

# SECURITY CONTENTS

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## SECURITY

### KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

Overall security incidents in Afghanistan remain low compared to levels before the August 2021 collapse of the former Afghan government.

Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) continued mass-casualty attacks against Shia mosques and Taliban security forces in and around major Afghan cities, including northern Kunduz, the capital Kabul, and southern Kandahar City.

The reclusive Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada made his first public appearances in years in southern Kandahar Province to address reports of abusive Taliban commanders.

### SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

In a weekly situation report for November 3–9, the State Department-contracted International Development Law Organization (IDLO) stated that overall, “Security incidents remain low compared to the levels prior to the collapse of the Ghani government.”<sup>1</sup> IDLO’s security assessment includes incidents of **political violence** as well as general criminal conduct (such as theft, home invasion, or assault).<sup>2</sup> Numbers of incidents appear to be low, particularly for rural areas and commercial road traffic.<sup>3</sup> News reports suggest some Kabul residents are pleased with police justice and that commercial activities are improving, with restaurants active and streets secure at night.<sup>4</sup>

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), political violence and protest incidents under the Taliban (September–December 2021) declined by 87% compared to average incidents under the Afghan government (January 2020–August 2021), as seen in Figure S.1 on the following page.<sup>5</sup> A much greater percentage of current incidents are also protest events rather than violence (16% of incidents compared to 1% under the former Afghan government). Protest motives

**Political violence:** The use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. Political violence is a component of political disorder, a social phenomenon that also includes precursor events, or critical junctures, that often precede violent conflict, including demonstrations, protests, and riots. Political disorder does not include general criminal conduct.

Source: ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook,” 2019, p. 7.


# SECURITY

range from demands for women’s rights and equal access to public spaces, to demands for Western countries to unfreeze Afghan assets.<sup>6</sup>

ACLED is a nonprofit organization funded in part by the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Its purpose is to collect and provide publicly available data on all reported political violence and protest events around the world.<sup>7</sup> ACLED notes that Afghanistan has always been a unique data challenge due to its largely rural character

FIGURE S.1

## VIOLENCE AND DISORDER IN AFGHANISTAN, FOR YEARS 2020–2021



● Number of incidents of violence and disorder  
 ■ Number of weapons released in U.S. air sorties

Note: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) aims to capture all instances of “political disorder” which includes “political violence,” defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation, as well as precursor events to violence, such as protests, demonstrations, and riots. U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) does not use the term “air strikes”; rather CFACC records the number of aircraft or drone sorties and the quantity of munitions expended or “weapons released” from the aircraft. The data presented in the figure is the number of weapons released, meaning that one aircraft sortie could release multiple weapons.

Source: ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 1/2022 and “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook,” 2019, p. 7; SIGAR analysis of ACLED data, 1/2022; CFACC, “Combined Forces Air Component Commander, 2014–2021 Airpower Statistics,” 12/31/2021; AP, “‘Distressingly high’ levels of violence threatens Afghan peace process, says US envoy,” 10/19/2020; LATimes, “Leaving Afghanistan under Trump deal could spur chaos, U.S. commanders say,” 3/14/2021; White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” 4/14/2021; AAN, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taliban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance,’” 7/2/2021; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2021; CENTCOM, “Update on Withdraw of U.S. Forces Afghanistan,” 7/5/2021.

and reporting biases that stem from intimidation by militant and state forces. This situation has not changed under the Taliban.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the decline in security incidents, significant violence persists, including mass-casualty attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K); civilian disturbances from abusive Taliban forces and others; and sporadic skirmishes by anti-Taliban National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA) insurgents.<sup>9</sup> As part of the Taliban’s plan to counter these threats, chief of staff Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat announced in mid-January that Afghanistan now has at least 80,000 army personnel stationed in eight corps throughout the country and will attempt to build this force to 150,000 members.<sup>10</sup> That target strength would not be far from the 182,071 reported strength of the former Afghan National Army in spring 2021.<sup>11</sup>

The United States also remains concerned over the threat from terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the region, including remnants of IS-K and al-Qaeda, that have aspirations to attack the United States. In December, CENTCOM commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie told the Associated Press that the departure of U.S. military and intelligence assets from Afghanistan made it much harder to track al-Qaeda and other extremist groups such as IS-K. He noted that the U.S. can rely on aircraft based outside Afghanistan to strike terrorists, such as al-Qaeda operatives, whose numbers have “probably slightly increased.” (As of December 31, 2021, there have been no U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan since August). He added that it was unclear how strongly the Taliban would go after IS-K.<sup>12</sup> A week later, in another Associated Press interview, Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi pushed back against General McKenzie’s implication that the Taliban may not be upholding its promise to fight terrorism and deny these groups safe haven: “If McKenzie has any proof, he should provide it,” Muttaqi said. “With confidence, I can say that these are baseless allegations.”<sup>13</sup>

## IS-K ATTACKS PERSIST

When Taliban fighters entered Kabul on August 15 and took control of the prison at the National Directorate of Security, they freed hundreds of prisoners held by former Afghan authorities, but also executed IS-K’s onetime leader, Abu Omar Khorasani, and eight other IS-K members.<sup>14</sup> This event, along with an August 26 IS-K attack at Kabul Airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members, appears to have galvanized the Taliban’s fight against its current greatest security threat, IS-K.<sup>15</sup>

Although IDLO’s security report for November 17–23 says the number of IS-K attacks has decreased significantly, violence persists.<sup>16</sup> Earlier this quarter, IS-K mass-casualty attacks killed at least 90 people in Afghan cities, including the capital Kabul, the northern city of Kunduz, and southern Kandahar City. These attacks have primarily targeted minority Shia



**Chief of staff** for the Taliban Ministry of Defense, Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, addresses graduation ceremony for Kabul Central Corps soldiers. (MOD screenshot)

“I would tell you that we continue to look in Afghanistan for particularly ISIS-K targets and al-Qaeda targets ... we are able to bring platforms in overhead to take a look ... in the long term, perhaps we can reestablish some relationships on the ground.”

—General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.,  
commander of U.S. Central Command

Source: PBS News Hour, “Gen. McKenzie on U.S. policy, commitments and action in the Middle East and Asia,” 12/9/2021.



**Taliban commando graduates** demonstrate raid planning. (MOD Twitter account)

mosques, as well as Taliban security forces, including during an assault on Kabul's military hospital.<sup>17</sup> The Taliban returned weapons they had confiscated to most Hazara guards at these mosques after these attacks.<sup>18</sup>

Prior to August 2021, destroying IS-K was a goal the Taliban, the Afghan government, and Coalition forces had shared since at least 2019.<sup>19</sup> In 2015, the Taliban's special-operations Red Units emerged specifically to eliminate breakaway Taliban factions that had aligned with IS-K. Consisting of multiple battalion-size units (300–350 personnel), Red Units gained early notoriety, even in Kabul, after a unit destroyed an IS-K faction in southern Zabol Province and freed Hazara prisoners that had been taken captive outside Ghazni.<sup>20</sup>

Multiple reports suggest some cooperation between Afghan government, Taliban, and Coalition forces succeeded in pushing IS-K out of eastern Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces in 2019 and 2020. DOD reported at the time that “sustained pressure from the ANDSF, Coalition, and the Taliban degraded [IS-K] ... this pressure forced [IS-K] to abandon territorial control in southern Nangarhar and Kunar.”<sup>21</sup> According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network and the *New York Times*, U.S. air strikes and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), coordinating with Taliban forces, delivered severe defeats to IS-K in those provinces.<sup>22</sup> As recently as late August, while in Kabul to speak with Taliban leadership about evacuation operations, CIA Director William J. Burns also reportedly stressed to the Taliban the need to stop attacks from IS-K.<sup>23</sup>

A violent organization with a significant bankroll, IS-K often appears as the last and most extreme option for disaffected individuals or groups in the region.<sup>24</sup> According to a *Wall Street Journal* article based on interviews with former Afghan government security officials, associates of the defectors, and Taliban leaders, a relatively small but growing number of former Afghan government intelligence and security personnel have joined IS-K.<sup>25</sup> IDLO reported in late November that the Taliban gave some former Afghan intelligence or special forces members the option of joining the Taliban. Those who have instead joined IS-K did so due to financial considerations, according to IDLO.<sup>26</sup>

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said ANDSF personnel “almost certainly have not joined violent extremist organizations within Afghanistan.”<sup>27</sup> According to a recent SIGAR interview with former Afghan general Sami Sadat, a corps commander in the volatile southern Helmand Province, the U.S. failure to evacuate skilled Afghan fighters, especially commandos and intelligence officers, could lead to IS-K's resurgence. Sadat said these people would be especially vulnerable to IS-K recruitment. Sadat added that this issue needs to be addressed more systematically, noting that IS-K may have the capability to take eastern Afghanistan quickly and establish itself in Kabul within a year.<sup>28</sup>

In a more recent SIGAR interview, General Masoud Andarabi, a former director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), discussed allegations of NDS personnel joining IS-K, including at least 10 in Nangarhar who are currently undergoing training in Pakistan. Echoing Sadat's concerns, Andarabi said that for these people, joining IS-K is about resistance and exacting revenge against the Taliban. He also noted that these personnel may feel the need to shelter from the Taliban by joining IS-K. Even some who had been on IS-K hit lists may find protection by joining IS-K, he said.<sup>29</sup>

## OTHER VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

### Unaccountable Murders, Assassinations, and Disappearances

According to a November Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, at least 100 former civilian government, military, police, intelligence, and militia personnel in four provinces alone have been summarily executed or disappeared from August 15 through October 31, 2021. HRW notes that these incidents have “taken place despite the Taliban’s announced amnesty for former government civilian and military officials and reassurances from the Taliban leadership that they would hold their forces accountable for violation of the amnesty order.”<sup>30</sup> HRW also noted that the fallen government had likewise “extensively used enforced disappearances against their opponents.”<sup>31</sup> In early December, Taliban spokesman Qari Sayed Khosti released a video statement in response to HRW allegations saying “We have some cases where some former ANDSF members were killed but they have been killed because of personal rivalries and enmities,” adding that holding Taliban authorities responsible for personal enmities is “unjust.”<sup>32</sup>

Taliban fighters or commanders exacting local revenge, IS-K operatives who have not halted operations against former government officials, and Taliban covert Red Unit counterterrorism raids against actual or suspected IS-K operatives appear to be responsible for most of these incidents. The report sometimes appears to rely on local hearsay or acknowledges that it is unclear who actually perpetrated events in question; regardless, it seems well established that disappearances and murders are occurring.<sup>33</sup> According to the State Department, “most evidence of executions or disappearances linked to the Taliban is purely anecdotal.”<sup>34</sup>

Under the terms of the general amnesty, HRW said, the Taliban leadership has directed former government personnel to register with the Taliban to receive a letter guaranteeing their safety. The Taliban seem to reserve the right to search for and detain personnel who have failed to register, even if the registration procedures may be unclear.<sup>35</sup> Significantly complicating this amnesty policy, and the standard policing operations attempting to enforce it while also instilling fear and caution among Afghan civilians, is the Taliban’s

ongoing Red Unit counterterrorism operations against IS-K, particularly in eastern Nangarhar Province and Kabul City. The Taliban response to HRW's report says that some former security personnel are being targeted for new criminal activities, including IS-K affiliation.<sup>36</sup> IDLO reported that the Taliban have heightened covert operations against IS-K, "conducting house-to-house raids and assassinating suspected IS-K members," but without claiming responsibility.<sup>37</sup>

After reports of human-rights violations by Taliban soldiers and commanders, on September 21, the Taliban announced a commission formed to investigate reports of Taliban human-rights abuses, corruption, theft, and other crimes. The commission consists of representatives from the defense and interior ministries as well as the directorate of intelligence. IDLO reports that as of mid-November, the Taliban had imprisoned or expelled 200 former members of those organizations for violations uncovered by the commission.<sup>38</sup> In response to HRW findings presented to the Taliban in November for comment, the Taliban said that detentions and punishments follow the judicial process, and that individuals are being detained not for "past deeds, but [because] they are engaged in new criminal activities ... and plots against the new administration."<sup>39</sup>

An Afghan journalist and author, Fazeliminallah Qazizai, who has interviewed a number of Taliban fighters, expressed concern that the Taliban's counterterrorism operations could bleed over into general human rights abuses:<sup>40</sup>

As the Taliban adopt the rhetoric and aesthetics of Western counterterrorism, they might come to learn from the mistakes that turned a friendly population against Western forces in much of rural Afghanistan. The aggressive posture of counterterrorism combined with the kind of summary justice the Taliban mete out can often lend itself to abuse. Like NATO, the Taliban will likely discover that superior fighting ability alone is not enough to eliminate threats as long as greater effort isn't put into winning legitimacy and guaranteeing accountability.

Echoing these concerns, IDLO said "there is concern that former Afghan Security Forces and government officials that have no links to IS-K could be grouped into these types of extra-judicial reprisal attacks."<sup>41</sup>

## Taliban Defense Minister, Supreme Leader Order Crackdown on Abuses

After the Taliban formed a commission in September to investigate Taliban abuses, reports indicated that leaders attempted to reinforce the policy against extrajudicial punishments. In late September, Reuters reported that Taliban defense minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, used an audio message to blame some "miscreants and notorious former soldiers" for committing a range of abuses, including

revenge against former ANDSF personnel. In an attempt to prevent further abuses, Yaqoob ordered commanders to screen recruits and keep unqualified people out of the security forces, adding, “As you all are aware, under the general amnesty announced in Afghanistan, no mujahid has the right to take revenge on anyone.”<sup>42</sup>

On October 30, the reclusive Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who had not been seen in public for years, appeared at a Kandahar *madrassa* (Islamic school) to warn that the Taliban now face the new challenges of governance, following their August 15 military victory. Weeks later, in mid-December, Akhundzada appeared again, this time at the Kandahar governor’s office to meet with officials from across the province. In addition to expressing dismay over the impact of Western sanctions and asset freezes, Akhundzada voiced concern over the numerous reports of low- and mid-ranking Taliban abusing their positions, stressing the need for discipline and prayer within the ranks.<sup>43</sup>

According to Afghan journalist and author Fazelminallah Qazizai, who first wrote about Akhundzada’s appearance, while “deep divisions within the Taliban have been exaggerated by their political opponents and sections of the media, I know that figures in the [de facto] government are frustrated by the errant behavior of some fighters who have assaulted and intimidated civilians.”<sup>44</sup>

## Anti-Taliban Insurgent Forces

Taliban foreign minister Muttaqi met in Tehran with National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA) leader Ahmad Massoud and Herati strongman Ismail Khan in mid-January, according to multiple news agencies. Khan, a former governor of Herat who has resisted the Taliban for much of his career, including by rallying forces to push them back in early August, surrendered days before Kabul fell. Iran’s foreign ministry said that the conflicting parties had good discussions. Khan’s nephew, Abdul Qayyum Sulaimani, who under the former Afghan government had been deputy ambassador to Iran, was appointed ambassador to Iran by Muttaqi.<sup>45</sup>

After the Taliban took Kabul in August, Ahmad Massoud, son of famed former Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, retreated to the rugged Panjshir Valley to lead the NRFA. The Panjshir Valley withstood occupation by both the Soviets in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s. The NRFA fighters were augmented by ANDSF remnants that refused to surrender.<sup>46</sup> The initial resistance was short-lived and the Taliban had captured the valley by early September, though the resistance group vowed to continue fighting.<sup>47</sup> IDLO in late October identified NRFA groups engaged in continued, sporadic fighting against the Taliban in five northern provinces (Panjshir, Baghlan, Kapisa, Balkh, and Badakhshan).<sup>48</sup>

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), former ANDSF personnel, including Afghan National Army Special Operations Command



**Taliban defense minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob** traveled to the eastern 201st Corps to assess the security situation. (MOD Twitter account)



## DOD Conducting Full Assessment of ANDSF Equipment

The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) advised SIGAR that DOD is conducting a full accounting of the types, numbers, and value of all military equipment the U.S. provided to Afghanistan since 2005, including an estimate of how much of that equipment may have remained in the ANDSF inventory before that forces' disintegration, was reduced by battle losses, worn out equipment, as well as equipment outside Afghanistan when the Taliban took over. DOD told SIGAR that open-source equipment information is incomplete and inaccurate, and that DOD is working on a full equipment assessment to be shared with SIGAR once completed.

Source: OUSDP, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2021.

**Usable aircraft:** Aircraft in the AAF's inventory that are located in Afghanistan and are either operational and available for tasking, or are in short-term maintenance.

**Total inventory:** The number of aircraft either usable or in long-term maintenance (either at a third-country location or in the United States); it does not include aircraft that were destroyed and have not yet been replaced.

**Authorized:** The total number of aircraft approved for the force.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/16/2021.

(ANASOC) personnel, have “almost certainly” joined the NRFA or are hiding from the Taliban regime to escape execution or imprisonment.<sup>49</sup> In a recent SIGAR interview, General Andarabi concluded that some of these personnel went to the NRFA, but a significant number of former Ministry of the Interior (MOI) personnel went straight to Iran, where they were welcomed.<sup>50</sup>

## DSCMO-A REMAINS IN QATAR

Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A) remains headquartered in Qatar at Al Udeid airbase, administering the final disposition of efforts in Afghanistan, such as service contracts funded by the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). DSCMO-A noted that ASFF may take years to close due to the possibility of future claims and litigation by contractors.<sup>51</sup> As of December 31, 2021, Army Major General Curtis Buzzard was director of DSCMO-A, which had 27 U.S. service members and DOD civilians (but no U.S. contractors). DSCMO-A is closing out and transitioning its activities to other DOD entities.<sup>52</sup>

## Aircraft inventory and status when the Afghan government fell

As of August 15, 2021, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) had 131 available, **usable aircraft** among the 162 aircraft in its **total inventory**. In addition, the Afghan Special Security Forces' (ASSF) Special Mission Wing (SMW) had 39 aircraft of unknown status available (helicopters included 18 Mi-17s and five UH-60s; airplanes included 16 PC-12 single-engine passenger and light-cargo aircraft).<sup>53</sup>

In mid-November, the Taliban reportedly asked former Afghan Air Force pilots to return to Afghanistan under a general amnesty, after a number of these pilots fled to neighboring countries, such as Tajikistan, during the Taliban takeover.<sup>54</sup> DIA concluded that some of these pilots have likely been co-opted by the Taliban to establish its air force.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, many former AAF pilots and crewmembers remain in hiding, with at least one U.S.-based private organization working to assist these personnel. The State Department also noted, “We are in regular communication with the government of Tajikistan, and part of those communications includes coordination in response to Afghan Air Force pilots.”<sup>56</sup>

## U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR SECURITY

The ANDSF have dissolved and U.S. funding obligations for them have ceased. Disbursements will continue until all program contracts are finally reconciled.<sup>57</sup> The U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$89.38 billion to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan provide security in Afghanistan,

as of December 31, 2021. This accounts for 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding disbursements for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002.

Congress established the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprised all forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF money was used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) salaries. The rest of ASFF was used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Of the nearly \$3 billion appropriated for the ASFF in FY 2020, \$2.1 billion had been obligated and nearly \$2.1 billion disbursed as of December 31, 2021. About \$718 million of FY 2021 ASFF has been obligated and nearly \$591 million disbursed, as of December 31, 2021.<sup>58</sup> Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented on pages 48–49.<sup>59</sup>

ASFF monies were obligated since 2005 by either DSCMO-A, CSTC-A, or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.<sup>60</sup> Funds that DSCMO-A and others provided directly (on-budget) to the Afghan government to manage went to the Ministry of Finance, which then transferred them to the MOD and MOI, based on submitted funding requests.<sup>61</sup> While the United States funded most ANA salaries, a significant share of personnel costs for the ANP were paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).<sup>62</sup> From a high point of just over \$304 million in 2014, the annual combined contributions by DOD and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to LOTFA had declined to about \$1 million in 2018 and 2019. Combined contributions rose in 2020 to \$5.5 million and nearly doubled in 2021, to \$10.8 million.<sup>63</sup> INL’s portion of LOTFA funds supported prison staff since 2015. These donations have been terminated and any remaining funds are being recouped.<sup>64</sup>

## ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is reviewing DOD’s efforts to ensure accountability for funds provided to the MOD. This audit will determine the extent to which DOD, since the beginning of FY 2019, ensured (1) the accuracy and completeness of data used in Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), and (2) the funds it provided to the Afghan government to pay MOD salaries were disbursed to intended recipients.

### **Congressional Committee Report Seeks an Accounting of Why the ANDSF Failed and What Equipment Was Lost in Afghanistan**

On December 7 and 15, 2021, the House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, passed S. 1605, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022. The NDAA was signed into law on December 27, 2021 (Pub. L. No. 117-81). Committee report (H. Rept. 117-118) accompanying the House version of the NDAA directed SIGAR to evaluate and report on:

- why the ANDSF proved unable to defend Afghanistan from the Taliban following the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel
- the impact the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel had on the performance of the ANDSF
- elements of the U.S. military’s efforts since 2001 to provide training, assistance, and advising to the ANDSF that impacted the ANDSF’s performance following the U.S. military withdrawal
- current status of U.S.-provided equipment to the ANDSF
- current status of U.S.-trained ANDSF personnel
- any other matters SIGAR deems appropriate.

Source: House Report 117-118 (Excerpt), “SIGAR Evaluation of Performance of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces,” 9/10/2021.

## Afghan National Army

### U.S. Funding

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$2.6 billion and disbursed more than \$2.3 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.<sup>65</sup> For information about how much ASFF was appropriated for the ANA and other force elements from FY 2008 through FY 2018, see the corresponding section of SIGAR's January 30, 2021, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

### ANA Sustainment

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$2.4 billion and disbursed more than \$2.2 billion from FY 2019 through FY 2021 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. These costs included salary and incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment-maintenance costs, including aircraft, and other expenses.<sup>66</sup>

### ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately nearly \$33.9 million from FY 2019 through FY 2021 ASFF appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.<sup>67</sup>

### ANA Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had disbursed more than \$15.7 million of nearly \$28.3 million of ASFF appropriations obligated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANDSF infrastructure projects.<sup>68</sup>

Before the Afghan government collapsed, DSCMO-A was managing six ASFF-funded ANA infrastructure projects having a total contract value of \$23.2 million with \$14.2 million of that obligated. All of these projects were terminated following the collapse of the Afghan government; DOD noted that final termination costs and amount recouped remain to be determined.<sup>69</sup>

### ANA Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$107.5 million and disbursed more than \$85.7 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA training and operations.<sup>70</sup>

Remaining ANA training contracts were terminated for convenience following the collapse of the Afghan government; DOD was not able to provide an update on termination costs and amount to be recouped this quarter due to ongoing program reconciliations with contractors.<sup>71</sup>

## Afghan Air Force

### U.S. Funding

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$2.0 billion and disbursed more than \$1.9 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the AAF.<sup>72</sup>

### Afghan Special Security Forces

The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) was the ANDSF's primary offensive component. The ASSF included a number of elements, such as the ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW).<sup>73</sup>

### U.S. Funding

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$1.2 billion and disbursed more than \$1.0 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ASSF.<sup>74</sup>

## Afghan National Police

### U.S. Funding

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$909.9 million and disbursed more than \$831.9 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.<sup>75</sup>

### ANP Sustainment

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated \$766.2 million and disbursed more than \$708.1 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP sustainment.<sup>76</sup> Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) were paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).<sup>77</sup>

### ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$3.7 million and disbursed more than \$3.6 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP equipment and transportation costs.<sup>78</sup>

### ANP Infrastructure

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated more than \$4.1 million and disbursed more than \$2.5 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP infrastructure projects.<sup>79</sup>



**Taliban-operated Mi-17 helicopter** flying over Kabul during a military parade. (MOD Twitter account)

## SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, SIGAR issued an UNCLASSIFIED version of its CLASSIFIED January 2021 report to DOD on the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR found that DOD took steps to develop the air forces' sustainment capabilities, but that they continued to need U.S. support, in part because training and developing personnel in supporting positions was never a priority. Further, neither the AAF nor SMW developed a recruiting strategy so were unable to meet their recruiting goals. Finally, pilots and aircraft maintainers were not always placed in positions that made best use of their advanced training and skills.

DSCMO-A was managing one DOD-funded ANP infrastructure project: the joint NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) and ASFF-funded closed-circuit television surveillance system in Kabul (\$19 million of this funded by ASFF). This project was terminated after the collapse of the Afghan government; final termination costs and amounts that can be recouped have yet to be determined.<sup>80</sup>

## **ANP Training and Operations**

As of December 31, 2021, the United States had obligated nearly \$135.9 million and disbursed nearly \$117.7 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP training and operations.<sup>81</sup> Remaining ANP training contracts were terminated for convenience following the collapse of the Afghan government; DOD was not able to provide an update on termination costs and amounts to be recouped this quarter due to ongoing program reconciliations with contractors.<sup>82</sup>

## **REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE**

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan to protect victims of conflict, provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, and enhance the security and safety of the Afghan people.<sup>83</sup> Although direct assistance to the former Afghan Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) was suspended on September 9, 2021, remaining humanitarian mine-action projects and implementing partners have continued on-the-ground mine and explosive-remnants of war (ERW) clearance activities.<sup>84</sup> PM/WRA is one of the few programs authorized to continue operations in Afghanistan.<sup>85</sup>

PM/WRA currently supports six Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and four international NGOs to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds).<sup>86</sup> Since FY 2002, State has allocated \$440 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional \$11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction effort). PM/WRA noted that release of fiscal year funding is tied to publication of the annual operations plan (OPLAN), and that the plan is often delayed 12–16 months. As of December 7, 2021, PM/WRA had released \$20 million in FY 2020 bilateral funds and is working towards releasing \$8 million of FY 2021 funds via an early-release program (releasing FY 2021 funds prior to finalization of the 2021 OPLAN).<sup>87</sup>

Although some information on ordnance cleared is still available, due to the dissolution of DMAC, PM/WRA is not able to provide quarterly data on minefields cleared, estimated hazardous areas, contaminated areas, and

### **SIGAR AUDIT**

This quarter, a SIGAR audit of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) efforts to implement, oversee, and evaluate its Conventional Weapons Destruction program since October 2017 found that PM/WRA conducted most of its required oversight of its implementing partners, but did not conduct some of its reviews within the required timeframes. SIGAR also found that PM/WRA adjusted some of its award agreements to assist its implementing partners in achieving their targets when they encountered challenges performing their work. However, the PM/WRA's implementing partners did not meet all of their award agreements' targets, and the PM/WRA did not assess how achievements of individual award agreements contributed to strategic and operational goals.

# SECURITY

TABLE S.1

<b>DEMINEING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE, FISCAL YEARS 2011–2021</b>					
<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Minefields Cleared (m<sup>2</sup>)<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>AT/AP Destroyed</b>	<b>UXO Destroyed</b>	<b>SAA Destroyed</b>	<b>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m<sup>2</sup>)<sup>b</sup></b>
2011	31,644,360	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	602,000,000
2012	46,783,527	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	550,000,000
2013	25,059,918	6,431	203,024	275,697	521,000,000
2014	22,071,212	12,397	287,331	346,484	511,600,000
2015	12,101,386	2,134	33,078	88,798	570,800,000
2016	27,856,346	6,493	6,289	91,563	607,600,000
2017	31,897,313	6,646	37,632	88,261	547,000,000
2018	25,233,844	5,299	30,924	158,850	558,700,000
2019	13,104,094	3,102	26,791	162,727	657,693,033
2020	23,966,967	2,879	7,197	85,250	843,517,435
2021	24,736,683	18,258	10,444	45,850	
<b>Total</b>	<b>284,455,650</b>	<b>85,973</b>	<b>1,332,102</b>	<b>4,795,965</b>	

a FY 2021 data covers October 1, 2020, through December 7, 2021. Due to the collapse of the Afghan government in August 2021, data for August 1–December 7, 2021, does not include minefields cleared or the estimated contaminated area remaining.

b Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. There are about 4,047 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) to an acre.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/10/2021.

communities affected. Table S.1 shows available conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2011–2021.<sup>88</sup>

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