day economic activities. While banks have remained largely closed, there have been media reports of periodic openings. However, banks have instituted a 20,000 afghani (around \$200) weekly limit on cash withdrawals to conserve their cash balances, combined with a limited number of open ATMs that are often depleted. Media reports have shown lengthy lines at banks as Afghans waited hours for a chance to withdraw what money they could. In late August, a public servant in Herat stated, "Banks are still closed. Only two ATM machines are working in the entire city, you have to line up for hours. But when your turn arrives, they run out of money or an electricity cut happens."<sup>32</sup>

Additionally, as of mid-September 2021, government workers were reportedly last paid in July, with the Ministry of Finance attributing the delay to "technical problems."<sup>33</sup> It was estimated that the former Afghan government employed over 800,000 people in the civilian and military sectors, so their unpaid salaries contribute to the decline in day-to-day economic activity.<sup>34</sup> Adding to the stress, prices for food, fuel, and other essentials have skyrocketed by as much as 75%.<sup>35</sup> Afghans resorted to selling their housewares to help feed their families, though some reported weak demand and ended up selling their goods at a loss.<sup>36</sup>

The devaluation of the afghani (AFN) also impacts the Afghan economy, which could further diminish Afghan households' ability to purchase food and other necessities. Since the collapse of the former Afghan government, the AFN has depreciated against the U.S. dollar, dropping from approximately 77 AFN to the dollar to around 90 as of October 8, 2021.<sup>37</sup> Adding further pressure to the country's limited cash reserves, Afghanistan does not have the technical capabilities to print its own currency. In January

## SIGAR OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN'S ENERGY SECTOR

Given the U.S. government's significant investment in Afghanistan's energy sector, SIGAR has focused a considerable portion of its oversight portfolio on projects and programs in the sector. An ongoing SIGAR audit is examining the broad scope of U.S. investment in the Afghan energy sector since 2009, including efforts to improve generation, transmission, and distribution.

2020, the former government contracted a Polish company, Polish Security Printing Works, to print 10 billion afghanis worth of new bills.<sup>38</sup>

On September 2, 2021, Western Union, the world's largest money-transfer firm, announced it was resuming services in Afghanistan, a move enabled by the reopening of banks. Services will be limited to only a handful of locations, largely in Kabul, and money transfers out of the country are still suspended. Western Union had originally suspended its operations on August 18, 2021, due to bank closures, insecurity, and other constraints on its employees' ability to conduct business. Another money-transfer firm, MoneyGram International, also suspended its services in August due to the security situation but resumed services in early September.<sup>39</sup>

## **BANKING UPDATE: FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN'S BANKS UNCERTAIN**

On August 23, 2021, the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce warned, "Afghanistan and its banking sector are at an 'existential flash point' where the collapse of the banking sector is at hand."<sup>40</sup> Prior to the Taliban takeover, Afghan banks had weathered the COVID-19 pandemic, in part due to their small loan portfolios helping to minimize losses, and had seen some modest improvements.<sup>41</sup> While banks' deposits initially declined and nonperforming loans increased because of the pandemic, the World Bank found that bank deposits grew by the end of 2020 as international grants and government expenditures fueled private-sector activities, and individuals and firms sought to reduce their cash holdings amid increasing political uncertainty and insecurity. In late 2020, bank deposits reached 292.6 billion AFN (equivalent to 19.9% of GDP), an increase from 263.8 billion AFN (equivalent to 18% of GDP) at the end of 2019; the loan to deposit ratio fell from 15.8% in 2019 to 13.8% in 2020.<sup>42</sup>

With the collapse of the Afghan government on August 15, banks closed for around 10 days before slowly starting to reopen. Given the central banks' sudden halt in access to foreign assets and resulting cash shortage, commercial banks announced they were suspending all services until Afghanistan's central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), could confirm liquidity and security arrangements. Even before the Taliban takeover, liquidity was an issue for the banking sector as many customers withdrew cash from the banks as security quickly deteriorated.<sup>43</sup> In the weeks leading up to the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, DAB reportedly had already depleted most of its U.S. currency reserves, exacerbating the current economic crisis.<sup>44</sup>

In mid-September, Afghan companies stated that all financial transactions had stopped due to the disruption between Afghanistan and international banks over the previous month.<sup>45</sup> Businessmen also complained that companies are subject to the banks' weekly limit on cash

withdrawals. One member of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment said, “The plan that allows people to withdraw \$200 USD [U.S. dollars] each week may work for ordinary people, but businessmen cannot do business with \$200 USD each week.” As a result, many companies are facing serious financial shortages with many laborers remaining unpaid as businesses are unable to withdraw enough funds to pay them.<sup>46</sup>

There are a number of questions and uncertainties regarding the Taliban’s ability to manage the banking sector. The Taliban appointed Haji Mohammad Idris as the acting head of DAB. Idris has served as the head of the group’s finance section, but possesses no formal financial training or university education.<sup>47</sup> The banking sector is also concerned that if the Taliban bars female employment, banks will lose a significant portion of their trained staff, making it even more difficult to operate. There also is much uncertainty about the future structure of Afghanistan’s banking system, including what kind of approach the Taliban will implement for Islamic banking and finance given their commitment to restructure the government according to their interpretation of *sharia* or religious law.<sup>48</sup>

Before Afghanistan’s current banking crisis, the private sector’s reliance on bank-sourced credit was already weak, with private-sector credit largely directed towards the trade (41%) and services (27%) sectors.<sup>49</sup> According to the Asian Development Bank, Afghan banks provided a line of credit to only around 5% of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, with the remainder seeking financing largely from informal sources.<sup>50</sup>

Afghanistan’s small banking sector was severely limited in its ability to finance private investment and support economic growth. Instead, the Afghan economy is heavily informal with 85% of Afghan adults lacking access to formal financial services. Prior to the collapse of the Afghan government, DAB estimated that only 3.9% of businesses rely on banks to finance capital expenses, with only 0.8% using banks to finance investments due to both demand and supply constraints. Those constraints included high interest rates and collateral requirements, lack of expertise, and limited access in rural areas.

As the Afghan economy has struggled to find areas of sustainable economic growth in recent years, the country has increasingly relied on remittances from Afghans working abroad, especially in neighboring Iran. By 2019, remittances accounted for the equivalent of 4.3% of Afghanistan’s annual GDP, an increase from 1.2% in 2014, according to World Bank data.<sup>51</sup> However, officials from the UN’s International Organization for Migration estimated this figure could be as high as 15–20%, given that many remittances are sent through the informal *hawala* money-transfer system.<sup>52</sup> In 2020, remittances to Afghanistan dropped by 10%, according to the World Bank.<sup>53</sup> Afghans in Iran, for instance, struggled to find work due to COVID-19 and economic sanctions, forcing many to return to Afghanistan where they faced rising levels of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity.<sup>54</sup>

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**Hawala:** informal money transmission networks that arrange for the transfer and receipt of funds or equivalent value, and settle their accounts through trade and cash.

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Source: Treasury, *Hawala: The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering*, 2003, p. 5.

## FinTRACA Activities Suspended

Following the Taliban takeover, the Afghan financial intelligence unit known as the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) was suspended. On August 15, this unit was disconnected from secure international servers used for exchanging information on illicit flows of money. As of September 14, 2021, it remained offline.<sup>55</sup> Established in 2006 by Afghanistan's Anti-Money Laundering Law, FinTRACA was responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing through analyzing and disseminating information received from traditional financial institutions, such as banks, as well as informal financial institutions, such as hawaladars.<sup>56</sup> Prior to its suspension, FinTRACA listed the Taliban as a terrorist group, with resulting prohibitions on its financial activities.<sup>57</sup>

FinTRACA served a vital role in scrutinizing financial traffic for suspicious or criminal activity, critical for Afghanistan's link with financial and banking networks abroad. As of August 2021, the organization had logged 645 suspicious financial transactions reports for the year.<sup>58</sup> Its suspension effectively cuts Afghanistan's ties with international financial institutions and hastens its departure from the global financial system.

Without a mechanism for tracking illicit money flows and with the Taliban now in control of the Afghan economy, local banks expect the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to lower Afghanistan's compliance status, which could further inhibit the country's connections to the global financial system.<sup>59</sup> FATF is a global, intergovernmental mechanism for money laundering and terrorist financing and acts to ensure that governments implement various international standards and reforms to combat illicit financing. It conducts periodic assessments to review compliance; noncompliant countries are subject to various sanctions limiting access to international financial markets. Afghanistan's next FATF assessment is currently planned for July 2022. FATF announced that it "is closely monitoring the developing situation in Afghanistan."<sup>60</sup>

## UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

With Afghanistan largely cut off from international funds, the financial analysis firm Fitch Solutions projected the country's GDP to contract by as much as 9.7% in 2021, with an additional drop of 5.2% next year. Before the collapse of the government in August, the Afghan economy was projected to grow by 0.4% this year.<sup>61</sup> Following the U.S. suspension of Afghanistan's foreign assets, the UN Secretary General's special representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, said, "The understandable purpose is to deny these funds to the de facto Taliban administration. The inevitable effect, however, will be a severe economic downturn that could throw many more

millions into poverty and hunger, may generate a massive wave of refugees from Afghanistan, and indeed set Afghanistan back for generations.”<sup>62</sup>

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, an estimated 55% of Afghans lived below the poverty line (defined as 2,064 afghanis per person per month or around \$1 in daily income), according to the most recent household survey data, an increase from 34% in 2008.<sup>63</sup> In 2020, during the early months of the pandemic, the World Bank projected that Afghanistan’s poverty levels could rise to as high as 73% due to the socioeconomic effects of COVID-19.<sup>64</sup> In April 2021, however, the World Bank estimated that overall poverty levels actually decreased from the pre-pandemic level to 47.1%, as the pandemic had a less severe economic impact in rural areas than originally projected. In urban areas, the Bank estimated that poverty levels rose from 41.6% to 45.5% in 2020.<sup>65</sup>

With the economic disruption caused by the collapse of the former Afghan government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projects that by mid-2022, poverty levels could increase by between seven and, in the worst-case scenario, 25 percentage points, compared to 2020. Relying on the World Bank’s initial projection of Afghanistan’s poverty level increasing to 73% in 2020 as its baseline, the UNDP’s analysis further warns that Afghanistan could face the prospect of “near universal poverty” with around 97% of the population living below the poverty line.<sup>66</sup> The UNDP representative in Afghanistan, Abdallah Al Dardari, pointed to a “budgetary shock,” a “reserve shock,” and a “trade shock,” combined with the absence of international economic support, as driving the rapidly deteriorating economic crisis.<sup>67</sup>

There are also a number of other uncertainties on economic-related issues looking forward, including what the Taliban’s ultimate position on female employment will be and to what extent the international community will remain engaged on Afghanistan’s economic and social development.

## Female Employment

Shortly after taking control of Kabul, the Taliban dismissed female government employees and forced women out of their jobs in other sectors, such as banking. Taliban officials ordered women to stay home from work until the Taliban are able to implement “proper systems” for their safety, saying that Taliban security forces are “not trained (in) how to deal with women.”<sup>68</sup> However, Taliban officials called for some women to return to work, especially for jobs in which they would be engaging with other women including the health-care sector and airport security.<sup>69</sup>

In 2020, according to World Bank data, women made up 21.6% of Afghanistan’s workforce.<sup>70</sup> A Taliban ban on female employment, whether de jure or de facto, will deal a further blow to Afghanistan’s current economic crisis and exacerbate widespread poverty.

## International Development and Trade

The Taliban have expressed interest in maintaining Afghanistan's existing trade relationships and attracting new international development to the country. For instance, a Taliban spokesperson announced that the group "would like Germany to support us in the humanitarian sector, and we need help in the health care sector, in the area of education and with the infrastructure."<sup>71</sup>

In late August, the Taliban also said they hope to maintain Afghanistan's trade relationship with India and keep the air corridor open between the two countries, with the Indian foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla saying that India is taking a "wait-and-watch" approach to engagement with a Taliban-controlled government.<sup>72</sup> However, the costs of shipping goods through the air corridor connecting India and Afghanistan were heavily subsidized by the former Afghan government. According to the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, government subsidies covered around 83% of shipment costs for flights to New Delhi and 80% of shipment costs for flights to Mumbai.<sup>73</sup>

Before seizing power in Kabul, the Taliban had recognized the importance of customs duties, which comprised approximately one-fifth of all domestic revenues for the former Afghan government, by seizing border crossings as they expanded their territorial control. This had the effect of denying customs revenue to the former Afghan government and putting further financial strain on it. In late July 2021, the former Afghan government reported a widening deficit due to an increase in security-related and public-health expenditures with a decline in domestic revenues due to the Taliban's seizure of the border crossings. On August 1, the Ministry of Finance asked all ministries to suspend their development projects due to declining revenues.<sup>74</sup> The Taliban kept the seized border crossings open for trade and were reportedly collecting customs revenue before the collapse of the government in August.<sup>75</sup>

Following the Taliban takeover, two key border crossings with Pakistan remained open for trade. However, many traders complained about continued insecurity along the roads and confusion over customs duties under a Taliban-controlled government.<sup>76</sup> On August 6, Iran instituted a ban on fuel exports to Afghanistan due to rising insecurity, but resumed them at the Taliban's request as fuel prices spiked in the country.<sup>77</sup> On September 8, an official from Iran's Ministry of Industry, Mining, and Trade announced that other exports to Afghanistan had also resumed with all border crossings between the two countries reportedly open to trade.<sup>78</sup> The Iranian Foreign Minister said, "Iran will keep its borders and border crossings with Afghanistan open to ease the current situation in this country, and will continue to trade."<sup>79</sup>

In 2018, the U.S. government waived sanctions against Iranian fuel exports to Afghanistan to avoid harming the Afghan economy, given its

reliance on Iranian fuel. However, a State Department spokesperson said this waiver “remains under active review” by the Biden administration following the collapse of the former Afghan government.<sup>80</sup>

Following a September 8, 2021, virtual meeting of the foreign ministers of Pakistan, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, a joint statement was released affirming “the importance of sustained international engagement on Afghanistan, especially in supporting its humanitarian and development needs.” Afghanistan’s six neighboring states further expressed their “readiness to keep ports open for Afghanistan and ensure the smooth cross-border flow of goods to facilitate Afghanistan’s access to external support, in particular the transport of humanitarian supplies, as well as to help Afghanistan strengthen economic and trade connectivity with the regional countries.”<sup>81</sup>

In early October, Pakistan (one of Afghanistan’s main trading partners) reported that its exports to Afghanistan had dropped by 73% following the Taliban takeover and the current economic crisis. On the other hand, the value of Afghan exports to Pakistan increased by 142% from August 16 to September 30, as compared to the period July 1–August 15. A customs official reportedly attributed this increase in trade from Afghanistan to a decline in the corrupt activities at the border crossings, such as government officials extorting drivers to pass into Pakistan with their goods, a practice that had inhibited trade.<sup>82</sup>

Afghanistan’s economy has been highly dependent on imports, generating a severe trade deficit that was almost entirely financed through external aid. Afghanistan’s main imports include petroleum, machinery and equipment, food items, and base metals and related articles.<sup>83</sup> In 2019, Afghanistan imported goods totaling \$7.33 billion while exporting only \$975 million worth, according to World Trade Organization data; this produced a negative merchandise trade balance of \$6.36 billion, equivalent to 30.1% of GDP.<sup>84</sup> In 2020, amid declining imports and exports (exports fell by 2% and imports by 5%), the negative trade balance narrowed to \$5.1 billion, equivalent to 26.7% of GDP.<sup>85</sup> The trade deficit was in part caused by Afghanistan’s low manufacturing capacity and poor domestic infrastructure, which results in a narrow export base—largely agricultural products and carpets—to limited destination markets.<sup>86</sup>

## Extractives Potential for Economic Growth

In early September, a Taliban spokesperson was quoted as saying that China would be “our main partner” for Afghanistan’s future economic development. In particular, he pointed to the potential of the country’s mining sector, stating, “We own rich copper mines, which, thanks to the Chinese, will be modernized. Finally, China represents our ticket to the markets of the world.”<sup>87</sup>

China has long expressed interest in tapping into Afghanistan's vast mineral wealth, including procuring stakes in various mining projects such as the Mes Aynak copper mine located around 25 miles southeast of Kabul and estimated to hold 11.08 million tons of copper. China's Jiangxi Copper and the Metallurgical Corporation of China took a 30-year lease on Mes Aynak in 2008, but, to date, development of the mine has been stalled, reportedly from a variety of factors including insecurity, corruption, lack of an enabling infrastructure, and archaeological sites near the mine.<sup>88</sup> In early September 2021, the chairman of Jiangxi Copper stated, "Due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan, the Mes Aynak copper mine invested by the company has not yet undergone substantial construction." However, he added that the company continues to monitor the situation in Afghanistan and would move forward on developing the mine when it becomes possible to do so.<sup>89</sup>

The strength of the informal mining sector, whose products are frequently smuggled out of the country, and lack of an enabling infrastructure limited the former Afghan government's ability to benefit from the extractives sector. Afghanistan's formal extractives sector was limited by low processing capacity, lack of reliable energy sources, poor transportation infrastructure, and insecurity which raised mining costs compared to regional markets. The potential for profitable mining operations, even in the formal economy, was further weakened by widespread corruption, which acts as an additional deterrent to investors in capital-intensive mining operations.<sup>90</sup>

The multiple obstacles to development have left a large percentage of mining activity in Afghanistan to be conducted by informal or illegal small-scale operations that smuggle their products out of the country.<sup>91</sup> Mining revenues accounted for only around 1% of the former Afghan government's sustainable domestic revenues in recent years, according to Afghan government accounting data.<sup>92</sup>

Illegal mining had increasingly been a key source of revenue for the Taliban. In areas under its control, the Taliban issued mining licenses, collected taxes and protection money from mining operations, and controlled the smuggling of quarried minerals and gems abroad, particularly to Pakistan.<sup>93</sup> In late January 2021, then-Minister of Mines and Petroleum Mohammad Haroon Chakhansuri stated, "The Taliban are currently mining in 750 areas. This group is using the money [made from] mining against the government."<sup>94</sup> As a result, the formal extractives sector failed to attract investment and materialize as a driver of economic growth and a source of sustainable domestic revenues for the former Afghan government.

## AFGHANISTAN'S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Before the collapse of the Afghan government, Afghanistan confronted a combination of persistent insecurity, the COVID-19 pandemic, and drought. The takeover of the Taliban and growing economic crisis has only exacerbated the humanitarian crisis facing Afghans.

On June 22, 2021, the Afghan government officially declared a drought.<sup>95</sup> With less snow and rainfall through the winter months of 2020–2021, many farmers are feeling its impact. A lack of snowmelt from the Hindu Kush mountains, for instance, led to low water levels in the Panjshir River, so that it no longer provided adequate irrigation for crops in Parwan Province. In other parts of the country, the absence of late-winter rains hurt the wheat harvest, driving up wheat prices in some areas by as much as one-third.<sup>96</sup> Wheat production is expected to drop by as much as 31% in 2021 as compared to the previous year's harvest with a 62% reduction in areas under cultivation; Afghanistan is facing a shortfall of 2.46 million metric tons of wheat as a result of poor harvests. Additionally, rice crops have fallen by 20%, vegetable yields are down 25–30%, and fruit production is expected to drop as much as 80% in some areas.<sup>97</sup>

Drought and lack of irrigation are depleting vulnerable households' financial and asset reserves, with many shouldering “catastrophic levels of debt.”<sup>98</sup> Forecasts have warned that drought conditions are likely to persist and even worsen into 2022, further deteriorating food security among Afghans.<sup>99</sup> In late August, Kazakhstan reported that it was unwilling to export its wheat to Afghanistan given the country's inability to pay following the suspension of Afghan financial assets by the U.S. government.<sup>100</sup> In recent years, Afghanistan's domestic agricultural production has been increasingly unable to meet the rising domestic demand for key crops, such as wheat. To meet this shortfall, the former Afghan government relied on agricultural imports. In 2018, for example, Afghanistan imported \$477 million of wheat, primarily from Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. The potential inability to finance the importation of crops to address food shortages increases the risk of famine within Afghanistan. By September 2021, approximately 14 million people—or one out of three Afghans—were on the brink of starvation, according to the World Food Programme.<sup>101</sup>

Afghanistan is also struggling to contain the spread of COVID-19 with a health-care system that has limited capacity to contain the disease or effectively treat afflicted patients. The pandemic and other public-health issues could be exacerbated by the increase in internally displaced persons. World Health Organization (WHO) officials warned that a spike in COVID-19 cases among displaced persons would increase the transmission of the disease within Afghanistan's cities and increase the burden on the already fragile health-care system. Among displaced persons, WHO is already reporting the prevalence of COVID-19-like symptoms, as well as increases in

cases of diarrhea, high blood pressure, reproductive-health complications, and malnutrition.<sup>102</sup>

According to the UN, the number of Afghans requiring humanitarian assistance in 2021 has reached approximately half of Afghanistan's total estimated population. This figure is nearly double that of 2020, and a six-fold increase compared to four years ago.<sup>103</sup> In January 2021, the UN said Afghanistan's Humanitarian Response Plan for 2021 would already require an additional \$1.3 billion to address the growing number of Afghans in need of humanitarian aid, including around 10 million children, stemming from a combination of ongoing conflict, drought, poverty, and COVID-19.<sup>104</sup> By September 2021, only 39% of the required funds were distributed.<sup>105</sup>

In September 2021, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi further warned that the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan would "very soon" result in far greater population displacement this year than the currently estimated 500,000 displaced Afghans within the country since January 2021.<sup>106</sup> Grandi had recently completed a three-day visit to Afghanistan during which he oversaw the arrival of a truck convoy of UNHCR-provided aid for displaced families that had entered Afghanistan through the Torkham border crossing with Pakistan and discussed with Taliban officials continued access and security for humanitarian assistance.<sup>107</sup>

Donors and international organizations have expressed their continued commitment to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan following the Taliban's government takeover. Delivering humanitarian funding within a Taliban-dominated state will, however, present new oversight challenges given existing prohibitions against providing financial support to the Taliban, with experts warning that some donated funds would inevitably land into the wrong hands.<sup>108</sup>

In late August, the WHO dispatched six medical teams to Kabul to provide emergency health-care services to more than 100,000 displaced individuals, with another 14 medical teams sent into eastern Afghanistan.<sup>109</sup> Yet the UN, along with NGOs, remained concerned about the safety of any staff continuing to work in the country.<sup>110</sup> After the Taliban takeover, aid organizations suspended operations in Afghanistan and expressed concern that their workers could be targeted by the Taliban for engaging in activities that the Taliban opposes, such as building schools for girls.<sup>111</sup> During the first week of September 2021, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths arrived in Kabul to meet with Taliban leaders and discuss the continued delivery of humanitarian assistance in the country. During the visit, Taliban authorities pledged that the safety and security of humanitarian staff would be respected, according to a UN statement.<sup>112</sup>

Some aid groups have continued to operate in Afghanistan and remain "cautiously optimistic" about their ability to do so moving forward. Such



**UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs** Martin Griffiths meets with Taliban leaders to discuss delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. (UN photo)

groups include Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which has operated in Afghanistan since 1980. MSF maintains strict neutrality, is not associated with any Western government and is focused on health care rather than subjects that could draw the Taliban's ire, such as female education and empowerment.<sup>113</sup>

A number of NGOs in Afghanistan already have a track record of engaging directly with the Taliban and operating in Taliban-controlled territory. In mid-December 2020, for instance, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) announced an agreement with the Taliban allowing them to establish 4,000 community-based education classes covering the first three grades of primary school in Taliban controlled- or influenced-territory. UNICEF did not inform Ministry of Education officials about the agreement.<sup>114</sup> With the Taliban now in control of the government, one aid worker in Kabul stressed that such engagement is possible by adopting a neutral stance and having a clear understanding of local dynamics to be able to operate.<sup>115</sup>

With the suspension of international development funds and the worsening humanitarian and economic crisis, a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) spokesperson stated during a September 7, 2021, briefing, "Basic services in Afghanistan are collapsing and food and other lifesaving aid is about to run out."<sup>116</sup> Ahead of the September 13 donors' conference in Geneva, the UN aid organization made a "flash appeal" for an additional \$600 million to meet the

needs of the approximately 11 million people in need of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan.<sup>117</sup> In September 2021, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization called for \$21 million in urgent funding to meet a “commitment gap” for its support of Afghan farmers, which totals \$36 million. This funding is intended to expedite support to farmers to ensure they do not miss the winter planting season and provide other support to Afghans dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods.<sup>118</sup> The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, a French NGO, also made an emergency appeal for an additional \$30 million to address the effects of drought for the most severely affected populations in Afghanistan.<sup>119</sup>

At September's Geneva conference, donors pledged more than \$1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, including the \$64 million from the United States.<sup>120</sup> On September 22, UN OCHA also released \$45 million from the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund to “help prevent Afghanistan's health-care system from collapse.”<sup>121</sup> Various regional countries also offered direct humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. China promised approximately \$31 million in humanitarian assistance “for emergency use to the Afghan people,” including food, winter weather supplies, three million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, and medicine.<sup>122</sup> In early September, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain flew food and medical supplies into Kabul.<sup>123</sup> On September 9, Pakistan sent its first shipment of approximately 30 tons of humanitarian aid, with promises of future shipments.<sup>124</sup>

At an October 12, 2021, G20 summit in Rome, participating nations announced that they would support UN activities and respond to UN appeals for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, as well as call on the World Bank to explore ways of redirecting support to international agencies operating in Afghanistan to support humanitarian efforts.<sup>125</sup> During the summit, the European Union also pledged \$1.15 billion in aid, which included the \$346 million it had earlier committed.<sup>126</sup>

## **CIVIL AVIATION UPDATE: TURKEY, QATAR WORK TO MAINTAIN KABUL AIRPORT OPERATIONS**

The completion of the U.S. evacuation on August 30 left the Taliban without the technical expertise to run the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). A functioning airport system and civil aviation sector are necessary for maintaining any diplomatic presence in Kabul and, more importantly in the near term, vital for facilitating the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

By September 1, a technical team arrived from Qatar to help restore Kabul airport operations, which were suspended after the completion of the U.S. withdrawal.<sup>127</sup> They were joined by 19 technicians from Turkey, according to media reports.<sup>128</sup> On September 4, the technical teams were

able to reopen the airport to receive aid shipments and for domestic flights between Kabul and Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar.<sup>129</sup> During a September 9 news conference, a Qatari engineer stated that the airport was 90% fixed, adding that there were “some technical issues that we cannot fix.”<sup>130</sup> On September 13, airport security employees, including border police who guarded the airport and female employees, reported returning to work at the request of Taliban officials. However, they also reported that they had not yet been paid and were “working for free.”<sup>131</sup>

The first commercial charter flight (operated by Qatar Airways) to depart Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal arrived in Qatar on September 9 with over 100 foreign nationals, including Americans, on board.<sup>132</sup> On September 11, a spokesperson for Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) announced it was resuming normal commercial air operations between Islamabad and Kabul with five flights per week, the first foreign airline to do so.<sup>133</sup> Four days later, Iran also resumed commercial flights into Afghanistan with two charter flights operated by Mahan Air arriving in Kabul.<sup>134</sup> However, on October 14, PIA announced it was cancelling its flights to Kabul due to Taliban authorities interfering in flight operations.<sup>135</sup>

Shortly after the Taliban takeover, Turkey withdrew its troops from Afghanistan after failing to reach an agreement with the Taliban for Turkish soldiers to remain at the Kabul airport. Turkey had overseen security and airport operations at the Kabul airport under the auspices of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.<sup>136</sup> In early June 2021, the Turkish government agreed in principle to continue to run and secure the airport subject to certain conditions including “political, financial, and logistical support” from its NATO allies.<sup>137</sup>

In a September 7 interview, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu continued to express concern about security for Turkish personnel at the Kabul airport, given Taliban opposition to any foreign troop presence. “But the most important is who ensures security?” he stated. “Outside the airport, it could be the Taliban but inside (the airport) it needs to be a private company or a state or two that the international community can rely on.”<sup>138</sup> On September 26, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted as saying that Turkey’s presence in Kabul would depend on whether the Taliban form an “inclusive” government.<sup>139</sup>

How the Taliban-controlled government will be able to run Afghanistan’s civil aviation sector with limited technical personnel and limited funding remains to be seen. Even before the collapse of the former Afghan government, representatives of the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA) were concerned about their ability to maintain the runway and equipment at HKIA, as well as their lack of mid-level managers to supervise technical staff.<sup>140</sup> The ACAA maintained that it had challenges with retaining a sufficient number of qualified personnel to manage, maintain, and operate

Afghanistan's airports.<sup>141</sup> More information on airport operations in Kabul can be found in the Classified Supplement to this report.

## EDUCATION

Even with donor assistance, Afghanistan struggled to improve its education outcomes in recent years, in the face of the Ministry of Education's capacity issues and continued insecurity; many students, particularly girls, remained out of school. Nevertheless, overall trends over the past 20 years show that Afghanistan's education sector and girls' access to education have made considerable gains since 2001. For example, student enrollment, despite being a poor indicator of actual attendance, increased ten-fold between 2001 and 2018, from approximately one million students to 10 million.<sup>142</sup> This figure includes 3.5 million girls, in contrast to almost no girls in school during the 1996–2001 Taliban regime.<sup>143</sup> The Taliban takeover, however, is a threat to the continued development and expansion of Afghan schools, especially regarding girls' education, and risks undermining the U.S. investment in Afghanistan's education sector, totaling \$1.3 billion since 2002.<sup>144</sup>

### Taliban Takeover Threatens Girls' Education

After the Taliban took control of the government, many educational institutions closed.<sup>145</sup> Some universities remained open, but reported the vast majority of their students were not showing up for class over security concerns.<sup>146</sup> In preparation for reopening, Taliban officials announced their intention to fully implement their interpretation of *sharia*, or Islamic law, including in matters of education.<sup>147</sup> In early September, the Taliban higher education minister announced a review of the subjects taught in school to ensure compliance with their governing ideology.<sup>148</sup> Regarding female education, the Taliban have so far announced their intention to continue allowing females to attend schools and universities within the limits of the Taliban's interpretation of *sharia*.<sup>149</sup>

In early September 2021, the Taliban-controlled government introduced gender segregation among students in universities and colleges; many primary and secondary classrooms were already gender-segregated. According to media reports, schools will be required to maintain separate entrances for male and female students and mixed-gender classes are only permissible if the number of female students is below 15 and the classroom divides males and females with a curtain. Taliban officials also announced that female students would be taught by women wherever possible. Additionally, all female students, teachers, and staff are required to wear a covering garment.<sup>150</sup>

The vice chancellor of a private university in Kabul, however, warned of the logistical difficulties many schools will face in complying with requirements for gender segregation.<sup>151</sup> According to UNICEF, only one-third of



**Girls head to school** in Herat even as Taliban restrict females' access to much of the educational system. (UNICEF Afghanistan photo)

Afghanistan's teachers are female, with much lower proportions in rural areas and in higher levels of education, and, therefore, there are not sufficient numbers for gender-segregated classrooms.<sup>152</sup> Even if the Taliban allowed female students to attend gender-segregated universities, logistical difficulties, including the availability of female teachers, could have the effect of limiting their practical ability to access educational opportunities. USAID stated, "The space for girls and women's education continues to shrink in Afghanistan. The lack of a clear policy or strategy to guide the education sector has led to fragmentation, inconsistency, and incoherent guidance from the local-level de facto authorities based on their own interpretations and understanding of education."<sup>153</sup>

On September 19, secondary schools reopened, but only for male teachers and students. The Taliban issued a statement saying, "All male teachers and students should attend their education."<sup>154</sup> Prior to the collapse of the government, the Taliban had reportedly asserted that girls should not attend school beyond the seventh grade and had banned girls from attending secondary school in areas under their control.<sup>155</sup> Primary schools have already reopened for younger female students in segregated classes.<sup>156</sup>

While a Taliban spokesperson said they were making preparations for opening girls' high schools (without details on a timeline), it was unclear if the Taliban-controlled government has sufficient resources or female teachers to be able to operate separate schools for female students.<sup>157</sup> Before the collapse of the Afghan government, the Ministry of Education reported that Afghan schools suffered from a lack of educational resources and a

teacher shortage, with the country's schools requiring at least 50,000 more teachers.<sup>158</sup> Even if female students are allowed to attend segregated higher education institutions, their inability to attend secondary schools would effectively bar them from advancing to the university level.

In September 2021, several protests by Afghan women erupted in Kabul as they demanded the right to be educated, work, and have representation in government. In response, Taliban forces beat the protestors with whips and batons.<sup>159</sup>

## PUBLIC HEALTH

Several NGOs and international organizations warned that Afghanistan's health-care system was on the verge of collapse, even as the COVID-19 pandemic continued to ravage the country. Médecins Sans Frontières stated that many Afghan healthcare professionals had not received their salaries in months and clinics are running out of medicine, while the numbers of incoming patients have increased. In early September, the WHO said 90% of their clinics in the country could close.<sup>160</sup>

On August 24, WHO announced that due to Afghanistan's instability, it had suspended its efforts to bolster the country's capacity to handle the pandemic, including the establishment of new testing laboratories, the installation of new oxygen plants in hospitals, and the expansion of isolation centers and intensive care beds for COVID-19 patients.<sup>161</sup> In mid-September, BBC News reported that the reserve stocks of medicine in hospitals in Mazar-e Sharif would last for only another month. Additionally, many health-care workers had not received their salaries since the collapse of the Afghan government, creating uncertainty over how the Taliban will fund the Ministry of Public Health.<sup>162</sup>

In addition to medicine shortages, hospitals report lack of food for patients and power shortages. One obstetrician in Maidan Wardak Province said, "These days I'm forced to help women deliver their babies by the flashlight on our smart phones because our hospital ran out of money to buy fuel for the generator. Carrying out a C-section by flashlight is a nightmare we now have to face regularly."<sup>163</sup> Without immediate support for maternity health, the UN Population Fund estimated that Afghanistan could be facing 51,000 additional maternal deaths, 4.8 million unwanted pregnancies, and double the number of individuals unable to access family-planning clinics over the next four years.<sup>164</sup>

Health-care services for women have been further restricted due to reports of the Taliban requiring them to be seen only by female staff. The Taliban have reportedly beaten male doctors who have treated female patients. Taliban orders that women must be accompanied by a male family member to be able to leave home potentially further restricts women's ability to access health-care facilities.<sup>165</sup>



**WHO medical supplies** arrive in Kabul, October 2, 2021. (WHO Afghanistan photo)

Afghanistan has long had a shortage of trained health-care professionals. In 2018, the country had a nationwide average of only 4.6 medical doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 people, far below the WHO threshold of 23 per 10,000 people, indicating a critical shortage. In rural regions, this shortage was more pronounced. In Kunar Province, for instance, the number of doctors per 10,000 people dropped to only 0.5.<sup>166</sup> Since the collapse of the government, this figure is most likely even lower given the inability to pay health-care workers' salaries, many individuals' reluctance to work given uncertainty over the security conditions in the country, or health-care workers having fled the country.<sup>167</sup>

Health-care service providers have struggled with the departure of various aid organizations, many skilled Afghans leaving the country, and uncertainty over how to operate under the Taliban-controlled government. Under these conditions, hundreds of clinics around the country have closed.<sup>168</sup> On September 22, WHO reported that approximately one-quarter of Afghanistan's COVID-19 hospitals had closed in recent weeks.<sup>169</sup> The clinics and hospitals that have remained open report a limitation on their services because of insufficient funds. This includes suspension of any ambulance services due to the inability to purchase fuel.<sup>170</sup> The disruptions at the airports also have delayed the delivery of urgently needed health supplies within the country.<sup>171</sup>

In early October, the UN Development Programme announced it would be taking over responsibility for World Bank-managed health-care services in Afghanistan, including managing the salaries of at least 25,000 doctors,

nurses, and other health-care workers. This program will be initially financed by a \$15 million donation from the Global Fund. These payments were stopped when the World Bank halted their funding to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover.<sup>172</sup>

Even before the Taliban takeover and the COVID-19 pandemic, Afghanistan struggled to contain outbreaks of treatable diseases due to poor access to health-care services stemming from continued insecurity, repeated population displacement, and insufficient resources, limiting the ability for public health improvements to bolster political stability.<sup>173</sup> Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, are the only two remaining countries in the world in which polio remains endemic.<sup>174</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated capacity and management problems that have hampered Afghanistan's public health system.<sup>175</sup>

Before the collapse of the Afghan government, Afghan doctors expressed grave concern over the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic with the rapid spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant, which data suggests is approximately 60% more transmissible than other variants and about twice as likely to land patients in the hospital.<sup>176</sup> The current number of COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan are severely undercounted as testing rates plummeted by 77% in the immediate aftermath of the Afghan government's collapse.<sup>177</sup> Even before this drop, testing levels were already low, with high test-positivity rates suggesting that actual case count was much higher.<sup>178</sup>

Afghanistan's health-care system also has struggled with recent increases in insecurity and the resulting civilian casualties. In early September, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that it had treated approximately 41,000 people wounded by fighting in Afghanistan over the previous two months.<sup>179</sup> The increase in patients at various health-care facilities, as well as crowding within internally displaced persons camps, has made infection-prevention and control measures difficult to implement, with experts warning of the continued risk of COVID-19 transmission.<sup>180</sup>

## Vaccination Rates Plummet in Wake of Taliban Takeover

In the days after the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, COVID-19 vaccination rates fell by 80% due to individuals prioritizing "their safety and security first."<sup>181</sup> With the drastic drop in vaccination rates, over two million vaccine doses in Afghanistan are at risk of going to waste as they are set to expire in the coming months.<sup>182</sup> By August 2021, only around 5% of Afghanistan's estimated population had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, according to WHO.<sup>183</sup> COVID-19 testing rates also fell by 77% following the Afghan government's collapse.<sup>184</sup>

WHO's director general warned that health gains in Afghanistan, such as progress made towards eradicating polio and the nascent COVID-19 vaccination program, could unravel under the current circumstances.<sup>185</sup> In recent years, the Taliban has opposed vaccination programs conducted through house-to-house campaigns (such as polio vaccinations) within areas under their control because of their suspicions that vaccination workers could use such approaches to gather information or pursue other objectives. The Taliban has not objected to vaccination programs such as routine immunizations in healthcare facilities or campaigns that use fixed sites such as mosques or other public venues close to communities.<sup>186</sup> With the limitations of Afghanistan's health-care system under the Taliban-controlled government and the potential absence of any widespread vaccination programs, public-health experts warn that COVID-19 will continue to spread quickly through the Afghan population and "add more pain and misery to a highly volatile and distressing situation."<sup>187</sup>

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