

SIGAR

**Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction**

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

INFORMATION ON USAID'S STABILITY
IN KEY AREAS PROGRAM – WESTERN
REGION, AFGHANISTAN



JANUARY 2019

SIGAR 19-11-SP



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

January 16, 2019

The Honorable Mark Green
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

Ms. Karen Freeman
Assistant to the Administrator,
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, USAID

Peter Natiello
USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan

Dear Administrator Green, Ms. Freeman, and Mr. Natiello,

Since 2003, USAID has spent at least \$2.3 billion on stabilization programs intended to extend the reach of the Afghan government to unstable areas, provide income generation opportunities, build trust between citizens and their government, and encourage local populations to take an active role in community development.¹ USAID's Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) West program was one such effort. SIKA-West was intended to reduce the impact of the insurgency in western Afghanistan by promoting good governance in unstable and high-threat districts and increasing the Afghan public's confidence in the Afghan government to lead the country after the security transition. The SIKA-West program was one of four regional SIKA programs implemented by USAID between December 2011 and September 2015. On January 29, 2012, USAID awarded AECOM International Development, Inc. (AECOM) a \$63 million, 18-month cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to implement projects in the SIKA-West region. After extending the duration of the program, USAID spent approximately \$51.6 million to implement SIKA-West.

In June 2017, SIGAR sent an inquiry letter to USAID requesting that the agency provide a complete list of SIKA projects by title, type of project, location, project status, and cost.² SIGAR used this information to categorize SIKA projects and determine the types of projects undertaken, project location, completion status, and the overall scope of SIKA operations in SIKA-West.

This fact sheet is the fourth and last in a series of reports that document SIKA's reach throughout Afghanistan, and provides detail of USAID's initiatives for the SIKA-West program.³

We provided a draft of this fact sheet to USAID on December 20, 2018. We received comments on January 13, 2019. In its comments, USAID reported that beginning in 2006 it worked in coordination with the Department of Defense and the Afghan Government to create stabilization programs to establish basic linkages between provincial government institutions and local communities. USAID reported that it has gradually shifted towards long-term capacity building to provide the technical guidance needed to help the Afghan Government deliver essential services to the people of Afghanistan. USAID's written comments are

¹ In our January 2016, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, we reported that USAID had "no plans to continue stabilization activities, and that they have not received resources from Congress for peace and security programing for FY 2015."

² SIGAR, *Inquiry Letter: Stability in Key Areas*, SIGAR 17-49-SP, June 28, 2017. USAID provided SIGAR with a total list of 6,277 SIKA projects that were implemented in the four SIKA regions between March 2012 and September 2015.

³ SIGAR, *Fact Sheet: Information on USAID's Stability in Key Areas Program-Northern Region, Afghanistan*, SIGAR-18-23-SP, January 12, 2018; SIGAR, *Fact Sheet: Information on USAID's Stability in Key Areas Program-Southern Region, Afghanistan*, SIGAR-18-53-SP, June 4, 2018; SIGAR, *Fact Sheet: Information on USAID's Stability in Key Areas Program-Eastern Region, Afghanistan*, SIGAR-19-05-SP, November 27, 2018.



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reproduced in appendix II. We also received technical comments from USAID, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We conducted our work in Washington, D.C. from March 2018 to January 2019 under the authority of Public Law 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*.

Should you or your staff have any questions about this project, please contact Benjamin Piccolo, Director of Special Projects, at benjamin.i.piccolo.civ@mail.mil or 703.545.2192.

Sincerely,

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

BACKGROUND

From September 2003 through December 2015, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent more than \$2.3 billion on stabilization activities and programs in Afghanistan. The programs were intended to solidify the U.S. military's gains in insecure areas by working with and supporting at-risk populations, extending the Afghan government's reach to unstable areas, providing job opportunities, building trust between citizens and their government, and encouraging local populations to take an active role in their development.⁴ One of these programs was the Stability in Key Areas (SIKA)-West program, which was intended to reduce the impact of the insurgency in western Afghanistan by promoting good governance in unstable and high-threat districts and by increasing the Afghan public's confidence in the Afghan government to lead the country after the security transition, as well as assist district and provincial level Afghan government officials in western Afghanistan implement community-based projects to support institutions, processes, and projects that fostered stable political, economic, and social development. Unlike other stabilization programs that focused on building the capacity of local communities to resist the influence of the Taliban, SIKA-West focused specifically on strengthening the capacity of district and provincial governments to target aspects of local instability.⁵ Between January 2012 and August 2015, SIKA-West supported provincial and district government bodies with goals of implementing Afghan-led community-based projects, and helping to build trust and legitimacy in local governments to deliver basic services and increase local economic capacity.

Several SIGAR reports and USAID-funded third-party assessments addressed efforts to assess the effectiveness of SIKA programs and other government stabilization activities.⁶ The third-party assessments funded by USAID included a March 2012, contract with Management Systems International Inc. (MSI) for the Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) program which was designed "to measure and map stabilization trends and impacts in areas such as security, rule of law, and economic activity; build a community of practice for rigorous monitoring and evaluation of Afghan reconstruction programs; and communicate lessons learned for the transition to Afghan-led sustainable development."⁷

This fact sheet is the fourth and final in a series of reports that document SIKA's reach throughout Afghanistan, and provides detail of USAID's initiatives for the SIKA-West program.⁸ In June 2017, SIGAR sent an inquiry letter to USAID requesting that the agency provide a complete list of SIKA projects by title, type, location,

⁴ In February 2010, USAID/Afghanistan formed the Stabilization Unit to unite all U.S. government stabilization planning and programs under one office. The unit's responsibilities were managing, coordinating, and monitoring and evaluating USAID's stabilization programs. In addition to SIKA, USAID's other stabilization programs in Afghanistan included the Quick Impact Projects, which concluded in 2007; the Local Governance and Community Development program, which concluded in 2011; the Community Based Stabilization Grants Program and Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative, which concluded in 2012; and the Community Development Programs, which concluded in 2013.

⁵ USAID believed that weak and ineffective local government structures fueled the insurgency and created instability, and that the lack of focused governance threatened to erode the legitimacy of provincial governments and their ability to deliver basic services. To help address instability at the local level in SIKA-West, SIKA-West's programming included programs to address factional influence, disparity in government capacity, absence of perceived legitimacy, lack of capacity and basic equipment, and problems with communication, access, and security.

⁶ SIGAR, *Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, SIGAR 18-48-LL, May 24, 2018. SIGAR, *USAID's Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives: Program Generally Achieved Its Objectives, but USAID's Lack of a Geospatial Data Policy and Standards Affected Its Implementation*, SIGAR 17-10-AR, October 26, 2016. SIGAR, *Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) Programs: After 16 Months and \$47 Million Spent, USAID Had Not Met Essential Program Objectives*, SIGAR 13-16-AR, July 29, 2013. SIGAR, *USAID Spent Almost \$400 Million on an Afghan Stabilization Project despite Uncertain Results, but Has Taken Steps to Better Assess Similar Efforts*, SIGAR 12-8-AR, April 25, 2012.

⁷ SIGAR, *USAID's Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives: Program Generally Achieved Its Objectives, but USAID's Lack of a Geospatial Data Policy and Standards Affected Its Implementation*, SIGAR Audit 17-10, October 26, 2016.

⁸ SIGAR-18-23-SP, SIGAR-18-53-SP and SIGAR 19-05-SP.

completion status, and cost.⁹ In response to our inquiry, USAID provided SIGAR with an excel spreadsheet documenting all the SIKA projects implemented in the four SIKA regions between December 2011 and September 2015, including 1,843 projects in the SIKA-West region.¹⁰ The information USAID provided concerning SIKA was generated from historical data inputted into Afghan Info, the official system of record for the SIKA program.¹¹ SIGAR used the information in Afghan Info to categorize SIKA projects to determine the types of projects that were conducted, project location, completion status, and the overall scope of SIKA operations throughout Afghanistan. USAID did not require its implementing partners to report on, and Afghan Info does not contain, the costs associated with individual SIKA projects. As a result, USAID cannot identify the specific amounts spent by USAID, through its implementing partners, for each SIKA project using historical data from Afghan Info.

While we did not assess the effectiveness of SIKA-West projects in reducing instability, this fact sheet provides information on the different types of projects conducted for stabilization operations in four provinces in western Afghanistan.¹² In conjunction with the other assessments that took a more comprehensive look at outcomes, the information contained in this report can assist decision-makers and government officials in better understanding U.S. efforts and expenditures intended to help stabilize Afghan communities.

LOCATION OF SIKA PROGRAM REGIONS

The SIKA program comprised four regional programs—East, West, South, and North—which supported USAID’s stabilization efforts across Afghanistan. SIKA programs were implemented in a total of 17 provinces across Afghanistan. USAID created the four regional SIKA programs through separate contracts costing the U.S. government over \$364 million upon contract completion.¹³ Figure 1 shows the location of each of the four SIKA regions.

⁹ SIGAR 17-49-SP.

¹⁰ The period of performance for SIKA-South began in April 2012. SIKA-North started in March 2012; SIKA-East began in December 2011; and SIKA-West began in January 2012. USAID reported a total of 1,055 projects reported for SIKA-South, 2,553 projects reported for SIKA-East, 1,843 projects reported for SIKA-West, and 825 projects reported for SIKA-North.

¹¹ According to USAID, Afghan Info allowed USAID to track the location of projects to the nearest geospatial coordinate, monitor the performance of development projects, and meet the Afghan government’s requirement that USAID provide information to the Afghan Ministry of Finance in order to track ongoing and completed donor-sponsored development activities. USAID required that implementing partners record SIKA program information into Afghan Info on a quarterly basis.

¹² In May 2018, we reported that the \$4.7 billion spent on “stabilization programs” in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2017 was largely unsuccessful in building and reforming government institutions in Afghanistan, and large sums of U.S. stabilization dollars often exacerbated conflicts, enabled corruption, and bolstered support for insurgents. See, SIGAR, *Stabilization: Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, SIGAR 18-48-LL, May 24, 2018.

¹³ AECOM International Development, Inc. received the contracts for SIKA-East, SIKA-West, and SIKA-South, and DAI received the contract for SIKA-North. Each of the contracts had an 18- month base period of performance with additional 18-month option periods.

Figure 1 - Location of SIKA Program Regions



Source: SIGAR Audit 13-16/Stability in Key Areas.


In January 2012, USAID awarded AECOM International Development, Inc. (AECOM) a \$63 million, 18-month cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to implement projects in the SIKA-West region. In January 2013, USAID extended SIKA-West's initial period of performance by 7 months, from July 2013 to February 2014. The Total Estimated Cost of the award to AECOM to implement projects in the SIKA-West region was reduced to approximately \$51.8 million from \$63 million. The total disbursement for SIKA-West was approximately \$51.6 million.

During the three years of the SIKA-West program, USAID and AECOM implemented SIKA projects in four provinces in the SIKA-West area of responsibility. These provinces were selected for SIKA activities because they contained Key Terrain Districts (KTD), which were insecure and unstable areas identified by U.S. military commanders to be the most critical to the success of the U.S. counterinsurgency mission.¹⁴ SIKA-West projects were implemented in KTDs to support the U.S. military's counterinsurgency strategy.¹⁵ In total, USAID and AECOM executed SIKA projects in 19 districts across the four provinces. See figure 2 for the location of SIKA-West program operations.

¹⁴ KTDs were developed by the International Security Assistance Force and the government of Afghanistan in 2010. KTDs were areas where the bulk of the population was concentrated, and that contained centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world. These districts roughly follow the line of the three major highways in Afghanistan through the most densely populated portions of the country. A total of 80 KTDs and an additional 41 area of interest districts were identified.

¹⁵ USAID required that AECOM use community-based contracting, known as the Kandahar Model, when implementing projects in SIKA-West. The Kandahar Model emphasized (1) the use of local labor, (2) avoidance of red tape, and (3) less reliance on sub-contractors to enable the quick delivery of services. This approach was designed to help local government bodies gain experience with project prioritization, implementation, and monitoring, as well as financial management.

Figure 2 - Location of SIK-West Program Operations



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID project data.

AECOM implemented on behalf of USAID a total of 1,843 projects in Baghdis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat provinces, and completed at least 1,660 of them. According to USAID data, throughout the four provinces a total of 45 SIK-West projects (2 percent) were cancelled. We were not able to determine whether 138 projects (7 percent) were completed by the time the SIK-West contract expired.¹⁶ Of the 1,660 completed projects, approximately 33 percent, or 542, were located in Herat. The remaining 67 percent were distributed between the other three provinces, with Ghor having the smallest percentage of SIK projects (14%, or 239 total). See figure 3 for the total number of SIK projects completed in SIK-West.

SIK-WEST PROJECTS BY PROVINCE

We categorized SIK-West projects into two main categories—“hard projects” and “soft projects.” Hard projects consisted of infrastructure-focused activities, such as the construction of roads, culverts, and canals.¹⁷ Soft projects consisted of capacity-building activities, such as vocational training, sponsoring youth councils, education, and conflict resolution, and focused on reducing instability by building trust in local government bodies.¹⁸ Figure 3 shows the percentage of total projects in each SIK-West province.

¹⁶ Based on data provided by USAID, we considered projects as complete or incomplete. For this fact sheet, the term “completed projects” does not include those projects that were either cancelled or indeterminate.

¹⁷ According to the USAID-procured MISTI evaluation, projects to build or rehabilitate roads were greatly valued by the community, improved access to government offices, and improved access to medical facilities, schools, and farms. Infrastructure projects, such as the building of protection walls or providing solar panels and drinking water were also valued by the community, as they provided protection over farm lands and enhanced local community services.

¹⁸ According to the USAID-procured MISTI evaluation, it was recommended that each SIK program include gender programming in its activities because research had found that women have the greatest impact on reducing support for the Taliban and other anti-government elements. According to MISTI, SIK-West had mixed results with gender programming.

Approximately 73 percent of the completed projects in SIKAWest (1,219 projects) were soft projects, and approximately 27 percent of the projects were hard projects (441 projects). Figure 4 shows the types of SIKAWest projects completed in SIKAWest.


In its final evaluation, MISTI found that in general SIKAWest program efforts were unsuccessful in reducing instability in Afghanistan, but helped to improve community cohesion and resilience.¹⁹

However, there were several specific observations, both positive and negative, with the SIKAWest program. For example, in its SIKAWest Final Performance Evaluation, MISTI reported that “SIKAWest had a generally effective capacity building program early on, but improved considerably in its final year, taking into account many of the MISTI mid-term performance evaluation recommendations.” In addition, the report noted that “SIKAWest had impactful project management, conflict resolution, leadership management, and communications trainings.” MISTI further claimed that conflict resolution training in particular achieved tangible results in Herat, Badghis, and Farah provinces.

On the negative side, in the SIKAWest Mid-Term Evaluation, MISTI reported that vetting and approval delays – some as much as eight months at the start of the program – “led to community disillusionment” with the program.²⁰ MISTI’s Final Performance Evaluation noted that “SIKAWest was least successful in good governance and concept note development trainings”²¹ and that “SIKAWest was troubled early on with significant staff turnover which affected morale...” New leadership in the second year “refocused activities on governance, in line with USAID’s reprioritization.” In addition, “SIKAWest programmed considerably against the unemployment [source of instability], but failed to demonstrate how any of its vocational trainings and infrastructure work reduced unemployment or increased access to markets.”

MISTI noted in its mid-term evaluation that, in order to address the major source of instability of unemployment, “...future programming would have greater stabilizing and sustainable effects if it focused more on outcomes rather than processes.”

Figure 3 - Total Completed Projects by Province in SIKAWest



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID’s SIKAWest data.


“The program did a good job empowering women and including them in activities, but was not as successful at ensuring they were active in decision making.”

¹⁹ Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Project, Stability In Key Areas (SIKAWest) Program: Final Performance Evaluation, September 2015.

²⁰ Management Systems International Initiatives (MISTI) Project, Stability In Key Areas: Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, March 26, 2014, 20.

²¹ These trainings taught Afghans how to develop concept notes for projects, which are project proposals that district entities submit to USAID for concurrence prior to developing a full grant application for the project. The concept notes include basic information such as the sources of instability the project addresses, location, and estimated activity budget.

Figure 4 - Location of SIKA-West Program Operations



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID's SIKA data.


SIKA-West Projects by Category

We grouped individual SIKA-West soft projects into 11 project subcategories, which include: agriculture, capacity building, conflict resolution, education and youth, election-related, gender and human rights, general public engagement, governance and anti-corruption, sports promotion and development, project planning and support, and other soft efforts. We categorized hard projects in the infrastructure category into seven subcategories. These include: walls, roads, culverts, bridges, irrigation structures, mixed projects (which consist of more than one infrastructure project) and other. We assigned each individual SIKA project to one category. See Appendix I for examples of the types of projects that were placed into each category.

SIKA-West Projects in Badghis

Of the 452 SIKA projects completed in Badghis, approximately 69 percent (313 projects) were soft projects, and 31 percent (139 projects) were hard projects. The majority of soft projects (148) completed in Badghis were general public engagement and government capacity building efforts. The majority of hard projects (122) in Badghis consisted of constructing irrigation structures, walls, and roads. See figure 5 for the types of projects completed in Badghis.

Figure 5 - Types of SIKA Projects in Badghis



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID’s SIKA data.


Note: The ‘other’ category for Soft Projects includes the following categories: election-related, conflict resolution, education and youth, governance and anticorruption, and other projects that could not be identified.

Note: The ‘irrigation structures’ category for Hard Projects includes a variety of infrastructure projects, such as constructing canals, culverts, and general irrigation projects.

SIKA-West Projects in Farah

Of the 427 projects completed in Farah, 74 percent (318 projects) were soft projects, and 26 percent (109 projects), were hard projects. The majority of soft projects (170) completed in Farah were designed to build local government capacity and general public engagement. Hard projects in Farah included building or repairing irrigation structures (29), roads (17), walls (16), water dividers (32), and the rehabilitation of 12 schools. Figure 6 shows the different types of projects completed in Farah.

Figure 6 - Types of SIKA Projects in Farah



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID’s SIKA data.

Note: The ‘other’ category for Soft Projects includes the following categories: agriculture, conflict resolution, counter-narcotics, governance and anticorruption, and other projects that could not be identified.


Note: The "irrigations structures" category for Hard Projects includes canals, culverts, gutters, water gates, and water reservoir construction.

Note: The 'walls' category for Hard Projects includes flood protection walls.

SIKA-West Projects in Ghor

Of the 239 projects completed in Ghor, 83 percent (199 projects) were soft projects, and 17 percent (40 projects), were hard projects. While about 66 percent of the soft projects (131) completed in Ghor were designed to support capacity building efforts, governance and anti-corruption, and general public engagement, 23 projects were designed for conflict resolution. According to MISTI's final performance evaluation, SIKA-West "...focused efforts on resolving local conflicts through the District Stability Committees. This saw particular success in Ghor and parts of Herat." More than half of all hard projects (30) completed in Ghor were for the construction of culverts and roads. Figure 7 shows the different types of projects completed in Ghor.

Figure 7 - Types of SIKA Projects in Ghor



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID's SIKA data.

Note: The 'other' category for Soft Projects includes the following categories: election-related, gender and human rights, sports development and promotion, and other projects that could not be identified.

Note: The 'irrigation structures' category for Hard Projects includes water reservoir and stream construction.


Note: The 'furniture provision' category includes providing furniture to schools.

SIKA-West Projects in Herat

Of the 542 projects completed in Herat, approximately 72 percent (389 projects) were soft projects and 28 percent (153 projects), were hard projects. As in the other provinces, the majority of soft projects focused on capacity building (133) and general public engagement (91). Capacity building projects were designed to train local government leaders on basic governance skills, including administration and project management, fundraising, stability analysis, advocacy and lobbying, among others.²² Building flood protection and other walls (70) was by far the largest hard project type, followed by roads (18) and culverts (10). Figure 8 shows the different types of projects completed in Herat.

²² According to the MISTI Final Performance Evaluation, SIKA West had impactful project management, conflict resolution, leadership management, and communications trainings. Project management trainings assisted CDCs and district governments to better plan, design, implement, and monitor development projects – a skillset many did not have prior to SIKA West involvement in the districts.

Figure 8 - Types of SIKA Projects in Herat



Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID’s SIKA data.

Note: The ‘other’ category for Soft Projects includes the following categories: election-related, , governance and anticorruption, and other projects that could not be identified.

Note: The ‘facilities’ category includes rehabilitation of schools, providing educational facilities, and building rehabilitation.

Note: The ‘irrigation structures’ category for Hard Projects includes a variety of irrigation projects including the construction of canals, culverts, and intake gates.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this fact sheet to USAID on December 20, 2018. We received comments on January 13, 2019. In its comments, USAID reported that beginning in 2006 it worked in coordination with the Department of Defense and the Afghan Government to create stabilization programs to establish basic linkages between provincial government institutions and local communities. USAID reported that it has gradually shifted towards long-term capacity building to provide the technical guidance needed to help the Afghan Government deliver essential services to the people of Afghanistan. USAID’s written comments are reproduced in appendix II. We also received technical comments from USAID, which we incorporated as appropriate.

APPENDIX I – PROJECT CATEGORIES AND PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS

We used professional judgment to assess SIKA project descriptions, and place each into designated project subcategories. We assigned each individual SIKA project to one subcategory. The categories are listed below, and contain examples of the different types of projects we placed into each category.²³

Table 1 - Examples of Project Descriptions Assessed and Placed into Each of the SIKA Project Categories

SubCategory	Sample Project Descriptions	
Agriculture	Irrigation Agriculture outreach Fruit and vegetable processing Water dividers Canals Dams	Water reservoir construction Water gates Tractor repair training Crop-specific Training Plant, Pest, and Disease Training
Capacity Building	Training, such as <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inventory asset management • Management and leadership • Financial management • Procurement • Fundraising 	District Social Workers (DSW) Program SIKA local program oversight meetings Advocacy and lobby SIKA board member training Monitoring of projects Stability Working Group District Kickoff Meeting Publicize Capacity Building Training** Stability Analysis Stability Technical Assistant Program Stability and Security Meeting
Conflict Resolution	Conflict resolution training Conflict Resolution Committee Peace journalism training Negotiation strategy training	Installation of community complaint boxes Peace meeting Tribal Conflict Resolution Committee Resolve tribal conflict Unity Building Coalition Building
Counter-Narcotics	Anti-poppy Cultivation	Provincial Counter-Narcotics Directorate (CND)

²³ We added additional project descriptions into the 11 project subcategories since we completed our review of SIKA-North (SIGAR-18-23-SP). We did not alter the number of project subcategories, rather included the projects descriptions to illustrate the varying types of projects completed in this region.

<p>Education and Youth</p>	<p>All school-related activities, including construction of schools and playgrounds</p> <p>Teacher training</p> <p>Playground construction</p> <p>University exam prep</p> <p>Public awareness for education</p>	<p>Provide school equipment</p> <p>Youth English courses</p> <p>Community, teachers, and education dialogue</p> <p>Pashto literacy courses</p> <p>Celebration of teacher day</p> <p>PLAY (Physical Education, Leadership, and Youth Development)</p> <p>Provide Heating for School</p> <p>Youth Council</p> <p>Education Promotion</p> <p>Rehabilitation of Schools</p> <p>Provision of Furniture to Schools</p> <p>Provision of Educational Material</p> <p>Provision of Basic Educational Supplies</p> <p>Provide Educational Facilities</p>
<p>Election-Related</p>	<p>Raise awareness of elections</p> <p>Civic outreach voting for gender</p>	<p>Civic education for elections</p> <p>Election logistics and support</p>
<p>Gender and Human Rights</p>	<p>Gender and Human Rights training</p> <p>Human rights</p> <p>Women’s rights</p> <p>Gender mainstreaming</p> <p>Gender Topics Public Outreach</p>	<p>Vocational training for women</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in handicraft • bead weaving • tailoring (sewing) • embroidery • public speaking
<p>General Public Engagement</p>	<p>Communications and outreach</p> <p>Project promotion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio broadcasts • mobile theater • Posters • Photographs 	<p>Public relations</p> <p>Signboard</p> <p>Media affairs</p> <p>Reporting on trends in SIKA projects</p> <p>Hashar (Volunteer coordination)</p> <p>Public Awareness</p> <p>Poetry Reading</p> <p>Poetry Contest</p> <p>Community Trust</p> <p>Notice Board</p> <p>District Information Center</p>

		<p>Direct Stabilization Committee (DSC) meetings</p> <p>Assess Program Needs</p> <p>Theatre</p> <p>Communication Training</p>
Governance and Anti-Corruption	<p>Anticorruption training</p> <p>Linking citizens to leaders</p> <p>HR and civil service law</p> <p>Governance and Development Coordinators</p>	<p>Access to GfRoA services</p> <p>Community Based Disaster Risk</p> <p>Disaster and environmental management Strategy and Planning</p>
Non-agricultural or Gender Specific Vocational Training	<p>Vehicle (automobile) Repair</p> <p>Generator Repair</p> <p>Motorcycle Repair</p> <p>Refrigerator Repair</p> <p>Electrical Solar Training</p> <p>Carpentry Training</p> <p>Computer Training</p> <p>Photojournalism Training</p> <p>Video Editing Training</p>	<p>Provide Toolkits for Students to Start Business in Tailoring</p> <p>Technical Training for Projects</p> <p>Sewing Training</p> <p>Electrical Wire Training</p> <p>Handicraft Training</p> <p>Plumbing Training</p> <p>Unspecified Vocational Training</p>
Infrastructure	<p>Walls (retaining wall, protection wall)</p> <p>Culverts (box culverts, slab culverts)</p> <p>Roads</p> <p>Siphons</p> <p>Wells</p> <p>Building rehabilitation</p> <p>Testing of construction materials</p> <p>Provision of water storage containers</p> <p>Project Planning</p>	<p>Stream construction</p> <p>Gutters</p> <p>Intake gates</p> <p>Supplying electricity</p> <p>Mixed Projects (two or more infrastructure projects funded under one project)</p> <p>Provision of furniture or equipment to schools</p> <p>Infrastructure Project Implementation</p> <p>Providing Infrastructure (except to schools)</p> <p>Solar Panels/Electricity</p> <p>Spillway</p> <p>Sanitization Fittings</p> <p>Flood Protection Walls</p> <p>Hand Pump</p>

		RCC Slabs Bridges
Project Planning and Support	This category primarily consists of efforts to train local district entities in understanding the different components of infrastructure projects and in infrastructure project planning and budgeting.	Develop checklists for infrastructure project completion Train in project planning and budgeting Discuss project feasibility and complexity
Sports Promotion and Development	Cricket field construction Football field construction Sports Program publicity	Volleyball playground construction Sports Program Development Sports Teams Multi-Sport Field
Other	Not Identifiable/Unable to Determine Service Provider's Catalogue	Provide Office Equipment Provision of Furniture

APPENDIX II – AGENCY COMMENTS



USAID | AFGHANISTAN

MEMORANDUM

January 13, 2019

TO: John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

FROM: Peter Natiello, Mission Director

SUBJECT: Mission Response to SIGAR Fact Sheet Titled:
“Information on USAID’S Stability in Key Areas Program
– Western Region, Afghanistan” (SIGAR SP-186/SIGAR-
19-XX-SP)

REF: SIGAR Transmittal email dated December 20, 2018

USAID thanks SIGAR for the opportunity to comment on this draft fact sheet.

Beginning in 2006, and in coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Afghan Government, USAID initiated stabilization programs to establish basic linkages between provincial government institutions and local communities. USAID worked directly with communities to identify and respond to local populations’ needs and concerns. USAID’s efforts included training local government officials in how to manage local projects, producing educational materials that informed the public about how to tap into government services, and providing support for small-scale public works projects. Over the years, USAID gradually shifted towards long-term capacity building, providing the technical guidance needed to help the Afghan Government deliver essential services to the people of Afghanistan. USAID’s last stabilization program concluded in 2015.

During implementation, USAID monitored its stabilization programs regularly and conducted evaluations that led to programming changes and improved impact. As part of these efforts, USAID implemented the Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project, which was the Agency’s largest and most comprehensive trends analysis and independent impact evaluation of stabilization interventions. Thanks to MISTI, USAID was able to adapt its projects as they were being implemented to make them more effective.

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Attachments: Appendix A – Technical Comments

cc: Elizabeth A. Chambers, Controller, USAID/Afghanistan
Kristian Moore, U.S. Embassy/Kabul
OAPA Audit

This project was conducted
under project code SP-186.

SIGAR's Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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