

SIGAR

**Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction**

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

**DOD Procured Non-Intrusive Inspection
Equipment: \$9.48 Million Worth of
Equipment Sits Unused at Borders in
Afghanistan**



NOVEMBER 2017

SIGAR-18-14-SP



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

November 27, 2017

The Honorable James Mattis
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

The Honorable Elaine Duke
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security

Mr. Kevin McAleenan
Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Improving the Afghan government's ability to sustain itself with reduced donor support has been a key priority for both the U.S. government and international donors. The collection of customs duties on goods entering Afghanistan is one of the largest revenue sources for the Afghan government, and improving the efficient and effective collection of custom duties is important to the government's long-term sustainability.

By procuring and installing non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment at Afghan borders and customs depots, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Border Management Task force (BMTF) hoped to improve the Afghan government's ability to reduce commercial smuggling, and increase the efficiency of the customs process and domestic revenue collection. We conducted this review to identify the amount of DOD funds spent to procure, operate, and maintain NII equipment installed at Afghan border crossings and customs depots, and to examine the extent to which that equipment is being maintained and used for its intended purpose.

A response from DOD showed that, in 2006, CENTCOM procured eight pieces of NII equipment at a cost of \$12.1 million. Over the course of several years, the equipment was installed at five locations across Afghanistan, and the BMTF provided assistance and training in the use of the equipment through October 2014. In order to maintain the NII equipment, CENTCOM also provided funding for contracts with Rapiscan (the equipment manufacturer) to maintain the equipment, which amounted to approximately 15-20 percent of the unit purchase price per year, or \$10.8 million to \$14.4 million in additional maintenance costs.¹ CENTCOM stopped funding maintenance costs in 2014, when the BMTF ceased operations in Afghanistan and the equipment was formally turned over to the Afghan government.

In March and April 2017, we conducted site inspections at each of the five locations and examined the condition of the NII equipment. Unfortunately, we found that only one location, the Kabul airport, had any functional CENTCOM-purchased NII equipment that was being used for its intended purpose. None of the equipment, valued at \$9.48 million, at any of the other locations was operational. We interviewed Afghan government officials at each location to determine why the equipment was not being used. Afghan officials we spoke with cited technical and software problems, maintenance issues/broken parts, and a lack of capable operators as reasons for the non-functional equipment. While Afghan officials at most of the locations stated that they or their

¹ The approximate 15-20 percent maintenance cost information methodology was provided by a Rapiscan official since the NII equipment maintenance contracts were not made available by either CENTCOM or Rapiscan. CENTCOM further noted that the purchase price of the NII systems included one year of warranty and maintenance support.

staff had received training on the use of the equipment, an official at one location noted that they had not been trained to maintain or trouble-shoot even minor problems. At three locations (Torkham, Weesh-Chaman, and Shir Khan Bandar), Afghan officials stated that the equipment had been inoperable for two or more years. Our site inspections showed that, outside of Kabul, the equipment became inoperable nearly as soon as BMTF mentors left the border locations and the equipment was turned over to the Afghan government.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and DHS for comment on October 30, 2017. We received written comments from DOD, CENTCOM, on November 14, 2017. In its comments, CENTCOM pointed out that the purchase price of the NII equipment included “one year of warranty and maintenance support” and provided a revised estimate for the total costs borne by CENTCOM to maintain the equipment; we revised the draft in accordance with CENTCOM’s calculation. CENTCOM also questioned our calculation of the total U.S. government investment to procure, operate, maintain, and train Afghan government officials in the use of the equipment because BMTF had multiple roles at the Afghan borders. We are very clear in our report that the BMTF “attempted to reduce corruption through mentorship and training classes focused on building the capabilities of Afghan government officials at these locations to properly use NII equipment, stem corrupt activities, identify suspicious cargo, and conduct routine border operations. Many of the techniques and much of the equipment provided by the BMTF could be used not only for counter narcotics activities, but also for efforts to reduce commercial smuggling.” Moreover, because many of the training courses and mentorship activities provided by BMTF were cross-functional and broadly applicable for border activities, neither we, nor CENTCOM, could accurately break down BMTF activities into discreet cost categories. Therefore, we believe CENTCOM’s assertion that “only a small fraction would have been NII related” is unsupported. Finally, CENTCOM requested that we revise the title of the report “to reflect the lack of Afghan government will or capacity to sustain the program as a lesson learned for future reconstruction efforts.” However, we believe the title of the report appropriately captures the contents of the report and the condition of the equipment at the time of our work. DOD’s written comments are reproduced in appendix I.

We also received technical comments from DHS on November 15, 2017, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan; at inland customs depots and border crossing points throughout Afghanistan; and in Washington, D.C. from September 2016 through August 2017, in accordance with SIGAR’s quality control standards. These standards require that we carry out work with integrity, objectivity, and independence, and provide information that is factually accurate and reliable. For more information on the policies and procedures and quality control standards for conducting special project work, please see SIGAR’s website (www.SIGAR.mil). SIGAR performed this special project under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Should you or your staff have any questions about this project, please contact Mr. Matthew Dove, Director of Special Projects, at (703) 545-6051 or matthew.d.dove.civ@mail.mil.

Sincerely,



John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

As of June 30, 2017, the United States had appropriated approximately \$119.74 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since fiscal year 2002.² In our January 11, 2017, *High Risk List* report, we found that corruption continues to be one of the most serious threats to the U.S.-funded Afghanistan reconstruction effort, and that much of the resources that the United States has committed to Afghanistan reconstruction projects and programs is at risk of being wasted because the Afghans cannot sustain them—financially or functionally—without massive, continued donor support.³

Afghanistan's projected domestic revenues for the current fiscal year are only expected to account for about 38 percent of the Afghan government's budgeted costs, with donors (of which the U.S. government is the largest) providing the remaining 62 percent.⁴ Improving the Afghan government's ability to sustain itself with reduced donor support has been a key priority for both the U.S. government and international donors. The collection of customs duties on goods entering Afghanistan is one of the largest revenue sources for the Afghan government, and improving the efficient and effective collection of custom duties is important to the government's long-term sustainability.⁵ In previous reports, SIGAR has raised concerns about the negative impact of corrupt practices and inefficient systems on the Afghan government's customs revenues. For example, in an April 2014 audit report, we reported that the Border Management Task Force (BMTF), a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)-funded task force overseen by the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP),⁶ provided non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment to support counter narcotics activities, reduce commercial smuggling, and increase the efficiency of the customs process and domestic revenue collection.⁷

In March 2015, SIGAR asked CENTCOM and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) for information related to the equipment purchased on behalf of the BMTF for installation and use at border crossing points in Afghanistan.⁸ In response to SIGAR's request, CSTC-A reported that it was not aware of any efforts to safeguard NII equipment, that it did not provide on-budget funding for the operations, maintenance, or security of the equipment, and that its personnel had not visited border crossing points to assess usage, security, or maintenance of the NII equipment since January 1, 2014.

We initiated this review to identify the amount of DOD funds spent to procure, operate, and maintain NII equipment installed at Afghan border crossings and customs depots, and to examine the extent to which that equipment is being maintained and used for its intended purpose.

To complete our review, we obtained and analyzed relevant documents and emails, and interviewed officials from DOD and CENTCOM, CBP, the NII equipment manufacturer (Rapiscan), and the Afghan government. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan; at inland customs depots and border

² SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, July 30, 2017, p. 65.

³ SIGAR, *High Risk List*, January 2017, p. 26.

⁴ SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, April 30, 2017, p.62.

⁵ For the first 11 months of Afghan fiscal year 1395 (December 22, 2015 thru November 21, 2016), customs duties accounted for 30 percent or about \$380 million of the total amount of taxation and customs revenue collected by the Afghan government.

⁶ The BMTF was established in 2006 to assist the Afghan government in securing its borders by providing expertise related to customs and border operations. By November, 2014 all BMTF personnel had left Afghanistan.

⁷ SIGAR, *Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenues as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan*, SIGAR 14-47-AR, April 15, 2014, pp. 5.


⁸ SIGAR, *Inquiry Letter: Afghan Customs Revenue; Questions for CENTCOM and CSTC-A*, March 5, 2015.

crossing points throughout Afghanistan; and in Washington, D.C. from September 2016 through August 2017, in accordance with SIGAR's quality control standards. These standards require that we carry out work with integrity, objectivity, and independence, and provide information that is factually accurate and reliable.

CENTCOM PROCURED EIGHT PIECES OF NII EQUIPMENT VALUED AT APPROXIMATELY \$12.1 MILLION

CENTCOM purchased eight pieces of NII equipment in 2006 to assist in the interdiction of illicit narcotics, precursor chemicals, and other illicit goods at border locations throughout Afghanistan and at the Kabul airport. The equipment was installed at five locations in Afghanistan. Figure 1 shows the location of the NII equipment purchased by CENTCOM.

Figure 1 - Border Crossings and Customs Depots where BMTF Oversaw CENTCOM-Procured NII Equipment



Source: Army Geospatial Command.

Table 1 lists the location, type of equipment, purchase cost, the Afghan government entity responsible for operating the equipment and the purchase year.

Table 1 - Location, Type, and Cost of NII Equipment Procured by CENTCOM for Installation in Afghanistan

| Location | Equipment ^a | Unit Cost | Operated By | Purchase Year |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------|---|---------------|
| Kabul Airport Cargo Ramp Gate | Rapiscan GaRDS Mobile | \$1,300,000 | Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan | 2006 |
| Kabul Airport Cargo Ramp Gate | Rapiscan GaRDS Mobile | \$1,300,000 | Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan | 2006 |
| Shir Khan Bandar Border Crossing Outbound | Rapiscan GaRDS Gantry | \$860,000 | Afghan Border Police | 2006 |
| Shir Khan Bandar Border Crossing Inbound | Rapiscan Eagle G6000 | \$2,800,000 | Afghan Border Police | 2006 |
| Torkham Border Crossing | Rapiscan Eagle G6000 | \$2,800,000 | Afghan Customs Department | 2006 |
| Islam Qala Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Gantry | \$860,000 | Afghan Customs Department | 2006 |
| Weesh-Chaman Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Mobile | \$1,300,000 | Afghan Border Police | 2006 |
| Weesh-Chaman Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Gantry | \$860,000 | Afghan Border Police | 2006 |
| Total Cost | | \$ 12,080,000 | | |

Source: DOD data.

Notes: ^a According to a DOD official these scanners were selected because each scanner configuration has a specific function: GaRDS Gantry is semi stationary and inspects large vehicles and cargo containers for illicit narcotics, explosives and contraband. GaRDS Mobile is the mobile version of the GaRDS Gantry and can be deployed to various locations routinely targeting trucks, cargo containers, and passenger vehicles. Rapiscan Eagle G6000 inspects highly dense cargo and isolates contraband in detail. Each machine was purchased to accomplish a specific mission at their location.

CENTCOM Provided Additional Funds for Equipment Maintenance and Operational Training of Afghan Personnel

BMTF advisers at border crossing points and at inland customs depots, at a cost of approximately \$36.5 million in CENTCOM funding, attempted to reduce corruption through mentorship and training classes focused on building the capabilities of Afghan government officials at these locations to properly use NII equipment, stem corrupt activities, identify suspicious cargo, and conduct routine border operations. Many of the techniques and much of the equipment provided by the BMTF could be used not only for counter narcotics activities, but also for efforts to reduce commercial smuggling,

which could result in increased efficiency in customs processes and higher domestic revenue collection.⁹ BMTF reports showed that BMTF mentors held more than 7,000 training sessions between 2010 and 2013, and assisted the Afghan Customs Department in conducting more than 670 seizures during the same period. In our April 2014 audit, we found that the Afghan government had praised the BMTF for its efficiency, mentoring capabilities, and the equipment it provided.¹⁰

CENTCOM also provided funding for contracts with Rapiscan to maintain the NII equipment. In response to our request for maintenance contract documentation, however, CENTCOM officials told us that they were unable to provide the information because they did not know the associated task order numbers. As a result, we contacted Rapiscan and interviewed officials to request maintenance documentation. However, as of September 7, 2017, Rapiscan has also been unable to provide contract documentation showing maintenance cost data. Rapiscan officials did state that the estimated maintenance costs equate to approximately 15-20 percent of the unit purchase price per year. Therefore, because we know that CENTCOM purchased the NII equipment in 2006 and turned over the equipment to the Afghan government between 2012 and 2014, we are able to estimate the approximate costs CENTCOM incurred for maintaining the equipment. From 2007-2014, we estimate that CENTCOM provided between \$10.8 million and \$14.4 million to maintain the NII equipment at the five locations in Afghanistan.¹¹ Table 2 shows the estimated maintenance costs for the NII equipment.

Table 2 - Estimated Maintenance Costs of NII Equipment Procured by CENTCOM for Use in Afghanistan

| Location | Equipment | Unit Cost | Purchase Year | Turnover Year | Estimated Maintenance cost per Year (15-20% of unit cost) | Total Estimated Maintenance Cost |
|---|--------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Kabul Airport Cargo Ramp Gate | Rapiscan | \$1,300,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$195,000- | \$1,170,000- |
| | GaRDS Mobile | | | | \$260,000 | \$1,560,000 |
| Kabul Airport Cargo Ramp Gate | Rapiscan | \$1,300,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$195,000- | \$1,170,000- |
| | GaRDS Mobile | | | | \$260,000 | \$1,560,000 |
| Shir Khan Bandar Border Crossing Outbound | Rapiscan | \$860,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$129,000- | \$774,000- |
| | GaRDS Gantry | | | | \$172,000 | \$1,032,000 |

⁹ BMTF advisers were funded through a contract executed by the Army Acquisition Center. This contract, awarded to CACI, Inc., provided for a wide range of counter-narcotics activities in a variety of countries, including the activities of the BMTF in Afghanistan. CACI, Inc., in turn, subcontracted responsibility of providing advisers for the BMTF to Fedsys, Inc.

¹⁰ SIGAR, *Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenues as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan*, SIGAR 14-47-AR, April 15, 2014, p. 9.

¹¹ According to CENTCOM, the purchase price of the NII equipment included one year of warranty and maintenance support. In addition to the eight NII scanners purchased by CENTCOM, CENTCOM also provided funding to maintain five additional Rapiscan NII scanners purchased by other donors, and co-located with the CENTCOM-purchased equipment, until 2014. Even though we requested maintenance cost information from DOD and the NII equipment manufacturer, Rapiscan Systems, neither could produce the information for our review.

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------|------|------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Shir Khan Bandar Border Crossing Inbound | Rapiscan Eagle G6000 | \$2,800,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$420,000- \$560,000 | \$2,520,000- \$3,360,000 |
| Torkham Border Crossing | Rapiscan Eagle G6000 | \$2,800,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$420,000- \$560,000 | \$2,520,000- \$3,360,000 |
| Islam Qala Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Gantry | \$860,000 | 2006 | 2013 | \$129,000- \$172,000 | \$774,000- \$1,032,000 |
| Weesh-Chaman Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Mobile | \$1,300,000 | 2006 | 2012 | \$195,000- \$260,000 | \$975,000- \$1,300,000 |
| Weesh-Chaman Border Crossing | Rapiscan GaRDS Gantry | \$860,000 | 2006 | 2014 | \$129,000- \$172,000 | \$903,000- \$1,204,000 |
| Total Estimated Maintenance Cost | | | | | \$10,806,000 - \$14,408,000 | |

Source: SIGAR analysis based on estimated unit maintenance costs.

Most of the NII Equipment at Afghan Borders Sits Unused and Broken

In March and April 2017, we conducted site inspections at each of the locations listed in Tables 1 and 2 to determine the condition of the NII equipment purchased by CENTCOM and the extent to which the equipment was helping the Afghan government decrease counter narcotics and commercial smuggling, and increase the efficiency of the customs process and domestic revenue collection. Unfortunately, we found that only one location, the Kabul airport, had any functional CENTCOM-purchased NII equipment that was being used for its intended purpose. None of the CENTCOM-purchased NII equipment at any of the other locations was operational. We interviewed Afghan government officials at each location to determine why the equipment was not being used. Afghan officials we spoke with cited technical and software problems, maintenance issues/broken parts, and a lack of capable operators as reasons for the non-functional equipment. While Afghan officials at most of the locations stated that they or their staff had received training on the use of the equipment, at one location an official noted that they had not been trained to maintain or troubleshoot even minor problems. At three locations (Torkham, Weesh-Chaman, and Shir Khan Bandar), Afghan officials stated that the equipment had been inoperable for two or more years. Our site inspections showed that, outside of Kabul, the equipment became inoperable nearly as soon as BMTF mentors left the border locations and the equipment was turned over to the Afghan government. Photos 1 – 4 show the unused equipment in various locations.

Photo 1 – Inoperable and Unused Scanner at Torkham Border Crossing Riddled with Bullet Holes



Source: SIGAR photo, April 9, 2017.

Photo 2 – Inoperable and Unused Scanner at Islam Qala Border Crossing



Source: SIGAR photo, March 13, 2017.

Photo 3 – Inoperable and Unused Scanner at Weesh-Chaman Border Crossing



Source: SIGAR photo, April 2, 2017.

Photo 4 – Inoperable and Unused Scanner at Shir Khan Bandar Border Crossing



Source: SIGAR photo, April 17, 2017.

CONCLUSION

CENTCOM purchased eight pieces of NII equipment that was supposed to assist the Afghan government reduce smuggling, and improve its ability to efficiently and effectively collect customs duties—a key source of government income. The total U.S. government investment to procure, operate, maintain, and train Afghan government officials in the use of the equipment is between \$59 million and \$62.6 million (including the \$12 million for initial procurement, \$36.5 million for BMTF operations which included NII operation and training, and 10.8 million to \$14.4 million in maintenance costs). While this was a well-intended program, it appears that much of this investment was wasted because the NII equipment sits unused at all but one location. This conclusion echoes findings from our April 2014 audit report, where we found that the presence of U.S. mentors, the BMTF, improved operations at Afghan borders, but their absence usually resulted in a reversion to inefficient (or corrupt and criminal) practices. With no presence at the Afghan borders since 2014,

the U.S. investment in NII equipment—and the hopes for using that equipment for meaningful improvements—relies on the Afghan government. Unfortunately, at this point, it appears that the Afghan government has been unable or unwilling to sustain that investment. Worse, without the use of the NII equipment, there is little to prevent the rampant commercial smuggling and cross-border narcotics trade that has continually plagued Afghan borders.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and DHS for comment on October 30, 2017. We received written comments from DOD, CENTCOM, on November 14, 2017. In its comments, CENTCOM pointed out that the purchase price of the NII equipment included “one year of warranty and maintenance support” and provided a revised estimate for the total costs borne by CENTCOM to maintain the equipment; we revised the draft in accordance with CENTCOM’s calculation. CENTCOM also questioned our calculation of the total U.S. government investment to procure, operate, maintain, and train Afghan government officials in the use of the equipment because BMTF had multiple roles at the Afghan borders, and “only a small fraction would have been NII related.” We are very clear in our report that the BMTF “attempted to reduce corruption through mentorship and training classes focused on building the capabilities of Afghan government officials at these locations to properly use NII equipment, stem corrupt activities, identify suspicious cargo, and conduct routine border operations. Many of the techniques and much of the equipment provided by the BMTF could be used not only for counter narcotics activities, but also for efforts to reduce commercial smuggling, which could result in increased efficiency in customs processes and higher domestic revenue collection.” Moreover, because many of the training courses and mentorship activities provided by BMTF were cross-functional and broadly applicable for border activities aimed at reducing commercial smuggling and corrupt activities, neither we, nor CENTCOM, could accurately break down BMTF activities into discreet cost categories. Therefore, we believe CENTCOM’s assertion that “only a small fraction would have been NII related” is unsupported. Finally, CENTCOM requested that we revise the title of the report “to reflect the lack of Afghan government will or capacity to sustain the program as a lesson learned for future reconstruction efforts.” However, we believe the title of the report appropriately captures the contents of the report and the condition of the equipment at the time of our work. DOD’s written comments are reproduced in appendix I.

We also received technical comments from DHS on November 15, 2017, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

APPENDIX I - DOD COMMENTS



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

13 November 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND INSPECTOR
GENERAL (CCIG)


SUBJECT: Response to SIGAR SP-146 Draft Report, "Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
Equipment at Border Crossings" (Tasker USCC1730357661)

1. CCIG requested CCJ3-IAG-CN Division conduct a technical review of the draft SIGAR report and provide comments as necessary. The following information is provided for consideration.
2. ISSUE 1: SIGAR estimates total maintenance costs for the NII equipment at between \$12,618,000 and \$16,824,000 based on seven years of purchased maintenance. However, the purchase price of the systems included one year of warranty and maintenance support. Using SIGAR's methodology the maintenance estimate for the NII would be between \$10,815,000 and \$14,421,000.
3. ISSUE 2: SIGAR concludes that, "...The total U.S. government investment to procure, operate, maintain, and train Afghan government officials in the use of the equipment is between \$61 million and \$65 million (including the \$12 million for initial procurement, \$36.5 million for BMTF operations which included NII operation and training, and \$12.8-16.8 million in maintenance costs)." This statement is not correct. While NII was a facet of the Border Management Task Force (BMTF), BMTF was created to coordinate and implement U.S. Embassy Kabul's Border Management Initiative (BMI). The BMI was a comprehensive effort to develop Afghan customs and border security institutions. The most significant activities of BMTF were to mentor and train personnel, and create a customs academy to ensure professionalization of the force. Of the \$38.5 million for BMTF operations only a small fraction would have been NII related. CENTCOM requests the costs of NII be identified as the procurement and sustainment costs only.
4. ISSUE 3: The title of the report, "DOD Procured Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment: \$9.48 Million Worth of Equipment Sits Unused at Borders in Afghanistan," hints at programmatic waste. The opposite was true. BMTF was a successful program and if not for the U.S. Government policy decision in 2011 to withdraw from

Afghanistan, would likely have continued to develop and professionalize the Afghan customs and border security institutions. The NII equipment was procured in 2006 fielded in 2007. While it is difficult to ascertain directly, a DHS OIG report (OIG-15-53, 25 March 2015) estimates the useful life expectancy of a large NII system is ten (10) years. Based on that estimate, the NII procured in 2006, and under the best of conditions, would have reached its useful life expectancy in 2017. Without U.S. Government support to re-capitalize the program, or Afghan Government financial support, those NII systems would have likely been at the end of their useful life expectancy. CENTCOM recommends SIGAR re-title the report to reflect the lack of Afghan government will or capacity to sustain the program as a lesson learned for future reconstruction efforts.

5. GENERAL COMMENT: The report's conclusion fully captures many of the problems the U.S. and Coalition governments had, and continue to have, with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, "...*Unfortunately, at this point, it appears that the Afghan government has been unable or unwilling to sustain that investment....*" CENTCOM concurs with that assessment.

6. My technical expert for your questions or concerns is Mr. Sean Dardeen (sean.p.dardeen.civ@mail.smil.mil or phone at DSN 312-529-5494).



RANDY P. OCKMAN
GS-15, DAFC
Division Chief

This project was conducted
under project code SP-146.

SIGAR's Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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