June 29, 2012

Increases in Security Costs Are Likely under the Afghan Public Protection Force; USAID Needs to Monitor Costs and Ensure Unlicensed Security Providers Are Not Used

SIGAR Audit 12-10 —

June 29, 2012

Progress Made Toward Increased Stability under USAID’s Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East Program but Transition to Long Term Development Efforts Not Yet Achieved

SIGAR Audit 12-11 —

April 25, 2012

USAID Spent Almost $400 Million on an Afghan Stabilization Project despite Uncertain Results, but Has Taken Steps to Better Assess Similar Efforts

SIGAR Audit 12-08 —

April 25, 2012

USAID Has Disbursed $9.5 Billion for Reconstruction and Funded Some Financial Audits as Required, But Many Audits Face Significant Delays, Accountability Limitations, and Lack of Resources (Reissued on May 2, 2012)

SIGAR Audit 12-09 —

April 20, 2012

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy of Its Contract Data, but It Should Assess the Feasibility of Correcting Data for Fiscal Year 2009 and Earlier

SIGAR Audit 12-07 —

March 15, 2012

Alert Letter on Transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force

SIGAR Alert-12-1 —

Jan. 31, 2012

Afghan First Initiative Has Placed Work with Afghan Companies, but Is Affected by Inconsistent Contract Solicitation and Vetting, and Employment Data Is Limited

SIGAR Audit 12-06 —

Jan. 12, 2012

DOD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings

SIGAR Audit 12-04 —

Oct. 26, 2011

Afghan National Security University Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract Administration Needs Improvement

SIGAR Audit 12-03 —

Oct. 26, 2011

Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center

SIGAR Audit 12-02 —