General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, and
Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Dear General Dunford:

This letter is to inquire about your plans for maintaining the U.S. military's support for programs and task forces to combat corruption in Afghanistan after U.S. combat operations conclude at the end of this year.

Numerous surveys, audits, legal proceedings, and reports from Afghan, international, and U.S. experts and organizations have identified corruption as one of the most serious obstacles to the reconstruction effort. In fact, the February 2014 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis report, issued in response to your office's request to examine the threat posed by corruption in Afghanistan, bluntly warned that “corruption alienates key elements of the population, discredits the government and security forces, undermines international support, subverts state functions and rule of law, robs the state of revenue, and creates barriers to economic growth.” In short, “corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the Afghan State.”¹

Although the United States has not had a comprehensive strategy to guide its anti/counter-corruption activities in Afghanistan, U.S. military agencies did establish various task forces to try to understand and counter the pervasive corruption in that country. For example, in 2010, the Department of Defense established Task Force 2010 in an effort to ensure that U.S.-funded contracts did not support the insurgency, and it created Task Force Shafafiyat to focus on the intersection of corruption with the narcotics trade and the insurgency. While creating and supporting these task forces was difficult, given the many competing military demands throughout Afghanistan, they were an essential step toward addressing a major problem that threatens to undermine the entire reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

Maintaining these task forces and other initiatives to stem corruption will grow increasingly complex as the U.S. military drawdown accelerates and the Afghan government takes on additional responsibilities. To help determine how the U.S. government is preparing to handle these challenges, I am requesting answers to the following questions:

1) What actions has your command taken in response to the recommendations included in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis anti/counter-corruption report?

2) What is the current status of and what are the future plans for the U.S. or international advisors assigned to improve the effectiveness of the Inspectors General of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior?

3) What is the current status of and what are the future plans for the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – Afghanistan (CJIATFA) and its subordinate units (Task Force Nexus, Task Force 2010, Major Crimes Task Force, Task Force Shafafiyat, and Afghan Threat Finance Cell)?

4) Do the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan have a comprehensive plan for combating corruption in the post-transition period? If so, please provide a copy of that plan.

Please provide your response no later than August 14, 2014. I am submitting this request pursuant to my authority under Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Please provide the requested information to Jack Mitchell, Director of the Office of Special Projects, at [email_address] or [phone number]. Please contact him if you have any questions.

Thank you for your cooperation. I look forward to your response and working with you in support of our nation’s critical mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
For Afghanistan Reconstruction

CC: General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, U.S. Central Command
MEMORANDUM FOR United States Central Command Inspector General (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621


1. References:
   b. Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – Afghanistan (CJIATF-A) Response Memorandum to the SIGAR Alert Letter (ENCL).

2. I have reviewed the SIGAR Alert Letter (1.a) and the response from CJIATF-A (1.b), and agree with their assessment that the Resolute Support mission will rely on an evolving “Essential Function” framework to combat corruption.

3. Point of contact for this memorandum is Mr. Richard C. Flippo, DSN [REDACTED].

Encl
CJIATF-A Response Memo, 18 Sep 14

JEFFREY N. COLT
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commander – Support
United States Forces - Afghanistan
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and
Commander, International Security Assistance Force

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1 Department of Defense, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), division of Joint Staff J-7 (Joint Force Development), "Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study," February 28, 2014.
1) What actions has your command taken in response to the recommendations included in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis anti/counter-corruption report?

2) What is the current status of and what are the future plans for the U.S. or international advisors assigned to improve the effectiveness of the Inspectors General of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior?

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Thank you for your cooperation. I look forward to your response and working with you in support of our nation’s critical mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
For Afghanistan Reconstruction

CC: General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, U.S. Central Command
SUBJECT: Responses to SIGAR’s 31 July 2014 Letter of Inquiry to General Dunford, COMISAF

Mr. John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
For Afghanistan Reconstruction

Dear Mr. Sopko:

Thank you for your interest in ISAF’s challenges with respect to corruption in GIRoA as well as your support in ensuring the decisions and investments related to our mission are wisely implemented to achieve our national objectives in Afghanistan.

Please find below responses to your specific inquiries included in the above-referenced letter, which are repeated for convenience. Please also note that ISAF is under new leadership, with GEN John Campbell, U.S. Army, assuming command on 26 August 2014. Consequently, the disposition of the command with respect to anti- and counter-corruption (CAC) efforts may change, and we will endeavor to keep you apprised of any significant changes in these critical areas.

1. What actions has your command taken in response to the recommendations included in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis anti/counter-corruption report?
   a. The JCOA Operationalizing Counter/Anti-corruption Study includes “Study Findings” and “Recommendations for Operationalizing CAC.”
      i. The three major findings described the causes of corruption and the misfeasance that has resulted in a culture of impunity on the part of GIRoA. Significantly, the fact that “lack of unity of effort reduces the effectiveness of CAC operations” and “lack of political will on the part of GIRoA rendered almost all counter-corruption efforts moot.”
      1. The command recognizes that “unity of effort” is the factor most relevant to ISAF as it is one area under our control. CJIATF-A has been the lead for CAC, and the ISAF plan has been for CAC to devolve into two “essential function” areas in the Resolute Support Mission, which along with oversight of the MoD and MoI PBPES will come under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance, a NATO position. Unity of effort in CAC operations will rely on coordination across the two staff elements manning these essential functions. The former CJIATF-Shafafiya now runs Essential Function 2 – Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) as EF2/TAO. Their mission focuses on Transparency, Accountability and Oversight through training, advising, and assisting the Ministries of Defense and Interior in establishing Ministerial Internal Control Programs (MICP) within each Ministry’s Inspector General Directorate. Under the current transition plan, CJIATF-A will
transfer C2 of the MCTF MT to the Rule of Law Essential Function. MCTF enables the criminal investigation and prosecution of GIRoA corruption cases.

2. ISAF recognizes the factor of political will, and should address that issue with the new GIRoA administration.

ii. Likewise, the “Plan, Organize, and Operate” section of the Recommendations covers the areas most relevant to ISAF, particularly the paragraph “Enable focused CAC leadership.”

1. CJIATF-A is currently scheduled to terminate as of 31 October 2014. The plan for each of the capabilities currently organized under the command and control of CJIATF-A is specified in paragraph 3 below.

2. Due in part to force structure changes being made to meet the 9800 cap for US military forces in Afghanistan, force structure dedicated to CAC will reside within the TAA effort, discussed below.

b. In addition to the general findings and recommendations, the JCOA study made ten recommendations specific to the ANSF Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisory effort. These recommendations were considered for incorporation into “Essential Functions” that will lead the train, advise, and assist (“TAA”) mission of RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RSM), which will replace the ISAF mission effective on 1 January 2015. Incorporation of the TAA recommendations are discussed in paragraph 2 below.

2. What is the current status of, and what are the future plans for, the U.S. or international advisors assigned to improve the effectiveness of the Inspectors General of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior?

a. Currently, our TAO advisors are working daily with their Afghan counterparts in the MoD, MoI, and GS IG offices. The senior advisors are focused on a “full-court press” for each of their counterparts to accept and establish a comprehensive Ministerial Internal Controls Program (MICP) within each of their directorates. TAO believes that establishing a comprehensive MICP will go far in ensuring critical processes are developed, implemented, and adhered to. TAO’s desired end state is a comprehensive and sustainable MoI and MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program (MICP) that informs GIRoA, NATO, and international stakeholders of transparency, accountability and oversight in accordance with best practices and forms the foundation for an effective counter and anti-corruption system.

b. According to MoD reporting, they have an IG structure in place and most of the IG process in execution. There is still room for further development and greater effectiveness. MoD is reportedly in the early stages of developing their internal control program. According to advisor reports, MoI significantly lags MoD in both areas due to a lack of leadership commitment and involvement in high-level corruption.

c. Essential Function - TAO assesses they will reach their train, advise, and assist goals of an effective MoD IG and internal controls program by the end of CY 2016 if there is TAO buy-in by all levels of leadership from POA through the operational units.

d. Essential Function - TAO has concerns about MoI reaching their IG and internal controls program by the end of CY 2016 due to their current leadership. EF2/TAO, whose leader is a Danish brigadier general who will be replaced by another Dane in December, is hopeful that new MoI leadership will better support TAO within the entire MoI.
3. What is the current status of and what are the future plans for the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-Afghanistan (CJIATF-A) and its subordinate units (Task Force Nexus, Task Force 2010, Major Crimes Task Force, Task Force Shafafiyat, and Afghan Threat Finance Cell)?

a. CJIATF-A is currently scheduled to terminate on 31 October 2014. CJIATF-A’s subordinate units include TF Nexus, TF 2010 and the Major Crimes Task Force mentoring team. CJIATF-A coordinates with, and exercises a degree of administrative control of, ATFC.

b. TF Nexus terminated their organization on 01 September 2014. TF Shafafiyat has been renamed the TAO EAG and has been reassigned to CSTC-A since July 2013. Effective with this reassignment, TAO has only informally coordinated with, but does not report to, CJIATF-A. TAO EAG is an “essential function” under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance (DCOS SA)/CSTC-A during the Resolute Support mission.

c. TF 2010, whose “counter-contracting with the enemy” capabilities are required by statute for “contingency operations,” will be transferred to either US Central Command or US Forces-Afghanistan on 31 Oct 14.

d. The MCTF mentoring team, which consists of six personnel, will transfer to an essential function under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance (DCOS SA) on 30 Oct 14.

e. The future of ATFC, which is a CENTCOM asset, is undetermined but recent decisions indicate that it will not have a military presence in Afghanistan.

f. The JIATF-A structure and mission, including the potential for continuation, is under review by GEN Campbell, the new COM. If CJIATF-A continues, TF 2010 and MCTF MT will likely remain under CJIATF-A. Although the COM has expressed an interest in the counter-nexus and counter-threat finance missions, decisions to terminate TF Nexus and eliminate ATFC’s military manning in Afghanistan after December 2014 are not expected to be reversed unless there is relief from the 9800 “boots on ground” cap.

4. Do the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan have a comprehensive plan for combating corruption in the post-transition period? If so, please provide a copy of that plan.

a. ISAF does not have a comprehensive plan for combating corruption in the GIRoA as it has limited its focus to two areas in the ASI: transparency and “predatory corruption,” which has been defined as the solicitation of bribes.

b. ISAF has deferred to the international community, i.e., civilian agencies, to address other areas of corruption, including “grand” or public corruption.
c. ISAF will terminate and the Resolute Support mission, effective 1 January 2015, will be responsible for any post-transition activities. The RS mission will include "essential function" areas referenced above, with the same focus on ASI transparency and predatory corruption.

5. Please do not hesitate to contact me at [redacted] or DSN [redacted] if you have any further questions.

BERT K. MIZUSAWA  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander, CJIA TF-A