May 10, 2018

USAID’s Results Tracking Phase II (SUPPORT II) Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by Checchi and Company Consulting Inc.

SIGAR 17-38-FA —

April 30, 2018

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: DOD Has Not Determined the Full Extent to Which Its Program and Projects, Totaling $1.5 Billion in Obligations, Achieved Their Objectives and Goals in Afghanistan from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013

SIGAR 18-45-AR —

April 23, 2018

Department of the Army’s Afghan National Army Communications Equipment Training and Sustainment Projects: Audit of Costs Incurred by DRS Global Enterprises Solutions

SIGAR 18-44-FA —

April 19, 2018

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: The World Bank Needs to Improve How it Monitors Implementation, Shares Information, and Determines the Impact of Donor Contributions

SIGAR 18-42-AR —

April 19, 2018

Department of Defense Task Force for Business and Stability Operations’ Support for the Kabul Business Incubator: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Friends of the American University of Afghanistan

SIGAR 18-43-FA —

April 10, 2018

Management and Oversight of Fuel in Afghanistan: DOD Is Taking Steps to Improve Accountability, but Additional Actions Are Needed

SIGAR 18-41-IP —

March 30, 2018

Afghanistan’s North East Power System Phase III: USACE’s Mismanagement Resulted in a System that Is Not Permanently Connected to a Power Source, Has Not Been Fully Tested, and May Not Be Safe to Operate

SIGAR 18-37-IP —

March 23, 2018

Afghan Ministry of Interior Headquarters Project: Phases 1 and 3 Experienced Construction Deficiencies, Poor Oversight, and Increased Costs

SIGAR 18-35-IP —

Feb. 1, 2018

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: DOD Cannot Fully Account for U.S.-funded Infrastructure Transferred to the Afghan Government

SIGAR 18-29-AR —

Jan. 26, 2018

Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV: Construction Met Contract Requirements and Most Facilities are Being Used, but Are Not Well Maintained

SIGAR 18-28-IP —